A SURVEY OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1945-1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300270002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: STUDY

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SOVIET STAFF STUDY
This study is a working paper prepared by the Soviet Staff,
OCI9 FOR INTERNAL DISSEMINATION ONLY. It represents an effort
to identify and assess the character of major trends in Sino-
Soviet relations since the'end of World War II. It is designed
solely to assist Soviet Staff analysts in developing a common
ent
appreciation
in thisbvitalorelationship between thewUSSRrand
developments
China.
State Dept. review
completed
Army Review
Completed
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w NEW
A SURVEY OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1945-1955
Table of Contents
Introduction .....................e....
Policy Toward Yenan--1945-1948...,,.,.
The Kremlin Faces a Triumphant Chinese
Communist Regime--1949-1950
The Korean War ...............
The Problem of Peiping's Industrialization...........
The Malenkov Regime ...............OOe....00000 pe.oe.
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 LI\VVVVVVL/ VVVL-~J
During the past two years, Moscow and Peiping appear to
have arrived at a working relationship which has been evolving
since the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949.
This relationship has been characterized by Soviet grants to
Peiping of economic assistance on a modest level, but including
high priority items, general Soviet avoidance of direct involve-
ment in potentially explosive situations in the Far East, and a
willingness on the part of the Soviet leaders to champion China's
claim to great power status in international affairs.
This relationship reflects the practical interests presently
shared by the USSR and China--i.e., Peiping is dependent on the
Soviet Union for the essentials of economic and military assist-
ance necessary to build up its position as an Asian great power,
while Moscow relies on China as the center of Communist power in
the Far East serving to counter Western-oriented power and to
provide uncommitted. Asians ,with an. impressive. example, of Com-
munist economic..an.d . military;.achievement 0
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I. POLICY TOWARD YENAN?-1945-1948
With the defeat of Japan and the immediate resumption of
hostilities between the Fuomintang and the Chinese Communists,
Moscow was confronted with the necessity of working out a stand
on the status of Mao and his party. The Chinese Communists were
attacking the USSR's treaty partner which Stalin had pledged at
Yalta to recognize and aids
The timing of the Yenan group's successes could hardly have
been apparent in 1945, and Stalin and Molotov were content to
follow a wait-and-see policy and pay lip service to Yalta pledges
of support for Chiang and a "unified democratic" China.
Dismantling in Manchuria:
i r
One of the earliest examples of Moscow's postwar errors in
its policy toward Yenan was the wholesale Soviet looting of Man-
churian industry. This enormous grab was evidently due to either
a callous disregard of the potential value which an undisturbed
industrial base in Manchuria would have for the Chinese Communists
or on a pessimistic calculation of Yenan's chances of controlling
that area for some: 'time '.t.o,come , This looting of Manchuria
has.,beenideScribed.?by many cOmpe.tent,:W.estern.lobservers as a big
mistake. The machinery reportedly was not'adaptable for use in
the USSR. In 1948 large quantities of it were observed rusting
on station platforms at major towns along the Transsiberiaz
railroad, and probably very little of it could have been econom--
ically returned for reinstallation in its original plant. A few
years later, though, a few small pieces of this machinery were
reportedly returned, in their original packing cases, as part of
the Soviet "aid" to the new Chinese People's Republic
Moscow's Neutrality in The Chinese Civil War:
In 1947, the strategic initiative in the Chinese military
conflict passed from the Nationalists to the Communists. By
the end of that year, Communist units were deployed in strength
along the railroads from North China to Manchuria. A Communist
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offensive mounted in late December succeeded in cutting all rail
connections. into Mukden and isolating all the major Nationalist
garrisons in Manchuria,
Meanwhile Moscow remained neutral, dropping occasional hints
that it would be willing to replace the US as mediator between
Chiang and the Communists. The Soviet officials punctiliously
followed Chiang on his various retreats, closing consulates as
the territories in which they were located fell under Communist
control, and, in the end, the USSR was the only major government
to move with the Kuomintang to Canton.
II. THE KREMLIN FACES A TRIUMPHANT
CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME--1949-1950
By late 1948, the Chinese Communists had completed the occupa-
tion of Manchuria. Tientsin fell on 15 January 1949, and by the
end of the month Peiping surrendered without a battle. From mid-
September 1948 to 31 January 1949 the Nationalists were estimated
to have lost 45 percent of their total troop strength.
By February 1949 the Intelligence Division of the Department
of the Army reported that events had so enhanced the position and
capabilities of the Communists that they were then capable of
achieving a complete military victory over the Nationalist forces.
Western observers. in Moscow believed that the rapid sweep
of events in China outpaced Soviet policy. During 1948 Moscow
several times intimated its readiness to mediate a political
settlement between Chiang and the Chinese Communists. Many
diplomatic observers felt that while these conciliatory gestures
might have been a pure smoke screen, it was more probable that
the Kremlin had underestimated both.Yenan?s military capacities
and Kuomintang weaknesses and thus believed that a political
settlement in. China would be advantageous at this time.: The
capture of Manchuria coupled with Mao's publicly stated intran-
sigence toward the Kuomintang probably forced the Kremlin to a
new appraisal of the China situation.
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On 8 January 1949, Chiang asked the Big Four to mediate in
the Chinese civil war. Ten days later the Kremlin handed its
refusal to the Chinese ambassador. There is tentative evidence
indicating that this interval was utilized for a meeting between
Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders to determine and coordi-
nate policies. This meeting might have come about on the initia-
tive of the Moscow leaders, who found it necessary to make a deci-
sion on the expected mediation request, or on the initiative of
Mao who feared the USSR might favorably consider such a proposal.
As the victorious Communist armies advanced toward the Yangtze,
editorial comment on the China situation in the Soviet press dried
up. To many Western obsevers in Moscow, this indicated that the
Chinese question had become too hot for any but the highest levels
to handle.
In September 1949, the Chinese Communist press defended
Stalin's partnership with Chiang in the Chinese Eastern Railway
and Soviet joint rights in Dairen under the 1945 Stalin-Chiang
Treaty on the grounds that they were necessary to prevent Chiang
from giving Manchuria to the US. According to this line the USSR
had taken the Manchurian machinery, first because it was entitled
to war booty, and secondly to keep the equipment out of Kuomintang
hands. The people of "new China" were called upon not to let
"national emotion" cause them to be victimized by anti-Soviet
propaganda.
Soviet sensitivity to the China problem in that period is
suggested by the arrest and expulsion from the USSR of Anna Louise
Strong, one of the Chinese Communists' most ardent champions and
a leading proponent of the "Yenan way" as a new guide for Asian
Communism'
. On 20 April 1949 the Chinese Communist forces crossed the
Yangtze without effective opposition and Shanghai fell on 25 May.
On 2 October 1949, shortly before the fall of Canton, the
USSR broke off diplomatic relations with the Nationalist govern-
ment and recognized the Central People's Government of the Chinese
People's Republic. N. V. Roshchin, first Soviet ambassador to
the Chinese People's Republic, presented his credentials to Mao
Tse-tung on 16 October.
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The Victors Come to Moscow:
Two weeks later, Wang Chia-hsiang, first Chinese Communist
ambassador to the Soviet Union, arrived in Moscow and Deputy
Foreign Minister Gromyko led a"group of protocdl officers
to meet him at the train. Wang was one of the "'returned student"
clique trained in Moscow and sent back to China by Stalin in the
early 1930's to run the Chinese Communist Party. His appointment
mong other things was, perhaps intended as a gracious gesture to
Stalin as was that of his successor, Chang Wen-tien, also a "re-
turned student."
On 6 November Malenkov delivered the important Revolution
Anniversary address in which he optimistically appraised Soviet
prospects for world revolution as a sequel to World War II.
Malenkov's sanguine ,.outl.ook ,has been attributed to the,
special importance attached by the Kremlin to the China victory.
At the UN later that month, Vyshinsky.;. declared that his govern-
ment no longer recognized the Nationalist delegation and walked
out of the debate on China.
In mid-December Mao Tse-tung arrived in Moscow, and Molotov,
Bulganin, and Gromyko met his train. The same day he was received
at the Kremlin by Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, and
Vyshinsky.
On 20 January 1950, Chou En-lai joined Mao in Moscow. The
selection of Foreign Trade Minister Mikoyan as the ranking
official to greet him and his subsequent entertainment by econom-
ic officials would suggest that the Chinese premier's mission at
that time at least in part was connected with the $300,000,000 loan
included ii the subsequent treaty. This loan has been used pri-
marily to restore looted Manchurian industries.
. Mao and Chou left Moscow on 17 February 1950, seemingly
satisfied with the results of their visit. Communist China had
a new treaty committing the USSR to a mutual defense arrangement,
a Soviet promise to withdraw from Port Arthur and to return the
Chinese Eastern Railroad, and a long-term credit which, though
not lavish, would at least permit the Chinese to undertake rapid
reconstruction of key industries. However, there were reports
at this time of some disquietude in Chinese Communist circles
at rumors from Moscow that the negotiations were not proceeding
favorably, and it is perhaps significant that the treaty re-
quired two months of negotiations.
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The New Regime Prepares for Peace:
By spring of 195Q9progress toward economic stability and
the final battle with the Nationalists--the "liberation" of
Formosa--seemed good. So far the Sino-Soviet alliance had pro-
duced an agreement to send Soviet experts to China, the forma-
tion of three Sino-Soviet joint stock campanies and a joint
Board of Management for the Changchun Railroad, the ratification
of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid, the signing
and ratification of a Sino-Soviet trade agreement for 1950, and,
on the military side, a discernible build-up of forces on the
mainland opposite Formosa.
On 23 June Mao Tse-tung discussed China's progress in a
closing speech at the second session of, the National Committee
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. He
stressed the importance of unity with the USSR. Presumably he
was aware of the imminence of the Korean adventure in the Far
East although certainly not of the speed with which he would be-
come involved.
The Western reaction to the invasion of South Korea on 25
June 1950 and the subsequent route of the North Korean army
raised a new problem area for Sino-Soviet relations.
Stalin was forced to put.real
pressure on Mao to bring the Chinese into the Korean war. The
Chinese leader reportedly extracted __promises of greatly increased
Soviet economic and military aid.
However, Peiping must have estimated that it was important
to keep North Korea from becoming a US-controlled base, border-
ing as it would the strategic area of Manchuria. Any display
of reluctance by Mao to intervene in Korea might therefore have
been mainly calculated to extract the most favorable terms from
the Soviet Union.
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1%W Nwole
A redeployment of Chinese armies toward Manchuria had begun
at least as early as After the UN
counter-attack and offensive toward the Parallel, the pace
of the Chinese preparations was accelerated. That autumn,
Peiping used Indian and Burmese diplomatic channels to inform
the United States that crossing the 38th Parallel by "American"
forces would necessitate Chinese intervention. .
By late September, some Chinese units were already present
in Korea. Large-scale intervention did not occur, however, until
the last week in November, when US forces reached the Yalu and
were overrun by a major Chinese offensive.
By the end of 1950, the Communists had recaptured North
Korea and by 4 January 1951 had taken Seoul.
Peiping saved the day for Moscow, but the outcome of Stalin?s
Korean gamble introduced serious new complications into the Sino-
Soviet,relationship.
Moscow Gives Back the Loot:
Early in 1951, Moscow made much of the fact that it had re-
turned to the Chinese all of the former Japanese property it had
held in Manchuria. These gifts had been promised a year earlier
under the treaty Mao had negotiated in Moscow. Peiping graciously
acknowledged that the installations had been enlarged while under
the direction of the USSR, whose administrators and trained tech-
nicians had made it possible for the plants to be delivered in
smooth running order. It was subsequently disclosed, however,
that one of the largest installations;,..allegedly returned--the
Dairen Shipyard--had actually been formed into a joint stock
company,
Suggestions of Strain:
By the first anniversary of the treaty on 14 February, there
were signs of strain in the Peiping-Moscow axis.
Any strain may well have resu a rom w a oscow c nsi. er
excessive demands by Peiping as the price for crossing the Yalu.
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It is possible that Mao was annoyed because the USSR was stalling
on the aid it had promised when the Chinese entered the Korean
war.
On 18 February the military situation began to change. The
Chinese Communist drive was halted on the central front, and two
days later UN forces launched a general counteroffensive. On
13 March the Communists broke off contact along the entire front,
and the Allies reoccupied Seoul on the following day.
The Communists launched two unsuccessful offensives, and by
the end, of May they had been driven back across the 38th Parallel
along most of the front. On 21 June they lost their last strong-
hold in South Korea.
Soviet Cease-fire Proposal,.
On 24 June 1951, Soviet UN delegate Malik made his proposal
for a Korean cease-fire based on a mutual withdrawal of forces
from the 38th Parallel. Next day the Peiping People's Daily
published the text of the Malik broadcast and declared that the
Chinese people supported the suggestion. On 10 July cease-fire
talks began at Kaesong.
A Quiet Period:
Generally 1952 seemed a relatively uneventful year in Sino-
Soviet relations. On 11 February 1952 the Peiping People's
Daily ran an article on the importance of the Sino- ovie alli-
ance, stressing that as long as China. stood with her "great
ally," she would be able to smash "the imperialist plot of aggres-
sion..!' China's task, therefore, was to strengthen and consoli-
date the "invincible. force" of the alliance.
On'14 February, the second anniversary of the treaty, Bul-
ganin, Molotov, and Miko an attended the Chinese embassy recep-
tion in Moscow. the Soviet guests were 25X1
amicable and stayed at the party for a proper number of hours.
In Peiping, Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai attended a special cele-
bration of'the event at the Soviet embassy.
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On 12 April 1952 the annual Sino-Soviet trade protocol was
signed in Moscow, providing for a "considerable expansion in the
exchange of goods in the current year as against the 1951 level."
Another protocol was signed "by which the Soviet Union is to.
deliver to the People's Republic of China equipment and materials
during 1952 on account of the credit granted under the agreement
of February 14, 19500"
Stalemate in Korea,.
Meanwhile, the Korean negotiations, which had broken down
at Kaesong and been resumed at Panmunjom in late October 1951,
were stalemated. Stalin hoped for 25X1
a Chinese break-through and hence was stalling.
By June 1952, however, UN forces were on the move, and the
Communists suffered heavy losses. On 23 June UN planes hit the
Yalu hydroelectric plants for the first time and by September
North Korean targets were being hit by aircraft operating from
carriers in the Northern waters. At Panmunjom the UN negotiators
broke off discussions on 8 October because of deadlock on the POW
exchange, and there was some evidence that this occasioned sur-
prise and concern in the Communist camp.
The Chinese leaders might have been satisfied with the prac-
tical benefits derived so far from the Korean war. They had
acquired the necessary Soviet assistance to build a first-class
land army and a formidable air force, although at the cost of
retarding their plans for industrial development and postponing
the invasion of Formosa. Moscow, on the other hand, had not
only been forced to buy its way out of a threatening military
disaster, but had increased the alarm and unity of the West.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF PEIPING's INDUSTRIALIZATION
When Chou En-lai appeared in August 1952 in Moscow with a
number of top-ranking Chinese economic officials, it appeared
that Peiping was anxious. to get. back to its industrial develop-
ment.
;Chou left Moscow in September 1952 after the announcement
of rather unexciting Soviet concessions to Peiping In accordance
with the 1950 Sino-Soviet agreement,'a commission was to be. set up to
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`~- complete the transfer of the Chinese Changchun Railway to Peiping
dot later than. 3L Decembef?,:1952.. It was also agreed that, ".at: the
request of the Chinese government," the time limit stipulated in
the 1950 agreement for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the
Soviet naval, base at Port Arthur should be extended until the
conclusion of peace treaties between Japan and the USSR and China.
In early October, China's number-two man, Liu Shao-chi,
publicly visited Moscow for the first time since he was there as
a student at the Far Eastern University in 1918. He went osten-
sibly to represent Peiping at the 19th Party Congress, but no
explanation was ever given as to why he stayed for some three
months after the meeting.
From late autumn 1952 until after Stalin's death, there were
an unusually large number of ranking Chinese officials in Moscow.
The top-level Chinese economic official who had come with Chou
in August 1952 stayed on through the next summer. The Chinese
minister of trade, Yeh Chi-chuang, arrived in November 1952 to
negotiate the annual trade agreement. Curiously, the Chinese
ambassador to Moscow was in Peiping during most of 1952 and 1953.
The prolonged stays of these officials and reports of Soviet
coolness and snubs to the Chinese in Moscow suggested that this
was a period of possible strain in the Sino-Soviet relationship.
Western journalists reported that the visiting Chinese officials
were shabbily treated at Soviet parties in Moscow, being rele-
gated to outer rooms. In February 1953, only Bulganin among the
Soviet leaders went to the Chinese embassy to celebrate the
anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty. It is possible that the
Chinese were making further demands on the Soviet economy for
the.long-sought domestic priorities at a time when Stalin was
annoyed with Peiping's inability to break the military stale-
mate in Korea. However, the Soviet leaders were going through
a period of internal tension they may well have considered more
urgent than the problems of their Chinese allies.-
Peiping may still have been optimistic about further Soviet
aid during late 1952. Although the heavy emphasis in propaganda
on the less material aspect of their relationship seemed 'to
Indicate that the optimism was tempered with caution. In Novem-
ber, the Chinese announced a Sino-Soviet Friendship Month, key-
noted by such slogans as "study advanced Soviet technique'' and
"learn from the experience of the Soviet Union."
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The other major Sino-Soviet problem, the Korean war, seemed
to produce some moves which were badly co-ordinated between
Moscow and Peiping. In November 1952, Vyshinsky vehemently
denounced the Indian resolution on a Korean armistice. Indian
diplomats expressed some surprise over this seemingly needless
Soviet attack, as they had been in constant contact with the
Chinese and had designed their proposal to meet what they felt
were Chinese desires.
On 10 March Pravda published a doctored photo of the 1950
signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. In this version, Malenkov
had moved next to Mao, and Molotov, Mikoyan, and Bulganin had
been erased, like Beria, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Roshchin and
Voroshilov. Only Stalin, Mao and Malenkov were left.
The implication must have been that there was a new man to
be dealt with-and that his presence at a Sino-Soviet event had
been chosen to illustrate his position as Stalin's heir. Peiping
and Soviet-bloc governments, however, treated the situation with
cared Malenkov was not singled out for praise, and his status
was carefully described by the phrase the Soviet government
headed by G. M. Malenkov."
On 25 March Moscow announced the signing of the annual
protocol on trade between the USSR and China, a protocol to the
agreement on credit to the Chinese People's Republic of 14 Feb-
ruary 1950, and an agreement concerning Soviet aid to China in
expanding and constructing power Stations. The agreements, as
usual, envisaged expanded mutual trade and specified that the
USSR would supply China with heavy industrial and agricultural
equipment in return for Chinese raw materials and foodstuffs.
Appointment of Kuznetsova
Chou, accompanied by the Chinese ambassador, returned to
Peiping on 24 March 1953, again leaving behind in Moscow the
economic and military aides who had gone there with him the pre-
vious August. Molotov, Malik, and the newly appointed,.ambassador
to China, V. V. Kuznetsov, saw the Chinese premier to his plane,
and Kuznetsov followed two days later.
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va.e'
Peiping is certainly Moscow's most sensitive diplomatic post
in the Orbit. The Kremlin changed ambassadors there within a
atter of hours after Stalin's death, replacing A. S. Panyushkin,
who had arrived at this post only four months earlier. In line
with their cautious policy on happenings in the Soviet Union at
that time, the Chinese gave no sign of their feelings about Mos-
cow's new emissary. In fact, the Chinese did not even announce
the appointment until Kuznetsov departed for the Chinese capital
on 25 March.
Kuzaetsov's trade union background and experience in Soviet
industry led to speciii1tiou that he was selected to aid the
Chinese with labor problems, during they `initial stages of their
first five-year piano. ,His activitie i,n China, however, received
little public notice and consequently provided no clue as ,to why
he was selected
Ending of Korean Stalemates
The. major problem settled by Stal,in,'s successors. with Chou
was Korea. Two days after Chou's arrival in Peiping, Peng Te4huai
accepted General Clark's month-:old offer'for the exchange of sick
and wounded and suggested resumption of the stalemated Panmunjom
talks.
These indications that a Korean truce was the first order
of business are further strengthened by Soviet diplomatic leaks.
A Soviet official in London hinted that the USSR wanted peace
because the Korean war had proved too bevy a drain on China And
the USSR, Despite Rhee's mass release - o_f prisoners in June, an
armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom on 29 July.
That summer, Moescow made- a big play to Chinese prestige.
Soviet-commentators became far more generous in their appraisal
of Mao's contribution to Marxist doctrine. In August Malenkov
and the whole party presidium attended a rather ordinary Chinese
farm show, and Mikoyan gave a "grand reception" to mark its
successful conclusion.
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rap, W
`%' Peiping Undertakes its Transition to Socialism:
There were no such celebrations to mark the conclusion of
the economic,-negotiations which Peiping's emissaries had been
carrying on in Moscow for almost a year. Chou's chief aide,
Li Fu?chun, evidently returned to Peiping during the summer of
1953. The results of his mission were not announced until Sep-
tember, however, when Li reported to the Central People's Govern-
ment Council that the USSR had "agreed to satisfy the demands" of
the Chinese government and would provide aid for the construction
of 141 basic industries in China in the course of an aid program
to run through 1959. There was no mention then of any formal
agreement, which Li Fumchun has subsequently said was concluded
in May.
It would seem that the Chinese were not unduly jubilant over
the agreement they had reached with Stalin's successors. While
Peiping was receiving industrial goods which were in short supply
throughout the Soviet bloc, it had received no large additional
credits to the $300,000,000 granted in 1950 for five years.
Throughout 1953, it is possible that Peiping was going through
a period of indecision on domestic policy. The outcome of the
Moscow negotiations undoubtedly played a great role in the diffi-
*rr culty of deciding what China's general line for the transition to
Socialism was to be. While Chinese industrialization has not
apparently been limited by the quantity or type of industrial
equipment the Soviet leaders were willing to provide, China's
limited export capability and the need to spend nearly half
its trade earnings from the USSR on military, imports, have been
governing factors.
Li Fu-shun, the man who had been most involved in these
negotiations, wrote an article upon his return from Moscow for
the China edition of the Cominform journal in which he criticized
those comrades who "set the scope of our new development plans
too wide and demand too much speed."
In addition to this evidently disappointing deal, the Peiping
leaders had to face other sobering announcements from the USSR
that summer. Malenkov's 8 August speech calling for concentra-
tion on increasing consumer goods for the Soviet populace did
not augur well in terms of what would be left over for China.
Khrushchev's report a month later on the failure of Soviet
agriculture just as the Chinese began their drive for collectivi-
zation could also have been disillusioning.
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A connection between Moscow's preoccupation with its own
troubles and Peiping's domestic policy was apparent. In the
autumn of 1953, Peiping announced a campaign of austerity simul-
taneously with the Soviet aid agreement In early 1954, the
Chinese were also warned by the People's Daily not-to expect
consumer goods from the USSR, since the Soviet economy developed
according to a definite ratio which would not be changed to absorb
more Chinese agricultural products or to produce more consumer
goods to meet Chinese demands.
Despite Khrus.hchev's implicit admission that Soviet agri-
cultural methods had proved disappointing, the central committee
of the Chinese Communist Party published in December a four-year-
old "Decision on the Development of Agricultural Producers'
Co-operatives" calling for establishment of 800,000 producers'
cooperativesby 1957, a goal that was soon.upped to 3,000,000,
embracing more than half of China's peasant population.
The prolonged bargaining between the USSR and China could
well account for the rather strained atmosphere at the October
Revolution Day ceremonies in Moscow in 1953. At the annual
reception, Molotov was reported to have ignored the Chinese ambas-
sador. To Molotov's one remark that there were "many complicated
problems" in the Far East and he was sure the Chinese ambassador
"had many thoughts on that subject," Mikoyan responded contemp-
low that the Chinese ambassador '?doesn't think at all."
Also beginning in the fall of 1953, a rather curious propa-
ganda difference was noted between Peiping and Moscow. On 19
September Malenkov had gone out of his way in a speech to the
visiting North Korean delegation to make a major address on the
Far East. There was a new situation in the Far East, Malenkov
asserted, and the world should take note of it. Now that peace
had been restored in Korea, the Chinese People's Republic could
be freely appreciated and its role as stabilizing factor in the
Far East was to be noted. He later said that the alliance
guarantees "the peace of the world." Peiping, however, seemed
not to take to this bit of flattery with its implications of less
need for direct assistance from the USSR. The Chinese continued
to stress the old formula--that the alliance guarantees "the
peace of the Far East and the world"--emphasizing joint Sino?
Soviet responsibility in the Far East.
On the other hand Peiping was. not reluctant to claim ad-
vanced political and economic status for its present stage of
development. In October 1953 the "general line" for the transi-
tion to socialism in China was announced in a directive signed
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by Mao. While the substance of this line was to be modified and
revised throughout the next year, the regime advertised through
all media available to Peiping that China was ready for this
in its year-end editorial for 1953 placed China in a pre=traits
tion status, by carefully distinguishing between the Eastern
European people's democracies, which were "building socialism,"
nd the Chinese, who were "making progress in building a new life."
Peiping's eagerness to claim Moscow's aid as the factor responsible
for its ability to by-pass capitalise and move ahead so rapidly
may have given the USSR more responsibility that the Kremlin
leaders were willing to accept.
In December 1953 a Soviet ideological expert, Pavel Yudin,
replaced Kuznetsov as ambassador to China. This shift was evi-
l somewhat of a surprise to Kuznets
Yudin, however, was obviously far 'better
qualified to handle any potentially dangerous ideological rifts
which might develop between the two countries.
This ideological discrepancy continued through the summer
of 1954. It was finally settled in September, when the long-
awaited Soviet text on Political Economy was reviewed by Pravda,
and China's movement in To socialism without a prior perio
capitalist development was cited as an outstanding example of how
each country must work out its own economic policy to build
socialism. However, China's claim to a unique state form--the
"people's democratic dictatorship"--for the transition to socia-
lism continues to contradict Political Economy's postulate that
it is "impossible" to build a oc a s society without the
"dictatorship of the proletariat."
Peiping As
The year 1954 raised to a new high Moscow's efforts to demon-
strate its regard for Peiping and the inviolability of the Sino?
Soviet alliance.
The annual Sino-Soviet trade protocol was signed on 23
January. It was announced that the USSR would supply China with
metallurgical and mining equipment, power generating equipment,
motor vehicles, tractors, agricultural and building machinery,
structural steel, nonferrous metal products, petroleum products,
chemicals, and other goods. China was to provide nonferrous
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metals, soya beans, rice, peanuts, vegetable oils, meat, tea,
tobacco, fruit, wool, raw silk, silk piecegoods, hides and
other goods.
At the Berlin conference in January, Molotov successfully
manipulated an invitation for Peiping to attend the Geneva con-
ference.
On the occasion of the Sino-Soviet treaty anniversary,
Molotov and his staff attended the Chinese embassy party in
Berlin, while Malenkov and a high-level group including Khru-
shchev honored the Chinese ambassador in Moscow. Two weeks
later, Malenkov and other leading party members attended a
banquet for visiting Chinese journalists.
In July, on his way back to Geneva, Chou stayed in Moscow
for two days, and, since both Khrushchev and Molotov were absent,
undoubtedly conferred with Malenkov.
Peiping Comes of Age:
When Chou again returned to Moscow in late July, Western
diplomats noted his self-assurance with the Kremlin leaders.
Chou took the opportunity to repay any snubs his countrymen had
suffered when they were negotiating for economic aid a year
earlier. At a reception given in his honor by Molotov, the
Chinese premier--with apparently little regard for the foreign
diplomats and correspondents present--made some rather pointed
and biting remarks 1A Mikoyan and Kaganovich. He spoke b them in English, a
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'Iftw 1%W
language they did not understand, and said he had no apology for
this since the two officials had not'.bothered to learn Chinese.
Chou told Mikoyan that, considering how many dealings he had
carried on with the Chinese, it was time he learned their language.
Mikoyan's defense on the grounds of the difficulty of the Chinese
language was rejected by Chou's observation that Russian was
equally difficult for the Oriental. To Kaganovich, Chou remarked,
"There's no excuse for you people." These sallies could have
been indicative of Chinese annoyance with the prolonged negotia-
tions which had marked all of Peiping's.economic dealings with
Moscow..
With both Khrushchev and Malenkov, Chou probably discussed
China's economic problems in light of the floods which by then
were destroying large areas of badly-needed crops. There is no
evidence,'however, that Chou got more than sympathy from the
Kremlin. On the contrary, Chinese rice exports to the USSR in
the second half of 1954 reached a record 275,000 tons.
In September, Moscow made its most lavish gesture of friend-
ship to China when Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan traveled to
Peiping to help the Chinese Republic celebrate its fifth birth-
day. In retrospect, this trip may have marked the end of an
era in Sino-Soviet relations. By the autumn of 1954, Moscow was
faced with a strong and growing China, quite possibly dissatis-
fied with the extent of Soviet economic aid,. and engaged in a
dangerously provocative adventure off the China coast.
During his visit, however, Khrushchev gave no evidence that
he championed a change in Soviet policy toward China. He avoided
any new pledge to Peiping on the Formosa question, carefully dis-
tinguishing between Soviet "government" endorsement of China's
claims to Formosa and the support of the Soviet "people" for
Peiping's military aim of liberating the island. Khrushchev
generously endorsed Peiping's new constitutional plans which call
for a moderate and almost unique transition to Socialism. Before
the Soviet, leaders left, they announced several major concessions
whi'ch' both parties utilized to demonstrate to the world the
firmness of their mutual alliance.
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V
It may be that the Chinese extracted a commitment.. for
increased military and economic equipment from Khrushchev while
his group was in Peiping. However, the additional modest Soviet
credit announced in the 11 October joint Sino-Soviet communique
was undoubtedly worked out in Moscow some time before the group
left.
If further commitments were made, they could easily have
played a part in the resolution of the Soviet policy problems
which culminated in the Malenkov shake-up. A suggestion of a
connection between Malenkov's demotion and the problem of aid
to China can be noted in a series of articles in the authorita-
tive Soviet journal Kommunist of February and March of this year.
These articles criticized ose individuals who had underestimated
the importance of heavy industry, especially in light of the
Soviet international obligations to "furnish friendly aid" for
the "economic development of the other countries of the camp of
There are indications that Peiping is continuing to receive
significant military aid from the USSR.~
While the present Kremlin leaders may possibly be moving
toward stronger material aid to China, they still have not given-
unequivocal support to Peiping's Formosan campaign, Their
propaganda has continued to portray this as an internal affair
of the Chinese, and Molotov has meanwhile been busy keeping the
way open for a diplomatic settlement. In late March, Khrushchev
took the strongest position to date
Bulganin had likewise pledged
e aid of the great Soviet people" to China in its "noble
cause"--again without spelling out what he meant by "aid,"
Molotov had been even more equivocal in his 8. February foreign
policy speech. In an early February interview with William
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,
Randolph Hearst Jr., Marshal Zhukov referred to Formosa as "one
err' of those little things" and an "accident"--a viewpoint which
Peiping might well have found annoying. It would seem that Mos-
cow clearly desires to avoid a general war over Formosa and is
anxious to forestall any actions by either side which might lead
to major military action and thus confront the Soviet leaders
with very difficult and painful decisions. Moscow has apparently
sought to restrain American actions by hinting at the consequences
of an attack on China. The Austrian delegation left Moscow last
April with the impression that the USSR would give China "all-
out aid" in the event of war.
Peiping and the Kremlin "New Team":
The USSR appears to be exerting pressure
on the Chinese to look for a peaceful solution to this question.
Peiping, on the other hand, may consider that the new team in
the Kremlin has gone farther, but still not far enough in its
military backing of Peiping's aspirations.
Moscow is certainly well aware of the sensitivity of the,
Chinese. In his reportedly unsatisfactory 8 February speech,
Molotov had made a special effort to elevate the Chinese to co-
partner status with Moscow as leaders of the camp of socialism.
In early March Anna Louise Strong was exonerated and her connec-
tion with and championship of the Chinese cause made this also
appear as a possible play to Peiping. Moscow's appointment on
22 March of V. V. Kuznetsev as first deputy foreign minister
and N. T. Fedorenko as deputy foreign minister put two China
experts high in the Soviet Foreign Ministry setup.
Prognosis:
. It seems inevitable that Peiping's economic problems will
continue to plague Moscow for the next several years. The
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Peiping regime is now committed to rapid industrialization, and
it starts from a considerably smaller industrial base than the
Soviet Union had in its parallel period of development. The
pattern of present East-West relations makes it necessary for
Peiping to depend on Moscow to provide the industrial equipment
necessary for the achievement of its goals, The Chinese have
thus beep continually forced to tailor their program to Soviet
willingness and capability to make Chinese economic progress
possible.,
In 1953 Mosoow exports of capital goods to China amounted
to nearly 3 percent of its total investment in capital goods.
Although this appears small it represents a fairly substantial
contribution at a time when the USSR is striving for greatly
increased industrialization, However, it would seem this is
only the beginning of the Chinese demands upon the Soviet economy,
and there may well be additional strains as Peiping attempts to
force Moscow into subordinating:?some of- its more Ammedi'ate economic
goals to the longer range in erests of the Chinese.
In the political field, China's position as a junior partner
seems now to be improving. Peiping's growing strength and its
expansionist tendencies should further strain the Sino-Soviet
relationship, Not only will Moscow have to share its leader-
ship of the Communist camp in Asia but also it must take account
of China's new dimensions as a world power. The present Far
Eastern situation, where Peiping's military might, created with
the aid of Soviet materials and technicians, threatens to involve
its benefactor in a general war with the United States, is
illustrative of Moscow's problems with a growing China.
Ideologically, the Communist theoreticians must take further
note of Mao's successful "creative application of Marxism-Lenin-.
ism." The dynamic experiment in building Socialism which be-
longed.to Moscow in the 1920's has now been transferred to Peiping,
which in addition is bordered by those areas most vulnerable
today to Communist expansion.
Chou En-lai's role at the recent Bandung conference illus-
trates the behind-the-scenes position in Asian politics which
Moscow may have to accept as the corollary of publicly recogniz-
ing Peiping's co-equal status. The. Chinese premier showed a
degree of flexibility and independence far greater than is custom-
ary for Soviet bloc representatives in dealing with the non-Com-
munist world.
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Chou did not defend the Soviet Union against public charges
of tyranny and imperialism, and he gave Peiping's approval to
the conference communique which contained features long chal-
lenged by Moscow, although he has since plausibl-yexplained his
actions as motivated by tactical considerations designed to
get the widest possible area of agreement. These included,
endorsement for UN membership of seven Afro-Asian nations which
the USSR had consistently vetoed, inferential approval of the US
plan for the peaceful use of atomic energy and American economic
aid, both of which Molotov has persistently denounced as "imperia-
list tricks," and .finally', endorsement for a proposal on nuclear
weapons and disarmament which deviates considerably from the
Moscow line.
While Chou by'no means abandoned the goals of world Com-
munism at Bandung, he did not speak as a prisoner of Moscow's
line. Moreover, Chou was willing to encourage the belief that
Communist China would develop along nationalist lines diverging
to some degree from the USSR. Chou's tactics suggested that
Peiping wished to further at this conference both Sino-Soviet
bloc objectives and Peiping's own goal of pre-eminence in Asian
politics.
Soviet ideology does not allow for other foci of Communist
doctrinal authority. In this respect, Peiping's power to make
independent policy decisions represents one of the greatest
trials that Moscow as the leader of international communism will
have to face.
Conclusion:
For the future the problem of Sino-Soviet relations would
thus seem to be that of constantly reconciling conflicting national
interests. Previously the greatest tensions an this relationship
have appeared to come when the respective interests of,the two
countries have become so antagonistic as to require modification.
This was the case in the 1920's when the Chiriesc..~: party was
nearly annihilated as a result of Stalin's policies, and it
seemed again to be true in 1950 when Peiping's immediate goals--
domestic development and the capture of Formosa--were put off
by the press of events in Korea. This conflict of interests may
again be developing since it seems likely that Moscow is being
asked to divert industrial goods from its own needs for the
economic growth of China.
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Thus the past five years have witnessed a growing recognition
by both'Peiping and Moscow of the fact that, as the strength of
the Chinese Communists grows, so does their degree of independence
and hence their bargaining power with Moscowa
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