Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 17, 2006
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 22, 1950
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP91T01172R000300280028-0.pdf2.38 MB
Approved For Erase : c ALf DP9 01 172RQ00300280028-0 ICATIONS or THE 14DAP T. OF 1, Overaali World Reaction to NDAP tK and Cana" .. . . . . ? ? ? . Western Europe ? . ? e ? ? ? ? ? +Scandinavia ~C ? . ? ar ELast ? ? . O USSR , ? ? ? ? ? .JuU lgrj 22 Page a ? 7 Saudi Arabia South Africa Liberia China ? . ? o Burw ? ? ? ? a The Philippines. Indmasiae Turkey` ? ? ? d . ?16 Malaya o ? Greece, a7 Portugal ? . ? ? ? ? ? ?q1, Spain . . . ? e . ? Iran?????????.16 France ? ? ? ? ? . ? * 40 Korea . ? Benelux. . ? ? ? ? a ? .12 Indochina.. ][tali. O ? ? ? r ? ? ? .12 hallat ? 2, Reaction to NDAP by Countries United Sin}dc.. ? a ? ? 9 Canada e ? O ? O ? e a a 9 Noxvay a ? ? ? ? ? ? ? a 9 Demmark?.???????10 .17 ?17 .18 wlq. ?20 1nes Military Budgets of MAP Countries a ? a ? ? ? ? ? ? Appenffix I Military Personnel Strength of MDAP Countries. ? . ? Ap ILT Chinese Nationalist Nilitrry Strength.. ? ? ? ? ? a ARMY review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : ClA RDP91 T01172 CG CON FI EN h 1,' Approved Forlease 2007/02/08 : CIA` 91 T01172 40300280028-0 T k- OF 1.113 1VL%1 P I Df CUSSI :m THE MUTUAL DEFENSE AS$] S ANCE PR RA.M, t TF IpKK :'T `k FAI` STATEMENT TO SAY '' aTTHE PROGRAM 1:7,13 t ~'t GENER. iL 'SEEN !A F7 ?.~L?~1',~.4~ $4 ,~'6A:#' EIVEs' y: :`!~~1: 6~1-XHV.,J$ THE N'c 9 -SOVfl:T WORLD, IN SUWARY SUPPORT FOR TRH'. PRO(RAM S`I'I !^x GE +'.li THE Imo: AND CANADA; S- WESTERN EIS 'CP3~ aR NATIONS T A Z?E D UBTS AS TO ITS EFFEC !VEYME S; KO U G1,,,11VT ?y r3L,EMS HAVE A LSI N IN THE NEAR EAST; AND IN THE F.gA !?~ "?.S`' VARYOUS F: CTO1 S WILL LIMIT ?I~ HE F' ` '?E~:F' EI~ESS OF MILITARY AIL), ALTHOUGH THE PROGI AM HAS BEEN SI TO VICL:7TN ' SOVIET PROPAGANDA A'TTiAC S.. IT BIAS NOT ALONE PRODUCED ANY DRAS C CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY, 1. OVER-ALL WORLD REACTION TO MDAP A. UK AND CANADA. THE UNITED KZTGDOM AND CANADA OVERWHELMINGLY APPROVE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND THE OB CTI ES OF TIE GOVERNPJIE TS AND PEOPLES ARE BOTH SOLIDLY BEHIND THE " CIE IS T THE BUILDING OF I LITARY STRENGTH IN WESTERN EUROPE IS r =BEST BEST INSURANCE AGAINST SOVIET A GGRESSIO 1. Ni BOTH C offN:TIES T 5 POSITION IS NON --PARTISAN; FT' IS N(YF ^, ; D WELL NOT EEC : A POLITICAL ISSUE, IN 31OT COI FR ESS, Approved For Release 2007 A-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 CONFINI 1. Approved For lease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 17W00300280028-0 SECRET THE COMMUNISTS AND EXTREME-LEFT DISSENTERS, NEGLIGIBLE IN NUMBERS, ARE POWERLESS TO INFLUENCE ANY APPRECIABLE BODY OF OPINION BY THEIR PROPAGANDA, ALTHOUGH AN OCCASIONAL ACT OF SABOTAGE BY A COMMUNIST MILITANT CANNOT BE COMPLETELY RULED OUT. B. WESTERN EUROPE or rrmaseasr WITH THE ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MDAP AT HAND, THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE ARE SHARPLY AWARE THAT A NEW MILITARY ALLIANCE IS SLOWLY TAKING SHAPE. HERETOFORE, THESE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES HAD THOUGHT IN TERMS OF NATIONAL PRIVILEGES AND ECONOMIC RESTORATION. THE NEED ACTIVELY TO SUPPORT TREATY COMMITMENTS HAS DISPELLED SUCH NOTIONS AND HAS OCCASIONED THOROUGH SOUL- SEARCHING, THE LESSER MEMBERS OF AN ALLIANCE ARE SELDOM ALTOGETHER HAPPY, AND IF THEY OCCUPY A STRATEGICALLY EXPOSED POSITION THEIR DISCOMFORT IS LIKELY TO BE ACUTE, THE EUROPEAN PEOPLES ARE AFRAID -- ON THE ONE HAND OF THE USSR AND COMMUNISM, ON THE OTHER OF THE UNITED STATES. AS LONG AS IT WAS US POLICY TO REVIVE THEIR ECONOMIES, THEY WERE CONTENT; WHEN IT BECAME US POLICY TO INTEGRATE THEIR ECONOMICS, THEY Approved For Release 2007/Q>ffR fi i -RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved Forlease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T011700300280028-0 SECRET WERE DUBIOUS; NOW THAT IT IS US POLICY TO MOBILIZE THEIR RESOURCES IN A MILITARY ALLIANCE THEY ARE FEARFUL. THE IDEA THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WAS A DETERRENT TO WAR SEEMS TO BE GIVING PLACE TO THE IDEA THAT IT IS A PREPARATION FOR WAR, WHILE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE USSR POSSESSES THE ATOMIC BOMB CONTRIBUTES TO THE FEELING OF U EASINESS* . TO CREATE BY 1954 A WESTERN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE USSR IS OUT OF THE QUESTION, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES. NO EUROPEAN COUNTRY OF DEMOCRATIC PRETENSIONS WOULD MAKE THE SACRIFICES ' NECESSARY TO SUPPORT SUCH AN ESTABLISHMENT. NEVERTHE- LESS, THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE, WITH SUBSTANTIAL US ASSISTANCE, CAN CREATE HIGHLY EFFICIENT "BALANCED COLLECTIVE FORCES" STRONG ENOUGH TO INSURE THAT THE USSR COULD CONQUER EUROPE ONLY BY LAYING IT WASTE BEYOND REPAIR. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD PROBABLY DISSUADE THE USSR FROM MILITARY ADVENTURES IN THE WEST. AT ANY RATE, THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE WILL BE CONTENT WITH NO LESS; THEY 43_ SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved Forilease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01172&900300280028-0 SECRET WILL NOT EMBRACE ANY PLAN OR ADHERE TO ANY POLICY THAT ENVISAGES ANOTHER INVASION AND AN EQUALLY DIS- ASTROUS LIBERATION. UNLESS THEY CAN BE FURNISHED VISIBLE EVIDENCE THAT AT LEAST A POTENTIAL DEFENSIVE FORCE OF SUCH PROPORTIONS WILL BE CREATED, THEIR WILL TO RESIST WILL CONTINUE NEGLIGIBLE, AND THEY WILL BE READY PREY TO COMMUNIST "PEACE" PROPAGANDA. THE WILL -TO-RESIST OF THESE PEOPLES HAS ALREADY BEEN IMPROVED BY THE JOINT ACTION SO FAR TAKEN, BUT IT IS STILL NOT FIRM, ONCE CONVINCED THAT SUCH MINIMUM FORCES CAN BE PLACED IN THE FIELD, THEY WILL REJECT SOVIET "PEACE" OVERTURES AND HONOR THEIR COMMITMENTS. EVEN FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SUCH FORCES, HOWEVER, AN INCREASING DIVERSION OF THE RESOURCES OF EUROPEAN NATIONS FROM RECOVERY TO DEFENSE WILL BE NECESSARY. THE PROBLEM WHICH NOW FACES THE TREATY POWERS IS TO DETERMINE THE PROPER PROPORTION OF RESOURCES TO BE THUS DIVERTED, AND, PARTICULARLY, TO PERSUADE THE SEVERAL EUROPEAN PEOPLES TO AGREE TO SOLVE THIS PROB- LEM EUROPEANS WILL EXPECT US LEADERSHIP AND A SUBSTANTIAL UP) CONTRIBUTION. -4 - SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For please 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T0117 400300280028-0 SECRET C. SCANDINAVIA NORWAY AND DENMARK ARE COOPERATING SATISFACTORILY WITH THE MDAP AND STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO ENSURE MAXI - MUM UTILIZATION OF THE MATERIAL BEING RECEIVED. NOR- WEGIAN PARTICIPATION IS WHOLEHEARTED IN CONTRAST TO THAT OF THE DANES, WHO HAVE MISGIVINGS OVER THE WISDOM OF THEIR MEMBERSHIP IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. APPARENTLY FEELING THAT THEIR MEMBERSHIP INCREASES THE PROBABILITY OF ATTACK ON THEM IN A FUTURE WAR IN EUROPE, THE DANES SEE LITTLE IMPROVEMENT IN DANISH DE- FENSE CAPABILITIES OR ASSURANCE OF EFFECTIVE AID IN CASE OF ATTACK. ALTHOUGH FORMER NEUTRALITY SENTIMENT HAS NOT DECREASED TO THE SAME DEGREE IN DENMARK AS IT HAS IN NORWAY, BOTH COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO LIVE UP TO THEIR OBLIGATIONS AS MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT. D. FAR EAST A SOLUTION TO THE VARIED PROBLEMS FACING THE INDIGENOUS NON-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS OF THE FAR EAST -5- SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved Fo6QAlease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 17W00300280028-0 SECRET (EXCEPT IN JAPAN) COULD BE FACILITATED BY INCREASING THE SIZE AND EFFICIENCY OF THEIR ARMED FORCES. THREE FACTORS, HOWEVER, WILL LIMIT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF US MILITARY AID TO THESE GOVERNMENTS. FIRST, EACH NATION POSSESSES A VARYING BUT NONETHELESS LIMITED CAPACITY TO ABSORB PROFFERED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. SECOND, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH ASSISTANCE DEPENDS IN LARGE PART UPON THE WILL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF EACH NATION TO OVERCOME INTERNAL DISSIDENCE AND RESIST POSSIBLE EXTERNAL ATTACK. LAST, MILITARY AID, BY ITSELF, IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SOLVE ALL OF EACH NATION'S PROBLEMS, EVEN IF SUCH ASSISTANCE WERE UNLIMITED IN SCALE. OFFICIAL GOVERNMENTAL REACTION TO PROPOSED OR ALREADY DELIVERED US MILITARY AID HAS BEEN FAVORABLE IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF THE FAR EAST WHICH ARE HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO NEWLY-WON SOVEREIGNTY OR TO THE NATIONALISTIC ASPIRATIONS OF NEARBY PEOPLES, THESE FAVORABLE GOVERN- MENTAL REACTIONS WILL BE CONDITIONED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY BELIEVE NATIONALISM THROUGHOUT THE REGION WILL BE AFFECTED. AMONG THE PEOPLES OF THESE SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For lease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 17$W00300280028-0 SECRET COUNTRIES SIMILAR BUT LESS ARTICULATE REACTIONS TO US AID AT ROME AND ELSEWHERE CAN BE ANTICIPATED. EXCEPT FOR STRONGLY ADVERSE PROPAGANDA UTTERANCES, NO REACTION ON THE PART OF ASIAN COMMUNIST POWERS OR LOCAL DISSIDENTS IS AS YET DISCERNABLE. E. THE USSR THE SOVIET REACTION TO MDAP HAS THUS FAR MAINLY BEEN EVIDENT IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU- NIST PARTIES AND IN SOVIET AND COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. THE USSR HAS NOT PROTESTED OFFICIALLY AND NO OUTSTAND- ING SOVIET LEADER HAS CONDEMNED MDAP SPECIFICALLY. THE. PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ATTACK ON MDAP HAS BEEN WOVEN INTO THE MORE COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNIST "PEACE EFFORT." ALTHOUGH THE CENTRAL TARGET OF THIS EFFORT HAS BEEN "PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS," MDAP SHIPMENTS HAVE BEEN CITED AS OVERT PROOF OF US "WAR- MONGERING" AND EFFORTS TO MAKE WESTERN EUROPE A "PLACE D'ARMES" FOR ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION. COM- MUNIST-LED DEMONSTRATIONS, STRIKES, AND ATTEMPTS TO SABOTAGE MDAP SHIPMENTS HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL, SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For R@fease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01172QA00300280028-0 SECRET LARGELY OWING TO EFFECTIVE POLICE ACTION AND LACK OF POPULAR ENTHUSIASM. THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO MDAP IS INDICATED BY THE KREMLIN'S WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES TO UNPOPULAR CAUSES, EVEN AT THE RISK OF HAVING INDIVIDUAL PARTIES OUTLAWED. ANTI-MDAP PROPAGANDA AND ACTIVITY CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SOVIET "PEACE CAM- PAIGN," BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT LOCAL COMMUNISTS WILL BE ABLE TO HAMPER THE PROGRAM SERIOUSLY. MEANWHILE, WESTERN EFFORTS TO DEFEND AND UNIFY WESTERN EUROPE HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A SOVIET DESIRE TO HASTEN THE CONSOLIDATION, OF THE SOVIET ORBIT. AS ONE OF THE MORE IMPORTANT WESTERN MEASURES, MDAP HAS PROBABLY AFFECTED SOVIET POLICY IN THIS MANNER AND MAY BE USED AS JUSTIFICATION FOR FURTHER SOVIET CONTROL OF SATELLITES. MDAP IN ITSELF, HOWEVER,HAS HAD NO EFFECT ON SOVIET POLICY WHICH CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THE TOTAL EFFECT OF ALL WESTERN DEFENSIVE MEASURES. SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA=RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Co - Approved For lease 007/04bA01-RDP91 T0117 00300280028-0 2, Reaction to :DAP by Countries. A. The United Kingdom. The UK Government strongly supports MBAP because it strengthens Britain's armed forms, will incraase L'lestern 'Europe's military strength,, and will broaden US responsibilities for slestern European defenses The British electorate overwhelmingly favors Britain's participation in IAP> and supports the Government's position in this matter. Only Britain's negligible left wing is opposed to the program as conducive to ware The issue is of no importance in British politics. No responsible press organ and no responsible group of !3ritish citizens have at my time objected to the presence in the UK of the US B?-29 groups. Although the insignificant Communist Party has attempted from time to time to fan public resentment over this question and over the government's policy of close military collaboration with the US, it has had no success' The Canadian Government supports the objectives of :,!DAP. Canada itself is not receiving and will not request any equipment under the 11DAP program. It does, however, desire to buy US material for cash and wishes to reach agreement with the US on some form of reciprocal purchasing such as the ,lorld ',gar II Hyde Park Agreement. The Canadian public supports the government and the subject is not a political issue. Although the small Communist Party and its sympathizers oppose IIDAP and the North Atlantic Treaty and can be expected to continue to do so, they will be unable to influence public opinion to any appreciable extent and the government not at all. C. Norway. The Norwegian Government is cooperating wholeheartedly with 1:IDAP and is taking measures to insure maximum utilization of the material being received, The government and Nomegians generally are convinced that imple- mentation of the Nr-T is the best available moans of preventing warm Norway's continued cooperation is assured and as its defense becomes more effective through arms aid and internal production the effectiveness of the small minority opposition will decrease, The Communist Party is waging an active propaganda campaign against Norwegian participation in the NiiT and the _DAP program, is not strong enough to launch any effective interference with !DAP implementation. The Norwegian Labor Party, the Defense Department, and the Foreign Office have inaugurated an extensive public information program to counter Communist anti :rDAP propaganda and keep the people in- formed of progress toward rebuilding. Norway's defenses. Approved For Release 2007/02/C -RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 CONFI E[ '.I L Approved For lease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01172&00300280028-0 SECRET D. Denmark, Denmark is cooperating in the Military Aid Program and is making efforts to ensure efficient utilization of the material being received, The Danish Government has indicated misgivings, however which are shared by the Danish people-over its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty be- cause there is not yet any visible assurance that Denmark's defensive situation has improved, The prospect of again being overrun and later liberated is understandably real to the Danes and they reason that NAT membership increases the probability of attack on them in a future war in Europe, Among some members of the Government Party there is also concern over the economic impact of increased defense costs incident to NAT membership, Although Denmark will continue to live up to its obligations as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty, Danish participation will lack vigor and resolution until Denmark's defensive capabilities are increased by arms aid and in- ternal military production and there is more tangible assurance of effective aid in case of attack. As in Norway, the Communist Party has levelled a vigorous propaganda attack on Danish participation in MDAP, but antis.IDAP propaganda is not likely to alter Denmark's fulfillment of its i;IDAP obligations and Communist strength is insufficient to interfere with the implementation of the program. , France o p,, General attitude: The Government favors the I.IDAP as a means of rebuilding French military strength, may be expected to give full co- gperation, and is unlikely to withdraw. The public generally lacks confidence in the ultimate success of the program, but presently is basically favorable, There is considerable criticism of the 1.;DKP end lack of confidence in its effectiveness in intellectual circles where neutrality sentiment is ;cost evident, Opposition to .IDAP will increase if military expenditures are required at the expense of continued economic progress and if T'rance's role in N T strate.ic plans is to provide the infantry whereas others supply sea and air power, b. Will to resist: Prospective receipt of :DAP material has improved the morale of the armed forces and probably increased their will to resist, but it has had no appreciable effect in countering the general lassitude of the people and their fear of war. Prospects that the will to resist will be strengthened to any great extent are doubtful, because of general public skepticism as to the efficacy of the :.IDAP in guaranteeing their security. _c., Ability to resist: '?IDa P has not to date increased French ability to resist. Only three partial shiploads of materiel, consisting of SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For i please 2007/02 4-RDP91T01172WO300280028-0 a few guns, signal, and other equipment, have been received, when ship- ment of all items programmed for France has been completed., ability to resist will be improved. do Communist intentions: The main effort of the Communist Party will be to promote the 'peace campaign" in non-Communist circles, endeavoring to create widespread pressure on the Government in favor of neutrality and withdrawal from the ::DAPO Attempts to disrupt MIDAP shipments and sabotage French munitions manufacture will not be abandoned. e. Reaction to change in ;DnP law regarding machines for arms production: There will be little reaction except among those officials actually workin;T with the Program, who will favor the increased flexibility possible under the revision* fQ reaction to Soviet possession of A-bomb: Announcement that the USSR was producing the atom bomb did not produce an immediate serious re- action. Knowledge that the US no longer had a monopoly on atomic arms has, however, increased the desire to avoid another conflict, strengthened doubts of US ability to protect .Vestern Europe, raised questions concerning the efficacy of MDAP rearmament to ward off a Soviet atomic attack. Approved For Release 2007/02/( Offiixl-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved ForlWease 2007/02/08 : d$i R 91 T0117*R00300280028-0 1' a lt.,.....Q aAe 4i~.Ld~ B,U(p General attitude: The great majority of the people favor MDAP and neither goverment is likely to withdraw from the IMT. b.. Will to resist..- The knowledge that 2-MAP equipment is forthcoming and the arrival of initial small shipments have probably increased slightly the will of the people to resist aggression. Any appreciable increase in Dutch and Belgian will to resist will depend upon further shipments and the actual utilization of the equipment by the armed forces r a Ability to resist: The Dutch and Belgians presently have little ability to resist aggression and it will be some time before B'S military aid., their otm efforts and over-all Western European defensive neasures, make an effective defensive force of the Belgian and "Netherlands armed forces. Financial commitments for the repatriation of Dutch forces in Indonesia will prevent the concentration of Dutch resources on European defense during 1950, clo intentions: The primary Communist objective is to pre- vent the unloading of HDAP equipment and to obtain non-Communist labor support in this objective. The Communists use every propaganda device at their command and usually tie their anti-MAP campaign to some phase of the "peace campaign." e. reaction to change in Z AP law regarding machines for arms pro, duotion: High Dutch and Belgian civilian and military officials will, react favorably, but the great majority of the people are not well enough acquainted with. the details of the program to have an opinion on the amend- ment. The Dutch of-"'icials believe increased self-sufficiency in armament production will alleviate the country's largo dollar deficit. j o Reaction to Soviet possession of A-bomb: The initial anrnounce- rent of the Soviet possession of the atom bomb was received calmly. If anything, it strengthened determination to unite ?trope politically, economically and mill tartly. G. Yz? a, General attitude: The Italian Government is in general favorably disposed to the IMAP and views its implementation as important to the govern - r. nt's prestige and stability,, it has no intention of withdrawing. It is appreionaive, however, lest the program reduce US economic aid and lest cost of implementing MIa&P jeopardize socio-economic progress and political - 12 0 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For lease 2007/02/08 '` 4 hDP91 T0117 )00300280028-0 stability,, The Italians also desire the approaches to the Pa Valley to be part of the primary line to be defended by joint Western European forces. There remains some resentment over the failure of Italy to obtain equal representation with Prance and the UK on the top MAP committee. General public apathy toward MAP is caused by the strong tendency to regard Western economic benefits more' highly than military benefits. Sao Will to resist: Italian will to resistx now quite low,, has been affected only slightly by MW and will increase slowly as military and economle integration of Italy vith the rent of Western mope grows. a. Ability to resist: Although MAP will improve Ito-IV's ability to rosiat, the extent of, improvement is severely limited by: (1) the Italian Peace Treaty; (2) Italy's low economic potentials and (3) Italyts "frontier" position. d- Comnnmist intentions: The major active opposition to ?fAP is centered in the Italian Comwtnlet Party (PCI), its allied Socialist groups (the PSI) and the Communist dominated labor unions (CGIL). With little hope of pro- venting the arming of the Italian Armed Forces under the I MAP program, the Comnaunistn are not likely to initiate large-scale sabotage or strikes directly against NA.P Implementation. Rather the Communists will probably concentrate on merging their "peace" campaign with exploitation of local and national socio-oconomLio issue. They will have some success in these efforts. At the same t me,, strikes and demonstrations over unemployment and other economic issues will probably be justified partly by blaming the government's pre- occupation with the military adventures to the exclusion of Italian social and economic problemsd .q. Attitude toward arms machinery amendment: The government has ex- pressed some dismay over the rigidity and red tape associated with a relatively small, amount of dollar assistance under AMP. Therefore,. ar47thing which per- mits greater flexibility.. such as the proposed machinery amendment, will be greeted favorably. X. Effect of the Soviet possession of the 1t-bomb: There is a con- sidorable feeling of ftZtility ovor Italy's role in a U.SA-USSR conflict,, This sense of futility was accentuated somewhat by USSR possession of the A-bomb. H. P. . ,,,gall a. Will to resist: The people as a whole passively support the Salasar Government, and would resist aggression to the best of their ability, Receipt 13- Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved Fori#ease 2007/02/08 : Cti=FP91T0117$U,00300280028-0 of IMP aid would i:n rove the morale of the armed forces and thus increase the *41.1. to resist aggression. b0 Ability to resists Portugal has received no IIDAP aid to date. The receipt of coastal defense equipment would increase the ability of the Portuguese to resist aggression but without large scale military aid they would be unable to offer appreciable resistance to a sustained attack. q. Communist intentions: V The small Communist Party in Portugal is so closely repressed by the police and security forces that it would be able to exert little influence In connection with MIS'. d. Attitude toward arms machinery amendxnen't: The Salazar Government would probably favor such a "national industryt' if it were equipped to raanu:?aacture munitions, but its benefits would be severely limited by the shortages of qualified technicians, raw materials, foreign exchange, and investment capital. . Reaction to Soviet possession of A-bomb: The Portuguese feel that the need is now greater than ever for defense plans organized by the US and closer military contacts between all Western nations. Generally, it in felt that the US is still far ahead of the USSR in atomic weapons and research. I. fit? gain ? Will to resist: The Spanish people have always strongly resisted foreign aggression.. hence military aid to the Franco Government would not increase their will to resist. u3 Ability to resist : Foreign aid would increase the ability of the Span 'sh array to resist aggression. Spain would require a vast amount of aid, however, to maintain an armed force on a modern war footing for any extended period of time in view of shortages in capital, transport equip- rient., industrial plant and power facilities, natural resources, and agri- cultural capacity. 1-, Cos mtunis t intentions: The Spanish Communist Party is numerically small and at present weakened by the growth of a "Titoista7 movement. Military aid to the Franco Government would undoubtedly increase the present and potential effectiveness of Communist anti-US and peace offensive propaganda. d. Proposed araenda:zent on arms production machinery: The amendment would be warmly received by the armed forces and government officials. Its use- fulnsss would be severely limited by the inefficiency of the Spanish state enterprises, especially r unitions manufaet-arres by the lack of technical ability; sand by the shortage of foreign exchange to import such materials as special ctee sand aluminum Ledo; Ts. SDCRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For >20iease 2007/02/08 : M P91 T0117 0300280028-0 e. Reaction to Soviet possession of the A--bombs The Spanish people not permitted access to world news except as oonsored by the government? Franco in public a Date nont has sitthaized the importance, and even exprossed his doubt of Russian paasesnion of the .-bomb. The Spanish press rarely dears with the subject of Russian air poorer, e., capacity to delver the A-bomb behind the Pyronoes, presmably to support Franco: a expressed belief that the Pyrenees vier forms a natural Mg:Inot Line t. .w15 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For Release 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP91 T0117200300280028-0 SECPZV The Iranian Government and the people in general strongly favor the A;DAP. Opposition is confined almost wholly to the small pro-Soviet minority. The Shah is determined to improve the capabilities of the armed forces in order to improve internal security,, protect Iran's borders against Soviet infiltration, and, in the event of Soviet invasion, to fight delaying actions and conduct guerrilla warfare. His determination to strengthen the array is so strong that he would probably divert funds needed for economic and social Improvement if military aid were not forthcoming. Recently Iran obtained from the US under a purchase agreement a quantity of military supplies and equipment as a step toward modernizing the Iranian armed forces. The Iranian Army is making efficient use of this materiel, and training in its use and maintenance is proceeding satisfactorily. Moreover, receipt of the materiel among the various units has had a telling effect on array morale. In the light of this etperience, it may be assumed that the Iranians will put to equally effective use any materiel received under MDAP, The Iranian armed forces are Irama.s most important bulwark against instability and, if properly equipped and trained, could be an effective in- strument for harassing a Soviet invasion if such should take place, The government and people of Turkey, almost unanimous in their determination to reairt Soviet demands which would infringe upon Turkey's national sovereignty and territorial independence, are wholeheartedly in favor of the continuation of US military aid programs. These programs have already made considerable progress to:aard achieving their purpose; the creation of a compact, mobile, modern, and efficient national defense force increasingly capable of offering' resistance to aggression by a major power, while at the same tine reducing the severe burden upon the national economy of the maintenance of large forces under arms In the face of a continuing Soviet threat, The NNDAP, together with US economic,, financial, and technical aid programs, is also of major significance in bolstering the Turks' determina- tion, as well as their military and economic ability, to resist aggression, and to pursue their policy of close association with the US and other western democracies in opposing Soviet/Communist imperialistic expansionism. Approved For Release 2007/02/0,q.CJ'&RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For RWease 2007/02IA-RDP91 T01170300280028-0 Greece has demonstrated its ability and determination to resist Communist aggression during the three-year guerrilla war which ended, at least temporarily, in the fall of 1949, The Greek armed forces have been gradually reduced since then from a peak of about 250,000 to a present strength of about 170,0000 Further contemplated reductions will bring the total strength down to about 1214,000 by January 1951. Of the roughly 8500 million military aid given by the US to Greece in the last three years., most has perforce been expended in fighting the guerrillas. Thus the smaller Greek armed forces still need equipment and weapons to replace worn-out items and to increase their mobility and striking power. While the 350-odd guerrillas still within Greece present no great problem, perhaps 10,000 guerrilla res,.rves now across the borders in Albania and Bulgaria are a potential threat to Greek security. By the fall and winter of 1950 there is a distinct possibility that the guerrillas, with a combat potential of perhaps 20,000 by then., may try to renew their attacks on Greece. The Greek armed forces must be ready to meet such a threat from the start0 The Dhahran mirbase, built and operated by the US but legally- belonging to the Saudi Arabian Government, has been leased to the UJ by short--.tern agreements since 1944. The contract., which was to expire on 23 June, has now been extended to 1 Febru:.ry 1951. In e.changs for a long- term agreement., I,:ng Ibn Saud would undoubtedly demand US military aid, probably including a grant-in-aid for free arms. The King alleges fear of aggression by his dynastic rivals, the Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Jordan; nevertheless, his calculation of the aid necessary to deter such aggression appears excessivea it is believed that the King will continue to extend the airbase agreement on a short-term basis even though his requests for aid are not cornpl:)tely filled, N. Union of South Africa 1o known formal request for military assistance from the US has been made by the Union of South Africa, although if the nation were eligible for military aid under the Korth Atlantic Pact; the military authorities in the Union would be most desirous of obtaining US equipment 'as 'a gift, The military planners of the Union generally think in terms of internal security, although in case of hostilities bet-;eon Past and "Vest.,, they plan to make available to the West one armored division with air support, ,van to achieve this objective., the Union will need considerable amounts of technical equipment from the UK, the rdditional source, as well as aid from the US. Without additional equipment., the Union co i ; id probably maintain :internal security., but its contribution in foreign areas would be limited b.r an equipment shorta-e and the isolationist feelings of a large segment of the population, - 17 - Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 SECRET Approved For Rolease 2007/02/08 :a,1 P91 T01172 00300280028-0 0. Liberia The Liberian. Iirrry consists of a Frontier Force of about 1500 ,Hens whose function is to maintain internal security and police Liberian borders, The Frontier Force is badly trained and poorly equipped. Although the Force was ablo to control the recent riots at the Firestone Plantations, it would be unable to control a major native uprising, Since the Firestone Plantations are of economic value to the US, and because of the strategic importance of the port of Monrovia and Roberts Field, both controlled by US companies, a well-trained and well-equipped Frontier Force is necessary for protection of US interests as well as maintenance of internal security, aA small organization trained in tropical warfare and equipped and trained in the use of short-wave radio would be most effective, A survey of the Liberian military situation has recently been completed by a US army officer, and recommendations will shortly be presented to the Liberian Government. - 18 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For I' 4ease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01172WO300280028-0 China. `.ht: two forces potentially available for exploitation in opposition to the consolidation of Communism in Chinn, (the Nationalist Government on Taiwan and the dissident elerrents within Chinese Corn unist--controlled areas en the main- land) hold little promise at this time for realization of US objectives throe : military exploitation. 1. Nationalist tleime on Taiwan, The US-recogriiZed National Government on Taiwan is a re *ime largely discredited in the eyes of its oin people, whether their inclinations are pro- or anti-Communist. In the past, provision of large (:,uantities of Ua military aid did not prevent the decline of the Nationalist regi^.te. At the present time the US is providin:y no military assistance to the Chinese Nationalists,, ~ . Present situation re: wiring military aid: From a , urely military standpoint, the Chinese Nationalist Government holds a strong; defensive position on Taiwan. Provided Nationalist military resources are employed vaith determination, the rer; possesses a considerable potential for resisting Chinese Communist attack, Moreover, the provision of modest quantities of na.vd and air force material. aid, primarily for maintenance, could substantially increase the Nationalist capability for survival. It is believed, hov~evcr, that the Chinese Nationalists lack both the will to resist a determined Communist effort and the ability to utilize effectively the resources already at their disposal. `,oreover, Communist infiltration and subversive activities on further reduce the potential effectiveness of US aid. ':chile past US aid has not been effective militarily, it has served to perpetuate the Nationalist regime politically and, in the economic field, has bolstered the regime's financial reserves. b? Estimated results of renei%in- US militar; aid: Kenenal of US military assistance -would be greeted favorably by the rka.tionalists and would increase t!?e potential of the Nationalist armed forces. Granting- such aid viould: (1) fail to rally popular Chinese support to the Nationalist cause; (2) neither overcome existing Nationalist disunity and ineptness, nor assure effective erg:r?loyment of the improved forces; (3) defer disintegration of the Nationalist Government at the risk , hovdever, of committing the US to prolonged financial support and even future direct military involvement; (4) permit the conservation of the renainin,:, Nationalist financial resources and tend to promote economic stability; (5) probably accelerate Commu:iist preparations for the takeover of Taiwan; and (6) intensify Chinese Communist propaganda concerning the "imperialist role of the US in the Far East" and increase the tendency to accept the charge at face value in those non--Communist countries Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 SECRET Approved For lease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01174000300280028-0 of the Far East where nationalism is at present an issued c. Estimated result of US aid: If US military aid to the Nationalist Government is not renewed, Tai~vzn probably come under Chinese Communist control within the next twelve months. Short of direct involvement of US forces, however, there is no assurance against this eventuality. 2. 'issident Prouns on the Chinese mainland. Present situation requiring military aid: Popular discontent with the Chinese Communist regime on the mainland is believed to be increasing. in addition to general popular dissatisfaction, the Chinese Coviiiunists have admitted the existence of some 400,000 armed dissidents on the mainland, mainly south of the Yari,^?tze River. The principal motivation of thesd groups is economic and their numbers include professiona.1 bandits, isolated ex-Nation;,- ist troops of various persuasions and disgruntled peasanLs. However, none of these dissident eleraents identified to date appears suitable for effective external exploitation. They lack leadership, unity of purpose, and over-all organization? b. Estimated results of providing US military aid: Efforts to support selected dissident groups through the provision of US military aid could serve to annoy the Communist regime, at this time, but could accomplish little more. The absence of leadership and cohesion would probably prevent conclusive results from aid on a major scale for the purpose of causing the downfall of the Communist regime. External military aid might, in fact, stimulate a general xenophobic reaction among the mainland Chinese which would bind them. more closely to the Communists and be interpreted by other Far Easteria powers as evidence of U5 "imperialism"". c. Estimated results of withholding US aid: Although the withholding of US military aid from mainland groups may be interpreted in' n some quarters as evidence of a lack of US determination to oppose Communism,, such inaction under circumstances would not, in fact, greatly accelerate the consolidation of Communist control over China. Q. Korea. a. Present situation requiriny7 ;military aid: The Republic of Korea established under US and UN guidance and support, is faced with the constant possibility of open invasion by the Soviet-supported People's Army of northern Korea and the daily problem of preserving internal security in the face of Communist guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion, within its on boundaries. - 20 - Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For R ease 2007/02/08+: Gi - DP91 T01172 0300280028-0 h. Effectiv4.ness of aid. already granted: US military aid to Korea has been utilized to the rr ,xi xrnm, as a result of effective functioning of the US Korean military advisory group and the favorable' attitude of the Korean Government and people. The US-assisted Korean Array has: (1) maintained sufficient internal security to permit progress in the ECA program for re- habilitation and development of the Korean economy; and (2) acted as a deterrent to possible northern Korean aggression, c. Reactions to US military aid: Reactions to US military aid have been entirely favorable in southern Korea although there have been complaints that the military aid was insufficient, The US intention to continue Korean aid, under MDAP, has been an important psychological. factor in maintaining the firm will of the Republic's leaders and iri.litary personnel to continue resistance to heavy Communist pressure, threats, and intimidation. Korean Communist propaganda reaction has been unfavorable, but no effective Corm, nist attempts have been made to stop US m litary aid to southern Korea. d. Future Aid: Continued US aid will serve to: (1) maintain the southern Korean will to resist Communism; (2) prevent open invasion from the north; and (3) permit continued development of the Korean economy and democratic government. US aid at levels higher than current authorizations would be effective in off setting the superior military potential of the opposing forces, particularly in artillery and aircraft. US military aid to Korea is, nonetheless, no positive guarantee against successful Communist invasion. A marked curtailment or halt of US military aid to Korea, however, would be followed by: (1) a serious deterioration in Korean Army materiel; (2) a marked reduction in Korean morale; (3) a significant increase in the susceptibility of Army personnel, government leaders and the people to Communist pressure; and (4) a decisive increase in the Communist capacity to exhaust the Republic's strength by guerrilla warfare,; Approved For Release 2007/02/08 RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved ForlIease 2007/02/O4-;h AARDP91 TO117 J00300280028-0 Indochina, a. Present situation requiring military aid: strong nationalist u,pris:ing is engaged in open revolt against French authority in Vietnam. The French Government has attempted a political solution to this proble:i and, by recognizing, the 17rench-sponsored "State of Vietnam" (as distinct from Ho Chi ' Binh's Communist-led "Republic") the US f orrmally acknowledged its satisfaction that the French were Taking a sincere effort to meet Vietnamese nationalist de ca.nds. The growing threat posed by the military activities of the Communist-led ,r epublic of Vietnam" (which has been recognized as a legal government by the USSR and Communist China), as well as the threat to US interests in Southeast Asia posed by developments in Chiina. led to a decision to extend economic and m JAi-,ary aid to France and the Indochinese states. b. Effectiveness of US aid: A force of )SO,000 Western--trained troops (40 percent of whom are European professional soldiers) under capable French co nd is bearing the brunt of the combat in Vietnam, It is anticipated that US aid will bring diminishing returns because of limitations on the ex- pansion of French military strength., the divided attitude of the Vietnamese population, and the strength, stability, and prospects for expansion of VietnamOs Communist-led rebel movement* It is apparent that the activo sup- port of the majority of the population cannot be obtained by military means alone; consequently, US military aid can do little more than maintain the stt,atua uo. c. Reactions to US military aid: Although much of the French press in ?aigon suspects the US of ulterior motives and criticizes the ""parsimonious" character of US aid, the reaction of the French Govermient is favorable. There has been a noticeable apathy, however, among those Vietnamese most inclined to be pro-US,, This attitude stems from suspicion that US add wIU Permit the French to perpetuate their control. ropaganda of the Communist-led rebel regime in Indochina is violer critical of all US motives, actions and presumed intentions, d.,, Future aid: A continuation or expansion of US .d would: (1) :intere the effectiveness of the forces under trench military command, and thereby provide additional tine and opporturdty for the implementation of a political solution to the Vietnarie:ze dispute; (2) provide for the development of a Vietnamese army which., if tinder the control of the State: of Vietnam rather than tinder the French High Command, would be potentially more effective against the rebel force than alien troops. A curtailment or cessation of US aid would insure ultiriate defeat of the French and their nominal Vie'tnarrete allies and the establishment of a pro-Soviet government in Indochina, Curt _1~< lt;ent of military aid, in turn, would probably lead to the same eventual result, SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For ,lease 2007/02/08;599--EZDP91T0117J 00300280028-0 a. Present situation requiring military aid: Thailand r s adjacency both to unsettled Indochina and Burma, and to Communist China., has raised serious doubts anon,, the Thai as to their prospects for survival as a non- Communist nation. Although the Communist movement in Thailand at present is not militant and poses no immediate threat, it is doubtf.'ul that the Thai Armed Forces, as currently organized and equipped, could long cope with a Communist-led "liberation -iovemennt", and certain that they vo uld be unable to resist an invasion in force. Military assistance would increase Thai- land's capabilities to police and guard its frontiers and un uld maintain a Thai ps,,rchological attitude favorable to the West: Thailand's present political leaders are believed to be genuinely anti-Communist and pro-'US, but it is only while they feel confident of the US interest in raai.ntai.nlng a strong position in the Far East that they will continue this orientation. b. I?ffectiveness of US military aid: No US military aid has yet been received. Future US aid would raise the efficiency and morale of the Thai armed forces, and increase their ability to maintain internal order. US aid will not, however., appreciably increase Thailand's presently non-existent, capabilities for resisting strong e.. ernal aggression. US aid should also induce the Thai Goverment to take a more positive anti-Communist position,, would increase i'rern.i eM i'hibul's prestige and political stature, and should result in closer cooperation with the US. c. Reactions to US military aid: Goverment and military leaders have viewed forthcoming military aid with great enthusiasm and the non-Communist press has indicated general approval. All vocal pro-Communist and Communist 11 elements have expressed disapproval of US military assistance. d. Effects of US aid: Granting of US military assistance Muld: (1) replace obsolete and heterogeneous materiel with modern, standardized equip- ment; and (2) increase the capabilities of the Thai Armed Forces if accompanied by an improved and expanded training program. Curtailment of US aid would prevent increased efficiency and capabilities on the part of Thailand's Armed Forces; termination of aid, at this time,, would leave the Armed Forces in t heir present inefficient condition. The US would suffer a serious loss of influence, and Thailand's presently pro-West Government leaders would doubt the US will and ability to oppose Communism in the Far East, thus result- ing in Thai accommodation to Soviet and Chinese Communist it assures, * 23 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For ease 2007/02/ -RDP91 T01172WO300280028-0 T. Burma to Present situation requiring militar aid Although Government armed forces have recently made progress against both Communist and non-Communist insurgents in Burma, widespread unrest will continue for some time. The UK and the Commonwealth, which have provided Burma with almost all its military equipments are incapable of providing all of the materiel needed by Burmese forces. In addition to internal disorders, Burma faces the threat of Chinese Communist activities along an undefined and ill-guarded border. The Burmese Government, heretofore neutral in the East-WWest dispute., has recently made a number of requests for US military assistance, 29 Effectiveness of US aid The provision of patrol craft would increase the ability of the Burmese Government to cope with insurgent activity which is currently disrupting important river traffic. Such assistance, which is supplementary to efforts of the Burmese themselves to maintain their own national security, and complementary to military aid made available by the British Commonwealth and the UIt, would assist in developing a pro- festern Burma, 3. Reactions to US aid Delivery of these vessels would be well received in Burma., and wide, favorable reaction is expected. The Communists and their sympathizers,, including certain Left-wing Socialists who ostensibly support the Government, denounce the acceptance of aid as a step toward subservience to the US. 4. Future aid Although contemplated US aid to Burma presently consists of this single project, it would (1) fill a serious gap in the UK-Commonwealth military aid program for Burma; and (2) assist Burma+s economic rehabilitation by fully reopening the nation's waterways to commerce. Failure of this aid to materialize would retard the growing trend of Burmese cooperation with the West. -21 - Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For Tease 2001 ' : CIA-RDP91 TO1172900300280028-0 tittvZo x~ec3^1e, ~n .tea The Philippine Government W s chief problem the solution of which requires military aid, is the containment of the Coiiuniet-led Huk vement and the maintenance of law and order during the period needed to effect basic economic and political reforms and thereby achieve long-range stability. The fluke, for the most part disaffected peasant guerrillas, have generally terrorized the Central Luzon countryside* Philippine Government Forces, supplied and equipped entirely with US materiels have boen able to bread-, up major Iluk concentrations, but have not been able to prevent destructive Iiuk raids 2 c. Eff2ctivp eee off US aid US aid has helped to maintain the pro-US orientation of the Philippine Republic and to provide needed military support beyond the financial resources of the Philippines a 3 Ft~. etiio~o STS~a The reaction to US military aid has been generally favorable, al. though them hive been complaints that the aid was ineuffic:lent-a criticisnrt which may increase as Chinese Communist expansion continues., The Coe rapist minority claims that US aid is aimed at r:za.intain ing imperlalirtic US controls Increased LAS utilization of Philippine bases could rea It in acceptance of this propaganda charge by some ardent nationalistic non- Communists who view the US use of these bases as infringements of Philippine sovereignty. 40 hit-IM-e-11" or exparsion Of US aid zldg (1) improve the capabilities of the Armed Force to combat the Huk threat to internal security; (2) maintain the presently strong US orientation of the Philippine Government and people, Curtaflment of US aid would make it impossible for the Philippine Government s s forces to maintain even their present capability to provide internal security. In addition to Huk activities, therefore, general lawlessness would increase. The 1FilIpinos would feel that the US was abandon- Ing them to the Communist. orbit., and pressure on the Government to adopt a nbutral policy or make a partial accommodation to Cotrrunisn would probably result 4 Approved For Release 2007/02/03 tl RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For ease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01172&00300280028-0 SRET V, . 1. EM201 6 . .. n~ mi itr~r+r aid. The new government of Indonesia is faced with the problem of de-- molilin-irg some 200,000 guerrillas who fought together with the Indonesian AT l against the Dutch. Although some of these irregulars are Ccem niat-led e.d stand in opposition to the present government of the USI:the great %aSority are simply roving bands whose continued presence as an armed force breatens to destroy the progress already made in the rehabilitation of the country's econo r. If these bands are not dissrmed, their activities. may well result in a general withdrawal of Western investors and technical personnel from Indonesia, an event which would intensify the seriousness of problems facing the young regime. The problem is largely one-of effec- tive policing, and this burden now rests upon the Amnu , which is attempting to perform police functions in addition to its other duties, including the suppression of dissident political groups. Militaxyg aid is required for the arming and training of such a police force in order to free the Arm for national defense duties. Extensive smuggling has also created a serious economic problem for the new governments A solution of this problem will. depend on the development of an effective coastal patrol which, in turn, depends on the availability of patrol craft and assistance in training. 20 Effectiveness of . The provision of badly needed equipment could assist materially in helping the new Indonesian goverment mot its primary problem -- the estab- lishment and maintenance of law and order. This assistance would also help maintain the present pro-Western orientation of the Indonesian Government. `ir~e~IL 3O LCaA -s. 3o Li1G.~57f 202 A US military aid program would be generally welcomed by the gov- ernmenta the armed forces, and business interests throughout Indonesia. There will be some Dutch suspicion that such aid is designed to enhance the US cosmercial position. US aid would be opposed by the Communists and other political dissidents in propaganda utterances, but no effective resistance to the development of a constabulary or the suppression of smuggling is anticipated. Continuation or expansion of US aid wouldt bolster the Government's ability to quell lawlessness and disorder and assist the economic rehabilit&. tion of the USI. Curtailment of US aid would increase the difficulty of establishing and mair..taia law and order in Indonesia, thus aggravating present economic dislocations and possibly leading eventually to a denial of -26- Approved For Release 2007/02/ CItY -RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For Tease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 TO1172a0300280028-0 SECHE of Indonesian tin and oil to the West, Under circumstances of increasing inter l disorder, moreover, the USI's present Western orientation would give way toaecomnodation to the growing strength of local Coudists and pry-Ccmmmista, No US mil,itarsr aid has been requested for Malaya and none is presently being offered, For the past two years, however,, the British in Malaya have attempted unsuccessfully to suppress a Co mv m st Chinese terrorist movement, in which approximately 3,000 - 5,000 men are holding down 36,000 British troops and 70,000 police and constabula,7 forces Losses inflicted by the British on the terrorists have been offset by re.. eruitmgnt fran Mlavaos large Chinese population0 The situation has steadily, deteriorated since Ncvenber 1949, terrorist forces he recently shown a definite improvement in military technique, and der terrorist successes are anticipated, Although Malaya's export economy has not yet been seriously affected, exports of tin and rubber cannot be .maintained if the present situation continues indefinitely, ?27- SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For lease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01172R00300280028-0 SECRET MMtaty Budgets of MW Co mtries Fiscal Tear Begithg 1 AprU 1950 (millions of dollars, converted at rate of $2.80 to the L) Defense Defense Defense Total Nation. % % Eapes diturel Bu+dget2 Iacone of total of National . Budget Inco?e 2,326.2 10$934 28,,E 20 8 1. Defense Estimates as ma tted to Pali , plus CIA estimate of other endiiuros attributable to d?fe. CIA Estimate. Fiscal Year Beginn3ng 1 4pril 1950 (millions of US dollars, converted at rate of US .9019 C 01.00) Defense Defame Defense Total National % % Expendit Budget2 Inc=3 Of total of National Budget moan 386 2x,099 11?817 18 303 I. Defense Estimates presented to Parliament. 2r~. As Presented to Parliamento 3. CIA Estimate Fiscal Year Beginuii 1 Jvly 1950 (millions of dollars, converted at rate of 7.14 Ironer a $1) Net Defense Defense Defense Total National S $ Expenditure Budget Produat2 of total of met Budget National Prod1 1031 3591 10522 191.5 2.7 1. Estimates submitted to Parliament end passed substantially as su t . 2. ECA estimate of Not National Product? National Income estimate not available,, Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 S Approved For-lease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 17W- 00300280028-0 CRET LMM No ffilitary axpendituree. am= a Fiscal Year Beginning 3. April 1950 (mMiong of dollars, converted at rate of 6,92 Ironer ee $1) Defense Defense Defense Total Not % % Expenditure Budget Nation of total of Net Produces Budget National Product 511 .2971 2,57 17.1 2.1 1. Estimates au1nitted to Par3lament. 2. CIA estimate 4 National Ineome estimate not available Fiscal Tear Big 1 January 1950 (mfllioas of dollars, convert at rate of 50 frnos a $i) Defense Defense Defense Total National % % Expenditure Badgetl Incamme2 of total of rational Budget3 Income 163.6 19595 16980 10025 3.28 1. Total goverrmaent expenditures budgeted. 2. Estimated national inoome for 1950. Fiscal year BVIMIM 1 January 1950 (millions of dolars, converted at rate of 3.8 guilders a $1) Defense Defense Defense Total National % % Expenditure Budget 7ncome1 of total of National Budget Income 307 19193 39737 2507 8.2 1 a National income for 1949$ 1950 estimate not available. 1-2 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 :1111 1110111 P91 TO1172R000300280028-0 Approved Forplease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 17p00300280028-0 ABET Pineal Year Begs 1 January 1950 ( lions of dollars, converted at rate of 50 francs a 1) Defense Defense Aefensa Total Batt ,1 % % Ezp nditure Budget incomerL of total of National Budget Inc+ e 41,7342 lm National. Income for 1948 (latest available) 2 a Includes Gendarmerie and Police, 6.2 206 iscul Year Beginang I January 1950 (millions of dollars, converted at rate of 350 f c ta $1) Defense Defense Defense Total National % % ] pendituae Budget Intel of total of National Budge Income 1,20D2 6x391 23.9157 18,7 552 1. CIA ea$3vate 2 a Additional expenditured for military purposes of 4423 mi113ou ar3 included in bo4gets of other ministries, Fiscal Yew BGginr I July 3.950 (millions of dollars, converted at rate of 624 lire . 1) Defense Total. Defame Defense Natic Expenditure Budge l Inc . Of total of National Budget Inc me 5172 29240 13.5200 23og 4.62 1. CIA estimate, 2. Includes Carabinieri (national police), 143 Approved For Release 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For lease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01172 00300280028-0 BMW Fiscal Year BeginaiM 1 January 1950. (Millions of dollars, converted at rate of 29.75 ecvoloc a $1) Defense Defame Defense Total Nations % % Expenditurol Budget Inca o of total of National Budget Income 4317 183.2 1,300 23.9 3.4 la CIA esti te. Fiscal Year 195041 Defense Total National Expend tun, Budget Inter Defense Defense S of total of Nabiona1 Budget Income 1193,96o,3oo $528sOOOOODO S,2,913,00O,00D 36077 6.66 1. Includes auxiliary services. 2. ECA Estimate Fiscal. Your, endlag 20 ,March 1950 (There is no reliable estimate for FI 1950x51.) Defense Defense Defense Total National % 5 Expenditure1 B ot1 IncoMA2 of total of National Budget incow $78,125,000 $317,437,500 22.5 to Actual total expenditures cure only about $2503,0000000, Actual defense expenditures are not known. 2. No figures exist on the national inoc . 1-4 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : M-P P91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved Forglease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01172$000300280028-0 SE= Pied. '!eas 1949--50 Dofa To-cal National Dofenso ? % Defense 1 ExpenAibuwl- Budget Them al or of Nation. Budget Income 3.46,667?oo 6383,000,000 $L,280,000,000 3803 1.05 3, EGA aubi o a 5 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For,&Iease 2007/02/08 x ZLUMP91 TO117W00300280028-0 3 al it-Mr- ersonr~el treng h of Ccau t 3o Cot nt r AM N Air ~'o~rco xo taA - United Kingdom 369,000 144,400 202,400 715,800 A Canada 20,670 9,440 16,670 47,060 Iceland - - - - Norway 17,650 6,200 4,125 27,975 Dentra.rk 17,500 4:400 850 22.750 Wince 500,300 59,082 66,764 626,146 Netherlands 71,000 30,000 d 8,000 109,100 b Belgium 59000 1,282 9,767 70,049 b Italy 245,000 34,887 26,479 306,366 Portugal 46,000 7,630 d 2,039 55.669 Turkey 273,000 ? 18,450 22,055 313,505 Iran 133,331 2,600 h 2,851 138,782 Greece 15,200 11,700 ' 6,120 169,620 g Excludes 64,000 colonial troops b Excludes colonials Plum 60,000 Gendarmerie Includes naval air arm c Plus 7,,000 National Republican Guard and 5400 Fiscal Guard AF Includes 75,000 Carabinieri Includes Gendarmerie of 24,500 and Customs Guards of 13,500. The ,"array ul11 be reduced from 22 to 16 divisions under the advice and guidance of US I;i.l.ttary Uission 1u of 30 April 1950 includes Gendarmerie of 23,200 2 A s of 30 Lrril 1950 As of 31 I?karch 1950 yp-1 Craft of TMAP United _2ji.n i? of At~ril 1 , L61 Op2rational 11on-0 erational Rc wwrve Battleship 5 1 - 4 lacat Carrier 6 4 1 ~L Light Fleet Carrier 6 5 Light Cruiser 24 14. 3 tP Destroyer 112 48 4 60 Escort 169 39 7 1.2' Gulaarine 63 30 3 30 Fleet I3.nesweper .~6$ 21- ' `A .. Totals 453 152 18 229 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CI4AW T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved FoIease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 17Q000300280028-0 SECR Be C a n a & As 2 ? J=e Taw Light Fleet Carrier 1 OMratiQwQ 1 Roa-OoeraMt M&I 0 0 Light Cruiser 2 1 0 1 Destroyer 21 4 1 6 Escort 6 2 ~. 3 Fleet Minesweeper ?s rQ Totals 29 8 3 18 G. Yee3,rtand (As of 1 , , D. 121M (A oaf1,LM 19 O Destroyer 5 3 2 0 Destroyer Coastal 5 1 0 Destroyer Escort 2 1 1 0 Corvette 3 2 0 Submarine 8 2 2 Fleet Minesweeper Totals 29 A 13 10 E, 3 Destroyer, Coastel 10 3 2 5 Escort 3 2 0 1 Submarine .. ., 16 '7 3 6 ' T' F. fit? CU (Al 29 1 12:91. , Fleet Minesweeper 1 2 2 1. Belgium is to receive 4 fleet mineatteepers from United K ngdoo a. Frane? (Ai3 OaP 1 ~]zp :19 , Battleship 2 Old Battleship(obsolete) 1 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For, (ease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T0117 ;000300280028-0 SECRET IQUI Q , x41 &2:92WAUM.A. Began Light Carrier 1 1 Escort Carrier l 1 Old Heavy Cruiser 3 Light Cruiser 7 a 7 on Old Light Cruiser 1 1 go 00 Destroyer 12 7 Escorts (DE,O PG, PF4) 21 21 Submarine 10 9 1 Old Submarine 2 2 2 Fleet M2nesweeper & 85 72 1 14 Ho Ita1 (A 2L1- = ISM). Old Battleship 2 2 Light, Cruiser 4 2 1 Destroyer 4 3 1 Destroyer, Coastal 15 13. 4 Escort (PCE) Totals M 45 ,'i 33 11 2.0 er1 (As of 1 Jun 3.$ 0 Light Carrier . 1 1 Light Cruiser 2 1 Destroyer 6 5 3. Escort (DLE,PG,PF) 71 41 1 Submarine 7 5 2 Fleet Minesweeper 3.2 11 1 Minelayer Totals 38 30 due" 5 1 2 destroyer escorts received from US under )DAP on 1 June 1950 J. POr a7. (As of 1 Juba 2252). ? Destroyer . 5 5 .. Escort (PF,PG) 8 7 1 ?* Submarine Old Sub!aarino 3 3 .. Totals 19 17 2 33`-3 CRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved Forv&lease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T0117 00300280028-0 SECS Old hew4y Cruiser Destroyw Destroyer Eswrt St bmorine Corvette Pecrc-ft L LOT I %+ 2 1 8 3 6 4 4 2 45 32 9 5 87 53 L. ~k o f ~s o 1jM 12M). 34 Turkey has 190 naval vessels of all types inol ng S old Battleship., 2 old Light Cruisers., 8 Destsayrors, 2 Destroyer Escorts, and 10 Submarines, Iran has 10 naval vessels of all types Including 3. repair ship, 1 Destz dyer Escort and 8 minor craft, 114 E~ Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For please 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 17g&00300280028-0 SECRET 3. =U= , rc a o,- , =CMM i A. Belillum+ (raj? 1295) To Bomber Attack Fighter Reconnaissance Transport Miscellaneous Totals ... 160 26 405 In Tactical_7 to Bo a O , S a t 1 9 Bomber Attack Fighter Recorthnjssance Transport Miscellaneous Totals Bomber Attack Fighter Reconnaissance Transport Miscellaneous am 87 cow 25 2L 138 Air r 41 20 577 63. 235 309 175 2,832 583 NMI Air oroe 48 15 52 14 203 20 59 39 28 18 __1M 492 106 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For lease 2007/02/08 : CIA--RRDDP91 T0117 00300280028-0 SWT C o Itsi~ BAs of`? , s = te5Q1 . fact +c 1 Maui 919to Bomber Attack Fighter Recosn3eiseance Transport Miscellaneous Totals loom _ 172 58 97 ,,.6i 392 ... 158 32 72 v 262 D. NQt-herd ~A9 2C Z June l9SQl s Bomber ..~ ~.. Attack ~.? -00" Fighter 50 15 Reconnaissance Ono .?" Transport 10 7 Miscellaneous . Totals 363 B_ ForoFa 32 Bomber 15 6 Attack ?.w Fighter 77 53 Reconnaissance 22 12 Transport 14 7 Miscellanea - O Totals 142 78 Air Ems f East Ina ft , ') Bomber +Gl. 25 Attack r.. so" Fighter 59 27 Reconnaissance -- isaw Transport 27 21 Miscellaneous -LU ja BECRLT Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Totals 264 116 Approved FoQelease 2007/02/08 C -RDP91 T01172 000300280028-0 8 Be idol ALD= Bomber 4 Attack Map Fighter 176 98 Reconnaissance now Transport 10 9 Miscellaneous W .1L Totals 302 Bomber Attack Fighter 15 Reconnaissance Transport 3 2iscellaneoua Totals 79 124 -AirForte OEM .Uw. F. 9Z$OO 4s 2f=? am a 9so1 R Tn Attack bombers 136 76 Dive Bombers 45 21 Military transport 57 22 Liaison/observation 60 38 Trainers lg2 60 Totals 407 . ` urk~y (Aa of ? 7u a 795n . G. CIA does not have the latest breakdown by types of Turkey?e 264 military aircraft, The Turkish Air Force is being trained and developed under guidance of the USA and consists of a balanced force of aircraft; almost entirely of US and UK origin, with a heavyr stress at present upon trainers. The balance consists principally of Intercept and penetration fighters, light bombers, and transport airplanes. Therm are no medium or heavy bombers or jet aircraft. IL.? SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved ForQprlease 2007/02/08 : CIA--RDP91 T0117100300280028-0 SECRET H. I A of 1 19 0 , Iran has a total of 264 aircraft of which 89 are first line fighters- Thunderbolts and Hurricanes, The remainder are transports and miscellaneous aircraft, 114 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0 Approved For4WeasGQ~/0 RDP91 TO117 00300280028-0 Chinese Nationalist Lilitary Strength The present military strength of the Rationalists is reported to total 1495, 000. of these, 370.,00') are Army, 81, 300 Air Force, and 44,003 Navy (including 12, 700 ; .arines) . Of the total army strength some 65,000 troops are located on Quemoy island with the remainder on Taiwan and in the Pescadores. The Army total largely consists of infantry strength but, includes 29, 000 Armored Force per- sonnel and 9,,000 in the Artillery Command. The Air Force consists of two light. bomber groups, four fighter groups, two transport groups, and one photographic reconnaissance; all based on Taiwan. Aircraft strength is as follows: Total __..~.r In Tactical Units* Light Bomber 1214 91 Fightor 196 179 Transport 265 148 Photographic 16 13 Trainer 235 Miscellaneous 9 9 Totals 8445 433 The Nationalist Navy has a total of 60 combat vessels, broken down as follows : In 0peration Under Repair Destroyers 1 0 Destroyer Escort 9 1 Patrol Craft 1 0 Submarine Chaser 0 2 Gun Boat 1 3 Motor Gun Boat 1 1 Mine Layer 0 1 Mine Sweeper 6 2 Landing S hip--Tank 8 3 Landing Ship--Pled 3 5 Landing Ship-Infantry 1 14 Auxiliaries -3 4 Totals 34 26 In addition to these 60 ships, the Nationalists have a comparatively number of smaller craft available for patrol operations. CONFIDE NTJ L' 3 Sixty percent serviceable. large Approved For Release 2007/Q?4TA-RDP91 T01 172R000300280028-0