COMMUNIST THREAT TO BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 7, 1951
• Content Type: IM

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300290005-0
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290005-0
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1. wing the past few marrto, them has been increasing evidence
that the Chinese Comcuniets b eve begun to intervene in use affairs by
?:ovidinng aid and guidance from across the border to the insurgent Burns
clo anist Party and by assisting other groups opposing the government
th magh the Chinese Communist Embassy in Rangoon.
2. A number of reliable reports during the past three months indicate
that the Chinese Communists have comae to an, agreement with the Burmese
C st Party regarding assistance to the letter. The substance of these
reports Is as follows: (a) Chu Chia-pi, a prominent Chinese Communist
, grills leader has been detailed as Chief of Staff of the 14th Aww in
'Tan, and has been assigned responsibility for planning and directing a
guerrilla campaign in north Burma, using disguised Chinese troops if neces-
sa ; (b) armed units of the Burmese Comma mist Party have been moving
n=thward toward the Chinese border to receive Chinese materiel and pft-
:pue for a "genmar+al offensive"; (c) the Chinese Caemmunistaa are conducting
an extensive program of training and equipping Burmese personnel in Yunnan;
d~ Chinese Communist army officers are "advising" Burmese Coasmaniste.
3. A number of reported Chinese Communist. actions, taken indepenaden fly
of the Biese Comoamanists, which suggest growing Chinese interest in Burma
include: (a) promotion of an "autonomous" Kachin state in iritary adja-
cent to Burr which, if established, might stimulate a separatist movement
eamong Bulls Kachins; (b) form into Burmese territory by Chinese forces
along Bunn's ill-defined northeast border (evidence is lacking to deter-
mine if the objective of these incursions was to engage Burmese forces);
(c) stockpiling of food and deployment along the Sine-Burmie border of an
addItioral 10, 00O troops, pteasu aably drawn fromi the aforementioned bath
Are (while a force of 10,000 troops is not sufficient to conquer Bu ma,
it is adequate to support indefinitely an extensive guerrilla campaign in
north Durm, as . well as to contain refugee Nationalist forces in Burma);
and (d) attempts of the Chinese Communist Embassy in Rangoon to establish
control over the local Chinese commmanity and the develop nt of close
liaison between this embassy and the strongly pro-Comaanist Butte Workers
and P is Party (BWPP). Apart from the activities of the Chinese, Ccmm-
munist . capabilities for undertaking political Intrigue under diplomatic
cover have been enhanced by the establishment, on April 1951, of a
Soviet , : y and the previous arrival in Indochina of additional repare-
sentatives of the Bo Chi Minh regime, who have been accorded semi.-official
status. ?
4. Purportedly reflecting Chinese direction, the Bumse Coammmmaanist
Party has abandoned its strictly Independent campaign to achieve the aili-
-SECRET_
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290005-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290005-0
terry defen;b of the government and now is advocating a united front Of all
insurgents. Further indications of Chinese Con mist Influence are reports
of s s on the part of the Buie Commudste to enlarge- and strengthen
their organization by widening their ranks to include several heretofore
Be to pro-Communist parties. (Previously it was f, that the' Chinese
had insisted upon the analgasation of the severe]. pro-C st groups be-
fore committing themselves to a definite program of substantial aid.)
5. ms's controls along its ill-defined border with Chia are in-
adequate to prevent large-scale illegal immigration, much more to p vent
the infiltration of Consist agents or incursions by Chinete forces.
G.xov nt forces we heavily engaged against insurgents in lower
and few, if any, reinforce ento can be made available for duty in the
rtWed border region. Consequently, most of Burma north of Mandalay is
vulnerable to Commist, operations. Furthermore, the Bins Government's
fear of C st China and its continued rfusill clearly to identify es-
pa DVIOnist International Commmism with local insurgence ease forestalling
the adoption of measures designed to check the growing C at threast.
6. A pattern of C st activity in Bur= is becoming apparent.
Until recent months, the Comounist movement was drifting more or less aim-
lessly and was badly in need of cation and revitalization. Now,,
ho ver, attempts are apparently being made to draw toget - the dis-
gruntled 61m ants in'Burm, a definite strategy for the ultimate over-
throw of the Burmese Government is evident and COmmunism in Burma is
ela ly to receive aid and possibly leadership from Ccs sammi.at China. This
sst eteGr envision the establishment of a "liberated arm" in north
Buss, from which a political and military offensive agLinst. the rest of
Bur= could be launched.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300290005-0