SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300320001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1999
• Content Type: BULL

Pr AAW 'AW 'AW AW AdW 'AW 'AW 'AW jiff
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172ROO0300320001-0
0
0
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
CONTROL NO.
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
1
0
0
ROUTiN ___ Top Secret
NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS
(Security Classification)
APPROVAL
COMMENT
CONCURRENCE
DIRECT REPLY
DISPATCH
FILE
INFORMATION
PREPARE REPLY
RECOMMENDATION
RETURN
SIGNATURE
State Dept. review completed
w
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
E2 IMPDET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172ROO0300320001-0 , dMW
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300320001-0
ml f b y D e l
5 September 1951
SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE BULLETIN
HIGHLIGHTS
The opening session on the evening of 4 September was devoted to an
address by President Truman. Rules of procedure were adopted on the morning
of 5 September at the second session, which featured Soviet/Satellite ob-
structionist tactics.
DEVELOPMENTS AT SAN FRANCISCO
1. No official summary on conference proceedings has been received as
yet. The conference tactics and obstructionist intentions of the USSR were
demonstrated at the second session. The Soviet bloc, comprised of the USSR,
Poland and Czechoslovakia, was unsuccessful in its attempts to force con-
sideration of Chinese Communist participation and to block the adoption of
the rules of procedure proposed by the US and the UK.
2. The Indonesian Foreign Minister informed US officials at San Fran-
cisco on 3 September that he was under instructions to report daily on de-
velopments at the conference, and that the Cabinet would make the decision
on whether to sign the treaty. The US officials gained the impression that
Indonesia would be willing to sign the treaty if given reasonable assurances
that satisfactory arrangements could be worked out on economic auestians
such as fishing rights and reparations.
COMMENT: The US Ambassador in Djakarta believes it is likely that the
Indonesian Government will sign, and thinks the treaty will subsequently
secure Parliament's ratification.
3? Prime Minister Yoshida in-
tends to zrscuss ine G in se signs orproblem with US and UK representa-
tives at San Francisco. The Japanese have indicated a firm intention to
deal with the Nationalists eventually, but apparently fear that active
moves in that direction might jeopardize pro ects or an early bilateral
treaty with India.
Document No. ----_ 1
------------
Ns Change a
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300320001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300320001-0
SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE BULLETIN
5 September 1951
4. A member of the Netherlands information bureau reportedly stated
that the Netherlands delegates say confidentially among themselves that they
do not expect Pakistan to sign the treaty. One delegate remarked that he
would be surprised if any Asiatic nation except the Philippines and As-
sociated States of Indochina signed. The same source reports that the
Netherlands will sign the treaty.
5. At a reception in San Francisco given for the British and American
press, the impression was gained that the UK delegation is maintaining a cool
and reserved attitude toward the Japanese delegation. The UK, however,
appeared to be definitely trying to sell the treaty, and the UK Foreign Of-
fice press chief displayed considerable pride in the part the UK played in
the treaty's preparation.
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
2. According to information obtained by the US Ambassador in Colombo,
Ceylon's Prime Minister has instructed Ceylon's delegation to sign the
treaty in its present form or accept any changes in the present text that
are more favorable to Japan.
3. The Department of State is concerned over press reports that Prime
Minister Nehru had told the Indian Parliament that Asian countries may hold
a Japanese conference of their own after the US-sponsored conference ends,
presumably to strengthen his influence over Burma and Indonesia and his
future position with extreme nationalistic and socialist anti-American ele-
ments in Japan. Ambassador Henderson, however, is inclined to believe
that Nehru's remarks were either misinterpreted or distorted.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300320001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300320001-0
SAN FRANCISCO COTUMENCE BULLETIN
5 September 1951
COMMENT: Mosaburo Suzuki, a former Communist and now the leader of
the Japan Socialist Party, visited Nehru shortly before India decided not
to attend the conference. It is likely that Nehru's subsequent decision
may have been influenced in some degree by Suzuki's comments, which in turn
were colored by his party's opposition to the Western treaty draft.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300320001-0