BERLIN CONFERENCE DEVELOPMENTS - VI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300340006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 17, 1999
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300340006-3
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OCI NO. 1525
COPY NO. 1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
3 February 1954
Molotov's proposals for Germany: While it was to be
expected that the Soviet Union's opening position on the.
German problem would contain maximum demands, the failure
to include any new proposals that might be attractive to
the West suggests that the Kremlin does not expect any
significant progress to be made on Germany at Berlin.
The three additions to the treaty proposed in March
1952 support the Soviet claim that West Germany is bearing
an economic burden from which East Germany has been freed,
add an additional prohibition against German participation
in EDC, and define a smaller armed force than originally
proposed for Germany. This latter addition may be calculated
to have some appeal in France.
Molotov has also clarified somewhat the proposed time-
table of elections and treaty preparation. He maintained
that the Deputy foreign ministers should start immediately on
drafting a treaty, with East and West German participation.
This, he says, would facilitate the bringing together of
the two German governments and the holding of elections. A
peace conference should be held by October. Final adoption
of the treaty would require the participation of an elected
all-German government.
State Dept. review completed
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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300340006-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO 1172R000300340006-3
Soviet official hints at desire for USSR-West German
relations: The Soviet press chief at Berlin has emphas-1-Fed
remarks made at the 29 January meeting by Molotov on the
prospects for improved relations between the USSR and West
Germany. He repeated that the absence of official relations
between the Soviet Union and West Germany "does not exclude
the possibility of appropriate contacts and the inauguration
of connections" between the two. Molotov said that although
past attempts at trade had been insufficient, new attempts
should be made to develop both economic relations and cultural
ties.
He made his statement while arguing for East and West
German representation at the conference, and American officials
in Berlin believe that this line may be used in arguing that
reunification is dependent on the active participation of the
East and West German governments. American officials also
see in the Soviet willingness to recognize the reality of
the existence of the West German regime an attempt to set a
precedent which it will urge the United States to follow
with regard to Communist China.
Bonn Socialists carp at Western line: Although support
for the tactics of the Western powers at the Berlin confer-
ence remains strong among all political parties in the Bonn
Bundestag, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has now found
objections to two aspects of the Wests' policies on German
unity. Party leaders will not give their unqualified support
either to excluding all East German representatives from the
conference or to the Allied unity formula presented by British
foreign secretary Eden.
Despite the party's opposition to official participation
of the East German government in the conference, party leaders
indicate that under some circumstances it might be advan-
tageous for representatives of both the East and West German
governments to serve as witnesses or experts on German
problems. While the SPD is willing to endorse the general
outline of the "Eden unity plan," its leaders object to the
provision which would permit the co-existence of both govern-
ments until a new constitution has been adopted by the unified
government.
The Bonn coalition has given its unqualified support to
Allied policies at the conference, and in finding ambiguous
objections to these policies, the Socialists appear merely
to be attempting to fulfill their role as the government
opposition. The party has frequently been forced to adopt
opposition tactics to the government's foreign policies be-
cause the Chancellor has not wanted the opposition to share
credit for his foreign policies, and has excluded the opposi-
tion from inter-party deliberati9ns.
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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO 1172R000300340006-3