GENEVA CONFERENCE BULLETIN - X
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91T01172R000300360010-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 21, 2006
Sequence Number:
10
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 17, 1999
Content Type:
REPORT
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Body:
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300360010-6
OCI NO. 4104 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COPY NO. 10 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
12 May 1954
GENEVA CONFERENCE BULLETIN - X
Indochina discussions: The Communist delegations opened
the Indochina phase of t e Geneva conference with a strong bid
to extend the negotiations to include Laos and Cambodia, as well
as Vietnam. As the first step in this tactical line, the Viet
Minh vice president devoted virtually his entire opening speech
to a plea for invitations to the "resistance governments" of
Laos and Cambodia. Chou En-lai supported this proposal, holding
that the conference had the right to determine its own compe-
tition, and Molotov followed with the allegation that these
"governments" controlled much of the territory of the two
countries and proposed five power talks on the Viet Minh
proposal.
In the second session on Indochina, the Viet Minh spokes-
man rejected the French proposal for halting the war and put
forward a plan calling for a cease-fire throughout Indochina
to be followed by a general political settlement which would
include the following major points: French recognition of the
sovereignty and independence of the "Democratic Republic of
Vietnam," Khmer (Cambodia) and Pathet Lao; eventual withdrawal
of all "foreign troops" from the three states; formation of
advisory committees to carry out. elections; and the establish-
ment of unified governments in all three states.
These terms probably represent the Communists' maximum
demands for a political settlement and were advanced primarily
for the record and for use as a bargaining counter. The Viet
Minh proposal, however, concluded with a provision which
appeared designed to keep the door open for serious cease-
fire negotiations. It suggested that a cease-fire might be
arranged without complete agreement on the shape of a political
settlement and included a provision vaguely resembling Bidault's
demand for the grouping of regular units in zones of assembly.
This approach is consistent with other indications that the
Communists are seeking to induce France to accept a simple
cease-fire agreement without political guarantees. Such an
agreement would leave the Viet Minh in the most advantageous
position to continue infiltration into Laos, Cambodia and
non-Communist areas of Vietnam, and would also reduce the
risk of possible American or United Nations intervention.
State Dept. review completed
SE POR. DE-C ,A.5 1FTr.A.T101d ACT16w
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I-An
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
THIS DOCUMENT.
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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300360010-6
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300360010-6
Swiss clarify decision to withdraw from NNRC: The Swiss
are quite determined to withdraw from the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission in Korea and hope the Geneva Conference
will deal soon with that question, according to the American
embassy in Bern. The Swiss foreign minister has given the
following reasons for such a decision: (1) it is useless to
prolong the life of the commission, .(2) only two members are
neutral, the other two are "mandatories of some of the bel-
ligerents," and (3) under the Swiss militia system men cannot
be ordered to Korea and since they do not want to volunteer
for such duty it would soon become impossible to get people to
fill the job.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300360010-6