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December 12, 2016
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April 10, 1952
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49617 Approved FswRelease 20 Q /21 : CIA-RDP91 T01 WR000400130011-3 CRET 16 10 April 1952 25X1A 25X1X 25X1X TO: Director, Central Intelligence THROUGH: Deputy Director (Intelligence) FROM: Assistant Director, Current Intelligence SUBJECT: Symposium of Comments on of 5 March, 1952, "Events Leading up to a Split in the Soviet Communist Leadership." This report was the subject of comment by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counsellor of the Department of State, by Mr. George F Kennan, Ambassador-designate to the Soviet Union, by 25X1A .u_ 1r itl a 11C%.1, , 4 UU by the Office of Current Intelligence, CIA. The comments showed almost complete unanimity on the report as a whole. The following points emerge from these analyses: 1. Like other documents which purport to describe a split in the Soviet leadership, this report suffers by being too "pat," too oversimplified. 2. The sources which claim access to information of this sort could hardly have come by it in the normal course of events. In particular, it is doubtful that they could know in detail of any split in the Politburo. Whatever its pre- liminary differences of opinion may be, the Politburo presents a united front once a decision has been reached. 3. This report contains contradictions and inconsist- encies which would hardly be present in an evaluation by any individual in a position really to know about the workings of the inner circle. 4. It should be borne in mind, however, is admittedly r scraps f ha d i f o n o - mation, considerable hindsight, and much hearsay. On this basis it is a shrewd and probably honest ev l ti opportunity Following analyses. a ua on by a man whose position gives him as good an observation as is permitted to any outsider. are brief general comments taken from the four T a. Te a / Al Approved For Release 2002/0 25X1 C 25X1X Da!c: By: 911---- Approved6er Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T072R000400130011-3 In summary, this analysis appears to be an extremely intelligent reconstruction based on discussion, gossip, some information and working backward from events ......... It cannot be taken at its face value but it is a very shrewd bit of deductive reasoning. In its main conclusions I would say that it was probably nearer right than wrong........'' (Mr. Bohlen based the last sentence on three points in the report: that in varying degree, both alleged factions desire to avoid war; that Stalin remains the unquestioned arbiter, above all subordinates; that the ascendency of the more cautious group is borne out in Soviet policy since Korea.) Mr. Kennan, agreeing in general with these points, added: "The source of this report appears to forget the important fact that when policy decisions are taken by the Politburo on specific, problems (and I do not believe that decisions are taken any other way) the question at issue is regarded as settled and no longer a fit subject for discussion or debate, and it is defended from that time on by all. members of the Buro. The result is that differences of views must always be restricted to the specific plane of the new question on the docket and can never attain the sweep of views professing to have historic depth." 25X1A "This document, in my opinion, is an able and probably 25X1X sincere effort to construct what goes on in the Politburo, based on rumor, gossip, and information which is probably .classified. I do not think that any such individual has access, classified or otherwise, to what really goes on in the Politburo. Too much of the document is not understanding, sincere Communist, and too much of it is in conformi.ty with Western patterns of thought rather than Russian." 25X1X The tl/CI comment stated: "Ii; it is a bona fide report it should be regarded as an evaluation by a man in an excellent position to see, hear and read of, in much more detail than anyone this side of the Iron Curtain, the development of Soviet policy and intentions ..... _The interpretations which m Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved Vot Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T044 R000400130011-3 this report sets :forth often run parallel to speculation in this country over the Kremlin's apparent hesitation in the face of growing Western strength and increasing Western effectiveness," The four comments are appended to this symposium. 25X1A KINGMAN DOA ASS - 3 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved FRelease 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91 T01 1R000400130011-3 TOP SECRET Appendix I. Analysis by her. Charles E. Bohlen March 17, 1952 MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH, Director of Central Intelligence, 25X1A I x read and reread this extremely interesting report I I concerning the divergent points of view within the Politburo and their resolution by Stalin. The author is obvious:Ly a man exceptionally well informed on doctrine, bolshev'.ik thought processes and the top mechanism of the Soviet Government. He appears also to have considerable knowledge as to the personalities directly involved. There is nothing in this analysis which directly contradicts what we know from other sources concerning the individuals and their beliefs. The account, however, appears to be too pat and over-precise to be accepted at full face value It is highly unlikely 25X1X that would have access to such complete information as the proceedings inside the Politburo as to be so categoric as to the exact positions taken by its various members on what are clearly the most secret debates on the most important issues in that body. My general impression therefore is that this is an extremely intelligent reconstruction of what probably happened, working backward somewhat from the events and basing this analysis, as indicated above, on a first-rate understanding of bolshevik thought and on the type of specular discussion which undoubtedly has been proceeding in Cominfo:rm circles in satellite countries plus, I should say, some scraps of hard information which provide the part of the skeleton on which this analysis is built. In one sense the division into the "realist" and "opportunist" schools is a rather curious terminology. What appears to have been at issue would perhaps best be described by those who believe that the world situation was still in a revolutionary :flow, i.e., the opportunists, and those who believe that world capitalism was entering a period of relative stabilization and revolutionary ebb, the realists. There is a further sub- division stemming directly from these two divergent; analyses concerning direct action versus indirect revolutionary exploi- tation. From other and obviously equally uncertain information it would appear that the leaders of the two schools, were Zhdanov on the one hand and Malenkov on the other rather than Zhdanov and Andreiev as indicated on page two, paragraph 8, although subsequently, in the development of the dispute it is correctly stated that Malenkov came to head the so-called opportunistic TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved, &V Release 2002108% - F 4-RDP91 T0'~I+12R000400130011-3 TOP :school, i.e., the school that believed that capitalism was not capable of a new period of-stabilization. I believe the analysis of the division as set forth in paragraph 14, page 4, is convincing since it centers around their difference in estimate of the state of world capitalism plus a reference to what undoubtedly was a very controlling factor, the effect inside the Soviet Union of one course of action as against another. The absence elsewhere of emphasis on the influence of domestic considerations is one of the chief weaknesses of this paper. The description, although probably imaginative, as to how Stalin dealt with these divergent tendencies in the politburo is, I believe, fully in accord with what we know from Stalin's technique of Government. I am also very much impressed with the description of the considerations allegedly advanced by both sides as to the Asian opportunities offered by the Communist victory in China and again by Stalin's resolution of the dispute. I found also particularly con- vincing the basis for Stalin's decision to go into South Korea as a sort of semi-compromise between the two schools (para- graph 26, page 6). These considerations are particularly valuable since they give greater emphasis to the so-called revolutionary aspects of the South Korean venture which I have always felt had not received sufficient attention in our analysis of Soviet motives in setting off the North Korean attack. The failure of all assumptions to,materialize as anticipated in the South Korean affair is, I believe, un- doubtedly true. All our information and the course of Soviet action since U.S. action in Korea seem to bear out the main thesis that the whole South Korean thing was a major politico- mili.tary, error which drastically and adversely affected the policies of the Kremlin. The most interesting part of the analysis is, of course, in paragraph 30, page 7, when Beria allegedly standing outside of the two factions (this is question- able) laid down the three main considerations governing Soviet action at the present time. There are certain points of detail on which this is questionable, such as placing Ehrenburg in the camp of the opportunists whereas his wartime attitude in regard to Germany, which required public chastisement at the hands of Alexandrov in the spring of 1945, would not logically put him in this group, and also the evident contra- diction in regard to Bulganin's position (paragraph 28, page 6) who demanded open Soviet participation in the Korean conflict on the grounds that its prolongation increased the risk of world war. Whatever its authenticity, I believe the description of how the world looks to the politburo as of January 1952 (para- graphs 42 through 55) is a very acute analysis. I would very Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved Fw'Release 2, e#0$/J~* A-RDP91TO14m7i2R000400130011-3 much doubt, however, whether, as stated in paragraph 56 on page 10, the so-called realist group believed that it would be possible to have a world war in the period 1954 to 1958 followed by an armistice which would then last for some 20 years. That seems to me to be an extremely infantile conception, given the status of modern weapons. The description of the status of power of the chief individuals concerned (paragraphs 60 through 63, page 11) is perfectly good speculation but by no means the only possible one. The present indications would show that Malenkov is for the moment riding considerably ahead of Molotov. In summary, this analysis appears to be an extremely intelligent reconstruction based on discussion, gossip, some information and working backward from events. In fact, in the description of the source, it is stated that the author based his analysis on what he had read and heard. It cannot be taken at its face value but it is a very shrewd bit of deductive reasoning. In its main conclusions I would say that it was probably nearer right than wrong since it emphasizes the following fundamental points: 1. Both factions are eager to avoid a world war although the so-called realists would be prepared to take greater risks in this regard than the opportunists;" 2. Despite the blow to his prestige in the Korean blunder, Stalin still remains the unquestioned arbiter, standing above all subordinates; 3. The victory of the opportunist or more cautious school appears to be confirmed up to the present by the course of Soviet policy since Korea and also by the recent emphasis in top Soviet speeches on the colonial and semi-colonial areas. From this report and other information it would appear highly important: to assemble and keep under constant review any information concerning the respective positions of Molotov on the one hand and Malenkov on the other. At the present time all information points to the rise of Malenkov and the eclipse, possibly temporarily, of Molotov. If this process was reversed, it might foreshadow a shift towards the school for direct action. George Kennan is at present in Princeton and unless you think it urgent that some special courier take this up to him, we will have to await his return to Washington, now set for the second of April, in order to get his appraisal. Approved For Release 2002/08/24 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000400130011-3 Approved pr Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T09 2R000400130011-3 Appendix Analysis by Ambassador George F. Kennan Date: April 3, 1952 To: Mr. Bohlen From: George F. Kennan My views about this paper coincide very closely with those ven on 'page 3 of your memorandum to General Smith of March 17. 25X1X I think this document was drafted by a peripheral character who had picked up a good deal of gossip and was a fairly shrewd Judge of what was going on, although probably without adequate background as to the pre- World War II history of the Soviet regime and Soviet foreign policy. The issue he has stressed, namely that of the-interpre- tation of the trend of events in capitalist society, is un- doubtedly correctly portrayed as the central issue of interpre- tation agitating --- and doubtless dividing, on many occasions ?-- the members of the Politburo. This, however, is by no means a recent phenomenon. The failure of the world revolution to follow the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1918 has always been the central fact in the foreign policy of the Soviet regime, and the prospects for the disintegration or consolidation, respectively, of capitalist society has always been, I feel sure, the central problem of analysis underlying the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. The account of specific issues arising for the Kremlin in the period since 1945 and of the ways in which they have been handled is extremely sketchy and often confused and over- simplified. The real truth is unquestionably a far longer and more complex story than this account would indicate. That there are disagreements of the nature he describes, I would not doubt; and that these differences center around the respective views of Molotov and Malenkov is natural in view of the relationship of those two men to the problem of suc- cession; but I think we should be extremely cautious about accepting, such material as real evidence of the positions of the men in question. I suspect that such differences as they may have would be found, if the truth were known, to be of a much more subtle nature than is suggested here and to have come out much more with relation to specific problems of policy, rather than as general views. The source of this report appears to forget the important fact that when policy TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approvedp- Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T0d4.72R000400130011-3 TOP SECRET decisions are taken by the Politburo on specific problems (and I do not believe that decisions are taken any other way) the question at issue is regarded as settled and no longer a fit subject for discussion or debate and it is defended from that time on by all members of the Buro. The result is that differences of views must always be i?estricted to the specific plane of the new question on the docket and can never attain the sweep of views professing to have historic depth. Approved For Release 2002/0B/24 : t lA-RDP91 T01 172R000400130011-3 Approved r Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T011 2R000400130011-3 TOP SECRET Appendix III: Analysis by 25X1A 1. The subject document is unusually interesting. The probability of the existence of tensions and cross.-purposes within the Politburo has long been recognized, but with the exception of past purges and questionable cases, such as that of Zhdanov, which, if they ever existed, have been resolved, our knowledge of their actual existence, nature, points at issue and groupings of personalities is, as far as I know, a complete blank. If the content of this document is reliable, its intelligence value is very high and could well have a, major effect on our planning and action. I do not believe that it merits such credibility. 2. In general, the viewpoint and reactions attributed to the "'opportunists" are much closer to orthodox Bolshevik thought than are those attributed to the "realists". I have no doubt but that it is possible, given sufficient knowledge, to group the Politburo into those who are inclined to favor more aggressive policies and those who would act less boldly. Such a grouping might also be a source of strain, but both groups would view things in the light of long-accepted central concepts, and the pattern of their divergences would depart materially from that set forth. in this document. Neither group would hold the view that their own masses would not permit the use of atomic weapons (par. 55), and often the view attributed to the Realists as being in opposition to that of the Opportunists could not fail to be held by any good Communist. Sometimes, as in the supposed contrast between the USA and Socialists, (par. 58) the views of both groups are actually orthodox and can be held simultaneously in the Russian mind with no difficulty. 3. If a division as extreme as that which is portrayed existed, the so-called Opportunists would be very apt to brand their opponents as "opportunists" and themselves as "realists", for some of the more important views attributed to the Realists are so inconsistent with a very consistent Bolshevik pattern of thought that those who held them would be regarded as adven- turers. Those aspects of Realist thought seem to me to be unnatural to a hard-core Communist (which must be a pre- requisite for Politburo membership) and sometimes even un- Russian. Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved E Release ,Ql/'b~IA-RDP91T012R000400130011-3 4. In the sense in which the Bolsheviks define the term, it would take some unaccustomed wishful thinking to consider the world situation ripe for immediate revolutionary action, even without the risk of war (6). No true Bolshevik, even if discouraged (and there is little to discourage them), could consider that all political means leading to final Communist victory had been exhausted (55), or seriously doubt that there would be time before 1954-1958 to take measures to interfere with a war initiated by the Americans (56). Nor would ,they consider that revolutionary intervention in favor of world Communism, as distinct from military intervention, has become so perilous as to constitute a major limitation (30 b), nor that aid to bourgeois Islamic feudal lords or any of the bourgeoisie, for that matter, need be unconditional (52). 5. The date of 1950 as one by which the recovery of the Soviet Union and the absorption of the satellites would have been achieved is not in accordance with realities, and would not appear so to even an optimistic Soviet mind (15). Much `different views are continually given to the Russian people by their leaders, and one has only to live in Russia to know that the time element is much longer. I believe that major questions of policy are settled in the privacy of the Politburo, and not in the broader publicity of joint meetings with the Cominform and Chinese statesmen (23). There are ample means other than external adventures for controlling the chronic dangers arising from the inactivity of the Soviet Army and the failure of Soviet workers to obtain the promised benefits (14). I do not believe that the Soviet leaders have fallen into self-deception by coming to believe their own propaganda, but rather that they believe in the ultimate validity of its orientation and aims and are completely conscious of its (to them legitimate) distortion of supporting fact (14). 6. Many of these points seem to me to be very represent- ative of viewpoints that are held by those who have not lived for long in the Soviet Union and are not familiar with its realities. They are part of the normal Western or non-Russian thinking? The explanation of Thorez' presence in Moscow as a make-weight for Eisenhower's presence in Europe (33) and regarding Korea as Stalin's first major politico-military error, together with its connotations (29a, 30, 60), seem to me to be non-Russian interjections. There is reason to believe that Russia's appraisal of atomic weapons is not consistent with the absolute weapon (2a). Especially noteworthy is the attribution to any hard-shell Communist of a belief that inter- national problems could have been settled by their arguments at the Paris conference (9), and to Molotov's disillusionment (10). They just don't think that way. ar Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved Fa elease 2Q103 't 9 -RDP91T011UP000400130011-3 7. Major considerations, notably problems of weaknesses and limitations of a peculiarly Russian nature, are completely untouched. In my opinion, the Politburo is well aware of them and they would profoundly condition the thinking of the Realists and be reflected in the issues under discussion. The problems that would arise in the minds of any responsible Russian are simplified out of existence. They know that there is more to overrunning Eurasia than a purely military capability (9c). Even when Russia is not directly involved, issues are over- simplified and a genuine schism would be more apt to cleave along other lines than those stated. This applies sometimes to the viewpoints of both Realists and Opportunists. Examples are the favoring of an attack on Tito (51), the reasons for calling off such an attack (33), the cleavage on further Chinese expansion (19), future action in Indo-China, Hong Kong and Formosa (53), and the policy towards the satellites (54). The realities involved, such as the intervention of the Seventh Fleet in Formosa and the fact that the Soviets are not being forced into either contrasting policy in the satellites, are missing. 8. Khruschev is something more than a colorless careerist, for, regardless of results, he has shown ability in agricultural planning and general administration. Russian officers have told me that Vasilievskii does not represent the Army, but is as much of a politico as Bulganin (60). 9. Among the minor inconsistencies and misstatements is that the satellites were exploited at the expense of devastated Soviet territory (2b), expectation of help from international Zionism (34), and US need to withdraw troops from Korea for the rearmament drive elsewhere (36). 10. Other explanations than those given sometimes seem to fit the facts and the situation better, such as the reason for Mao's visit to'Moscow (20)and anti-Semitism (34). The Koniev plan for overrunning Europe may have existed (10), but it is a normal function of the military to make plans within the limits of their capabilities. Whether or not they are seriously considered for implementation is another question. It is probable that Kuznetsov and the old army chiefs do not always fully support Molotov (61), but this does not necessarily mean a Politburo split. 11. The document is lengthy, and very much of it is not subject to these objections. Much of it can well be accurate. Even the grouping of personalities may be true, but if so it would be on different issues and different platforms. A doubtful point which seems to be capable of authoritative - 3 - Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved For Rase 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172RQ.W400130011-3 TOP SECI.ET independent intelligence checking is that regarding Communist strength. among the Indians of Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil and Chile (47). A genuine schism might arise on the subject of military security versus ideological security in Germany (50), and there is undoubtedly more than one opinion on how best to exploit Communist gains and successes (5). 1 believe that it is very true that no firm decisions or blue prints have been made by the Politburo, and that that has a continuing impact in the satellites, including China, and in the little Polit?buros of all the Communist parties of the world (64). I do not believe, however, that there is any fundamental struggle in the Politburo for acceptance of a Plan with a capital ?'P", but that instead the Russians will continue to be opportunists and adjust themselves with a high degree of flexibility to whatever comes as they have in the past, without changing 25X1Xtheir basic Communist aims, intentions and orientation. 12. This document, in my opinion, is an able and probably sincere effort to construct what goes on in the Politburo, based on rumour, gossip, and information which is probably classified. I do not think that any such individual has access, classified or otherwise, to what really goes on in the Politburo. Too much of the document is not understanding, sincere Communist, and too much of it is in conformity with Western patterns of thought rather than Russian. It is recommended that the alignment of individuals, but not their supposed viewpoints or powers, be kept in mind as a possibility. 25X1A 25X1A 1.1. Since preparing the foregoing, I have read the very able analysis done by CIA's organization which takes into account external rather than internal evidence. The only comment I have to make on that analysis is that it may lay too much stress on the discrepancy between the announced role of the Cominform and the role implied in the document under discussion. It would not only be contrary to Communist training and doctrine for the Cominform to adhere to its publicized functions, but most of those particular inconsist- encies disappear when one accepts the high probability that the influential members of the Cominform can and will continue to function in a broad area as Communists under a different hat. In any event, strongly reinforces the conclusions which I have drawn above. - 4 - Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved L Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91 T014,iP2R000400130011-3 TOP SECRET Appendix )[V: Analysis by the Office of Current Intelligence, CIA 15 March 1952 1. This is one of several similar reports supporting one school of thought which interprets Soviet policy in the post- war period as indecisive because of an as yet unresolved split within the Politburo over the degree of militant action to be risked in pursuing the USSR's ultimate goal. In some versions, the split purportedly is on the level below the Politburo itself. All these reports suffer because they give the unmistakable impression of being generally too "pat." In most cases the sources purporting to possess this information could hardly have come by it in the normal course of events. There are also certain contradictions in this source's account of^Y,I'l 25X1X be accurately informed. 2. This report must remain speculative since indecisiveness and a deep policy split are by no means the only possible explanations for recent Soviet policy and tactics. 3. It should be pointed out that the introductory para- graph to this report describes it as "source's personal interpre- tation of what he has read and 'heard." It could, of course, be a plant; if so, it is a carefully thought-out one. if it 25X1X is a bona fide report F_ I it should be regarded as an evaluation by a man in an excellent position to see, hear and read of, in much more detail than anyone this side of the Iron Curtain, the development of Soviet policy and intentions. As such it must be seriously treated and carefully checked. The interpretations which this report sets forth often run parallel to speculation in this country over the Kremlin's apparent hesitation in the face of growing Western strength and increasing Western effectiveness. 4. For comments on details of this report, see attached annex. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved Fo*Release 20f)~8/~~-RDP91 T011 X000400130011-3 25X1A COMMENTO REPORT ON "EVENTS LEADING UP 1. Much of the paper could have been written from hind- sight, that is from the record of current history since 1945 and an assumption that if a split had existed in the Politburo throughout this period, the conflicting views could have been 25X1X as the source describes them. 3. The present report is more ambitious than most of this series, since it draws up two Politburo groups, nearly equal in, size, and alleges that this division has existed since World War Ii with no significant change in the composition of the conflicting parties. The contrasting positions of these groups on most of the issues in Soviet relations with the West are presented and show a nearly superhuman consistency over a period of six years. 4. No evidence is available with which to evaluate the information in such reports as to the various individual opinions of Politburo members or the cliques into which they might be split. Party discipline and the principle of "demo- cratic centralism" assure presentation of a united front to the world after a decision is made, regardless of divisions prior to the decision. 5. It is also unlikely that a split in the Politburo would be revealed to even as important an outsider as Mao, or that the latter could directly determine Soviet policy (paras. 23 and 26). In fact, it would have been imprudent at any time to strengthen Mao's bargaining position by making a split Politburo so clearly evident to him? Needless to say, the Soviet regime would do everything to avoid the eventuality described in par. 64 of the report, in which the Approved For Release 2002t08f1t CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved For*,Qrelease 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91 T011700400130011-3 TOP SECRET 25X1X split is pictured as common knowledge in Satellite govern- ments and in "little Politburos" all over the world. 6. The report also asserts that the division runs through Communism outside Russia (par. 39), but formal divisions along the line described are not known to exist outside the Orbit. In view of numerous other reports on disagreements within the parties, such a split presumably would have become known. 7. Since the source of this report it is extrem-ly unlikely that he would have accurate information on deliberations in the Soviet Politburo. There is no evidence available to substantiate the all-important role the source attributes to Beriya as a mediator between the factions and as the man responsible for the truce negotiations (paras 30 and 36). 8. The source's statement that Stalin lost confidence in himself as a result of the unexpected UN intervention in Korea (par. 30) is less likely to be a fact than a reflection of loss of confidence in him on the part of some Satellite officials. 9. In treating the whole postwar picture, the source is often inaccurate in his timing of events. Thus he places the wave of anti-semitism in the USSR in 1950 or early 1951 when it actually occurred in early 1949 (par. 34), and Molotov's conversion to the need of Korean truce talks in July 1951, (see par. 35), when it would seem probable that the shift must have occurred considerably prior to Malik's June 23 speech. 10. In the source's account of events which influenced Soviet :foreign policy or revealed the split in the Politburo, there are certain surprising omissions. The source does not discuss the Kremlin attitude toward dealing with Tito prior to the :latter's break with the USSR, or the Paris conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers in the spring of 1951, or the Japanese Peace Conference of September 1951. 11, There are certain contradictions in the source's 25X1C account of meetings or plans on which should The accurately informed? The source makes reference To plans to be carried out by "Cominform headquarters" in the Near East and in Latin America (par. 47), We have no evidence that the Cominform -- Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties -- sponsors covert activities, formulates any phase of international Communist policy, or that it has headquarters or branches other than in Bucharest. The function of the Cominform today apparently is to publicize propaganda and ideological guidance through the journal it issues from Approved For Release 2002/0'8/2`1 CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved W Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T092R000400130011-3 TOP SECRET Bucharest. In fact, the nine member parties have held no known meeting since November,1949. The source's account of Cominform activities contrasts with a report based on an interrogation of Arnost Heidrich, former Secretary-General of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs who defected in November 1948. When questioned regarding the role of the Cominform, Heidrich remarked that it is a front organization designed primarily for the spread of propaganda. Heidrich elaborated that controls are exercised over national. Communist parties through more direct channels from the Soviet Communist Party. The source mentions "Cominform centers" in Addis Ababa and Accra (par. 47 from which a "racial revolt" in Africa will be directed, but no such Cominform centers are known to exist. The Soviet Union itself maintains missions in Africa located in Cairo, Pretoria, and Addis Ababa. The Soviet establishment in Addis Ababa consists of a legation, hospital and reading room, with a staff of possibly 20 to 30, which is large, but not much out of proportion in view of the outside activities. This mission is not a Cominform center, but has contributed to Soviet propaganda and subversive activity in Central and East Africa. There are indications that it has the role of a transmission center for propaganda and for contact with front groups and Communist parties in such places as Eritrea, British Somaliland and the Belgian Congo. It is in contact with the Soviet Consulate in Pretoria, South Africa, as well. There is no Soviet mission of any sort at Accra. A check of the file on Communism in the Gold Coast discloses no reference whatsoever to a Cominform center there. Its existence is improbable on general grounds. There is also a specific reason for believing its existence improbable. This consists of specific infor- mation on the nature of the outlet for distributing Communist literature in September 1950 period, when the present native nationalist leaders were in jail instead of running the govern- ment. 25X10 lidentified this outlet as the "New African Literature House" and evaluated the firm as "interested primarily in the financial return of.the sale of these publi- cations rather than in the content." 12. The source reports the results of a Moscow meeting in the early spring of 1950 of "a plenary session of the Politburo and Cominform in Moscow" (paras. 23 to 26). This vastly exaggerates the role of the Cominform, of whose true nature a Satellite official might be expected to be aware. Instead of presenting it as a periodic instrument for the glorification of Soviet policy, he makes it a sort of inter- national counterpart of the Politburo -- more like the Comin- tern of the 1920's. 25X1X 13. Although I I may have received information concerning a USSR-Satellite meeting, the list of Approved For Release 2002!081? CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved Fsp Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91 T0W2R000400130011-3 TOP SECRET subjects discussed reflects certain obvious characteristics of the international situation of early 1950, with the possible exception of "American military arrangements in Germany, Japan, and Spain" and the location of atomic experiments in Siberia (par. 24). 14. The report does not contain a clear statement on the likelihood of war during the next several years. How- ever, since the source alleges that the "opportunist" group is now in power (par. 40), war in 1952 is considered not intended and not probable even though remaining a possibility. The policies ascribed to the "realist" group does not appear from the report to have had predominant power since the fall of 1950. 15. The apocalyptic long-range prophecy of paras. 56 and 57 contrasts markedly with par. 59 and does little but weaken the report as a whole. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/25: CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000400130011-3 ApprovedrFror Re@W/0M~LLCI&EIWWbb72RQW400130011-3 CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY SECURITY INFORMATION 25X1A INFORMATION REPORT REPORT NO. CD NO. COUNTRY U.S?S.R. SUBJECT Events Leading Up to a Split in. the Soviet Communist Leadership DATE OF INFO. I I 25X1A PLACE ACQUIRED STATE EV ARMY E V DATE DISTR. 5 March 1952 NO. OF PAGES 11 NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) ' SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. 25X1 X 1. Russian Communist leaders of the Politburo are agreed that: a. World revolution, as the final result of the class struggle in modern society, will be a political achievement arising out of the social conditions created by the brutality and selfishness of the capitalist system. In the last phase, when all other devices leading to world revolution have been exhausted, there will be militant action by the revolting masses. (Marx, 1859) b. The world revolution will take place as the final result of an accumu- lation of minor revolutionary actions on the part of the masses, organized and led by the Communist party, which has taken over the command of the working classes in modern society. It will be fought out in a cycle of world wars, the last of which will develop as a war of continents, with the two Americas as agents of capitalism against Eurasia as the defender of Communism, and Africa as an important and probably decisive battleground. (Lenin, 1917) c. World revolution, as the end-product of the growing force and influ- ence of the Soviet Union to a position of leadership in the progressive part of mod- ern society, can be achieved without direct Soviet participation in the cycle of world wars. The Soviet must, however, supply the strongest possible impetus and produce the disintegration and collapse of capitalism. For tactical reasons conces- sions and delays may be countenanced to make it appear that capitalism and CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET/CONTROL -U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY NU roV AIR FBI '~P X002 R?I I Approved rb Rel $ / NTM-"TT40J,0~4.Qg130011-3 TOP_SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY 25X1A D Communism.. can co-exist in the world, provided that these tactics serve the ulti- mate purpose. (Stalin, 11936) . 2. The-Politburo has been forced to take cognizance of new basic developments occurring during the period of the Second World War, as .follows; a. The invention of atomic weapons, which rendered Lenin's cycle of world wars an impossibility, limiting the number of future world wars to one or two. This accelerates the approach of the last phase of the world crisis, which began in 191.4. b. The unexpectedly great Soviet territorial gains and political successes, which have brought with them the necessity of exploitation at the expense of the reconstruction of devastated Soviet territory. Victory in the final clash between capitalism and Communism has thus become a much more immediate reality than could have been anticipated. 3. In consequence of these developments, the Politburo decided in 1945 not to disarm, but to keep 'the largest possible portion of the Soviet Army. in a state of immediate readiness, and to set up the Kominform,as its new instrument of aggressive international Communism. 4. These decisions, based upon the suppositions of a guaranteed internal secur- ity for the Soviet Union and the submissive attitude of the satellites, had the practical re- sult of greatly increasing the personal power of Beria, then head of the Soviet Police. He was entrusted with the direction of all of the.Soviet system. 5. From 1945 on, there have developed wide divergences within the Politburo with regard to the best method of exploiting the territorial gains and political successes ob- tained by the Soviet. These changes. destroyed the old.-balance of power and made a change in Communist tactics an obvious necessity. Two different schools of Communist thought arose with regard to the best tactical method of bringing about world Communism. 6, The realist school considers the world situation, as produced by the Second World War, ripe for immediate revolutionary action, even at the risk of war. 7. The opportunist school considers the world situation, as produced by the Second World War, one which offers opportunities for indirect revolutionary action, which need not risk war, 8. These, divergencies within the Politburo appeared originally in disputes on fundamental theoretical questions between Zhdanov and Andreiev, but without affecting prat- tical Soviet policy. Mikoyan, who urged the revival of economic cooperation between East and West, was one of the first to adopt the opportunist point of view publicly, and produced some effects on. practical policy. 9. During the 1945-1946 period of preparation for the peace settlements there were clashes between the Soviet and its war-time allies about such questions as the adminis- tration of Germany, the future of Trieste and the Italian colonies, Poland, etc. These clashes produced further divergencies in the Politburo about the tactics to be followed by Communists throughout the world., about principles to be defended and measures to be taken at the Paris peace conference of 1946.. Molotov, after arguing in vain with American .Secretary of.State Byrnes and British Foreign Minister Bevin, reached the conclusion that the post-war world situation, dominated by Soviet military supremacy and economic confu- sion in the capitalist states, could not be exploited by bargaining measures unless these were accompanied by intimidation. He accordingly took over the leadership of the realist group in the Politburo, whose conceptions may be defined as follows: TOP SECRET/CONTROL e U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000400130011-3 Approve4.6or R!~~nM~(I0Z/qN'lEai?VMJPII"00130011-3 TOP SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY 25X1A a. Any delay may help the West to find its way out of its difficulties and to recover its strength. b. Communist military action would not inevitably be answered by the West with war, but on the contrary, could extract from the West new compromises for the benefit of the Soviet. c? Even if a new world war took place, the Soviet armies could rapidly overrun Eurasia. d. If Eurasia were occupied, the chances of the powerless and surprised USA accepting a truce would be greater than ever before. e. A respite, lasting perhaps several decades, would thus be gained, in which the Soviet orbit could be immensely reinforced in preparation for the final clash. 10. The Soviet General Staff shared Molotovns disillusionment with the result of the Paris conference. It began at once to work out the so-called Koniev plan. for overrunning Europe. A whole generation o:f Soviet diplomats (Zorin, Gromyko, Malik) adopted a strong line, and Soviet policy noticeably hardened. 1 1. During the same period of preparations for the peace settlement the.first con- n.rete political penetrations on a large scale were made in such defeated capitalist countries as France and. Italy. Meanwhile Soviet Communist Party officials took over the direction of Soviet public life from the military leaders, regarding the latter as nationalistic and politi- cally unreliable. The propaganda and doctrinal drive in Russia was revived at the same time as conspiratorial and subversive activities abroad, and Malenkov, as the Soviet Communist Party leader and spokesman, became more and more involved in this activity. The careless, ness with which the West permitted the Soviet to take over all capittlist positions in Central and Southeast Europe was regarded by Malenkov and his followers as indisputable evidence of the decadence of the West. This political and economic disintegration in capitalist countries has long been. a dogma of the Communist faith as announcing the forth-coming revolutionary victory of the working classes of the world, 12. ..Dealing with such leaders as Thorez, Togliatti, Gottwa ld, "Pieck, Bierut, Rakosi, Ho .Chi Minh, when invited to Moscow for conferences, Ma.lenkov reached the con- clusion that the world situation. could best be exploited by promoting social disturbances in capitalist countries. He considered that this world situation was dominated by Communist superiority in political prestige, resulting from Communist participation in the resistance movements against German and Japanese occupations, and Communist readiness everywhere to submit to the working classes solid, attractive, and progressive economic programs, in comparison to the programless and. backward capitalist leadership. As instrumentalities Malenkov looked forward to continuous cycles of strikes, eventuating in revolts and civil warn--instrumentalities which do not depend upon the use of other, more drastic and ag- gressive procedures. The use of such aggressive means, Malenkov believed,. might pro- voke the awakening of the capitalist warmongers and bring about armed conflict. Such con- flict would unnecessarily endanger the class struggle. Malenkov was thus led to reject any concept of military action, since the result of World Communism .could better be attained by peaceful means. Asa result Malenkov became the leader of the opportunist group in the Politburo., whose concepts may be summed up as follows: a. The revival of capitalist society in the West is impossible and its decline cannot be arrested. b. Revolutionary action cannot be resisted successfully by the weak- ened bourgeoisie, and will be vigorously supported by the working classes, who are psychologically weary of war. TOP SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY 3- Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved?Fpor Rt0.R/01 EILAfLfEliP9C1p*400130011-3 TOP SECIET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY 25X1A c. Even though the risk of revived Fascist reactionism in capitalist countries is run, Eurasia could quickly be overrun by organized peoples' revolts at any time. d, The USA would surely accept a truce if Eurasia became Communist through the revolutionary action of the masses, since an economic crisis would develop there. e. A respite of some decades would be gained in this way,. -and could be used to undermine the white man's posit;.-. )n in Africa through propaganda for Islamic and Negro freedom, and in the same way a foothold could be gained in 1 South America before the final, clash. 13. Sharing Nialenkov's belief in theefficacy of conspiratorial and subversive ac- tion are such economists as Varga, such publicists as Ehrenburg, and the numerous agents in Western countries. 14. After the Paris Peace Conference ended in October, 1946, the division with- in the Politburo took more precise form in the attitude toward social conditions in Russia and the orbit states. The realist (Molotov) group, discounting the belief in a world crisis of capitalist society, insisted on the dangers arising from the inactivity of the Soviet Army and the-.-failure. of-Soviet workers to obtain the promised benefits. The opportunist group considered the world crisis of capitalism as imminent, basing this ;judgment upon the numerous (distorted or fabricated) reports of hunger and unemployment in Western coun- tries. These 'rfacts, " which made Soviet life .attractive in comparison, were presented at public meetings, in the press, on stage and screen, so often and so effectively th.t there arose-a, degree of self-4eception, in which the illusions invented by them about the West became realities .for the very inventors. Varga, the economist, early deserted the oppor- tunist group, and other quarrels arose which called for Stalin's intervention. 15. Thanks to Beria's guarantee of 1946 that by 1950, at the latest, the Soviet would have adequate strength in atomic research and weapons, Stalin decided to consider the period 1946-1950 as a transitional epoch in which there would be achieved: a. The recovery of the Soviet Union. b. The absorption of the satellites. c. The maintenance of Soviet military strength. d.. The political and economic undermining of the West. 16. In a practical sense, Stalin's decision failed to bridge the gap between the realist and opportunist groups. It merely offered both an opportunity to make the best of conditions, but it was not made clear to both that armed conflict with the West should not be involved. 17. This. two-.fold. policy of the Soviet Communist Party, resulting from Stalin's decision, brought about defeats for each group during the transitional epoch. The realist group was defeated on the Berlin blockade and with regard to Tito's defection, which demon- strated the dangers of the accidental outbreak of the clash with the West. The opportunist group was defeated on the Italian elections and in the expulsion of the Communists from .Ramaelier's government in France, which demonstrated the limits of Communist infiltra- tion of the West. Both groups shared. responsibility for the absorption of Czechoslovakia, which represented a gain., but also aroused Western suspicion to the point of rearmament. TOP SECRE'T'/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3 Approved;FOr Re' OA2LO%~ kcIAL- 91GTjTd? 4P0130011--3 TOP SE ET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY 25X1A 18. The fundamental rift in Russian. Communist policy, which threatened to cause internal struggles in Communist parties throughout the world, flared up again after the vic- tory of Mao Tse-tung Communist armies in China. This was accepted by the whole Politburo as the greatest event in the history of world Communism since the outbreak of the Russian revolution in 1917. Asia has always been considered by..Soviet strategists as at least equiva- lent to Europe in importance for Communist. world. conquest, and was accepted by all Soviet leaders as the preliminary battlefield of the Communist world revolution. The conquest of China thus offered a suddgn opportunity to begin an armed attack on. the whole of Asia, or at least a general revolutionary movement. The Politburo was unanimous in believing that the abandonment of widespread Asiatic territories by American capitalist interests and the weak- ness of the defenses of British, French, and Dutch imperialists, offered good chances for the successful exploitation of the triumph of the Chinese Communist armies. But the two Politburo groups diverged sharply on the tactics to be employed in this exploitation, and two different proposals were laid before Stalin. 19. The realists asked immediate military intervention in favor of the revolting Asiatic peoples, while the opportunists asked for a pause in Chinese expansion and the con- solidation of ground already gained. 20. The struggle between the two groups became very acute, and in the late au- tumn of 1949 Stalin decided to invite Mao Tse-tung to Moscow for consultation. 21. Molotov, without binding the Soviet to direct action, presented h 4o Tse-tung with the arguments that military action in Asia could not be opposed by' the weakened: and de - pressed. West and would therefore involve no risk of world war; and.. that Chinese' military ac- tion in Asia would be the starting point of a general Asiatic revolution which could not be restrained by the West and. therefore Asia would be won for Communism without a world war. 22. Malenkov distrusted a successful Oriental and. non-Russian Communist, and offered Mao Tse-tung the arguments that the Chinese Communist victory,would in any case have revolutionary consequences among Asiatic peoples, consequences which could not be resisted by the West; and that Chinese Communist victory in Asia requires a recovered China for the final clash with capitalism. 23. No agreement between the two groups could be reached, and Mao Tse-tung de- manded a guarantee of Soviet help in case of a conflict resulting from Chinese military or revolutionary actions in Asia. In the early spring of 1950 Stalin convoked a plenary session of the Politburo and Kominform in Moscow, inviting Mao Tse-tung. Stalin directed. the de- bate ruthlessly, in his. desire to decisions on the fundamental items of Commu- nist world policy and to end, once and for all, the debate between the two groups, which had spread into the Kominform. Stalin himself summed up the evoluti n of the international situation as consisting of the running out of the period of absolute soviet military supremacy and. the postponement of all immediate chances of world crisis by American economic pros-, perity. 24. At the meeting there were also considered. the following developments in the Soviet orbit: a. The successful experiments with atomic weapons, in Siberia under Beria's supervision. b. The quick recovery of China, which was not deprived of important strategic materials from Western sources. c. The promising results of the drive for industrialization. among the satellites, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia. TOP SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALQ ONLY Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000400130011-3 Approved FelelQ~Q~$fICif~~R11i4130011-3 TOP SECRET/CONTROL m U.S. OFFICIA,Lu ONLY 25X1A 25. The following points with relation to the capitalist countries were considered. a. The positive results of Marshall Plan aid among the Western coun- tries, bringing Communist agitation there to a standstill. b. The dangers resulting from American military arrangements in Germany, Japan, and Spain. c, The possibilities of the contagious-influence of Tit& heresy among Western Communist parties. 26. Some spokesmen from both groups :desired. priority to be given to Yugoslatvia. Stalin decided against intervention there,. prepared militarily.. from ,Hungary-.and"Aulgaria, ?a internally by revolutionary movements in Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia,, iha'nks to . Mao"use-tungos insistence that the Soviet concentrate on Asia. . Stalin decided upon Asia as" the most fruitful field. for Communist expansion, as being ceuntermmoves; South Korea was selected because it was oconsidered, the Americans were not interested, due to the unsatisfactory peace settlement there, and -ready to?.acce t a Communist fait accompli, because South Korea was considered militarily unprepared an politically weakened by the corrupt pseudo-democratic regime; because militarnterven- tioan. by North Korean troops was expected to develop into a -revolution; and. because victory in South Korea, achieved without any risk of world war, was considered as a useful means of strengthening the, prestige- of the Soviet Union and China and preparing for further moves 27. TIje choice of South Korea gave particular satisfaction to the realist g rou ending the period of time wasted in vain ws,itinga but also satisfied o Pa cause of the -reva~lutionar the Ppaxtunists, 16e _ sponsibility for the decis n to begin external military intervention in south urea the re_ new stage of revolutionary action in Asia. Korea as the 28. America?s immediate and vigorous military intervention in.South Korea had disastrous effects on the new Soviet world strategy Not one of the assumptions behind Stalinas decision to allow the North rear at world poliry, tack true, Bulganin now came .forward on behalf of the realist group, blaming the half-measure prove resulting from the -eternal braking action of the o es and Soviet participation in the conflict, ppiOrtcmists, and demanding open Chinese prolongation of which was increasing the ?iak of world war. Mikoyan proposed immediate mediation through India. He declared that the North Korean attack, which proved neither quick nor efficient enough to produce a revolu- tionary movement in South Korea, was adding nothing to Communist prestige in the world; that in the long run it would put Communism in the position of being the .ag ressor and would endanger Chinats vital traffic with the West in strategic materials by way of Hong Kong. 29. The Politburo was forced to reconsider the whole world situatian in the light of the .following .factors. a. Stali&s first major politico-military error, which weakened his hitherto spotless reputation as a wartime leader and guarantor of Soviet unity. .b. The influence of the creation of a battlefield in which Americans were directly involved, with the initiative removed from Soviet hands. c. The influence of starting the American rearmament drive, most feared by Soviet leaders, which changes the world balance of power to the detri- ment of the Soviet. TOP SECRET/CONTROL _ U, S. OFFICIALS ONLY _6_ Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000400130011-3 Approve or F (W0jg/( %4,1 LCLAt@p1 0400130011-3 TOP SECRET /CONTROL ?U, S, c~l