SYMPOSIUM OF COMMENTS ON((SANITIZED) OF 5 MARCH, 1952, 'EVENTS LEADING UP TO A SPLIT IN THE SOVIET COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP.'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000400130011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 10, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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16
10 April 1952
25X1A
25X1X
25X1X
TO: Director, Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
FROM: Assistant Director, Current Intelligence
SUBJECT: Symposium of Comments on of 5 March, 1952,
"Events Leading up to a Split in the Soviet Communist
Leadership."
This report was the subject of comment by Mr. Charles E.
Bohlen, Counsellor of the Department of State, by Mr. George F
Kennan, Ambassador-designate to the Soviet Union, by
25X1A
.u_ 1r itl a 11C%.1, , 4 UU
by the Office of Current Intelligence, CIA. The comments
showed almost complete unanimity on the report as a whole. The
following points emerge from these analyses:
1. Like other documents which purport to describe a split
in the Soviet leadership, this report suffers by being too "pat,"
too oversimplified.
2. The sources which claim access to information of this
sort could hardly have come by it in the normal course of
events. In particular, it is doubtful that they could know
in detail of any split in the Politburo. Whatever its pre-
liminary differences of opinion may be, the Politburo presents
a united front once a decision has been reached.
3. This report contains contradictions and inconsist-
encies which would hardly be present in an evaluation by any
individual in a position really to know about the workings
of the inner circle.
4. It should be borne in mind, however,
is admittedly
r
scraps
f ha d i
f
o
n
o -
mation, considerable hindsight, and much hearsay. On this
basis it is a shrewd and probably
honest ev
l
ti
opportunity
Following
analyses.
a
ua
on by a man
whose position gives him as good an
observation as is permitted to any outsider.
are brief general comments taken from the four
T a. Te a / Al
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25X1 C
25X1X
Da!c: By: 911----
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In summary, this analysis appears to be an extremely
intelligent reconstruction based on discussion, gossip, some
information and working backward from events ......... It cannot
be taken at its face value but it is a very shrewd bit of
deductive reasoning. In its main conclusions I would say
that it was probably nearer right than wrong........'' (Mr.
Bohlen based the last sentence on three points in the report:
that in varying degree, both alleged factions desire to avoid
war; that Stalin remains the unquestioned arbiter, above all
subordinates; that the ascendency of the more cautious group
is borne out in Soviet policy since Korea.)
Mr. Kennan, agreeing in general with these points, added:
"The source of this report appears to forget the important
fact that when policy decisions are taken by the Politburo on
specific, problems (and I do not believe that decisions are
taken any other way) the question at issue is regarded as
settled and no longer a fit subject for discussion or debate,
and it is defended from that time on by all. members of the
Buro. The result is that differences of views must always be
restricted to the specific plane of the new question on the
docket and can never attain the sweep of views professing to
have historic depth."
25X1A
"This document, in my opinion, is an able and probably
25X1X sincere effort to construct what goes
on in the Politburo, based on rumor, gossip, and information
which is probably .classified. I do not think that any such
individual has access, classified or otherwise, to what really
goes on in the Politburo. Too much of the document is not
understanding, sincere Communist, and too much of it is in
conformi.ty with Western patterns of thought rather than Russian."
25X1X The tl/CI comment stated:
"Ii; it is a bona fide report it
should be regarded as an evaluation by a man in an excellent
position to see, hear and read of, in much more detail than
anyone this side of the Iron Curtain, the development of
Soviet policy and intentions ..... _The interpretations which
m
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this report sets :forth often run parallel to speculation
in this country over the Kremlin's apparent hesitation in
the face of growing Western strength and increasing Western
effectiveness,"
The four comments are appended to this symposium.
25X1A
KINGMAN DOA ASS
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Appendix I. Analysis by her. Charles E. Bohlen
March 17, 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH,
Director of Central Intelligence,
25X1A I x read and reread this extremely interesting report
I I concerning the divergent points of view within
the Politburo and their resolution by Stalin. The author is
obvious:Ly a man exceptionally well informed on doctrine,
bolshev'.ik thought processes and the top mechanism of the Soviet
Government. He appears also to have considerable knowledge as
to the personalities directly involved. There is nothing in
this analysis which directly contradicts what we know from
other sources concerning the individuals and their beliefs.
The account, however, appears to be too pat and over-precise
to be accepted at full face value It is highly unlikely
25X1X that would
have access to such complete information as the proceedings
inside the Politburo as to be so categoric as to the exact
positions taken by its various members on what are clearly
the most secret debates on the most important issues in that
body.
My general impression therefore is that this is an extremely
intelligent reconstruction of what probably happened, working
backward somewhat from the events and basing this analysis, as
indicated above, on a first-rate understanding of bolshevik
thought and on the type of specular discussion which undoubtedly
has been proceeding in Cominfo:rm circles in satellite countries
plus, I should say, some scraps of hard information which provide
the part of the skeleton on which this analysis is built. In
one sense the division into the "realist" and "opportunist"
schools is a rather curious terminology. What appears to have
been at issue would perhaps best be described by those who
believe that the world situation was still in a revolutionary
:flow, i.e., the opportunists, and those who believe that world
capitalism was entering a period of relative stabilization
and revolutionary ebb, the realists. There is a further sub-
division stemming directly from these two divergent; analyses
concerning direct action versus indirect revolutionary exploi-
tation. From other and obviously equally uncertain information
it would appear that the leaders of the two schools, were Zhdanov
on the one hand and Malenkov on the other rather than Zhdanov
and Andreiev as indicated on page two, paragraph 8, although
subsequently, in the development of the dispute it is correctly
stated that Malenkov came to head the so-called opportunistic
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:school, i.e., the school that believed that capitalism was
not capable of a new period of-stabilization. I believe the
analysis of the division as set forth in paragraph 14, page 4,
is convincing since it centers around their difference in
estimate of the state of world capitalism plus a reference to
what undoubtedly was a very controlling factor, the effect
inside the Soviet Union of one course of action as against
another. The absence elsewhere of emphasis on the influence
of domestic considerations is one of the chief weaknesses of
this paper. The description, although probably imaginative,
as to how Stalin dealt with these divergent tendencies in the
politburo is, I believe, fully in accord with what we know
from Stalin's technique of Government. I am also very much
impressed with the description of the considerations allegedly
advanced by both sides as to the Asian opportunities offered
by the Communist victory in China and again by Stalin's
resolution of the dispute. I found also particularly con-
vincing the basis for Stalin's decision to go into South Korea
as a sort of semi-compromise between the two schools (para-
graph 26, page 6). These considerations are particularly
valuable since they give greater emphasis to the so-called
revolutionary aspects of the South Korean venture which I have
always felt had not received sufficient attention in our
analysis of Soviet motives in setting off the North Korean
attack. The failure of all assumptions to,materialize as
anticipated in the South Korean affair is, I believe, un-
doubtedly true. All our information and the course of Soviet
action since U.S. action in Korea seem to bear out the main
thesis that the whole South Korean thing was a major politico-
mili.tary, error which drastically and adversely affected the
policies of the Kremlin. The most interesting part of the
analysis is, of course, in paragraph 30, page 7, when Beria
allegedly standing outside of the two factions (this is question-
able) laid down the three main considerations governing Soviet
action at the present time. There are certain points of
detail on which this is questionable, such as placing Ehrenburg
in the camp of the opportunists whereas his wartime attitude
in regard to Germany, which required public chastisement at
the hands of Alexandrov in the spring of 1945, would not
logically put him in this group, and also the evident contra-
diction in regard to Bulganin's position (paragraph 28, page 6)
who demanded open Soviet participation in the Korean conflict
on the grounds that its prolongation increased the risk of
world war.
Whatever its authenticity, I believe the description of
how the world looks to the politburo as of January 1952 (para-
graphs 42 through 55) is a very acute analysis. I would very
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much doubt, however, whether, as stated in paragraph 56 on
page 10, the so-called realist group believed that it would
be possible to have a world war in the period 1954 to 1958
followed by an armistice which would then last for some 20 years.
That seems to me to be an extremely infantile conception, given
the status of modern weapons.
The description of the status of power of the chief
individuals concerned (paragraphs 60 through 63, page 11) is
perfectly good speculation but by no means the only possible
one. The present indications would show that Malenkov is
for the moment riding considerably ahead of Molotov.
In summary, this analysis appears to be an extremely
intelligent reconstruction based on discussion, gossip, some
information and working backward from events. In fact, in the
description of the source, it is stated that the author based
his analysis on what he had read and heard. It cannot be
taken at its face value but it is a very shrewd bit of
deductive reasoning. In its main conclusions I would say
that it was probably nearer right than wrong since it emphasizes
the following fundamental points:
1. Both factions are eager to avoid a world war although
the so-called realists would be prepared to take
greater risks in this regard than the opportunists;"
2. Despite the blow to his prestige in the Korean blunder,
Stalin still remains the unquestioned arbiter,
standing above all subordinates;
3. The victory of the opportunist or more cautious school
appears to be confirmed up to the present by the
course of Soviet policy since Korea and also by the
recent emphasis in top Soviet speeches on the colonial
and semi-colonial areas.
From this report and other information it would appear highly
important: to assemble and keep under constant review any
information concerning the respective positions of Molotov
on the one hand and Malenkov on the other. At the present
time all information points to the rise of Malenkov and the
eclipse, possibly temporarily, of Molotov. If this process
was reversed, it might foreshadow a shift towards the school
for direct action.
George Kennan is at present in Princeton and unless you
think it urgent that some special courier take this up to him,
we will have to await his return to Washington, now set for the
second of April, in order to get his appraisal.
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Appendix Analysis by Ambassador George F. Kennan
Date: April 3, 1952
To: Mr. Bohlen
From: George F. Kennan
My views about this paper coincide very closely with those
ven on 'page 3 of your memorandum to General Smith of March 17.
25X1X I think this document was drafted by a peripheral character
who had picked up a good deal of
gossip and was a fairly shrewd Judge of what was going on,
although probably without adequate background as to the pre-
World War II history of the Soviet regime and Soviet foreign
policy.
The issue he has stressed, namely that of the-interpre-
tation of the trend of events in capitalist society, is un-
doubtedly correctly portrayed as the central issue of interpre-
tation agitating --- and doubtless dividing, on many occasions ?--
the members of the Politburo. This, however, is by no means a
recent phenomenon. The failure of the world revolution to
follow the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1918 has always been
the central fact in the foreign policy of the Soviet regime,
and the prospects for the disintegration or consolidation,
respectively, of capitalist society has always been, I feel
sure, the central problem of analysis underlying the formulation
of Soviet foreign policy.
The account of specific issues arising for the Kremlin in
the period since 1945 and of the ways in which they have been
handled is extremely sketchy and often confused and over-
simplified. The real truth is unquestionably a far longer
and more complex story than this account would indicate. That
there are disagreements of the nature he describes, I would
not doubt; and that these differences center around the
respective views of Molotov and Malenkov is natural in view
of the relationship of those two men to the problem of suc-
cession; but I think we should be extremely cautious about
accepting, such material as real evidence of the positions of
the men in question. I suspect that such differences as they
may have would be found, if the truth were known, to be of
a much more subtle nature than is suggested here and to have
come out much more with relation to specific problems of
policy, rather than as general views. The source of this
report appears to forget the important fact that when policy
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decisions are taken by the Politburo on specific problems
(and I do not believe that decisions are taken any other way)
the question at issue is regarded as settled and no longer
a fit subject for discussion or debate and it is defended
from that time on by all members of the Buro. The result
is that differences of views must always be i?estricted to
the specific plane of the new question on the docket and can
never attain the sweep of views professing to have historic
depth.
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Appendix III: Analysis by
25X1A
1. The subject document is unusually interesting. The
probability of the existence of tensions and cross.-purposes
within the Politburo has long been recognized, but with the
exception of past purges and questionable cases, such as that
of Zhdanov, which, if they ever existed, have been resolved,
our knowledge of their actual existence, nature, points at
issue and groupings of personalities is, as far as I know,
a complete blank. If the content of this document is reliable,
its intelligence value is very high and could well have a,
major effect on our planning and action. I do not believe
that it merits such credibility.
2. In general, the viewpoint and reactions attributed
to the "'opportunists" are much closer to orthodox Bolshevik
thought than are those attributed to the "realists". I have
no doubt but that it is possible, given sufficient knowledge,
to group the Politburo into those who are inclined to favor
more aggressive policies and those who would act less boldly.
Such a grouping might also be a source of strain, but both
groups would view things in the light of long-accepted central
concepts, and the pattern of their divergences would depart
materially from that set forth. in this document. Neither
group would hold the view that their own masses would not
permit the use of atomic weapons (par. 55), and often the
view attributed to the Realists as being in opposition to
that of the Opportunists could not fail to be held by any
good Communist. Sometimes, as in the supposed contrast between
the USA and Socialists, (par. 58) the views of both groups are
actually orthodox and can be held simultaneously in the Russian
mind with no difficulty.
3. If a division as extreme as that which is portrayed
existed, the so-called Opportunists would be very apt to brand
their opponents as "opportunists" and themselves as "realists",
for some of the more important views attributed to the Realists
are so inconsistent with a very consistent Bolshevik pattern of
thought that those who held them would be regarded as adven-
turers. Those aspects of Realist thought seem to me to be
unnatural to a hard-core Communist (which must be a pre-
requisite for Politburo membership) and sometimes even un-
Russian.
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4. In the sense in which the Bolsheviks define the term,
it would take some unaccustomed wishful thinking to consider
the world situation ripe for immediate revolutionary action,
even without the risk of war (6). No true Bolshevik, even if
discouraged (and there is little to discourage them), could
consider that all political means leading to final Communist
victory had been exhausted (55), or seriously doubt that
there would be time before 1954-1958 to take measures to
interfere with a war initiated by the Americans (56). Nor would
,they consider that revolutionary intervention in favor of world
Communism, as distinct from military intervention, has become
so perilous as to constitute a major limitation (30 b), nor that
aid to bourgeois Islamic feudal lords or any of the bourgeoisie,
for that matter, need be unconditional (52).
5. The date of 1950 as one by which the recovery of the
Soviet Union and the absorption of the satellites would have
been achieved is not in accordance with realities, and would
not appear so to even an optimistic Soviet mind (15). Much
`different views are continually given to the Russian people
by their leaders, and one has only to live in Russia to know
that the time element is much longer. I believe that major
questions of policy are settled in the privacy of the Politburo,
and not in the broader publicity of joint meetings with the
Cominform and Chinese statesmen (23). There are ample means
other than external adventures for controlling the chronic
dangers arising from the inactivity of the Soviet Army and the
failure of Soviet workers to obtain the promised benefits (14).
I do not believe that the Soviet leaders have fallen into
self-deception by coming to believe their own propaganda, but
rather that they believe in the ultimate validity of its
orientation and aims and are completely conscious of its (to
them legitimate) distortion of supporting fact (14).
6. Many of these points seem to me to be very represent-
ative of viewpoints that are held by those who have not lived
for long in the Soviet Union and are not familiar with its
realities. They are part of the normal Western or non-Russian
thinking? The explanation of Thorez' presence in Moscow as a
make-weight for Eisenhower's presence in Europe (33) and
regarding Korea as Stalin's first major politico-military
error, together with its connotations (29a, 30, 60), seem to
me to be non-Russian interjections. There is reason to believe
that Russia's appraisal of atomic weapons is not consistent
with the absolute weapon (2a). Especially noteworthy is the
attribution to any hard-shell Communist of a belief that inter-
national problems could have been settled by their arguments
at the Paris conference (9), and to Molotov's disillusionment
(10). They just don't think that way.
ar
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7. Major considerations, notably problems of weaknesses
and limitations of a peculiarly Russian nature, are completely
untouched. In my opinion, the Politburo is well aware of them
and they would profoundly condition the thinking of the Realists
and be reflected in the issues under discussion. The problems
that would arise in the minds of any responsible Russian are
simplified out of existence. They know that there is more to
overrunning Eurasia than a purely military capability (9c).
Even when Russia is not directly involved, issues are over-
simplified and a genuine schism would be more apt to cleave
along other lines than those stated. This applies sometimes
to the viewpoints of both Realists and Opportunists. Examples
are the favoring of an attack on Tito (51), the reasons for
calling off such an attack (33), the cleavage on further Chinese
expansion (19), future action in Indo-China, Hong Kong and
Formosa (53), and the policy towards the satellites (54).
The realities involved, such as the intervention of the Seventh
Fleet in Formosa and the fact that the Soviets are not being
forced into either contrasting policy in the satellites, are
missing.
8. Khruschev is something more than a colorless careerist,
for, regardless of results, he has shown ability in agricultural
planning and general administration. Russian officers have told
me that Vasilievskii does not represent the Army, but is as much
of a politico as Bulganin (60).
9. Among the minor inconsistencies and misstatements is
that the satellites were exploited at the expense of devastated
Soviet territory (2b), expectation of help from international
Zionism (34), and US need to withdraw troops from Korea for
the rearmament drive elsewhere (36).
10. Other explanations than those given sometimes seem
to fit the facts and the situation better, such as the reason
for Mao's visit to'Moscow (20)and anti-Semitism (34). The
Koniev plan for overrunning Europe may have existed (10),
but it is a normal function of the military to make plans
within the limits of their capabilities. Whether or not they
are seriously considered for implementation is another question.
It is probable that Kuznetsov and the old army chiefs do not
always fully support Molotov (61), but this does not necessarily
mean a Politburo split.
11. The document is lengthy, and very much of it is not
subject to these objections. Much of it can well be accurate.
Even the grouping of personalities may be true, but if so it
would be on different issues and different platforms. A
doubtful point which seems to be capable of authoritative
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independent intelligence checking is that regarding Communist
strength. among the Indians of Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil and
Chile (47). A genuine schism might arise on the subject of
military security versus ideological security in Germany (50),
and there is undoubtedly more than one opinion on how best
to exploit Communist gains and successes (5). 1 believe that
it is very true that no firm decisions or blue prints have
been made by the Politburo, and that that has a continuing
impact in the satellites, including China, and in the little
Polit?buros of all the Communist parties of the world (64). I
do not believe, however, that there is any fundamental struggle
in the Politburo for acceptance of a Plan with a capital ?'P",
but that instead the Russians will continue to be opportunists
and adjust themselves with a high degree of flexibility to
whatever comes as they have in the past, without changing
25X1Xtheir basic Communist aims, intentions and orientation.
12. This document, in my opinion, is an able and probably
sincere effort to construct what goes on
in the Politburo, based on rumour, gossip, and information
which is probably classified. I do not think that any such
individual has access, classified or otherwise, to what really
goes on in the Politburo. Too much of the document is not
understanding, sincere Communist, and too much of it is in
conformity with Western patterns of thought rather than Russian.
It is recommended that the alignment of individuals, but not
their supposed viewpoints or powers, be kept in mind as a
possibility.
25X1A
25X1A
1.1. Since preparing the foregoing, I have read the very
able analysis done by CIA's organization which
takes into account external rather than internal evidence.
The only comment I have to make on that analysis is that it
may lay too much stress on the discrepancy between the announced
role of the Cominform and the role implied in the document
under discussion. It would not only be contrary to Communist
training and doctrine for the Cominform to adhere to its
publicized functions, but most of those particular inconsist-
encies disappear when one accepts the high probability that
the influential members of the Cominform can and will continue
to function in a broad area as Communists under a different
hat. In any event, strongly reinforces the conclusions
which I have drawn above.
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Appendix )[V: Analysis by the Office of Current Intelligence, CIA
15 March 1952
1. This is one of several similar reports supporting one
school of thought which interprets Soviet policy in the post-
war period as indecisive because of an as yet unresolved split
within the Politburo over the degree of militant action to be
risked in pursuing the USSR's ultimate goal. In some versions,
the split purportedly is on the level below the Politburo itself.
All these reports suffer because they give the unmistakable
impression of being generally too "pat." In most cases the
sources purporting to possess this information could hardly
have come by it in the normal course of events. There are
also certain contradictions in this source's account of^Y,I'l 25X1X
be accurately informed.
2. This report must remain speculative since indecisiveness
and a deep policy split are by no means the only possible
explanations for recent Soviet policy and tactics.
3. It should be pointed out that the introductory para-
graph to this report describes it as "source's personal interpre-
tation of what he has read and 'heard." It could, of course,
be a plant; if so, it is a carefully thought-out one. if it
25X1X is a bona fide report F_ I it should be
regarded as an evaluation by a man in an excellent position to
see, hear and read of, in much more detail than anyone this
side of the Iron Curtain, the development of Soviet policy and
intentions. As such it must be seriously treated and carefully
checked. The interpretations which this report sets forth
often run parallel to speculation in this country over the
Kremlin's apparent hesitation in the face of growing Western
strength and increasing Western effectiveness.
4. For comments on details of this report, see attached
annex.
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25X1A
COMMENTO REPORT ON "EVENTS LEADING UP
1. Much of the paper could have been written from hind-
sight, that is from the record of current history since 1945
and an assumption that if a split had existed in the Politburo
throughout this period, the conflicting views could have been
25X1X as the source describes them.
3. The present report is more ambitious than most of
this series, since it draws up two Politburo groups, nearly
equal in, size, and alleges that this division has existed since
World War Ii with no significant change in the composition of
the conflicting parties. The contrasting positions of these
groups on most of the issues in Soviet relations with the West
are presented and show a nearly superhuman consistency over a
period of six years.
4. No evidence is available with which to evaluate the
information in such reports as to the various individual
opinions of Politburo members or the cliques into which they
might be split. Party discipline and the principle of "demo-
cratic centralism" assure presentation of a united front to
the world after a decision is made, regardless of divisions
prior to the decision.
5. It is also unlikely that a split in the Politburo
would be revealed to even as important an outsider as Mao,
or that the latter could directly determine Soviet policy
(paras. 23 and 26). In fact, it would have been imprudent
at any time to strengthen Mao's bargaining position by making
a split Politburo so clearly evident to him? Needless to
say, the Soviet regime would do everything to avoid the
eventuality described in par. 64 of the report, in which the
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25X1X
split is pictured as common knowledge in Satellite govern-
ments and in "little Politburos" all over the world.
6. The report also asserts that the division runs through
Communism outside Russia (par. 39), but formal divisions
along the line described are not known to exist outside the
Orbit. In view of numerous other reports on disagreements
within the parties, such a split presumably would have become
known.
7. Since the source of this report
it is extrem-ly unlikely that he would have accurate information
on deliberations in the Soviet Politburo. There is no evidence
available to substantiate the all-important role the source
attributes to Beriya as a mediator between the factions and as
the man responsible for the truce negotiations (paras 30 and 36).
8. The source's statement that Stalin lost confidence in
himself as a result of the unexpected UN intervention in Korea
(par. 30) is less likely to be a fact than a reflection of loss
of confidence in him on the part of some Satellite officials.
9. In treating the whole postwar picture, the source is
often inaccurate in his timing of events. Thus he places the
wave of anti-semitism in the USSR in 1950 or early 1951 when it
actually occurred in early 1949 (par. 34), and Molotov's
conversion to the need of Korean truce talks in July 1951, (see
par. 35), when it would seem probable that the shift must have
occurred considerably prior to Malik's June 23 speech.
10. In the source's account of events which influenced
Soviet :foreign policy or revealed the split in the Politburo,
there are certain surprising omissions. The source does not
discuss the Kremlin attitude toward dealing with Tito prior
to the :latter's break with the USSR, or the Paris conference
of Deputy Foreign Ministers in the spring of 1951, or the
Japanese Peace Conference of September 1951.
11, There are certain contradictions in the source's 25X1C
account of meetings or plans on which
should The accurately informed? The source makes reference To
plans to be carried out by "Cominform headquarters" in the
Near East and in Latin America (par. 47), We have no evidence
that the Cominform -- Information Bureau of the Communist and
Workers' Parties -- sponsors covert activities, formulates
any phase of international Communist policy, or that it has
headquarters or branches other than in Bucharest. The function
of the Cominform today apparently is to publicize propaganda
and ideological guidance through the journal it issues from
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Bucharest. In fact, the nine member parties have held no
known meeting since November,1949. The source's account of
Cominform activities contrasts with a report based on an
interrogation of Arnost Heidrich, former Secretary-General of
the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs who defected in
November 1948. When questioned regarding the role of the
Cominform, Heidrich remarked that it is a front organization
designed primarily for the spread of propaganda. Heidrich
elaborated that controls are exercised over national. Communist
parties through more direct channels from the Soviet Communist
Party. The source mentions "Cominform centers" in Addis Ababa
and Accra (par. 47 from which a "racial revolt" in Africa will
be directed, but no such Cominform centers are known to exist.
The Soviet Union itself maintains missions in Africa located
in Cairo, Pretoria, and Addis Ababa. The Soviet establishment
in Addis Ababa consists of a legation, hospital and reading
room, with a staff of possibly 20 to 30, which is large, but
not much out of proportion in view of the outside activities.
This mission is not a Cominform center, but has contributed
to Soviet propaganda and subversive activity in Central and
East Africa. There are indications that it has the role of a
transmission center for propaganda and for contact with front
groups and Communist parties in such places as Eritrea, British
Somaliland and the Belgian Congo. It is in contact with the
Soviet Consulate in Pretoria, South Africa, as well. There is
no Soviet mission of any sort at Accra. A check of the file on
Communism in the Gold Coast discloses no reference whatsoever
to a Cominform center there. Its existence is improbable on
general grounds. There is also a specific reason for believing
its existence improbable. This consists of specific infor-
mation on the nature of the outlet for distributing Communist
literature in September 1950 period, when the present native
nationalist leaders were in jail instead of running the govern-
ment. 25X10
lidentified this outlet as the "New
African Literature House" and evaluated the firm as "interested
primarily in the financial return of.the sale of these publi-
cations rather than in the content."
12. The source reports the results of a Moscow meeting
in the early spring of 1950 of "a plenary session of the
Politburo and Cominform in Moscow" (paras. 23 to 26). This
vastly exaggerates the role of the Cominform, of whose true
nature a Satellite official might be expected to be aware.
Instead of presenting it as a periodic instrument for the
glorification of Soviet policy, he makes it a sort of inter-
national counterpart of the Politburo -- more like the Comin-
tern of the 1920's.
25X1X 13. Although I I may have received
information concerning a USSR-Satellite meeting, the list of
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subjects discussed reflects certain obvious characteristics
of the international situation of early 1950, with the possible
exception of "American military arrangements in Germany,
Japan, and Spain" and the location of atomic experiments in
Siberia (par. 24).
14. The report does not contain a clear statement on
the likelihood of war during the next several years. How-
ever, since the source alleges that the "opportunist" group
is now in power (par. 40), war in 1952 is considered not
intended and not probable even though remaining a possibility.
The policies ascribed to the "realist" group does not appear
from the report to have had predominant power since the fall
of 1950.
15. The apocalyptic long-range prophecy of paras. 56 and
57 contrasts markedly with par. 59 and does little but weaken
the report as a whole.
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SECURITY INFORMATION 25X1A
INFORMATION REPORT REPORT NO.
CD NO.
COUNTRY U.S?S.R.
SUBJECT Events Leading Up to a Split in. the Soviet
Communist Leadership
DATE OF
INFO. I I 25X1A
PLACE
ACQUIRED
STATE EV
ARMY E V
DATE DISTR. 5 March 1952
NO. OF PAGES 11
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW) '
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO. 25X1 X
1. Russian Communist leaders of the Politburo are agreed that:
a. World revolution, as the final result of the class struggle in modern
society, will be a political achievement arising out of the social conditions created
by the brutality and selfishness of the capitalist system. In the last phase, when
all other devices leading to world revolution have been exhausted, there will be
militant action by the revolting masses. (Marx, 1859)
b. The world revolution will take place as the final result of an accumu-
lation of minor revolutionary actions on the part of the masses, organized and led
by the Communist party, which has taken over the command of the working classes
in modern society. It will be fought out in a cycle of world wars, the last of which
will develop as a war of continents, with the two Americas as agents of capitalism
against Eurasia as the defender of Communism, and Africa as an important and
probably decisive battleground. (Lenin, 1917)
c. World revolution, as the end-product of the growing force and influ-
ence of the Soviet Union to a position of leadership in the progressive part of mod-
ern society, can be achieved without direct Soviet participation in the cycle of
world wars. The Soviet must, however, supply the strongest possible impetus and
produce the disintegration and collapse of capitalism. For tactical reasons conces-
sions and delays may be countenanced to make it appear that capitalism and
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D
Communism.. can co-exist in the world, provided that these tactics serve the ulti-
mate purpose. (Stalin, 11936)
. 2. The-Politburo has been forced to take cognizance of new basic developments
occurring during the period of the Second World War, as .follows;
a. The invention of atomic weapons, which h9.ve rendered Lenin's
cycle of world wars an impossibility, limiting the number of future world wars to
one or two. This accelerates the approach of the last phase of the world crisis,
which began in 191.4.
b. The unexpectedly great Soviet territorial gains and political successes,
which have brought with them the necessity of exploitation at the expense of the
reconstruction of devastated Soviet territory. Victory in the final clash between
capitalism and Communism has thus become a much more immediate reality
than could have been anticipated.
3. In consequence of these developments, the Politburo decided in 1945 not to
disarm, but to keep 'the largest possible portion of the Soviet Army. in a state of immediate
readiness, and to set up the Kominform,as its new instrument of aggressive international
Communism.
4. These decisions, based upon the suppositions of a guaranteed internal secur-
ity for the Soviet Union and the submissive attitude of the satellites, had the practical re-
sult of greatly increasing the personal power of Beria, then head of the Soviet Police. He
was entrusted with the direction of all of the.Soviet system.
5. From 1945 on, there have developed wide divergences within the Politburo
with regard to the best method of exploiting the territorial gains and political successes ob-
tained by the Soviet. These changes. destroyed the old.-balance of power and made a change
in Communist tactics an obvious necessity. Two different schools of Communist thought
arose with regard to the best tactical method of bringing about world Communism.
6, The realist school considers the world situation, as produced by the Second
World War, ripe for immediate revolutionary action, even at the risk of war.
7. The opportunist school considers the world situation, as produced by the
Second World War, one which offers opportunities for indirect revolutionary action, which
need not risk war,
8. These, divergencies within the Politburo appeared originally in disputes on
fundamental theoretical questions between Zhdanov and Andreiev, but without affecting prat-
tical Soviet policy. Mikoyan, who urged the revival of economic cooperation between East
and West, was one of the first to adopt the opportunist point of view publicly, and produced
some effects on. practical policy.
9. During the 1945-1946 period of preparation for the peace settlements there
were clashes between the Soviet and its war-time allies about such questions as the adminis-
tration of Germany, the future of Trieste and the Italian colonies, Poland, etc. These
clashes produced further divergencies in the Politburo about the tactics to be followed by
Communists throughout the world., about principles to be defended and measures to be taken
at the Paris peace conference of 1946.. Molotov, after arguing in vain with American
.Secretary of.State Byrnes and British Foreign Minister Bevin, reached the conclusion that
the post-war world situation, dominated by Soviet military supremacy and economic confu-
sion in the capitalist states, could not be exploited by bargaining measures unless these were
accompanied by intimidation. He accordingly took over the leadership of the realist group in
the Politburo, whose conceptions may be defined as follows:
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a. Any delay may help the West to find its way out of its difficulties and
to recover its strength.
b. Communist military action would not inevitably be answered by the
West with war, but on the contrary, could extract from the West new compromises
for the benefit of the Soviet.
c? Even if a new world war took place, the Soviet armies could rapidly
overrun Eurasia.
d. If Eurasia were occupied, the chances of the powerless and surprised
USA accepting a truce would be greater than ever before.
e. A respite, lasting perhaps several decades, would thus be gained,
in which the Soviet orbit could be immensely reinforced in preparation for the
final clash.
10. The Soviet General Staff shared Molotovns disillusionment with the result of
the Paris conference. It began at once to work out the so-called Koniev plan. for overrunning
Europe. A whole generation o:f Soviet diplomats (Zorin, Gromyko, Malik) adopted a strong
line, and Soviet policy noticeably hardened.
1 1. During the same period of preparations for the peace settlement the.first con-
n.rete political penetrations on a large scale were made in such defeated capitalist countries
as France and. Italy. Meanwhile Soviet Communist Party officials took over the direction of
Soviet public life from the military leaders, regarding the latter as nationalistic and politi-
cally unreliable. The propaganda and doctrinal drive in Russia was revived at the same time
as conspiratorial and subversive activities abroad, and Malenkov, as the Soviet Communist
Party leader and spokesman, became more and more involved in this activity. The careless,
ness with which the West permitted the Soviet to take over all capittlist positions in Central
and Southeast Europe was regarded by Malenkov and his followers as indisputable evidence of
the decadence of the West. This political and economic disintegration in capitalist countries
has long been. a dogma of the Communist faith as announcing the forth-coming revolutionary
victory of the working classes of the world,
12. ..Dealing with such leaders as Thorez, Togliatti, Gottwa ld, "Pieck, Bierut,
Rakosi, Ho .Chi Minh, when invited to Moscow for conferences, Ma.lenkov reached the con-
clusion that the world situation. could best be exploited by promoting social disturbances in
capitalist countries. He considered that this world situation was dominated by Communist
superiority in political prestige, resulting from Communist participation in the resistance
movements against German and Japanese occupations, and Communist readiness everywhere
to submit to the working classes solid, attractive, and progressive economic programs, in
comparison to the programless and. backward capitalist leadership. As instrumentalities
Malenkov looked forward to continuous cycles of strikes, eventuating in revolts and civil
warn--instrumentalities which do not depend upon the use of other, more drastic and ag-
gressive procedures. The use of such aggressive means, Malenkov believed,. might pro-
voke the awakening of the capitalist warmongers and bring about armed conflict. Such con-
flict would unnecessarily endanger the class struggle. Malenkov was thus led to reject any
concept of military action, since the result of World Communism .could better be attained
by peaceful means. Asa result Malenkov became the leader of the opportunist group in the
Politburo., whose concepts may be summed up as follows:
a. The revival of capitalist society in the West is impossible and its
decline cannot be arrested.
b. Revolutionary action cannot be resisted successfully by the weak-
ened bourgeoisie, and will be vigorously supported by the working classes, who
are psychologically weary of war.
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c. Even though the risk of revived Fascist reactionism in capitalist
countries is run, Eurasia could quickly be overrun by organized peoples' revolts
at any time.
d, The USA would surely accept a truce if Eurasia became Communist
through the revolutionary action of the masses, since an economic crisis would
develop there.
e. A respite of some decades would be gained in this way,. -and could
be used to undermine the white man's posit;.-. )n in Africa through propaganda for
Islamic and Negro freedom, and in the same way a foothold could be gained in
1 South America before the final, clash.
13. Sharing Nialenkov's belief in theefficacy of conspiratorial and subversive ac-
tion are such economists as Varga, such publicists as Ehrenburg, and the numerous agents
in Western countries.
14. After the Paris Peace Conference ended in October, 1946, the division with-
in the Politburo took more precise form in the attitude toward social conditions in Russia
and the orbit states. The realist (Molotov) group, discounting the belief in a world crisis
of capitalist society, insisted on the dangers arising from the inactivity of the Soviet Army
and the-.-failure. of-Soviet workers to obtain the promised benefits. The opportunist group
considered the world crisis of capitalism as imminent, basing this ;judgment upon the
numerous (distorted or fabricated) reports of hunger and unemployment in Western coun-
tries. These 'rfacts, " which made Soviet life .attractive in comparison, were presented at
public meetings, in the press, on stage and screen, so often and so effectively th.t there
arose-a, degree of self-4eception, in which the illusions invented by them about the West
became realities .for the very inventors. Varga, the economist, early deserted the oppor-
tunist group, and other quarrels arose which called for Stalin's intervention.
15. Thanks to Beria's guarantee of 1946 that by 1950, at the latest, the Soviet
would have adequate strength in atomic research and weapons, Stalin decided to consider
the period 1946-1950 as a transitional epoch in which there would be achieved:
a. The recovery of the Soviet Union.
b. The absorption of the satellites.
c. The maintenance of Soviet military strength.
d.. The political and economic undermining of the West.
16. In a practical sense, Stalin's decision failed to bridge the gap between the
realist and opportunist groups. It merely offered both an opportunity to make the best of
conditions, but it was not made clear to both that armed conflict with the West should not
be involved.
17. This. two-.fold. policy of the Soviet Communist Party, resulting from Stalin's
decision, brought about defeats for each group during the transitional epoch. The realist
group was defeated on the Berlin blockade and with regard to Tito's defection, which demon-
strated the dangers of the accidental outbreak of the clash with the West. The opportunist
group was defeated on the Italian elections and in the expulsion of the Communists from
.Ramaelier's government in France, which demonstrated the limits of Communist infiltra-
tion of the West. Both groups shared. responsibility for the absorption of Czechoslovakia,
which represented a gain., but also aroused Western suspicion to the point of rearmament.
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18. The fundamental rift in Russian. Communist policy, which threatened to cause
internal struggles in Communist parties throughout the world, flared up again after the vic-
tory of Mao Tse-tung Communist armies in China. This was accepted by the whole Politburo
as the greatest event in the history of world Communism since the outbreak of the Russian
revolution in 1917. Asia has always been considered by..Soviet strategists as at least equiva-
lent to Europe in importance for Communist. world. conquest, and was accepted by all Soviet
leaders as the preliminary battlefield of the Communist world revolution. The conquest of
China thus offered a suddgn opportunity to begin an armed attack on. the whole of Asia, or at
least a general revolutionary movement. The Politburo was unanimous in believing that the
abandonment of widespread Asiatic territories by American capitalist interests and the weak-
ness of the defenses of British, French, and Dutch imperialists, offered good chances for
the successful exploitation of the triumph of the Chinese Communist armies. But the two
Politburo groups diverged sharply on the tactics to be employed in this exploitation, and two
different proposals were laid before Stalin.
19. The realists asked immediate military intervention in favor of the revolting
Asiatic peoples, while the opportunists asked for a pause in Chinese expansion and the con-
solidation of ground already gained.
20. The struggle between the two groups became very acute, and in the late au-
tumn of 1949 Stalin decided to invite Mao Tse-tung to Moscow for consultation.
21. Molotov, without binding the Soviet to direct action, presented h 4o Tse-tung
with the arguments that military action in Asia could not be opposed by' the weakened: and de -
pressed. West and would therefore involve no risk of world war; and.. that Chinese' military ac-
tion in Asia would be the starting point of a general Asiatic revolution which could not be
restrained by the West and. therefore Asia would be won for Communism without a world war.
22. Malenkov distrusted a successful Oriental and. non-Russian Communist, and
offered Mao Tse-tung the arguments that the Chinese Communist victory,would in any case
have revolutionary consequences among Asiatic peoples, consequences which could not be
resisted by the West; and that Chinese Communist victory in Asia requires a recovered
China for the final clash with capitalism.
23. No agreement between the two groups could be reached, and Mao Tse-tung de-
manded a guarantee of Soviet help in case of a conflict resulting from Chinese military or
revolutionary actions in Asia. In the early spring of 1950 Stalin convoked a plenary session
of the Politburo and Kominform in Moscow, inviting Mao Tse-tung. Stalin directed. the de-
bate ruthlessly, in his. desire to reach-.final decisions on the fundamental items of Commu-
nist world policy and to end, once and for all, the debate between the two groups, which had
spread into the Kominform. Stalin himself summed up the evoluti n of the international
situation as consisting of the running out of the period of absolute soviet military supremacy
and. the postponement of all immediate chances of world crisis by American economic pros-,
perity.
24. At the meeting there were also considered. the following developments in the
Soviet orbit:
a. The successful experiments with atomic weapons, in Siberia under
Beria's supervision.
b. The quick recovery of China, which was not deprived of important
strategic materials from Western sources.
c. The promising results of the drive for industrialization. among the
satellites, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia.
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25. The following points with relation to the capitalist countries were considered.
a. The positive results of Marshall Plan aid among the Western coun-
tries, bringing Communist agitation there to a standstill.
b. The dangers resulting from American military arrangements in
Germany, Japan, and Spain.
c, The possibilities of the contagious-influence of Tit& heresy among
Western Communist parties.
26. Some spokesmen from both groups :desired. priority to be given to Yugoslatvia.
Stalin decided against intervention there,. prepared militarily.. from ,Hungary-.and"Aulgaria,
?a internally by revolutionary movements in Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia,, iha'nks to
.
Mao"use-tungos insistence that the Soviet concentrate on Asia. . Stalin decided upon Asia as"
the most fruitful field. for Communist expansion, as being ceuntermmoves; South Korea was selected because it was oconsidered, the Americans were
not interested, due to the unsatisfactory peace settlement there, and -ready to?.acce t a
Communist fait accompli, because South Korea was considered militarily unprepared an
politically weakened by the corrupt pseudo-democratic regime; because militarnterven-
tioan. by North Korean troops was expected to develop into a -revolution; and. because victory
in South Korea, achieved without any risk of world war, was considered as a useful means
of strengthening the, prestige- of the Soviet Union and China and preparing for further moves
27. TIje choice of South Korea gave particular satisfaction to the realist g rou
...as ending the period of time wasted in vain ws,itinga but also satisfied o Pa
cause of the -reva~lutionar the Ppaxtunists, 16e _
sponsibility for the decis n to begin external military intervention in south urea the re_
new stage of revolutionary action in Asia. Korea as the
28. America?s immediate and vigorous military intervention in.South Korea had
disastrous effects on the new Soviet world strategy Not one of the assumptions behind Stalinas decision to allow the North rear at world poliry, tack true, Bulganin now came .forward on behalf of the realist group, blaming the half-measure
prove
resulting from the -eternal braking action of the o es
and Soviet participation in the conflict, ppiOrtcmists, and demanding open Chinese
prolongation of which was increasing the ?iak of
world war. Mikoyan proposed immediate mediation through India. He declared that the
North Korean attack, which proved neither quick nor efficient enough to produce a revolu-
tionary movement in South Korea, was adding nothing to Communist prestige in the world;
that in the long run it would put Communism in the position of being the .ag ressor and
would endanger Chinats vital traffic with the West in strategic materials by way of Hong
Kong.
29. The Politburo was forced to reconsider the whole world situatian in the light
of the .following .factors. a. Stali&s first major politico-military error, which weakened his
hitherto spotless reputation as a wartime leader and guarantor of Soviet unity.
.b. The influence of the creation of a battlefield in which Americans
were directly involved, with the initiative removed from Soviet hands.
c. The influence of starting the American rearmament drive, most
feared by Soviet leaders, which changes the world balance of power to the detri-
ment of the Soviet.
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