PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON SOVIET INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 12, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Llan X011 21R000400200002-5
PE ODIC INTELLIGEWvE REPORT. ON
SOVIET INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES
JCS & ARMY REVIEWS
COMPLETED
FBI REVIEW COMPLETED
1. U.S.S.R. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD
From: 6 July-1950
To t ll July 1950
Assistant Chief of staffs 0-2
Department of the Ar ra
Washington 25, D. C.
12 July 1950
a. The Soviet Union is in the advanced stages of preparation
for war and could initiate offensive operations with no
additional warning. Reliable intelligence on Soviet in-
tentions to go to war in the near future is lacking.
Soviet air capabilities have increased in the Far East and
there is unidentified naval movement off the North Korean
coast.
c. Recent indications point to a continuation of Soviet pre-'
paredness measures and to an increased condition of readiness,
especially in the Balkans and the Near and Middle East areas.
2. SOVIET-COI UNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD
.a. Summary.-The buildup of Chinese Communist forces opposite
Taiwan continues and Soviet air capabilities in China and the
Far Eastern U.S.S.R. have increased. Fifty unidentified
25X1 vessels have been detected off the North Korean coast. The
buildup of supplies in the Balkans has increased capabilities
for action against Greece, Turkey or Yugoslavia.
b. Operations of enemy component elements.
(1) K?REA.-See current situation reports. Approximately
FBI REVIEW COMPLETED fifty unidentified vessels have been detected off
North Korea by U.S. Naval reconnaissance,,
Document no. __.....__.__x_---_-_____---_-_---
Mo Change In C % 0
[] Caclassil"ed
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Class. Changed to: TS S ~At
Next Review Date:
Auth.2 HR 70-3
. 7 _FEB_197~ ---
O1~172R00040
CONFIDENTIAL
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(2) CHINA..--The movement of Chinese Coanminist forces into
the staging area opposite Taiwan has continued
despite the presence of the U.S. fleet. Forces in
the area have increased more than 100% in the past
eight weeks. Airfield construction is continuing
in the Canton area.
in the
(3) Balkans have increased d ing the past action
months
as the result of the flow of militate equipment to
Bulgaria and Albania, but troop dispositions do not
indicate action to be imminent.
(4) GERMANY.--There has been a slight relaxation of Soviet
military security measures in Eastern Germany. Soviet
troops in Germany continue concentrated in maneuver
areas. Some increase in Soviet bridging capabilities
and training is indicated.
See Tab A, attached.
SOVIET CAPABILITIES.-The Chinese Commaunista are not given the.
capability of seizing Taiwwan, although the attack may be
launched for political reasons. Soviet capabilities in the
Far East have increased as a result of an increase in air
stye
e or o rear once
possess the capa o executing early additional amphibious
or naval operations in the Sea of Japan-of an undetermined
magnitude by means of the vessels listed in Para 2b (1) above.
Soviet capabilities in the Balkans have increased during the
past several months. Other capabilities remain essentially
unchanged.
CONFIDENTIAL
1 1b 1' 8000400200002-5
25X1
25X1
 TAR "A"
TIA
25X1
25X1
TQQW2R000400200002-5
FSTIM tTE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TO GO TO SPAR IN THE I! 1EDIATE FUTURE
Proceedings of the ITF Steering Committee, 11 July 1950
mma
Approve Ua 20
1. Soviet Intentions in the Far East.
b. Reports of the deployment of Chinese Cmmmaunist troops
reveal a continuing movement of troops north and east Qfr from the Canton nte
area, with increased troop movements at Hengyang and
numerous rumors, there is no definite indication that troops are actu-
ally being deployed towards Manchuria and there have been no reports of
the staging of troops northward through Hankof or of activity in to date
Shanhaikuan, the pass from North China,to Manchuria.
thus limit the movement of Chinese CommiUnist troops totowaar troops-towards lien,
which is the staging area for an attack on Taiwan.
increase in the buildup of Communist forces opposite Taiwan of more
than 100% during the past eight weeks; with present troop strength in
the area estimated at 13Os000? Reports indicate that this movement
has continued despite the U.S. announcement that the Seventh Fleet
would defend Taiwan. It has been further reported that the. Chinese
Communists intend to proceed with the attack on Taiwan. (See attached
d. Continuing airfield construction under Soviet supervision
is reported in the Canton area.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved Fo le eos 24/0
 Approved ,fe at 20
cnuGinFNriei
25X1
25X1
e. There is a strategic reae 70,000 Korean troops in
Manchuria and an estimated 25sOOO Korean troops, formerly with the
Chinese Communist forces, are now employed in Korea. All evidence
indicates that these are effective combat forces.
f, Rumors of a new concentration of Chinese Communist forces
on the Temkin border are unconfirmad and are discounted because of
evidence of the movement of the 38th and 39th Armies away from this
area. no evidence of an imminent attack on
Ind. China by Chinese Communiat forces, and there are some indications
of discontinuance of Chinese Communist supplies to the Viet Anh. How-
ever, tanks are reliably reported to be in this general area of South
China.
g. Soviet air strength in the Far East has increased from
about 3,000 to about 5,300 aircraft in recent months.
h. On 11 July, U.S. Naval reconnaissance picked up approxi-
mately fifty ships in three columns close in shore off the North
Korean coast at 40 40N, 129 25E?
2R000400200002-5
Type or vessels j, couraw
and speed were not established.
i. From the above it is concluded that:
(1) There is no completely reliable evidence of a
deployment of Chinese Communist forces to Manchuria.
(2) The strategic 'reserve of Koreans in Manchuria, to-
gether with Chinese Communist troops already stationed
there, are available for use in Korea, and some re-
inforcements of North Korean forces appear to have
been madea
(3)
(4)
(5)
The Soviet or North Korean forces possess the capa-
bility of executing early additional amphibious or
naval operations in the Sea of Japan.
The buildup of Chinese Communist forces for an attack
on Taiwan continues and the attack may be attempted
at any time after mid-July.
It would be to the advantage of the Soviets to involve
U.S. forces against the Chinese Communists by an attack
on Taiwan. The Soviets might-utilize this action to
give undercover aid to the Chinese Communists to get
the U.S..'further embroiled in the Far East or to invoke
the Sino-Soviet defense treaty which calls for Soviet
aid to the Chinese Communists in case they are attacked.
LI FIDENTIAL
RR9 J 11F2 R000400200002-5
25X1
 (66) The pressu~ ~ ~ .Koa border is continuing
("7y
There is no new evidence of a troop buildup or imp
neat military action against Indo China or other
countries of Southeast Asia.
2. Soviet Intentions in the Balkans.
a. The continuing rumors of Bulgarian troop movements
towards the Yugoslav border are not confirmed and present evidence
does not confirm any unusual deployment of Bulgarian forces on the
Yugoslav border.
b. Capabilities for the initiation of military action. in
the Balkans have increased, however, as the result of the cons ,hirable
movemept of military equipment into Bulgaria and more recently Albania.
There appears to be no evidence of a comparable buildup of supplies in
Rumania.
c. While there are no reliable indications of imminent mili-
tary action in the Balkans, the buildup of supplies indicates that
action may be directed at a future date against Turkey, Greece or
Yugoslavia. The reduction of forces in European Turkey has made
European Turkey vulnerable to initial successes by the Bulgarian Army.
It is estimated that the Bulgarian forces have the capability of over-
running European Turkey.
d. The SovvRom shipping company has closed its Istanbul
office and the Soviet consul departed Istanbul on 4 July. The Soviet
Ambassador, together with the Bulgarian Counsellor and Czech Consul,
left Turkey several weeks ago.
3. Soviet Intentions in Aestern Europe.
a. There continues to be no evidence in Germany of a con-
centration of Soviet forces, other than for maneuvers, or of a rein-
forcement of units. A slight relaxation of Soviet security measures
is indicated by the return of passes to the British and French Mili-
tary Liaison Missions to the Soviet Zone, and it is expected that
passes of the U.S. Mission may soon. be returned.
25X1
Approved Fo
CONFIDENT. 14
 Approved "I 00 - P TQ R000400200002-5
CONFIDENTIAL
d. There in evidence of a considerable movement of Soviet
troops both in and out of Austria during June, but the evidence does
not at present indicate that a reinforcement was involved. The bulk
of the movement was probably the arrival of young recruits and the
departure of the older age groups.
e. The propaganda campaign by the U.S.S.R. and Eastern
Ibropean countries charging the U.S. with spreading potato bins may
be a prelude for some action by the U.S.S.R. in this or a related
field. Possibilities are that it may be used as an excuc3e for the
reimposition of the Berlin blockade, as a justification for the re--
impositiort of food rationing, or as an excuse for some retaliatory
action.
4. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.
25X1
b. The-Soviets are acquiring several large vessels which nay
be utilized as troop transports. The salvaged ex-German vessel, Asia,
with a capacity of 1,000 passengers, is new enroute from the Baltic to
the Far Fast in ballast. The takeover by the Soviets of the Polish
liner, the Batory, appears to be imminent.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved FT ecQc~ / Bil ? I FR9 1T2R000400200002-5
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