REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200014-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: October 5, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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REPORT OF INDICATIOIi OF SOVIET -COMMUNIST INTFNNTIONS
Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
4 October 1950
1. Indications of Intentions in tche Far
as A aeries of recent Chines Communist proncruncements,
additional evidence of the deployment of Chinese Communist Field
Forces to } nchuriai and the progress of U.N0 Forces in Korea have
accentuated the question of iumaediate Chinese Communist intentions
with regard to Korean
(1)
On 3 October, the Indian Ambassador in Peiping
was informed by Chinese Foreign Minister Chou Enmlai
that the Chinese Coe- unists would send troops across
the frontier to participate in the defense of North
Korea if U.N. 1orces crossed the 38th parallel. Chou
stated that this action would not be taken if only
Seth Koreans crossed the parallels In an interview
with Chou alai about one week earlier, the Indian
Ambassador had gained the impression that the Chinese'
Communists believed that the U05o was preparing to
attack them and must make their preparations accord-
ingly, and further reported that the Chinese were ex-
tremely bitter towards the U.S. and over their
failure to be admitted to the U.N.
(2) Other Chinese Communist statements, although less
definite with respect to their intentions, have been
marked by an increasingly belligerent tone. ITLthin
the past two wee;cs the Chinese Communists have made
m
their first open admission that they have been en
cauraging the return of Koreans from China to aid in
the defense of Horth Korea. in a recent statement
Mao Tse-tung placed considerable emphasis on the
necessity' of a strong Chinese Communist Armiy, and it
is noteworthy that there have been no references in
acme tine to a passible demobilization of now of the
Chinese Communist forces, as was earlier announced.
In public statements on the anniversary] of the estab-
lishment of the Chinese Communist government, Chou
En'lai denounced the United States as "the most dann
germs enemy"- of Chinas stated that 'the Chinese
Communists would not "supinely tolerate seeing their
neighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists,"
and expressed confidence that the North Koreans would'
ultimately win through tactics of a prolonged war of
resistance,,
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North Korean actions and other available information
point to the conclusion that the North Koreanss,_the
Chinese Communiuts "and the UoS.S0R, recognize that
the invasion of South Korea has failed and are now
concentrating their efforts on retaining Coiuni.et
control of the area north of the 38th parallel.
There is no indication that the North Koreans are pre-
paring to terminate hostilities or accept the surrender
terms. Soviet actions in the U.N. suggest that the
U.S.S.R. is willing to negotiate on the Korean question,
but the fact that the Soviets have to date. limited
their proposals to terms obviously unacceptable to the
Western powers indicates they mey continue ob3truc?-
ionist and stalling tactics. The possibility cannot
be discounted that the U.S.S.Ro and Communist China
have not. yet firmly decided on a course of action If
U.N. advances continue, and that they still hope to
involve U.N. forces in a protracted and. indeecisive
winter campaign without committing forces other than
North Koreans.
be There are no indications of an imminent invasion of Formosa.
There was a light bombardment of Chinamen during the week but Chinese
Nationalist reconnaissance of the Fukien coast has revealed no Junk con-
centrations or other unusaul activity. Work on airfields on the coast
is contint.rg to receive priority and the Nationalists have reported the
completion of the runway at Focchctr0 Further inforimation confirms the
previously reported blackout and evacuation of dependents from Swatow
and it is reported that there is a genuine fear of a U.S,, or Nationalist
assault theroo
c. In Indo-China, Chinese Communist 'logistical and training
support, of the Viet Minh continues, and there is an unconfirmed report
of the arrival of flame throwers for the Viet Minh. This weapon would
be highly useful in attacks against French pets and watchtowers, mare
of which are made of wood, The French continue to take a grave view
of the Viet Idnh threat in Tonkin, and French and Vietnam. morale has
declined considerably...Ha ver, a successful French counteroffensive
against the Viet Minh capital and arm headquarters at Thai Nguyen has
at least temporarily improved the French position. This operation' was
designed not only to demoralize the Viet Minh but probably also to re-
lieve the heavy Viet lanh pressure on Caobang' and Laokay, both - of which
have been reinforced by the French. Since the Viet Minh are adept at
moving their headquarters rapidly and frequently, any dislocation will
probably be temporary. There have been no w w indications of Chinese
C t intention to invade lndo-Chinas although it is a continuous
possibility.
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b.. A question of paramount interest in connection with
Soviet military intentions In the strength of Soviet units in Buropeo
Available information from Germany indicates a probability that Soviet
troop strength there has inaroased by an indeterminate amount this year,
but there is no good evidence that Soviet unite have been raised from
peacetime (about 70%)strength to war T/O. Fairly reliable information
from Austria indicates that Soviet units there are not above peacetimes
strengths Very fragmentary reports have suggested that the Soviets
intend the demobilization of the 1926 class NCQ9s this autumn, although
there is no evidence that it has begun. Soviet action in this respect
may be an important indication of intentions. .
c. tiro
additional pontoon bridgea have recently been constructed across e
Danube between Rumania and Bulgaria. These are reported to be at
Orehovo and Svishtov, further don the river than the previously re-
ported pontoon bridge between Calafat and Vidin. There have been no
reports of Soviet -troop movement In this area, homvor, and the estab-
lishment of these bridges, if true, may be a trairth g exeroise. A
further. probable indication of continued logistical preparations in the
Balkans was - the recent observation of new military trucks and tanks
being loaded for shipment at Odessa; there have been previous reports
this summer that trucks and tanks were being shipped from Odessa to.the
Balkanso
do Continuing. observations have not revealed any evidence
that sizeable numbers of Soviet troops are arriving in Hungaryp despite
various recent rumors to this effect. Soviet air activity in Rumania,
recently reported as unusually heavy, appears to have diminished0
eo Recent Communist-inspired activity in both Germany and
Austria has been more openly aggressive. Although m ekend Communist
demonstrations in West Germ * were successfully handled by the police,
overt Cosy nuniat activity is increasing in accordance with the announced
Communist policy of harassment of West Germr4y0 In Austria, the most
serious Communist demonstrations in years have broken out follow the
announcement of a now pricy age aaZreement,, and there has been evidence
of direct Soviet support' of Communist strikers and demonstrator?so The
Austrian incidents were note however, timed to coincide with Communist
action in Germany, and apparently be Communists merely took opportun-
istic advantage of an, unpopular government decree.
f. There is no information now available to indicate that
the recent Afghan raid into Pakistan was Soviet-inspired., If the inci-
dent develops into a real conflict, the U05oS.Ro could be expected to
exploit the situation by offering weapons to Afghanistan.
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General Indications of Soviet Intentionso
as There is evidence that the number of Soviet ships
operating outside Communist-controlled waters has been gradually
diminishing in the past'two months, but ships are continuing to leave
Soviet ports and there are no indications of general recall of Soviet
shipping to home ports. This circumstance my in part be the result
of increased Soviet chartering of foreign vessels which has released
greater numbers of Soviet ships for short hauls in local waters,
although this in turn could reflect both a greater need for local
shipping and increased precautionary measures. The Soviet fishing
fleet is now also reported to be leaving Icelandic waters.
be Observations in the U.S.S.R. indicate that there has
been a curtailment for about a month of flights by IL-120s, the
larger of the major transport planes employed on the Civil Air Fleet,
and that .ta 4y of these planes are grounded at airfields. On about
15 September, IL-120s were also withdrawn from run to Czechoslovakia.
Although the IL=12's were grounded last year for modification and the
Soviets have had considerable difficulty with them, it Is someoihat
surprising'-that such action wed be taken at the height of good fall
flying weathers This action could, therefore, indicate a desire to
accomplish further modifications of these aircraft for saes late fall
operations.
co From the foregoing, it is concluded that:
(1) There is little evidence of unusual current military
activity in Europe, although there are some indica-
tions, particularly in the Balkans, of continuing
logistical preparations.
(2) Firm indications that the Soviets intend a major
action in Europe or the Near East in the immediate
future are lacking, but there is some evidence of
heightened Soviet precautionary measures and of
increased overt Communist activity.
I A b
t~?HN 171o`iilidi~l+:
Brigadier General, GSC
Chairman, Joint Intelligence
Indications Committee
coNFi~EthAL
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Col a F. Adar+s a G='2
Col J ? K. Baker, O2
Col Co V. Broinloy, G?2
Col. F. P. tun on, JIG
Col HmH?Smith, G'2
Col. D. Ito F/ac.tz, USAF (D/1-USAF)
Col T. J o Walls, 0-2
Cdr Lm G. Gardner,, J r, UST (ONI)
Lt Go] W0 F.Jung, U-2
Lt Col J P. } llll, G-2
Cdr F? Welden, USN (OR[)
Maj U. G. Carl an, G"2
Capt J.. Lo Sutton USAF (D/1-USAF)
CIA
Mae n a Grabo, Cn-2
CIA
e , C-2
Distribution:
Secrotdry, General Staff, D.A
Department of State, Attn: L litary Liaison Branch
Director of Central Intelligence
Dimator of Naval Inteliigencce
Director of Intelligence., USAF
Joint Intelligence Group., JCS
CINCFE, Attn: AC/S, G=-2
Cal CPAC, Attn% A0139 &-2
CIN'CJ , Attn a Dieter of Intelligence
CI MIB, Attn; Director of Intelligences
CIlG.AL, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CC} Y" FUSFA, Attn: AC/S, 0-2
COMEWRUST, Attn: AC/S, (FF2
Assistant Chief of Staff, Ga3, DA
Aesietant Chief of Staff, G-28, DA
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