REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 12, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COO' reee
Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions
JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
TOP SMUT
No.; 10
le SITUATION AT FAD Oe PERIOD
erom: 5 October 1950
To : 11 October 1950
Assistant Chief of Staff, C-2
Department of the Army
Washington 25; D. C.
12 October 1950
a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state
of readiness for ear and could initiate offensive operations
with no additional warning. There are no conclusive indi-
cations of imminent Soviet hostilities.
b. It cannot be determined conclusively whether the Chinese
Communists will exercise their substantial canabilities to
intervene in Korea, although the deployment of experienced
combat troops to eanchuria and reiterated thraAn of inter-
vention continue to indicate a possibility of such action.'
c. There are clear indications that the North Koreans intend
to continue the struggle. It is possible that the U.S.S.R.
and Communist China have deferred the cztabliatmcnt of a
line of action for North Korea until future developments
further clarify the situation.
U. Successful Viet Linh action against the French has sheen
the marked increase of Viet einh effectiveness resulting
from Chinese Communiet aid and further large-ecale Viet
einh attacks may be expected in the near future.
e. Current Soviet and Satellite military and political activity
elsewhere generally do not appear to indicate an imminent
diversionary action outside the Ear East, nor is there
evieence of the general preparatory measures which might be
expected to precede an involvement of Soviet forces in the
Dement No.
Karam conflict.
NO Chan3o In Class.
DazIanified
7;!los. Changed to: IS S
Pial.qP,VJ Date:
29 1979
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2. SILLARY OF 50 VIET-COiLiUNIST ()PIRA TIONS DURING PERIOD
a, KOREA. -- See current situation reports. The Chinese
Communists have reiterated their implied threats to
intervene in Korea but their statements do not provide
a clear indication of the nature of the aid which they
might extend. The Chinese Communists continue to have
the military capability to intervene with experienced
combat forces now in Manchuria, but there is no reliable
new information on military preparations in the area.
The North Koreans have rejected the demand to surrender
and clearly intend to continue the struggle north of the
nth parallel.
b. CHINA. -- Reports of the movement of Communist forces inland
from the invasion ports on the China coast and unfavorable
weather conditions now make it highly probable that the
invasion of kormosa has been postponed.
c. INDO-CHINA. -- Viet ilinh success in destroying a substantial
portion of French forces evacuating Caobang is a serious
loss to the French. The marked increase in Viet ninh
capabilities and departure from strictly guerrilla tactics
indicate a probability of further larger operations, but
it cannot be determined whether this is an immediate pre-
lude to a major offensive.
d. GERMANY. There is no information to indicate any unexpected
development in connection with the East German elections on
15 October, and the Fast German para-military forces are not
apparently preparing to assume immediate operational functions.
Some Soviet units are reportedly beginning to return to winter
barracks; large scale exercises may be terminating.
e. SeDTHEAST EUROPE. There are some indications that Satellite
forces have terminated maneuvers and are returning to normal
locations. It is possible that the Soviets are preparing
for a shift of forces or reorganization of command in Austria,
Hungary, and Rumania, but there is no evidence of preparations
for immediate operations. Present call-ups may indicate an
increase in the size of the Czech Army.
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E. AUSTRIA. ? Although recent Communist efforts to create
major unrest have failed, the Communists retain the
capability of seizing power in the Soviet Zone if fully
supported by the Soviets.
GE:NFRAL, ? The previously reported reduction of Soviet
shipping in foreign waters does not now appear to be an
abnormal security measure, nor is there information on
other unusual Soviet precautionary or preparatory
measures,
go
3. COkt,UNIST CAPABILITIES. ? The Chinese Communists continue to
have substantial capabilities for a military intervention in
Korea. Current Viet Minh attacks have confirmed the material
increase in their capabilities. There was no 'other apparent
significant change during the period.
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REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIBT-COLEUNIST =mum
Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
11 October 1950
10 Indications of Intentions in the Far East.
v. Uithin the past ueek there has been additional evidence
of North Korean intentions to continue the struggle and the Chinese
Communists have reiterated their threats of possible intervention in
Korea? No new information has been received, however, to'clargy
Chinese Communist intentions; and it cannot be determined, on the
basis of present evidence, ehother or not the Chinese Communists will
exercise their substantial capabilities to intervene in Komar,
(1) The North Koreans have rejected the demand to
surrender, and their stiffening resistance also
indicates that they intend to continue fighting
north of the 38th paranoia
(2)
(3)
(4)
Cn 11 October the Chinese Communist Foreign
Ilinietry issued a statement which declared that
Communist China could not "stand idly by" in the
face of U.N. advances into North Korea, that this
action was a "menace to the security of China," and
that the "aggressors must be anyworable for their
acts in extending the war." This statement, like
other previous threats, has provided no clear
indication of the nature of the aid which the
Chinese Communists may intend to extend to North
Korea or whether an overt intervention by Chinese
Communist troops is planned.
There has been no new information with regard to
Chinese Co let military activity in 1:anchuria or
an deployments of Chinese Communist Field Forces in
the area, and Field Force strength in Manchuria
continues to be estimated at 155,0000 A possible
negative indication of Chinese Communist preparations
for immediate hostilities is the fact that a USAF
reconnaissance flight on 8 October found the cities
of Antung? Port Arthur, Dairen, and cities on the
Shantung Peninsula brightly lighted, and no blacke
out efforts were made0
In spite of recent reports of continuing airfield
conetruction, there are no reliable indications
that the North Korean Air Force has been or will be
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reinforced and 110 further reports have been received
with regard to a concentration of aireraft in the
&ntung area. Although Chinese Communist air strength
is believed to be increasing, there are no indica.'
tions that it will be committed in tho near future
or if committed the area of em,l. u,nt.
(5)
Soviet activity in the U.N., though it is beooming
lets conciliatory, continues to provide no clear indi-
oation of Soviet intentions with respect to Korea.
The noncommittal taotios of the Soviets suggest the
possibility that they reached no firm decision.
It is noteworthy that available information on the
Communist Party worldwideline also suggests that.
the Parties of various countries are uninstruoted Or
at a loss as to how to explain Korean developments.
c. In Indo.China, the French decision to withdraw the
Caobang garrison has apparently offset their gains resulting from the
offensive against the Viet Utah intim Thal Nguyen area. According
to report, the withdrawing Caobang garrison of three battalions and
a relief colt= of four battalions driving northward from That Rho
have been out off by the strong Viet Ilinh forces in the area. .It is
probable that substantial elements of the French force have beien
destroyed, which will constitute a serious loss to the Freneh4 The
action clearly indicates the increased capabilities of the net Linh
and refleots the extent and effectiveness of Chinese Communist assist.
awe. The Viet 1112211 attack is a departure from strictly guerrilla
warfare tactics which have hitherto been used. Although it is evident
that the Viet lanh are now capable of coping with major French forces
and that heavier fighting is to be expected, it is too early to
determine whether this action is an innediate prelude to a concerted
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Viet Llinh effort to drive the Trench out of Indo-China or presages
the adoption of a policy of harasoment on a major scale. No new
Viet llirth presswe has boon reported on the western defense line of
border posts around Lackey, but further attacks in Kis area can be
expected at anytime. There have been no revrindications of Chinese
Communist intentions to invade Indo-China with regular forces. Proof
of Chinese Communist technical and training assistance to the Viet
Vinhwas established by the capture from Viet tlinh foroes of Chinese
quartermaster accounts and technical training manuals. The effective-
ness of Viet Linh antiaircraft fire also reflects increased Chinese
logistical support. Reports of undetermined reliability state that
two airfields in Kwangsi are now ready for use in siding the Viet
Vinh.
d. There is little indication of intensified Cotmunist
pressure in other countries of Southeast Asia. In lialaya, British
security forces are making slow progress against the Communist insur-
gents and there is no evidence that any significant degree of outside
aid is reaching the insurgents. In Thailand. there is a constant
danger of Communist-inspired labor trouble but rePorts.ofChinese
Communist plans for such action are not confirmed. Communist-led
dissident activity in the Philippines and Burma continues; but there '
are no indications of major changes in their capabilities, intentions,
or methods.
e. Fran the foregoing, it is concluded that:
(1) It cannot be definitely determined whether the
ChineSe Communists will exorcise their substantial
eapabilities to intervene in Korea, although the
deployment of experienced combat troops to tan..
()burin and reiterated threats of intervention conp
tinue to indicate a possibility of such action.
( 2 )
(3)
The Uorth Koreans have shown every indication of
continuing the struggle with determination and it is
possible that a aro Soviet and Chinese Communist
decision as to intervention has been deferred pend.
ing future developments, although support of the
North Koreans will continue.
There is a strong likelihood that the invasion of
Formosa has been postponed for this year.
(4) Successful Viet Lanh action against the French has
at least indicated a marked increase in Viet Ilinh
oapabilitios. resulting from Chinese Communist
assistance, amdimgrbe i prelude to other large-
scale Viet lanh attacks.
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20 Indications of Intentions in_21E2E_ELlaam_East.
a. Bo information has teen reported Allah would be indica-.
tive of further developments in connection with the East German
olootiafts of 15 Ootober. Although police patrol of the borders has
increased, this is believed to reflect East German concern over the
effectiveness of tho ITestern propaganda campaign against the eleotions.
Available information with respect to the East Zone parap-mdlitary
forces provides no indication that these units are about to assume
any major operational funotioms or are preparing for any action
imediately following the electiafts. The present training program of
the ground element (Alert Police). which it was previously expected
would be terminated by the time of the elections, has been extended
to December. Although there are indications of the formation of both
a naval and an air arm of the East German forces, these appear
definitely to be only a nucleus for further expansion and without
significant capabilities at present, has reported
the formation of an East German air unit at Erfurt which teoclived
former German Air Force aircraft in April but, in general, it is
believed these units are organized in cadre form for ultimate expanp.
sion in the event of an emergency. Also of possible significance is a
report that a now canal is to be oonstructed around Berlin which will
bypass the West sectors. Although this canal when completed would be
a great help in the blookade of Berlin and may indioate an intent
ultimately to reimpose the blockade, it will be some time before it is
completed.
b. It is new believed that the Soviet maneuver program in
Germany has progressed Somewhat beyond last year's schedule and that
larger scale exercises probably did begin about two weeks earlier than
last year. Fragmentary reports now indicate that A.rw exercises
(i.e., inter-divisional exercises) possibly were under way in late
September and are now probably drawing to a close. It also now
appears that some Soviet units have begun to return to winter barracks
although firm evidence of such a general move has not yet been received.
A general return or units to thoir barracks will be a negative indica-
tion that combat operations ore planned in the near future, particularly
if equipment is also returned to maintenance status.
or, In 2outheast Europe, similar indications are noted in
observations that some units have returted from maneuvers to normal
locations. ramgarien Any maneuvers have terminated, and it is
reported that 876fte Bulgarian troops are returning to barracks in the
Sofia area, There is as yet no confirmation that this trend is general'
throughout Bulgaria and, as Sofia is quite close to the YUgoslav border,
the move to barraoks in this area is not necessarily a negative indica-
tion of possible Bulgarian operations. There is, however, no inform.
ation presently available which would point to the probability of fall
military operations anywhere in Europe.
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a. Iimation from Hungary continuesWindicate a possi-
bility that the Soviets are planning either the movement of additional
troops into Eungary or a possiblo reorganisation of command in this
area, but there continues to be no evidence of tho arrival of new
Soviet units. Previously reported indications of unusual activity
have been the apparent shift of two depots or elements thereof from
Austria to Etmgary, the arrival of small Soviet elements in twins near
Budapest, new barracks construotion (sone of it possibly for Soviet
use) and occasional irregular vehiole numbers. If a general reoreant.
isation or preparations for the shifting of Soviet forces in Austria,
Magary and Rumania is under may, it is apparently a very gradual
process; there has been little apparent haste in these activities and
no activity has been reported which would indicate that they are in
probable preparation for any imminent operations.
e. In Czeohoslovakia, inoreased road blooks on the German
border have been noted, probably as a security measure to restrict
border creasers but possibly also as fortifications. There has been
evidence for months of intensive security precautions along this
border. The callup of the fall class of conscripts in Cseohoslovakia
has begun in possibly somewhat larger numbers than normal. As there
is also no information that any men have been released, an increase in
the Czech Army maybe indicated.
fo After an abortive Communist attempt to oreate major
unrest in Austria, the situation has returned to normal with an
apparent considerable loss of Communist and Soviet prestige. Although
the incidents have demonstrated the resistance of the Austrians to
Communion, the. Communist capability to stage a ooup in the Soviet Zone
of Austria has not diminished and the Austrian police and people would
be incapable of preventing such a home if fully backed by the Soviets.
The events have indicated, however, that the U.S.S.R. is apparently
not yet ready to render such support to the Austrian Communists.
g. The Afghan incursion into Pakistan territory has proved
to be no more than another border incident and thoie is no indication
of Soviet or Communist instigation of the incident.
3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.
a. Available information with respoot to the recent recluse.
tion of the nuMbere of Soviet vessels in foreign waters does not now .
indicate may alarming trend and it is believed that shipping outside of
Soviet waters will again increase in the near future. No firm conolu.
sion can be dream AB to reasons for the recent reduction.
- b. There is no additional information as to the reasons for
the withdrawal of the Soviet IL-12 transports fnmn European runs during
good flying weather. The Czech and Polish airlines are still using
some Ile-12e0 although the Soviet Aeroflot is not.
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do From the foregoing, it is concluded thats
(1) Current information on Soviet and Satellite min.
tary and political activity is generally negative
with respect to intentions to undertake a diver-
sionary aotion outside tho Far East in the imme.
diate future, although a lack of indications does
net preclude such an intention.
(2) The previously reported indications of possible
increased Soviet precautionary measures, parti.
oularly with rogard to shipping, do not now appear
to be an abnormal security measure.
(3)
There is evidence of a oontinuing long-term progrmm
to improve the capabilities of the Satellite armed
forms and the military potential of Eastern Europe.
(ATTC491
JOHN =MMHG
Brigadier General, GSC
Chairman, Joint Intelligence
Indications Committee
Col E, P, Adams, G.2
Col J. K. Baker, G.2
Col R. C. Hommel, USIX (011I)
Col Ho 14 Smith, G.2
Co]. R. F. Vance JIG
Col Do N. Week:Atli, USAF (DA-USAF)
Lt Col 17. F. Jung, 0.2
Lt Col J, P. Lerrill? G.2
Lt Co]. R. Reynolds, Jr, G.2
Cdr R. L. Taylor, USN (OUI)
Lt Cdr L. F. Barry, USN (OM)
Capt re L. Greaves, G.2
Cant J. L. Sutton'. USAF (DA-USAF)
CIA
Liss Cynthia Grabo, G-2
ICIA
Ia. Samuel Lao?, 0.2
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Distribution:
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Sooretary? Genoral Staffs DA
Department of Staes Attn: rilitary Liaison Bran&
Director of Central Intelligence
Direotor of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelligence's USAF
Joint Intelligence Group, JCS
GIMP'S, Attn: ACA3s Gm2
CIUCPAC, Attn: AC/G, G.2
C/UCBUR0 Attn: Director of Intelligence
CIUCARIBs Attn: Director of Intelligence
CINCALs Attn: AC/Ss Gm2
CONGEUUSFAs Attn: AC/bs Gm2
COEGMTBLST, Attn: AC/S, G'.2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G'.% DL
Assistant Chief of Staff, G4.2? DA
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