REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000400200021-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: November 22, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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''Port or sndioat an6 of Soviet-Communist intention*
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SITUATION AT E61) OF PERIOD
om s i6 November 1960
io t 21 November 1950
Anatstant Chief of Staff. G
Department of the Army
aehiugton 20. 17. C.
r-v November 19b0
The Soviet armed forces in being are in au advanced state of
readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with
no a.dchitional warning. Thera are indications of Soviet hostile--
intentions, but the activity apparent during the week
ficierit to indicate a probability of imminent Soviet hostilities.
b~ Chinese Communist activity indicates continued military xpreppaa"
tione in Worth China and Manchuria for the support
'long-tam operations in Korea. The military activity of Chinese
Communist troops in Korea so far is not sufficient to indicate
the existence of a plan for major offensive operations, and the
action at present appears to have been undertaken with the objec-
tive of prolonging attritional warfare against the U.N. forces.
The extensive Chinese preparatory measures against the contingency
the conflict anticipated that Its
extenaiov re6ime has
of ,war indicate It& in the Communist
o otior.ts maay res
and the remainder of China.
an Viet Minh activity indicates a policy of constant harassmento or
ld~a for Ma jo r overati
t
SUMMARY OF SOVIi.:'T_COM MUNIST OFNRATL ONS DURING PERIOD.
a. KOREA-CRINA. -miiemy forces in Korea showed no signs of pprrepar`
Ing a general defense line or of offensive intentions.
Lured Chinese Com unist troops have been poorly trained, It
ill-supplied and show no great desire to fight U.S. forces.
probable that the pilots of enemy jets in Korea are Chinese
r
French. forces while the Vi?t -In" bu
continues. There is continuing evidence of increasing Coanmuniet
dissident activity in Southeast Asia. particularly in Indonesia
and Malaya.
Soviet and Communist activity in Europe i dioateo that military
and political preparations there are continuing despite an apparent
previous lull in Soviet aggressiveness..' There s dea sot a
continuing build-up of Satellite forces, particularly
Ge many.
ft
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Co 1unists, although the possibility that Soviet Pilots he"
are
made flights over Korea should not be ruled out.
continuing indications of a northward movement of Chinas the Communist troops from South and East Chi Ai, o d at aa~lIraW
of Soviet personnel northward from Shangh
in South and East China. - - ?
defensive preparations oaring to
propaganda oontiinued to charge that t. -
stated that their
attack Chinao and a North Korean tiara for w decisive bloat
retreat was temporary and in P,~ypesr~-
against the Amerioanso
arr. maintaining constant pressure on
Th? Viet
b, INDO IINA.-i ale action. while the units in i'onkin 1.,~+ ` stical
up for future =jar cperaVir Ons is continuing with logi
aid from chins. There -ice' no ft rv' indications of a major attack
in the near future,.; ne Preach believe that a determined
'I tC'" o
general Viet hiL 'I will be launched in December and the
possibility of ;.gent Viet Minh action in Laos has been
report"-4.
?o INrx"9"~~' -uast-inspired relds ham
le betarcenaleftdwinglf of
,jyva?s tobacoo crop and the struggle
groups and the goveruwdr,%, will probably ly be intensified
coming weeks*
do BuM?TIBET.- li numbers of Chinese Communist troops are
reportec+ moving through the Kachin territory of northern Burma
indicates that
enroute to Tit,et. Information province andCthat sChinese
advance on Tibet has halted in Sikang
forces are not yet In Tibet proper.
e. SCANDIUAVIAo- Sever&1 Instances of sabotage of Norwegian military a concerted
installations indicat-t'?e flee Pom~rs$
, ~tt aref 1s no reliableo evidence
.~abotag? program. P
of concurrent increased '*Qviet pressure on Finland.
f, CERZ-',ANY.,,whore has been a probable increase of about 32,000
Soviet troops in Gernan,Y since late September, but there is
s,dditional evidence of the release; of one class of Soviet 14C4?s
from Europe. ilnoonli need reports ind:.cate that the Soviet air-
field expansion proI,rum in Germany is being Continued. The
"ast German Alert F(,li.oe have completed their initial training
programs s.re being organized into 'bac?tical units, and East
German ground stre;th will probably be doubled within the next
The East Gersten Foreign inistry' is reportedly establish-
year, an elaborate tea ommi-nications network with other Communist
eoent
capitals which may to intended for military purposeb? C Aecenistt
,iolationa of flight regulations oven West Germany by
s iroraft are a thrt a .to safety and possibly deliberately
provoaative. East Garman propaganda against the U. Sa has
inoreasedo
51 M1.
me v
,,, s.. Z R,
T
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EASTERN EVA?PE0--There is now reliable evidence of the establish-
ment of Polish armored units, Continuing increased security
measures have been noted in Rumania and Poland,
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES,-Chinese Communist capabilities for military
action in Korea continue to increase and Viet Minh capabilities
are gradually increasing. Capabilities in F,hrope are increasing
with the continuing build-up of Satellite forces and improved
logistical and communications faoilitieea
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TAB "A"
ISPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMAUNIST INTENTIONS
Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
21 November 1950
1. Indications of Intentions in the Far Easter
a.- Available information on Chinese Communist activities
within the past week revealed no significant new developments with
regard to their intentions but generally supported previously reported
trends* There continued to be no indication of eneu offensive prepa-
rations in Korea,, but there were continuing reports of the northward
movement of Chinese Communist troops,) of Chinese defensive measures and
of general military preparations for the eventuality of war. Propaganda
continued to charge the U.S. with aggressive designs against China.
(1)
In Korea, Comaunist forces generally continued their
tactics of limited withdrawals and delaying actions.
There was no definite indication that enemy forces
were preparing a general defense line or that the
Chinese Communists have selected a q area for an an-
out defense. There was also no evidence to indicate
that these withdrawals were in preparation for a
counter-offensive, and enemy forces generally showed
little aggressive tendency and no great will to fight.
The interrogation of a number of Chinese Pffus revealed
that many of them were former Nationalists who had had
little training, and that they have little equipment,
a poor supply system and in some cases are short of
food. Few of these prisoners knew when they crossed
the Yalu that they were to fight U.S. forces and their
discovery of the identity of opposing forces accounted
for many surrenders. The statements of these prisoners
indicate that Chinese Communist forces in Korea are not
"volunteers" and also that the Chinese troops encoun-
tered to date are not representative of the best troops
of the Fourth Field Array. There is also no indication
that the Chinese troops have been supplied with good
equipment. With the freezing of the Yalu River, which
normally occurs in late November, Chinese capabilities
for logistical support of their forces in Korea will be
substantially increased as the ice on the river will
support fully loaded heavy trucks.
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(2) Although firm evidence is lackingg it appears
probable that the pilots of the enemy jet aircraft
operating from bases in Manchuria are Chinese
t failed to press
l
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report states
Chinese Communist, has been established in Iikdeno
There is a possibility that aircraft from Soviet units
have also appeared over North Korea, however. on
16 November, a flight of U.N. bombers was followed for
a hundred miles, butn~ in theedirection of~Vladi~vostaka
craft which disappeared
(3) In Communist China,, reports of northward troop movement,
although diminished in volume within the past week, con-
tinued to indicate that sizable movements of troops and
supplies were still under way during the first two weeks
of November. Additional reports tended to confirm that 25X1 C
a portion of the Third Field Army has moved northward
from Shanghai possibly to the Shantung Peninsula.
a very large number o trains were
troops an equipment north from Nanking Tientsinp
that only express was being moved because of military
requirements and that freight trains were returning
ing
empty from the north. If these troop a their destina-
fact continuing as far north as Tientsin
tion iin
may well be Manchuria, but there is as yet no firm
evidence of the movement of Third Field Army units into
t~nchuria. A report on 13 November stated
d that tanks 25X1 C
Communists Pilots have frequen
,Y The
attacks, despite superior aircraft performance.
pilots have handled their aircraft poorly and their
gunnery has been poora Reports of the training of
Chinese communist pilots by the Soviets indicate that
Chinese pilots are available, and a recent unconfirmed
that an air command post, presumbl.Y
that aircraft were being move no an
which had come from Manchuria were being returned to the
north? and numerous sources have confirmed d that Soviet vietd
military perso
from Shanghai.
Zu.
II`i'hird Field Army troops are
Pr nee into Canton for transport northward, that the
movement of stores and aammnition northward continues,
and that large amounts of POL are being smuggled in from
Hong Kong and also moved north. An unconfirmed report
has ind.cated that elements of various Chinese Comu ist
units are being moved northward, presumably for service
in Koreas that the basic unit to aid in operations in
the north is a company and that each division is expected
to produce approximately one battalion by requiring each
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platoon to furnish three soldiers. Such a method
of selection would be consistent with previous
Chinese Communist practice in the invasion of Hainan,,
is also consistent with early reports of the composi-
tion of units in Korea, and could account in part for
the numerous reports of small troop unit movements and
diverse identifications.
(4) Additional information on Chinese defensive measures
has included reports that factories are being evacuated
from Kwang-Lung Province and Canton, that security pre-
cautions have been tightened in Shanghai and Canton,,
and that air raid precautions are being hastened in
South Central China. Increased stress on the formation
of local militia units was reported from many areas of
China. Airfields at Hankow, Peiping and Canton are
being prepared for jet operations according to reports
from several sources. re-
ported on 14 November at emergency reconstracti-an of
Waite Cloud airfield was under way with the work to be
completed in November and that a Communist official
had stated that new types of aircraft were soon to
arrive "because of the present international situation."
General Chinese apprehension that war is imminent
appeared unabated, and there were reports for the first
Ime of arrests of citizens for listening to the Voice
=f America
(5) There was no indication, from the tenor of Chinese
Communist propaganda during the week, that the Chinese
Communist delegation to the U.N. would be prepared to
accept American assurances that the U.So has no aggres-
sive designs on China. The Peiping radio on 17 November,
in a reply to President Truman e s statement on this sub-
Ject,reaffirmed previous assertions that the U.S. was
preparing to invade China and stated that U.S. declara-
tions "are not convincing anyone" in China. In Moscow*
the newspaper Izvestia stated on 19 November that the
U.S,, was conducting a provocative and aggressive policy
towards China and was "deliberately seeking to provoke
war against China." An announcement of the Central
Committee of the North Korean Communist Party on
19 November stated that their reverses by no means
signified defeat. The retreat was described as tempo-
iary with the object of preparing a decisive blow to
the American hordes and gaining ultimate victory. The
announcement also stressed the importance of the Korean
situation to China. This announcement has been broad-
cast by the Moscow radio for domestic consumption.
411up SEC TR ET
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(6) The following report on alleged Communist strategy
in Korea is unconfirmed but not inconsistent with
Chinese action to date: At a conference between
Chinese Communist leaders and Soviet advisers on
3 November it was reportedly decided that the Chinese
Communists would (a) fight a war of maneuver in Korea,
avoid major battles, stall for time and drain U. So
manpowrer; (b) attempt to prevent decisive action in
the U.N. and split the Western powers on the Korean
issue; (a) continue the enlistment of "volunteers"
but make no declaration of war; and (d) remove indus-
tries from Manchuria to Northwest China to provide for
the exigencies incident to the failure of this strategy.
(7) The reported but unconfirmed shipment of Soviet mines
and torpedoes to China could be for one or more of the
following purposes: defense of the Chinese coast or a
counter-action to any future blockade; the use of
Chinese submarines; the use of Chinese ports by Soviet
submarines (which if true might be an indication of
the terms of the Sino-Soviet treaty).
be In Indo-China, Viet Minh activity during the past week
has been primarily designed to maintain pressure on French units,
particularly in the Tonkin area. Viet Vinh harassing actions and attacks
on small posts have occurred both east and west of Hanoi and on the road
from Hanoi to Dinhlap in the northeast, but in none of these operations
has there been any indication of the massing of forces or the coax dinated
large-scale movement of Viet Minh unitso Shipment of tanks to the Viet
Minh is a probable development for the near future although such ship-
ments from Hainan are as yet not confirmed. In addition to arms smug-
gling from Hainan by sea (which has been partially interdicted by the
French), a Viet Minh air supply route has been established from Hainan
and equipment for receiving air-dropped supplies has been set up at
fields in Tonkin and at a new field in northern Annam. The French con-
sider that the most favorable season for a major Viet Minh effort in the
Delta will be between 1 November and 1 February and are particularly con-
cerned about the period from 10 to 31 December. Viet Minh mobility is
less affected by poor weather conditions than is the French, however,
and Viet Minh operations are more likely to be based on the progress of
their turn build-up and French capabilities than on weather factorae
Present indications are that the Viet Minh build-up for future operations
against the Delta area is continuing and that harassing and probing pres-
sure will be maintained constantly. There are no indications of a Chinese
invasion, although the danger of Korean-style intervention will grow
should the Viet Minh show signs of faltering. has
reported a strong possibility of Viet Minh attac os n we
next few days
ET.
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c. A series of Communist-inspired fire raids in Indonesia,
which began on 10 November, has resulted in the loss of half the_1950
crop of Java's finest tobacco. Although the gradually deteriorating
security conditions in Indonesia during the past several months. are
in part the cause of this action at the present time,, the boldness of
the Communist attacks suggests outside direction. There are indica-
tions that the government is planning and undertaking stringent measures
against Communist and labor organizations, and the struggle between left-
wing groups and the government is expected to be intensified in coming
weeks.
d. Reports persist. that Chinese Communist troops have
encroached on Burmese territory in the northern Kachin state and that
skirmishes with Kachin troops have taken place. The Chinese Communist
intransigent attitude towards Tibet has increased Burmese worries that
the Chinese will assert their claims to northern Kachin territory. It
is probable that the present troop movement across Kachin territory in-
volved some 2,,40U Chinese troops an route to Tibet. Reports
have tended to refute previous reports that Chinese troops had
en ere Tibet proper.
eo From the foregoing, it is concluded that:
(1) Chinese Communist activity indicates continued military
preparations in North China and Manchuria for the sup-
port of extended,, longterm operations in Korea.. Vie
military activity of Chinese Communist troops in Korea
so far is not sufficient to indicate the existence of
a plan for -major offensive operations, and the action
at present appears to have been undertaken with the
objective of prolonging attritional warfare against the
U.N. forces. The extensive Chinese preparatory measures
indicate that the Communist regime has anticipated that
its actions may result in the extension of the conflict
into Manchuria and North China. The shift of Soviet
advisory personnel from Central China to Manchuria prob-
ably also indicates that the training and re-equipping
of Chinese Communist forces may be conducted in the
north.
(2) Present Viet Minh activity indicates a policy of constant
harassment of French forces in Tonkin while the build-up
of the Viet Minh for major operations continuese There
are no firm indications of when such large-scale attacks
will be launched, although the French believe that the
period between 10 and 31 December will be critical. There
is a possible threat of Viet Minh attacks in Laos.
(3) There is continuing evidence of increasing Communist
dissident activity and sabotage in Southeast Asia.
T 0 lt" rfCI o T
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2< Indications of Intentions in Ruroe and the Near East.
a. The sabotage of two,, and possibly three, widely separated
Norwegian military installations on 16 November has indicated a definite
possibility of concerted Communist sabotage action in that country. The
installations involved were the Bardufoss airbase in northern Norway (at
which several bunkers containing a considerable quantity of ammunition
were destroyed by fires set off, evidently, by incendiary time pencils),
Nola airfield near Stavanger (where 20 pairs of cables leading from the
airfield to the seaplane base were cut), and an ammunition depot at
Trondheim (where a wire. fence was out but no actual damage reported).
Although Norwegian defense officials have suggested that the saboteurs
may have been young Air Force conscripts and have been inclined to attach
only minor significance to the actionst the coincidence of these events
suggests more than haphazard efforts. Initial reports indicated a possible
connection between these events and a reported increase in Soviet radio
traffic in the Murmansk area and the Aaland Islands and the alleged de-
livery of a Soviet demand to Finland.
Another MUM
indication of Soviet interest in e c was trio pu hase during October
of about 700 Norwegian and Danish nautical charts by officers of a Soviet
vessel during its visit to Sweden.
b~ Additional reports on Soviet troop rotation in Germany now
indicate the arrival of about 48,000 new troops between 21 September and
4 November and the departure during that period of approximately 16,000,
resulting in an apparent net increase of about 32,000 to date. Although
there is no firm basis for determining whether the present increase is
temporary or permanent, the additional evidence that some troops are
leaving provides further confirmation that the NCO's of the 1926 class
are being demobilized in Europeo There is as yet no indication that Soviet
anti-aircraft guns have been emplaced at the Oder giver bridges, despite the
movement of a Soviet AAA division to this area. Two Soviet ground attack
regiments have been moved to newly completed airfields in the western por-
tion of the Soviet Zone of Germny, and unconfirmed reports indicate that
land is being requisitioned at three new sites near the western border for
further airfield enlargements
c o Two recent violations of flight regulations over West Germany
by communist aircraft have indicated at least a reckless disregard of
safety-regulations and possibly deliberate attempts to provoke an jncidentb
The Soviet plane transporting Maurice Thorez to Moscow failed to obtain
clearance from the Frankfort traffic center, resulting in the dispatch of
a U. S. plane to identify it; the U-S.S.R. then filed a charge that its
plane had been "attacked" by a U.S. jet. During the past week, 30 flights
of Czech aircraft also overflew West Germany, on route to bring delegates
to the peace congress, without obtaining prior permission. There has been
a marked increase in East German propaganda attacks on Americans in the
past few daya.
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d~ There is now considerable evidence that the East German
Alert Police are being expanded and reorganized. Two reports have
indicated that the ground element is to be doubled in strength, or
:increased to about 100,000, within the next year, The initial train-
ing program of the Alert Police was reportedly terminated on 1 November,
rather than the previously indicated date of 1 December, and all units
are now being organized into tactical battalions. This suggests that
preparations are being made for the activation of regiments and possibly
eventually of divisions0 The present training schools for officers and
NCOes are'to continue but with fewer students, Other reports also indi-
cate definite plans for the formation of an Fast German air unit, includ-
.ng preparations for a school ?ckr pilots the adoption of an air force
uniform, and the turnrv,er cf a Soviet airfield to the Germans.
a. The East German Foreign. Anistry Is reportedly soon to
acquire a short-wave telecommunications network linking it with diplo-
matic posts in Eastern Europe,, Moscow and the Far East. The plan pro-
vides for the installation of emergency gasoline generators in case of
power failures, and this provision and the ambitious scope of the net-
work appear entirely out of keeping with routine diplomatic needs of
the East German Governments It is therefore possible that Soviet mili-
tary requiremnts, rather than East German needs, have dictated the
establishment of this elaborate network, which would be of great value
in co-ordinating activities throughout the Satellite countries,
f. There were some further indications during the week of
increased security measures in Eastern Europe and of the build-up of
Satellite Armies. In Rumania, increased supervision of U,S., and British
diplomats by the security police was reported, and the call-up of a new
class to the army was officially announced, These are probably the men
born in 1930 and the second class inducted this year, while one class
has been released. Information from Poland now confirms previous indi-
cations that an infantry division at Gdansk (Danzig) has been converted
to an armored division, and the movement of Polish armored troops into
this area has been observed. There are also indications that an armored
corps is being formed in northwest Poland with headquarters at Bydgoszcz.
Also in Poland, there are reports that the Soviets are reactivating a
former German training area in Silesia (near the Czech border) and that
they are requisitioning large amounts of accommodations in the same area.
This significant possibility is as yet unconfirmed, however, and recent
observations have failed to reveal the presence of Soviet troops in the
areas of the reported requisitioning.
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From the foregoing, it is concluded that:
(1) Available intelligence does not indicate the
probability of Soviet or Satellite military
action in Europe in the immediate future, but
there is evidence of a continuing build--up of
Satellite forces? particularly in East Germany.
(2) Sabotage in Norway and other Soviet and Communist
activity indicate.that military and political
preparations in Europe are continuing, despite an
apparent previous lull in Soviet aggressivenesso
JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, CSC
Chairman, Joint Intelligence
Indications Committee
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i:;oi h. V,, Adam b (3-2
`Ccl. ago ch Baker, 0-2
G-'~ Duff , Cr?2
Ccl 11. Do Neely, USAF (D/1-USAF)
C a~_ J1~a F4 Go Vance, JxG
G_ of Da N. y/ackwitz, USAF (D/I-USAF)
Cdr Peter Bolin, USN (ONI)
Lt Col W. C. Lantaff, G-2
Lt Col J. P. Pbarrill, G-2
Cdr Frederick Welden, USI1 (01a)
iiaj C. L. Flanders, (1-2
Lt Cdr 1 Ile Hatch, USIA (ONI )
Capt F. Lo Greaves, (3--2
2 5X 1 A GaPt in LO Sutton, USAF (D/1-USAF)
CIA
25X1 A joss Cynthia ra o, 0-2
0TA
?fir Samuel. e,
I4 rss Keatts Twyf ord, 0-2
25X1 C
Distributions
Assistant Secretary of the Army (GM)
Secretary, General Staff, DA
Comptroller of the Army
Brig Gen F. No Roberts, Kilitary Adviser to Sp Asst to President
Department of State, Attn: Military Liaison Branch
Director of Central Intelligence
Director of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, USAF
Joint Intelligence Group, JCS
CINCFE, Attn% AC/S, G-2
CINCPAC, Attn: Director of Intelligence
ClNCE1flt, Attn: Director of Intelligence
CINCARIB, Attn : Director of Intelligence
CINCAAL, Attn: Director of intelligence
CCW ENUSFA, Attn: AC/S, (-2
CO1~,ENTRUST, Attn : AC`S, Cr-2
C01J ARAL, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CGUSARCARIB, Attn: AG/S,2
'UBARPAC Attn: AG/Sr G12
Mier, Army el Fo
co, second Aril,y, At 4nr t HC/ a, (1-2
GG, Third Army, Attn: AC/B, (-,2
CG, Fourth Arrkv, Attr : AG/S, 0-2
CG_, Fifth Arty, Attn: AC/B, G--2
GG, Sixth Army, Attu: AC/B, G?2
Assistant Chief of ;Btafi, v--3, DA
Assistant Chief of Staff, 0--2, DA
lit) `~~
cQs, t t AU/so G-2
Go,, First Army, Attn: AG/B, 0-2
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