REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS NO. 51

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000400230010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2001
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 26, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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C R O O F
CO CWSIONS
The Soviet Km Poroee being are in an advanced state at
readimas for war as could Initiate offensive operations with
no additional warning. %ilitary and political indications are
that the Co uniets intend to insist upon a solution of controver-
sial iwob14mss strictly along lines which further Communist world
objectives. There are no indications that the Soviets and their
no uniet ailiea,, In pursuing their major objectives, intend
necessarily to avoid future actions which might precipitate global
hosti,iittea o
2? in Ko"ae preparations for further e e aailitery action continue
and C ist forces are in a position to latuneh a major Offensive
without material warning. Thermo are no indications that the
C ste have abandoned their objective of the, withdrawal Of
foreign tromps as a basic condlti.on.for a settlement.
There is no indication of a modification of Chinese C unist
objectives in Aeia4 Purther major silitear T operations outside
the Korean theater do not appear to be imaa1nent although prepare -
tions era being made to move Chinese Caeunlat troops into Tibet.
The" are continued Indications of increasing Chinese Cta aauniat
longmtera p aparati s for support of the Viet ?[linh.
tF . Available intelligence does not indicate Soviet intentions to
initiate hostilities in guropo or the Hear East, in the iaa diate
future but there are continuing iMlcatiOns of Soviet and Satellite
preparations for ware The Soviet air strength in Dee m is large
and is steadilir. 1 asingo
The Soviet "Peace offensive" appear@ to be superficial o and the
indications of insa easing Soviet cooperstivensss with the West
represent an employment of different tactices designed to reduce
the iaaprov ut of t power position of the Vast'
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ANALYSIS OF INDICATIONS
Indieations of intentions in the Far last ..
go -
dly Political and Propaganda. There waas6 no ssignificanthaa
during he 'ses in Communist p pag
cease-fire discussions. C nt from H arth Korean g
Chinese Cowunist and Soviet soureesd up to the resumption
of the truce discussions an 25 July ', provided no indias -
tion that the Cos unists were prepared to withdraw their
de ad for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from
Imes, altbough there was also no suggestion that they
were preparing to break off the discussion. Soviet press
soments continued to be limited to reprints of North
Korean and Chinese C ainiat items rsitesticag that the
withdrawal of foreign troops In essential to a seettlement
TABS dispatches from Pyongyang dur the week accused
the American delegation at KaeaaoD$ of categorically l*fuss-
ag to discuss a troop withdrawal despite the fact that
without such evacuation a "peaceful settlement of the Scram
t ueetion is Imposssiblem" and quoted the Worth man con-
tention that "the Korean people den nd the withdrawal of
foreign troops" and "insist on the final solution of this
q aestianu" The Peiping radio on 24 July resumed its pro-
tests against continuing U.S. military action and charged
that American planes had penetrated China t s air space in
the "most flagrant provocation of *IL" Despite this
apparent uncompromising attitudes howeverg there were no
threats in Communist peopeganda that a failures to agree
to their proposals would lead to breakdown of the discus-
ear? to
stons~?ltae Coeseufist position continues to app
be designed to place the blame an the U 0S t for .-any
kdom which saight occur in the peace conference and
e
ace-
selves as the champic+nss of P
(2) Around. Although there in no firm indication of the
ji;jrs future course of act ion a the Communists have
continued to improve their capabilities for either a
4
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r aza 1 of the offensive or the maintenance of a pr o-
lotxge:d defense Vehicle sight x s haveyc~ the
fairly high sver*ging about 500 per week. It is vet coated that the or r has been able a 51nec
30 June, to stockpile sufficient supplies in forward areas
to support a 45 division attack for 9 to 11 days or a 72
division attack for 5 to T days. flo increased volume of
eene artillery fire, the forvar?d displacement of artillery
in the eastern sector of the front and reports of increased
tee sightings are indicative of eeneoW readiness for a
resumption of the offensive. Recent probing action of the
eel has shown his interest in the dispositions of U.S troopa, particularly in the east central sector, and PW'a
indicate a C ist attempt to maintain the offensive
spirit of their troops. According to a tiold osti to,,
the present enemy situation is such that the preparations
leeh normally have preceded previous offensives eight
not be necessary or could be accomplished very rapidly.
fte C unist forces are maintaining closer contact than
in the past, the combat effectiveness of most units in
contact indicates their "able eenaplont in an offensive
sole,, and weather conditions aight permit the movement of
"serves into attack positions without detection Inteer-
roptiara of ?V's captured sinr:e I July has resulted in 16
reports indicating that the enemy is preparing for are frm
offensive 9 and of then have given dates ranging
25 July to 19 August. t attack
allege that orders have Been asu
if the U.S, does not meet their deeeeands and that prepara-
tions are being made accordingly. A PV from the 27th CC?
Army has statodg on the other hand, that the mission of
this A when it moved into the front on 15 July was
to deefe for six weeks.
There continues to be no firm indication of the arrival
of additional Chinese Comaaunist units in Bore despite
the nuoaroua recent reports that substantial reinforce-
ments have crossed the Yalu. Mere Is a possibility,,
however, that a umber of Chinese Comunist armies o
e4 ich have not been t ly identified, may actually
be. present In Kom and that CC? strength may be from
100,000 to 300000 In excess at the present eestI ate of
262H000 , In addition, there are fairly reliable reports
that elements of the CC? 41st, 43d and 46th Armies may
be moving northward from South China and are possibly
deestd for Korea.
According to recent reports of uncertain reliability,
some 20 Soviet offieers arrived in Pyongyang In late
June, possibly as advisors for the cease-fire discussions
the Soviets have seamed control of Chinese Coawaunist and
North Korean oomairnications n and Soviet military advisors
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to North Korean units are to be doubled by late Aauat a
An increase in Soviet advisors Is Possible, elthOu 1
not confir eda but there continues to be no reliable
evidence that Soviet military personnel a other than
advisors and AAA troops are present in Korea, '
(3) Air. En air activity in Korea during the week vas
itcd to several night interception operations by
individual aircraft and one engagement between K10-151o
and U.S. Marine Corps jet%. There were no firs Indies-
tions that this activity is to be expended. Airfield
repair still continues at several loc*tions is North
a, however, and unconfirmed reports continue to
mention the existence and training of an "international
volunteer air force" in nchuria ~ Reliable evidence
indicates that the la ease in enter flak strength had
maintained a steady rate up to about the tis of the
beginning of the Ebesong Mlles., Information is not yet
available to determine whether or not this increase has
cunt inuad o
25X1 C
C auniet propaganda with respect to the Japanese peace treaty and
there contInuos to be no clear indication of any definite Soviet nova
to forestall its signing. The Soviet Union and C ist China have
both reaffirmed their rejection of the proposed treaty, An official
Chinese publiottlon asserted that a peace treaty with Japan without
Chinese C nist participation is illegals invalid and, entirely
unacceptable to the Chinese people a while Pravda lutained that
"everyone to whom peace is dear will reject the :Japanese treaty draft
ic*tin$ the presence of tour-engine boa rs
_4r_a -_ in Manchuria and China a Theme reports. together with the
sighting of a non-friendly B-29 type aircraft off Korea
during May, support the belief that an undetermined
number of TU:-P P s are In the Par lest and probably have
conducted flights in Ranchuria, possibly for familiarisa-
tion or training purposes. That a TUA unit Is actually
nently stationed in Manchuria is considered unlikely.
b. JAPAI There has been no new develop nt in Soviet and Chinese
as a threat to peace In the Per East,,"
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The observation of an additional dumbo radar at FIguer.
seventh woste site borrd has e
makes the sixth radar observed along the
of the Soviet Zone of Germany
reported but is not yet confirmed? The new sites are
considerably removed from airfield warning area, Indic tng
probable utilisation for early cover8ge,, although
it is also possible that these radars are positioned
temporarily for maneuvers. Fairly reliable reports of
50 em AA guns on two airfields in the Soviet Zone 007
indicate that these guns are replacing or supplenting
the present )7 mm guess n Although the reported arrival
of 50 M;R guns In the Zone was reported in Octoberi this
is the first evidence of their employmnt
Of the seven new runways under construction In the So let,
Zone, work is p ^ogreastng .pteadtly at five where about
complote4p while
one-third of the cement laying has b enye begun.
at the other two cement laying has
In Austria, there has been no further evidence of re-
equipment of tighter or light bomber regiments with
modern aircraft.- The jet tighter division at Wiener-
Eeustadt w with 67 Set fighters and trsiner's, is conduct -
ing normal training operations.
ba SATSLUM ,
(1) Bul via a There are indications that call -ups of
Bu garian reservists during 1951 are on a far larger
scale than in previous years, The major categories of
reservists being called are signal personnel, motor
vehicle drivers, and tank and artillery specialists,
with particular emphasis on the latter. Although *cue
for
reports have Indicated that the reservist call-up
rusher training of 30 to 40 days, others indicating
that new regiments are being. ford from reservists sug-
gest that many are being hold for longer periods. Bean-
while two of the three divisions of the Third Bulgarian
Army are reported concentrated along most of the Turkish
frontiers a with units of the Second Army along the
eastern part of the Greek frontier. Evidence that care-
taking parties are still in pera*nant garrisons, however,
suggests that the ?~ effect mav,~o~depln pur-
poses rather than
(2~ Cap?allsoslovalsia-1~ ary? Recent field trips by cm-potent
Military observers K'u ar.?y and Czechoslovakia indicate
that no unusual military activity Is under way in the
areas covered. A Western military attache observed
nothing unusual between the Eusarnian border and Budapest,
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and another observor noted no unusual army or air
activity on a -five -day trip through Moravia and Slovakia.
A recent observation of a somewhat unusual number of
vehicles in the Susice and Sumava areas of western
Czechoslovakia (both known maneuver areas) probably
reflect training exercises.
o. YUGOSLAVIA. The attack on Tito by Molotov during the course
of his 21 July address at the Polish "Liberation Day" ceremonies does
not apD to have immediate significance in terms of increased Soviet
hostility towards Yugoslavia. P4olotov reiterated the well-worn
Cominform line that Yugoslavia has become a capitalist pawn under
Tito and that this cannot last long as the Yugoslavs would "find a
way to freedom and the liquidation of the fascist Tito regime." Vim
Cominform Journal has predicted previously that Tito would be overthro
ia?arill An analysis of Soviet intentions towards Yugoslavia made
s
. y?
by General Popovic, Yugoslav Chief of Staff, prior to Molotov's state-
ment-reflected Yugoslav feeling that their country would not be
attacked by outside forces simply to wipe out the regime, but that
such an attack if it occurred would be part of overall global hostilities.
d. NEAR MW NI LE UST.
Ql) Iran. There are no clear indications of unusual Soviet
it iitary activity on the Iranian frontier. According to
two recent reports, box cars. parked along the rail l
between Ashkfnabad and Thakhe (east of the Caspian) do
not reflect a military build-up but are for the housing
of Soviet farm workers temporarily in the area. There
are Indications teat the Soviets may initially attempt
to penetrato Iranian oil operations through the employment
of oil technicians from the Satellites. A recent report
that Iran has received an offer from an Integrated team
of 150 highly qualified technicians from the Soviet-
controlled Austrian fields tends to confirm a pervious
report that the Soviets were recruiting technicians in
Austria for work in Iran-. In addition, It has been
reported that agents from Soviet-controlled oil marketing
organizations in Austria are soliciting markets In Western
Europe for Near East oil. An apparent decision to attempt
Intervention indireedly may have stemmed from a belief
that offers of Satellite aid would be considered more
favorably than would the direct offer of Russian tech-
n.icians?
(2) A ghanistan. There are indications of increased Soviet
and members of the Soviet trading delegation in Kabul
have tended to move out of the diplomatic compound.
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P MICR ET
rsN an t-508 Watch Cco ittse Rem #50), purportedly designed to
improve Soviet relations with the k slo-A hrporeip ar, 'Wo phi er t
ofp publish aent of Britis Herbert
Morrison-0 and possibly by by the the Soviet acceptance of the RCE invitation
to attend prela ry East-test trade talk&, The decision toattead
was represented by the Soviets as having been made at a hUh level
ra
and the attendance of ispor?tant offioia1s of the l these assertions,
de
was cited as evidence of Soviet sinceritya a Soviet th se sss ati is
the acaeptanc~e act.tal?~y represent bet ~n~tbe 94. and Western
probably dealed to drive a v edge Of strategic materials to
Etiaropee~n comtrion an the Issue of expo
tine Soviet bloc.
BAN STATyONS ALI GEDLT SUCEDu AaeordIX4 to a
CD S
warved n se reports soviet radio ' s~ had been Off the air for a
~ prior to 12 Julys The paper r ested that such two-week ? ~ ~'~ p a
develar t Uff"117 precedes politicS1 or aatittary' events of post
itmportsnO Limited available Oviden fa'o other sou es tends to
indicate that ostern contact with Soviet i ddio ham ttations has doclli al
over the post several months althouO
by the 3ov3et stations has not been verified,, ~ ~f~~+a~~ni be
rsaahe4 at Present as to whether
sig+if van
of any
-' JOh N VEC X
~-
Brigadier Generals GSC
Chai n, Watch Copasitt"
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Presents
Departxat of State :
Mr 0,
Ij It. plosson
W. Ado 1PS`Yl~ rvol
Mr Se M. Wiedemann
Cena?1 s111gence Agency:
25X1A
,of or Staff. 0-2.
Cal1oIF.AdaNG
Col J. 1. Baker
ColRoa. Duff
Col ?. 17. doffman
Col a. H. foaaze
Col 3 ~ B. Talley
Lt Col B. Z. Cowan
LL Col K. 14L Lele1e3
Cap% 0. C. Quigley
Capt S~ H. 1 &lworth
,,is$ Cynthia Orabo
are setts itor4
Itr 11. g o Berkey
S al NcXae
Nr R. 3. Spencer ?
office of ?anal lntolligences
Cdr S - C m Looia
Or R ~ L. Taylor Jr
LC4r D F Sara' .
Ca 1. jUdd
mr S. A. Bailey nce IISAFs
Dlreaatorate of Intelligt
Capt R. P. Beebe (USA)
Cal S.- g 3ra ctcett , Jr qS!!C ~
Col .J o F o Pinimey
Cal I& O 11* a 9 lliaaa
Cdr J, S o Reedy
Lt Col W e F. Zeller
LCdr S H. Dinaaore
Mai J. L. Sutter raon
v rt On
Atomic 81x7 Comlaaiona 14r 11C' Sen e
Gott Intelligence Group 0 JCS : $r J
A ? Cdr C o Site an t on a Mr g o S a
Feder 1 Bu ?'a of Invest i~
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president
Sr. is Gen V o N- Roberts, 111 1ta AAista for r-te1~ to .
1e1aent of State, Attn. Sp
Di, etor of Central intelligence
Executive SOOrOta v QSD
Director of NQ-a1 Inte11igcfc
Director of Inteiligenoe o USAF
joint ntelllzanad 0roup a JCS
Atom-le 19nergy Co.ssion
?idt
Federal Bureau of Invests
Civil Dot-east Liaison, OSD Project
Chlef 9 ArMd Porcase Spools% Weapons
Coordinated by Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff 8 0-2s DA
gds 55245 and 72391
D.paaa sr % of %hq A? Distributions
Officet, Sectary of the Dry .
Assistant Sectary of the Army B)
chief of Stiff
Seeretar , Gnert1 Staff
comptroller of tho A
Aesietent Ch1et at Staff o 0-21 DA
Aesiatant Chief of Staff o 0-3, DA
Chief. P C Off a , 4-2"
SUAPE 9 Attu Senior U.S.. Ash 04. Representative
CI 5 o Attnn AC/ s, 0-2
CI : o Attu_ Ducats. of Intel.l. n
ACA. 0-2
C alsr , IIsnd Defense Po m. Attno
CI IS o Attu-. DI rector of Intell i caoe
C1 1"L, A.tta Director of intelligence
C 1151 A j, Attn: ACA. 0-2
C USAR La Attu; ACA. 0
C003A XINa Attu' Ac/3, 0-2
COUSLUFAC, A.'t` n? AC/S 9 0.2
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Chief, r WIMAIA Attu C/3* 0 -2
ThUld A R Attu A.C/SO C-2
cGv Fourth AMY, Attns AC/SD 0-2
CC,, pitth AMY, AM'- AC/'Se 0.2
? Silks Attu o ACI e C Q2
s Seventh e Attnb AC/So 0-2
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