REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS NO. 48

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000400230013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 5, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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WATCH CONNITTEE
of the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions
TOP SECRET
No. 48
Document No.
f:o Change In Class.
0 Declassified
Changed to: IS S
;:ext ROVIM Dale: MCC/
Auth.: HR 0-3
Date: - 001-9
IIDICATIoat-DURINCI09V
PERIOD
From: 28 June 1951
To s 3 July 1951
Washington 259 D. C.
5 July 1951
KOREA: Despite the agreement of the Chinese Communists and North
Koreans to undertake cease-fire discuasionso there continues to be
no indication of the nature of the guarantees which they will ask
or their terms for a political settlement. It is possible that
the Communists believe they may secure their objectives through
protracted negotiations. The continued build-up of their military
power indicates that they are attempting to negotiate from a position
of strength while enhancing their capabilities for further military
action. Evidence of the continuing build-up of enemy ground strength
includes substantial vehicle sightings, Pi reports of plans for a
new offensive and of the presence of new Chinese Communist armies
in Prime persistent although unconfirmed reports of a CCF mechanized
force b and numerous reports that the U.S.S.R. is reequipping the
Chinese Communist armies. Reports of large numbers of Soviet troops
in Korea are not substantiated but their presence in small numbers
is well established. There is evidence of an extension of the area
of 11I0-15 defensive deployment in Manchuria and North China, and
there has been further marked improvement in the efficiency of enemy
AA in Korea. Reports state that "the
CCAF bomber command" has 800 bombers at its disposal and that a
Chinese Communist airborne division is to be moved from Tientsin
to Antung. Various I reports also state that large forces
are being built up for an orrensive if peace negotiations fail and
that Chinese Communist military preparations are scheduled to be
completed by late summer.
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2. CHINA& Two reports of recent Chives. Communist joint maneuvers in
a higher degree of readiness. Thure are also
South-Central China may indicate that these f aining
reports of 25X1C
increased air activity in the are, opposite Formosa There is now
evidence that Soviet aratment is being supplied to the
Chinese Communist Nary and a subatrine flying a Chinese Communist
flag has again been reported at Dunn. Reports that Soviet sub-
DIA and DOS Reviews Completed rierhtraSeftung coast are not confirmed
marines are petrol!
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INDOCHIMA: The recent southward movement of two Viet Minh divisions
into northern Annum may foreshadow Viet Minh attacks against Prenah
positions in Annum and lines of communioation between Annam and
Laos. There is increasing Prench concern in Indochina over the
possibility of Chinese Communist intervention. There are continued
Indications of Chinese Communist supply of equipnent to the Viet
Minh, and work on the Chinese railroad to the Indochina border is
reportedly being rushed.
4. BURMA: The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon has reached the conclusion from
numerous reports that the Chinese Communists are committed to a
program of aid to the Burmese Communist Party and that this aid has
been under way for several months.
5. OERMANYmMISTRIA: There have been no significant changes in the
disposition of Soviet troops in Germany or in the pattern of field
training. A total of about 80,000 troops are now estimated to be in
the two major rifle army training areas opposite the Western Zonal
borders. There is continuing evidence that a troop rotation program,
Involving the return of the 1927 class to the U.S.S.R. for demobiliza-
tion, is under way in Germany, but there are no indications as yet
that the 1927 class in Austria is being discharged. The Berlin
traffic question continues unresolved and renewed restrictions may
be a Soviet effort to exert pressure on the Interzonal trade negotia-
tions.
6. BAUM: There are indications that two Rumanian air regiments are
to be reequipped with 1410-15 aircraft. Recent information from
refugees provides further confirmation that a program is under way
to construct long runways in eastern Bulgaria and that some of these
are being completed this summer. It is now apparent that the
evacuations from the Rumanian frontier adjacent to Yugoslavia
are on a very large scale. The area may extend to a depth of 30 to
40 mils. and there are indications of urgency in completing the
program, which most Western observers consider has chiefly long-range
implications. There is considerable evidence that reservists in
Bulgaria are being called for refresher training but a report that
a "partial mobilization" is being accomplished in this manner is not
confirmed. Recent observations tend to diecount the pre-
sence of Soviet troops in southwestern Rumania and limited
observations in Hungary suggest that Soviet troop activity there
is normal.
OTHER SATELLITES: Recent field trips by Western observers through
eastern Czechoslovakia and central and southwest Poland revealed no
unusual military activity. The estimated strength of the Polish Army
has been increased from 180 0000 to 200.000 on the basis of evidence
that callups last autumn were larger than previously reported, and
an Unconfirmed report states that the Army is to be increased to 22
divisions and 225,000 men by the end of 1952. Polish Air Force
training In jet fighter aircraft continues.
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CONCLUSIONS
I. The Soviet Armed Forces In being are in an advanced state of readiness
for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional
warning. Military and political indications are that the Communists
intend to insist upon a solution of controversial problems strictly
along lines which further Communist world objectives. There are no
indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies, in pursuing
their major objectives, intend necessarily to avoid future actions
which might precipitate global hostilities.
2. Strong indications of a continuing Communist military build-up in
Korea and Manchuria point to the Communist intention to continue the
struggle if they fall to secure their objectives by political means.
3. There are continuing indications of Chinese Communist military
assistance to the Viet Minh and the Burmese Communists.
4. Available intelligence does not indicate Soviet intentions to initiate
hostilities in Europe or the Near East in the immediate future. Thera
area however, continuing military and political indications of Soviet
and Satellite preparations for war, including the further tightening
of border security measures and the reequipping of the Satellite air
forces.
a
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ANALYSIS OF INDICATIONS
Indications of Intentions in the Far East.
a. KOREA.
(1)
Cease-fire pro sal. Communist commentary and action during
the week with respect to the proposed cease-fire in Korea
continue to provide no firm indication of a change in Com-
munist policy in Korea. Although the Communists, in agree-
ing to a meeting of military representatives, have shown
a willingness to discuss the "first step" proposed by
Malik, there has been no substantial indication of the
nature of the guarantees which they will ask or their
terms for a political settlement. Other than the clarifica-
tion by Oromyko that the cease-fire discussions would be
limited to strictly military questions, there has been
little further commentary trom Moscow. Communist propaganda
In general, however, is making increasing reference to a
settlement and has emphasized that the U.S. is being "forced
by world opinion" to ask for a cease-fire. The reasons
for the Communist request to postpone cease-fire discussions
until.10-15 July are problematical, but they may include a
desire to build up propaganda for the event and also
possibly to coordinate plans in view of previous indications
that the Soviet proposal may have been a sudden one. Accord-
ing to al "'report, purportedly originating with
North Korean officials, North Korean peace terms call for a
withdrawal of all U.N. forces, after which the North Koreans
envisage that South Korea will readily fall from the effects
of internal subversion and guerrilla warfare. A second
report states there is a rumor among North Korean officers
that the Soviets have promised the North Korean Government
to secure the withdrawal of the U.N. forces from Korea,
otter which the North Korean Army, with increased Soviet
logistical support and the aid of additional North Korean
troops now training in Manchuria, will again attack South
Korea. Although both these reports may be without foundation,
It is probable that the Communists believe that the currant
negotiations may assist them to secure their objectives
eventually. Numerous indications of the continued strengthen-
ing of the Communist military position suggest that the
Communists are attempting to negotiate from a position of
strength and are using the breathing spell to enhance their
pabilities for further military action should they f0,1 to
In their objective by political means.
(2t Ground. Communist military activity in Korea during the
End further reports that the U.S.S.R. is prawidthg
military equipment to the Chinese Communists indicate that
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a military build-up in Korea and Manchuria is continuing.
Although action on the front was largely confined to
patrolling, vehicle sightings continued to be substantial and
an unusually large number of tanks was observed on one
occasion on the east coast area. Communist Pals continue
to report enemy plans for another offensive and some have
stated that the late June offensive was postponed to mid-
July. PW's have also reported the presence of four new
Chinese Communist armies in Korea in addition to a division
of the 47th Army which was identified last week. Another
report that a Chinese Communist mechanized corps has moved
from Yangdok to Kokaan is consistent with earlier reports
that a CCP mechanized force of 30,000 troops had arrived at
Yangdok in early Nay, although its existence remains uncon-
firmed. PW statements that the Soviets have been reequipping
CCF units in Korea meanwhile remains the most reliable
evidence that such a program is probably under way. Although
only a piecemeal commitment of Soviet materiel has been
noted to date, the latest PW reports assert that the U.S.S.R.
began to supply the CCP with large quantities of materiel
after the first of the year. Fa interrogations have
identified all weapons of the Sqviat World War II rifle
division in CCP hands. Reports'
state that the U.S.S.R. has now supplied equipment
for a total of 22 Chinese Communist divisions and that this
equipment has been distributed to other areas as well as
Manchuria. Although additional reports that Soviet troops
in substantial numbers are entering Korea are discredited
by other available evidence, the presence of Soviet AA
troops in small numbers in North Korea, particularly in the
Pyongyang area, has been reported previously and is well
established.
(3) Air. Although there were no significant new developments
in enemy air activities during the week, recent information
further substantiates the continuing increase in Communist
defensive air capabilities. Evidence indicates an extension
of the Kb .15 defense of Manchuria. The airfield at Ta
Tung Kau, southwest of Antung, is nowan operational base,
and further south, near Tientsin, the field at Han Tsun
is reportedly operational with the types of aircraft
unreported. A field report states that, whereas previously
HO% of enemy flak hits in Korea were on aircraft flying
below 1,000 feet, about 50% of hits now are on aircraft
flying above 2,500 feet. The majority of hits are by guns
ranging from 20 to 40 mm, and aircraft are being hit at all
altitudes up to 5,400 feet. It is to be noted that this
has occurred since reports og the appearance of Soviet AA
personnel in Korea. Reports'
may also reflect a significant increase in Chinese Communist
bomber and airborne capabilities in the Korean-Manchurian
area.
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Although the CCA? is no
estimated to have only 130 light bombers Nu-21s), the
combined Chinese and Soviet air strength in the area is
estimated to include approximately 1,400 light bombers.
report is is not confirmed and no Chinese Communist airborne
divisions have been identifiede although considerable
evidence of Chinese Communist airborne training has been
previously reported'.
b. JAPAN. The North Korean regiae has sent a note to the U.S.S.R.
asking to participate in the drifting of tha J844nese peace treaty. Thiv
development further underscores the Cmmun5:.stst concern with the
Japanese question and implies at aVer th4 Korean issue is settled, the
problem, of Japan is to reotive even vector attention.
t. CIINA. Two recent reports of
in Couth-Contral China may indiaate t,
hicter degree of readiness.'
1UPEC-2421V air and ground manouvers
ben 2043 June.
an6 sir 71,aneuvera were recentl con&
untr th3',; supervision of Zeule advis-
rapirta tf renewed Communist eati
ar0ough photo reconnalastnce ef aevc
joint Chinese Couniat maneuvers
at these forces are attaining a
-era cmduoted in tho sanxing area
joint army, navy
,ted IA the vicinity of Swatow
A,s. Thera are. also
ity.in the area opposite Formoms,
^ ai woaks ago showed little air
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aotiviti in thie area According to one report avgas is being airlifted
to Pooehow Oar* the repair shop ere fully manned and where there are
epproximately 20 light bombers and fres 20 to 60 flaeltere. Teta-offs
and landings occur by day and night. but no bombing or gunnery prsotiee
has been observed. Near Aims the eompletion of reconatruotion week et
Malang Airfield and the presenoe of large numbers of air personnel
at or nee e the field has been reported. However. *taller reports or
activity in this area were hot verified by air reconnaissance ?tote.
graphie evidence that three Chinese Communist frigates in Shanehai have
been equipped with Soviet AA armament whieh is still standard in the
Soviet fleet and with surface seareh radar is oenstdered a significant
instanee of Soviet materiel assistance lassmuch as Chinese Communist
ground ane eir forces probably +antes a higher priority than the navy.
The presence of a submarine at Dairen flying the Chinese Communist flag
has again been reliably reported.
Soviet coastal-type submarines are patrolling the Shantung coast
betweee Chefoo-and Welheivel, There Is no other evidence of the transfer
of this type submarine away from Siberian waters.
d. INDOCHINA- Although recent Viet Minh activity has been on a
smell scale, the southward movement of two Viet Minh divisions Into
northern Annan may foreshadow Viet Minh attacks against Preach positions
In Annan And lines of lommunicatier between Annam and Laos. It is apparwe
enst resent Viet Minh activities, together with the possibility that
the Chinese Communist* may make a face-sewing move to offset their
reverses in Koreas are causing increasing concern to the Preneh. General
De Lattre publicly stated at a press conference this week that COIF advisee
are becoming inereeeingly numerous in the Viet Minh army. 1T.3 attaches
in Saigon believe that the recent Korean developments together with
the movement or Viet tlinh divisions southward, changes in CCP dispositices
in South China, and read and railroad construction wori( in the Indochina
*order area point to the probability of Chinese Communist intervention
In the near future. A recent press report states that the Chinese
Commentate are rushing completion of the railroad which will eonnect
Nennine with Chennankuan on the Indochina borders but
penile's* that the target
date of aid-July wili not be met. A reports wilt Hainan Island is no
longer to be used as a supply point for the Viet Minh may be a remit
ef the effectiveness of French patrol activity in repent sonthe but will
not adversely affect the flow or supplies to the Viet Minh because of
the availability of lard routes. There are continued indications of
the supply of equipment to the Viet Minh from Communist Chloe.
*. BOMA. On the basis of numerous recent reports and the signifi-
cant shift of Burmese Communist insurgents towards the Sino-Burna borders
the OZ. **bassi in Burma has concluded that the Chinese Communists are
committed to a program to aid the Burmese Communist Party and that such
aid has been under way for the past few months. Most of the supporting
information and the conclusion that the aid program Is under way have
Dean covered ta previous Watch Committee reports. A recent claim by
Than Tun, BCP leader0 that he has never signed a met with Mao Testing
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is contradioted by other evidence and is probably designed to avoid
charges that the BCP is subservient to the Chinese Communists.
f. THAILAND. There has been no clear evidence of Communist involve-
ment in the recent abortive coup in Bangkok. The dissident navy and
marine faction which kidnapped the Premier referred to itself%) however9
as a "liberation Party and Army9" typical Communist terminology in Asia.
There have been previous suggestions that ex-Premier Pridi Phanomyong,
who generally has navy support, might seek Communist support in returning
to power, but there is no firm indication that Pridi was actually
involved in this attempt.
2. Indications of Intentions in Euro and the Hear East.
a. GERMANY -AUSTRIA.
(1) Soviet Ground Forces.. There have been no significant changes
h?ili?Frsiireported disposition of Soviet troops or
in the pattern of Soviet field training in Germany. In the
Letzlingeer Heide area opposite the British zonal border
there are an estimated 40,000 troops, including two divisions
of the Third Shock Army, the two tank divisions previously
reported there, and small el nts of six other divisions
Which do not normally train In this area. In the Eisenach-
Ohrdruf area near the 11.S. zonal border Soviet troops in
training? also estimated it 40,0000 include the four
divisions of the Eighth Guards Army together with elements
of three other divisions. The apparent concentration of
troops in the Third Shock and Eighth Guards Army areas is
not believed to be an indication of immediate hostile
intent but givee the Soviets an increased potential for
launching a surprise atteek in considerable force at any
time. Remaining divisions in the Soviet zone are disposed
either in other training Areas or are still at their normal
garrisons, with training 'oeing carried out in nearby areas.
The training pattern continues to be generally similar in
nature to that of June-July 1950.
(2) Woo movements. Soviet troop cvements in and out of
rmany eon inue to be reported but present information
rammins too fragmentary to assess with accuracy the total
numbers involved.
??C5
through 27 June rehiFfliWiRR7711PC-IniaMmmimrskrengen ga
189000 troops offset by an outgoing movement of 9,000 to
119000, suggesting that a troop rotation program is probably
underway involving the recently conscripted 1931 class and
the 1927 class now being discharged. In Austria 8300 new
Soviet troops are now estimated to have arrived at the
Wilfleinsdort reception end demobilization center between
30 May and 29 June. Although the arrivals are considered
normal? there continue to be no fire indications that the
class or 1927 is being discharged in Austria.
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(3, Berlin traffic problem. The Berlin traffic question
continues unresolved.. East German traffic authorities
have ruled that certificates of origin must still accompany
a number of categories of goods being shipped from West
Berlin to West Germany. With Interzonal Trade negotiations
now underway, it is possible that the renewed restrictions
represent a Soviet means of exerting preseure to influence
the course of the negotiations. Of possibly related
significance also is the recent request by the Russian
section of the Berlin Air Safety Center that notification
of intended flights in the Berlin corridors be given the
day before. This suggests a possible attempt to make the
use of the corridors more difficult.
b. =ANS
il) Satellite air. The Commander in Chief of the Rumanian Air
nii-e-ii7RWitedly in Moscow to discuss the equipment of
two Rumanian air regiments with MIG-15 aircraft. These
regiments according to the report will be the first to be
equipped with 1IG8s. In the light of recant reports of
pilot training in this tepe plane at Zilistes airfield,
the formation of the units is possible. In Bulgaria,
further evidence tends to confirm the program previously
reported underway to construct long runways in the eastern
part of the country. According to refugees who allegedly
worked on the fields, the runway at Bawer - approximately
90000 feet long - has been completed, and the construction
at Balchik of a 7300 foot runway is scheduled for completion
by 1 September. In addition to these two fields, which
lie in the Black Sea coeetal plain, work is reported at
Harmanlii/vanovo and Malevo Airfields in southern Bulgaria
near the Greek-Turkish herder. The report states that
more than two hundred aircraft are to be stationed at the
latter field.
V.) Evacuation Programs.. There are indications that evacuation'
programs p5Ii?1Y reported underway in Hungary and Rumania
are continuing. Evacuations from Budapest are in their 6th
week, with several reports now suggesting that assignment
to the countryside is merely the first step and that able-
bodied persons are moved again to "unknown destinations".
From Rumania the U.S. Minister reports that the large-scale
evacuations along the Rumanian western frontier are likely
to extend the full length of the Yugoslav border and up
to a depth of 30 or 0 miles. lit reported to
have counted nine evacuation trains of about thirty ears
each west of Braila within a twenty-four hour period.
Xstimates indicate that tap to 50,000-75,000 persons may
have been evasueted already. Some urgency is evident in
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that (a). the evacuation is taking place in this Important
agricultural region before the harvest, which will inevitablr
be affected adversely despite special government ufforts to
insure a general harvest success in this first yeti* of the
Rumanian five-year plan; and (b) the evacuation has been
carried out with such speed that transportation facilities
have been overburdened, thus causing several serious accidents.
The consensus among Western representatives in Buchirest
remains, however? that the measure probably is intehded for
long-term security purposes related to both border .00ntrol
and military considerations.
(3) Bulgarian army. There are indications that the Bulgarian
Law for compulsory military services which provides that
all members of the reserves be called to duty periodisally
75F refresher training (at least once every three years),
is being implemented. Bulgarian refugeesl I 25X1C
state that there has been a "partial mobilisation"
of the 1919, 19200 1924, and 1926 conscript classes for a
40.4ay period of training with new Soviet weapons. Reports
from other sources confirm that reservists from classes
prior to 1927 have been recalled to duty for refresher
training. There is no reliable information available on
the number of reservists involved and while it is possible
that a "partial mobilization" could be undertaken under the
guise of a call-up for refresher training? there are no
Indications that the call-ups have been on that scale.
(4) Soviet forces. In Hungary, elements of the Soviet 2nd
ri-"Tiratiaiiized Division at Ssekesfehervar appear to be
engaging in normal activities and apparently had not moved
out for summer maneuvers as of 27 June. A report that
Kesel (south-central Hungary) was to prepare billets for
50000 Soviet troops has not been substantiated but the town
is in a known maneuver area and the 2d Guards Mechanized
Division could logically move there for training. There
are no indications of unusual Soviet troop activities in
Rumania. refugees from Rumania recently reported
variously that Soviet truck convoys had arrived in Constants
from the north, that otters had left Constants for the south
loaded with troops, the Soviet troop strength at Constants
had increased consideratly in the first half of 1951, and
that several Soviet off cars had moved into headquarters at
Pitesti in early June. The possible arrival of the 1931
class in Rumania as well as seasonal training activity may
=plain the troop convoy reportedly passing through Constants.
Howeverol passing through Pitesti 25X1X
ID aid-Juin =MOO MA; no oeservea no Soviet troops there.
He likewise reported an absence of Soviet troops or vehicles
elsewhere on his 550 mile trip through southern and central
Rumania.
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c. OTHER SATELLITE AREAS.
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(1) Czechoslovak and Polish Armed Forces. There are indications
uflfg.--molaintiarYactthereisitivity under' way in
Czechoslovakia or Poland. I who
completed a motor trip in late June eastward from Prague
to the Soviet frontier, covering some of the major cities
in Czechoslovakia (Brno, Nitre, Banska? Bystriea, Kosice*
Slov N. Nesto, Present. zilina, Olomouc), stated that he
had observed no Soviet troops, no unusual military activi-
ties and only normal rail traffic. Similarly in Poland, the
U.S. Assistant Army Attache observed no unusual activity on
a recent field trip through central and southwest Poland.
Some training areas were occupied by Polish troops, but no
heavy equipment was seen and the observed train movements
included only small amounts of Soviet equipment. In a recent
estimate the Army Attache concluded that, by the end of
1951, twelve of Poland's sixteen divisions may be fully
trained and equipped and that, from all available indications*
unit and staff organization conforms to the Soviet pattern.
Presumably these forces could thus be integrated easily
with Soviet troops or operate independently. The estimated
strength of the Polish Army has now been raised from
180,000 to 200,000 on the basis of additional information
which indicates that call-ups of conscripts of the 1929 and
1930 classes in the autumn of 1950 were larger than pre-
viously reported. the
Polish Army is scheduled to be expanded further by the end
of 1952 to a strength.of 22.divisions and 225,000 men.
(2) Polish jrA Force. Type 28 jet fighter aircraft at Warsaw/
EFarowo Airfield, previously accepted as part of the
Polish Air Force, have now been observed bearing Polish
Air Force markings. Formation flights of up to four air-
craft have been observed.
al/VN (.4:Y1C:0'72?rLA
JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier general, OSC
Chairman, Watch Committee
SF
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Present :
Department of State:
Mr B. H. Klosson
Mr W. M. Marvel
Ce Intent nce A ncy:
Office o a 88 an ef of Staff, 0-2:
Brig Oen John Weakening
Co] E. P. Adama
Col J. K. Baker
Col M. B. DePass
Co] R. O. Duff
Col H. H. Smith
Lt Col E. R. Lang
Lt ol J. P. Merrill
Maj H. L. Pelchlin
Maj W. O. Peak
Capt C. C. Quigley
Capt E. H. Walworth
Mite Cynthia Orabo
Mrs &setts Twyford
lir Samuel McKee
Mr R. P. McNair
Office of Naval Intelligence:
Cdr S. C. Loomis
Cdr R. L. Taylor
Cdr P. Walden
Mr 0. B. Kidd ?
Directorate of Intelligence o USAF:
Co E. E. Brackett. Jr. (USMC1
Co-, H. D. Neely
Co. J. P. Pinkney
Col E. F. Williams
Mr?. H. Lokey
Oda J. R. Reedy
MA: J. L Sutton
Atamit! Energy CoMMiSSiOn: Mr N. C. Henderson
Joint Intelligence Oroupo JCS: Car. P. munson
Peden 1 Bureau of Investigation: Ar S. W. Reynolds
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Distribution:
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72R000400230013-0
Brig Oen F. M. Roberts, Military Advisor to Sp Asst to President
Department of State, Attn: Sp Assistant for Intelligence
Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Secretary, OSD
Direetor of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, USAF
Joint Intelligence Group, JCS
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Civil Defense Liaison, OSD
Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
Coordinated by Off toe of the Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2, DA
Exts 55245 and 7259%
Department of the Army Distribution!.
Office, Secretary of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army (GM)
Chief of Staff'
Secretary. General Staff
Comptroller at the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2, DA
Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-3, DA
Chief, P Ise Off.? 0-20 DA
SHAPE, Attn: Senior U.S. Army 0-2 Representative
CINCVE, Attn: AC/S, 0-2
OINCEUR. Attn: Director of Intelligence
Commander, Zeeland Defense Force, Mu: AC/S, 0-2
CINCARTB? Attn: Director of Intelligence
CINOAL, Attn: Director of Intelligence
COMDINUSFA, Attn: LC/8, 0-2
0OUBARAL. Attn: AC/S.0-2
COUSABCARIB. Attn: AC/800-2
COUSAMPAC, Attn a ACAS, 0-2
Trieste
Chief, Army Wield Forces, Attn: IAC/30 0-2
010 First Arm)', Attn: AC/S, 0-2
CO. 8crond Army. Attn: AC/3, 0-2
CO. Third Army, Attn: AC/S, 0-2
CO. Fourth Army, Attn: AC/30 0-2
COs Firth Army, Attn: AC/3, 04
CO, Sixth Army, Attn s AC/8,4-2
000 Seventh Army, Attn: *C/3, 0.2
CO. Amy Antiaircraft Command, Ent Air Farce Base
Ot.iestern Army Antiaircraft Commtnd, Stewart Air Force Base
CO, *stern Army Antiaircraft Commind? Hamilton kir Force Base
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