DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE: CSI RESEARCH PROJECT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92-00455R000100140003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 15, 1983
• Content Type: MF

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DDSfT-625-83
1983
1. The attached outline contains a number of topics for
25X1 consideration by in her Agency demographic
profile research project. Although these topics were developed
within the DDS1T as being of interest to us, many of them
probably are not unique to this Directorate. I recognize the
enormity of her task, especially in light of the short time she
has to collect the research data, analyze them, and write the
report. I wish her well.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence
FROM: James V. Hirsh
Acting Deputy Director for Science and Technology
SUBJECT: Demographic Profile: CSI Research Project
REFERENCE: CSI 83-0610, dated 30 June 1983
25X1 2. Shoul not be able to meet the due date,.1
suggest that either s e or another qualified Agency officer be
given sufficient time to coplete this potentially worthwhile
'roject. We have tried to remain w1'tWiin the general bounds of
'demography but perhaps have overreached them in some instances.
Also there is a certain amount of overlap among topics included
under major outline headings.
25X1
in the Directorate.
3. I would be happy to meet t some
mutually table time. Also n my staff
(extentioacce is available shout you need clarification or
additional information from here or any of the individual Offices
25X1
25X1
25X1
mes Hirsh
Attachment:
As stated
25X1
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 ATTACHMENT
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OUTLINE OF DDSIT TOPICS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE PROJECT
The following topics and questions seek data on how it was
THEN and how it is NOW.
RECRUITING
- How were current employees recruited? Previously?
- What motivating factors attracted them to the Agency
(e.g., money, interesting work, security, location,
and the like)?
- What percentage stay in the career field for which
they were recruited? What percentage switch?
- What are the expectations of new employees in terms
of career development and what are the probabilities
that they will achieve those objectives?
- Kinds of people recruited:
Educational levels?
Socio-economic mix (e.g., Ivy League or not)?
Experience levels?
Specialists vs generalists?
Do we hire the expertise we need or do we develop
it? If we develop it, must we? Could we contract
for it?
- Numbers of applications received vs numbers brought on
board. Where do greatest losses occur? Reasons?
- What geographic areas and institutions offer the most
fertile recruitment opportunities for technical
officers? Other substantive officers?
Non-technical/substantive?
- At what point in their lives are most technical
officers recruited?
Initial job category vs current or final; career
track, (e.g., is it related to background at EOD)?
Scientific and technical employees as a percentage
of total Directorate workforce? Substantive
non-scientific/technical employees as percentage of
Directorate workforce? Agency workforce?
Substantive staff vs support staff?
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SUBJECT: OUTLINE OF DDSF,T TOPICS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE PROJECT
Women and minorities as percentages of the Agency
and Directorate populations of the technical staff?
Non-technical substantive staff? Support staff?
Average age of total Agency population? Directorate
population? Technical vs the substantive non-technical
and the support population? What are age distributions
by grades within those populations?
Grade creep-over time?
How valid are the Agency's pre-employment tests as
predictors of job performance?
What is the degree of cross-directorate personnel
assignments?
Are certain scientific disciplines associated with
rapid career progression in the DDS&T? The Agency?
If so, which disciplines?
What percentage of employees in the Agency and the
DDS$T pursue additional education and what has been
the change over time? How much is self-sponsored and
how much component sponsored by Directorate?
Are there discernible job progression/movement patterns
in the Agency? In the Directorate? If so, what are they?
RETENTION
- Kinds of people who stay and kinds who leave?
- Attrition rates of technical officers? What are the real
reasons for their leaving (e.g., perhaps better
opportunities elsewhere, length of the recruitment process
expanding bureaucracy, too little or too much
challenge, organization failed to meet assignment
expectations as portrayed during recruitment, pay cap
disillusionment with prospect of changes in retirement
benefits/rules, changing public image of the Agency,
social changes including trend toward greater self
interest, couples having two incomes/careers, threats
to safety at overseas locations, financial burden from
high cost of living in Headquarters area and overseas
locations)?
- Which scientific/technical disciplines tend to have
higher retention rates? Loss rates?
2
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SUBJECT: OUTLINE OF DDSET TOPICS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE PROJECT
Comparison of retention rates of employees hired
immediately upon graduation (BS or graduate degrees)
with co-op/summer intern/graduate fellow and with
employees hired after experience in private industry?
Comparison of retention rates for those hired at
Grades GS-13 and above with those hired at grade levels
through GS-12?
- What would have to change to reduce attrition rates?
Impact of departures on those remaining?
Is career progression random or planned? If planned,
by whom--supervisor/manager or individual?
Is there a definable career point where most technical
employees make the decision to stay or leave? If so,
could higher retention rate be achieved if attention/
routine action were taken at or prior to that decision
point?
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
- Does the organization respond rapidly enough to
changing requirements?
- How do sweeping changes of upper management affect
the organizational structure? Attrition rates?
Production?
- Have there been changes from centralized to
decentralized management? Placement of technical
disciplines?
- Have changing demographic profiles resulted in
organizational changes, restructuring?
MOST USEFUL SKILLS
Skills across the spectrum of crafts as well as
the scientific and technical disciplines
Analytic skills.
Oral and written communication skills
Management skills/training/experience
Interpersonal skills
Motivation, imagination, creativity, initiative,
dedication
Experience in the private sector
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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Short-form of questionnaire: grouped by subject
Two major thrusts of questions: (a)to provide an over-all
profile of employees to match with US general population
for similarities &/or differences; and (b) to get at level
of education/skills and rate of acquisition, retention, and
loss.
1. Total number of employees?
2. Average age at time of hire
3. Average grade at time of hire
4. Total number of employees born in: (list by region).
S. Total number of employees residing in (at time of hire): (list
by region).
6. Number of employees who lived overseas prior to
employment:
a) total
b) less than one year, one to five years, six to
10 years, over ten years
7. Total number of employees whose:
a) parents worked for the Agency
b) whose relatives (non-parent) worked for the Agency
c) whose parents worked for the Agency overseas
8. Total number of employees who served in: (list by world
geographic area).
9. Average number of years served in: (list by world area).
10. Average age of employee at:
a) time of hire with a college degree
b) retirement
c) early retirement
d) resignation
11. Total number of handicapped employees
12. Average number of siblings of all employees?
13. Total number of employees who are the eldest (or only
child) in their families
14. Total number of employees who are the youngest child
in their family?
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15. Average number of schools employees attended prior
to graduation from high school'
16. Total number of employees who, at time of hire, were:
a) single
b) married
c) widowed
d) separated
e) divorced
f) annulled marriage
g) remarried
17. Total number of employees divorced after time of hire
18. Average number of marriages, per employee, at time of hire?
19. Average number of marriages, per employee, contracted
after time of hire?
20. Total number of marriages between Agency employees
21. Total number of divorces between Agency employees
married to each other?
22. Average number of children employees have?
23. Total number of employees who, at time of hire, had:
a) no college degree
b) a B.A./B.S.
c) a degree in: (list disciplines)
d) a M.A. degree
e) a Ph.D. degree
f) any higher degree (M.D.,.lawyer, etc.)
24. Average grade at time of hire of employees with:
a) a college degree
b) a graduate degree
25. Average grade at:
a) time of first overseas assignment with the Agency
b) time first eligible to retire
c) retirement
d) early retirement
e) resignation
26. Average number of years in service of employees:
a) without a college degree
b) with a college degree
c) with a higher degree at time of hire
d) eligible to retire
e) who resign
f) at retirement
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27. Total number of employees with:
a) a higher degree
b) a M.A. in: (list disciplines)
c) a Ph.D. in: (list disciplines)
d) a M.D.
e) a law degree
f) other
28. Total number of employees:
a) eligible to retire
b) who retired
c) who retired early
d) who resigned
29. Average number of years in:
a) college for all employees
b) overseas service for all PCS employees (non-TDY-ers)
c) post-graduate school, prior to hire
d) college, at retirement
e) college of employees who retire early
f) college of employees who resign
30. Average number of Directorates served in:
a). at time eligible to retire
b) at retirement
c) at early retirement
d) by employees who resign
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 Approved For Release iFC.I,6,FDP92-00455R000100140003-7
The idea of having a demographic profile of the Agency arose at a
meeting of the Board of Directors of the Center for the Study of
Intelligence approximately 18 months ago. Initial work was
attempted in the summer of 1982 when an employee was attached to the
Center for a few months, but the project failed to get underway for
lack of data.
Lacking resources, nothing more was attempted until this
summer when again an employee came to the Center for three months.
The proposed assignment was to produce'a concepts paper which would
serve as a terms of reference for a full-scale demographic profile
of the Agency to be undertaken some time in the future, resources
and interest permitting. On this occasion, the attempt to acquire
data proved to be more successful.
METHODS AND PROBLEMS
The ideal method was conceptualized as a mix of collecting and
analyzing data; conducting both intensive and extensive interviews;
and reading Agency histories to lend relevance to the statistics.
The method which actually evolved was dictated by circumstances, as
described below.
From the beginning of the project, at the end of June 1983,
the primary concern was to collect sufficient data to give meaning
to the concepts paper. Accordingly, a questionnaire was designed
to collect general demographic data as well as data of particular
concern to Agency managers (skills bank, retirement rates, etc.).
Very shortly thereafter, a series of interviews with the
Director of Personnel, the Executive Director, the DDA, ADDI, and.
ascertain
DDS&T--as well as other interested individuals--were conducted to A
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their specific interests and concernsA hat, in particular, might
they want to know about the Agency population?f t.-hrcr- txs
Early on these individuals' own
41
perceptions about Agency demographics ('" the majority of people
used to come from the East and from Ivy League schools") came to be
referred to as popular Agency "myths" which would be interesting to
`re
test against h ~ j data&V ] The most common
responses, however, were of an intense but generalized interest:
people simply wanted to know what the Agency population looked
like now and how--if at all--it had changed over time and in what
respects. The dominant concern was that trends be identified so
that projections of future needs could more accurately be made.
The notable exception to this generalized response came from the
-,zY' '*DDS&T which provided a detailed and comprehensive outline of
issues which could, in itself, serve as the "concepts paper"
(see Appendix A). It was a useful contribution which helped +o
important
Crrr delinea xxxfud areas of inquiry but, in the event, proved
somewhat disheartening as the inability to address several of the
issues became more apparent.
The initial enthusiasm which characterized the construction
of the questionnaire for the Information and Analysis Branch (IAB)
of the Office of Personnel was considerably dampened by the
realities. The first hard fact was that 1976 was the furthest
back that all data had been coded so as to be electronically
retrievable. Some kinds of data were available back to 1966, and
even smaller amounts (categories of information) were available as
far back as 1947.
The second discouraging factor was that some
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information requested (where did employees come from?) had never
been acquired. In *t case 0 locati~xc y~ the information
was not kept because the Agency never had to fill a geographically
defined quota--hence there was no perceived need to collect the
of t-1e wA,'c6
information. Neither was all4information &h- employees provide
on the Personal History forms of the Agency application package
encoded Furthermore, many of the questions sought to distinguish
between characteristics/qualifications that an employee had at time
of hire (as opposed to developing or acquiring as a consequence
of being an Agency employee). The regular IAB programs could not
make this distinction. --x
hie ? egrae, i# n -rn 3~-brad-- ---higher- gree at-ti e- o `hire)
Other questions aimed at tracking employee careers could not be
answered (for example, the numbers who had served in more than one
Directorate).
Perhaps most discouraging of all, the data were.given in
aggregates (all current employees) and could not be broken out
annually in order to make statements about trends, rates, and
other comparisons possible. The data represented everyone on
board, whatever their time of entering on duty. (See Appendix B--
a copy of the original questionnaire showing which questions could
be answered, and what changes were necessary to make ittpossible.)
With all of these qualifications plainly stated, the IAB analysts
began to work on those questions which could be electronically
answered--often after being reworded. For example, the question
"Average number of years in service of employees with a higher
degree at time of hire" could be answered only by dropping the
at time of hire" qualifiersd -a~?r
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While waiting for the IAB analysts to provide the first round
of data, more interviewing resulted in the serendipitous
acquisition of the first set of hard data. These came from
bf the Office of Medical Services, who had been
acquiring data for the last three years and who generously shared
these:`total Agency population numbers from 1952-1982 broken down
by Directorates and showing totals in the foreign field, as well.
These data resulted in the first of the graphics produced for the
demographic project.
Working with t4a- 6 data first exposed another problem which was
to plague the remainder of the project: Directorate totals did not
equal Agency totals (which were invariably higher) after 1957. It
was difficult to identify the "hidden" category of people, and it is
still not conclusively resolved--tentatively, it is assumed they
belong to the Interim Assignment Staff.
The dimensions of the problem of consistency in -the numbers
became clearest when the first data from IAB (acquired the first
week of August) was closely followed by data given the author by
another office--although IAB was the original source of both sets.
any of the totals were different, even for the same month and year.
Two important facts emerged from the initial confusion. One was
that the figures fluctuate from month to month so that it is necessary
to collect numbers from exactly the same day and month (30 June, e.g.)
for every issue or comparability becomes impossible. Second, it
became obvious that defining the population was no easy task, and that
different reports (shelf reports) used different parameters. The most
common dichotomies which account for differing totals are:
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--Full-time permanent personnel (FTP) only or FTP plus
part-time personnel (PTP).
--GS grade personnel only or GS plus other civilian
personnel.
=FTP regular staff only or FTP. regular staff plus staff
contractors. (In 1975 'g -combined ceiling was instituted,
and it becomes impossible to distinguish between regular
staff and staff contractors. Prior to 1975, staff
contractors were never included unless there was a specific
request that they be.)
--Civilians only or civilians plus military personnel.
In addition to these choices, all of which can result in
differing totals on the same issue for the identical time period,
there was the problem of extraneous service groups which have
appeared and disappeared over the course of Agency history: The
X, Y, and Z service groups; the Undetermined (U) group; the ICS
group; the NIESO group; and the 5 (still unidentified) group. Finally,
totals are affected by the inclusion or exclusion of the Wage Board.
Any total which includes every possible category of employee is
colloquially referred to as a "kitchen sink" total, but it is rarely
used. There is reason to believe that the figures provided by
are "kitchen sink" totals, however, since they are consistently
higher than totals on other reports.
With the cooperation of IAB, OMS, and EEO, by the end of August
the Center had a fairly complete set of shelf reports which spanned
the entire history
One set of reports
service, sex race,
educational level
of the Agency. But one last problem remained.
(1966 to 1983) gave Agency strength by career
.e aYf f ~-_ Jim
occupation and grade--but did not show gxa x;
or language capabilities.--ihe reports spanning
1947 to 1965 primarily show totals. The last set of reports (1982
1983 only) show sex, age, length of service, career service,
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occupation, educational level and language capability--but not
grade or race. Interpretations and conclusions would clearly
require interpolation, extrapolation, and plain leaps of faith.
By the middle of August it was apparent that the battle to
gather comparable and consistent numbers on any issue was the
primary focus of attention for the project. It was also clear
that while one standard demographic question could not be answered
(geographic origin of employees), there was a rich mine of information
to be tapped on other subjects. On the other hand, several of the
more pressing questions about career tracks, background of
employees, motives for either joining or leaving the Agency, still
could not be addressed. In effect, the nature of the available
data ultimately dictated the course of the project.
This is not to imply that every issue for which there is
information has been addressed. Undoubtedly some data, although
available, were never acquired. However, it became clear that
the project had to rely on the shelf reports,pxmzdxa:m;mtxbyxiaxx
provide annual
xxtxaixxmtxxtx which immimde xxxxxt counts,rather than on information
on "all current employees" (regardless of year) which is what
an ad hoc
one gets in response to query to the IAB data bases. Nonetheless,
it is felt that the information provided in this pilot study will
provide both an interesting and a useful baseline for future efforts
of the same nature.
Sources and The 195.2 Baseline
There are three bodies of data, each different in the categories
and amount of information provided, as noted earlier. The data
provided by IAB was retrieved both electronically and
manually. An IAB analyst had to go to Archives and manually inspect
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and count data for the years prior. to 1966. Thus this body of data--
whose totals are consistently higher than the shelf report totals,
which begin in 1966--provides the only source of figures by Directorate
prior to 1966. This corpus (called the OMS data for clarity) begins in
1952 and goes through 1982,which accounts for the 1952 baseline of
the present study. The OMS data are also the source of the bulk
of the graphics, rxpt which are easily identifiable by the 1952-1982
identifier in their titles.
The drawback, which requires one of those leaps of faith, is
that attempts to provide information for years which span pre- and
post-1966 involves using number sets which are not identical. There
is reason to believe, however, that the rates and proportions are
the same on the OMS and shelf report data. Looking at patterns of
growth and decline, for example, the OMS data and shelf report data
yield identical patterns although the numbers (and resulting percentages)
are quite different. In the point made at the beginning of the next
section, it was necessary to compute growth and decline patterns, by
over
Directorate, A the last 30 years. The contrast between the OMS
and shelf report numbers can be seen below, although the patterns are
identical:
1974-1983: OMS
1974-1983: shelf report STAT
DDS&T
Clearly, anyone wanting to use these figures to make a budget
argument will have obvious preferences for one set of numbers over
the other. The numbers cannot be used for specific purposes of a
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budget allocation nature, but one set and the other, in co biNion,
can be used to make points which refer to patterns!' (In the point
made in the following section, the OMS numbers are used throughout, for
consistency, and [Lem er veritas]to make the point more dramatically.)
To provide maximum utility to the present study, and to prevent
frustration and confusion, it is necessary to indicate the precise
source, parameters of the population, and method of computation used
for every table, graphic, and even theoretical or interpretive point
made. This will tax the reader's patience but it is the only means
of
of making this rich body of data usable by others and/not_perpetuating
the problems experienced by the author and other users of personnel data.
One last caveat to the reader: most of the statistics (all of the
percentages, but many others besides)were the work of the author,and
IAB is not responsible for either errors or misuse of the raw data which
might inadvertently have occurred. Percentages, averages, and most
other statistics have consistently been rounded off to the next
highest number when the fraction was .50 or higher. On a few occasions
this led to a minor distortion of the numbers, as when a set of three
numbers (percentages, for example) should add up to 100 but the fraction
were almost evenly distributed in thirds. In such cases, the highest
fraction was always chosen to round off to the next highest whole
number. For example, faced with .33, .31, and .36, the latter number
was chosen to round upward so that all the percentages would add to 100
than
ratherA99. This happened very seldom, but it did occur.
phe!SrntCd cAie fal* r i P A"J1,04.
Finally, although most data,/ ~~17" - vn -= ~rJ GS personnel .01"
///'the IAB statistics provided on average age,
~~ L j1 U 1 4 _-~~J
length of service, etc., are always computed for the larger population
(which might include part-timers in some cases or non-GS civilian
personnel, in others). The author was necessarily constrained to use
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these figures as the raw data for computing other statistics, although
the IAB statistics are calculated on a slightly larger population
than the one the author was describing.
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DAILY BANK BALANCES AND MONTHLY BANK STATEMENTS
An Analogy To Explain The Differences Between "All Current Employee"
Reports and Quarterly, Biannual, Or Annual Shelf Reports
When you go into your bank and ask what your (current)
balance is, the figure the bank gives you probably will not match
any figure in your checkbook. There are outstanding checks,
deposits not credited, etc., in the bank's figure. If you ask
again the next day, you may get a different figure from the bank--
more checks have been presented against your account, deposits
credited, and so on.
The only way you can be certain what your balance is, is to
wait for your monthly bank statement. This has all the information
you need: what checks are outstanding, your balance at a precise
check number; all deposits and withdrawals; and the dates of those
transactions.
Note that you know your exact balance only for a date already
past. Your latest bank statement ends with check #500 but you have
already written 20 more, and now want to know your balance after
writing check $$520. You have to wait until next month! (Unless
you are a meticulous bookkeeper and don't rely on an accountant.
If you rely on an accountant...)
Cd al P~- 1 a+~ th 'f t !.~ /~1 ~?l~+c( ~z ' /!'Gt'CP. .~ ~f ~ Ti r~.~d', .! r.~t:
i Tutu/C7 6c ; r11 ~d'.~ a f~P x~ ('.~?cl,'7`r0,d~'; ,'
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 OUTLINE FOR A DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY OF THE
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Preface
--Introduction
--Methods and Problems
Theoretical Overview: Long-Term-Trends
--Sensitivity to Changes in Administration
--The Creation of Four Cultures
--Recruitment and Retention
1983 Snapshot: The Agency and Directorates
--10 topics to be covered
--trends, problems, issues
1)
age
6)
2
sex
7)
3
race
8)
4
education
9)
5)
language
capability
10)
marital status
occupation (P-T-C)
percent on probation
grade level
retirement rate
The Agency Over Time
--information, where available, on 10 topics
snapshots: 1952, 1962, 1972, & 1982
The DDA Over.Time
--information, where available, on 10 topics
--trends, problems, issues
The DDO Over Time
--information, where available, on 10 topics
--trends, problems, issues
The DDI Over Time
--information, where available, on 10 topics
--trends, problems, issues
The DDS&T Over Time
--information, where available,
--trends, problems, issues
on 10 topics
The DCI's Office Over Time
--information, where available, on 10 topics
--trends, problems, issues
Myths Re-Visted
in comparative
- - s u mrj*pyovreb 41 Rrafeas& k 28i PCI 1 O?2-&(Y44 R&th %0140003-7
--the genesis of "myths" (Sally's concep )
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THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
Introduction
Sensitive to Changes in Administration
A first step in the demographic project was to develop an annual
chronology which set the Agency in the context of U.S. and world
history. The tenure of each of the Directors (DCI) was used to
integrate Agency and national/world history, and the OMS totals by
Directorate (U.S. and foreign field populations) were incorporated.
The result indicated that the CIA and each of the Directorates
apps sensitive to fluctuations in the country's political and
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2
economic environment. This can be understood as an inevitable
consequence of the circumstances which gave rise to the Agency
in 1947 and those which accounted for its survival.
The history (1976) documents that the Central
Intelligence Group (CIG--the 1947 forerunner to the CIA) came into
existence in a ferment of competition among other Federal Departments.
Problems of "turf" characterize Agency history within the larger
Intelligence Community (IC) and, inevitably, internally as well.
The Agency's struggle to survive, in spite of the Departments'
(State, War, etc.) efforts to dominate and control it, had a number
of immediate and long-term consequences. One of these is that the
personal stature and proclivities of individual Directors had an
enormous impact on the over-all direction the Agency took at any
given period. Only one of the first four Directors was not a
military careerist, andi -1c redits General Walter Bedell
Smith's reputation in the Community, his assertiveness, and his
administrative abilities for shaping the Agency as it is today (1976: 12)
Another critical factor in the Agency's history has been
the nature of the relationship between the DCI.and the President
of the United States, and the effect of the President's personal
work style and his interests on Agency priorities. It was Truman's
interest in and desire for the Agency's Daily summary that made
current intelligence the career track to quick advancement, and
resulted in the Dail taking precedence over production of the
National Intelligence Estih a'f' (NIEs) [1976: 151.
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3
Perhaps the most important and long-term consequence of
the IC's fear of losing its own intelligence collection and
analysis functions to the CIG/CIA was that the CIA's dominant role
evolved in a different area than the one originally intended. Rather
than devoting most of its efforts to coordinating functions and
the production of NIEs--which theoretically would reduce duplication
of effort by the IC--the post-war concern with Soviet intentions and
aggression (the Cold War) resulted in the early pre-eminence of
the Directorate of'Plans (DDP--now the Directorate of Operations or
STAT DDO) .
1976: 8-9; 12; 26)
While it was the intended analytic and coordinating functions
of the Directorate of Intelligence (DDI) which gave birth to the
CIA (19761: 8-9), it was the covert action capability of the DDO
which accounted for the Agency's growth and, perhaps, its very
survival. For a succession of U.S. Presidents, the CIA provided
an option that lay between diplomacy and overt war, thanks to the
OSS expertise, technology, and overseas stations still in STAT
place after World War II (1976: 45). "The Departments (essentially
the NSC) defined U.S. policy objectives; covert action represented
one means of obtaining those objectives, and the CIA executed the
operations" (1976: 30). Certainly the decades of the Cold War
(see Figure 1) are the period of the Agency's initial and greatest
growth. The period of detente sees the sharpest decline in Agency
strength since its inception.
Arguably, other factors could account for the sharp decline in
Agency strength since the beginning of detente. I Istates STAT
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4
that there was a wave of retirements in the early 1970s--is this
coincidence, or was there also a political cause? The Viet Nam
war was winding down. There were government ordered personnel cuts
25X1
in the late 1960s--concern with the national budget deficit or a
reflection of the political climate?
These factors are all
undoubtedly part of the explanation of the decline in Agency size,
but alternative hypotheses invite discussion as well. Specifically,
what were the political motives--if any--which themselves created
the set of factors which reduced the Agency's strength?
The pleasure and wrath of United States Presidents were visited
on the CIA--most often in the person of its Director--according to
the Agency's ability to further a President's foreign policy objectives.
The paramilitary efforts demanded by various Presidents could not
be concealed from the world or the U.S. public as other covert
actions could. Equally obvious, it is covert action failures which
become publicized and have an impact on public and Congressional
opinion. The Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Watergate disclosures
demonstrate the Agency's vulnerability to Presidential pressures.
A depressing indication of the extent to which the CIA's
public image has been linked to a President's activities is
provided by the 1982 World Almanac. The first mention of the
Central Intelligence Agency, in the section on United States
history, comes on page 713 under the 1974 entries: "Charges that
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) abused its powers by massive
domestic operations were published Dec. 21".
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The Four Cultures
The Agency's sensitivity to Presidential and Directors' styles
and concerns has had different impacts on each of the Directorates.
This may account for both the emergence of the four Directorate
"cultures" and the enormous resistance to creating one culture.
Problems of "turf" characterize internal relations, both within
and between Directorates, as employees respond to obvious opportunities
for advancement.
Using 1961 (Bay of Pigs) and 1973 (Watergate) as historical
boundaries to test this idea, Agency history can be divided into
three periods: 1953 to 1961; 1962 to 1973; and 1974 to the present.
25X1
The following table shows the results. 1OM6 nat-obeA:
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One of the patterns revealed by this table is that while a
Directorate might experience some growth during a span of years, --
nevertheless its over-all share of Agency resources may decline
(notably the case with the DDI). This suggests that Presidential
have
pressures and Directors' particular interests4kxx had a noticeable
impact on the differential development of the Directorates. It is
no secret that Dulles was passionately interested in the DDO and
virtually ignored the rest of the Agency, for example.
The table shows that over the 30 year period, the DDI's portion
of over-all Agency size declined from being o
being approximately) lof the whole.
The DDO has gone from being
of the Agency to
25X1
25X1
less than although part of the DDA strength (particularly
the Office of Communications) properly relates to DDO functions.
Nevertheless, the DDA has the most stable history over the 30 years
of any of the Directorates, remaining consistently near one-third
of Agency strength since 1953. Because of the support and the
services it provides the other Directorates, the DDA bridges the
large gulf which separates the DDI and the DDO, for example, as
no other Directorate can. This fact by itself contributes to the
particular "culture" of the DDA, as does the diversity of the people
that make up its population.
The 1973 transfer of NPIC from the DDI to the relatively young
DDSF,T had the net effect of equalizing the two Directorates' share
of Agency strength. However, the DDI remained at the same strength
while the DDSET's portion of the Agency increased by 5% over the
following decade.
The DDO's acquisition of DCD in 1973 off-set what otherwise
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would have been a much greater reduction in size as a result of the
Schlesinger cuts. It is not known whether this was one of the
motives for the transfer, but other data also suggest that "leveling
differences" among Directorates, components, and occupations may
,for example,
be a trend in Agency history. In 1982flthe Office of Personnel
upgraded eight Clerical positions to Technical, and two Clerical
positions to Professional. The result was to equalize the
proportions of Clerical. and Technical employees in the Agency.
In 1981, Professionals made up 63% of the Agency; Technicals were
10% and Clericals were 27%. Following the re-definition of the
positions in 1982, the percentage of Professional employees remained
at 63%. Technicals now made up 18% and Clericals were 18% of the
Agency's force.
None of this explains why the DDO has not regained lost ground,
however, and leads to the discussion of another long-term consequence
of the initial forces which shaped the Agency's development.
Recruitment and Retention
The beginning of the separate cultures in the Agency has to be
attributed to the interaction of complex factors dating back to
the late 1940s and early 1950s. The lack of cooperation by other
Federal Departments, in those early days, restricted the DDI's
access to their informatiorand impeded their coordination function
(1976). The DPO's fear of their operations being compromised
(security concerns) led to extraordinary comparmentation within the
Agency (1976: 22). The special frustrations or advantages
experienced differed in each of the Directorates from the beginning.
Perhaps one cultural theme was common to the entire organization:
career advancement was linked to producing quickly and being
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associated with fast-breaking events--current intelligence and projects.
Long-term researchers and asset developers (in the DDO) may have
the slowest advancement and career success in the Agency. (This is
one of several issues that the available data cannot address). But
each Directorate has its special history and mission, and the
personality characteristics and talents of its employees necessarily
differ.
The significance of this latter fact lies in the impact which
United States and world historical events have on the ease with
which specific types of employees can be recruited and retained.
For example, the present economy which puts academics at a
disadvantage in the market place affords the DDI the best opportunity
to recruit with relative ease. The same economy favors a scientific/
technological career in private industry over one in the DDS&T. Over
time, these differences in the career attraction the Agency offers
to civilians with different specialties leads to over-all disparities
in Directorate size. It may also contribute to the maintenance of
careful boundaries (cultures) among the Directorates so that the
history of one cannot affect the development of another.
The political consequences of Presidential demands on the
CIA--and the resulting impact on public and Congressional opinion
when the consequences are negative--certainly affects the morale
of Agency employees. People evidence surprise when they learn that
more employees I left under Helms than under any other DCI. One.
person's quick response was that the rate was lower under Helms than
under Schlesinger
for example. The accuracy of this
observation is not as telling as the rapidity with which it was made.
Helms was one of our own and furthermore the cuts were ordered by
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the government, ostensibly as part of the national concern with the
budget deficit. The cuts made by Turner) (during the Carter - 25X1
presidency were also more demoralizing to employees than those made
during Helms' tenure. Again there is a noticeable difference in
rate, but it seems apparent that the political motive for the cuts
affect recruitment of new people.
is the critical factor in employee morale. The same factors could h
The post-Watergate decade shows a 16% reduction in the DDO's
strength (difference between 1974 and 1983 strength). Two hypotheses
suggest themselves to explain the DDO's failure to recoup from the
1973 cuts. First, the change in U.S. values which followed the
25X1
Viet Nam war and Watergate scandal could also affect the motivation
of young people to choose a career in the clandestine services.
states that Dulles' stand against Senator Joseph McCarthy in 1953
contributed to the Agency's reputation as a liberal institution (1976:44)
making it an attractive place to work.
The negative impact of the Watergate publicity could represent the
opposite effect of discouraging people from seeking a career with the
Agency.
A positive aspect of the same phenomenon can be seen in Figure 1.
The State Department has reported that following international crises
their application rate soars. The Iranian revolution and the taking
of American hostages in Iran coincided with the second-lowest point
in Agency strength. A marked increase in Agency strength followed the
hostage crisis, suggesting that the event stirred a wave of patriotic
fervor in American citizens, as well as inclining the Federal government
not to be caught short again.
The second hypothesis to explain the DDO's difficulty in recruiting
suitable candidates is that those who do apply now have different
characteristics and motivations than candidates in the past. The
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rejection rate of CTs is higher now than formerly, but
25X1
(Psychological Services Division) insists that the Agency's standards
have not changed in the last 25 years. The higher rejection rate
reflects changes in the type of applicants. Perhaps the negative
publicity the Agency has suffered also works to attract unsuitable
candidates.
If the Agency's standards for recruitment have not changed
in 25 years, but the values of the general population have changed,
the use of the older standards may result in the recruitment of
people who are marginal--in motivation and characteristics--to the
rest of the country. Put differently, the rigid application of
the old standards may no longer identify the same kind of people
as those standards once did. Changes in values and symbols will
mask characteristics in civilians which the Agency may want in its
employees, while use of the old standards may select for people
with characteristics which are not as desireable.
It would be useful to know in what way the CTs who wash out
today differ from those who are accepted. This might permit
identification of the specific values, symbols and lifestyles
of civilians which are at odds with the old standards but which
are held, nonetheless, by the type of employee the Agency desires
to attract.
Reliable information confirms that many applicants are
rejected in the field by "old-hand" recruiters who "know" that
the applicants do not possess characteristics the Agency wants.
The problem of recruitment and retention of personnel, in the DDO
and other Directorates, may require learning how to identify the
same kind of people under different symbolic guises. The current,
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11
long-term employees in the Agency have changed with the rest of
the country. Concern with the environment and its resources; int-erest
in self-help programs and groups; non-political involvement in civil
rights issues, and a host of other current interests (representing
changes in values) characterize Agency employees just as much as they
do the general population. But the recruitment standards may not be
as up-to-date. The overt values, symbols, and lifestyles of the
healthy, well-adjusted person of the 1980s will not be the same as
those of the 1950s. The healthy, well-adjusted solid American citizen
of 1880 might strike us neurotic, bigoted, and inflexible today.
It may also be that economic changes are responsible for problems
in recruitment and retention of personnel, if the Agency cannot
compete with the private sector. If an individual is extrinsically
motivated (by a high salary, for example), it could be that--in the
em p to MenT w;
past--such a person soughtc Agency r and remained satisfied
during a long, productive career. However, if extrinsic motivation
is a dominant characteristic in an individual, then he/she probably
will not stay when economic changes favor the private sector.
y ,The words of M.F. Herz, with reference to a career
in the Foreign Service, apply to Agency service as well:
"Those who believe that every effort made 'for the government'
must be compensated, who look upon every assignment with a calculus
of advantages vs. disadvantages, who need to 'do their own thing' on
their own terms, will miss an entire dimension of the diplomatic life
that is different in kind from every other career,.,except perhaps
the military services, because of the discipline that it requires.
A career in diplomacy is simply too demanding and dangerous to be
approached in any other spirit. Therefore, unless one can derive
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some pride from the fact that one is also serving one's country--
yes, serving one's country--the inevitable sacrifices and disabilities
that are involved will never seem adequately compensated" (in Kearney
1981: 15)*
Herz recommends that this attitude be stressed in the earliest
recruiting stages (1981: 15) and the same approach might also benefit
the Central Intelligence Agency.
* I am indebted to Dr. Helen Kearney for making available a copy
of her paper, "Organizational Constraints on Lifestyles," presented
at the Groves Conference on Marriage and the Family, Mount Pocono,
Pennsylvania, May 1981. The Herz quote is taken from that paper.
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT:
(Optional)
Policy Agenda: P
ersonnel Management in the 1980's
FROM:
EXTENSION NO.
Chic , o icy -a
1005 Ames
/OPPPM
SDATE TA
NOV 1-40(f
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
----
--- -
--
RECEIVED
- --
FORWARDED
-----
INITIALS
- -
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
~
DD/PEE
1006 Ames
In September you saw the first
-----
--___ _ ----_--------_-_ --------_-
~
--
_--
2.
_
draft of the attached policy
agenda. Since that time we have
met with two groups of personnel
3
careerists to gather further input
/D/pppM
in refining the policy agenda.
5E58 Has.
The attached is the result of
d
this refinement.
In initially discussing the
5
concept of a policy agenda, you
.
DD/PPPM
mentioned the possibility of
further review either by your
b
senior OPPPM managers, the PMAB,
EXCOM, or the DDCI. Do you wish
to pursue any of these avenues?
D/PPPM
If you agree with the Agenda,
we will order it into priority
- 8.----
----- -----
----
----
---------
--
action items. i.s nW A
working on IA app_ican of the
80's) and I plan to have other
v..__-__-_
----------___.___-_-
staff members begin inquiry in
compensation and mobility shor~A
10.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FOR
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