SOVIET BLOC AND NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED COUNTRY STATEMENTS AT THE CSCE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) (CDE-VII & CDE-VIII) 10 SEPTEMBER - 18 OCTOBER 1985 5 NOVEMBER - 20 DECEMBE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP92-01168R000100060001-9
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
389
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 30, 2012
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 1, 1986
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP92-01168R000100060001-9.pdf18.53 MB
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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ~X1 Directorate of Intelligence Volume II Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned Country Statements at the CSCE Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) (CDE-VII & CDE-VIII) 10 September -18 October 1985 5 November - 20 December 1985 CR 86-10190 February 1986 Copy 0 3 4 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ~~~C1 Directorate of Secret Intelligence Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned Country Statements at the CSCE Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) (CDE-VII & CDE-VIII) 10 September -18 October 1985 5 November - 20 December 1985 Volume II This rP/erence aid was prepared by the O,,~ice oJ. Central RPlerence. Comments and questions may be directed to Chic,/; USSR-EE Division, OCR; This document, done as a "service of common concern," contains sensitive diplomatic infor- mation and is disseminated to recipients by name for work under their cognizance. Fur- ther dissemination may occur only with the concurrence of C/USSR-EE/OCR/CIA. Secret CR 86-10190 February 1986 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07729 SUBJECT: SATISFACTOAY.AGREEMENT APPARENTLY REACHED ON TRANSITION TO CDE EXPLORATORY PHASE REF: STATE 301423 1. CDE VII - 041. 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. THE NATO CAUCUS BAS APPARENTLY REACHED A SATISFACTORY AD REFERENDU?i AGREEMENT WITH THE EASTERN AND NNA GROUPS ON A FRAMEWORK FOR THE TRANSITION TO THE EXPLORATORY PEASE OF THE CDE. BECAUSE THE DELEGATION AGREES TEAT THE AGREEMENT PROTECTS OUR INTERESTS ON ALL IMPORTANT POINTS AND BECAUSE IT IS CONSISTENT WITH REFTEL, I HAVE SAID THAT I BELIEVE IT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO WASHINGTON. IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CONTRARY, I WILL GIVE OUR FORMAL AGREEMENT TO THE CAUCUS MEETING AT 10:30 LOCAL TIME OCTOBER 10. k. THE TEXT OF TBE "AGREEMENT" (TRANSMITTED SEPTEL) WOULD BE CIRCULATED TO ALL DELEGATIONS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE; ACCOMPANYING ORAL STATEMENTS (ALSO SEPTEL) WOULD PROBABLY BE READ BY THE NNA COORDINATOR. IN BRIEF, THE FOLLOWING REY POINTS RAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE EAST: - A. NATO CAUCUS FORMULATION ON VERIFICATION, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION HAS SURVIVED INTACT ("IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY COIiPLEMENTARY CSBMS"). B. NATO CAUCUS FORMULATION ON VERIFICATION SURVIVES INTACT ("CSBMS TO BE ADOPTED WILL BE PROVIDED WITS ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT"). - C. AN ADEQUATE FORMULATION ON CONSTRAINTS SURVIVES FROM ORIGINAL "NON-US NON-PAPER" ("CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES"). - D. US POSITION ON DRAFTING IS ADEQUATELY PROTECTED. THERE WILL BE AN INFORMAL ORAL STATEMENT, SEPARATE FROM THE "AGREEMENT," WHICH WILL READ, "IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT TRANSITION TO THE DRAFTING STAGE SHOULD S?ART, IF POSSIBLE, DURING THE EIGHTH SESSION." IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE MUS? BE CONSENSUS FOR DRAFTING TO BEGIN, THIS POSITION IS SUPPORTED BY THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT, AND WE GAVE CLEARLY SIGNALLED THAT WE WILL NOT AGREE TO DRAFT UNLESS WE ARE SATISFIED WITS THE EXPLORATORY PEASE. - E. OUR POSITION ON "CONSULTATIONS AND RAPID MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS" IN TBE CONTEXT OF THE VERIFICATION/INFORMATION/COMMUNICATION PACKAGE IS PROTECTED, t.E., THE ABOVE PHRASE WILL NOT BE PART OF .THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THERE WILL BE AN ORAL STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THESE TOPICS~WILL BE ? 206 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 RAISED, BUT THIS WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION IN ANY CASE; WE COULD NOT_PREVENT THE ROMANIANS/NNAS FROM INCLUDING THEM UNDER THE SUBJECT OF "COMMUNICATIONS". S. THERE WAS UNANIMOUS APPROVAL OF THE AGREEMENT PACKAGE IN THIS MORNINGS NATO CAUCUS. THE UK REPRESENTATIVE, WITH WHOM I HAVE CONSULTED CLOSELY, EXPECTS A GREEN LIGHT FROM LONDON. 6. THE NNA ARE A POSSIBLE FLY-IN-THE-OINTMENT SINCE THEY HAVE NOT YET FORMALLY ACCEPTED THE PACKAGE, BUT TBEY ARE NOT EXPECTED TO RAISE DIFFICULTIES GIVEN THEIR EAGERNESS TO MOVE AHEAD. 7. EVEN IF WE AGREE ON MONDAY TO MOVE INTO THE FROM USDEL CDE FOR USIA PM DIRECTOR HOLMES FROM BARRY E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT APPARENTLY REACHED ON EXPLORATORY PHASE AND HAVE A COUPLE OF TRIAL RUNS BEFORE THIS ROUND CLOSES, PROCEDURAL WRANGLES WILL CONTINUE TO OCCUPY MUCH OF OUR TIME. PARALLEL WITH SUBSTANCE, THE ERPLORATORY PHASE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER HOW TO STRUCTURE DRAFTING. THIS COULD TARE THE ENTIRE EIGHTH ROUND, BUT THIS GIVES US ANOTHER "FIREBREAK" IF NEEDED. 8. NONETHELESS, THE MOVE TQ A MORE INFORMAL STAGE GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE A MUCH HIGHER PRIORITY T~ SUBSTANCE, WHICH IN TURN ENHANCES THE PROSPECTS FOR OUR CSBMS. THIS IS AN ACCOMPLISHMENT WE CAN POINT TO WITH SATISFACTION. MUCH OF THE CREDIT BELONGS TO JIM GOODBY, WHO STRUCTURED THE BASIC OUTLINES OF 'fHE TRANSITIONAL FRAMEWORK. ' BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L S?OCRHOLM 07730 SUBJECT: TEXT OF INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AND ORAL - STATEMENTS 1. CDE VII - 042 - C - ENTIRE TEXT T. FOLLOi~IING IS THE TEXT DESCRIBING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE TRANSITION TO AN EXPLORATORY PHASE OF THE CDE, AS WELL AS TEXT OF ORAL REMARKS WHICH WOULD ACCOMPANY WRITTEN TEXT. AS REPORTED SEPTEL, THIS LANGUAGE WAS ACCEPTED AD REF BY THE NATO CAUCUS OCTOBER 9. 3. BEGIN TEXT: (1) THE EXIS?ING WORKING STRUCTURE WILL BE USED AS A MEANS OF UNDERTAKING AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT FIGURE IN THE SUBSEQUENT PROCESS OF DRAFTING LANGUAGE ON A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSHM'S, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE, FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. (2) IN INFORMAL MEETINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS THE FOLLOWING TOPICS WILL BE TAKEN UP: WORKING GROUP A - TUESDAY NON-USE OF FORCE WEDNESDAY EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION, - - - COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION, AND - - - DEVELOPMENT OF'MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, IN - - - THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM - - - COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY - - - CSBM'S - THURSDAY CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF - - CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES WORKING GROUP B - TUESDAY NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES - THURSDAY OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES (3) INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS SHOIILD START DURING THE 7TH SESSION () WITH A VIEW TO FACILITATING AN EARLY - TRANSITION ?0 THE DRAFTING STAGE. (4) BOTH IN THE EXPLORATION OF THE TOPICS MENTIONED ABOVE - AND IN SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING OF LANGUAGE FOR A - CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ALL WORK AND ALL DRAFT TEXTS WILL - BE CONSIDERED PROVISIONAL AND WILL NEITHER IMPLY NOR - PREJUDICE FINAL AGREEMENT ON ANY OF THE ELEMENTS - DISCUSSED. (S) IT IS RECALLED THAT THE CSBM'S TO BE ADOPTED WILL BE - PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT. U THE EXACT DATE (OCTOBER 15) MIGHT NOW BE INDICATED. END TEX?. 4. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ORAL REMARKS: BEGIN TEXT: (1) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT OF HEANS OF COMiiiJNICATION, CONSULTATIONS AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S WILL ALSO BE DISCUSSED; ' 208 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 (2) INFORMAL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WILL BE CHAIRED BY ROTATING CHAIRMEN; (3) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT TRANSITION TO THE DRAFTING STAGE SHOULD START, IF POSSIBLE, DURING THE 8TH SESSION. OCTOBER 9, 1985 NOTE: THE NN-DELEGATIONS WISH TO LEAVE OUT THE REFERENCE TO COORDINATORS END TE7C? . BARRY END OF MESSAGE NNNN 209 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CONF IDENTIALSTOCRHOLM07781 SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING, OCTOBER 10, 1985 REF: STOCKHOLM 7730 1. CDE VII - 044. 2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. THE CDE NATO CAUCUS OCTOBE& 10, DUE TO A FRENCH RESERVE, FAILED TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT AND ORAL UNDERSTANDINGS ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE REPORTED REFTEL. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS, GASCBIGNARD (FRANCE) BLOCKED CONSENSUREQUIRING A CHANGE OF THE WORD "WILL" TO "COULD" IN THE AD REF WORDING OF THE ORAL UNDERSTANDING ON CONSULTATIONS -- IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, CONSULTATIONS AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S WILL ALSO BE DISCUSSED." PARIS HAD INSTRUCTED GASCHIGNARD TO OBTAIN CAUCUS AGREEMENT THAT THE NATO SPOKESMEN WOULD TELL RAHILUOTO (FINLAND) THAT NATO WAS PREPARED TO GIVE FULL AGREEMENT TO THE TEXT'S WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THIS CHANGE. GASCHIGNARD EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS MEAN? TO PROVIDE A POLITICAL,SIGNAL OF THE DIFFICULTY WE HAVE WITH T'HE CONCEPT OF CONSULTATIONS. THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS IN THE CAUCUS TO ACCEPT THE FRENCH POSITION, WHICH MOST DELEGATIONS VIEWED AS DANGEROUS BOTH BECAUSE IT WOULD PROMPT OTHER CHANGES FROM THE EAST AND NNA'S, AND WOULD MARE THE WEST APPEAR TO BE BLOCKING AN AGREEMENT. IN RESPONSE, GASCHIGNARD FURTHER INDICATED THAT, IF THE CAUCUS COULD NOT AGREE TO HAVE THE SPOKESMEN HARE THIS POINT ON BEHALF OF NATO, HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH RAHILUOTO AS SOON A POSSIBLE (I.E., TODAY) AND MARE IT IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY. 4. THE CAUCUS SPENT SEVERAL HOURS SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION OF THIS SEEMING IMPASSE. DISCUSSION WAS PARTICULARLY CHARGED FOLLOWING GASCHIGNARD'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WOULD GO TO RAHILUOTO DIRECTLY IF THE CAUCUS COULD NOT ACCEPT THE FRENCH POSITION. BARRY (U.S.) SUPPORTED FRANCE'S SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS ON CONSULTATIONS, AND REMINDED THE CAUCUS THAT HE ALSO HAD VOICED SOME CONCERN OVER THE VERB "WILL" IN THE ORAL UNDERSTANDING. HE NOTED THAT MANY, IF NOT ALL, CAUCUS MEMBERS PROBABLY SHARED FRANCE'S SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS ON THIS ISSUE. FOLLOWING CONSIDERATION OF SEVERAL OPTIONS, THE CAUCUS AGREED TO AN APPROACH SUGGESTED BY THE U.S. WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE FRENCH TO SEND THEIR POLITICAL SIGNAL WITHOUT DEMANDING A CHANGE IN THE TEXT, THEREBY PREVENTING AN OPEN DISPLAY OF CAUCUS DISUNITY. THE CAUCUS INSTRUCTED THE NATO SPOKESMEN TO TELL RAHILUOTO (ON THY. EVENING OF OCT. 10) THAT "THE CAUCUS HAS NOT ARRIVED AT A FINAL CONSENSUS; A PROBLEM REMAINS WITH RELATION TO CONSULTATIONS." IF PRESSED BY 210 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 RAHILUOTO AS TO WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS, THE SPOKESMEN WERE INSTRUCTED TO RESPOND THAT " WE (THE CAUCUS) WILL TRY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM AMONG OURSELVES." ON THE BASIS OF THIS APPROACH, GASCHIGNARD AGREED NOT TO APPROACH RAHILUOTO AT THIS TIME. S. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SESSION, THE CAUCUS WAS INFORMED THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAD PASSED VIRTUALLY THE SAME MESSAGE TO RAHILUOTO BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN "UNABLE TO SOLVE ROMANIA'S PROBLEM" (ROMANIA APPARENTLY WANTED THE ORAL POIN? ON CONSULTA?IONS EITHER STRENGHTENED OR MADE PART OF THE WRITTEN TExT). THE CAUCUS AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE AT 9:45 AM ON OCTOBER 11. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 211 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CONF IDENT IALSTOCRHOLM07822 SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, OC?OBER 10, 1985 1. CDE VII - 04S 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. BECAUSE OF CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS' PREOCCUPATION WITH REACHING A PROCEDURAL SOLUTION ONLY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR DELIVERED A PREPARED STATEMEN? AT THE OCTOBER 11 PLENARY. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSRY REAFFIRMED GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL, FORECASTS WHICH WOULD COVER NAVAL, AIR, GROUND ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS. IN SO DOING, HE NO?ED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS MORE MEANINGFUL THAN THE WEST'S LIIiITED MEASURE WHICH ONLY DEALT WITH LAND ACTIVITIES. IN RESPONSE, AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) SAID GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS WAS A POSITIVE STEP, BUT $IS DELEGATION WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE "SMALL PRINT" OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE ANNUAL FORECASTS OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. (FULL TEXT OF GRINEVSRY'S S?ATEMENT SENT SEPTEL.) BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 212 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07821 SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, HEAD - OF USSR DELEGATION TO CDE, OCTOBER 11, 1985 REF: TEL CDE VII - 045 1. CDE VII - 046 2. THE FULL TEXT OF THE STATEMENT DELIVERED OCTOBER 11, 1985, BY THE HEAD OF THE USSR DELEGATION TO THE CDE FOLLOWS. BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN, - ADDRESSING IN PARIS MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MIKHAIL GORBACBEV REAFFIRMED THE READINESS OF OUR COUNTRY TO PROMOTE THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. IT IS PRECISELY WITH THIS AIM IN MIND, WITH THE AIM OF SEEKING ACCORDS REGARD- ING THE PROBLEM OF CONFIDENCE IN THE MILITARY FIELD THAT THE SOVIET UNION, AS MIKHAIL GORBACHEV INDICATED, WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS SOVIET PROPOSAL IS AIMED A? GIVING NEW IMPETUS TO THE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM FORUM. IN FACT, ANOTHER IMPORTANT TOPIC IS BEING INCLUDED IN THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE, THAT OF EXCHANGING ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND NOT IN A CURTAILED FORM PROPOSED BY SOME STATES BUT ON A BROAD PLANE COVERING ALL TYPES OF MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS OF FORCES. IT IS SUCH AN APPROACH TO AN AGREEMENT IN THI$ FIELD THAT WILL HELP OVERCOME SUSPICION ANH=IMPEDE A COVERT PREPARATION OF WAR. - MARE YOUR JUDGMENT. THE NUMBER OF MILITARY MANEUVERS IN EUROPE AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREAS AND AIR SPACE HAS BEEN GROWING WITH EACH YEAR. THEY REPRESENT THOROUGHLY COORDINATED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN LAND AND SEA ?HEATERS AND IN AIR. IN THEIR FRAMEWORK AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS AND TRANSFERS OF TROOPS HAVE BEEN ACQUIR- ING AN EVER-THREATENING DIMENSION. THE SCOPE AND THE SCALE OF THOSE MANEUVERS CONDUCTED ON LAND, AT SEA AND IN AIR ARE SUCH THAT THEY COULD BE UTILIZED TO DEMONS- TRATE FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. ALL THIS IS ELOQUENTLY MANIFESTED BY NUMEROUS FACTS NOT ONLY OF PAST BUT OF RECENT HISTORY. - IF WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT A GREAT NUMBER OF GROUND TROOPS, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES ARE PUT IN FULL COMBAT READINESS AND HAVE THE NECESSARY AMMUNITION THIS ACTIVITY RESEMBLES, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, A PRELUDE TO WAR AND THUS LEADS TO INCREASED SUSPICION AND DISTRUST. THESE SERIOUS QUESTIONS HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON CONFI- DENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND BUST BE CONSIDERED AT THE CONFERENCE. 213 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 IN THIS CONNECTION I WISH TO ELABORATE SOMEWHAT ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION REGARDING EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS PROPOSAL LIKE OTHER CBM'S, WHETHER LIMITATION, NOTIFICATION OR OBSERVATION MEASURES, SHOULD, AS THE SOVIE? UNION REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT, ENSURE THE RIGHT OF EACH STATE TO EQUAL SECURITY AND ASSURE A SITUA?ION WHERE NO STATE OR GROUP OF STATES COULD OBTAIN ADVAN?AGES OVER THE OTHERS. THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL PLANS COULD NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMEN? UNLESS THEY COVER THE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY NOT ONLY OF GROUND TROOPS BUT ALSO OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, AS WELL AS MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF TROOPS OF EUROPE AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREAS AND AIR SPACE. THE SOVIET UNION PROCEEDS HERE FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVISIBLE SECURITY, ITS COMPREHENSIVE CONSIDERATION FROM USDEL USU FOR IP/PFE GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL E.o. izss6: N/A ?AGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, HEAD IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL EUROPEAN STATES. WE ARE OPPOSED TO ANY SELEC?IVE COVERAGE BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF A PARTICULAR TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY. ABROAD APPROACH IS IN FULL AND COMPLETE ACCORD WITH THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE. THE "MILITARY ACTIVITIES" CONCEPT IN THE MANDATE IS FAR BROADER THAN THE ACTIVITIES OF GROUND TROOPS OR THE SO-CALLED OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES. IT MUST BE ADMITTED ?HAT INFANTRY IS NO LONGER THE QUEEN OF BATTLEFIELDS. NEW GODS OF WAR AT SEA AND IN AIR WITH THEIR ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES AND FORMIDABLE WEAPONRY ROCK SECURITY IN EUROPE DURING MANEUVERS. IT IS PRECISELY THESE MAJOR MANEUVERS, THEIR AREAS AND DATES THAT ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS SHOULD BE INFORMED OF IN ADVANCE. THEY SHOULD BE NOTIFIABLE AND SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ANNUAL PLANS. IN THIS WAY WE COULD REDUCE SUSPICIONS AND IMPEDE A COVERT PREPARA?ION OF WAR. - INCIDENTALLY, SOME OF OUR COLLEAGUES HERE IN THIS HALL HAVE SPENT MUCH EFFORT TO TRY AND CONVINCE THE CONFERENCE THAT EUROPEAN SECURITY IS THREATENED ONLY WITH GROUND TROOPS AND THAT AS FAR AS AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES GO THEY ARE JUST A SORT OF INNOCENT TOURIST CRUISES IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, LET ME QUOTE A DIFFERENT OPINION BY A NO LESS AND, PERHAPS, EVEN MORE AUTHORITA- TIVE EXPERT ON THE MATTER. I HAVE IN MIND GENERAL ROGERS, SUPREME COMMANDER OF NATO ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE, WHOSE OPINION, APPARENTLY, SHOUf.D NO? BE OVERLOOKED. IN HIS RECENT INTERVIEW TO THE FRENCH SCIENCE ET VIE MAGAZINE PUBLISHED IN OCTOBER UNDER THE HEADLINE "NEW 214 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 STRATEGY FOR EUROPE" HE SAID THAT MODERN WARFARE MUST ACHIEVE BASIC OBJECTIVES BY AIR STRIKES OF OUR (U.S.) AIRCRAFT AND OUR (U.S.) KISSILES AND NOT ON LAND AND NOT BY GROUND FORCES. THE SAME GOES FOR THE Navy. - WHAT ARE, THEN, THE GROUNDS ON WHICH I? HAS BEEN PERSISTENTLY SUGGESTED TO US THA? AIR AND NAVAL FORCES -- THESE STRIKE FORCES OF MODERN WARFARE WHICH, ACCORDING TO GENERAL ROGERS, MUST ACHIEVE BASIC OBJECTIVES -- BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SCOPE OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IiEASURES? THE ANSWER CAN BE SIMPLE: EITHER THEY DO NOT WAN? TO STRENG?HEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE OR THEY WANT TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES FOR THEMSELVES. - BOTH APPROACHES ARE ALIEN TO THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION. - NOW THAT THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS OF NOTIFI- ABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES FIGURES IN THE PROPOSALS OF ALL THREE GROUPS OF STATES THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT AND THE NEGO?IA?ION OF CORRESPONDING AGREEMENTS COULD BE INTENSIFIED. WE WILL HAVE TO AGREE ON ONE QUESTION: WHA? SHOULD BE THE CONTENT OF THOSE FORECASTS, WHAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THEM AND WHAT SHOULD BE THE MAGNITUDE OF INFORMATION GIVEN ON EACH ACTIVITY. CERTAINLY, THE ISSUE AT HAND SHOULD BE THE INCLUSION NOT OF THE DAY-TODAY COMBAT TRAINING OF GROUND TROOPS AT TRAINING FIELDS, TEST RANGES AND FIRE RANGES WHERE TROOPS OF ANY STA?E ARE ENGAGED IN ROUTINE TRAINING BUT RATHER OF MAJOR MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS AND AIR AND NAVAL FORCES WHICH INDEED POSE A THREAT TO SECURITY. MR. CHAIRMAN, - THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DEMONSTRATE IN PRACTICE ?HEIR READINESS TO INTENSIFY THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE AND TARE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITIONS OF OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. IT IS CLEAR FROM OUR STA?ED READINESS TO ACCEPT AGREEKEN? ON MUTUAL EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF FROM USDEL USIA FOR IP/PFE GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: STA?EKENT BY AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSRY, HEAD MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WE EXPECT APPROPRIATE RESPONSES FROM THE OTHER PARTICIPATNS IN THE CONFERENCE IN ORDER TO START, AT LAST, MOVING TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORDS. END TEXT. BARRY END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED 215 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET S TATELREN T by Oleg A. GRIl~TEVSKY, Ambassador at I+arge, Head of the USSR Delegation to the Coafereace on Confidence- and Security- Building Neasures and Disarmament is Europe Stockholm, October 11, 1985 216 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 fir. Chairman, ~ddressiao is Paris members of the French Parliament the General Secretary o! the CP.SII Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev reffirmed the readiness of our country to promote the solution of the problem of ?.strengthening confidence and security is Europe. It is precisely with this aim in mind, with the aim of seeking accords regarding the problem of confidence in the military field that the Soviet IInion, as Mikhail Gorbac'~ev inaicated, was prepared to accept agreement on the exchange of annual plans of notifiable military activities. This Soviet proposal is aimed at giving new impetus to the work of the Stockholm forum. Ia fact, another important topic is being included in the agenda of the Conference, that of exchanging annual pleas o! military activities, and not in a curtailed form proposed by some states but on a broad plane covering all t;~pes of manoeuvres and movements o! forces. It is such as approach to an agreement is this field that Hill help overcome suspicion and impede a covert preparation of war. ~dake your ~udgemeat. The number of military manoeuvres in $urope anti in the ad~o;~ sea (ocean) areas any air space aas been growing with each year. They represent thoroughly coorciinater~ military activities in lead and sea theatres and in air. In their framecrork air and naval manoeuvres and transfers of troops t have been acquiring as ever tY~ceatening dimension. Tne scope and the scale o! those manoeuvres conducted on !anti, at sea and in air are such that they could-be utilized to demonstrate force for political intimidation. gll this is eloquently manif este by numerous !acts not only of past but o! recent history. Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 2. If ire take into account that a great number o! ground troops, air and naval forces are put in lull combat readiness and have the necessary ammunition this activity resembles, ror all practical purpos+s, a prelude to war and thus leads to encreas:d su8picion and distrust. ~cuese serious questions have a direct bearing on confidence' and security in ]~Vrope and must be considered at the Conference. Ia this connection I wish to elaborate somewhat on certain aspects of the position o! the Soviet union regarding exchaa6es o! annual pleas o! notifiable military activities. 'this proposal like other CBllds, whether limitation, no-cificatioa or observation measures, should, as the Soviet Union repeatedly pointed out, ensure the right o! each state to equal security and assure a situation where no state or group o! states could obtain .advantages over the others. :Che exchange of annual plans could not satisfy this requirement unless they cover the notifiable activity not onl;~ o! ground tTOgas but also o! air and naval rorces, as well as movements (transfers) o! troops in Europe and is the aa~oinir~r, sea (ocean) areas and air space. The Soviet union proceeas here from the principle of indivisible security, its comprehensive consideration is the interests o! all hliropeen states. V1e are opposed to nay selective coverage by confidence-builr..ing measures o! a particular type of military activity. A broad approach is in lull and complete accord with the mandate o! the Conference. The "military activities" concept in tae mandate is ra~r broader than the activities o! ground troops or the ?o palled out-of- _ garrison activities. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 sEC~er 3. It must be admitted that infantry is ao longer the queen of battlefields. New gods of war at sea and is a1r Frith their advanced technologies and formidable weaponry rock security in lsvrope during manoeuvres. It is precisely these mayor manoeuvres, their areas and dates that all the participants in the all-L+1~sopeen process should be iaYormed off. in advance. They ahovld~be aotiYiable and such iaf ormation should be iacludea is annual pleas. Ia this way we could reduce suspicions and impede a covert preparation of war. Incidentally, same of our colleagues here is this hall have spent aucu erf ort to try and convince the Conference that ~:uropeen security is threatened only Kith ground troops 2na that as far as air and naval activities go they are dust a sort of innocent tourist cruises in Europe. However, let me quote a diPferant opinion by a no less and, perhaps, even more authoritative expert on the natter. I have in mind general Rogers, Supreme Commander of NA'1.'0 armed forces in Europe, whose opinion, apparently, should not be overlooked. In his recent intervievr to the r'reach Science Et Vie magazine published in October under the Headline "New strategy for Etiirope" he said that modern warfare must achieve basic objectives by air striKes of our (II.S.) aircraft and our (U.S.) missiles sad not oa lead and not b9 ground forces. The same goes ror the Navy. What are, then, the grounds on which it Has been persistently suggested to us that air and naval forces -these striKe forces of modern warfare which, accoraing to General Rogers, must achieve basic ob~ectivea - b.e excludes rrom the scope of confidence-building measures? The anstiver can~be simple: either ~~ they uo not want to strengthen confidence aa~i security is Europe or they x ant to obtain unilateral advantages for themselves. 219 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 4. Both approaches are alien to the Soviet IInioa~s position. Noa that the exchange o! annual loredasts o! notifiable military activities figures is the proposals o! all three groups o! states the exchange o! visas on the subject and the ne~etiation o! correapoadiab agreements could be intensified. die will have to agree oa one questions what should be the content o! those forecasts, what should be included is them and ghat should be the.nagnitude o! information given oa each activit y Certainly, the issue at head should be the inclusion not o! the day-to-day combat training of ground troops at tr suing fields, test ranges and rite ranges where troops o! any state are engaged in routine tram but rather of mayor manoeuvres and movements o! troops and air wad naval forces which indeed pose a threat to security. Mr.Chairmaa, The socialist countries demonstrate in practice there readiness to intensify the work o! the Conference and take into account the positions o! our negotiating partners. It is clear from our stated readiness to accept agreement on mutual exchanges o! annual plans o! military activities. Y;e expect appropriate responses from the other participants in the Coaf erence in order to stt~rt, at last, moving to mutually acceptable accords. 220 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N? I A L COMPLET O1 OF OS STOCKHOLM 08022 SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEER OF OCTOBER 7-11, 1985 1. THIS IS CDE -061. 2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. SUMMARY. LITTLE NEW GROUND WAS PLOWED, AS NATO AND WTO CONTINUED TO HOLD THEIR OWN. NNA REMAINED QUIET. FOR THE SECOND WEER, THE WTO ALSO REMAINED SILENT IN THE WORKING GROUP ON VERIFICATION. AND, OF INTEREST, CZECHOSLOVAKIA INDICATED THAT THE WTO MAY BE READY TO DISCUSS THE OBSERVATION REGIME, PROVIDED IT IS CONSIDERED "HAND IN HAND" WITH THE ELABORATION OF ACTIVI?IES TO BE NOTIFIED. END SUMMARY. 4. WORKING GROUP AB. THERE WAS NO MEETING OF WG AB THIS WEER. 5. WORKING GROUP B: NOTIFICATION -- OCTOBER 8, 1985. DEMARR (HOWARD) DEFENDED SC.1'S FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AS GROUND FORCES CAN SEIZE AND OCC~FPY TERRITORY. SMALL STATES BELIEVE LOWER THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, HE SAID. HOWARD NOTED THAT THE SC.1 PROPOSAL ON "ALERT" ACTIVITIES STRIKES A GOOD BALANCE BETWEEN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF MILITARY FORCES TO CONDUCT REALISTIC TRAINING. POLAND (STANIEVSRY) ASSERTED THAT THE MEANING OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT IS STILL UNCLEAR AND ACTIVITIES TO BE COVERED ARE UNCLEAR. A CLOSE EXAMINATION REVEALS THAT SC.1 SPONSORS SPEAK ONLY OF MANEUVERS. STANIEVSRY ASKED IF SC.1 AUTHORS ENVISAGID DIFFERENT NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS FOR MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS. NETHERLANDS (VAN DER GRAAF) SAID THAT DESPITE ASSURANCES THAT THE EXERCISE "DRUZHBA 85 " WAS WELL BELOW THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD, UP TO 30,000 TROOPS COULD HAVE PARTICIPATED, USING THE USSR (TATARNIROV) MODEL FOR STRUCTURING AN EXERCISE. THE PRESENCE OF HIGH-RANKING AUTHORITIES AND THE LEVEL OF PRESS COVERAGE ALSO SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THE EXERCISE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. VAN DER GRAAF SAID. 221 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 FRG (SCHMIDBAUER) NOTED THAT IN DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF DIFFERENT STRENGTHS OF DIFFEREN? DIVISIONS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA MADE REFERENCE ONLY TO PERSONNEL, NOT OTHER~I2~ORTANT DIVISION ELEMENTS. DIVISIONS ARE STRUCTURED AS EACH COUN?RY SEES FIT, HE NOTED, JUST AS MOSCOW HAS DETERMINED WTO DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE. FRANCE (!ERIC) SAID THAT THE WEST HAS NOT REJECTED NUI~RICAL PARAMETERS. HE ACCUSSED CZECHOSLOVAKIA OF BEING MORE RIGID THAN ITS EASTERN COLLEAGUES. IF YOU WON'T LISTEN TO SC.1 SPONSORS, HE SAID, AT LEAST LISTEN TO YOUR WTO COLLEAGUES. UR (BACK). ANALYZING THE NOTIFICATION OF "RAVRAZ 85" IN TERMS OF THE HFA AND WTO WGB.1 CRITERIA, SAID THE RESULT REPRESENTED LITTLE IF ANY IMPROVEMENT OVER THE HFA. USSR (TATARNIROV) ROSE TO THE DEFENSE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, TELLING FRANCE (!ERIC) NOT TO WORRY ABOUT NUANCES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE HE AGREED THAT EVERY STATE HAS A RIGHT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN DIVISIONAL STRUCTURES, TATARNIROV SAID THAT MANNING LEVELS MUST BE CONSIDERED. SOME DIVISIONS, FIE CONCLUDED, ARE MANNED AT AS LOW AS 20 PER CENT; WHILE ONE G-N HARDLY CALL THAT A DIVISION, IT MAY PLAY AS A DIVISION IN AN EXERCISE. FRANCE (!ERIC) STATED THAT A NUANCE WAS THE USSR'S (TATARNIROV) EXPLANATION OF THE 20,000 NUMERICAL THRESHOLD IN TERMS OF STRUCTURE. END OF .*iESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION 2 ??*** FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR US SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL E.O. 12356: DEL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PAR!, PREL SUBJECT: CDE; WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEER OF SWITZERLAND (SCHARLI) SOUGHT TO HEAD OFF CRITICISM OVER THE FACT THAT SWITZERLAND DID NO? INVITE OBSERVERS TO ITS NATIONAL EXERCISE "TORNADO", NOTIFIED ON AUGUST 25, WHICH BEGAN OCTOBER 7 AND RUNS UNTIL OCTOBER 17, PROVIDING SOME DETAIL ON THE EXERCISE. THE FACT THAT 2'HE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION DID NOT CORRESPOND TO SWITZERLANp'S VIEWS ON STANDARDIZED NOTIFICATION WAS NOT A CONTRADICTION, HE ASSERTED. ALL S?AYES MUST FIRST DEIiONSTRA?E A WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN SUCH NOTIFICATIONS. SWITZERLAND WILL NOT RISK THE FIRS? STEP IN SUCH SENSITIVE AREAS (ARMY MOUNTAIN CORPS 3) UNTIL OTHERS SHOW GOOD WILL. 6. WORKING GROUP A: NON USE OF FORCE -- OCTOBER 8, 1985. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ASSERTING ?HAT SC.l SPONSORS WERE ADDRESSING NUF IN MORE CONCRETE TERMS, GDR (GEORGI) ANNOUNCED THAT I? WAS NOW "HIGH TIME" TO SEER COMMON NUF LANGUAGE AND HOVE TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS. THE CRITERIA FOR A CREDIBLE NUF COMMITMENT, AS OUTLINED BY THE FRG ON OCT 1, WERE MET IN SC.6'S BASIC ELEMENTS. THE GDR SUPPORTS ENRICHING THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE "CSCE DIMENSION", TO SERVE AS THE CORNERSTONE FOR A NEW PHASE OF DETENTE IN EUROPE. GEORGI ASKED THE FRG DELEGATION, IN LIGHT OF AN EARLIER STATEMENT, FOR ITS IDEAS ON A CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS AND CONCRETE NUF FORMULATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CONCRETE CSBM'S, AND FOR NUF FORMULATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE THE GREATEST POSSIBLE POLITICALLY BINDING EFFEC?. HUNGARY (RORMENDY) NOTED APPROVINGLY THAT THE FRG HAD SAID EARLIER THAT "NO POLITICAL AIM, NO CONCEPTION OF LAW OR RIGHTS, NO IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION CAN JUSTIFY THE USE OF FORCE." HE INTERPRETED THIS STATEMENT IN STRICT WTO TERMS: NUCLEAR ARSENALS HAVE CHANGED THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE OR MANIFESTATION OF FORCE AND THUS JUSTIFY A NEW EMPHASIS ON THE NUF COMMITMENT. RORMENDY AGREED WITH AN EARLIER U.S. STATEMENT THAT THE APPROACH TO A NUF REAFFIRMATION: SHOULD BE PRECISE, "BE BASID ON" THE LANGUAGE OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE FINAL ACT (AS OPPOSED TO U.S. REP'S STATEMENT THAT THIS LANGUAGE SHOULD BE "USED"), SHOULD DEAL WITH BOTH THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE, AND SHOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES IN THEIR MUTUAL, AS WELL AS THEIR INTERNATIONAL, RELATIONS. RORMENDY DID NOT CHALLENGE THE CREDIBILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE TEN FINAL AC? PRINCIPLES, BUT DID NO?E THAT HUNGARY INTERPRETS THEIR PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND EQUALITY DIFFERENTLY THAN DOES THE U.S. AS FOR THE U.S.~(GUNDERSEN) VIEW THAT AN AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM WOULD BE REVIEWED PERIODICALLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE HELSINKI REVIEW PROCESS, ADVOCATED CONSULTATIONS AND EXCHANGE OF NECESSARY INFORMA?ION IN THE EVENT OF THE RISK OF WAR (AS OUTLINED IN PARA 8 OF SC.6) INSTEAD. BULGARIA (RADOUROV) CONTENDED THAT THE UN CHARTER, THE FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ADDRESSED THE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY. HE CRITICIZED THE "MINIMALIST" APPROACH OF SOME (WESTERN) DELEGA?IONS WHICH FAVOR THE "MERE REPETITION" OF UN CHARTER AND FINAL AC? NUF LANGUAGE, ARGUING THAT THIS WOULD NOT GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE NUF OBLIGATION IN ALL WAYS AND FORMS, AS CALLED FOR IN THE FINAL ACT. 223 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SPAIN (LOAENZO) DEBUNKED THE EAST'S EFFORTS AT PROMOTING A NUF TREATY, CITING ARTICLE 35 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON LAWS AND TREATIES TO THE EFFECT THAT A TREATY IS VOID WHEN IT GOES AGAINST. AN IMPERATIVE NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (NORM OF THE SAME CHARACTER). NOTING THAT THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IS SUCH A NORM, THE SPANISH DELEGATE CRITICIZED THE SC.6'S END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION 3 ??*** FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR US SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL E.O. 12356: DEL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEER OF EMPHASIS ON A TREATY WHEN NUF ALREADY HAS A MAXIMUM OBLIGATORY NATURE. RECALLING THE CYPRIOT SUGGESTION THAT A NUF REAFFIRMATION INCLUDE THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE, LORENZO REMINDED THE CONFERENCE THAT IN 1959 THE UN CREATED A SPECIAL COMMITTEE WHICH TOOK MORE THAN A QUARTER OF A CENTURY TO COME UP WITH A DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION AND p NON-RESTRICTIVE LIST OF ACTS WHICH CONSTITU?E AGGRESSION. $E FUR?HER ARGUED THAT THE MADRID MANDATE DID NOT CALL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OR CODIFICATION OF SUCH PRINCIPLES, BUT RATHER HAD CHARGED THE CONFERENCE TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE THROUGH NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS, I.E., CONCRETE CSBM'S. RARHMANINOV (USSR) DISAGREED WITH LORENZO'S INTERPRETATION OF THE UN CHARTER, ARGUING THAT IT DOES NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REGIONAL AGREEMENTS WHICH "INCLUDE THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY." HE INSISTED THA? THE CDE DID NO? NEED PERMISSION TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE. CYPRUS (PAPADAPOULOS) AGAIN SAID THAT WE ARE CHARGED TO GIVE THE NUF PRINCIPLE A "CDE DIMENSION"; IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT THE NUF PRINCIPLE WAS SINGLED OUT IN THE MADRID MANDATE. HE ACCEPTED THE FRG'S TERM "CSCE DIMENSION", SAYING THAT IT ALSO WOULD GIVE THE PRINCIPLE THE "CDE DIMENSION", I.E., THE "MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" AS PART OF THE DEFINITION OF THE SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE. HE ASKED OTHERS FOR PROPOSALS ON HOW TO DO THIS. ? 224 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 7. WORKING GROUP A: INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION -- OC?OBER 9, 1985. ITALY (DE BERNARDIN) STRESSED THE NEED FOR ADEQUA?E VERIFICATION PROVISIONS COUPLED WITH THEIR TIMELY IMPLEMENTATION. AN ESSENTIAL PAR? OF VERIFICATION/INSPECTION IS ITS PREPARATION INCLUDING ?HE REQUEST AND RESPONSE. DEDICATED COl~IIitJNICATION LINKS WILL ENHANCE TIMELY PREPAMTION, AND COULD ALSO BE USED TO MANAGE THE NORMAL FLOW OF INFORMATION RELATING TO CSBM'S. DE BERNARDIN SAID THAT THE SC.1 VERIFICATION PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO FIT THE NEED AND NOT BE OVERLY INTRUSIVE. 'T'HUS, THE INSPECTION TEAM SHOULD NOT PROLONG ITS ACTIVITIES OVER 48 HOURS. SC.1/MEASURE 1 PROVIDES FOR PROVISION OF STATIC INFORMATION THAT WILL ASSIST IN 'I`HE DETERMINATION OF THE NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY AND WILL ALLOW THE AUTHORITY REQUESTING AN INSPECTION TO BE EXACT IN SPECIFYING LOCATION. PRIOR INFORMATION ASSISTS A COUNTRY IN DEVELOPING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS TO ASR AND THEREBY FACILITATES SPEEDY INSPECTION. ROMANIA (BUHOARA) CONTINUED ITS SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, ASSERTING THAT PROPOSALS TO DATE CONFIRM "WITHOUT A DOUBT" THE IMPORTANCE COUNTRIES ATTACH TO SETTING UP MEANS AND PROCEDURES FOR INFORMATION, CONSULTATION, AND COMMUNICATION BETWEEN STATES. DIFFERENCES IN POSITIONS NOTWITHS?ANDING, SEVERAL CONVERGENT AND COMPLIMENTARY ELEMENTS ARE EMERGING. THE ESTABLISHMEN? OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION, COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION CONSTITUTE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE SAME EFFORT -- TO CONTRIBUTE TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION AND TO COMPLIMENT AND STRENGTHEN EACH OTHER. SC.1, SC.3, AND THE ROMANIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE ALL ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF CONSULTATIONS. AND THOSE WITH NO CONCRETE PROPOSALS, HE ASSERTED, HAVE BEEN FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARDS CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE. HE CITED THE SEPTEMBER 23 U.S. (HANSEN) STATEMENT AS ENCOURAGING, INASMUCH AS THE U.S. AGREES PARTIALLY THAT AT LEAST IN GENERAL TERMS CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION ARE IMPORTANT. HE CONTENDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION 4 ??*** FROM USDEL CDE GENEVa FOR US SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL E.O. 12356: DEL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP AC?IVITIES, WEER OF 225 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 MISUNDERS?OOD T$E ROMANIAN) POSITION? AIDE-MgKOIRE ADDRESSES THE THE ROMANIAN FACT-FINDING PROCEDURES ~DEg STION OF ESTABLISHING ~ ~GUED AGAINST AN ~~~ CIRCUMSTANCES. THEE WERE ONLY EARLIER PORTUGUESE ASSERTION ?HAT VERIFICATION AT TWO APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF APPRO THIS CONFERENCE, RECALLING 0 ACHES OUTSIDE OF THE TWO BLOCS: THER (VERIFICA?ION BY CHALLENGE), AUSTRIA VERIFICATION BY CHOICE), AND ROMANIA (FACT-PINDING). DENMARK (ROSENTHAL) NOTID TEAT 7~ DEGREE OF CRITICISM OF THE SC.1 VERIFICA?ION/INSPECTION PROPOSAL VARIES. SOME HAVE ADMITTED INSPECTION, SUCg IDEAS TAT ARE NOT DIFFERENT FROM OBSERVATION BY C~~~FICATION BY CHALLENGE, FACT-FINDING. ALL RAVE IN ~p~ON CONCEPT OF ACTIVITIES WILL TARE p T~ VIEW THAT THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. CRITICI~SH OUNDERIEI(TRAORDINARY HE OBSERVED, ON THE ASSUMPTION QUENTLY BASED, WILL LEAD TO A MASSIVE TAT ITS I~'LEMENTATION NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS. THE WTO CARR OUTUT 1'WO INS~pECTIpNSCI OF THE 35 STATES COULD STATES, IT WOULD RESULT IN OVER OF THE PARTICIPATING A YEAR. BU? SC.1 STATES THAT 2,000 SUCH INSPECTIONS COULD CARRY OUT NO MORE ~~ PARTICIPATING STATE -- A TOTAL OF ONLY 70? 2'HAN TWO INSPECTIONS PER YEAR INSPECTIONS ARE NOT ~' ROSENTHAL SAID, INSPEC?IONS" NECESSARY SO-CALLED "ON-SITE OR ON ~ Z~ INSPECTION CAN BE BASED IN TAE ~O~' ~ AERIAL. INSPECTION W THE AIR ON=SI?E INSPECTION. IN ANY EVENT. IT IS U~IVLIK~L~ THE QUOTA FOR INSPECTIONS WILL BE FILLED THAT COUNTRY WILL WANT TO HOLD A? LEAS? ONE IN RESERVE AS A SHOULD IT BE NEEDED LATER. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT THE SC.1 OBJECTIVES WERE MODEST -- TO ESTABLISH A NARROWLY LIMITED SYSTEM OF INSPECTION TO COPE EFFEC?IVELY WITH A KIND OF SITU pNILL BE ABLE LEAD TO HOSTILITY. (COMMENT: SEVERAL, NATO DELEGATIOONS QUESTIONED HIS CONTENTION THAT AN AERIAL INSPECTION OVER A CER?ASIN AREA WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AN "ON-SITE" INSPECTION PER SE. ~ CO~~T?) $. WORKING GROUP B: OBSERVATION -- IRELAND (0'CONNEL) SAID WE MUST DEVELOPTAN OBSERVATION REGIME THAT MEETS I?S AGREED PURPOSE. OUTLINING A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ELEMENTS FOR INCORPORATION IN AN OBSERVATION REGIME IN ORDER TO MEET ITS PURPOSE, HE OBSERVED THAT IT WAS NO ACCIDENT THAT HIS IDEAS PARALLELED THOSE OF OTHERS (SC.1/AMPLIFIED). WHILE THE FINAL ACT HAS A STRONG DIMENSION OF GOOD WILL, IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE PURPOSE. HE OBSERVED, OBSERVATION IS MORE STRINGEN~AND ISSTEM, CONNECTED WITH A STRONG VERIFICATION DIMENSION. IN CONCLUSION, O'CARROL SUGGESTED 'THAT THIS MAY BE A PERTENENT EXAMPLE FOR (1tiR njSCUSSIONS. 226 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 U.S. (MCPEAR) AGREED WITH ?WO USSR (TATARNIROV) REMARKS: IT IS UNACCEPTABLE THAT THE PRACTICE OF OBSERVATION BE TRANSFORMED INTO VERIFICATION, AND THE SECURITY OF THE STATE HOSTING OBSERVERS SHOULD NO? BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED. OBSERVATION WILL NOT FULFILL THE MADRID MANDATE CRITERIA THAT CSBMS BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE, HE STATED. SC.1'S OBSERVATION MEASURE IS DESIGNED TO MEASURE COIipLIANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ROUTINE, WHILE ITS VERIFICATION MEASURE IS DESIGNED TO FOCUS PRIMARILY ON ANOMALOUS SITUATIONS. AND WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT AN OBSERVER CANNOT SEE EVERY ASPECT OF EVERY PHASE OF A MANEUVER, HE POINTED OUT, IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE HOST STATE TO ENSURE THAT AS MUCH AS CAN BE SEEN WILL BE SEEN. CZECHOSLOVAKIA REITERATED THAT AN AGREEMENT OF WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED AND S~SEQUENTLY SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION MUST BE REACHED PRIOR TO DEVELOPMENT OF END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION s ??*** FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR US SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL E.O. 12356: DEL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEER OF AN OBSERVATION REGIME. ALTHOUGH WE HAVEN'T REACHED SUCH AN AGREEMENT, HE SAID, THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE HAVE NOT ACCOMPLISHED ANYTHING. WE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING THE PREREQUISITES FOR FURTHER AND MORE iN DEPTH CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM, FOR ITS PART, THE WTO HAVE ATTEMPTED TO FURTHER THE DIALOGUE BY PUTTING FORWARD OBSERVATION SCENARIOS. AND, HE SAID, ENOUGH PREREQUISITE GROUNDWORK HAS BEEN LAID TO BEGIN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF OBSERVATION IN ITS FULL AGE, SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH NOTIFICATION. RECALLING THAT SC.1 PROVIDES FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES COMBINED WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, HE ASKED FOR THE VIEWS OF SC.1 SPONSORS ON HOW OBSERVATION OF THESE NAVAL AND SEA ELEMENTS WOULD PROCEED. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT: (1) WE NEED TO DETERMINE THE ACTIVITIES TO WHICH OBSERVERS ARE INVITED, AND (2) TO DETERMINE THE INTERACTION BETWEEN NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION OF THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION ACTIVITIES. THIS REQUIRES A REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY EFFECTS OF THE MEASURES ADOPTED, 227 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 9. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS -- OCTOBER 10, 1985. THIS REMARKABLY BRIEF MEETING FEATURED A SHORT STATEMENT BY ITALY (BLAIS). BLAIS CRITICIZED THE INTERPRETATION OF HIS OCTOBER 3 SPEECH FROM ITALIAN INTO RUSSIAN, NOTING THAT IT SAD BEEN RELAYED FROM FRENCH. JUDGING FROM THE USSR'S (TATARNIROV) REACTION TO THIS STATEMENT (BUIS' IDEAS WERE CSARACTERIZED AS "EXTRAVAGANT" AND "NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ADEQUATE LOGICAL ARGUMENTS,"), BLAIS SURMISED TEAT SOME OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF SIS REMARKS MUST HAVE BEEN LOST IN THE TRANSLATION. SE CONCLUDED BY PRECISELY REPEATING THE MAIN POINTS OF SIS OCTOBER 3 STATEMENT. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDEN?IAL NNNN 228 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET C O N F I D E N T I A L S?OCRHOLM 07820 SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS OF OCTOBER 11, 1985 REF: STOCKHOLM 7781 1. CDE VII - 48 2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. THREE NATO CAUCUS SESSIONS ON OCTOBER 11 ONCE AGAIN FOCUSED ON THE PENDING INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AGREEMENT, AND THE CON?INUING FRENCH RESERVE TO THE ORAL UNDERSTANDING ON CONSULTATIONS (REFTEL). BY THE END OF THE DAY IT APPEARID THAT THE FRENCH POSITION WAS THE ONLY REMAINING OBSTACLE TO FULL CONFERENCE ACCORD ON THE AGREEMENT. DURING THE MORNING CAUCUS SESSION GASCHIGNARD INDICATED THA? THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM OCTOBER 10 (WHICH APPARENTLY ALLOWED HIM NO ROOM TO MANEUVER), AND THA? FRANCE CONTINUID TO BELIEVE THAT A STRONG POLITICAL SIGNAL NEEDED TO BE SEN? ON CONSULTA?IONS. GASCHIGNARD WAS UNMOVED BY THE COMMENTS OF SEVERAL DELEGATIONS THAT THE NATO SPOKESMEN HAD SENT SUCH A SIGNAL THE PREVIOUS EVENING WHEN THEY HAD ?OLD RAHILUOTO (FINLAND) THAT, "ONE PROBLEM REMAINS WI?H RELA?ION TO CONSULTATIONS". BARRY (U.S.) SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS OTHER WORDING OF THE ORAL POINT COULD RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM. CITRON (FRG) PROPOSED, "IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, THERE WILL BE A POSSIBILITY TO DISCUSS CONSULTATION AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S". GASCHIGNARD aGREED TO THIS SUGGESTION; HOWEVER, AS THERE WAS NO CAUCUS CONSENSUS TO PRESENT' IT AS A NATO POSITION, THE SPOKESMEN WERE INSTRUCTED TO COIWEY IT TO RAHILUOTO AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE "CONSULTA?IONS PROBLEM". 4. DURING THE AFTERNOON, THE CAUCUS SPOKESMEN REPORTED THE RESULTS OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS WZTH RAHILUOTO. RAHILUOTO HAD INDICATED THAT HE HAD TAKEN THE PROPOSED LANGUAGE TO THE NNA CAUCUS, BUT THAT THE CAUCUS DID NOT WANT TO REOPEN DISCUSSION AND HAS TAKEN THE FIRM POSITION THAT THERE SLOULD BE NO FURTHER CHANGES TO THE TEXTS. RAHILUO?0 HAD FURTHER INFORMED THE SPORESIiEN THAT CETERCHI (ROMANIA) HAD TOLD HIM THA? ROMANIA WOULD NOT BLOC CONSENSUS ON THE AGREEMENT, WHICH IT WAS PREPARED TO GIVE ONCE THE WEST HAD ACCEPTED THE FULL TEXTS. FOLLOWING THIS REPORT, THE CHAIR (NORWAY) REMARKED THAT THE CAUCUS HAD NOW SENT A FORCEFUL SIGNAL ON OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH CONSULTATIONS AND ASKED IF THE CAUCUS COULD NOW ACHIEVE CONSENSUS TO ACCEPT THE PACKAGE AS DRAFTED. GASCHIGNARD, HOWEVER, MAINTAINED HZS POSITION AND THE FRENCH RESERVE ON THE AGREEHEN?. DISCUSSION CLOSED ON THIS TOPIC WITH CITRON (FRG) CALLING ON FRANCE TO RECONSIDER THE APPEAL OF THE CAUCUS THAT IT JOIN IN~CONSENSUS, AND MELLBIN (DENMARK) 229 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 TESTILY AND WITH EVIDENT FRUSTRATION NOTING THAT WE HAD REACHED THE "END OF THE ROAD" IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH RAHILUOTO, AND RHETORICALLY ASKING IF FRANCE'S "ALLIES AND FRIENDS" SHOULD NOT EXPECT A POSITIVE ANSWER FROM THE FRENCH ON MONDAY. S. COMMENT; MANY IN THE CAUCUS ARE CLEARLY FRUSTRATED WITH THE FRENCH POSI?ION, AND MANY DELEGA?IONS NOW FEAR THAT THE EAS? WILL USE THIS DELAY TO ACCUSE NATO OF BLOCKING PROGRESS. GASCHIGNARD, WHO HAS APPRECIATED U.S. SUPPORT ON THIS MATTER, TOLD AMBASSADOR BARRY FOLLOWING THE MEETING THAT HE HOPED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO FALL-OFF HIS POSITION, BUT COULD NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE NEW INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE MONDAY BECAUSE D'ABOVILLE (QUAI DISARMAMENT CHIEF) WAS OUT OF PARIS. IN ANY EVENT, GASCHIGNARD WAS NOT POSITIVE HIS INSTRUCTIONS WOULD CHANGE UPON D'ABOVILLE'S RETURN. THIS DRAWN OUT SQUABBLE IS ALREADY CAUSING PERSONAL AND NATIONAL ANIMOSITIES TO SERVICE AMONG CAUCUS MEMBERS. CONSEQUENTLY, IF THE FRENCH STICK ON THIS POSITION CAUCUS UNITY WILL DISSIPATE AS OTHER DELEGATIONS "GO PUBLIC" 'TO AVOID RESPONSIBILITY FOR BLOCKING PROGRESS. END COMMENT. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 230 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CONFIDENT IALSTOCRHOLM07847 SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS HEFTING, OCTOBER 14, 1985 REF: STOCI~OLM 7730 1. CDE VII - 051 2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEX?. 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE OCTOBER 14 CDE NATO CAUCUS SESSION, FRANCE WITHDREW ITS RESERVATION ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AND JOINED FULL CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON THE AGREEMENT. ADOPTION OF THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE BY THE CONFERENCE WAS BRIEFLY THREATENID BY MALTA, WHICH WITHDREW ITS EARLIER CONCURRENCE. HOWEVER, UNDER NNA PRESSURE MALTA ACCEPTED THE AGREEMENT AT THE LAST MINUTE. INFORMAL DISCUSSSIONS BEGAN ON OCTOBER 1S. END SUMMARY. 4. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) OPENED THE OC?OBER 14 NATO CAUCUS MEETING BY WITHDRAWING THE FRENCH RESERVA?ION ON THE ORAL UNDERS?ANDING ON CONSULTA?IONS AND JOINING IN CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AGREEMENT (REF A). GASCHIGNARD ADDID THAT FRANCE STILL REGARDED THE ISSUE OF CONSULTATIONS AS ONE.OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND BELIEVED ;THAT THE FRENCH POSITION HAD RESULTID IN THE CAUCUS SENDING A "USEFUL POLITICAL SIGNAL" SON ?HIS SUBJECT TO THE CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE. HE ALSO FEL? THAT THE FRENCH POSITION HAD BEEN INSTRU- MENTAL IN SECURING ROMANIAN AGREEMENT TO THE TEXT AS DRAFTED. (BEGIN COMMENT: WHILE MANY DELEGATIONS THANKED THE FRENCH DELEGATION FOR JOINING THE CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON THE ISSUE, THERE IS A LINGERING SENSE OF FRUSTRATION ABOUT FRENCH TACTICS ON THE PAR? OF SOME CAUCUS MEMBERS. BUWALD~A (NETHERLANDS), FOR EXAMPLE, ARGUED THAT THE ONLY POLITICAL SIGNAL THAT THE CAUCUS HAD SENT BY DELAYING APPROVAL OF THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AGREEMENT WAS OF ALLIID DISSONANCE. END COMMENT.) 5. THE NATO SPOKESMAN IMMEDIATELY INFORMED KAHILUOTO (FINLAND) OF NATO'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT IN ANTICIPATION THAT THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE COULD BE IMPLEMENTED AT THE AFTERNOON MEETING OF WORKING GROUP AB. THE PROSPECTIVE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, WAS IN CONSIDERABLE DOUBT FOR SEVERAL HOURS, AS RAHILUOTO INFORMID THE NATO SPOKESMEN THAT ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM VALLETTA MALTA HAD WITHDRAWN ITS CONCURRENCE WITH THE AGREEMENT. THE MALTESE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AGREEMENT, RALILUOTO HAD SAID, BUT RATHER WITH THE LONG-AWAITED (AND LONG-DEBATED) NNA POSITION PAPERS, AND WERE WITHHOLDING CONSENSUS TO ENSURE THAT MALTESE VIEWS WERE ADEQUATELY CONSIDERID IN THOSE PAPERS WHICH ARE NOW (PERHAPS) BEING FINALIZED. CITRON (FRG) ADVISED THE CAUCUS THAT HE HAD LEARNED FROM ANOTHER SOURCE THAT WHAT MALTA WANTED WAS THE INCLUSION OF INDE- PENDENT NAVAL MOVEMENTS IN THE MIDITERRANEAN IN THE NNA ? 231 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 PAPERS. (COMMENT: SEVERAL NNA CON?ACTS HAVE INDICATED TO US THAT YUGOSLAVIA HAD BEEN PRESSING THE MALTESE ON THIS POINT, AND WERE NOT DISPLEASED WITH THE MALTESE GAMBIT. END COMMEN?.) BOTH CITRON AND CIARRAPICO (ITALY) FELT THAT SOME NATO REACTION WAS WARRANTED (CITRON WONDERING IF IT MIGHT NOT SOON BE TIME FOR THE CDE TO MOVE FORWARD WITHOUT MALTA), BUT MOST AGREED THAT THE NNA COULD BEST HANDLE THIS PROBLEM. THE SUSPENSE WAS SHORT-LIVED, AS THE OTHER NNA MEMBERS, IN FAC?, WERE ABLE TO PRESSURE MALTA TO JOIN IN THE CONFERENCE CONSENSUS IN TIME FOR THE AFTERNOON AB MEETING. AT THIS TIME, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER MALTA SIMPLY SUCCUMBED TO NNA PRESSURE OR A DEAL WAS STRUCK WITHIN THE NNA CAUCUS TO SECURE MALTA'S AGREEMENT. WITH T$E MALTESE PROBLEM SOLVED, WORKING GROUP AB QUICKLY ADJOURNED ITS FORMAL SESSION AND ADOPTED THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE WITHOUT DISCUSSION. INFORMAL CLUSTER MEETINGS BEGIN ON OCTOBER 15. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 232 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCIOiOLM 07830 SUBJECT: CDE PUBLIC DIPLOMACX/NEW EXPLORATORY PHASE REF: STOCKHOLM 6852 1. CDE VIII - 050. 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. THE STOCI~OLM CONFERENCE (CDE) ADOPTED A MORE I1~'ORMAL STRUCTURE TODAY (OCTOBER 14) TO BEGIN A NBW EXPLORATORY PHASE OF ITS WORN. USDEL CDE HAS TAKEN THE FOLLOWING LINE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH TME PRESS: BEGIN TALKING POINTS: THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES THE ADOPTION OF A NEW INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENT FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS LONG CALLED FOR MORE INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS AS A NECESSARY PRELUDE TO ACTUAL DRAFTING OF A FINAL AGREEMENT; WE HOPE THAT THE EXPLORATORY PHASE NOW BEGINNING WILL SEE THE KIND OF SUBSTANTIVE GIVE AND TAKE NEEDED TO RESOLVE TID: COMPLEX AND IMPORTANT ISSUES WHICH ~~ STILL REMAIN BEFORE THE CONFERENCE. QUESTION: DOES THIS ARRANGEMNT REPRESENT A DEALT HAS NATO MADE CONCESSIONS ON ITS MEASURE ONE (EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION) AND MEASURE FIVE (VERIFICATION) IN RETURN FOR EASTERN AGREEMENT TO DROP ITS NON-STARTERS? ANSWER: N0. WE HAVE MADE NO CONCESSIONS, AND THIS DECISION DOES NOT COMPROMISE ANY OF OUR MEASURES. OUR DOCUMENT SC.1/AMPLIFIED REMAINS INTACT AS A COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING DOCUMENT. END TALKING POINTS. 4. AS NOTED, THIS INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT SHOULD SEE INTENSIFICATION OF DISCUSSIONS ON SUBSTANCE; SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES ON KEY ISSUES REMAIN. USDEL PLENARY SPEECH OF SEPTEMBER 10 (REF) OUTLINES WESTERN POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES. USDEL WILL DEVELOP MORE DETAILED BRIEFS ON THESE ISSUES WHICH, P/PFE IN USIA CONCURRING, WE WILL DISTRIBUTE THROUGH THE WIRELESS FILE. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07896 SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE: THE UN-CDE RELATIONSHIP REF: A) STATE 266848, B) USUN 2605, C) USUN 2574, - D) STATE 299182 1. CDE VII - 052 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: U.S. DELEGATION HAS INFORMED ALLIES OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CDE OF A UN DRAFTING EXERCISE ON T$E NON-USE OF FORCE. WHILE MOST ALLIED DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM WERE INITIALLY UNAWARE OR UNCONCERNED ABOUT T$E UN DIMENSION OF NUF, THERE SEEMS TO BE AN INCHOATE AWARENESS THAT DRAFTING ON A UN DECLARATION ON NUF WILL COMPLIGTE OUR WORK IN STOCKHOLM. ACCORDINGLY, DELEGATION CONCURS WITH USUN'S REQUEST FOR DEMARCHES IN SELECTED CAPITALS. ON THE SUBJECT (SEE PARR 6). END SUMMARY. 4. DRAWING ON REF A ANALYSIS, AMBASSADOR BARRY RELAYED TO THE NATO GUCUS U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE COMPLICATIONS FOR THE CDE POSED BY A UN DRAFTING EXERCISE ON NUF DOMINATED BY THE NONALIGNED MOST DELEGATIONS WERE EITHER UNAWARE OR UNCONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLIGTIONS OF A UN NON-USE OF FORCE DRAFTING EXERCISE FOR THE CDE; ONLY THE UR AND THE FRG SEEMED TO HAVE FORMED COHERENT (AND DIVERGENT) VIEWS. THE UR, ON THE ONE HAND, STRONGLY SUPPORTS OUR VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SHIFT FUTURE UN WORK ON NUF TO THE CHARTER COMMITTEE. ON THE OTHER HAND, FRG AMBASSADOR CITRON, AN OLD UN HAND, SEES AN "ENDLESS" DRAFTING EXERCISE ON A UN DECLARATION ON NUF AS PREFERABLE FROM A CDE POINT OF VIEW TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A WORLD TREATY ON THE SUBJECT. 5. GIVEN THE DIFFERING LEVELS OF INTEREST AND DISINTEREST ON A SUBJECT THAT MAY WELL AFFECT OUR FUTURE DELIBERATIONS, U.S. DELEGATION HAS CONDUCTED A SORT OF CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING EXERCISE AMONG SELECTED CDE DELEGATIONS (PARTICULARLY ITALY, THE FRG, AND FRANCE) ON THE DANGERS OF AN NNA-CONTROLLED DRAFTING EXERCISE AT THE UN. WITHOUT EXAGGERATING THE INFLUENCE OR THE COMMITMENT OF SOME~OF OUR FELLOW NATO DELEGATIONS, THERE SEEMS TO BE AN INCHOATE AWARENESS THAT DRAFTING A UN DECLARATION ON NON-USE OF FORCE MAY HAVE NEGATIVE RAMIFIGTIONS FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THERE IS ALSO SOME CONCERN ON THE PART OF OUR ALLIES HERE IN STOCKHOLM THAT ONE NUF HAND (STOCKHOLM) DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THE OTHER (NEW YORK) IS DOING. ACCORDINGLY, NOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE JETTISONED THEIR WORLD NUF TREATY IDEA AND NOW ADVOGTE PREPARATION OF A UN DECLARATION ON THE SUBJECT, SOME OF THESE DELEGATIONS SEEM PREPARED TO RAISE THE SUBJECT WITH THEIR CAPITALS DURING THE COMING 234 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 RECESS (OCTOBER 18 - NOVEMBER S). 6. BASED ON THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, U.S. DELEGATION CDE CONCURS WITH REF B REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT TO CONSIDER DEMARCHES IN BONN, PARIS, AND ROME WHILE CDE DELEGATIONS ARE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS, I.E., OCTOBER 21 - NOVEMBER 1. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 235 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L COIiPLET O1 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 07987 SUBJECT: USDEL OBJECTIVES FOR EXPLORATORY PHASE OF CDE 1. CDE - VII S3. 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE CONFERENCE NOW HAS ADOPTED AN INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENT WHICH THE DELEGATION BELIEVES CAN BE USED PROFITABLY TO PURSUE SEVERAL BASIC OBJECTIVES: FURTHER NATO COORDINATION; RAISE THE WEST'S GENERAL LEVEL OF UNDERS?ANDING AND KNOWLEDGE OF OUR PACKAGE WITHIN NATO CAUCUS; EXPLORE MORE FULLY CONVERGENCES/DIVERGENCIES WITH THE IDEA OF FORCING THE EAST TO DISCUSS OUR PACKAGE; FURTHER GAIN NNA SUPPORT. END SUMMARY 4. THE CONFERENCE NOW HAS ADOPTED AN INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENT WHICH THE DELEGATION BELIEVES CAN BE USED PROFITABLY TO PURSUE SEVERAL BASIC OBJECTIVES. THE FOLLOWING ARE DELEGATION VIEWS ON WHAT WE WILL TRY TO ACHIEVE. S. MAINTAINING/ENHANCING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND EDUCATION: ?HE MAJORITY OF CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING IiANY NATO CAUCUS MEMBERS, DOWNPLAY THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING ANYTHING POSITIVE DURING THIS INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE AND, THEREFORE, WANT TO MOVE IN?0 DRAFTING AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THIS RUSH TOWARDS DRAFTING IS, IN OUR VIEW, ILL-ADVISED FOR TWO REASONS: FIRST, WE AREN'T READY AS A CAUCUS TO DRAFT, AND SECOND, IMPORTANT GROUNDWORK REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THE CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE FOR DRAFTING. ENTERING MORE INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS, THE CAUCUS NEEDS TO TIGHTEN ARGUMENTS ON DETAILS OF THE NATO PACKAGE AND ALSO DEVELOP ERPERTISE IN ARTICULATING CONVINCING ARGUMENTATION. THUS, DURING THIS INFORMAL PERIOD, WE HOPE TO RAISE THE GENERAL LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE OF SOME CAUCUS MEMBERS AND ALSO WILL TRY TO IMPROVE NATO COORDINATION TO ENSURE ALL SPEAR WITH ONE VOICE IN CONSTANTLY EVOLVING NEGOTIATING CONDITIONS. 6. TOUTING OUR PACKAGE: INFORMAL STRUCTURE SHOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER EDUCATION OF THE CONFERENCE ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THE NATO PACKAGE AND COMMITMENT OF NATO TO FUNDAMENTAL, POSITIONS AND PRINCIPLES. FOR EXAtiPLE: 236 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 INVIOLABILITY OF VERIFICATION: THE ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION AND ITS CONNECTION TO THE REST OF OUR PACKAGE ARE NOT FULLY APPRECIATED, EVEN WI?HIN THE NATO CAUCUS. WE WILL STRESS THIS CONCEPT AND THE NECESSITY FOR ITS UNIVERSAL APPLICATION TO CSBMS. - DOWNPLAY OF NUF/CONSTRAINTS: WE WILL EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION ON THESE TWO ISSUES SINCE BOTH HAVE GREAT POTENTIAL TO AFFECT OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. SOME ALLIES ARE URGING US TO ADOP? A MORE "FORTHCOMING" STANCE A? THE CDE ON THESE TWO ISSUES, ESPECIALLY NUF. THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO LINK THE VERIFICATION OF NUF WITH A CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM, MOVING THEMSELVES ONE STEP CLOSER TO THEIR LONG-DESIRED OBJECTIVE OF A "DROIT DE REGARD" OVER EUROPEAN SECURITY MATTERS. NEVERTHE- LESS, THE INFORMAL PHASE WILL GIVE US AN OPERATIONAL "TESTING GROUND" FOR OUR ARGUMENTATION AND SHOULD ALLOW US ?0 POSITION OURSELVES BETTER TO PREVENT SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF THESE ISSUES. REJECTION OF LINKAGE: THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO LINK PROGRESS IN ONE AREA WITH PROGRESS IN OTHERS, PARTICULARLY LINKING NUF AND CSBMS, ON THE ONE HAND, AND CSBMS APPLYING TO LAND FORCE. ACTIVITIES AND EASTERN PROPOSALS FOR CSBMS INVOLVING INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES ON THE OTHER. WE WILL DEMONSTRATE THAT SUCH LINKAGE IS A NON-STARTER. NO KINI-PACKAGE: THE EAST CAN BE EXPECTED TO WORK TOWARDS REDUCING THE OUTCOME HERE TO THE ADOPTION OF A "MINI-PACKAGE" (I.E., NUF, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION, ALL WITH INADEQUATE VERIFICATION)CONFIDENTIAL ON END OF MESSAGE ***??< SECTION 2 ??*** FROM USDEL CDE E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE SUBJEC?: USDEL OBJECTIVES FOR EXPLORATORY PHASE OF CDE PERCEPTIONS OF "PROGRESS" AT THE CDE, MANY EUROPEANS MAY OPT FOR SUCH AN OUTCOME AS WE APPROACH THE END GAME, EITHER AS A "FINAL" AGREEMENT OR AS AN "INTERIM" SOLUTION PRIOR TO A CALL FOR RECONVENING THE CDE AFTER THE VIENNA REVCON. OUR EFFORTS IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, BOTH IN THE WORKING STRUCTURE AND ON THE MARGINS, WILL CON?INUE TO MARE IT CLEAR THAT THIS IDEA OF A "MINI-PACKAGE" IS A NON-STARTER. 237 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ' MAINTAIN THE MANDATE: PUSH FOR NOTIFICATION OF INDEPEND THE EASTERN G ACTIVITIES AS ENT AIR AMBIT TO AN ATTEMPT TO RENEGOTIATE THED NAVA1, MANDATE BY CHANGING THE PRESENT CDE FOCUS FRO~EUROPE A GEOGRAPHIC ENTITY TO A BROADER AS AIMS TO INCLUDE WHAT THE SOVIETS RE~ATDGIC ONE WHICH SUPPIO T?FOR OUR REJECTIONOOF ~ FORWARD BASED TF~+ WE CONTINUE TO BUILD OUR PRINCIPAL TOOL. THIS, USING THE T? EXPLORING CONVER ~-DATE AS STRUCTURE G~CES/DIVERGENCIES: THE INFORMAL BASIC ISSUESRIN ~ DER TO FOR US TO HOME IN WORK, PARTICULARLY ON SUCH~E THE STRUC UPON THE GARRISON REY SUBJECTS ~'URE OF FUTURE ' STRUCTURAL APPROACH ~ OUT-OF- ~D CONSTRAINTS. VERIFICATION, INFO 8? GAIN NNq RMATION AGREED SUPPORT: BECAUSE TAE 1VNA UPON A pACRAGE OF THEIR O~ HAVE NOT YET ,?WE CAN USE THE-EARLY PART OF ?HIS PHASE TO PRODUCT. TRY TO INFLUENCE THEIR FINAL, THIS GROUp~SO' ~ WILL CONTINUE COURTING OUR POINTS OF VIEi~ TO GAIN THEIR AND EDUCATING AT LEAST LONG ENOUGH TpE EXPLORATORY~pH?4SESSHOULD LAST BE DISCUSSED, SINCE THISSSHOULD NNA PACRAGE EMERGE ON SOME ISSUES. STRENGTHEN 0 `~ HOWEVER. THIS SHOULD NOT BE AN IrQiUTABLEOGOALON UNIFIED PA T~ NNA MAY FAIL TO COME FORWARD WITH A CRAGE OR WE MAY LEARN SHIFTING IN WAYS WHICH WILL Dp THAT ITS SUBSTANCE IS ~~ ~ MAY WANT TO MOVE ON US MORE HARK THAN GOOD. TAT ARRIVES. ANOTHER TACK BEFORE THE NNA Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 9? THESE ARE THE OBJECTIVES WE PLAN EXPLORATORY PHASE. IF WASHINGTON WISHESPUSS 0 PURSUE B RR~ GOALS, WE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED ~CORDINGLY. END OF IiESSAGE NNNN CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET O1 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 07942 SUBJECT: NATO CAUCUS VIEWS ON FUTURE CDE STRATEGY 1. CDE VII-054. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN TWO MEETINGS RESTRICTED TO HEADS OF DELEGATION ONLY, THE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSED OUR GOALS DURING THE CURRENT EXPLORATORY PHASE OF THE CDE AND THE QUESTION OF HON HEST TO MANAGE SOVIET EFFORTS TO DRAFT SIMULTANEOUSLY ON NON-USE OF FORCE AND CSBMS. ONLY THE U.S., UK, FRANCE AND PORTUGAL BELIEVE AN EXTENDED EXPLORATORY PHASE WOULD BE USEFUL; THE REST WANT TO MOVE ON TO DRAFTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS FAR AS NUF/CSBM LINKAGE IS CONCERNED, ONLY FRANCE AND THE U.S. ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD TRY HARD TO GET DRAFTING STARTED ON OUR MEASURES WHILE STONEWALLING ON NUF. TENSIONS BETWEEN THE "WETS" AND "DRYS" WILL SURFACE EARLY IN THE NEXT ROUND. END SUMMARY 3. AT MY SUGGESTION, THE NATO HEADS OF DELEGATION MET IN RESTRICTED SESSION TWICE ON OCTOBER 15 TO DISCUSS STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT ROUND. THE TWO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS CONSIDERED WERE: -- WHAT SHOULD OUR GOALS BE DURING THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WE ARE NOW IN? -- HOW SHOULD WE MANAGE SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE LATERAL LINKAGE BETWEEN THEIR NON-USE OF FORCE PROPOSAL AND CSBMS? 4. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, MOST HEADS OF DELEGATION ARGUED FOR KEEPING IT AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE AND MOVING INTO THE DRAFTING STAGE SOME?IME DURING THE NEX? ROUND. SOME, LIRE THE FRG, SUGGESTED THAT THE PHASE COULD BE USED TO ORGANIZE NATO DELEGATIONS TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE IN THE VARIOUS WORKING GROUPS. OTHERS SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE NNA PAPERS TO EMERGE AND BE DISCUSSED. MANY, (NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, DENMARK, TURKEY, GREECE, SPAIN, CANADA AND ITALY) POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO MARE SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE AND THAT IT WOULD THEREFORE BE.UNLIRELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DO S0. EVEN THE USUALLY HARDLINE UR SUGGES?ED IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT A REAL NARROWING OF SUB- STANTIVE DIFFERENCES DURING THIS PERIOD; HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT A RATHER LENGTHY EXPLORATORY PERIOD WOULD BE USEFUL BECAUSE IT WOULD PERMIT NATO TO PROMOTE ITS OWN PACKAGE MORE EFFECTIVELY. HE PARTICULARLY URGED THA? WE TRY HARDER TO SELL OUR POSITION ON "STATIC INFORMATION" TO THE NNA'S DURING THIS PERIOD. FRENCH AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD ARGUED FOR A LENGTHY EXPLORATORY PHASE WHICH WOULD BE USED TO "FILTER" ?OPICS FOR DRAFTING. HE SAID WE SF~OULD TRY TO EXTRACT SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS FROM THE SOVIETS ON THIS PHASE AND DEFINE AREAS WHERE AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. PART OF OUR PURPOSE SHOULD BE TO ACTIVATE 240 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 THE DISCUSSION OF OUR PROPOSALS AND, IF POSSIBLE, START DRAFTING ON SOME ?OPIC OF INTEREST TO US WHILE STONE- WALLING ON NUF. I SUPPORTED THE FRENCH POSITION. S. ON TACTICS FOR HANDLING SOVIET LINKAGE, THE FRG SUGGESTED "LURING" THE SOVIETS INTO DRAFTING ON ISSUES OF INTEREST TO US, SUCH AS NOTIFICATION, BEFORE WRITING DOWN ANYTHING ON NUF. AT AN EARLY STAGE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE SOME OF OUR NUF LANGUAGE - SAY THE UN CHARTER PROVISION. FROM THAT POINT ON, DRAFTING WOULD CONTINUE ON NUF AND CSBMS AT A PACE WE CONTROLLED - SAY FIVE TINES AS MUCH ?EXT ON CSBMS AS ON NUF. ?HE UK SUGGESTED THAT THE PROPER TACTIC WAS A "DEAL" (PREFERABLY STRUCK BEHIND THE SCENES) TRADING OFF SOMETHING ON NUF FOR SOMETHING ON CSBMS. OTHERWISE THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE DRAFTING BECAUSE, UNDER THE PRINCIPLE THAT NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED THEY CAN ALWAYS VETO DRAFTED LANGUAGE ON CSBMS IF THEY DO NOT GET WHAT THEY WANT ON NUF. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS (ITALY, DENMARK AND SPAIN) ADVOCA?ED DEVELOPING A NUF TEXT WITHIN NATO. FRANCE WAS THE ONLY ADVOCATE OF "SEQUENTIALISM" - INSISTING ON STONEWALLING ON NUF WHILE PRESSING AHEAD ON CSBMS. NUF SHOULD NOT EVEN BE DISCUSSED WITHIN NATO UNTIL THE NNA PAPERS EMERGE; WE MAY FIND THE NNA POSITION A BETTER STARTING POINT THAN A TEXT WE DRAFTED. FRANCE SAID THE BASIC TRADEOFF IN CDE WAS END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION 2 ??*** FROM USDEL CDE E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PAR, CSCE, PREL, CDE SUBJECT: NATO CAUCUS VIEWS ON FUTURE CDE STRATEGY BETWEEN CSBMS AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE CDE PROCESS, NOT BETWEEN NUF AND CSBMS. I OPPOSED DISCUSSION OF NUF IN NATO SINCE IT INEVITABLY WOULD LEAK. FROM WHAT I KNEW OF THE SOVIET POSITION I DOUBTED THAT SEQUENTIALISM WOULD WORK, BUT I SUPPORTED TRYING IT. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 6. COMMENT: IN OUR DISCUSSIONS BOTH OF PROCEDURE AND OF STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE IT APPEARED THA? TENSIONS BETWEEN THE "WETS" AND "DRYS" ARE RUNNING HIGH, WITH THE "WETS" INCREASINGLY ACCUSING THE "DRYS" OF TRYING TO PREVEN? ANY OUTCOME AT ALL IN THE CONFERENCE. SORE OF THIS IS DUE TO PENT UP FRUSTRATIONS CREATED BY ARGUING OVER TEXTS FOR THE PAST SIX WEEKS, BUT I SUSPECT THAT THE BREAK WILL NOT HEAL ALL WOUNDS. THE DISPUTES WILL PROBABLY REEMERGE EARLY IN THE NEXT SESSION. END COMMENT BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 242 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07969 SUBJECT: KAMPLEMAN-BRUNNER DISCUSSION ON STOCKHOLM - CONFERENCE REF: GENEVA 9731 1. CDE VII-056. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. USDEL POSI?ION ON RELATIONSHIP OF STOCKHOLM TO MADRID IS IDENTICAL TO THAT DESCRIBED IN PARR 4 OF REFTEL. ON THE QUESTION OF A TERMINA?ION DATE, WE HAVE EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR A FIRM DATE IN JULY. THERE WILL NOT BE CONSENSUS ON THIS, HOWEVER. WE WILL PROBABLY END UP WITH A JULY 18 TARGET DATE FOR COMPLE?ION PLUS AN "OPTIONAL" ADDITIONAL SESSION BEGINNING IN LATE AUGUST AND ENDING WHEN THE VIENNA PREPCOM BEGINS IN SEPTEMBER. THE CATCH IS THAT IT WILL TARE CONSENSUS NOT TO MOVE ON TO OPTIONAL SESSION, WHICH MEANS WE WILL HAVE IT. 3. AS FOR ?HE NNA, WE ARE NOT PRESSING ?HEM A? ALL ?0 TABLE ?HEIR PAPERS; IN FACT WE HOPE THEY WILL NOT EMERGE IN THEIR CURRENT STA?E BECAUSE WE S?ILL HOPE TO INFLUENCE THEIR CONTENT. THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT BE TABLED UNTIL WELL INTO THE NEXT ROUND, IF THEN. WE AGREE WITH BRUNNER ABOUT THE RELA?ION OF CDE. TO THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV GENEVA MEETINGS; THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS HERE IN ADVANCE OF GENEVA SINCE WE RECESS FROM OCT. 18 - NOV. 5 IN ANY CASE. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 4. WE WORK CLOSELY WITH THE SWISS DELEGATION HERE AND APPRECIATE THE SUPPORT THEY HAVE PROVIDED FOR U.S. POSITION WITHIN THE NNA. THEY ARE AKONG THE MOST ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ELEIiENTS HERE. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFTDEN?IAL 244 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET O1 OF 03 S?OCRHOLH 08026 SUBJECT: EASTERN VIEWS ON CDE AND VERIFICA?ION ?1. CDE VII -062. 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. SUMMARY. SELF-PROCLAIMED "HONEST BROKER" ISTVAN RORMENDY, DEPUTY HEAD OF HUNGARIAN DELEGATION, TREA?ED US CDE DEPUTY TO LUNCH ON 17 OCTOBER 85 WHICH, IN ADDITION TO DELIGHTS FROM THE SWEDISH KITCHEN, INCLUDED A MENU OF VIEWS ON CDE ISSUES THAT RORMENDY DESCRIBED AS RECIPES FROM MOSCOW. THE SOVIET UNION WANTS A CDE AGREEMENT AS PART OF ITS NEW EMPHASIS ON EUROPE AND WILL THEREFORE REQUIRE LITTLE MORE FROM THE WEST THAN A REAFFIRMATION OF PRINCIPLE TWO OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN THE REALM OF POLITICAL MEASURES. SOVIETS ARE ALLEGEDLY WILLING ?0 MARE SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN HELSINKI FINAL ACT CBMS BUT WANT SOME FACE-SAVING WESTERN MOVE ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN RETURN FOR COVERAGE OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. RORHENDY'S PAPER ON VERIFICA?ION OF CSBMS PRESENTED IN A RECEN? SWEDISH VERIFICATION SYMPOSIUM WAS TOUTED AS CONTAINING SOVIET VIEWS ON HOW ON-SITE INSPECTION COULD BE PART OF AN OUTCOME OF THE CDE PROCESS. SELEC?ED EXCERPTS FROM THE PAPER ARE FORWARDED IN PARR 7. END SUMMARY. 4. HUNGARIAN CDE DEPUTY RORMENDY REFERRED TO THE HUNGARIAN ROLE IN STOCKHOLM AS BEING THA? OF "HONEST BROKER" BETWEEN SOVIE? AND US DELEGATIONS. (COMMENT: RORMENDY HAS ALSO BEEN REGARDED BOTH AS AN INFLUENCE PEDDLER FOR ?HE SOVIETS AND AN AGENT OF DISINFORMATION. END COMMENT) IN THIS SELF-PROCLAIMED CAPACITY RORMENDY SAID HE WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSRY'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE RECEN?LY ADOPTED INFORMAL WORKING SCHEME SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS AN INDICATION OF SOVIET IMPATIENCE AND DESIRE ?0 HAVE AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER 1986 PREPARATION FOR THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE. ?HE SEPTEMBER DATE FOR ENDING THIS PHASE OF THE MEETING HAS MORE OR LESS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS, RORMENDY OPINED. BU?, HE ADDED, THE SOVIETS WANT A SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT WHICH WILL BE SUFFICIENT ?0 END THE FIRST STAGE AND CLAIM THE CONFERENCE TO BE A SUCCESS. THIS, RORMENDY EMPHASIZED, WAS IN HARMONY WITH THE NEW EMPHASIS ON EUROPE WHICH HAS EMERGED IN THE FOREIGN POLICY ES?ABLISHMENT OF GORBACHEV/SHEVARDNADZE -- AN ELEMENT OF WHICH IS TO CONVINCE THE EUROPEANS THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT POSE A THREAT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY. S. THE WEST, RORMENDY CLAIMED, WILL ONLY HAVE ?0 AGREE TO A REPACKAGING OF THE NUF LANGUAGE ALREADY CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT TO MEET SOVIET DEMANDS IN THAT AREA. IT WILL BE THE VOLUME OF VERBIAGE RATHER 245 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 THAN THE SUBSTANCE WHICH MUST SATISFY SOVIET PRESTIGE IN A FINAL OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM. TURNING TO CONCRETE CSBtiS, KORMENDY INSISTED THAT THE SOVIE?S ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE HELSINKI CSBMS BUT THAT A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO GIVE THE SOVIETS SOME SATISFAC?ION ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND INDEPENDENT AIR AC?IVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. HE HINTED BROADLY THAT THE CAPTURING OF INDEPENDENT AIR AC?IVITIES WOULD ASSUAGE SOVIET HUNGER FOR OBTAINING REVENGE FOR THE COVERAGE OF THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN PART OF SOVIET UNION IN THE MADRID MANDATE. RORMENDY'S OWN CONVERSA?IONS WITH SEVERAL ALLIED DELEGATIONS, HE SAID, HAD CONVINCED HIM THAT WESTERN EUROPEANS WILL INSIST ON AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM IN ORDER TO OPERATIONALIZE THE CONCEPT OF EUROPE FROK THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. (COMMENT; KORMENDY IS PROBABLY THE EASTERN DELEGATE WHO MOST ACTIVELY PURSUES INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH WESTERN DELEGATIONS. END COMMENT) 6. RORMENDY'S MAIN MESSAGE FOR THE DAY, HOWEVER, CONCERNED VERIFICATION. HANDING OVER A REVISED VERSION OF THE PAPER HE PRESENTED AT THE SWEDISH SYMPOSIUM ON VERIFICATION OF DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, KORMENDY COMMENTED THAT THE PAPER HAD THE BLESSINGS OF SOVIE? AUTHORITIES. (COMMENT: A? THE SYMPOSIUM ITSELF, DANIEL ROTFELD -- A MEMBER OF THE POLISH DELEGATION AT END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION 2 ??*** FROM USDEL CDE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, MBFR, PARM SUBJECT: EASTERN VIEWS ON CDE AND VERIFICATION KADRID AND A HABITUAL ATTENDEE AT CSBK CONFERENCES -- STATED THAT RORMENDY WAS WAY OUT IN FRON? OF THE SOVIET POSITION. END COMMENT). THE PAPER ENTITLED ALTERNATIVE VERIFICATION MODELS FOR CSBMS IN EUROPE", FIRST ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT THE WESTERN MODEL AS PRESENTED IN MEASURE S OF SC.1 THEN DESCRIBES TWO ADDITIONAL MODELS. RORMENDY SAID THE SOVIETS HAD PROVIDED THE WORDS DEALING WITH ON-SITE INSPECTION IN THE SECOND MODEL AS WELL AS THE ENTIRE SUBSTANCE OF THE THIRD MODEL. 7. SINCE RORMENDY INSISTS HIS VIEWS ARE COMPATIBLE WI?H THOSE OF THE SOVIETS (GDR AMBASSADOR BURRING HAS ALSO INDICATED THEY ARE) THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS FROM THE KORMENDY PAPER ARE FORWARDED. -- HOW KUCH ON-SITE INSPECTION IS ENOUGH? THE SELF-EVIDENT ANSWER IS THA? THE NUMBER OF ON-SITE INSPEC?IONS, PROVIDED REASONABLE AND SHARED VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF AGREED CSBMS WOULD HAKE THIS KETHOD NECESSARY, SHOULD CORRESPOND TO THE NUMBER Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 OF SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS OR AMBIGUOUS EVENTS THAT CANNOT BE PROVED OR IDENTIFIED OTHERWISE. IT MUST NOT BE LESS AND SHOULD NOT BE MORE. -- A SECOND VERIFICATION MODEL THAT CAN BE CONSIDERED FOR THE PURPOSES OF A CSBM REGIME PROVIDES FOR MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATIVE VERIFICATION BASED ON NA?IONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. DEPENDING ON THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF INDIVIDUAL MEASURES IT MAY INCLUDE ON-SITE INSPECTION AS WELL. -- AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF THIS SECOND VERIFICATION MODEL IS THE ESTABLISHMENT DF A CONSULTATIVE FORUM COMPOSED OF ALL PARTICIPATING S?AYES. ITS FUNCTION WOULD BE TO DEAL WITH ANY ISSUES OR QUESTIONS OF COMPLIANCE THAT MAY EMERGE IN THE DAY-TO-DAY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSBM AGREEMEN?. IF THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF CSBMS AGREED AT THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CDE DO NOT NECESSITA?E THE FUNCTIONING OF A PERMANEN? BODY, CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPA?ING STATES COULD BE CONVENED AT A SHORT NOTICE ON AN AD HOC BASIS. -- SHOULD IT CORRESPOND TO THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF CSBMS AGREED AT ?HE CDE, THERE MAY BE A NEED FOR CONSIDERING THE IMPLEMEN?ATION OF MEANS AND METHODS OF VERIFICATION WITH SOME OP?IONS FOR ON-SI?E INSPECTION, DESPITE THE GROWING AWARENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS OF ?HIS MOST INTRUSIVE METHOD OF VERIFICATION. 0 IT SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTICIPATING STATES, INCLUDING THOSE OUTSIDE OF THE ZONE OF APPLICATION SINCE ?ROOP OR FORCE MOVEMENTS FROM THEIR ?ERRITORIES INTO THE ZONE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE NO?IFIED. 0 ON-SITE INSPEC?ION, LIRE ANY OTHER METHOD OF VERIFICATION, SHOULD HAVE A CLEARLY DEFINED OBJECTIVE I.E. TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THOSE CONCRETE CSBMS IN THE FRAMEWORR OF WHICH IT WAS AGREED UPON. -- NO REALISTIC VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT OF CSBMS COULD SUPPORT THE USE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION AS A ROU?INE METHOD OF MONITORING COMPLIANCE. I? SHOULD BE APPLIED AS A LAST RESORT AFTER THE POTEN?IALS OF OTHER AGREED MEANS AND METHODS OF VERIFICATION HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED, IN EXCEPTIONAL SITUATIONS OF CRISES OF CLEAR VIOLATIONS THAT COULD BE FELT THREATENING BY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. -- IT MAY BE EXPLORED WHETHER THE SWEDISH IDEA OF "VERIFICATION BY CHALLENGE" COULD HAVE A USEFUL ROLE IN VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH CSBMS. THIS CONCEPT, AS DESCRIBED BY ALVA MYRDAL, "RELIES ON THE INTEREST OF A PAR?Y UNDER SUSPICION TO FREE ITSELF THROUGH THE SUPPLY OF RELEVAN? INFORMATION NOT EXCLUDING AN INVITATION TO END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 247 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ***??< SECTION 3 ??*** FROM USDEL CDE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, MBFR, PARM SUBJECT: EASTERN VIEWS ON CDE AND VERIFICATION INSPECTION BY AN OUTSIDE PARTY OR ORGAN. I? IS EASIER TO PROVE YOUR OWN INNOCENCE THAN SOMEBODY ELSE'S GUILT. -- ON-SITE INSPECTION BUST NOT BE CONCEIVED AS THE CONSUMMATION OF SUSPICION BETWEEN A AND X THROUGH A BILATERAL ACT. INSPECTORS FROM ONE OR PREFERABLY MORE PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD CARRY OUT THEIR TASK ON BEHALF OF THIRTY-FOUR. THIS PERCEPTION SHOULD ALSO BE REFLECTED IN THE PATTERN OF DESIGNATION OF INSPECTORS IN THE CONSULTATIVE BODY. -- THE VERIFICATION PROCESS MAY HAVE TO DEAL WITH TIME-URGENT CASES AS WELL. IA' THIS CONTEXT, CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN AT THE CDE TO THE IDEA OF SHORT EMERGENCY MEETINGS WHICH COULD BE CONVENED AT THE DEMAND OF ANY ONE OF THE 35 PARTICIPATING STATES WITHIN A NUMBER OF HOURS. -- THE CDE MAY ALSO WANT TO BUILD UPON THE IMPORTANT EXPERIENCE WITH THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, THE SEA-BED TREATY OR THE OUTER SPACE TREATY WHICH CONTAIN PROVISIONS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. -- IN A CERTAIN STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS THE CDE MAY WISH TO CONSIDER A THIRD MODEL BASED ON THE ESTABLISHKEN? OF JOINT MONITORING CAPABILITIES WHICH CAN BE CALLED INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. -- THE VERIFICATION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY CARRIED OUT BY IAEA IS A POWERFUL EXAMPLE OF THE FEASIBILITY OF THIS IDEA. -- REMOTE SENSING DEVICES OPTIMALIZED FOR MONITORING CSBM OR ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS THAT MAY EMERGE FROM SUBSEQUENT STAGES OF CDE MAY BE RENTED FROM GOVERNMENTS, DONATED BY THEM OR PURCHASED ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS. EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEND AN AGREED NUMBER OF EXPERTS TO OPERATE THE DEVICES. OBVIOUS CANDIDATES FOR HOSTING THE HEADQUARTERS AND THE EQUIPMENT ARE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES. -- THE MAIN FUNCTION OF THE JOINT ORGANIZATION WOULD BE THE CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF THE COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CDE. '- THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING MAY BE SOMEWHAT REDUCED BY THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF THE DETECTION CAPABILITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. (COMMENT: WE ASSUME THIS REFERS TO AWARENESS OF LIMITATIONS OF CAPABILITIES. END COMMENT) -- BEYOND MONITORING, THE VERIFICATION PROCESS COULD BE SUPPORTED, MUTATIS ?SU?ANDIS BY THE SAME MEANS AND METHODS AS DESCRIBED AT THE SECOND MODEL. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 BARRY END OF ?SESSAGE NNNN Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 UNCLAS COIiPLET O1 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 07956 SUBJECT: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT SC.1 REFERENCES TO - NATIONAL TECHNICAL BEANS (NTM'S) 1. CDE VII --059 2. S - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. SUMMARY: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOU? PROVISIONS IN SC.1 MEASURE S FOR THE USE OF NTM'S FOR VERIFICATION CENTER ON THE PROBLEMS THEY POSE FOR OUR NEGOTIATING TACTICS AS WELL AS ON THE QUESTION OF U.S. WILLINGNESS TO SHARE NTM-COLLECTED EVIDENCE. USDEL HAS LEARNED THAT THE HAGUE HAS ASKED THE NETHERLANDS NATO MISSION TO EXPLORE WAYS TO DEFLEC? ATTENTION FROM THE ROLE GIVEN NTM'S IN SC.1, WHICH THEY VIEW AS DETRACTING FROM OUR POSITION ON ON-SITE INSPECTION. THE DUTCH ARE ALSO PERSISTING IN ?HEIR QUEST FOR A DEFINITIVE U.S. STATEMENT ON THE ROLE OF NTM'S IN A CSCE CONTEXT. THE NETHERLANDS MISSION MAY SOON BRING UP ONCE AGAIN THE QUESTION OF NTM'S IN SC.1 IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. 4. MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE INVITED US E~. MEMBER HUCK TO LUNCH FOR PURPOSE OF EXPLORING WAYS TO MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR EXPLOITATION BY THE SOVIETS AND NEUTRALS OF REFERENCES IN SC.1 TO A ROLE FOR NTM'S IN THE VERIFICATION OF A CDE AGREEMENT. THE FOLLOWING DAY DEPUTY HEAD OF THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION SIZ00 INFORMED U.S. DEPUTY HEAD OF DEL HANSEN THAT THE NETHERLANDS STILL BELIEVES THE U.S. HAS NOT COME TO GRIPS WITH AN INCONSISTENCY IN ITS POLICY ON THE QUESTION OF SHARING EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY NTM'S. AS EVIDENCE OF THIS INCONSISTENCY, SIZ00 CITED OUR WILLINGNESS TO PUBLICIZE NTM-COLLECTED DATA ON THE SS-20 BUILDUP AND OUR STATED POLICY IN STOCKHOLM OF NOT SHARING NTM DATA IN A CSCE CONTEXT. 5? THE DUTCH VIEW SC.1 REF NTM S MAINLY AS A FACTOR COMPLICATING OUR ABILITY TO MAKE A MORE EFFECTIVE CASE FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION. THE SOVIETS, FOR INSTANCE, SOMETIMES CITE THE PROVISIONS IN SC.1 FOR NTM'S IN SUPPORT OF THEIR POSITION THAT NTM'S ALONE ARE ADEQUATE FOR VERIFICATION. THE DUTCH ALSO CONSIDER THE OCCASIONAL REQUESTS BY SUCH NEUTRALS AS AUSTRIA FOR A DEFINITION OF WHAT NTM'S COMPRISE AS TROUBLESOME. THE DUTCH DELEGATION APPARENTLY HAS RECEIVED RECENT INSTRUCTIONS THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST TO ENGAGE IN AN EXERCISE THAT WOULD INVOLVE DEFINING NTM'S. THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR INDICATED RECENTLY THAT THE DELEGATION HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT THE NETHERLANDS ITSELF HAS SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT WISH TO BE IDENTIFIED. 6. DURING THE DISCUSSION QUOTED FROM A 250 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CABLE WHICH HE HAD AT HAND AND WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN SENT TO THE NETHERLANDS MISSION TO NATO. ACCORDING TO THE CABLE, ABOUT FOUR PAGES IN LENGTH, PRIMARILY ADDRESSES THE RINDS OF PROBLEMS THAT HAVE ARISEN, OR COULD ARISE, BECAUSE OF THE REFERENCES IN SC.1 TO N?Ii'S AND NON-INTERFERENCE. 7. SOME SPECIFIC DUTCH CONCERNS, AS REFLECTED IN THE CABLE OR ELABORATED ON BY ARE AS FOLLOWS: - A) THE REFERENCES TO NTM'S AHEAD OF THE PROVISION FOR INSPECTIONS IN MEASURE 5 OF SC.1 COULD BE CONSTRUED AS SUGGESTING A MORE IMPORTANT ROLE FOR NTM'S AND MARES IT MORE DIFFICULT TACTICALLY TO SELL ON-SITE IHSPEC?ION AS THE CENTERPIECE OF OUR VERIFICATION PROPOSAL. - B) THE PROVISION FOR NON-INTERFERENCE INVITES LEGITIMATE REQUESTS FOR DEFINITIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTE NTM'S, HOW THEY OPERATE, AND WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE IMPERMISSIBLE INTERFERENCE. DUTCH DELEGATION HAS RECENTLY COME TO APPRECIATE ?HAT IT SHARES U.S. INTEREST END OF MESSAGE SECRET ***??< SECTION 2 ??*** FROM USDEL GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT SC.1 REFERENCES TO IN AVOIDING DEFINITIONS OF NTM'S. - C) NEUTRALS MAY SEIZE UPON THE INTERFERENCE QUESTION IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH PRECEDENTS WHICH WOULD PROTECT WHATEVER SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS THEY MAY EVENTUALLY DEVELOP AND OPERATE. THIS COULD LEAD TO DISCUSSION OF COMPLEX TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES, MILITARY OPERATIONAL MATTERS AND BEHAVIOR WHICH MAY IMPEDE COLLECTION BY NTM'S. 8. SIZ00 IN HIS MEETING WITH HANSEN MADE CLEAR THAT THE DUTCH REGARD THE U.S. POSITION ON NTM'S AS INCONSISTENT. HOW CAN WE MAINTAIN A POLICY THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT SHARE EVIDENCE RELATING TO FUTURE POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF A CDE AGREEMENT AND AT THE SAME TIME RELEASE NTM-COLLECTED DATA ON SUCH SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS THE SS-20 PROGRAM FOR PURPOSES OF MOBILIZING ALLIED SUPPORT FOR U.S. INF DEPLOYMENTS? 9. COMMENT: WE WELCOME DUTCH INTEREST IN REDUCING THE ROLE OF NTM'S IN THE VERIFICATION PORTION OF OUR NEGO- TIATING PACKAGE. WE STILL FACE THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, OF PERSUADING THE DUTCH TO BACK OFF THE QUESTION OF SHARING THE RESULTS OF NTM'S. THE DUTCH MAY F$EL THEY HAVE SOME LEVERAGE TO PUSH THE SHARING ISSUE IN VIEW OF A PROBABLE POSITIVE DECISION ON NOVEMBER 1 TO ACCEPT U.S. CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS. IN THE ABSENCE OF DEFINITIVE 251 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 WASHINGTON GUIDANCE, U.S. REPS HAVE CONSISTENTLY VOICED THE VIEW THAT WE WILL NOT SHARE INFORMATION FROM NTM'S IN THE CDE. WHZLE THIS ISSUE IS PROBABLY MANAGEABLE HERE, IT MAY BE USEFUL IF USNATO AND USDEL COULD BE PROVIDED WITH ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR OUR POSITION. END COMMENT. BARRY END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN ? 252 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET O1 OF 06 STOCKHOLM 08083 SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING PAPERS REF: (A) STOCKHOLM 7415 (B) STOCKHOLM 6957 1. CDE VII - 060. 2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TERT. 3. SUMMARY. THE NNA HAVE BEEN WORKING DOWN TO THE WIRE THIS ROUND TO DEVELOP A SERIES OF POSITION PAPERS TO SUPPLEMENT SC.3. A "CORE" GROUP OF THREE DELEGATIONS (SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, AUSTRIA) REACHED AD REF AGREEMENT ON SUCH A PACKAGE, BUT HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GET YUCASLAVIa, MALTA, CYPRUS AND FINLAND FULLY ON BOARD. IT MAY BE THAT THESE PROBLEMS WILL BE RESOLVED DURING THE BREAK AND A PAPER WILL BE TABLED EARLY IN ROUND VIII. U .S. DEL, THROUGH A VARIETY OF CONTACTS, HAS BEEN ABLE TO PIECE TOGETHER THE ANTICIPATED PACKAGE. IN PARTICULAR, THE NNA SEEK TO HAVE COME A LONG WAY TOWARDS OUR STRUCTURAL PARAMETER AND OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. THERE WILL BE A SEPARATE VERIFICATION SECTION ("OBSERVATION BY REQUEST") WHICH BASICALLY PROVIDES FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION, BUT ALSO FOR THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL. THE SECTION ADDRESSING NON-USE OF FORCE CONTAINS LARGELY UNERCEPTIONAL LANGUAGE FROM THE UN CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, BUT ITS LENGTH AND DETAIL MAY CAUSE US TACTICAL DIFFICULTIES. END SUMMARY. 4. THE NNA HAVE CONTINUED TO WORK FEVERISHLY BEHIND THE SCENES DAY, NIGHT AND WEEKENDS -- TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE OF PAPERS FOR TABLING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH A "CORE" GROUP OF THREE DELEGATIONS (AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND SWEDEN) FINALLY REACHED AN ACCOMMODATION LATE IN THE SESSION, THEY HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO BRING FINLAND, MALTA, CYPRUS AND YUGOSLAVIA ON BOARD. THE "CORE" GROUP HAD HOPED TO SECURE AD REF AGREEMENT ON THE PACKAGE HERE IN STOCKHOLM, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT CAPITALS WOULD REVIEW THE PACKAGE DURING THE BREAK, FOR TABLING EARLY ON DURING THE NEXT ROUND. AT LEAST FIVE STICKING POINTS, HOWEVER, HAVE PREVENTED SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THE PRODUCT WILL NONETHELESS BE REVIEWED IN CAPITALS DURING THE BREAK. THE MORE OPTIMISTIC AMONG THE NNA HOPE THAT THE PAPER WILL BE READY TO TABLE BY THE SECOND WEER OF THE NEXT ROUND. AMORE PESSIMISTIC NNA VIEW IS THAT THE "CORE" GROUP, AND POSSIBLY FINLAND, MIGHT BE FORCED TO TABLE A PARCEL OF PAPERS WHICH WOULD NOT REPRESENT THE ENTIRE NNA. THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING THE PAPER IS REVEALING. THAT YUGOSLAVIA POSED PROBLEMS CAKE AS NO SURPRISE; HOWEVER MEMBERS OF Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 THE "CORE" GROUP EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND FRUSTRATION THAT FINLAND PROVED SO DIFFICULT (THE FINNS HAVE USUALLY PLAYED A CONCILATORY ROLE AMONG THE NNA). THE FINNS, AS WE UNDERS?AND IT, PROFESS RELUCTANCE TO GO T00 FAR AFIELD FROM THE REGIME ESTABLISHED BY THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, HAVING A PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN PRESERVING THE PROCESS; THEY THUS SHY AWAY FROM EMBARKING UPON SOMETHING T00 NEW AND DIFFERENT AND HENCE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS. THIS LONG, DIFFICULT ROAD TO CONSENSUS AMONG THE NNA HAS THUS EXACTED ITS TOLL ON THE GROUP IN TERMS OF END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION 2 ??*** FROM USDEL CDE STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING PERSONAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS. ALTHOUGH THE NNA FUNCTION AS WELL AS CAN BE EXPECTED -- GIVEN THEIR DIVERSE SECURITY INTERESTS AND PERSONALITIES -- THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS OF TENSION IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY AS THEY DRAW CLOSER TO AN AGREEMENT. ONE WELL-TIMID PLOY WAS INFORMATION ON THE NNA POSITION WHICH WAS LEAKED TO THE BONN NEWSPAPER, "GENERAL ANZEIGER" AND HIT THE NEWS STANDS ON OCTOBER 10TH. (WE HAVE HEARD AUSTRIA IS RESPONSIBLE.) THIS ARTICLE OUTLINED THE AREAS WHICH PROBABLY WILL BE COVERED IN THE NNA PACKAGE, WITH A SHORT PARAGRAPH OF WHAT IS CONTAINID IN EACH. WHILE THE "BLUE" NNA -- SWISS, AUSTRIANS -- NO DOUBT WERE PLEASED WITH THEIR COUP, IT DREW THE IRE OF THE HOLDOUTS (FINLAND, YUGOSLAVIA) AS A HEAVY HANDED AT?EMPT TO FORCE CONSENSUS AMONG THEM. ANOTHER "ACTIVE MEASURE" EMPLOYID TO PRESSURE OTHERS EMBARRASSED THE MALTESE ON SWEDISH TELEVISION FOLLOWING THE AGREEMEN? TO MOVE TO INFORMAL WORKING DISCUSSIONS. THE MALTESE, WHO HAD BLOCRID CONSENSUS FOR A DAY, WERE FEATURID ON SWEDISH TELEVISION THAT NIGHT. AS THE CAMERA ZOOMID IN ON THE MALTESE DELEGATE, THE SOUND OF LAUGHTER FROM OTHER DELEGATES COULD BE HEARD IN THE BACKGROUND. THE MALTESE DELEGATE IS CONVINCED THE SWIDES WERE BEHIND THIS. THERE ALSO ARE INDICATIONS OF SOME SNIPING AMONG THE SWIDES, FINNS, AUSTRIANS AND SWISS. THE FINNS Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 REPORTEDLY ARE UNHAPPY WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE NNA NO?IFICATION PROPOSAL. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, AT LEAST, THIS HAS INCREASED THE FRICTION BETWEEN THEM AND THE SWEDES, WHILE THE SWISS HAVE JOINED THE SWEDES IN A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE. NORMALLY, THE SWISS DEPRECATE THE SWEDES, WHO TRY TO HAVE AN ANSWER FOR EVERYTHING. THE YUGOSLAVS REMAIN THE MOST UNPLACABLE IN THE GROUP, AND AS A RESULT, HAVE BEEN UNDER HEAVY NNA PRESSURE. IT IS INTERESTING THAT IN ARGUING AMONG THEMSELVES THE NNA HAVE BEEN SURPRISINGLY INFORMATIVE IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE WEST. THIS MAY WELL BE DUE TO A NEED TO CLARIFY WHAT THE PROBLEMS ARE, AND TO DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM THEM. IN OTHER WORDS., IT IS EASY FOR THE SWISS OR AUS?RIANS TO DISCUSS THE PACKAGE AND THE NNA PROBLEMS, BECAUSE ?HEY ARE NOT THE REASON FOR THE NNA DELAY. 5. SERIOUS WORK HAS GONE INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "CORE" GROUP'S PACKAGE AND THE "CORE" GROUP IS, BY AND LARGE, BOTH PLEASED WITH, AND PROUD OF, ITS PRODUCT. THERE IS SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE -- ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT ENOUGH FOR SOME. ONE "CORE" GROUP DELEGATE CHARACTERIZED THE PAPER AS "65 PER CENT NATO." AND YUGOSLAVIA IS RUMORED, AT FIRST BLUSH, TO HAVE DUBBED I? OUTRIGHT AS A "NATO PAPER." THE PROOF, HOWEVER, IS IN THE PUDDING. U.S. DEL, THROUGH A VARIETY OF CONTACTS, HAS TRIED TO GET A HANDLE ON WHAT WE MIGHT EXPECT TO SEE FROM THE NNA'S EARLY NEXT ROUND -- AN "SC.3/AMPLIFIED". IT IS POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, THAT THE PRICE OF SECURING YUGOSLAV AND FINNISH SUPPORT OR EVEN THE REVIW BY CAPITALS WILL RESULT IN CHANGES. NONETHELESS, PIECING TOGETHER VARIOUS BITS OF INFORMATION, WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS A FAIRLY ACCURATE, ALBEIT GENERAL, PICTURE OF WHAT THE PACKAGE LOOKED LIRE AT THE END OF THIS ROUND. END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION 3 ??*** FROM USDEL CDE STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING 6. GENERAL. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE PRESEN?ED SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY, THE NNA APPEAR TO HAVE MOVED TOWARDS OUR Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 STRUC?URAL PARAMETER AND OUR OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. WE UNDERSTAND THA? AC?IVITIES TO BE PRE-NO?IFIED ARE MANEUVERS COVERID BY THE MANDATE. HOWEVER, MANEUVERS WILL BE DEFINED BASICALLY AS FORMATIONS ,OR UNITS OU?-OF-GARRISON, ALTHOUGH GARRISON WILL BE REFERRED TO AS A "PEACETIME LOCATION." AND PEACE?IME LOCATION WILL BE DEFINED IN SUCH A WAY SO AS TO EXCLUDE WHAT WE HAVE ?ERMED THE MOBILZEA?ION PHASE (I.E., FOR A COUNTRY THAT MOBILIZES OUT OF VILLAGES, THE PEACETIME LOCATION WILL BE WHERE THEY GATHER AND PICK UP EQUIPMENT.). NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS WILL BE SPECIFIID. THE THRESHOLD iS a STRUCTURAL ONE, THE Divi5i0N, ALTHOUGH DIViSiON IS FURTHER DEFINED IN TERMS OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS (NUMBERS OF TROOPS) WITH ACCOMPANYING EQUIPMENT (TANKS, HELICOPTERS, ETC.), OR AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE, OR AIR-MOBILE UNITS ON THE LEVEL OF A BA?TALION ACCOMPANIID BY AN AS YET UNDESIGNATID NUMERICAL THRESHOLD, AND SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY OF A CERTAIN NUMBER OF SQUARE METERS. 7. RELEVANT DEFINITIONS WILL BE, WE UNDERSTAND, ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: -- riILITARY MANEUVERS: ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORMA?IONS AT OR ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL IN COMBAT-RELATID EXERCISES OU?SIDE THEIR PEACETIME LOCATIONS, INCUDING ?HE RELOCATION OF SUCH FORMATIONS AT A NOTIFIABLE LEVEL BETWEEN PEACETIME LOCATIONS AND T$E EXERCISE AREA AS WELL AS BETWEEN DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE EXERCISE. (BEGIN COMItEN?; THE NNA WILL BELIEVE THIS IS AS FAR AS THEY CAN GO, AND YUGOSLAVIA, AND PERHAPS FINLAND, THINK IT IS T00 FAR. END COMMENT.) -- MOVEMENTS; THE RELOCATION OF FORMATIONS, IN NON-COMBAT RELATID ACTIVI?IES, AT OR ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL TO AND FROM PEACETIME LOCATIONS/S?AGING AREAS. (BEGIN COMMENT; ACCORDING TO THE SWISS, THE NNA DESIGNED THIS IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO POSE PROBLEMS TO NATO MOVEMENTS/TRANSITS. END COMMENT.) -- DIVISION: MOBILE MILI?ARY UNITS TEMPORARILY OR PERMANENTLY UNDER ONE COMMAND IN HEADQUARTERS, COMBAT AND SUPPORT ELEMEN?S AND ?WO-FIVE UNITS AT BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL WITH X TANKS, ARMOURID FIGHTING VffiICLES, HELICOPTERS OR X TROOPS AND Y TANKS, ARriOURED FIGHTING VffiICLES, HELICOPTERS. BEGIN COMMENT: USING THIS APPROACH, "DIVISION", PER SE, IS NOT A THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION, BUT IS NOTIFIID UNDER A NUMERICAL EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD. END COMMENT.) 8. TIMING AND CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT NOTIFICATION IS TO BE GIVEN 42 DAYS IN ADVANCE (PRECISELY TWICE THE NUMBER OF DAYS CALLED FOR UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.) THE NNA PACKAGE WILL NOT HAVE AN INDEPENDENT STA?IC INFORMATION MEASURE, BUT ? 256 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 RATHER WILL CALL FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION, IN FAR GREATER DETAIL THAN THAT PROVIDID FOR IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED, IN THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION. INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED WILL FALL INTO FOUR CA?EGORIESs GENERAL (THIS WILL INCLUDE CERTAIN "STATIC" INFORMATION, WHICH IS A REY ELEMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA'S CON?INUED OPPOSITION ?0 THE TOTAL PACKAGE), PARTICIPATING UNITS, INFORMATION ON DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION, AND OTHER INFORMATION (TO INCLUDE RELATIONSHIP OF THE EXERCISE TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES.) ***??< SECTION 4 ??*** FROM USDEL CDE STATE FOR PK/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJEC?: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING NOTIFICATION 9. THE PACKAGE WILL ALSO INCLUDE A SEC?ION ON ACTIVITIES NOT NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE -- BASICALLY SHORT NOTICE MANEUVERS ("ALERT" ACTIVITIES) AND MOVEMENTS. THE TRIGGERING MECHANISM FOR NOTIFICA?ION WILL BE THE SAME AS THAT FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY? MANEUVERS. CONSTRAINTS 10. WE UNDERS?AND THAT CONSTRAINTS ARE BASICALLY ALONG THE LINES OF THOSE OUTLINED IN REF (B). IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE YUGOSLAVS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO COMPLETELY BAN CONCURRENT LARGER-SCALE MANEUVERS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT A NEW ELEMENT -- A RESTRICTION ON THE DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY TO NO MORE THAN 17 DAYS -- WILL BE ADDED. 11. THE NNAS HAVE DEVELOPED A COMPREHENSIVE OBSERVER REGIME ?HAT WILL REQUIRE MANDATORY INVI?ATION OF OBSERVERS TO ALL PRE-NOTIFIED MILITARY MANEUVERS AND TO NOTIFIED MILITARY MANEUVERS (ALERTS) WHEN THE DURATION OF A MANEUVER EXCEED'S AN AS YET UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF HOURS. THE REGIME WILL REQUIRE THAT CERTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ACTIVITY BE PROVIDED IN THE OBSERVER INVI?ATION, AND ALSO WILL ADDRESS IN ? 257 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE MODALITIES AND GUIDELINES FOR OBSERVATION, TO INCLUDE THE PROVISION OF MAPS. INVITA?IONS WILL BE EXTENDED AT T$E TIME OF T$E NOTIFIGTION. THE MOMENT AT WHICH I'HE OBSERVATION STARTS, HOWEVER, DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE WHAT WE WOULD HAVE HOPED FOR -- AN OBSERVA?ION WILL START NOT LATER THAN AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF SOURS AFTER/AFTER THE ACTIVITY HAS STARTED. WHILE OBSERVERS WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW ALL THE MAIN PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A SPECIFIC PROVISION ALLOWING THE OBSERVER TO OBSERVE THE DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY FROM START TO FINISH AND RETURN ?0 GARRISON (PEACETIME LOCATIONS). (BEGIN COMMENT; THIS IS EVIDENCE THAT THE NNA DO NOT FULLY EMBRACE THE OOG CONCEPT. THEY DEFINE "MANEUVER" CLOSE TO OOG, BUT DO NOT APPLY IT ?0 THE PERIOD OF OBSERVATION. THIS WILL BE A PROBLEM AREA FOR US. END COMMENT.) 12. THIS ISSUE WILL APPARENTLY BE ADDRESSED UNDER ?HE TERMS OF "OBSERVATION BY REQUEST AND NTM'S." WHILE IT APPEARS TO BE MUCH MORE THAN INITIALLY WAS INDICTED BY ?HE NNA, IT NONETHELESS LOOKS AS IF I? WILL FALL SHORT OF WHAT WE WANT. WHILE CHARACTERIZED BY SOME OF THE NNA AS A "NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL ON-SITE INSPECTION", IT DOES NO? REALLY SEEM TO BE THAT AT ALL, AS WE BELIEVE THERE MAY BE TWO CATCHES. AN "OBSERVATION" READ INSPECTION) MAY ONLY BE REQUESTED IF A STATE DEEMS ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS TO BE IN JEOPARDY OR IF A STATE BELIEVES THAT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CSBM REGIME (AS A WHOLE) IS CALLED INTO QUESTION. THUS, THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH SUCH AN "OBSERVATION" COULD BE REQUESTED ARE EXCEPTIONAL. IN ADDITION, A STATE MAY REFUSE SUCH A REQUEST ON GROUNDS OF SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS. THE ELEMENT OF TIMELINESS WILL, HOWEVER, BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, PROBABLY REQUIRING A STATE TO END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 258 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ***??< SECTION S ??,t** FROM USDEL CDE STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD ?~ LYNN HANSEN E.O. 12356: DECL: OpDR DEL, US NST DEL ?AGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, pREL SUBJECT: CDE: CURREN? S?ATUS OF NNA -- INVITE "OBSERVERS", OR A? LEAST RESPOND rp EKING REQUEST, WITHIN TWELVE HOURS, ALWAYS BE PART OF AND ~ NNA OBSERVER WILL APPEARS THAT '~ RE~ STSS ORA" BSERVgETION"FIN`E'LY, IT INVITATIONS/RESPONSES WILL HAVE TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOME PROVISIONS FOR AGREED PROCEDURES FOR RAPID COMMUNICATIONS. ---------------------------------------------- COMMUNIG-TIONS/CONSULTA?IONS --------------------------------------------- 13. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH MODALITIES FOR "RAPID COMMUNICATION" (TELECOMMUNICATION LINES), IT APPEARS THAT THE PROVISIONS TO BE INCLUDED IN ?HIS BECTON WILL BE, BY-AND-LARGE, VOLUNTARY IN NA?URE. WHILE COMMUNICATIONS MUST BE TRANSMITTED TO ALL PAR?ICIPATING STATES, THE RAPID MODALITY COMMUNICATIONS "CAN" RATHER THAN "MUST" BE USED. AND, SHOULD CLARIFICATION AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BE NECESSARY, AGAIN, THIS COMMUNICATION SYSTEM "CAN" BE USED. CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE ENVISAGED EI?HER ON AN AD HOC BASIS. OR AT REGULAR INTERVALS AS DECIDED BY THE STATES, BUT NOT, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, REQUIRED. THE SWISS CONCEPT OF SALON DES AMBASSADEURS HAS NOT DISAPPEARED ENTIRELY. THERE MAY BE A PROVISION FOR A CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM LINKED TO "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST." ANNUAL CALENDERS ---------------------------- 14. WE UNDERSTAND THEIR ANNUM, CALENDAR PROPOSAL WILL BE SIMILAR TO SC.1/AMPLFIED. THERE MAY BE A FEW DIFFERENCES, AS THE NNA PAPER IS LIKELY TO CALL FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE TYPES OF FORCES PARTICIPATING, TO WIT: LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE ACTIVITY; NUMBER AND TYPES OF THE 259 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 PARTICIPATING DIVISIONS OR EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS OF GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES; AND NUMBER AND TYPES?OF THE PARTICIPATING AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIR-MOBILE BRIGADES OR REGIMENTS. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT INFORMATION FOR THE IDENTIFICA?ION OF THE PARTICIPATING UNITS, BY ORGANIZATIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, WILL BE CALLED FOR. -- --------- ---------------------------- NON-USE OF FORCE 15. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, WILL CONTAIN FIFTEEN ELEMENTS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY DRAWN FROM THE UN CHARTER AID HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE POINTS, IN AND OF THEPSSELVES, ARE LARGELY UNEXCEPTIONABLE INCLUDING SECTIONS ON THE PRIMACY OF THE CHARTER, BALANCE IN THE HELSINKI PROCESS, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (TO MOLLIFY THE SWISS). THERE IS ALSO A YUGOSLAV-INSPIRED SECTION ON TERRORISM. WHILE THE NNA DRAFT IS A LO? LONGER THAN WE WOULD HAVE WISHED, AT LEAST IT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE DETAILID DEFINITIONS OF FORCE ("THE CDE DIMENSION") ADVOCATED BY THE CYPRIOT REPRESENTATIVE. --------------------------------- PROBLEMS -------------------------------------- 16. AS INDICATED EARLIER, BOTH YUGOSLAVIA AND FINLAND HAVE SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE PACKAGE AS IT HAS NOW EVOLVED, AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST FIVE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES. FINLAND DOES NOT LIKE THE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION 6 ??*** FROM USDEL CDE STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING DEFINITIONS OF MOVEMENTS AND DIVISIONS, OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE THEY STRAY T00 FAR FROM ACCEPTED HELSINKI FINAL AC? CONCEPTS, BUT MOST LIKELY BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TROUBLE ACCEP?ING THEM. SPECIFICALLY, THE FINNS WOULD LIRE TO SET THE TRIGGER FOR NOTIFICATION OF A MANEUVER AT THREE, VICE TWO UNITS OF A DIVISION. FINLAND ALSO HAS A PROBLEM WITH THE TREATMENT OF WHAT WE CALL "ALERT" ACTIVITIES. YUGOSLAVIA, IN TURN, HAS DIFFICULTY ACCEPTING THE NOTION OF SPECIFYING PEACETIME LOCATIONS (ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THAT, IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRING THE YUGOSLAVS ON BOARD, ONE OF THE NNA DELEGATES PULLED OUT A MAP AND POINTED OUT YUGOSLAV PEACETIME LOCATIONS IN ORDER TO PROVE TO YUGOSLAVIA Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 THAT THESE LOCATIONS WERE HARDLY A SECRET), AND WITH OBSERVA?ION BY REQUEST; HERE, YUGOSLAVIA WOULD LIRE TO LIIiIT THE RATIONALE FOR HARING SUCH A REQUEST STRICTLY TO SUPREKE NATIONAL INTERESTS. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDEN?IA1. NNNN Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 .~~~~w>~.,~ PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY ~ DELEGATIONS OF AUSTRIA, CYPRUS, FINLAND,~MALTA, SAN MARINO, SWEDEN,ccS//WIT1ZERLAND, YUGOSLAVIA x~ 7 The abo~-e-sentioned Stites, Renewing their commitment to document CSCE/SC.3, Expressing their wish to contribute to the further progress of the Conference, Submit the following: 262 SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES The participating States x311 Give prior notification to all other participating States of military manoeuvres, covered by the mandate, i.e. - the engagement of military formations at or above the notifiable level as defined below outside their normal locations in combat- related exercises and - movements of such formations at or above the notifiable level between their normal locations and the exercise areas as xell as between the areas of the different phases of the exercises. Such manoeuvres rill be subject to prior notification, whenever they - numerical total(s) - to be defined - of forces participating in the activity as a whole, emphasizing mobility and firepower or - three amphibious, airborne, air-mobile units on battalion level or combinations thereof and a total number of xx troops or a total number of xx troops and a total of yy square metres of shipborne loading capacity. *For the purpose of the agreement a division or equivalent formation is defined as - a mobile military unit structured, permanently or temporarily, under one casaand in headquarters, combat and support elements or - achy other group of forces of equivalent capability containing 2-5 units on brigade/regiment level with a total number of at least x fro ns and y tanks/armoured fighting vehicles/helicopters or a total number of at least z tanks/armoured fighting vehicles/heli- copters. ' 263 SECRE? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Prior notification will be given by the participating States on whose territory these manoeuvres take place as well as by those States carrying them out. Prior notification gill also be Miven by States participating in these manoeuvres whenever their participation reaches notifiable level. Prior notification will be given 42 days or more is advance of the start of these military manoeuvres in'a standardized format containing the following information: 1. General information 1.1. Type and designation of the activity 1.2. Main purposes 1.3. Timeframe of the activity 1.4. Area of the activity 1.5. Level of command, organizing gad commanding the activity 1.6. Psrticipating States 1.7. Number gad types of participating divisions or equivalent formations of ground, naval and air forces 1.8. Number gad types of participating amphibious, airborne and air-mobile brigades or regiments 1.9. Numerical strength of the activity and the number of troops of each participating State 2. Information on oarticipatin? units 2.1. Number, types, and, whenever possibls, names of units of each partici- pating State involved in the activity, down to and including - brigade and/or regiment level; equivalent level of ground, naval gad air forces - battalion level in case of amphibious, airborne and air-mobile units 264 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 2.2. Numerical strenNth (manpower) of - directinN staff, including umpires - each a-a~or unit. at - divisional level or above - battalion level in case of amphibious, airborne and air-mobile units 2.3. Number and/or type of the followin~+-: - tanks - other armoured fi2htina vehicles - river crossing and other types of heavy assault er~ineerin2 equipment - logistic assault support equipment - selfpropelled artillery and multiple rocket launches (more than - other artillery and multiple rocket launches (more than 100 mm), as wll as mobile surface to air missile launches - heavy live ammunition - combat aircraft - combat helicopters - transport aircraft - transport helicoptes - naval cosibatants - landing crafts - amphibious vessels, including shipborne loading capacity - auxiliary amphibious ships, including shipborne loadinN capacity ?level of detail to be defined 265 ' cFrteFT E Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 3. Int'ormation on different abases of the mili activity and their teoaraahical definition 5.1. The starting and finishing dates of the s~ovesients of forces involved, whenever they reach notifiable level, as well as the period of absence from their normal locations 3.2. Duration of each phase, tactical purpose and corresponding geographical areas, including staging areas, and final positions before returning to their normal locations 4. Other information 4.1. Additional relevant information to be defined on the units participating in notifiable activities. 4.2. Substantial changes and additions to the annual calendar+- as well as reasons for such changes 4.3. Relation to other notifiable activities 4.4. State responsible for the observation programme ?See page 6 266 ' SECRE? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ANNUAL CALENDAR OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES The participating States will transmit to all other participating States the calendar of their military activities subject to prior notification and plarn:ed for the calendar year beginning on the subsequent January 1st. This annual calendar will be transmitted every year, not later than October lat- in a standardized format containing the following in!'ormation: 1. Type of activity 2. Main purposes 3. Timeframe of the activity with envisaged starting and finishing dates 4. Area of the activity 5. Level of command, organizing and commanding the activity 6. States participating in the activity 7. Number and types of the participating divisions or equivalent formations of ground. naval and air forces 8. Number and types of the participating amphibious. airborne and air-mobile 10. Numerical strength of the activity in terms of manpower as well as the 267 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION The participating States will invite observers tY`om all other partici- pating States to military manoeuvres subject to prior notification in accord- ance with the provisions set out below. 1. The invitation of observers will be extended simultaneously with the prior notification of the military activity. 2. In addition to the basic information aa~ the military activity, given in the prior notification, the invitation will specify - State responsible for the observation programme - the period of observation - the number of observers invited per participating State - the languages used in interpretation and translation during the observation. ' The deadline for accepting the invitation will be 21 days before the start of the observation. If no reply is given in time, it will be assumed -: that no observers will be seat. 3. Additional information will be sent not later than 14 days before the start of the observation to those States which have accepted the invitation or which request such additional informatia~n. The information will include - basic situation and main phases of the activity - maps of the area of activity with a scale to be specified - general practical arrang~eata for the observers - authorized equipment for the observers - general observation programme 268 SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 4. At latest when the observation begins information rill be given to the observers on the - detailed observation programme ' - directing staff responsible for the observation - details of practical arrangements. S. The observation will cover the duration of the activity, as notified, whenever it reaches the notifiable level, during phases to be defined. 6. The invitation will be valid for at least one observer from each participating State; in case of larger scale activities at least two observers will be invited. In the case of particularly large activities an even higher number of observers could be envisaged. 7. While the observers are on the territory of the State where the activity takes place, their persons and property, as well as their living quarters, will be granted the same privileges and immunities as those accorded to diplomatic agents in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. S. The invited State decides whether to send military and/or civilian 9. Observers from all participating States will be treated without discrimi- nation and offered equal opportunities to carry out their functions. 10. Observers will be given the possibility to use high capability optical 11. The use of photographic equipment is generally prohibited, unless the irniting State grants exceptions. 12. Irrespective of the language(s) used in briefings and information, it/they will be interpreted or, respectively, translated into at least one working language of the CSCE. Languages to be used will be indicated in the invitations given. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 18. The observers will be divan extensive and wthoritative information on the Pu~'pose, the basic situation and the prodrsss of the activity throudh detailed daily briefings rich the help of asps and drawing describing the ' current situation. 14. In particular the observers, in order to evaluate wheth~? the activities are carried out in cont'ormity with the prior notification and whether they are ran-threatening in nature, will be diver opportunity - to observe ground, naval and air units carrying out the main activities se well as areas that are essential for the above purposes of obser- vation - to visit, within the framework of alternatives offered, field units on levels to be defined and to follow their utivitiea and to communicate with commanders and troops - to be briefed on unit levels, to be defined, by camnandera or members of their staff - to be provided with information concerning their approximate position, geographically and in relation to units referred to in earlier briefings. They will be provided with appropriate means of transportation. 15. The inviting State will also consider requests made by other partici- pating States before the start of the observation programme with regard to possibilities to supplement the observation programme in order to meet particular concerns expressed. 16. The inviting State rill guide the observers in the area of activities. Observers will follow the relevant instructions issued by the inviting State is accordance with the provisions set out in this document. The inviting State will not be required to permit observatia~n of restricted installations such as fortifications or similar defence sites. 270 sECxEr Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 17. Observers will be Siven the opportunity to commursicate with their tabassies and/or with their home authorities. 18. The invitir~ State will cover the costs of board and.lod~in~ during the observation pro~raame. SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF ![ILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE 1. The participating States trill give notification to all other participating States of military aanoeuvrss u defined on page 2, covered by the mandate, ~+hich are carried ont at short notice, ~+henever they reach botifiable level u defined on page 2. 2. The participating States Mill give notification to all other participating States oP such military movements which are not in conjunction with combat- related exercises, of military formations at or above notifiable level to and Pram normal locations/staging areas, covered by the mandate, whenever they reach notifiable level as defined on page 2. 3. Notification Mill be given by the participating States on whose territory these manoeuvres and movements take place u well u by those State: carrying them out. Notification will also be given by States participating in these manoeuvres and movements ~fienever their participation reaches notifiable level. 4. Notification will be given at the earliest possible opportunity prior to the start of these manoeuvres and movements in a standardized format containing information as outlined under the section on prior notification Mith exceptions to be defined. S. The participating States will invite observers from all other participating States to military manoeuvres carried out at short notice, when the duration of the activity at or above notifiable level exceeds ... hours, in accordance with provisions to be elaborated. SFxRh`P Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET CONSTRAINTS ON CERTAIN lIILITARY ACTIVITIES 1. The participating States gill abide by the following constraints on the notifiable military activities referred to in this section: 2. No individual solitary manoeuvre will exceed five times the notifiable , level and its duration at or above notifiable level will not exceed 17 days.. 3. The States will neither permit on Choir own territory nor carry out or participate in more than a total of five notifiable military manoeuvres per calendar year which are of a size leas than two times the notifiable level; moreover, the States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or participate? in a total of more than one such manoeuvre at the same time. However, if such manoeuvres are notified in the annual calendar by the States on whose territory they take place as well as by those States carrying them out, the total number per calendar year and the number of such manoeuvres taking place at the same time will not be restricted. 4. The States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or participate+ in more than a total of five military manoeuvres per calendar year, which are of a size of two times the notifiable level or above. Such r--- manoeuvres will be notified already in the annual calendar by the States on whose territory they take place as well as by those States carrying them out. The States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or participate? in a total of more than two such manoeuvres at the same time. However, once a year two such manoeuvres may be combined but not exceed a total of seven times the notifiable level. 273 SF,'CRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST OF 1RLITARY ACTIVITIES A participating State Which considers that its national security interests are at stake or that the continued elfeetiveness of the agreement is seriously feopardized because of specific circ~s~stanoes in the oontest of the implemen- tation oP measures contained in the preceding sections, Kill be entitled to request to send observers to another participating State n:- very short notice. The request vrill be addressed to the State on whose territory the activities or presumed activities are carried out. It Kill define the requested observation area and cite the relevant measures on which the request is based as well as state the reasons for the request. The State which has received such a request will, within twelve hours after receiving the request, im-ite the requesting State to carry out the observation. The modalities and guidelines for such observation, including exceptions which apply to restricted areas, will be defined. If, for reasons of supreme national security interests, a State which has been requested to receive observers would find itself compelled not to grant the request, it will state the ressons which in the particular situation have caused the refusal in an answer addressed to the requesting State within twelve hours after receiving the request. In view of the fact that the CSCE proeesa takes place outside military alliances, the requested State will in addition invite observers from a third participating State with which it does not maintain relations of military alliance. If observers from a third State take part, they will participate in the whole observation together with the observers iron the requesting State, and be provided xith the same facilities. After a requested observation has been carried out, the requesting State, the inviting State as well as the invited third State, Kill each submit a report to the other participating States Kithin ... hours upon completion of the observation. - 274 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 The request and the answer thereto as well as the reports on the obser- vation will be transmitted in accordance with the provisions contained in the following section. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING MITE INFORMATION NOTIFICATION AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEMS MITH REGARD TO THE MLASZAtES TO BE ADOPTED 1. General provisions for communication Each participating State gill transmit all eoms~unioations foreseen in the preceding sections to all other participating States. Such oommunications can be transmitted in oonforaity with the modalities for rapid communications set out below. The participating States can also make use of the rapid communication system in order to provide and request clarification and additional information as well as in order to exchange views concerning the implementation of the measures in the preceding sections. 2. Modalities for rapid communications In order to ensure that the eommunications can be transmitted without delay and at all times, the participating States will keep telecommunication lines accessible between the designated representatives of the participating States for transmitting and receiving printed text, charts and maps. Access to all such communications will be restricted in accordance with CSCE practice. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS Arrangements for short aeetings of representatives of all the participating States, in relatioa to the implementation of the measures in the preceding sections, should also be envisaged. Such aeetings could be eomened - on an?ad hoc basis, at the request of any participating State, to deal with exceptional situations - at intervals and dates to be decided by the participating States, to proceed to an exchange of vie~+s on the routine implementation of the measures SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 30CRL~!' NON-USE OF FORCE The participating Statss stress their oommitment to the Final Act of the CSCE and the need for improved and oonsistent impleaentation of all its pro- visions, and thus to further the process of increuing security and dsveloping oo-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to intsrnatioasl peace and security in the xorld u a vdtole. They are also oonscious of the interrelation betxeen security in 8urope u a xhole, and security in the Mediterranean area. All the principles set forth in the Final Act are of primary significance and, accordingly, xill all be equally gad unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others. Respect for these principles rill encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of co-operation among the participating States in all fields. The participating States are oonscious of the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security xithin the CSCE. They stress that the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force is a universally recognized obligation in international law, binding all States, and that non-compliance xith it consequently constitutes a violation of international lax. They reaffirm their determination to respect this principle, contained in the Final Act, so ss to ensure that, as a norm of international life, it is strictly and effectively observed. No consideration may be invoked to serve to xarrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle. They recall the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if as armed attuk occurs. The participating States rill refrain, in their mutual as xell as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial iategrity or political independence of any State, or in a~y- other manner inconsistent xith the purposes of the United. Nations and xith the Final Act, and, accordingly, - - SECRET ~ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ~ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 t SECRET - from any manifestation of force, direct or iadireet, for the purpose of inducing any State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights, regardless of this Status political, social, economic, or cultural system and irrespective of whether?or not they aaintain with this State relations of alliance. No territorial occupation or acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force will be recognized as legal. The participating States stress their firm cosjmitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as contained in the Final Act, convinced that it is an essential complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat ' or use of force. They reaffirm their resolve to settle exclusively by peaceful means any dispute existing or arising between them. They also express their determination to reinforce, improve and develop the methods at their disposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The participating States confirm the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the respect for which is an essential factor for the CSCE process and for international peace and security as well as for the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States. The participating States confirm that they will refrain from direct or indirect sssistance to terrorist activities or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State. Tbey express their determination to take effective measures for the prevention and supression of acts of terrorism and will take all appropriate measures in preventing Chair respective territories frog being used for the preparatioa, organization or commission of terrorist activities, including measures to prohibit on their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organisations that instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 The participating States ~+ill fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law. They declare that their existing international eoomitments, rights and obligations do not conflict Math the present document. They confirm that in the event of a conflict betMSen the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter ~+ill prevail. The participating States are convinced that the situation in Europe and the equal respect for the legitimate security interests of every participating State require determined efforts by all of them to build mutual confidence, lessen military confrontation, strengthen security for all and promote disarmament. By their very nature concrete CSBI[s serve to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force. - ~- ~ SE1c!uc~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08027 SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, OCTOBER 18, 1985 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 7956, B) STOCKHOLM 7994 1. CDE VII - 064 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE U.S. AND USSR WEIGHED IN ON THE ISSUES WHICH MUST BE RECONCILED IF THERE IS TO BE AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. (TEXTS OF BOTH SPEECHES SENT REFS A AND B.) CANADA ENUMERATED PROBLEM AREAS REVEALED DURING INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. LUXEMBOURG SPORE ON BEHALF OF THE EC-10 END SUMMARY. 4. AMBASSADOR BARRY OUTLINED DIFFERENCES WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IN ORDER FOR THE CONFERENCE TO MOVE INTO INTEN- SIFIED NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT. HE CALLID ON THE EAST TO CEASE ITS EFFORTS TO CHALLENGE THE CDE ZONE OF APPLICATION. (TEXT OF SPEECH SENT REF A.) 5. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSRY'S COUNTERPOINT GENERALLY PLAYED UP TO THE EUROPEANS, PLACING THE CONFERENCE IN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN DETENTE. HOWEVER, HE ALSO CRITICIZED THE ALLEGED ATTEMPT OF THE U.S. TO "EXPOSE" THE STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF FORCES; TO CONSIDER ONLY GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY; AND TO "DELAY" DEVELOPMENT OF NUF. (TEXT SPEECH SENT REF B.) 6. AMBASSADOR DELWORTH (CANADA) URGED THE CONFERENCE TO MOVE QUICKLY INTO DRAFTING VIA CONCRETE CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANCE IN THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. HE CLAIMED THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE ALREADY REVEALED PROBLEMS, E.G., Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET (1) ON VERIFICATION/INFORMATION, WHICH IS REJECTED BY THE EAST; (2) ON THE EAST'S ATTEMP? TO ERTEND THE CDE ZONE; AND (3). ON THE EAST'S DESIRE TO DRAFT NUF LANGUAGE BEFORE MOVING TO DRAFTING IN OTH$R GROUPS. 7. IN A BRIEF STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE EC-10, DEPUTY HEAD OF DELEGATION RAYSER (LU%EMBOURG) CHARACTERIZED THE AGREEMENT ON INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENTS AS A "TURNING POINT" IN DISCUSSIONS. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SBC88T' SUGJ 'T:_ U.S. CDE PLENARY SPEECH, `0/8/85 1. ~ 2. U-ENTT TEXT. 3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE ADDRESS AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, FTIF:AD OF USDEL CDE, GAVE IN PLENARY TODAY, OCTOBER L8. BEGIN TEXT: THIS CONFERENCE HAS JUST CROSSED A THRESHOLD. WE HAVE, I EDPE, DECIDED TO LEAVE PROCEDURE BEHIND AND CONCENTRATE ON SUBSTANCE. MY DELEGATION, WITH OTHERS, WORKED HARD TO BRING ABOUT THE TRANSITION, AND WE WELCOME IT AS LONG OVERDUE. IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, PRESIDENT REAGAN EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WOULD SOON SEE "THE BEGINNING OF PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A FINAL AGREEMENT." IN MAY, THE PRESIDENT SAID: "THE CONFERENCE IS NOW AT A POINT WHERE IT COULD MOVE INTO A 108E INTENSE NEGOTIATING PHASE..." WE HAVE FINALLY TAKEN THAT STEP. MY PREDECESSOR, AMBASSADOR GOODBY, PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN GETTING THE SOMETIMES CUMBERSOME CONSENSUS PROCESS UNDER WHICH WE OPERATE TO WORK. SO DID MANY OTHER DELEGATES. BUT LET US NOT BE T00 FREE WITH SELF-CONGRATULATIONS. LET US REFLECT ON NEARLY TWO YEARS OF DISCUSSION WHICH HAVE DONE LITTLE TO MAKE EUROPE MORE SECURE OR CONFIDENT. THE TIME REMAINING TO US IS SEVERELY LIMITED. THE TIME SPENT ON PROCEDURE DURING THIS PAST ROUND, HOWEVER NECESSARY, HAS NOT LED 1'0 SIGNIFICANT CONVERGENCE ON THE ISSUES; IF ANYTHING, IT HAS SERVED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR SUBSTANCE. AS WE LOOK AHEAD TO THE NEXT ROUND, WE SHOULD HAVE A CLEAR VIEW IN MIND OF THE COMPLEXITY AND URGENCY OF THE TASK BEFORE US. DURILG THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WE ARE NOW IN, OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO FIND OUT IF THERE IS INDEED SUFFICIENT COMMON GROUND AMONG US ON WHICH A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME CAN BE BUILT AND TO DETERMINE WHEN AND HOW WE CAN BEST MOVE TO ACTUAL DRAFTING. LET'S NOT DELUDE OURSELVES; ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SIGNS OF EMERGING CONSENSUS ON SOME ISSUES, SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON MOST. FINDING SOLUTIONS TO THEM WILL BE DEMANDING. THE UNITED STATES IS READY FOR SUJSTANTIVE NEGOTIATION. IN A STATEMENT ON SEPTEMBER L0, AMBASSADOR GOODBY IDENTIFIED THE MAIN ISSUES BEFORE THE CONFERENCE AND OUTLINED THE POSITIONS OF THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF SC.L ON THEM. AMONG OTHER THINGS, HE EXPRESSED OUR FUNDAMENTAL ?_ BELIEF THAT THE THRESHOLD FOR I~TIFICATION MUST BE SIGNIFICANTLY LOWERED; HE ARGUED FOR THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AND THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO NOTIFICATION; HE EXPLAINED OUR VIEWS ON OBSERVATION AND ON-SITE INSPECTION. AND HE EXPLAINED THE NEED FOR AN ANNUAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 EXCHANGE OF INFORM~ITION ON MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURES AND LOCATIONS.- THESE POSITIONS ON THE CONTENT OF CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES LIE AT THE HEART OF DEGATE HERE AND WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS OF OUR CONTRIBUTION TO DRAFTING. IF WE CAN NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT ON SUCH MEASURES, WE WILL HAVE MADE THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN EUROPE LESS LIKELY; THEN, A REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE COMMITMENT, AS PART OF THAT AGREEMENT, WOULD HAVE REAL MEANING. OTHER QUESTIONS WE WILL ADDRESS HERE NOT BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THEY ARE PART OF OUR MANDATE, BUT BECAUSE OTHERS HAVE RAISED THEM. I HAVE IN MIND PARTICULARLY ATTEMPTS TO ALTER THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. THE MANDATE IS CLEAR IN REFERRING TO THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE; IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR IN AFFIRMING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. STATED MOST PLAINLY, ACTIVITIES IN THOSE AREAS ARE COVERED ONLY WHEN THEY MEET BOTH OF TWO CRITERIA: END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED 284 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET ~??< SECTION 2 ??~'*~ FRO1 USDEL CDE USIA FOR P/PFE E.O. L235b: N/A TAGS: CSCE, CDE, PARM, PREL WHEN THEY AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AND WHEN THEY ALSO CONSTITUTE A PART OF ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN EUROPE FOR WHICH NOTIFICATION IS REQUIRED. WE ARE PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT THE MANDATE IN THIS REGARD AS IN ALL OTHERS; THE ZONE OF APPLICATION IS MOT OPEN TO RENEGOTIATION OR REINTERPRETATION. MR. CHAIRMAN, MY GOVERNMENT AND, I BELIEVE, MOST OTHERS HERE WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT EMPTY FORMULATIONS WHICH PROMISE SECURITY TO OUR PUBLICS BUT DO NOTHING TO FULFILL THE PROMISE. AS THE MADRID MANDATE SAYS, THE PRODUCT OF OUR WORK HERE MUST HAVE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. BY MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, I MEAN A SUBSTANTIVE, QUALITATIVE ADVANCE OVER THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, MEASURES WHICH CAN IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF EVERY PARTICIPATING STATE TO UNDERSTAND THF. INTENTIONS AND PURPOSES BEHIND THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. THIS REQUIRES A MUTUAL[.,Y COMPLEMENTARY SET OF MEASURES ADDRESSING THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF 1ILITARY ACTIVITY, NOT ISOLATED MEASURES DIRECTED AT SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN WE ESTABLISH A RELIABLE PROFILE OF THE ACTIVITIES WHICH ROUTINELY OCCUR OVER A GIVEN PERIOD OF TIME SO AS, FINALLY, TO DEVELOP NORMS FOR MILITARY BEHAVIOR. TO OUR MINDS, BUILDING SUCH A PROFILE REQUIRES A SYSTEM OF ANNUAL FORECASTS AND NOTIFICATIONS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE EVALUATED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INFORMATION ABOUT FORCES NORMALLY STATIONED IN THE AREA. ONLY SUCH AN INTERRELATED SYSTEM WOULD ALLOW REALLY INFORMED ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE MEANILG OF ACTIVITIES IN THE OVERALL MILITARY CONTEXT. IN THIS REGARD, THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES THE STATEMENT GENERAL SECRETARY CORBACHEV MADE IN PARIS ON OCTOBER 3 THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT "MUTUAL EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION." THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF DOCUMENT SC.L, INCLUDING MY COUNTRY, PROPOSED SUCH AN EXCHANGE AS ONE OF THE SIX MEASURES WE TABLED AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THIS CONFERENCE, UNCLAS 285 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 IN JANUARY, L984. DOCUMELT SC.3, TABLED BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES IN MARCH OF THAT YEAR, ALA CONTAINS SUCH A PROPOSAL. SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THIS CONCEPT SERVES AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE GONVERGQYCE OF VIEWS NECESSARY FOR A FINAL COMPREFIENSIVE AGREEMENT. I MUST ADD, HOWEVER, THAT THE RECENT REMARKS ON THIS SUBJECT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, EQUATING INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, .QUALIFIES GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT IN A WAY WHICH UNDERCUTS THE EMERGING AGREEMENT ON THIS MEASURE. MR. CHAIRMAN, AS OUR MANDATE STATES. AND AS WE HAVE BEEN STRESSING SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS CONFERENCE, THE REQUIREMENT OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE ALSO MEANS THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED HERE MUST BE: VERIFIABLE AND PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE MEANS OF VERIFICATION. IN RELATION TO I~TIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THIS REQUIRES THAT EVERY STATE HAVE THE ABILITY TO ASSURE ITSELF THAT ALL OTHER STATES ARE PROVIDING I~TIFICATION FOR EVERY ACTIVITY WHICH MEETS THE AGREED PARAMETERS. WITHOUT THE MEANS OF VERIFYING THAT ITS UNDERSTANDING OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IS ACCURATE AND COIPLETE, NO STATE CAN GAIN REAL CONFIDENCE FROM A SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, AND NO SUCH SET CAN BE OF TRUE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. I KNOW THAT THE UNITED STATES, ITS GOVERNMENT, CONGRESS AND PEOPLE, COULp NEVER ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT HERE WHICH WAS NOT VERIFIABLE IN ALL ITS OPERATIVE PARTS. END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED +~??< SECTION 3 ??~~~r FRO1 USDEL CDE USIA FOR P/PFE MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE SPOKEN GENERALLY TODAY TO REMIND THE CONFERENCE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS OF MY DELEGATION AS WE ENTER INTO A NEW PHASE OF OUR WORK. I HAVE NOT ADDRESSED ALL ISSUES BEFORE US; I HAVE NOT TRIED TO ARGUE THE DETAILS 0~' OUR POSITIONS. I HAVE SIMPLY TRIED TO DESCRIGE--IN OUTLINE--OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS REQUIRED BY OUR MANDATE AND BY THE EXPECTATIONS OF OUR STATES AND PEOPLES. I LOOK FORWARD TO A PRODUCTIVE NEXT ROUND, ONE IN WHICH ACTUAL DRAFTING COULD BEGIN. BUT AS AN EXPERIENCED OPTIMIST I AM ALWAYS LOOKING FOR THE RAIN CLOUDS OVER ? SESS ONIZON. THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS DURING THIS T~iAT SOME DELEGATIONS WOULD LIKE TO IMPOSE A KIND OF DUAL LINKAGE ON THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS, INSISTING THAT PROGRESS ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, AS DEFINED BY OUR 2R( SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 MANDATE, BE HELD HOSTAGE BOTH TO PROGRESS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE ISSUE AND ALSO TO WORK ON PROPOSALS WHICH, IN FACT, LIE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF OUR MANDATE. THIS IS A FORMULA FOR COMPLETE STALEMATE, WHATEVER WE CALL THE STAGE WE ARE IN. FINALLY, LET ME NOTE THE BROADER CONTEXT IN WHICH WE WORK. IN ABOUT ONE YEAR, OUR GOVERNMENTS WILL GATHER IN VIENNA TO EVALUATE PROGRESS IN THE WHOLE CSCE PROCESS, INCLUDING THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. OUR IMMEDIATE JOB HERE IS MORE NARROW; IT IS TO ENACT A SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. BUT IT IS WELL. TO KEEP IN MIND, AS MY DELEGATION AND OTHERS HAVE SAID BEFORE, THAT OUR SPECIFIC WORK CAN ACHIEVE ITS FULLEST SIGNIFICANCE ONLY IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF SECURITY WHICH TRANSCENDS MILITARY AFFAIRS AND ENCOMPASSES POLITICAL, CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AS WELL. PART OF THAT BROADER CONTEXT WAS THE OTTAWA MEETING ON HUMAN RIGHTS HELD LAST JUNE; ANOTHER IS THE CULTURAL FORUM WHICH OPENED IN BUDAPEST ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER L5. AND THE BERN MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS, COMING IN THE SPRING OF NEXT YEAR, CAN CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE BALANCE OF THE OVERALL CSCE PROCESS. MR. CHAIRMAN, I BEGAN WITH A CALL FOR HASTE. LET ME END BY SUGGESTING PATIENCE AS WELL. ONE OF OUR MOST BELOVED WRITERS, E. B. WHITE, DIED A SHORT TIME ACA; ONE OF THE LOST FAMOUS PASSAGES HE WROTE GOES AS FOLLOWS: "AS LONG AS THERE IS ONE UPRIGHT MAN, AS LONG AS THERE IS ONE COMPASSIONATE WOMAN, THE CONTAGION MAY SPREAD AND THE SCENE IS NOT DESOLATE. HOPE IS THE THING THAT IS LEFT TO US, IN A BAD TIME. I SHALL GET UP SUNDAY MORNING AND WIND THE CLOCK AS A CONTRIBUTION TO ORDER AND STEADFASTNESS." NEARLY TWO YEARS OF WINDING THE CLOCK HAS BROUGHT US TO THIS NEW THRESHOLD. MY DELEGATION, LIKE OTHERS, HAS HELD THE HOPE OVER THOSE MONTHS THAT PATIENCE, STEADFASTNESS, AND DETERMINATION CAN FINALLY LEAD TO SOLID RESULTS. THE CONFERENCE HAS NOW, I BELIEVE, TAKEN A STEP TOWARD THAT END. MY DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO WORK STEADILY AND CAREFULLY IN ORDER TO HELP MAINTAIN BOTH THE MOVEMENT AND THE PATIENCE NECESSARY FOR FINAL SUCCESS. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. END TEXT BARRY END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED NNNN NNDD Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 UNCLAS COMPLET O1 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 07994 SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSRY, - HEAD OF USSR DELEGATION TO THE CDE, - OCTOBER 18, 1985 1. CDE VII - OS8 2. T'$E FULL TEXT OF THE STA?EMENT MADE BY THE HEAD OF THE USSR CDE DELEGATION FOLLOWS. BEGIN TEXT: DIS?INGUISHED MR. CHAIRMAN, - IT WILL NOT BE AN OVERSTATEMENT TO SAY THAT THIS SESSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAS BEEN UNUSUAL. ITS WORK CAN BE DESCRIBED THIS TIME AS POSITIVE. WHILE IT IS STILL ?00 EARLY TO MARE A FINAL JUDGMENT WE BELIEVE THAT IT HAS MARRED A CERTAIN TURN AT THE CONFERENCE TOWARDS MOVING OVER TO MORE PRODUCTIVE WORK. - THE CONFERENCE HAS ALWAYS BEEN AFFEC?ED BY MAJOR INTERNATIONAL EVENTS. IN THIS RESPECT IT CAN BE CALLED, TO USE A FIGURE OF SPEECH, THE BAROMETER OF POLITICAL MOODS IN THE CAPITALS OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES, THE INDICATOR OF, FIRST AND FOREMOST, THE REALIZATION BY THE EUROPEANS OF THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS. - THE STOCKHOLM FORUM WAS POSITIVELY AFFECTED BY THE RECENT SOVIE?-FRENCH SUMMIT MEETING WHICH HAD AN IMPORTAN? SIGNIFICANCE FOR STRENGTHENING EUROPEAN SECURITY, BROADENING THE ALL-EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE VISIT TO FRANCE BY THE GENERAL SECRE?ARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMI??EE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV LAID A GOOD BASIS BOTH FOR THE DEVELOPMENT' OF THE SOVIE?-FRENCH COOPERATION WHICH IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR OF STABILITY IN EUROPE AND FOR A TURN TO A RADICAL IMPROVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TO ENHANCED SECURITY OF ALL COUNTRIES. - ADVANCE ALONG THE TRAIL BLAZED IN HELSINKI HAS ALWAYS DEPENDED ON THE CLIMATE PREVAILING IN EUROPE, THE POLITI- CAL WILL AND INITIATIVE TO PURSUE DE?ENTE AND SECURITY AND ON THE STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN S?AYES. THE HIGHER THE LEVEL OF THOSE RELATIONS AND THE FIRMER THE WILL TO COOPERATE, THE DEEPER IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS. EUROPE, WHERE DETENTE WAS BORN' CAN AND SST P1~AY AN INDISPENSABLE ROLE IN THE ACTIVE SEARCH FOR WAYS LEADING ?0 A DRASTIC IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY FACILITATED BY A SUBS?ACTIVE OU?COME OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 - INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT A TENDENCY IS GAINING MOMENTUM IN EUROPE TO OVERCOME THE LOGIC OF CONFRONTATION. THIS REQUIRES RESOLUTE AND BOLD ACTIONS, A FRESH VIEW OF AND APPROACH TO NUMEROUS INTER- NATIONAL PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY WI?H RESPECT TO A000M- PLISHING THE TASKS OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURI~'Y-BUILDING IN EUROPE. SPEAKING IN PARIS MIKHAIL GORBACHEV STATED THAT THE TINE HAS COME TO TURN MORE RESOLUTELY THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE TO THE NEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENTS AS THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES HERE TO INTENSIFY THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLD?IONS." - ONE OF THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THOSE OPPORTUNITIES WAS THE DECISION TO MOVE AT THE CONFERENCE OVER TO EXPLORA- TION AND SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING OF ISSUES WHICH WOULD SHAPE THE FRAMEWORK OF POSSIBLE ACCORDS ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE COMPLETING THE FIRST STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE THREE GROUPS OF STATES, NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED, WARSAW TREATY, AND NATO, DEMONSTRATED THEIR FLEXIBILITY AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN PREPARING THAT DECISION. I WOULD LIRE TO PAY SPECIAL TRIBUTE TO AMBASSADOR KAHILUO?0, DISTINGUISHED HEAD OF THE REPUBLIC END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED ***??< SECTION 2 ??*** FROM USDEL USIA FOR IP/PFE GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSRY, OF FINLAND, FOR THE IMPORTANT ROLE WHICH HE PLAYED IN REACHING THIS AGREEMENT, WHOSE DIPLOMATIC MASTERSHIP MADE IT POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME MANY OBSTACLES. - WE SHARE THE OPINION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE STEP TAKEN BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE ESTABLISHES THE FRAMEWORK AND GUIDELINES FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF OUR WORK, MARES IT POSSIBLE TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS AND SETS THE CONFERENCE AT A BUSINESSLIKE TEMPO. . 289 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ' UNFORTUNATELY, THE UNITED STATES AND COUNTRIES CONTINUE THE LINE A? NARROWING DOWN OTHER NATO AND CAPACITY OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE SCOPE REDUCE EVERYTHING TO MEASURES WHIG CONCERNTO~NLYTRLAYNDO FORCE ACTIVITIES WHILE LEAVING ASIDE THE MOST DANGEROUS TYPES OF FORCES, I.E., AIR AND NAVAL, FORCES. HOWEVER, IT IS WITH THEIR STRIKES THAT BIG AND SHALL WERE STARTED MORE THAN ONCE DURING THE LAST SO OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING THEY p YEARS OR S0. INSTEAD MEASURES DESIGNED TO ALM OFF ITS ANTIPODE -- OF THE ARMED FORCES OF~POSE THE LOCATIONS AND STRUCTURES ~I~-TE~. ADVANTAGES. THE EUROPEAN STATES AND TO SECURE MANY WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE CLEARLY GUOUSLY IN FAVOR OF NON-USE OF FORCE BECOMING THE INDIS- PUTABLE LAW OF '~ IAMBI HARING I?S WEIGHTTY CONTRUIBUT ONTTO S' OF THE CONFERENCE ?HIS CAUSE. HOWEVER, A LINE IS CLEARLY VISIBLE HERE, T00, TO DELAY THIS DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. ' THE CURRENT SITUATION REQUIRES AS NEVER BEFORE THE NEED TO GIVE MORE EFFECT TO THE RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF NO USE OR THREAT OF FORCE, AND IN ITS MOST IMPORTANT DIRECTION AT THAT, THAT OF PROHIBITING THE USE OF ANY RINDS OF WEAPONS, NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ALIKE. IT IS ON THIS PREKISE THAT IS BASED THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIAL- IST COUNTRIES TO CONCLUDE A TREATY ON THE RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS. MR. CHAIRMAN, - THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM REQUIRES ENERGETIC SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD COMBINE MUTUALLY SUPPLEMENTARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY BOTH IN THE POLITICAL AND THE MILITARY FIELDS. ADVANCEMENT SHOULD BE ALONG BOTH DIRECTIONS. ATTEMPTS AT PUSHING THE CONFERENCE ONTO A ONE-WAY ROAD WILL LEAD TO NOTHING. - WE FACE CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS: A CAREFUL EXPLORATION OF THE ISSUES TO ELABORATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORDS. 290 .SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 A WEER OF INFORMAL, DISCUSSIONS HAS SHOWN THAT THE CONFERENCE HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. NO MATTER HOW COMPLEX THE ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION IN STOCIOiOLM ARE, THEY CAN PRODUCE RESULTS, PROVIDED THERE IS THE NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL. END TEXT. BARRY END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED NNNN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 .SECRET IIno!licial translation ssasaYSxs by Oleg A. GRIl~95~, lmbassador at I+arge, Head of the DSSR Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures and Disarmament in ~lzrope Stockholm, October 18, 1985 SEc`urT Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Diet{~,~shed yr..Chairman, It will not ~e as overstatement to nay that this session of the Stockholm Coaiereace has been uatisnal. Zts work can be described this time ~aa positive. chile it is still too early ~to make a~tinal ~adgement we believe that it has marked a certain turn at the Conference towards moving over to more productive work. she Conference has always been affected by mayor international events. In this respect it cea be called, to use a fugure of speech, the barometer of political goods in the capitals oY the participating states, the indicator ot, first sad foremost, the realization by the 3uropeeas of thdir security interests. The Stockholm foram was positively affected by the recent Soviet-preach summit meeting which had an important Bigniticance for strengthening 8tiiropeea security, broadening the all-European cooperation and improving the international situation. The visit to France by the General Secretary of the CPSII Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev laid a good basis both for the development of the Soviet-drench cooperation which is a signiticeat factor oY stability is Slirope and for a fora to a radical improvement is international relations a~ad to enhanced security of all countries. Ldvaace along the trail blazed in Helsinki has always depended on the climate prevailing in blirope, the political will sad initiative to pnrsne detente sad security sad on the state o= bilateral relations between states. The higher the level of bho.e s+elationa sad the Sirmer the will to cooperate, the deeper is the development of the all-St~sopeen process. 81,trope, where detente was born, can and must play ea indispensable role is the Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 2. active search !or ways leading to a drastic improvement is the ~itaation.which world be significantly facilitated by a substaa- tiv+e aratco~me of the Stocrholm Coalersnce. 3ateraational developments have demonstrated that a tendency ie g~i-~g momentum in 3lzrope to overcame the logic o! conlron- tatioa. '!'his regalres resolute and bold actions, a lresh view o! and approach to nnmeroas international problems, particularly with respect to accompliahiag the tasks of confidence-and securit9- building in lhzrope. ~pea]~ing is Paris yikpgil Gorbachev stated that the time has come to turn sore resolutely the Stockholm Conference to the negotiation od agreements as "there are opportunities here to intensity the search !or mutually acceptable solatioas?. One of the maaiiestatio~ of those ..opportunities was the deaieion to move at the Conference over to ezpioration and snbasqueat drafting of isen~ea which would shape the rramework o! possible accords oa coaiiavnce-had securi~-builaing measures za btirope eomp1etiia~ 4he a.ireg .tags tir ?he svoektiosn Coatereace. itepreseatatiives o! all the three groups o! states, neutral and no~'aligaed, Narsaw 'rraety and !~d'!'O, demc'nstrsted their lleaibility and mutual aaderstanding 1n preparing that decision. I world lies to pa, special tribute to dmbassador Bahiluoto, distinguished head o! the Hepablia of 1'inland, !or the important sole which ae ple~ea is reaching this agreement, whose diplomatic mastership made it possible to overcome many obstacles. Ms~ahare the opinion?to the errwct that the step tares by the Pestioipaata is the Conference eat:bushes the frameworY 294 SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 lLr. Chais'man, ?he achievement o! success is Stockholm requires energetic search !or solutions which would eombiae antually supplementary aspects o! security both in the political and tha military fields. ~dvancsment should be along both directions. lttempts at pushing the Conference onto a aae~~ road will lead to nothing. ~s lace concrete negotiations: a carei'vl ezploration o! the issues to elaborate mutually acceptable accords. ~ wee]c o! informal discussions has shown that the Conference has the potential !or posl~tive development. bo matter how complez the issues under discussion in Stockholm are, they can produce results, provided there is the necessary political will. SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION O1 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104 SUBJECT: CDE; WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEER OF OCTOBER 14-~8, 1985. 1. CDE VII -063. 2. CONFIDENTIAL - EN?IRE TEXT. 3. SUMMARY. THIS WEER MARRED THE TRANSITION OF CDE WORK INTO A MORE INFORMAL SETTING, AS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON MONDAY TO HOLD INFORMAL MEETINGS IN EACH OF T$E FIVE CLUSTERS. THESE INFORMALS, FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, WEN? WELL AS NATO WAS EFFECTIVE IN BOTH FOCUSING AND DIRECTING DISCUSSIONS IN MOST OF THE MEETINGS. IN THE POLITICAL GROUP (NUF) THE WARSAW PACT PUSHED FOR EARLY DRAFTING AND PRESENTED AN OUTLINE OF A POSSIBLE NUF AGREEMENT. WHILE LITTLE NEW SUBSTANTIVELY EMERGED, WE ARE SATISFIED TEAT THE "GIVE-AND-TARE" WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE SHARPENING OF FOCUS NECESSARY BEFORE COMMON GROUND WILL EMERGE. END SUMMARY. 4. WORKING GROUP AB -- OCTOBER 14, 1985. THERE WERE NO SPEAKERS AT THIS MEETING. AT AN INFORMAL MEETING IMKEDIATELY FOLLOWING, THE CDE AGREED ON AN INFORMAL STRUCTURE FOR ITS FUTURE WORK. (SEE SEPTEL.) FRG (SCHMIDBAUER) RICKED OFF THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH A PREPARED LARGELY POLITICAL, STATEMENT OF WELCOME FOR THE INFORMAL MEETINGS. HE IDENTIFIED AS AREAS OF COMMON GROUND THE DESIRE TO IMPROVE UPON THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT BY LOWERING THESHOLDS AND DEVELOPING MANDATORY PROVISIONS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT DIVERGENT VIEWS REMAINED ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES. WE MUST EXPLORE RAPPROCHEMENT POSSIBILITIES, HE CONCLUDED. UR (BACK) FOCUSED ON THE OUT-OF-GARRISON (OOG) CONCEPT AS AN IMPROVEMEN? OVER THE USE OF TERMS "MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS," WHICH WOULD REQUIRE DEFINITION. LIMITED DEFINITIONS WOULD BE OPEN TO CIRCUMVENTION AND BROAD DEFINITIONS WOULD LOSE THE UTILITY OF DISTINCTION. THE WTO HAS ALSO INTRODUCED A CONCEPT NOT IN THE FINAL ACT, HE SAID, -- THAT OF TRANSFERS. HE NOTED, THE TERM MOVEMENTS IS ALWAYS QUALIFIED BY THE TERM TRANSFER AN ASKED WHY; COULD THERE BE MOVEMENTS THAT ARE NOT TRANSFERS, WAS A TRANSFER A PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY REDEPLOYMENT, AND WOULD IT COVER STAGED TRANSFERS, SUCH AS SEMI-ANNUAL TROOP ROTA?IONS? THE OOG CONCEP? IS COMPRESHENSIVE, HE SAID; IT CAN'T BE CIRCUMVENTED, AND IS EASY TO VERIFY. ONLY ONE DEFINITION -- THAT OF GARRISON -- IS REQUIRED. THAT DEFINITION WAS PROPOSED, AND HAS NOT BEEN REJECTED, HE OBSERVED. USSR (TATARNIKOV), SAID THAT THE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND MUST BE BASED ON THE MANDATE WHICH CALLS FOR COVERAGE OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT ACTIVITIES THE .296 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT INCLUDES. IT DOESN'T SEEM TO INCLUDE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING AREA, WHICH ARE COVERED UNDER THE MANDATE AND REPRESENT A THREAT. WE MUST TAKE SUCH ACTIVITIES INTO ACCOUNT. IN RESPONSE TO THE UK, HE SAID THAT THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS INCLUDES THE MOVEMEN? OF FORCES USING VARIOUS FORMS OF TRANSPORTATION, INCLUDING RAILWAYS, DURING MANEUVERS OR THE ROTATION OF TROOPS. THE CONCEPT IS ALSO ADDRESSED IN MILITARY MANUALS. TATARNIROV SAID A TRANSFER IS AKIN TO A MOVEMENT BUT INCLUDES ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT OVER A LONGER DISTANCE, SUCH AS BRINGING TROOPS FROM THE FAR EAST OR THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE. UR (BACK) NOTED THAT THE MAJOR SOVIET OBJECTION TO THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT APPEARED TO BE BASED ON THE EXCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. HE CHALLENGED THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO JOIN IN DEVELOPING END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 297 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET 25X1 C O~N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104 SUBJEC?: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVI?IES, WEER OF COMMON GROUND ON USING THE OU?-OF-GARRISON APPROACH, WITH RESPECT TO NOTIFYING ACTIVITIES BY GROUND FORCES WHICH DWELL IN GARRISONS. FRANCE (FELIX-PAGANON) IDENTIFIED THREE PROBLEMS IN THE AREA OF NO?IFICATION: (1) SCOPE OF NOTIFICATION (WHAT DO WE WANT TO NOTIFY); (2) LEVEL OF NOTIFICATION (?HItESHOLD); AND (3) THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICA?ION (WHAT INFORMATION TO EXCHANGE). SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE AREA OF THRESHOLDS, HE ASSERTED. WE ARE ALL AGREED ON THE NECESSITY OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS, THE FRENCH DEPUTY STATED, CLAIMING THAT NO ONE QUES?IONS THE PRINCIPLE OF A NUMERICAL ?HRESHOLD. BUT THE SITUA?ION IS LESS CLEAR REGARDING STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS. HOWEVER, THOSE WHO ARGUE AGAINST THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD HAVE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN INTRODUCING A STRUCTURAL DIIiENSION TO THE NUMERICAL PARAMETERS. WE SHOULD DETERMINE HOW TO USE THIS APPROACH. (BEGIN COMMENT: MANY OF OUR NATO COLLEAGUES WERE CONCERNED WITIi THE FRENCH REFERENCE TO THE ACCEPTABILI?Y OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS AND THE ALLUSION TO THE POSSIBILI?IES OF COMBINING NUMBERS WI?H STRUCTURE. WHEN CHALLENGED BY TURKISH AND DUTCH DELEGA?ES LATER AT A NATO MINI-CAUCUS MEETING, HOWEVER, THE FRENCH CONTENDED THAT THEY HAD SAID NO SUCH THING. END COMMENT.) YUGOSLAVIA (BOZOVIC) SAID THAT THE ONLY THING HE KNEW ABOUT THE OU?-OF-GARRISON CQNCEPT WAS THAT IT WAS SIMPLE, NEEDS NO DEFINITION, AND WAS SO ALL-EMBRACING I? CAN'T BE CIRCUMVEN?ED. "HOW CAN WE TAKE A STAND ON AN ISSUE WHEN WE DON'T KNOW WHAT IT IS?", HE ASKED. U.S. (HANSEN) QUICKLY RESPONDED THAT EVERY MILITARY EXERCISE OF GROUND FORCES WAS INCLUDED IN THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT ENCOURAGING BOZOVIC TO TARE HIS PENCIL IN HAND AND WRITE DOWN A TYPICAL LIST, HANSEN NOTED THAT A LIST WOULD INCLUDE MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS, COMMAND STAFF EXERCISES, COMMAND POST EXERCISES, GROUND TRAINING EXERCISES, ROAD MARCHES, AND REDEPLOYMENTS -- IF THEY MET AN AGREED THRESHOLD. ACTIVITIES THAT WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED UNDER THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT MIGHT BE, FOR EXAMPLE, TROOPS USED FOR HARVESTING OR DISAS?ER RELIEF, BECAUSE THE OOG CONCEPT FOCUSES ON COMBAT ELEMENTS AND COMBAT CAPABILITIES. DENMARK (HOWARD) HIGHLIGHTED AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT -- I? COVERS MILITARY AC?IVITIES FROM THE VERY START OF THOSE AC?IVITIES. USSR (TATARNIROV) STATED`THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD HEARD SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION OF OOG. THERE IS EVEN SOME COINCIDENCE OF VIEWS, HE NOTED, ? 298 SECRE? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET INASMUCH AS OOG INCLUDED ACTIVITIES THAT THE W?0 HAS ADDRESSED IN ITS PROPOSALS. BUT, HE ASKED, WHY SHOULD WE TRY SO HARD TO DO SOMETHING DIFFERENT, WHICH RIGHT EVEN REQUIRE A LISTING OF EXCEPTIONS, WHEN WE ARE ALREADY AGREED UPON THE SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES TO BE COVERID. UK (BACK) RESPONDED THAT ONE TERM TO COVER MANY ACTIVITIES WAS PREFERABLE TO MANY TERMS. U.S. (HANSEN) REITERATED THAT THE REFERENCE TO EXCEPTIONS FROM THE OOG CONCEPT WAS MERELY ILLUSTRATIVE. THERE WERE AC?IVITIES WHICH WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED OUT-OF-GARRISON (OOG), ACCORDING TO PROVISIONS OF MEASURE 3, BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT INVOLVE PARTICIPATION OF MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS. S. WORKING GROUP A: POLITICAL -- OCTOBER 15, 1985. THE EAST ATTEMPTID TO PUSH THIS WORKING GROUP IN THE DIRECTION OF DRAFTING ON NUF AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN ' 299 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104 SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVI?IES, WEER OF USSR PRESENTED THE MOS? DETAILED DESCRIPTION TO DATE OF THE STRUCTURE OF A NUF AGREEMEN?. CYPRUS WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE SOVIET STATEMENT AND PRESENTED ITS OWN FRAMEWORK FOR A NUF DECLARATION. ?HE U.S., NOTED THAT EVERYONE SEEMED TO AGREE THAT NUF LANGUAGE SHOULD BE PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS, AND WARNED THAT EFFORTS TO MOVE BEYOND UN CHARTER LANGUAGE WOULD LEAD THE CONFERENCE INTO TREACHEROUS WATERS. TOWARD THE END OF THE MEETING POLAND SUGGESTED THAT THE NUF CLUSTER, INDEPENDENT OF THE OTHER MEETINGS, HOVE TO DRAFTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. USSR (RARHMANINOV) DESCRIBID THE STRUCTURE OF A NUF AGREEMENT, CONSISTING OF THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: -- A PREAMBLE MADE UP OF PROVISIONS FROM THE UN CHARTER, THE FINAL ACT AND, PERHAPS, THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT; -- A GENERAL AFFIRMATION FOLLOWED BY AN ELABORATION OF THE TYPES OF FORCE TO BE BANNED, WITH PRIDE OF PLACE GIVEN TO THE "MOST DANGEROUS FORM, MILITARY FORCE;" -- SPECIFIC POINTS, I.E., A "CONCRETIZA?ION" OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE "AS APPLIED TO THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND OUR MANDATE;" -- A REFERENCE ?0 IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN; -- A CONCLUDING SECTION WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE SUCH PROVISIONS AS: CONSULTATIONS; THE POSSIBILITY OF REQUESTING CLARIFICA?IONS AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION; "OTHER POINTS IN SC.6;" A REAFFIRMATION OF FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES OF THE UN, SUCH AS ARTICLES 51 AND 103. IN ADDITION, RARHMANINOV OFFERED THE FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE SOURCES OF LANGUAGE FOR A NUF AGREEMENT: -- THE DECLARATION ON THE PRINCIPLE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS; -- THE DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY; -- THE DECLARATION ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE; -- THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION; -- BILATERAL SOVIET-U.S., SOVIET-FRENCH AND SOVIET-U.K. DOCUMENTS . CYPRUS (PAPADAPOULOS) WAS "ENCOURAGED" BY THE SOVIET STATEMENT, AS IT REFLECTED THE TYPE OF ISSUES HE HAD TRIED TO EXAMINE IN MARCH 1985. HE SUPPORTED "COMPLETING" THE CONCEPT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE BY COVERING ALL ELEMENTS OF ESCALATION, I.E., THE THREAT OF FORCE, THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE AND, FINALLY, THE USE OF FORCE. HE OFFERED HIS FRAMEWORK FOR A NUF DECLARATION: -- A DEFINITION OF THE ELEMENTS OF NUF; -- THE ROMANIAN IDEA OF SPECIFYING THE ACTIONS FROM WHICH STATES WOULD HAVE TO REFRAIN; -- THE CDE (CSCE) DIMENSION: THE LINKAGE BETWEEN 300 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET CONCRETE CSBM'S AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE; I.E., THE CREATION OF OPERA?IONAL BARRIERS AGAINST TAE USE OF FORCE; -- OTHER ADDITIONAL OR SUPPORTIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING CONSULTATIONS, ETC.; -- AN EXCEPTION TO THE BAN ON THE USE OF FORCE ARTICLE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN ? 301 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104 SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF S1 (SELF-DEFENSE). U.S. (GUNDERSEN) AGREED WITH CYPRUS THAT THE DISCUSSION OF NUF WOULD BE COMPLEX, BUT NOTED THAT ALL AGREE THAT NUF LANGUAGE SHOULD BE PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS. HE WARNED THA? MOVING BEYOND T$E AUSTERE BUT UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE OF THE UN CHARTER, WOULD BE A MOVE INTO TREACHEROUS AND UNCHARTED WATERS. THE CDE'S GOAL IS TEAT OF HARING THE USE AND THREAT OF FORCE LESS LIKELY, NOT OF FORMULATING NEW NUF LANGUAGE. A NUF REAFFIRMATION WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CSBM'S WOULD BE WORSE THAT MEANINGLESS; IT WOULD GIVE ONLY ?HE ILLUSION OF SECURITY. OP THE MYRIAD OF INTERWAR NUF AGREEMENTS, WHETHER IN THE GUISE OF NON-AGGRESSION PACTS OR FRIENDSHIP TREATIES, ALMOST ALL WERE UNAMBIGUOUSLY BROKEN, HE SAID. ROMANIA (BUHOARA) STRESSED THE NEED TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT POSITIONS ON SUBSTANCE. HE AGREED THAT MORE IS REQUIRED TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE PRINCIPLE THAN MERE ENUNCIATION. HE RECOMMENDED IDENTIFYING BOTH THE CONCRETE FORMS OF MILITARY FORCE OR THE THREAT OF MILITARY FORCE FROM WHICH STATES WOULD HAVE TO REFRAIN, AND "POST?IVE ACTIONS". TO SAVE TIME THE ROMANIAN DELEGATE RECOMMENDED USING EXISTING AGREED TEXTS. RARHMANINOV INSISTED THAT CSBM'S SHOULD FLOW FROM A REAFFIRMATION OF NUF. THE FINAL ACT IS BASED ON THE MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY, HE SAID, AND HE STRESSED THE NEED TO APPROACH A NUF REAFFIRMATION AND SUBSTANTIAL CSBM'S IN THE MILITARY SPHERE "HAND IN HAND." POLAND (KONARSKI) SUGGESTID A MOVE TO DRAFTING IN THE NUF CLUSTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT WOULD MAKE MORE SENSE TO MOVE TO DRAFTING, HE SAID, "IN AREAS (E.G. NUF) WHERE DIFFERENCES ARE NOT SO DEEP AND WHERE WE DON'T HAVE MUCH ?0 SAY IN AN EXPLORATION PHASE, AS OPPOSED TO A DRAFTING PHASE WHERE WE WILL HAVE MORE TO SAY." THE EXPLORATORY PHASE COULD BE USED PRODUCTIVELY, HE NOTED, IF DELEGATIONS TRIED TO FORMULATE A RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET OUTLINE OF A POSSIBLE DOCUMENT, BAKING CLEAR WHA? THEY DO AND DON'T WANT INCORPORATED IN SUCH A DOCUMENT. 6. WORKING GROUP A: INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION -- OCTOBER 16, 1985. IN A WELL-COORDINATED EFFOR?, NATO COUNTRIES HOMED IN ON THE SUBJECT OF INFORMATION. THE USSR SPORE OFTEN, AND ASSERTED THAT THE ISSUES OF INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION WERE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION. WE COUNTERED THIS ? 302 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET ASSERTION, BUT WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CON?INUE TO PUSH THIS INTERPRETATTATARNIROV) EXPRESSED SURPRISE WITH SPAIN'S STATEMENT. THE CONFERENCE, HE ASSERTED, HAD REACHED A CLEAR CUT DECISION THAT INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICA?ION, AND THE USSR IS READY TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE INFORMATION IN THAT CONTEXT. AS TO THE QUESTION ABOUT PEACETIME LOCATIONS, TATARNIROV SAID THAT THERE MAY BE DIFFERENT RINDS -- BARRACKS, CAMPS, SOME OTHER RIND OF DISPOSITION OF FORCES, AND GARRISONS. PRECISE DEFINITIONS ARE AVAILABLE, IF NEEDED. INFORMATION SHOULD BE EXCHANGED AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION, HE SAID, AND THE INFORMATION WILL DEPEND ON THE TYPE OF MANEUVER NOTIFIED AND WHETHER IT INVOLVES GROUND, SEA OR AIR FORCES. UR (FREEMAN) RECITED THE TITLE OF THE MEETING IN ITS ENTIRETY FOR THE BENEFI? OF THE USSR. REGARDING USSR COMKENTS ON PEACETIME LOCATIONS, HE ASKED WHETHER THEY RECOGNIZED THE REQUIREMENT FOR INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF THOSE VARIOUS ELEMENTS FOR AN EFFECTIVE CSBM REGI2~E. USSR (TATARNIROV) ALSO REFERRED TO THE TITLE OF THE MEETING, CONTENDING THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED ON OCTOBER 14 THAT INFORMATION, VERIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION WILL BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SYSTEM OF NOTIFICATION. WE ARE PROCEEDING ON THAT UNDERSTANDING, HE SAID. THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON PERMANENT LOCATIONS, HE SAID, AS SUCH INFORMATION IS NOT OF ANY INTEREST. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS WHERE THE EXERCISE TAKES PLACE. IN A THINLY VEALED ALLUSION TO INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY IF SOMEONE ELSE NEEDED TO KNOW THIS INFORMATION. FREEMAN (UR) AND HANSEN (U.S.) BOTH REAFFIRMED THAT THIS INFORMAL CLUSTER WOULD DISCUSS INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBMS. FRANCE (MERIC) VEERING MORE THAN A BIT OFF COURSE, SAID EVERYONE THINKS THAT WE WILL ONE DAY MOVE TO A DISARMAMENT STAGE IN THE CDE. FOR THIS, INFORMATION WILL BE CRITICALLY ESSENTIAL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE FRENCH DELEGATION WAS INSTRUCTED TO DO THE MAXIMUM TO MAKE PRQGRESS AT CDE, AND NOTED THAT THE CONFERENCE HAS NOT YET HEARD THE FRENCH POSITION ON ALL OF THE ISSUES. USSR (TATARNIROV) SAID THAT WHEN THE DISARMAMENT STAGE IS REACHED, ALL THE CARDS WILL BE LAID ON THE TABLE, AS DURING SALT I AND SALT II. AS TO WHERE TROOPS COME FROM (I.E. PEACETIME LOCATIONS), THAT WOULD BE COVERED UNDER THE WTO PROVISIONS ADDRESSING MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS. 7. WORKING GROUP B: OBSERVATION -- OCTOBER 17, 1985. THE FNFORMAL SESSION ON OBSERVATION WITNESSED LONG Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET DISCUSSION WITH MANY PARTICIPANTS. THE USSR IMPLIED THAT IN THE CASE OF TROOPS MOVING TO AN EXERCISE AREA, END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 304 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104 SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP AC?IVI?IES, WEER OF THEIR PEACETIME LOCATION WOULD BE NG?IFIED UNDER THE CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THE WTO MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS PROPOSAL. WTO STILL WON'T ACCEPT THE MANDATORY NATURE OF AN OBSERVATION REGIME OR THE INVITATION OF ALL STATES TO AN EXERCISE. POLAND (STANIEWSRI) IDENTIFIED SOME AREAS OF CONVERGENCE REGARDING OBSERVATION KODALITIES: DETAILED BRIEFINGS; ABILITY TO OBSERVE "TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE" ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMAND STAFF; AND NEED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACTS WITH PERSONNEL "WHERE CONDITIONS PERMIT AND ARE JUSTIFIED." THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE DEFINED BY THE HOST STATE AND IT IS IN ?HE HOST STATE'S INTEREST TO ENSURE THAT THE PROGRAM WILL MEET ITS NEEDS. THE HOST COUNTRY MUST ALSO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE OBSERVERS; THE METHODS MAY DIFFER ACCORDING TO THE ACTIVITY BEING OBSERVED. STANIEWSRI IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF OU?S?ANDING ISSUES ON WHICH HE BELIEVED AGREEMEN? SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT, NAMELY: CONDITIONS FOR OBSERVERS, LODGING, ATTENDANCE, MEANS OF TRANSPORT AND MEDICAL RESOURCES. BUT ON SOME ISSUES, HE NOTED, THEE ARE MAJOR DIFFERENCES AND FURTHER IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION IS REQUIRED. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME CONTEND THAT AN OBSERVER SHOULD BE PRESENT AT ALL ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION FROM THE START TO THE FINISH; WHILE OTHERS BELIEVE THAT IT IS SUFFICIENT FOR THE OBSERVER TO OBSERVE MAIN EPISQDES (HE SUPPORTED ?HE LATTER POSITION). HE ALSO ASSERTED THAT OBSERVATION FOR THE DURATION OF THE MANEUVER, WHICH COULD L GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PARM, CDE, CSCE, PREL SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEER OF PARTICULARLY IF IT IS CLOSE ?0 A BORDER. POLAND RESPONDED THAT ACTIVITIES AREN'T NOTIFIED UNTIL THEY REACH THE NOTIFIABLE THRESHOLD -- WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN UNTIL THE TROOPS HAVE GATHERED AT THE EXERCISE AREA. DENMARK SAID ?HAT IT WAS PAR?ICULARY IMPORTANT THAT THE RETURN TO GARRISON BE OBSERVED, AS TROOPS HAVING JUST COMPLETED A TRAINING EXERCISE WERE PREPARED FOR WAR AND THUS MOST THREATENING. FRANCE (MERIC) ASSERTED THAT WE MUST KNOW WHERE THE TROOPS COME FROM; OBSERVERS MUST HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION, AND MAPS SHOULD ALSO BE PROVIDED FOR OBSERVERS. USSR (TATARNIROV) RESPONDED THAT THAT THE AREA OF THE MANEUVER WOULD BE CLEARLY INDICATED AND IN THE SOVIE? PROPOSAL ON MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS, TROOPS COKING FROM FAR AWAY WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS TO WHERE ? 305 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET THEY ARE FROM. TATARNIROV TOLD DENMARK (HOWARD) THA? THE USSR HAD NEVER SAID THAT AFTER TRAINING THE OBSERVERS WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAWN. THE TRANSFER OF FORCES, UNDER THE WTO PROPOSAL, WILL REQUIRE OBSERVATION AND, HE POINTED OUT THAT IN THE WTO SCENARIOS WE MARE SURE OBSERVERS CAN WATCH THE RETURN OF TROOPS. CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) ASKED THE U.S. WHETHER IT WAS WILLING TO DISCUSS AN OBSERVER REGIME FOR AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES COMBINED WITH GROUND FORCES. U.S. (BLANK) TOOK THE QUESTION UNDER ADVISEMEN?. 8. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS/FORECASTS -- OCTOBER 17, 1985. IN INFORMALS, THE NETHERLANDS (VAN GORP) WELCOMED GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, NOTING THAT IT HAD PLACED NO PRECONDITIONS ON WHAT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. BECAUSE OF THE BROAD CONSENSUS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF FORECASTS, VAN GORP SAID HE DID NO? FORESEE GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN AGREEING TO SPECIFIC MODALITIES. HE ASKED HOW THE SOVIET UNION ENVISAGED THE STRUCTURE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT FORECASTS HAVE A CONSTRAINING EFFECT ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES, E.G., PREPARATIONS FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK OR ACTIVITIES AIMED AT INTIIiIDATION. CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) INSISTED THAT FORECASTS WOULD ENSURE THE RIGHT OF EACH STATE TO EQUAL SECURITY ONLY IF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES, I.E., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEEVERS, AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS, ARE INCLUDED IN THEM. HE CRITICIZED NATO FOR ITS "SELECTIVE" APPROACH AND ARGUED THAT AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, EQUIPPED WITH MODERN WEAPONRY, REPRESENT A THREAT TO SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. THE FRG (METSCHER) CRITIZED THE FINE PRINT -- A DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES WHICH INCLUDED GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS -- GRINEVSRY HAD GRAFTED ONTO GORBACHEV'S PARIS PROPOSAL. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHAT IS NOTIFIABLE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE NOTIFICATION MEETING IN WORKING GROUP B. METSCHER PRESSED FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE STRUCTURE OF AN ANNUAL FORECAST: WOULD IT BE BROKEN UP BY QUARTERS, WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION WOULD I? CONTAIN -- THE NAME AND DESIGNATION OF EXERCISES, THEIR DURATION, ETC? THE USSR (TATARNIROV) FOCUSED ON THE DEFINITION' OF "MILITARY ACTIVITIES", AS CONTAINED IN THE MANDATE AND ASSERTED THAT IT INCLUDED A BROAD RANGE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, E.G., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS. HE CRITICIZED THE FRG FOR INCLUDING ONLY GROUND ACTIVI?IES. TA?ARNIKOV ALSO ARGUED THAT ROUTINE COMBAT TRAINING AT FIRING RANGES 306 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 END OF PSESSAGE NNNN 307 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104 SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVI?IES, WEER OF PARTICULARLY IF IT IS FLOSS TO A BORDER. POLAND RESPONDED THAT ACTIVITIES AREN'T NOTIFIED UNTIL~THEY REACH THE NOTIFIABLE THRESHOLD -- WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN UNTIL THE TROOPS HAVE GATHERED AT THE EXERCISE AREA. DENMARK SAID THAT IT WAS PARTICULARY IMPORTANT THA? THE RETURN TO GARRISON BE OBSERVED, AS TROOPS HAVING JUST COMPLETED A TRAINING EXERCISE WERE PREPARED FOR WAR AND THUS MOST THREATENING. FRANCE (MERIC) ASSERTED THAT WE MUST KNOW WHERE THE TROOPS COME FROM; OBSERVERS MUST HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION, AND MAPS SHOULD ALSO BE PROVIDED FOR OBSERVERS. USSR (TATARNIROV) RESPONDED THAT THAT THE AREA OF THE MANEUVER WOULD BE CLEARLY INDICATED AND IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS, TROOPS COMING FROM FAR AWAY WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS TO WHERE THEY ARE FROM. TATARNIROV TOLD DENMARK (HOWARD) THAT THE USSR HAD NEVER SAID THAT AFTER TRAINING THE OBSERVERS WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAWN. THE TRANSFER OF FORCES, UNDER THE WTO PROPOSAL, WILL REQUIRE OBSERVATION AND, HE POINTED OUT THAT IN THE WTO SCENARIOS WE MAKE SURE OBSERVERS CAN WaTCH THE RETURN OF TROOPS. CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) ASKED THE U.S. WHETHER IT WAS WILLING TO DISCUSS AN OBSERVER REGIME FOR AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES COMBINED WITH GROUND FORCES. U.S. (BLANK) TOOK THE QUESTION UNDER ADVISEMENT. 8. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS/FORECASTS -- OCTOBER 17, 1985. IN INFORMALS, THE NETHERLANDS (VAN GORP) WELCOMED GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, NOTING THAT IT HAD PLACED NO PRECONDITIONS ON WHAT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. BECAUSE OF THE BROAD CONSENSUS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF FORECASTS, VAN GORP SAID HE DID NOT FORESEE GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN AGREEING TO SPECIFIC MODALITIES. HE ASKED HOW THE SOVIE? UNION ENVISAGED THE STRUCTURE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT FORECASTS HAVE A CONSTRAINING EFFEC? ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES, E.G., PREPARATIONS FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK OR ACTIVITIES AIMED AT INTIMIDATION. CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) INSISTED THAT FORECASTS WOULD ENSURE THE RIGHT OF EACH STATE TO EQUAL SECURITY ONLY IF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES, I.E., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANUEVERS, AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS, ARE INCLUDED IN THEM. HE CRITICIZED NATO FOR ITS "SELECTIVE" APPROACH AND ARGUED THAT AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, EQUIPPED WITH MODERN WEAPONRY, REPRESENT A THREA? TO SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. THE FRG (METSCHER) CRITIZED THE FINE PRINT -- A . 308 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES WHICH INCLUDED GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS -- GRINEVSRY HAD GRAFTED ONTO GORBACHEV'S PARIS PROPOSAL. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHAT IS NOTIFIABLE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE NOTIFICA?ION MEETING IN WORKING GROUP B. METSCHER PRESSED FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE STRUCTURE OF AN ANNUAL FORECAST: WOULD IT BE BROKEN UP BY QUARTERS, WHAT RIND OF INFORMA?ION WOULD I? CONTAIN ~- THE NAME AND DESIGNATION OF EXERCISES, THEIR DURA?ION, ETC? THE USSR (?ATARNIROV) FOCUSED ON THE DEFINITION OF "MILITARY AC?IVITIES AS CONTAINED IN THE MANDATE AND ASSERTED THAT I? INCLUDED A BROAD RANGE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, E.G., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS. HE CRITICIZED THE FRG FOR INCLUDING ONLY GROUND ACTIVITIES. TATARNIROV ALSO ARGUED THA? ROUTINE COMBAT TRAINING AT FIRING RANGES END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 309 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 S CRET C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 08 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104 SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT SC.1 IS NOT THE ONLY PROPOSAL ON THE TABLE AND URGED DELEGATIONS TO FOCUS ON COMMON GROUND, NOT CONTRADICTIONS, IN THEIR POSITIONS. TURKEY (BOLUICBASI) REMINDED THE CONFERENCE OF THE THREE-YEAR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH RESULTED IN THE MADRID MANDATE AND BLUNTLY WARNED THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD NOT ACCEP? THE SOVIE? INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE. ROMANIA (BUHOARA) CITED SEVERAL UNATTRIBUTED, BUT CLEARLY NATO, STATEMENTS TO ARGUE THAT CONSTRAINTS SHOULD NOT MERELY CODIFY CURRENT MILITARY PRACTICE OR BEHAVIOR, BUT SHOULD LIMIT THEM. HE ALSO DISAGREED WITH WESTERN DELEGATIONS WHICH GIVE A LOW PRIORITY TO CONSTRAINTS. THE ROMANIAN INSTEAD ECHOED HIS EASTERN COLLEAGUES IN INSISTING THAT ALL ISSUES BE TAKEN UP IN PARALLEL. CANADA (NAMIESNIOWSRI) EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE CDE, LIRE THE TOPHEAVY SWEDISH WARSHIP, THE VASA, WHICH OVERTURNED ON ITS MAIDEN VOYAGE, WOULD FAIL TO REACH CONCENSUS IF IT WERE OVERLOADED. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ? 310 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET O1 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08084 SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII 1. CDE VII - 066 2. C - EN?IRE TEXT. 3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE SEVENTH ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WAS DOMINATED BY PROSAIC PROCIDURAL PROPOSITIONS. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE CDE BEAST, EVEN SEEMINGLY BENIGN PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS HAVE LONG-TERM SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS. DURING THE LAST WEER OF THE SESSION, THE CONFERENCE ACCEPTID A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO DRAFTING BEGINNING WITH AN INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE WHICH REFLECTID THE U.S. APPROACH. DURING THE "TEST" RUN OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, MOREOVER, NATO FARID WELL AND, ON THE WHOLE, WAS ABLE TO DIRECT DISCUSSIONS ON WESTERN TERMS. WHILE THE CONFERENCE ESSENTIALLY ACCEPTED THE WESTERN APPROACH TO PROCIDURE, IT HAS NOT BEEN WITHOUT A PRICE FOR WESTERN UNITY. THE SEEMINGLY'ENDLESS SERIES OF MEETINGS LEADING TO CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON WORKING STRUCTURE CONTRIBUTED TO A CLEAR DIVISION OF NATO INTO "WETS" AND "DRYS," WHICH DOES NOT AUGUR WELL FOR END GAME NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIETS, IN THE MEANTIME, WERE ON THEIR BEST BEHAVIOR AS THEY COURTID THE EUROPEANS. WHILE THEY WERE ACCOMMODATING ON PROCIDURE, ON SUBSTANCE THEY HELD THEIR GROUND. THE NNA WERE CONSPICUOUS BY THEIR PUBLIC SILENCE. HOWEVER, THEY WORKED FEVERISHLY BEHIND THE SCENES -- DAY, NIGH?, AND WEEKENDS -- TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN ELABORATED NNA PACKAGE. THIS SO FAR UNSUCCESSFUL QUEST FOR CONSENSUS HAS LID TO MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS, WITH A CHANGING CAST OF CHARACTERS (YUGOSLAVIA, FINLAND, CYPRUS, AND, OF COURSE, IaALTA) ASSUMING THE ROLE OF NNA SCAPEGOAT. THE STRAINS WITHIN THE NNA WERE AT ONCE UNEXPECTED AND INEVITABLE. UNEXPECTED IN THAT, HERETOFORE, THE NNA HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PLAY THE ROLE OF HONEST BROKERS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. INEVITABLE, IN THAT, PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME . IN HISTORY, THEY HAVE HAD TO IDENTIFY COMMON SECURITY CONCERNS. THE NNA'S LONG NIGHT'S JOURNEY TOWARD A CONSENSUS DOCUMENT HAS AFFORDED US TIME TO SEDUCE THEM -- WITH SOME SUCCESS -- TO HOP INTO THE WESTERN CONCEPTUAL BED ON SUCH TOPICS AS OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES AND THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD. FINALLY, LESS BECAUSE OF MALICIOUS INTENT THAN OF CAPRICIOUS INCOMPETENCE, PROBLEMS WITH RUSSIAN TRANSLATIONS CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY. NATO 4. THE NOT SO MAGNIFICENT OBSESSION. FOR MUCH OF THE SEVENTH ROUND THE NATO CAUCUS WRESTLED WITH THE PROSAIC QUESTION OF HOW AND WHEN TO MOVE INTO AN INFORMAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 EXPLORATORY NEGOTIATING PHASE. ?HE PROTRACTED AND SOMETIMES HEATED DEBATE OVER PROCEDURE MOVED SUBSTANCE TO THE BACK BURNER. THE PAPER CIRCULATED BY AMBASSADOR GOODBY CONTAINING SOVIET SUGGESTIONS ON WORKING STRUCTURE. WHICH EVOLVED OUT OF GOODBY'S EXCHANGES WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY -- AND HOW TO RESPOND TO IT -- WAS AT THE CORE OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS. WHILE MOST OF OUR ALLIES WANTED TO BEGIN DRAFTING SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, THEY EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH. DRAFTING WILL BE PRECEDED BY AN INFORMAL, EXPLORATORY PHASE. THIS APPROACH, IN OUR VIEW, PROTECTS THE U.S. AND ALLIID STANCE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE THE CONFERENCE ESSEN?IALLY BOUGHT THIS WESTERN APPROACH ?0 INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, IT HAS NOT BEEN WITHOUT COSTS. S. CONTRETEMPS AND CONCORD. DURING THE CAUCUS DISCUSSIONS ON HOW TO BREAK THE PROCEDURAL IMPASSE, THE ALLIES DISPLAYED A MORE THAN HEALTHY DOSE OF CENTRIFUGAL END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION 2 ??*** DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN; AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII PROCLIVITIES. MOST OF OUR.AI.LIES ARGUED FOR A QUICK AND FORTHCOMING RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET SUGGESTIONS ON WORKING STRUCTURE, WITH MINIMAL CHANGES. THESE DELEGATIONS WERE DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE AN EARLY (IF NOT I2QlEDIATE) TRANSITION TO DRAFTING, WITHOUT ANY SIGNIFICANT "FIREBREAK" BETWEEN THE EXPLORATORY AND DRAFTING PHASES. OTHERS, NOTABLY THE FRENCH, THE UR, AND THE U.S., WERE EXTREMELY CHARY ABOUT ENTERING INTO ANY INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE AND PREDETERMINE THE EVENTUAL DRAFTING STRUCTURE. WE SHOULD, ACCORDING TO THEIR VIEW, MARE HASTE CAUTIOUSLY. IN ANY CASE, THE FINE PRIN? IN EACH CLAUSE OF THE NON-AMERICAN, NON-PAPER" WAS EXAMINED LIRE A USED CAR GUARANTEE. CAVEAT EMPTOR. 6. HALUR, FELIR, AND I. WHEN ACCORD WAS FINALLY REACHED WITHIN THE CAUCUS, THREE SPOKESMEN, TURKISH AMBASSADOR HALUR OZGUL, BELGIAN AMBASSADOR FELIX STANDAERT, AND DANISH AMBASSADOR SRJOLD MELLBIN, WERE APPOINTED TO PRESENT NATO'S POSI?ION TO THE EAST AND THE NNA. AFTER EAC~i ROUND OF SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, MELLBIN WOULD OPEN THE FOLLOWING CAUCUS MEETING WITH THE REFRAIN, -'?ODAY, HALUR, FELIX, AND I ." WITH EACH Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET TURN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE CAUCUS DESIGNATION FOR THE TRIO SEEIiED TO CHANGE. THEY WERE FIRST DUBBED THE SPOKESMEN, THEN THE WISE MEN, THE TROIKA, THE TRINITY, AND THE MUSKETEERS. (MERCIFULLY, BECAUSE OF THEIR QUIET AND EFFECTIVE DIPLOMACY, THEY ESCAPED THE THREE STOOGES APPELLATION.) 7. "WETS" AND "DRYS." IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO DRAFT EARLY, THE "WETS" DEMONSTRATED A WORRISOME WILLINGNESS TO ACCOMMODATE THE EAST BY ADVOCATING A MINIMALIST, "CONSENSUS-BUILDING" NATO OPENING POSITION IN THE NEGOTIATION OF AN INFORMAL STRUCTURE. IT TOOK ENERGETIC EFFORTS BY THE "DRYS" (UR, U.S., FRANCE, AND PORTUGAL) TO HEAD OFF "WET" EFFORTS TO CONCEDE A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE NATO POSITION IN AN IN?ERNAL CAUCUS PRE-NEGOTIATION. IRONICALLY, IT WAS THE "WETS," LED BY CANADIAN AMBASSADOR DELWORTH (WHO HAD EARLIER REFERRED TO THE NA?0 POSITION AS A "TOMBSTONE PROPOSAL") WHO WERE MOST VOCAL IN CONGRATULATING THE CAUCUS WHEN THE EAST ACCEPTED MOST NATO CHANGES. 8. THE FRUSTRATION FACTOR. THE SEEMINGLY ENDLESS SERIES OF MEETINGS LED TO BICKERING AND RECRIMINATIONS IN THE CAUCUS -- DUE AS MUCH TO PERSONAL PIQUE AS TO POLITICAL POSITIONS. AT VARIOUS TIMES THE UR, BELGIUM, CANADA, AND FRANCE WERE ACCUSED OF HOLDING UP CAUCUS CONSENSUS. THE U.S. DID NOT ESCAPE ITS NIGHT IN THE BARREL. 9. THE FRENCH FACTOR. THE FRENCH, IN PAR?ICULAR, WON FEW FRIENDS AND INFLUENCED FEWER PEOPLE DURING THE SEVENTH SESSION. THE SO-CALLED FRENCH SOFT-TRANSITION OPTION, "LA TRANSITION EN DOUCEUR," WAS SO NUANCED THAT ITS INTRICACIES MYSTIFIID NOT ONLY FRANCE'S NATO PARTNERS, BUT THE FRENCH THEMSELVES. FRANCE'S LAST-MINUTE RESERVE ON THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AGREEMENT AND OPEN THREAT TO BREAK RANKS AND APPROACH THE NNA COORDINATOR, FINNISH AMBASSADOR RAHILUOTO, BILATERALLY ON ?HE CONSULTATIONS ISSUE HAD, HOWEVER, THE MOST SERIOUS RAMIFICATIONS. SEVERAL SHARP EXCHANGES OVER THIS ISSUE ERUPTED IN THE CAUCUS; THE ATMOSPHERE WAS PARTICULARLY TENSE BETWEEN BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE). SOME DELEGATIONS WONDERED ALOUD WHY THE ALLIANCE BOTHERED TO MEET IN CAUCUS AT ALL IF THE FRENCH (AND BY INFERENCE ALL OTHERS) COULD PRESENT THEIR NATIONAL VIEWS AS THEY PLEASE. ONE SPANISH DELEGATE NOTED ACIDLY, "CAN YOU IMAGINE LIVING NEXT TO END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION 3 ??*** DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN; AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL 313 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII THESE PEOPLE FOR THE LAST 100,000 YEARS?" WHILE OTHERS MANAGED TO CONTAIN THEMSELVES IN CAUCUS, FRUSTRATION AND ANGER WITH FRENCH TACTICS WERE VIRTUALLY UNIVERSAL. TO AVOID ISOLATING THE FRENCH ENTIRELY, THE U.S. PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR THEIR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION IF NOT THEIR TACTICS. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ANTICIPATE THAT LINGERING RESENTMENT WITH THE FRENCH WILL NOT QUICKLY DISSIPATE AND COULD PRESENT ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR ALLIANCE COHESION IN STOCKHOLM IN THE FUTURE. FOR THEIR PART, THE FRENCH ACTIONS SUGGEST THAT THEY WILL INCREASINGLY KEEP THEIR OWN COUNSEL AND ASSERT THEIR NATIONAL POSITION AS THE CONFERENCE PROGRESSES. ALTHOUGH WE SHARE MANY OF THEIR BASIC POSITIONS, GALLIC PRIDE AND PREROGATIVES WILL MARE FRANCE AN UNPREDICTABLE FACTOR IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. 10. AND THE .GOOD NEWS. ON A MORE POSITIVE NOTE, WHILE NATO HEADS OF DELEGATION ENGAGED IN A LONG -- AND AS YET INCONCLUSIVE -- DEBATE OVER HOW TO ORGANIZE COORDINATING TEAMS FOR THE EXPLORATORY MEETINGS IN THE EIGHTH ROUND, INFORMAL WORKING LEVEL MEETINGS AND DISCUSSIONS PAID OFF IN A GOOD FIRST WEER PERFORMANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE. A GOOD DEGREE OF COORDINATION WAS ACHIEVED IN ALL WORKING CLUSTERS, WITH A NUMBER OF WESTERN SPEAKERS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN EACH. A DIALOGUE WAS INITIATED WITH THE EAST ON A NUMBER OF KEY ISSUES WHICH PROMISES TO CLARIFY BOTH AREAS OF COMMON GROUND AND AREAS OF DIVERGENCE. AS THE SESSION CLOSED, THE ALLIANCE'S GENERAL VIEW WAS THA? WE WERE OFF TO A GOOD START IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE. THE EAST. 11. THE NEW SOVIET MAN, STOCKHOLM STYLE. THE SOVIETS WERE ON THEIR BEST BEHAVIOR THIS ROUND. WHETHER IT BE A REFLECTION OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP OR ANTICIPATION OF THE NOVEMBER SUMMIT, EVEN THE OFTEN CHURLISH SOVIET AMBASSADOR WAS UNCHARACTERISTICALLY UPBEAT IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS "RIPE" FOR GETTING DOWN TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS, GRINEVSRY DECLARED IN HIS OPENING PLENARY STATEMEN?, AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMEN? IS PREPARED TO DO ITS PART. DURING THE PROCEDURAL NEGOTIATIONS I? BECAME CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS INDEED WERE ANXIOUS TO GET DOWN TO BUSINESS -- BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF THEIR BASIC POSITIONS. WHEN THE ALLIANCE HUNG TOUGH ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS, THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED MOST OF NATO'S SUGGESTED CHANGES ON THE COMPROMISE WHICH EVENTUALLY LED TO AGREEMENT ON AN INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. IN HIS CLOSING MESSAGE, GRINEVSKY AGAIN ADOPTED AN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ACCOMMODATING TONE. PRIVATELY, HE IMPLIED NO GIVE ON SUBSTANCE. 12. NOT SO BENIGN INTENT. FROM AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE, HOWEVER, THE INTENT OF GRINEVSRY'S SOOTHING LANGUAGE IS FAR FROM BENIGN. HIS IS A MESSAGE WE HEARD AT THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT THIS AUGUST AND ONE WE UNDOUBTEDLY WILL HEAR IN GENEVA THIS NOVEMBER. IT IS A MESSAGE INTENDED FOR EUROPEAN, RATHER THAN AMERICAN, EARS: THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHO SHARE "OUR COMMON HOME" SEE THE IMPERATIVE TO "GET DOWN TO BUSINESS" IN STOCKHOLM; THE "SOVIET-FRENCH SUMMIT HAS POSITIVELY AFFEC?ED" THE WORK FOR "DETENTE IN EUROPE;" "THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FAVOR ACCELERA?ING THE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE." IF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SHOULD FAIL TO RESOLVE EAS?-WEST DIFFERENCES, ACCORDING TO THIS LOGIC, IT WOULD NOT BE THE FAULT OF THE SOVIET UNION BUT THE UNITED STATES AND ?HE PEOPLE AND NATIONS OF EUROPE WOULD BE THE LOSERS. WE HAVE PUT FORWARD REASONABLE PROPOSALS; WE HAVE SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE AND HAVE END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION 4 ??*** DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN; AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII DEMONSTRATED THE POLITICAL WILL TO NEGOTIATE, MOSCOW PROFESSES. IT IS ONLY THE "UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN NATO ALLIES" WHO "HOLD STUBBORNLY" TO POSITIONS DESIGNED TO GAIN THEM "UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES." MOSCOW'S INTENT, THEREFORE, MAY BE TO PREPARE THE PROPAGANDA GROUNDS FOR FAILURE AS MUCH AS SUCCESS. 13. DOUBLE LINKAGE. THE NON-USE OF FORCE AND INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN THE FOCAL POINTS OF EASTERN WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES. THESE SUBJECTS ARE NOT UNRELATED. THE SOVIETS ARGUE THAT PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATING A COMPLETE PACKAGE OF CSBM'S, INCLUDING GROUND ACTIVITIES, IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF THE WEST ACCEPTS NEGOTIATIONS ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL AC?IVITIES. FURTHERMORE, PROGRESS IN DRAFTING CSBM'S IS CONTINGENT ON COMPARABLE PROGRESS ON DRAFTING A NUF COMMITMENT. "NOW IS THE TIME," POLISH AMBASSADOR RONARSKI CLAIMED, "TO BEGIN DRAFTING ON NUF" (READ: WE WILL NOT BEGIN REAL DRAFTING ON CSBM'S WITHOUT AT LEAST PARALLEL PROGRESS ON NUF DRAFTING). THIS APPROACH, OF 315 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 COURSE, IS A RECIPE FOR S?ALEMATE. THE EASTERN IDEA OF LINKAGE WILL LEAD TO A PARALLELISM THAT IS MORE GEOMETRIC ("TWO PLANES THAT DO NOT INTERSECT") THAN PHILOSOPHICAL ("DEVELOPING READILY RECOGNIZED SIMILARITIES"). A MAJOR TASK DURING THE NEXT ROUND WILL BE HOW BEST TO MANAGE SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE LATERAL AND INTERNAL LINKAGE BETWEEN NUF AND CSBM'S AND BETWEEN GROUND AND INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, RESPECTIVELY. IT WILL NO? BE EASY. 14. CHTO DYELA?. IDEAS ON HOW TO BREAK THE SOVIET DOUBLE LINKAGE WERE AS NUMEROUS AND NUANCED AS THE WINES OF FRANCE. SOME DELEGATIONS SUGGEST "LURING" THE SOVIETS INTO DRAFTING ON ISSUES OF INTEREST TO US, SUCH AS NOTIFICATION, BEFORE WRITING DOWN ANYTHING ON NUF. AT AN EARLY STAGE, HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO THE FRG, WE WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE SOME OF OUR NUF LANGUAGE -- SAY THE UN CHARTER PROVISION. FROM THAT POINT ON, DRAFTING WOULD CONTINUE ON NUF AND CSBM'S AT A PACE WE CONTROLLED -- E. G., FOUR OR FIVE TIMES AS MUCH TEXT ON CSBM'S AS ON NUF. A COUPLE OF DELEGATIONS BELIEVE ?HAT THE PROPER TACTIC WOULD BE TO MAKE A "DEAL" (PREFERABLY STRUCK BEHIND THE SCENES) TRADING OFF SOMETHING ON NUF FOR SOMETHING ON CSBM'S. OTHERWISE THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE DRAFTING BECAUSE, UNDER THE HALLOWED CSCE PRINCIPLE THAT NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED, THEY CAN ALWAYS VETO DRAFTED LANGUAGE ON CSBM'S IF THEY DO NOT GET WHAT THEY WANT ON NUF. SOME OF THE "WETTER" DELEGATIONS ADVOCATE DEVELOPING A NUF ?EXT WITHIN NA?0. STILL OTHERS, PARTICULARLY FRANCE, INSIST ON A SEQUENTIAL APPROACH, I.E., STONEWALLING ON NUF WHILE PRESSING AHEAD ON CSBM'S. NUF SHOULD NOT EVEN BE CONSIDERED WITHIN NATO UNTIL THE NNA PAPERS EMERGE, THE FRENCH ARGUE; WE MAY FIND THE NNA POSITION A BETTER S?AR?ING POINT THAN A TEXT WE DRAFTED. THE BASIC TRADEOFF IN CDE WAS BETWEEN CSBM'S AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE CDE PROCESS, NOT BETWEEN NUF AND CSBM'S, ACCORDING TO SOME OF THE NATO "DRYS." WE ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THIS APPROACH. IN ADDITION, WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT DEVELOPING A COMMON NATO NUF TER? FOR POLITICAL (THE EAST SHOULD REMAIN THE DEMANDEURS ON NUF) AS WELL AS PRACTICAL (ANY NATO TEXT WOULD INVARIABLY LEAK) REASONS. THE NNA 15. THE STOCKHOLM MARATHON. THE NNA HAVE CONTINUED TO WORK FEVERISHLY BEHIND THE SCENES -- DAY, NIGHT, AND WEEKENDS -- TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE OF PAPERS FOR TABLING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH A "CORE" END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 316 Declassified in Part ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ***??< SECTION S ??*** DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN; AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBS? GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS., ROUND VII GROUP OF THREE DELEGATIONS (AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND SWEDEN) FINALLY REACHED AN ACCOMMODA?ION LATE IN THE SESSION, THEY HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO BRING FINLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA ON BOARD. THE "CORE" GROUP HAD HOPED TO SECURE AD REF AGREEMENT ON THE PACKAGE HERE IN S?OCRHOLM, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT CAPI?ALS WOULD REVIEW 'fHE PACKAGE DURING THE BREAK. A NUMBER OF S?ICRING POINTS, HOWEVER, HAVE PREVENTED SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THE HOST OPTIMISTIC OF THE NNA NOW EXPRESS "'THE HOPE" THAT THE PAPER WILL BE READY TO TABLE BY THE SECOND WEER OF THE NEXT ROUND. 16. THE COURTSHIP OF THE NNA. THE NNA'S LONG NIGHT'S JOURNEY TOWARD A CONSENSUS DOCUMEN? HAS ALLOWED US TO CONTINUE COURTING THEM. IN PUBLIC PLACES AND PRIVATE CONTACTS, WE HAVE -- WITH SOME SUCCESS -- ATTEMPTED THROUGH GENTLE PERSUASION (SOME CALL IT SEDUCTION) TO GET 'THE NNA TO HOP INTO THE WESTERN CONCEPTUAL BED. BASED MAINLY ON WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NNA HAVE MOVED TOWARD NATO'S POSITIONS BY DEFINING MANEUVERS IN THEIR PAPER TO BE LARGELY SYNONYMOUS WITH OUR OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AND ACKNOWLEDGING THAT OBSERVATION CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR VERIFICATION. HOWEVER, WHILE OUR NNA COLLEAGUES ASSURE US THAT THEIR PAPER WILL CONTAIN NO SURPRISES AND WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS, WE ARE NOT TOTALLY REASSURED. THE PORTIONS ON NUF AND CONSTRAINTS WILL MOST LIKELY POSE PROBLEMS FOR US. 17. THE STRAINS WITHIN THE NNA WERE AT ONCE UNEXPECTED AND INEVITABLE. HERETOFORE, THE NNA HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PLAY THE ROLE OF HONEST BROKER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN FORCED TO ELABORATE A COMMON SECURITY POSITION. HOWEVER, NOW, FOR THE FIRST ?IME IN HISTORY, THE NNA HAVE BEEN FORCED ?0 IDENTIFY COMMON SECURITY CONCERNS -- AND IT AIN'T EASY. (SEPTEL DESCRIBES THE CURRENT SHAPE OF THE NNA PAPERS IN DETAIL.) 18. THE FINNISH ENIGMA. THE LONG AND YET UNFINISHED ROAD TO CONSENSUS ALSO HAS TAKEN ITS TOLL ON THE NNA IN TERMS OF BO?H PERSONAL AND NATIONAL RELATIONS. MEMBERS OF THE "CORE" GROUP, FOR EXAMPLE, EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND FRUSTRATION THAT FINLAND HAS PROVEN TO BE SO DIFFICULT. THAT YUGOSLAVIA POSED PROBLEMS CAME AS NO SURPRISE. RELYING AS THEY DO ON A CONCEPT OF TERRITORIAL DEFENSE, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 THEY HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITHOUR INFORMATION MEASURE. VARYING ACCOUNTS HAVE FINLAND HIDING BEHIND YUGOSLAVIA AND VICE VERSA. THE FINNS, DISPLAYING A CERTAIN PROPRIE?ARY INTEREST -- AND A DESIRE TO BEEP THE CSCE PROCESS ALIVE -- ARE RELUC?ANT TO GO T00 FAR AFIELD FROM THE REGIME ESTABLISHED~BY THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IN ADDITION, THE FINNS MAY NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS ACCEPTING CONCEPTS WHICH ARE T00 NEW AND DIFFERENT AND HENCE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS. FINALLY SOME SOURCES ARGUE THAT FINNISH RELUCTANCE TO JOIN THE "CORE" GROUP WAS DUE TO I?S DESIRE NOT TO BE SEEN AS PART OF A PRESSURE GROUP ON YUGOSLAVIA. FINLAND HAS PLAYED A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE DURING PROCEDURAL NEGOTIATIONS. FINNISH AMBASSADOR RAHILUOTO ACTED AS HONEST BROKER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN FASHIONING THE FINAL COMPROMISE, WHICH LED TO AGREEMENT ON ENTERING INTO THE EXPLORATORY PHASE. THIS, T00, MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO FINLAND'S ROLE IN HOLDING UP THE TABLING OF THE NNA PAPERS. 19. AND THE MA3.TESE GAMBIT. IF FINLAND PLAYED ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE ON THIS QUESTION, MALTA PLAYED THE ROLE OF, WELL, MALTA. AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR, THE MALTESE SAID THAT, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM VALLETTA, IT WOULD WITHDRAW ITS CONCURRENCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT. THE MALTESE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE INFORMAL WORKING END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL ***??< SECTION 6 ??*** DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN; AND FAIR/LS - HARRY OBST GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII - STRUCTURE, ACCORDING TO RAHILUOTO, BUT RATHER WITH THE LONG-AWAITED (AND LONG DEBATED) NNA POSITION PAPERS. THEREFORE IN A CLASSIC MALTESE BARGAINING STANCE, MALTA WI?HIiELD CONSENSUS TO ENSURE THAT MALTESE VIEWS WERE ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED IN THOSE PAPERS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT MALTA WANTED THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL MOVEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE NNA PAPERS. SEVERAL NNA CONTACTS INDICATED TO US THAT YUGOSLAVIA HAD BEEN PRESSING THE MALTESE ON THIS POINT AND WERE NOT DISPLEASED WITH THE MALTESE GAMBIT. SOME OF OUR FRUSTRATED NATO COLLEAGUES OPENLY WONDERED WHETHER IT WAS NOT TIME TO PRESS MALTA THROUGH DEMARCHES OR MERELY TO IGNORE MALTA, THEREBY BREAKING THE CONSENSUS RULE. VALLETTA, NO DOUBT, WOULD HAVE LOVED THE LIMELIGHT. HAPPILY, COOLER HEADS PREVAILED AND THE NNA WERE LEFT TO DEAL WITH THEIR MALTESE ALBATROSS. THE SUSPENSE WAS Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SHOR?-LIVED, AS THE NNA WERE ABLE TO PRESSURE MALTA TO JOIN IN THE CONFERENCE CONSENSUS IN TIME FOR FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INFORMAL COMPROMISE IN WORKING GROUP AB THAT AFTERNOON (OCTOBER 14). WE THINK MALTA SIMPLY WAS SENDING THE CONFERENCE A POLITICAL SIGNAL AS IF THE 34 OTHER PARTICIPANTS COULD EVER FORGET THA? MALTA INDEED HAD ITS OWN SPECIAL PLACE IN THE CSCE PROCESS. 20. WORKING GROUPS. THE FIRST FIVE WEEKS SAW BOTH NATO AND WTO DELEGATIONS POSI?ION THEMSELVES FOR THE ANTICIPATED TRANSITION TO THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. NATO DELEGATIONS HELD THEIR GROUND WELL AND, IN OUR VIEW, THROUGH FURTHER CLARIFICATION, ENHANCED UNDERSTANDING OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE NNA. (WE WILL BE ABLE TO MEASURE OUR EFFECTIVENESS WHEN THE NNA POSITION PAPERS FINALLY EMERGE.) THE NNA WERE VIRTUALLY SILENT AS THEY WORKED FEVERISHLY BEHIND THE SCENES IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THESE PAPERS. THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO TAKE THE FLOOR REFLECTED AN INFORMAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE NNA'S NOT TO SPEAR UNLESS SPORfiN T0. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE YUGOSLAVS ON VERIFICATION AND THE CYPRIOTS ON NUF, THE NNA DISPLAYED COMMENDABLE DISCIPLINE. 21. SUBTLE SIGNALS. THE EAST HINTED AT SOME FLERIBILITY ON BOTH THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD AND THE OU?-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. WHILE REJECTING BOTH PROPOSALS AS SUBSTITUTES FOR THE TRIED-AND-TRUE TERMS AND PRACTICE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT REGIME, THE EAST LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR THESE NEW CONCEPTS TO "SUPPLEMENT" EXISTING ONES. ON THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD, THE SOVIET DELEGATION SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT IT DID NOT REJECT THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH, NOTING THAT STRUCTURAL INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED IN THE NOTIFICATION TRIGGERED BY NUMERICAL PARAMETERS. THE EAST'S PROFESSED MAJOR OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS ALONE IS BASED ON THE DISPARITY BETWEEN DIVISIONS FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. IMPLICIT IN THIS OBJECTION, HOWEVER, WAS AN INDICATION THAT A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER IN SOME RIND OF COMBINATION WITH A NUMERICAL PARAMETER MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. THE EASTERN "NON-STARTERS" VIRTUALLY DISAPPEARED FROM THE AGENDA, AS THE EAST, REALIZING THA? THE CONFERENCE'S PATIENCE WITH THESE PROPOSALS WAS RAPIDLY RUNNING OUT, FOCUSED ON "NON-USE OF FORCE." FINALLY, CERTAIN EASTERN SOURCES HAVE MADE DISCREET, AND AS YET UNCONFIRMED, NOISES THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT SOME VERY DILUTED FORM OF ON-SITE INSPECTION IN THE END GAME. 22. ON THE DOWN SIDE, THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT THE ISSUES OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION CANNOT BE DISCUSSED INDEPENDENT OF A NOTIFICATION MEASURE. IN FACT, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN THE ONLY WARSAW PACT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 DELEGATION TO SPEAR ON THIS SUBJECT THIS ROUND, END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 3Z0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ***??< SECTION 7 ??*** DEPAR?MENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN; AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII REFLECTING MOSCOW'S LACK OF TRUST IN ITS ALLIES' ABILITY TO HANDLE SENSITIVE SUBJECTS IN ANY GIVE-AND-TAKE WITH ?HE WEST. THE SOVIETS, WITH SOME ASSISTANCE FROM THEIR LOYAL GDR COLLEAGUES, ALSO HAVE CARRIED THE BALL ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, ASSERTING THAT THESE PROPOSALS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID MANDATE. THE SOVIETS HAVE, MOREOVER, REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF OBLIGATORY INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, AND THEY CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT AN OBSERVATION REGIME CANNOT BE DEVELOPED UNTIL IT IS DETERMINED WHICH ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED, AND, THUS, CANDIDATES FOR OBSERVATION. 23. WORKING GROUP DYNAMICS CHANGED FURTHER DURING THE LAST WEER OF THE ROUND AS THE CONFERENCE ENTERED INTO THE INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE. DURING THIS "TEST" RUN OF INFORMAL MEETINGS THE WEST FARED WELL AND WAS ABLE TO DIRECT DISCUSSIONS ON ITS TERMS. THE USSR, LED BY SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIROV, HOWEVER, AGGRESSIVELY ARGUED ITS CASE ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, WHILE AMBASSADOR RAKHMANINOV PLAYED THE DEMANDEUR ROLE IN THE GROUP DEALING WITH NON-USE OF FORCE. ALL IN ALL, HOWEVER, THE GIVE-AND-TARE THAT CHARACTERIZED THESE MEETINGS BODES WELL FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS DURING THE NEXT ROUND. 24. PROCEDURAL PROBLEM FOR THE NEXT ROUND. JUDGING BY WHAT WE HEAR FROM THE SOVIETS AND SOME OTHER WTO'S, THEY ARE CONSIDERING A MAJOR PROCEDURAL OFFENSIVE IN THE NEXT ROUND TO ESTABLISH THE POINT THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE CAN EXTEND ITSELF. YET THERE APPEARS TO BE NO MAJOR OBSTACLE TO SUSPENDING THE CONFERENCE BEFORE THE SEP?EMBER PREPCON FOR THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE, NATO, AND MANY NNA'S WOULD BLOCK CONCENSUS ON MEETING WHILE THE VIENNA MEETING IS IN PROGRESS, INSISTING THAT ONLY THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE ITSELF CAN DEBATE ON WHEN, AND WHETHER, CDE RESUMES. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THIS IS AN ESSENTIAL LEVERAGE ON SOVIET POSITIONS ON CSBM'S. WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE ARE SUPPORTED BY NATO, AS WELL AS ? 321 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 REY NNA'S. THIS, IN OUR VIEW, SHOULD BE A CENTRAL THEME OF DISCUSSIONS WITHIN NATO AND WITH THE NNA COUNTRIES. 25. DELIVERING MOSCOW'S MESSAGE TO STOCKHOLM. PROBLEMS WITH THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTH CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE CONFERENCE. THIS ROUND THE ISSUE HAS BEEN LESS ONE OF MALICIOUS INTENT THAN OF CAPRICIOUS INCOMPETENCE. WE HAVE SEEN IN THE PAST, AND NO DOUBT WILL SEE IN THE FUTURE, COLLUSION BETWEEN THE SOVIET-SUPPLIED RUSSIAN LINGUISTS AND THE SOVIET DELEGATION. THIS ROUND, SHEER INCOMPETENCE CAUSED US MORE PROBLEMS THAN DELIBERATE MISTRANSLATIONS. AS A RULE, THE SOVIETS HAVE ROTATED DIFFERENT INTERPRETERS THROUGH STOCKHOLM VIRTUALLY EVERY ROUND, WITH THE UNFORTUNATE RESULT THAT THEY ARRIVE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE SPECIALIZED CDE VOCABULARY AND, BY THE TIRE THEY LEARN IT, MOVE ON TO SOMETHING ELSE. EVEN THE SECRETARIAT, EVER ANXIOUS TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIETS, HAS COMPLAINED ABOUT THE FREQUENT CHANGES OF PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION, STOCKHOLM APPEARS TO BE THE PLACE WHERE INEXPERIENCED SOVIET LINGUISTS CUT THEIR TEETH AND THE SWEDISH SECRETARIAT IS NOT PAR?ICULARLY PLEASED TO HAVE THE SOVIET LINGUISTS RECEIVE THEIR ON THE JOB TRAINING IN S?OCRHOLM. AND FINALLY, THE -BAST SOVIET INTERPRETERS PRESUMABLY ARE BEING SIPHONED OFF FOR THE U.S.-SOVIET GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS. 26. AMONG OUR ALLIES, ONLY THE GERMANS AND THE BRITISH CONCUR THAT SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE TO RECTIFY THE CURRENT HIRING PRACTICES; THE OTHERS APPEAR WILLING TO END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ***??< SECTION 8 ??*** DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN; AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII FOLLOW OUR LEAD, BUT SEEM TO SEE THE PROBLEM AS A U.S.-SOVIET DISPUTE. 27. WE HAVE TALKED WITH THE SECRETARIAT FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS ABOUT ADOPTING THE SAME RECRUITMENT PRACTICES FOR RUSSIAN AS THOSE USED FOR THE OTHER FIVE LANGUAGES -- HIRING INDEPENDENT FREELANCERS. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM, BUT A NATURAL BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA ?OGETHER WITH A FATALISTIC BELIEF THAT ?HERE ARE NO COMPETENT RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION MARE THE SECRETARIAT EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO ROCK THE BOAT. THIS LATTER CONVICTION IS A LINE WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE FED INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS FOR DECADES WITH CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS -- AND TO A CERTAIN DEGREE IT HAS BECOME A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY: BECAUSE OF THE LONGSTANDING PRACTICE IN UN AND OTHER MULTILATERAL MEETINGS OF HIRING ONLY SOVIETS FOR THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTHS, GIFTED YOUNG IN?ERPRETERS HAVE BEEN DISCOURAGED BY THE LACK OF JOB PROSPECTS FROM DEVELOPING THE ABILITY TO INTERPRET INTO RUSSIAN. NONETHELESS, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED ONE SUCH GENEVA-BASED INTERPRETER, WHO COMES WELL RECOMMENDED, BUT HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE SECRETARIAT THAT ITS OWN ADVISERS IN GENEVA DO NOT RECOMMEND HER. 28. WHILE IRKSOME NOW, SOVIET CONTROL OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO IN THE FINAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE AGREED ENGLISH TEXT WILL NEED TO BE TRANSLATED INTO THE OTHER OFFICIAL LANGUAGES. WE CAN EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR RUSSIAN LANGUAGE PERSONNEL TO WIN BACK POINTS IN THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION THAT THEY LOST DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARIAT IS NOW HIRING INTERPRETERS FOR THE FIRST SESSION OF 1986. THEREFORE, ANY ASSISTANCE DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE IN IDENTIFYING QUALIFIED INDEPENDENT RUSSIAN LINGUISTS WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 323 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRE? UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08422 SUBJECT: START OF CDE ROUND VLLL L. CDE VIII - OOL 2. UNCLASSIFIED-ENTIRE TEx? 3. ROUND VIII OF CDE RESUMES TOMORROW, NOVEMBER S, IN STOCKHOLM. IT WILL CONTINUE UN?IL DECEMBER 20. 4. USDEL CDE HEAD, AMBASSADOR BARRY; HAS BEEN DELAYED IN WASHINGTON. I HAVE ASSUMED CHARGE. HANSEN END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED NNNN 324 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 085 31 SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 4, 1985 1. CDE VIII - 004 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: TEE CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING OF NOVEMBER 4 DISCUSSED RECENT OVERTURES GRINEVSRY (USSR) HAS MADE TO SEVERAL ALLIED DELEGATIONS CONCERNING THE POSSIBLILITY OF THE CDE ESTABLISHING ITS OWN RESUMPTION DATE. CAUCUS CONSENSUS WAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE CDE DOES NOT HAVE THIS AUTHORITY. WITH REGARD TD THE ANTICIPATED NNA PAPER, THE CAUCUS DETERMINED THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO POCKET ANY POSITIVE POINTS, BUT SHOULD AVOID APPEARING OVERLY ENTHUSIASTIC. DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDAR WAS GENERALLY INCONCLUSIVE, BUT JANUARY 21 DID EMERGE AS THE MOST LIKELY DATE FOR CONVENING THE NINTH SESSION. NORWAY AND DENMARK ARGUED ,THAT NO "ARTIFICIAL" CUTOFF DATE FOR THE CDE SHOULD BE SET PRIOR ?0 THE START OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 4 FOR POLITICAL REASONS, WHILE THE U.S. AND FRANCE COUNTERED THAT THE CDE SHOULD NOT CONTINUE BEYOND SEPTEMBER 19 AT THE LATEST TO DEMONSTRATE THAT CDE IS SUBORDINATE TO THE FULL CSCE. END SUMMARY. 4. CONTACTS: THE NATO CDE CAUCUS HELD ITS FIRST SESSION OF THE EIGHTH ROUND ON NOVEMBER 4. MELLBIN (DENMARK) REPORTED~ON GRINEVSRY'S VISIT TO COPENHAGEN OCTOBER 20-21, DURING WHICH GRINEVSRY INDICATED THAT ?AERE WAS NO NEED TO LIMIT THE COORDINATORS FOR THE CDE DRAFTING PHASE TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NNA, BUT THAT NATO AND WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE FORTHCOMING NNA PAPER SHOULD NEITHER BE CONSIDERED AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING NOR AS A COMPROMISE DOCUMENT. U.S. DEPREP HANSEN (THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY), BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS), AND CITRON (FRG) ALL REPORTED THAT GRINEVSRY HAD PROBED WESTERN VIEWS ON THE POSSIBLILITY OF THE CDE SETTING ITS OWN RESUMP?ION DATE. U.S. AMBASSADOR BARRY, HANSEN SAID, FIRMLY REJECTED THE SOVIET SUGGESTION. 5. NNA PAPER: IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF HOW BEST TO HANDLE THE ANTICIPATED NNA PAPER, EDES (UR) AND BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) ADVISED THAT NATO SHOULD NOT APPEAR T00 ENTHUSIASTIC OVER ITS POSITIVE ELEMENTS, AS OVEREAGER SUPPORT WOULD COMPLICATE THE NNA'S POSITION AT A TIME WHEN SOME NNA MEMBERS (NOTABLY FINLAND) ALREADY FEAR THA? THE PAPER TILTS T00 FAR TOWARD THE WEST. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH BUWALDA'S SUGGESTION FOR THE NEAR TERM THAT, WHILE WE SHOULD POCKET THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS OF THE NNA POSITION, IN WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WE SHOULD NOTE ONLY THOSE POINTS OF SC.1 WHICH ARE MISSING AND OVERLOOK S1t1iLARITIES WITH THE WESTERN PACKAGE OF CSBM'S. 6. CALENDAR FOR 1986: A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDAR WAS, OF COURSE, LARGELY INCONCLUSIVE BUT, ON A 325 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET FUNDAMENTAL POINT, PRODUCED CONSENSUS THAT, CONTRARY TO GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL, THE CDE DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SET ITS OWN RESUMPTION DATE. THERE WAS ALSO GENERAL AGREEMENT (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FRENCH, WHO ARE PUSHING FOR JANUARY 14) THAT JANUARY 21 IS THE EARLIEST REASONABLE DATE TO STAR? THE NINTH SESSION IN ORDER TO ALLOW TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS IN CAPITALS AND A POSSIBLE MEETING IN BRUSSELS. THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC SCHED[TLE FOR 1986, AS DELEGATIONS CONTINUE TO WRESTLE WITH DIVERGENT HOLIDAY, TRAVEL TIME REQUIREMENTS, ETC. TURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF AN ENDING DATE FOR CDE, SOME DELEGATIONS (NOTABLY DENMARK AND NORWAY) WANTED TO AVOID CREATING ANY "ARTIFICIAL" CUTOFF DATE, WHICH, IN THEIR VIEW, COULD CREATE POLITICAL DANGERS FOR THE ALLIANCE, AND WERE PREPARED TO STAY IN SESSION UNTIL NOVEMBER 4. THE U.S. AND FRANCE STRONGLY OPPOSED THIS LINE AND ARGUED THAT STOCKHOLM MUST BE SUSPENDED BY SEPTEMBER 19 (IN FACT, FRANCE SUPPORTS ONLY A TECHNICAL SESSION AFTER THE FRENCH CUTOFF DATE OF JULY 18) IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THE PROPER SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENT (CSCE) AND CHILD (CDE). IT WAS AGREED TO RETURN TO THIS SUBJEC? A? A FUTURE CAUCUS. HANSEN END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 326 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CONF IDENT IALSTOCRHOLM09615 SUBJECT: CDE DRAFTING AUTHORITY REF: STATE 30L425 L. CDE VIII - 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT 3. SUMMARY: WHEN CDE RECONVENES IN LA?E JANUARY, TIME LEFT FOR NEGOTIATING A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT BEFORE THE VIENNA PREPCON WILL BE VERY LIMITED. IN ORDER TO GET AS SUBSTANTIVE AN AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE AND TO MINIMIZE LAST-MINUTE PRESSURES TO AGREE TO UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE OR A MINI-PACKAGE, USDEL CDE BELIEVES IT NOW NEEDS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO DRAF? DURING THE NEXT ROUND (IR). DRAFTING, OF COURSE, WILL BE AD REFERENDUM TO CAPITALS, AND THE PRINCIPLE THAT NOTHING IS AGREED .UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED WILL BE OBSERVED. CF. ACTION REQUEST PARR 7 AND OSD NOTE PARR 8. END SUMMARY. 4. USDEL CDE BELIEVES THAT, FOR TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS, IT MUST CONSOLIDATE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT EARLY ON AS MANY OF OUR CSBM POSITIONS AS POSSIBLE. TIME IS GROWING SHORT IN WHICH TO NEGOTIATE THE COMPLEX ISSUES WHICH MUST BE SETTLED IF A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT IS TO BE ACHIEVED BEFORE THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING BEGINS IN FALL, L986. 5. THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE IN CDE IS AN AGREEMENT WHICH EMPHASIZES THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) PRINCIPLE AND EXTENDS THE CSBM ZONE THROUGH INCLUSION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES, WHILE REDUCING TO A MINIMUM THE SUBSTANCE OF ANY CSBMS. AWARE THAT T$EY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO WIN EXTENSION OF THE ZONE, THE SOVIETS ARE PURSUING THIS COURSE TO ENSURE A MINIMALIST OUTCOME TO CDE. AS PART OF THEIR TACTIC, THEY ARE NOW SPREADING THE WORD THAT REY DECISIONS ON CDE WILL BE MADE AT THE NEXT US-SOVIET SUMMIT IN JUNE, L986. SIMILARLY, THEIR TACTICS ON THE WORK PROGRAM FOR L986 SUGGEST THAT THEY PLAN TO "END-LOAD" THE NEGOTIATIONS BY HARING THEIR MINIMAL CONCESSIONS IN THE SUMMER AND PRESSING FOR A LAST FRANTIC EFFORT TO RESCUE SOMETHING BEFORE VIENNA CONVENES. 6. SUCH A SITUATION WOULD PUT US IN A DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION. UNTIL WE ARE ABLE TO CONFRONT CONFERENCE ISSUES HEAD-ON IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO PIN DOWN THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF GREATEST INTEREST TO US. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO RECORD AS MUCH AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE ON SUBSTANCE BEFORE THE NEXT US-SOVIET SUMMIT SO THAT WE WILL HAVE A CLEAR IDEA AS TO WHETHER AN AGREEMENT IS IN REACH AT ALL. WHAT WE WANT TO AVOID IS HEADING INTO A SUMMIT WITH ALL THE REY ISSUES OPEN AND ENDING UP "TRADING" CONCESSIONS THERE AMONG CDE ISSUES, AS WELL AS BETWEEN CDE AND OTHER ISSUES. BECAUSE OF THE 327 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET COMPLEXITY (IF NOT TO SAY IMPENETRABILITY) OF CDE ISSUES AND THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT ASPECTS, USDEL WANTS TO KEEP CDE OUT OF THE SUMMIT VORTEX AS MUCH AS WE CAN. BUT, WITH PROBABLY ONLY FOURTEEN WEEKS IN OUR L986 WORK PROGRAM BEFORE THE SUMMIT, THERE ISN'T MUCH TIME REMAINING. 7. IN KEEPING WITH THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFTEL, USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE CDE IG WHICH WILL BEET IN EARLY JANUARY SHOULD AUTHORIZE DRAFTING. ALL TEXT WILL EMERGE FROM THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS AD REFERENDUM. ON THE BASIS OF THE ESTABLISHED CSCE PRINCIPLE, NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL ALL IS AGREED. 8. NOTE: THE ABOVE IS THE POSITION OF ALL USDEL AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES EXCEPT THE OSD REP. THE POSITION OF ?HE OSD REP IS THAT THE ISSUE OF DRAFTING SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE JANUARY IG AND THAT THE IG SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR DRAFTING IN CDE HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. END NOTE. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 328 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08530 SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STA?EMENTS, NOVEMBER 5 1. CDE VIII - 003 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT 3. BEGIN SUM?'.ARY: AT THE NOVEMBER 5 PLENARY, THE WEST (FRG, FRANCE, NORWAY) FOCUSED ON REY UNRESOLVED SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH REQUIRE CLOSER ATTENTION BEFORE MOVING INTO DRAFTING. THE EAS? (BULGARIA, USSR) ARGUED THAT THE WEST MUST DISPLAY THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY IN ORDER TO MARE FURTHER PROGRESS. AUSTRIA SUGGESTED AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS BE LINRID TO LIMITATION MEASURES AND COMMUNICATION/RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. END SUMMARY. 4. AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) SAID HIS DELEGATION WOULD "WELCOME A TEST RUN OF DRAFTING ALREADY THIS YEAR." HE OUTLINED SOME REY AREAS OF "REAL" COMMON GROUND WHICH NEED DETAILED DISCUSSION IF WE ARE TO HOVE INTO A "TEST RUN OF DRAFTING THIS YEAR." THESE AREAS INCLUDE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY; AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS; AND AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF VERIFICATION. CITRON STRESSED THAT NTM ALONE CANNOT SERVE AS A REFERENCE POINT FOR COMPLIANCE OF AN AGREED CSBM. HE CAUTIONED THE EAST AGAINST INSISTING ON NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AS ?A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATION: 5. AMBASSADOR MEVIR (NORWAY) SAID HIS DELEGATION, LIRE THE FRG, WOULD LIRE "AT LEAST SOME WEEKS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE DRAF?ING MODE" THIS YEAR; HE ALSO STRESSED SUBSTANTIVE AREAS WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IF WE ARE 7`0 DRAFT "WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY." WITHIN THE "CORE" AREA OF COMMON GROUND, I.E., NOTIFICATION, MEVIR POINTED OUT THREE ISSUES WITH WHICH THE CONFERENCE RUST STILL CORE TO GRIPS 1) THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT; 2) USE OF THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH AS THE MAIN NOTIFICATION PARAMETER, UNDERPINNED BY A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD, FIRST FOR EQUIPMENT AND SECONDARY FOR TROOPS; AND 3) A LOWER THRESHOLD FOR AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES. THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO SUPPORTED AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS, DISCUSSION OF "BALANCED CONSTRAINING MEASURES," ADEQUATE VERIFICATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, OBSERVATION AND A REAFFIRMATION OF NON-USE OF FORCE. MEVIR MADE THREE POINTS OF PROCEDURE: 1) WE MUST AVOID PROCEDURAL EXERCISES IN THE FUTURE WHICH WILL DELAY PROGRESS; 2) THERE NEEDS TO BE A SMOOTH TRANSITION INTO DRAFTING, WI?H SOME WEEKS OF EXPERIENCE IN DRAFTING BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR; AND 3) WE SHOULD REACH AN AGREEMENT "IN GOOD TIME BEFORE VIENNA BUT WITH NO ARTIFICIAL DEADLINE." (BEGIN COMMENT: ON THESE LAST TWO POINTS, NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE CAUCUS. 329 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET END COMMENT.) 6. AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) REFUSED TO ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH THOSE WHO CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE HOVE TO DRAFTING. HE ARGUED THAT DRAFTING CANNOT BE CONJURED UP AS A MANIFESTATION OF PROGRESS; RATHER, PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DETERMINE T8E POSSIBILITIES FOR DRAFTING. IN THIS CONTEXT, GASCHIGNARD COlQ~F.NTED THAT A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN AREAS WHERE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN EXPRESSED AND THOSE AREAS WHERE THAT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE. AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION, AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION FALL INTO THE FIRST CATEGORY~AND SHOULD FIGURE IN A FINAL AGREEMENT. THE SITUATION IS DIFFERENT FOR EXISTING PROPOSALS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE, HE SAID, ALTHOUGH FRANCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE A NUF REAFFIRMATION FROM AN AGREEMENT. HE LATER SAID SUCH A REAFFIRMATION WOULD BE A FUNCTION OF CSBM'S, NOT A CSBM ITSELF. THE SITUATION IS "RADICALLY FROM USDEL PM/CDE FOR AMBASSADOR BARRY E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STA?EMENTS, NOVEMBER 5 DIFFERENT" FOR PROPOSALS FOR CEILINGS ON THE SCALE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ABOUT WHICH A NUMBER OF DELEGA?IONS, INCLUDING HIS OWN, HAVF. SERIOUS RESERVATIONS, BECAUSE CEILINGS PRESUPPOSE LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE AND TRANSPARENCY WHICH ARE NOT PRESENT TODAY. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE STUDYING CONSTRAINTS FORMULAS, BUT REJECTED REDUCING CONSTRAINTS TO CEILINGS. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CATEGORICALLY REJECTED CONSIDERATION OF A "POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY" WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CSBM'S BECAUSE 1) SUCH A MECHANISM CANNOT CONSTITUTE A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE, AND 2) CSCE STATES AGREED TWELVE YEARS AGO TO HOLD PERIODIC REVIEW MEETINGS TO EXAMINE THE OVERALL PROCESS OF CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION, AND 3) FRANCE CANNOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE SUGGESTION THAT CONSUL?ATIONS BE INTEGRATED INTO CSBM'S OR EVEN SUBSTITUTE FOR SUCH CSBM'S AS INFORMATION OR VERIFICATION. TURNING TO THE WORK SCHEDULE FOR 1986, GASCHIGNARD ELABORATED THE FRENCH POSITION IN SUBSTANTIAL DETAIL: THERE SHOULD BE THREE?OR FOUR SESSIONS BEFORE JULY; A POLITICAL AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE WOULD BE NEEDED BY THE END OF THE SPRING; IN JULY, IF NECESSARY, A DECISION COULD BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS TO HOLD A FINAL SESSION BEFORE THE PREPCON TO WORK ON TERTS. (BEGIN COMMENT: ALL THREE WESTERN SPEAKERS, WHILE DEFENDING THE ALLIANCE POSITION, LAID DOWN CLEAR NATIONAL MARKERS IN TERMS OF THEIR PRIORITIES ? 330 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET AND OUTLOOK TOWARD THE CONFERENCE. NORWAY AND FRG, FOR EXAMPLE, DISPLAYED AN URGENCY TO MOVE QUICKLY INTO DRAFTING, WHEREAS FRANCE MADE IT CLEAR IT REJECTED A TIME?ABLE FOR DRAFTING. END COMMENT.) 7. AMBASSADOR TODOROV (BULGARIA) REVIEWED THE DECLARATION OF THE OCTOBER 22-23 WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN SOFIA. AF?ER HIS LONG SUMMARY OF THE MEETING, HE HAILED AN ELABORATION OF NON-USE OF FORCE AS THE "MOST IMPORTANT" WORK OF THE STOCRHOLIi CONFERENCE. TODOROV SUGGESTED AGREEMENT BE REACHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON A TRANSITION PERIOD INTO DRAFTING, AND THAT A START BE MADE ON DRAFTING TEXTS OF MUTUALLY ACCEP?ABLE ACCORDS. 8. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSRY (USSR) MADE TWO POINTS IN A RIGHT OF REPLY TO CITRON'S STATEMENT: 1) CITRON'S EMPHASIS ON NATO PROPOSALS OMITTED THE IMPORTANT AREAS OF NUF AND CONSTRAINTS; IS CITRON'S DEFINITION OF COMMON GROUND, INCLUDING NUF AND CONSTRAINTS, NOT A DEPARTURE FROM THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE ON ALL OUTLINED AREAS? AND 2) "PRACTICALLY ALL SIDES" HAVE SAID THEY WELCOME GORBACHEV'S READINESS TO EXCHANGE MILITARY CALENDARS, BU? WHERE IS NATO'S RECIPROCAL MOVEMENT? NATO HAS DONE NOTHING TO ADVANCE THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE, GRINEVSRY CLAIMED. AFTER HARING THESE POINTS, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON NATO TO GIVE UP THE "ILLUSION" ?HAT THERE CAN BE ONE-WAY NEGOTIATIONS. IN A DEFENSIVE RESPONSE, CITRON SAID HE HAD NOT SOUGHT TO INCORPORATE ALL AREAS OF COMMON GROUND IN HIS COMMENTS, BUT PREFERRED INSTEAD TO FOCUS ON A FEW KEY AREAS. CITRON ADDED THAT HE HOPED THESE REMARKS WOULD "APPEASE" THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. HANSEN END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 331 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Unofficial translation by Ambassador Stephan Tododrov, Head of the Bulgarian Delegation to the CSCE Stockholm Conference Plenary, November 5, I985 Mr. Chairman, On October 2T and 23 in Sofia took place the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty, in which the highest ranking representatives of the member-states participated. In the capital of Bulgaria the States-members to the Warsaw Treaty again reaffirmed the top priority they attach to the betterment of the political climate in Europe and in the world, to the averting of the nuclear threat overshadowing Europe.and the world. As it is stated in the Declaration adopted at the meeting, the worsening of international tension has moved closer to the point beyond which events may get out of control. The spiral of the arms race is raising impetuously. The reasons of this state of affairs are well-known to everyone. Particularly alarming is the threat of the arms race spreading to outer space which would lead to a destabilisation of the overall strategic situation. Even the layman is well aware that this would pose a particular threat to Europe. The Sofia Declaration reaffirms - under no circumstances will the Warsaw Treaty member-sates sacrifice the security of their peoples. At the same time however they are firmly opposed to the arms race and its escalation and declare themselves in favour of securing a balance of power at the lowest level. The principal objective of their foreign policy has always been the removal of the danger of nuclear war, the lowering of the level of military confrontation and the development of international relations in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and detente. A positive turn in the international situation demands a new 332 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET political approach corresponding to the realities of the present- day world. Aa it was underlined at the meeting, such an approach should be based on mutual restraint and responsibility, on taking into account the legitimate interests of all, on predictability both in the political as well as in the military spheres. Full support was expressed at the meeting to the recent initiatives of the Soviet :Jnion submitted at the Soviet-American Geneva negotiations on the whole complex of space and nuclear issues. The moratoria in the sphere of nuclear weapons, declared by the Soviet Union, were also supported. The conviction was voiced that the undertaking of similar actions by the United States would be an important prerequisite for achieving results in the field of disarmament. Tha leaders of the allied socialist States believe that the upcoming Soviet-American summit should contribute to allaying the present-day dangerous tensions in the world, to diminishing the military threat, to achieving mutually acceptable decisions aimed at curbing the arms race and real progress towards disarmament. To achieve a positive shift in the international relations it is necessary to put an end to the power politics and confrontation. All States should abide strictly by the principles of respect for national independence and sovereignity, non-use of force or threat of force, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, a peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, equality of rights and other universally acknowledged norms in international relations. Slander campaigns giving a distorted account of the situation in some countries or others and of their politics are inadmissible By proposing a wide-ranging sat of measures and means to overcome the tensions in the present-day political situation the Warsaw Treaty member-states pointed out that?they were guided by the SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 premise thst ideological differencies should not be transferred into interstate relations and thus undermine their stability, and the energetic interaction between all States and between all forces which stand for a normalisation of the international situation is today more necessary than ever before. As for the political and military situation on our continent the leaders of the allied States declared that an exceedingly important aspect of the drive for eliminating the nuclear menace is checking the present dangerous course of events and lowering the level of military course in Europe. They were guided by the understanding that European security and interna- tional security as a w~iola cannot be achieved by military means or by military force. Stable peace on the continent can be secured only through detente, disarmament, the strenghtening of confidence and the promotion of international cooperation. In this context the participants in the Sofia meeting called again for major complementary measures, both political and military to be mapped out in the nearest future at the Stockholm Conference, aimed at strenghtening confidence and security in Europe. The States-members to the Warsaw Treaty emphasized again the great importance of the Conference of the leaders of the European States, the USA and Canada held ten years ago that adopted the most important principles and provisions on which security and cooperation were to be built, and reaffirmed their readiness to continua to participate constructively in the work of the European fora. Th? Helsinki Final Act, permeated by the spirit of detente has stood the test of time, and as the recent meeting of foreign ministers in Helsinki proved, remains a long-term programme for European cooperation. It was underlined at the meeting that at the present moment it is vitally important to strenghten mutual confidence, to deepen on the basis of the Final Act the political dialogue between the European countries in various fields, by various forms and at va:'ioua levels on the interest of healing the climate on the continent. 334 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET various levels in the interest of healing the climate on the continent. It was confirmed that the participants in the meeting intend to further their efforts so that the many-sided process which began in Helsinki should develop in a steady and balanced manner. The forthcoming meeting in Vienna in I986 of the participating States in the all-European conference is called upon to play a major role in this respect. It was also stated that the Warsaw Treaty member-states invariably declare for a consistent trans- lation into practice of all principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act by the signatory parties. The development of inter-State relations on such a basis would help to make Europe a continent of lasting peace and mutually advantageous cooperation The concrete initiatives launched by the participants at the Sofia meeting are contained at the published Declaration which the Bulgarian Delegation has the honour to submit in full extent to the attention of all participants to the Stockholm Conference. "The Declaration which we have adopted - stated the Secretary General of the CC of the BCP and President of the State Council of thi'PR?Bulgaria Todor Zhivkov - represents a wide-ranging platform, a realistic understanding of what is necessary to do in order to achieve a positive turn in the European and inter- national situation". Mr. Chairman, The eighth session of the Stockholm Conference, in the opinion of the Bulgarian Delegation, starts its work in a moment when in the international and European context a tendency is gaining momentum to overcome the logic of confrontation. The political dialogue between state and political leaders of East and West has become more intensive. Representatives of various circles SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Q Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08549 SUBJECT: GERMAN TV INTERVIEW WITH USDEL CDE DEPUTY 1. CDE VIII - 006 ' 2. WEST GERMAN TELEVISION'S CHANNEL 2 OF MAINZ HAS INTERVIEWED USDEL CDE DEPUTY LYNN HANSEN ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CDE AND THE UPCOMING GENEVA MEETING. THE INTERVIEW WILL BE AIRED ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15, AS PART OF A LONGER STORY ON EUROPEAN SECURITY. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY EVALUATION AMEMBASSY BONN MIGHT HAVE OF THE PROGRAM AND THE HANDLING OF THE INTERVIEW. HANSEN END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED NNNN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08583 SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 6, 1985 1. CDE VIII - 007 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: STANDAERT (BELGIUM) REPORTED ON A MEETING IN MOSCOW DURING THE CDE INTERSESSION BETWEEN THE BEi:GIAN Al83ASSADOR TO THE USSR AND SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY IN WHICH GRINEVSKY RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING A CDE SKELETON AGREEMENT IN THE SPRING OF 1986 AND THEN HAVING A MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING LATER TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. CAUCUS REACTION WAS HIGHLY NEGATIVE TO THIS IDEA. CANADA REOPENED THE DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDAR BY PROVIDING OTTAWA'S VIEW THAT A TEXTUAL READING OF THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS INDICATES THAT THE CDE COULD CONTINUE UP TO OR BEYOND NOVEMBER 4 IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN. THIS INTERPRETATION WAS MET WITH VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS NEGATIVE REACTION, SPEARHEADED BY FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. END SUINIARY. 4. CONTACTS: THE NOVEMBER 6 NATO CAUCUS MEETING OPENED WITH STANDAERT (BELGIUM) REPORTING ON A MEETING IN MOSCOW BETWEEN TIDr BELGIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR AND SOVIET CDE AlH3ASSADOR GRINEVSKY DURING THE INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD. GRINEVSKY MADE THREE POINTS AT THE MEETING: 1) CDE IS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL CONFERENCE, THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT WE SI~OULD NOT BE BOUND BY A STRICT TECHNICAL READING OF THE MADRID MANDATE; 2) THE USSR ATTACHES GREAT IMPOR- TANCE TO THE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, WHICH IT VIEWS AS A REAL THREAT TO SECURITY IN EUROPE; AND 3) HE (GRINEVSKY) IS THINKING ABOUT ACHIEVING A SKELETON CDE AGREEMENT IN THE SPRING, WITH OUTSTANDING ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED AT A POSSIBLE MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) INDICATED THAT GRINEVSKY HAD MADE THE SAME NOISES ABOUT A MINISTERIAL TO HIM SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, ALTHOUGH AT THAT TIME HE HAD REFERRED TO A VICE-MINISTERS' MEETING. IN RESPONSE TO THESE REPORTS, CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) OBSERVED THAT A CDE MINISTERIAL WOULD SERVE WELL THE SOVIET INTEREST IN DIMINISHING THE STATURE OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE. CITRON (FRG) ADVISED THAT WE MAKE IT KNOWN TO GRINEVSKY EARLY ON THAT THIS IDEA WON'T FLY. 5. 1986 CALENDAR: DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDAR WAS REJOINED WHEN, ON INSTRUCTIONS, ANSTIS (CANADIAN DEPREP), EXPRESSED OTTAWA'S VIEW THAT A PURELY TEXTUAL READING OF THE MANDATE AND DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI PREPARATORY MEETING DO NOT SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT THE CDE MUST ADJOURN BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE BEGINS, NO MATTER HOW DESIRABLE THAT GOAL MAY BE. A CONSENSUS WILL BE REQUIRED TO ADJOURN THE CONFERENCE, ANSTIS OBSERVED-AND, AS THIS Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 WILL BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE CONTINGENCY OF WORKING UP TO (OR Et1EN BEYOND) NOVEMBER 4. IN ORDER TO AVOID PROCEDURAL HASSLES, OTTAWA FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT WE ONLY SCHEDULE FOR NEXT YEAR ON A SBSSION-BY-SESSION BASIS. WIT$ THE EYCEPTION OF MELLBIN (DENMARK), WHO SUPPORTED OTTAWA'S INTERPRETA- TIONS, CAUCUS SENTIMENT WAS CLEARLY IN OPPOSITION TO OTTAWA'S VIEWS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH UK AND FRG STATEMENTS THAT THE 1986 CALENDAR SHOULD BE AGREED UPON IBIS SESSION AND NOT ON A SESSION-BY-SESSION BASIS WHICH COULD CREATE MORE PROCEDURAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS. CANADA'S INTERPRETATION THAT THE CONFERENCE GOES ON UNLESS THERE IS CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN MET WITH SIMILARLY NEGATIVE REACTION. FtANSEN (U.S.) INDICATED TEAT WASHINGTON WAS CONVINCED THAT THE CDE COULD NOT PROGRESS BEYOND THIS FIRST STAGE WITHOUT A DECISION FROM VIENNA AND THAT WE WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTINUE SIN STOCKHOLM AFTER THE VIENNA MEETING BEGINS. HE ALSO STRESS? AGAIN THAT THE U.S. STRONGLY FAVORS A "NATURAL" CUTOFF DATE OF SEPTEMBER 19, I.E., BEFORE THE VIENNA PREPCON. CITRON (FRG) CONCLUDED TIR; DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT THE EAST IS APPARENTLY WILLING TO ACCEPT A CUTOFF DATE, AND HE "PLEADED" THAT WE USE THIS FACT TO QUIETLY AND QUICKLY SET TBE 1986 CALENDAR (FOR CITRON, WHD HAS A MARKED TENDENCY TO CAST HIS REQUESTS OF THE CAUCUS AS "PLEAS," THIS WAS HIS THIRD SUCH "PLEA" OF THE AFTERNOON, THUS GIVING HIM BIS FIRST "BAT TRICK" OF TBE EIGHTH SESSION). ANSTIS PROMISED TO REPORT TBE CAUCUS' REACTION TO OTTAWA AND ADDED TEAT OTTAWA WOULD WELCOME ANY INTER- PRETATION OF THE RELEVANT TE%TS THAT SUPPORTS NATO'S POLITICAL VIEWS ON ADJOORNING THE CDE. DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC DATES FOR THE 1986 SESSIONS MEANDERED ON WITHOUT CONCLUSION. END 346 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CONFIDENTIAL STOCKI~LM 08642 SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 8, 1985 REF: STOCKHOLM 8583 ~. c~ vill - o>> 2. C -ENTIRE TEXT 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING OF NOVEMBER 8 FAVORABLY REVIEWED WESTERN PERFORMANCE TO DATB IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT TBERE WAS ROOM FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN ALLIANCE COORDINATION. THE MOST PRCSSING ISSUE WAS HOW TO FEND OFF EASTERN QUCSTIONS ON THE DETAILS OF NOTIFICATION, OOSERVATION AND VERIFICATION FOR AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO GROUND ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THE CAUCUS REFERRED THIS MATTER TO THE OBSER- VATION WORKING GROUP MINICLUSTER FOR STUDY, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS WOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR IMMEDIATE USE, WHILE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS GOING BEYOND SC.1 WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE AND CAPITALS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION. END SUMMARY. 4. CONTACTS: MEVIK (NORWAY) REPORTED ON A NOVEMBER 6 LUNCS WITH GRINEVSKY (USSR), WlE~O HAD EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT FIVE COORDINATORS WOULD BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE Nt1MBER FOR THE DRAFTING PHASE, DRAWING THREE FROM THE NNA, ONE FROM NATO, AND ONE FROM THE WARSAW PACT. HE ADDED TEAT IN TBE END HE COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT ONLY TWO NNA COORDINATORS (AS NATO FAVORS), BUT THAT IT QUICKLY WOULD BECOME APPARENT THAT THERE WAS T00 MUCH WORK FOR TWO PEOPLE. GRINEVSKY HAD ONCE AGAIN DISCUSSED HIS IDEA OF ACHIEVING A SKELETON AGREEMENT BY MAY OF NEXT YEAR BUT HAD TOLD MEVIK THAT OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES COULD BE RESOLVED BY HIGH LEVEL BILATERAL CONTACTS RATHER THAN AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING HE HAD MENTIONED TO EARLIER NATO INTERLOCUTORS (REFTEL). HE HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT THE MAIN OBSTACLE HE SAW TO AN AGREEMENT WAS THE WESTERN EXCLUSION OF THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A NOTIFICATION REGIME. 5. REVIEW OF INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS: THE MAIN AGENDA ITEM WAS A DISCUSSION OF NATO PERFORMANCE AND 000RDINA- TION IN TBE INFORMAL MEETINGS TO DATE (BACKGROUND: THE DUTCH, INTER ALIA, HAVE BEEN PUSHING THE CAUCUS TO CONSIDER A MORE FORMAL APPROACH TO THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS, I.E., TEAMS DE FILE, IN ORDER TO SMOOTH THE TRANSITION TO THE DRAFTING PHASE, PRESUMABLY LATER THIS ROUND). GUNDERSEN (U.S.) STRESSED THAT THE FIRST WEEK OF THE EXPLORATORY PHASE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTIVE AND WOULD BE BUILT UPON IN FUTURE INFORMAL MEETINGS. SINCE THIS WAS JUST THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, BY DEFINITION A TIME OF TRIAL AND ERROR, WE SHOULD USE THIS PHASE TO IMPROVE OUR COORDINATION AND DISCIPLINE AND TO 347 SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 FOCUS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THERE WAS, IN OTHER WORDS, NO NEED TO DISCUSS MOVING OEYOND THE EXPLORATORY PHASE A? THE PRESENT TIME. PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE DISCUSSION WERE THAT: 1) NATO HA3 TURNED IN A GENERALLY GOOD PERFORMANCE ALTHOUGH COORDINATION COULD BE TIGHTENED SOMEWHAT AND DELEGATES COULD SHOW MORE RESTRAINT IN RISING TO EASTERN BAIT; 2) THE EXPLORATORY PHASE HAS BEEN VALUABLE IN ALLOWING THE WEST TO PROMOTE FURTHER ITS PROPOSALS AND AS AN EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN PREPARATION FOR DRAFTING; 3) NATO SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONDUCT A HOLD- ING OPERA?ION IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE CLUSTER; AND 4) OUR POSITION NEED3 TO BE FURTHER DEVELOPED ON NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO GROUND ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. ON THE LAST POINT EDES (UK) POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE ON THE DEFENSIVE; THE EAST HAS ASKED QUESTIONS, AND WE HAVE HAD NO ANSWERS. THE CAUCUS AGREED THAT THE NATO MINICLUSTER FOR THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP SHOULD EXAMINE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND CONSIDER THE CONTENT OF RELATED NOTIFICA- TION AND METHODS OF OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION. THE NETHERLANDS AND SPAIN SUGGESTED THAT THESE QUESTIONS BE REFERRED TO THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE IN BRUSSELS, BUT CITRON (FRG) ARGUED THAT THEY SHOULD BE ADDRESSED HERE FIRST. BLANK (U.S.) CAUTIONED THAT, WHILE THE MINI- CLUSTER COULD DEVELOP DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS TO BE USED IN REPONSE TO EASTERN QUESTIONS, NATO MILITARY COMMANDERS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSULTED BEFORE WE COULD SAY ANYTHING IN 3TOCKH0LM ON THE MODALITIES OF NOTIFICATION, OBSERVA- TION AND VERIFICATION OF FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES THAT WENT BEYOND SC.1. THE CAUCUS DIRCCTED THE MINICLUSTER TO PROCEED WITH ITS STUDY BUT THAT ONLY NEW DEFENSIVE AGRUlU+NTS WOULD OE USED NOW, WHILE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS ARISING FROM ITS CONSIDERATION WOULD BE REFERRED TO BRUSSELS AND CAPITALS FOR FURTHER STUDY. END Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKE~OLM 086411 SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, - NOVEMBER 5-8, 1985 1. CDE VIII - 015 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE EIGHTH ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM O0~4'E~iCE OPENED WITH HIGH EXPECTATIONS AND LOW THEATER. WITH THE ADVENT OF A MORE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AND ON THE EVE OF THE U.S.-USSR SUM!lIT, MANY CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS HOLD HIGH EXPECTATIONS THAT THE EIGHTH ROUND WILL LEAD TO DRAFTING BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. THE EAST, PLAYING TO THE PUBLIC -- AND NNA -- GALLERY, DISPLAYED A THEATRICAL SI~W OF IMPATIENCE WITH THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD DRAFTING, ESPECIALLY ON NON-USE OF FORCE AND PRESSED FOR THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN A CSBM'S REGIME. MEANWHILE, THE MUCH BALLYHOOED AND FREQUENTLY DELAYED CONFERENCE OPENING OF THE NNA PACKAGE IS STILL STRUGGLING ON THE ROAD, ESPECIALLY IN BELGRADE AND HELSINKI. THE WEST, IF NOT TOTALLY SATISFIED WITH THE ALLIANCE'S OPENING WEEK PERFORMANCES, SEEMS CONTENT TO USE THE E%PLORATORY PHASE TO PROMOTE ITS PROPOSALS AND TO IMPROVE ITS ORGANIZATION. END SUMMARY. 4. NATO: GOT A DATE? DURING THE INTERSESSIONAL BREAK, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY PROCED FOR WESTERN WEAKNESSES ON THE QUESTION OF WLETHER THE CDE COULD SET ITS OWN RF.SUl~TION DATE. HE FOUND NONE. ALL OUR ALLIES REPORTED THAT TfII3Y HAD FIRMLY REWFFED SOVIET OVERTURES; THE PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE OF THE CSCE ESTABLISH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CSCE MOTHER AND THE CDE CHILD, I.E., THE CDE CANNOT SET ITS OWN DATE FOR RESUMING WORK AFTER VIENNA. FURTHERMORE, MOST NATO DELEGATIONS AGREE THAT IT IS IN NATO'S SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL INTEREST TO SUSPEND THE CDE WELL BEFORE THE VIENNA CONFERENCE. ONLY CANADA, ON INSTRUCTIONS, WAVERED, ARGUING THAT A PURELY TEZTUAL READING OF THE MANDATE AND THE DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI PREPARATORY MEETING DID NOT SUPPORT THIS VIEW. THERE ALSO WAS GENERAL. AGREEMENT WITHIN NATO THAT THE 1986 CALENDAR SHOULD BE AGREED UPON THIS SESSION AND NOT ON A SESSION-BY-SESSION BASIS AS SUGGESTED BY THE CANADIANS. DURING CAUCUS DISCUSSION ON THE CALENDAR U.S. DELEGATION STRESSED THAT WE STRONGLY FAVORED A "NATURAL" CUTOFF DATE BEFORE THE VIENNA PREPCON IN SEPTEMBER AND PREFERRED A REASONABLE BREAK BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND, E.G. JANUARY 21. 5. THE EXPLORATORY PHASE: WHILE THE CAUCUS GENERALLY (AND GENEROUSLY) GAVE WESTERN ACTORS FAVORABLE REVIEWS FOR TREIR OPENING PERFORMANCES, BEHIND THE CURTAINS CAUCUS CRITICS WERE MORE CURT-THAN KIND. L?D BY THE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 DUTCH, THESE CRITICS ARGUED THAT WE MUST COORDINATE OUR PRESENTATIONS AND RESPONSES, PARTICULARLY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE AND ON NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, AND INSPECTION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO GROUND ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THE CAUCUS HAS RECOGNIZED EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO FORCE THE ISSUE ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES (SEE PARA 9 OELOW) AND TABBED MILITARY ADVISORS TO STUDY THE ISSUE. WE ARE NOT AS EYERCISED ABOUT THE EARLY COURSE OF THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AS ARE SOME OF OOR ALLIES, WHO MAY HAVE ULTERIOR MOTIVES (THE DUTCH, NORWEGIANS, DANES, AND GERMANS HAVE ALL STATED THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO SMOOTH THE TRANSITION INTO DRAFTING LATER THIS ROUND). AFTER ALL, THIS WAS ONLY THE FIRST WEEK OF THE EKPLORATORY PHASE, BY DEFINITION A TIME OF TRIAL AND ERROR. THIS PHASE SI~ULD ALLOW THE ALLIANCE AMPLE TIME TO PROMOTE ITS PROPOSALS AND TIGHTEN ITS DISCIPLINE. OF COURSE, THE EAST ALREADY HAS DISCIPLINE TO SPARE (AND, AS THE PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR ONCE NOTED,. THE EAST EUROPEANS ENVY US OUR DIFFERENCES, NOT OUR DISCIPLINE). 6. THE PLENARY: WHILE THE ALLIES MAY EQUIVOCATE IN PRIVATE, THEY REMAIN FIRM ON SUBSTANCE IN PUBLIC. THE FRG, FRANCE, AND NORWAY, WHATEVER THEIR TACTICAL DID -- AND THEY ARE LEGION -- ALL FOCUSED ON KEY UNRESOLVED SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH REQUIRE CLOSER ATTENTION BEFORE MOVING INTO DRAFTING. THESE ISSUES INCLUDE: (1) THE OUT-0F-GARRISON CONCEPT; (2) THE USE OF THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH FOR NOTIFICATION; (3) THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION; AND (4) THE E7CCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS. THE ALLIANCE CONTINUES TO HAl~IlKER HOME THESE THE!!ES IN THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS. ON DRAFTING, THE FRG AND NORWAY ARGUE FOR PROGRESS SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, I.E., BEFORE CHRISTMAS, THE FRENCH CONTEND THAT DRAFTING CANNOT BE CONJURED UP AS A MANIFESTATION OF PROGRESS; RATHER, PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DETERMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR DRAFTING. 7. THE NNA: DOES IT PLAY IN HELSINKI (OR BELGRADE)? THE MUCH BALLYHOOED AND FREQUENTLY DELAYED CONFERENCE OPENING OF THE NNA PACKAGE IS STILL STRUGGLING ON THE ROAD. WHEN WE LAST LEFT THE NNA TRAVELING SHOW AT THE FALL OF THE SEVENTH ROUND CURTAIN IN OCTOBER, IT HAD DEOUTED SUCCESSFULLY IN BERN, VIENNA, AND STOC1Qi0LM. ONLY THE PREDICTABLY PUGNACIOUS AND SURPRISINGLY STUBBORN AUDIENCES OF BELGRADE AND HELSINKI, RESPECTIVELY, HAD WITHHELD THEIR ACCOLADES FOR THE PACKAGE. A FEW WEEKS OF INTENSE OUT-0F-TOWN PRESSURE (INCLUDING FROM WASHINGTON) AND SOME MINOR CHANGES IN THE SCRIPT (E.G. MANEUVERS ARE NON MENTIONED IN THE SAME BREATH WITH MOVE!lENTS) HAVE WON OVER THE FINNISH AUDIENCE. THE YUGOSLAVS ARE A TOUGHER AUDIENCE TO PLEASE; THEY STILL 350 SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 INSIST ON DROPPING OR MODIFYING THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION SCENE, PARTICULARLY ITS LOCALE, I.E., NORMAL PEACETIME. THUS, THE NNA THEATER IS STILL DARK. IF THE TEMPERAMENTAL METHOD ACTOR, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR BOZOVIC, CAN BE SOOTHED, THE SHOW MAY OPEN ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15. IF RIOT, THE NNA'S CAREFULLY CRAFTED CONSENSUS MAY DISSOLVE INTO CACAPHONOUS SOLILOQUIES. 8. THE NNA ON NUF: IN ITS PRESENT INCARNATION (14 ELE!lQiTS) THE NNA NUF TEXT IS A CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT ON EARLIER DRAFTS WHICB HAD INCLUDED UP TO 35 SEPARATE ELEMENTS. THE TEXT IMPLICITLY REJECTS THE AMBITIONS AND DAIS APPROACH ADVOCATED OY THE CYPRIOTS AND YUG03LAVS (I.E., A STOCKHOLM DECLARATION GIVING A EUROPEAN DIMENSION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE) AND, INSTEAD, REFLECTS A MORE WESTERN ORIENTED APPROACH. MOST NATO DELEGATIONS, UPON SEEING THE NUF PORTION OF THE NNA DOCUMENT, HAVE BREATHED WHAT AMOUNTS TO A COLLECTIVE SIGH OF RELIEF. THE FIRST REACTION OF THE FRG REP WAS: "WHERE DO WE SIGN?" AND THERE'S THE RUB. EVEN IF WE WERE ABLE TO ACCEPT ALL THE NNA LANGUAGE -- AND WE'RE NOT -- BY APPEARING T00 EAGER TO EMBRACE NNA DRAFT LANGUAGE WE MAY GIVE IT THE KISS OF DEATH. THUS, FOR BOTH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS, WE HAVE RECOlfl~IENDED A CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO THE NNA NUF TEXT. 9. THE EAST: DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE EIGHTH ROUND, EASTERN CONTORTIONISTS WORKED HARD TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION OF FLEXIBILITY WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONCESSIONS IN SUBSTANCE. THE CLEAR TOP PRIORITY FOR THE EAST WAS TO SELL ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. TARING FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE GREATER GIVE-AND-TAKE OF THE NEW WORKING S'RUCTURE, EASTERN SPEAKERS GRILLED NATO ABOUT ITS HANDLING OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, I.E., THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH: WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION ON THESE AIR AND NAVAL FORCES WOULD BE EXCHANGED? HOW WOULD SUCH ACTIVITIES BE OBSERVED AND VERIFIED? WHILE LESS CATEGORICAL THAN IN THE PAST IN THEIR REJECTION OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, EASTERN INTERVENTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE UNFAILINGLY NEGATIVE; THEY CHARGED THAT THE WESTERN MEASURE WAS DISCRIMINATORY AND DID NOT SATISFY THE CSCE'S MUL?ILATERAL CHARACTER. THEY SUGGESTED AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH WHICH SHARED MUCH WITH THE AS YET UNTABLED NNA APPROACH: MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WHICH PRESUMABLY WOULD PUT THE ONUS ON THE STATE REQUESTING THE INSPECTION TO CONVINCE THE 34 OTHE~tS OF THE LEGITIMACY OF ITS SUSPICIONS. BY EASTERN STANDARDS THEY FREELY DISCUSSED ANNUAL FORECASTS -- ALCEIT WITH THE UBIQUITOUS EASTERN CONDITION THAT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES BE INCLUDED. 10. FOLLOW THE LEADER: TAKING THEIR CUE FROM THE 351 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE IN EACH WORKING GROUP, EASTERN SPEAKERS FOLLOWED A DISCIPLINED, IF UNIMAGINATIVE, PATTERN. THEY BARRAGED THE WESTERN KEYNOTE SPEAKER WITH QUESTIONS, APPARENTLY HOPING THA?, THROWN OFF BALANCE, H$ MIGHT MIS4PEAK. THE EAST SHOWED INCREASING IMPATIENCE TO MOVE TO DRAFTING, ESPECIALLY IN AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THEM, SI~Qi AS NUF. FRUSTRATED BY THEIR FAILURE TO CE? THE WEST TO LOCK HORNS ON NUF, THEY URIDLED A? WE.4TERN INSISTENCE THAT THE NUF PRINCIPLE IS NOT A CSBM AND ACCUSED NATO OF RENEGING ON THE OCTOBER 14 PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT. DESPITE THEIR ILL-CONCEALED DISPLEASURE AT THE SUCCESSFUL WESTERN HOLDING ACTION ON NUF, THE WARSAW PACT DID NOT RETALIATE IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS DEALING WITH CSBM'S (THEY DID VENT THEIR FRUSTRA- TION IN THE GENERAL DISCUSSIONS IN WORKING CROUP AB). THIS QUASI-RESTRAINT ON TREIR PART MAY BE A SIGN THAT THEIR FLEZIBILITY DOES NOT REFLECT A REAL SEARCH FOR PROGRESS AT THIS POIN?, BUT RATHER A DESIRE TO STAY IN THE NNA'S GOOD GRACES WHILE PAINTING THE WEST AS THE SPOILERS AT STOCKHOLM. END 352 SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 UMiL'i.AS STOCKHOLM 08615 SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, Ll/1.1~/85 L. CDE VIII - OLO 2. FOLLOWING IS THE STATEMENT AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, MADE TO THE CDE TODAY, NOVEMBER LL. AMBASSADOR BARRY HAD JUST RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM FRO!! WASHINGTON, WHERE HE MET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND HAD HIS CONFIRMA?ION HEARINGS BEFORE TBE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. 3. BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN, I REGRET RETURNING A WEEK LATE FOR THIS ROUND, BUT I USED MY TIME TO ADVANTAGE IN BRIEFING SENIOR ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL FIGURES ON OUR PROGRESS HERE. I RETURN WITH A STRONG SENSE OF WHAT MY GOVERNMENT HOPES FOR FROM STOCKHOLM. ON NOVEMBER 5 I MET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH, CHIEF OF STAFF REGAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR MACFARLANE AND !!EMBERS OF HIS STAFF PRESENT. A3 REPORTED BY THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN, THE PRESIDENT WELCOMED OUR ADOPTION OF A MORE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE DESIGNED TO OPEN MORE INTENSIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT LESS THAN A YEAR REMAINS BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OF THE CSCE; THUS THERE IS LITTLE TIME FOR US HERE IN STOCKHOLM TO REACH AGREEMENT ON MEASURES WHICH WOULD ENHANCE SECURITY AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN EUROPE. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE INSTRUCTED MY DELEGATION TO REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS, WORKING TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER SPONSORS OF SC.L. LAST THURSDAY I TESTIFIED BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE IN CONNECTION WITH MY CONFIRMATION IN THIS POST. I FOUND THE SENATORS SUPPORTIVE OF MY EFFORTS HERE AND INTERESTED IN THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE CSCE PROCESS. THERE IS GROWING ATTENTION TO THE APPROACHING VIENNA REVIEW MEETING, WHICH WILL HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF JUDGING HOW THE REQUIREMENT FOR BALANCE AMONG THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IS BEING CARRIED OUT AND DECIDING WHETHER THE PROGRESS MADE HERE IN STOCKHOLM WARRANTS CONTINUATION OF THE CDE IN ITS CURRENT PHASE OR IN A NEW STAGE. MY DELEGATION SHARES THE VIEW EXPRESSED ON NOVEMBER 5 BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY, AMBASSADOR MIEVIK, THAT OUR "OVERRIDING NEED IS TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE UNRESOLVED SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES BEFORE US." THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WE HAVE NOW ENTERED WAS ADOPTED BECAUSE IMIPORTANT QUESTIONS MUST BE ADDRESSED BEFORE DRAFTING CAN BEGIN; WE~WILL NOT RESOLVE ALL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 DIFFERENCES, BUT WE MUST ENGAGE IN CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION AND DETERMINE MORE CLEARLY WHERE THE COMMON GRDUND NBEDED FOR DRAFTING E%IST3 AND WHERE IT DOES NOT. IN ONE PROMISING AREA, THE EAST APPEARS READY TO JOIN IN NEGOTIATION OF AN ANNUAL FORECAST OR CALENDAR OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. DETAILS FOR THE CONTENT OF SUCH A l+B:A3URE E%IST IN.lIEASURE 2 OF SC.L/AMPLIFIED. WE ASR THE EAST TO COMMENT ON MEASURE 2 AND ALSO TO PROVIDE SIMILARLY PRECISE DETAILS ABOUT THEIR OWN POSITION ON AN ANNUAL E%CI~ANGE OF PLANS FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IN THIS WAY, REAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE COULD BEGIN. THIS IS ONE E%AMPLE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WE LOOK FOR DURING THIS PHASE, THOUGH, OF COURSE, PROGRESS IN THIS AREA ALONE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT. IN THIS E%PLORATORY PHASE, AS THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE, MY DELEGATION AND THE OTHER FIFTEEN SPONSORS OF SC.L WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT ALL DELEGATIONS ABIDE BY THE INSTRUCTIONS UNDER WHICH THE STOCCKI~iOLM CONFERENCE OPERATES. IN PARTICULAR, WE ARE C0 THA? SOME DELEGATIONS CONTINUE TO STATE THAT INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE ARE LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS FOR NEGOTIATION IN THIS CONFERENCE. THEY ARE NOT. THE MADRID MANDATE IS PERFECTLY CLEAR; I NEED NOT REPEAT TBE ARGUl~1TS. OUR THIRTY-FIVE DELEGATIONS MUST FOLLOW TBE RULE OF THE MANDATE; WE CANNOT CHANGE IT. OUR DELEGATIONS DO NOT HAVE THAT POWER; ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSUME THAT POWER WILL CAUSE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE TO FAIL. MY DELEGATION IS NOT PREPARED TO CHANGE THE MANDATE AND WILL NOT ACCEPT ATTEMPTS BY OTHERS TO DO S0. WE WILL OBEY THE MANDATE IN EVERY PARTICULAR. FOR E%AMPLE, AS STATED IN SC.L/AMPLIFIED, WE WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH MEET THE TWO CRITERIA OF THE MANDATE FOR ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE, THAT IS, ACTIVITIES WHICH "AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE ." WITHIN THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ACCEPTED BY ALL AT MADRID, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF HOW BEST TO DEAL WITH ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. WE ARE NOT PREPARED AND THE STOCIQiOLM CONFERENCE IS NOT EMPOWERED TO GO BEYOND THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. I WOULD POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT, BASED ON THE OUT-0F-GARRISON CONCEPT, THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WILL AFFECT MANY MORE NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES THAN OTHER APPROACHES, SINCE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH INVOLVES NO THRESHOLD WHICH SUCH AN ACTIVITY MUST MEET-BEFORE IT IS 354 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 INCLUDED IN A NOTIFICATION; AN ACTIVITY MUST ONLY AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AND CONSTITUTE A PART OF AN ACTIVITY IN EUROPE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. UNDER THE TERMS OF MEASURE 3 OF SC.L/AMPLIFIED, ANY NAVAL OR AIR ACTIVITY, REGARDLESS OF ITS SIZE, WHICH SUPPORTS AN OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITY INVOLVING ONE HALF OR !LORE OF A DIVISION'S COMBAT ELEMENTS WOULD BE COVERED BY NOTIFICATION. MR. CHAIRMAN, THE FIRST MEETINGS IN THE ESPLORATORY PHASE HAVE, BY AND LARGE, BEEN ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE; THEY PROVIDE A GOOD START. DURING THE PAST WEEK, WE HAVE HEARD REFERENCES TO THE OCTOBER L4 AGREEMENT WHICH TOOK US INTO THIS PHASE AND ALSO REFERENCES TO AN ALLEGED AGREEMENT TO MOVE AHEAD IN ALL AREAS EQUALLY. MY DELEGATION WILL, OF COURSE, ABIDE BY ALL AGREEMENTS WE HAVE UNDERTAHEN, HERE, IN MADRID AND ELSEWHERE. WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND, HOWEt1ER, THAT OUR RESPONSIBILITY IS NOT TO CONSTRUCT A COMPROMISE OF ARTIFICIAL SYMMETRY GIVING ONE SIDE PART OF WHAT IT WANTS AND OTHERS PART OF WHAT THEY WANT. OUR RESPONSIBILITY IS TO ENACT A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH, IN AMBASSADOR CITRON'S FELICITOUS PHRASE, ESTABLISHES "A SYSTEM OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY" FOR EUROPE. SIMILARLY, OUR DELEGATIONS ARE NOT HERE TO ESTABLISH OUTLINES OR PRINCIPLES, TO CLEAR AWAY THE UNDERBRUSH, PERHAPS, SO THAT OTHERS MIGHT SOLVE THE REALLY TOUCH GORE QUESTIONS. AS MY DISTINGUISHED DANISH COLLEAGUE, AMBASSADOR MELLBIN, SAID MANY MONTHS AGO, WE HERE IN THE STOCffiiOLM CONFERENCE HAVE OUR OWN VITALLY IMPORTANT JOB Ta DO, AND WE MUST NOT WAIT FOR OTHERS TO DO IT FOR US; THE RESPONSIBILITY REMAINS OURS TO ENACT A SUBSTANTIVE, MILITARILY MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE, SECURE AND OPEN EUROPE. IF WE CANNOT DO THAT, WE CANNOT; AND THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING, NOT WE, MUST EVALUATE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THAT FAILURE. ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION IS BY THE SHORT TIME REMAINING BEFORE VIENNA, WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO A MEANINGFUL AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT AND PLEDGE OUR BEST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE IT. THANH YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. 355 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08763 SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 13, 1985 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 7987, B) USNATO 6481 1. CDE VIII - 017 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT 3. BEGIN SUMMARY; THE CDE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSED THE PENDING NNA PAPER (NOW EXPECTED TO BE TABLED ON NOVEMBER 1S) AND DETERMINED THAT WE SHOULD WELCOME IT IN GENERAL TERMS, BUT THEN FOCUS ON QUESTIONS AND NEGATIVE ELEMENTS TO AVOID GIVING IT THE "KISS OF DEATH" VIS-A-VIS THE EAST. CAUCUS "WETS" PUSHED FOR A S?ART TO DRAFTING BY THE LAST 2-3 WEEKS OF THIS ROUND, EITHER IN ALL GROUPS (NORWAY OPTION) OR IN ONE OF NATO'S CHOOSING (FRG OPTION). THE U.S., FRANCE, PORTUGAL, AND UR ALL OBJECTED TO EITHER OPTION. BARRY (U.S.) NOTED THAT WE COULD NOT SET A FIXED DATE FOR DRAFTING, BUT COULD. IDENTIFY GOALS AGAINST WHICH TO MEASURE THE APPROPRIATENESS OF DRAFTING. DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDAR FOCUSED ON THE QUESTION OF AN ENDING DATE. BARRY (U.S.) DREW CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT BY OBSERVING THAT THIS WAS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL QUESTION AND ARGUING THAT A SEPTEMBER 19 DATE FOR SUSPENDING ALL CDE ACTIVITIES WOULD BEST SERVE THE WEST'S INTERESTS. DELWORTH (CANADA) CONTINUED TO STRESS THE MORE THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT THAT THE CDE COULD NOT ADJOURN/ SUSPEND UNTIL THERE WAS A CONSENSUS TO DO S0, WHICH IiAY NOT BE UNTIL NOVEMBER 4. (SEE PARR 7 FOR DELEGATION COMMENT ON BRUSSELS DISCUSSION ON THE CALENDAR.) END SUMMARY. ~~ 4. THE NNA PAPER: CAUCUS DISCUSSION INITIALLY FOCUSED ON THE STILL PENDING NNA PAPER (NOW LIKELY TO BE TABLED AT THE NOVEMBER 15 PLENARY), AND HOW BEST TO HANDLE IT. ALTHOUGH ITALY AND SPAIN SUGGESTED THAT WE EMBRACE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE NNA PAPER, MOST DELEGATIONS AGREED WITH BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) THAT WE HAD TO AVOID GIVING THE PAPER THE "RIBS OF DEATH" BY BEING OVERLY ENTHUSIASTIC (COMMENT; WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO TARE THIS APPROACH BY SEVERAL NNA INTERLOCUTORS, WHICH, TO TWIST THE OLD RING CROSBY STANDARD, IS BASICALLY TO "ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE AND ELIIiINATE THE POSITIVE." END COMMENT). BUWALDA ALSO DREW SUPPOR? WHEN HE OBSERVED THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH WE COULD SAY ABOUT THE PAPER AT ALL UNTIL IT HAD BEEN STUDIED BOTH IN STOCKHOLM AND IN CAPITALS. THE CHAIR (DENMARK) OBTAINED A CONSENSUS THAT, FOR THE TIME BEING, THE NATO CAUCUS MEMBERS WOULD WELCOME THE NNA PAPER BUT CONFINE ITSELF ONLY TO VERY GENERAL POSITIVE COMMENTS, WHILE FOCUSING ON CONCRETE CRITICISMS AND CLARIFYING QUESTIONS. IT WAS FURTHEk AGREED THAT THE RESPECTIVE MINI-CAUCUSES FOR EACH CLUSTER WOULD UNDERTAKE AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE PAPER. 356 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 S. DRAFTING: INTERMINGLED WITH THE DISCUSSION OF THE NNA PAPER, THE CAUCUS "WETS," LED BY MEVIR (NORWAY), TOOK THE OCCASION TO PRESS YET AGAIN FOR A PASSAGE TO DRAFTING IN ALL GROUPS DURING THE LAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS OF THIS ROUND. THE FRG AND BELGIUK PLAYED A VARIATION OF THE THEME BY SUGGESTING THAT WE BEGIN DRAFTING IN A GROUP OF OUR CHOOSING (E.G. OBSERVATION OR NOTIFICATION) USING SC.1/AMPLIFIED AS THE BASIC TEXT AND TRYING TO FIND COMMON ELEMENTS THEREIN. MEVIR AND DELWORTH (CANADA), WHILE EXPRESSING SYMPATHY WITH THIS IDEA IN THE ABSTRACT, DOUBTED THAT THE EAST WOULD AGREE UNLESS WE SIMULTA- NEOUSLY STARTED DRAFTING ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF). BARRY (U.S.) REJECTED THE "WET" APPROACH, STATING THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SET A FIXED TIME WHEN DRAFTING SHOULD BEGIN, RATHER (BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REFTEL) HE OUTLINED A NUMBER OF OBJECTIVES FOR THE EXPLORATORY PHASE AGAINST WHICH THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A TRANSITION TO DRAFTING COULD BE BE MEASURED. THESE OBJECTIVES INCLUDED CLARIFYING OUR POSITION ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES -- E.G., NO REINTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE, NO INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITES AND NO LINKAGE BETWEEN PROGRESS ON NUF AND ON CSBM'S. MACRLEY (UK FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 13, 1985 DEPREP), CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL), AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) SUPPORTED THE U.S. POSITION, WITH CUTILEIRO OBSERVING THAT IT WAS "PREMATURE" TO SPEAR OF DRAFTING AND GASCHIGNARD SAYING THAT FRANCE IS PREPARED TO DRAFT "WHEN WARRAN'~ED," BUT THAT IN ITS VIEW IMPORTANT POINTS WERE BEING "EXTRACTED" FROM THE EAST IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE. CITRON (FRG) OBSERVED THAT, WHILE WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TALK TOUGH BILATERALLY ABOUT THE EXCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR, WE SHOULD NOT MARE EASTERN ACCEPTANCE A PRECONDITION FOR DRAFTING IN STOCKHOLM BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WOULD NEVER DROP IT IN AN EXPLORATORY PHASE. MEVIR (NORWAY) ASKED BARRY WHETHER HE HAD MEANT THAT NATO WOULD HAVE TO BE GAIN SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS FROM THE EAST BEFORE DRAFTING COULD BEGIN. BARRY REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT SAID WE HAD TO WIN SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD CERTAINLY TRY TO DO S0, BUT THAT WE SHOULD MARE EVERY EFFORT TO CLARIFY OUR POSITIONS ON THE REY ISSUES ?0 AVOID COMPLICATIONS DOWN THE LINE. DISCUSSION CLOSED WITH THE CHAIR CONCLUD- ING THAT THERE WAS NO AGREED CONCEPT ON THE TRANSITION TO DRAFTING. 6. 1986 CALENDAR: ALTHOUGH i:AUCUS CONSENSUS IS STILL LACKING ON THE 1986 CALENDAR, THERE WAS DISCERNABLE MOVE- MENT IN OUR DIRECTION, WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF 357 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CANADA. BARRY (U.S.) ARGUED THAT THE IMPORTANT CALENDAR QUESTION WAS THE ENDING DATE AND 'THAT IN CONSIDERING THIS ISSUE OUR PRIMARY CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE WHAT BEST SERVES NATO'S POLITICAL INTERESTS AND NOT SOME THEOLOGI- CAL EXAMINATION OF THE MANDATE AND THE DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI PREPCON. HE CONTENDED THAT AN ENDING DATE PRIOR TO THE VIENNA PREPCON WOULD PUT THE MOST PRESSURE ON THE EAST TO GET DOWN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON CSBM'S, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME DEMONSTRATING THE PROPER SUBORDINATION OF THE CDE TO THE FULL CSCE. BARRY ADDED THA?, IN HIS CONCEPTION, WE SHOULD FINISH OUR NEGOTIATING WORK AROUND THE FRENCH CUTOFF DATE OF JULY 18, WITH THE REMAINING WEEKS TO BE USED FOR TOILETTAGE (I.E., TECHNICAL "CLEAN- ING UP" OF THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION INTO THE SIX OFFICIAL CSCE LANGUAGES). GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), WHILE STILL PRESSING FOR JULY 18, INDICATED THAT HE COULD AGREE TO AN OP?IONAL SESSION RUNNING TO SEPTEMBER 19 FOR TOILETTAGE, iF THERE IS a CONSENSUS TO HOLD ONE. ALL OTHERS (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CANADA) SEEMED PREPARED TO ACCEPT SEPTEMBER 19, A? LEAST AS THE ENDING DATE FOR SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT SOME (NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, FRG) WERE NOT CONVINCED THAT TOILETTAGE COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED IN OCTOBER. DELWORTH (CANADA), HOWEVER, PERSISTING IN TARING THE THEOLOGICAL VIEW, AND, ALTHOUGH AGREEING FROM A POLITICAL VIEWPOINT WITH AN EARLY CUTOFF ? ARGUED THAT THE RELEVANT TEXTS REQUIRED A CONSENSUS TO END OR SUSPEND THE CONFERENCE WHICH HE FEARED WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN FOR ANY DATE PRIOR T_0 NOVEMBER 4. HE ALSO CONTENDED THAT SEPTEMBER 19 WAS NOT A NATURAL CUTOFF DATE BECAUSE THERE IS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE VIENNA PREPCON AND CDE. AT BEST, DELWORTH EXPECTED THAT WE COULD AGREE NOW ON A SCHEDULE THROUGH SEPTEMBER 19 NOW, BUT WOULD THEN CONTINUE ON A WEER-TO-WEER BASIS UNTIL A CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN IS ACHIEVED. TARING ISSUE WITH THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, GASCHIGNARD ARGUED THAT THE CONFERENCE SETS ITS MEETING SCHEDULE BY CONSENSUS, AND UNLESS THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO CONTINUE PAST SEPTEMBER 19 (OR JULY 18) THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER MEETINGS. GIVEN THE CANADIAN POSITION, NO CAUCUS POSITION WAS ACHIEVED ON A CUTOFF DATE. CAUCUS CONSENSUS DOES SEEM TO BE DEVELOP- ING, HOWEVER, TO BEGIN THE NINTH SESSION ON JANUARY 21, HOLDING A SINGLE SESSION OF 6-8 WEEKS BEFORE EASTER. CANADA NOW APPEARS ISOLATED IN SUPPORTING A JANUARY 14 STARTING DATE AND TWO FOUR-WEER SESSIONS BEFORE EASTER. 7. COMMENT; RE USNATO 6481, WE AGREE THAT STOCKHOLM IS THE PLACE TO RESOLVE THE CALENDAR ISSUE. OUR BO?TOM LINE IS THAT THE AXE MUST FALL ON SEPTEMBER 19 AND THAT FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL 358 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 13, 1985 ALL ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE CONSENSUS TO CONTINUE, NOT CONSENSUS ?0 STOP. THANKS TO MISSIONARY WORK IN CAPITALS AND BRUSSELS, WE BELIEVE WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THIS GOAL. BARRY ' END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 359 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08814 SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF - FORCE (NUF) REF: A) STOCKHOLM 4366, B) STOCKHOLM 4334 1. CDE VIII - 019 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A DANISH REVISED WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF FORCE (SEE PARR 6). WHILE IT IS AN IMPROVEMENT ON THE ORIGINAL DANISH DRAFT, ITS FORK AND SOME OF ITS CONTENT WILL CAUSE US PROBLEMS. OVER THE COMING WEEKS THE DELEGATION WILL BE OFFERING SOME OF OUR THOUGHTS ON THIS AND OTHER DRAFTS ON NUF WITH A VIEW TOWARDS DEVELOPING U.S. STRATEGY ON THE SUBJECT. END SUMMARY. 4. AT THE NATO CAUCUS OF NOVEMBER 13, DANISH AMBASSADOR MELLBIN DISTRIBUTED THE FOLLOWING REVISED WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF FORCE PREPARED BY THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY (SEE REFS A AND B FOR ORIGINAL WORKING PAPER). THIS REVISED PAPER, ACCORDING TO THE DANISH AMBASSADOR, TARES INTO ACCOUNT COMMENTS ON THE EARLIER DRAFT IN STOCKHOLM AND AT THE BONN BRAINSTORMING SESSION. WHILE THE DANES STATE THAT THE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN THIS DRAFT "ONLY EXEMPLIFY POSSIBLE METHODS FOR SOLVING OUR (NUF) PROBLEM," THEY CLEARLY REFLECT WHAT DENMARK COULD ACCEPT IN A CONCLUDING DOCtTMENT. 5. IT SHOULD FIRS?' BE NO'!'ED THAT THE REVISED DRAFT IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE JUNE 1985 DRAFT. FOR EXAMPLE, IT HAS DELETED EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO "ARMED FORCE" AND IMPLICI? REFERENCE TO THE BONN DECLARATION. NEVERTHE- LESS, THE DRAFT, INTER ALIA, STILL IS DIVIDED IN A PREAMUULAR AND AN OPERATIVE PART AND CONTAINS OUT-OF- CONTEXT LANGUAGE FROM THE UN'S DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION (RESOLUTION 3314/XXIX). WHILE THE REVISED PAPER HAS BEEN WHITTLED DOWN TO THREE PAGES, IT STILL IS ALMOST AS LONG AS, AND IN SOME CASES WORSE THAN, THE NNA TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE (SEE SEPTEL). OTHERS, MOREOVER, ARE SOON TO ENTER THE CROWDED NUF FIELD; THE CANADIANS HAVE ALREADY CIRCULATED THEIR NUF PAPER IN WASHINGTON AND THE ITALIANS TELL US THEY, T00, ARE ABOUT TO ENTER THE FRAY WITH A LONG PAPER. FORTUNATELY -- AND SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY -- WORD OF EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THESE DRAFT TEXTS HAS NOT LEAKED OUT BEYOND THE CAUCUS TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOW- LEDGE. IN ADDITION, THE CAUCUS HAS MAINTAINED ADMIRABLE UNITY IN WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS AROUND A MINIMALIST NUF POSITION BASICALLY FORMULATED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION. HOWEVER, SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE CLEARLY CHAMPING AT THE BIT. OVER THE COMING WEEKS DELEGATION WILL BE OFFERING SORE OF OUR THOUGHTS ON THE NNA WORKING PAPER AND OTHER NUF DRAFTS WITH A VIEW TOWARDS DEVELOPING U.S. STRATEGY ON THE SUBJECT. WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON THE NNA, DANISH, 360 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 6. BEGIN TEXT DANISH REVISED WORKING PAPER: REVISED WORKING PAPER CONSIDERATION OF THE CONTENTS OF SOME ELEMENTS FOR A TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. IN A WORKING PAPER OF 10TH JUNE 1985, THE DANISH DELEGA- TION PUT FORWARD SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ELABORATING, WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, A TEXT ON THE NON- USE OF FORCE, AS A POSI?ION PAPER REFLEC?ING A CONSENSUS VIEW IN THE ALLIANCE AND FOR POSSIBLE USE AS GUIDANCE TO DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM WHEN THEY HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AND POSSIBLE NNA TEXTS ON THIS ISSUE IN 'THE WORKING GROUP CONCERNID. FOLLOWING DISCUSSION IN THE NATO CAUCUS IN STOCKHOLM AND A DISCUSSION IN PRINCIPLE DURING THE INFORMAL BONN MEET- ING OF HEADS OF CDE DELEGATIONS, WE FEEL ZT EXPEDIENT TO FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF OFFER A REVISED VERSION OF OUR WORKING PAPER FOR RENEWED CONSIDERATION BY ALLIES. THIS REVISED VERSION SERVES THE SANE PURPOSE AS THE FIRST ONE: IT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO CLARIFYING THE POSITIONS OF THE ALLIANCE WITH A VIEW TO DECIDING HOW TO PURSUE THE ISSUE OF NON-USE OF FORCE AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. IT IS NOT SUGGESTED THAT THE TEXT SHOULD AT THIS STAGE BE DISCUSSED WITH OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. THIS REVISED TEXT IS SEEN SOLELY AS A MEANS FOR THE ALLIANCE TO REFINE ITS POSITIONS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE QUES?ION AND, IF POSSIBLE, TO DISCUSS, ONE BY ONE, THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS WHICH COULD BE INCLUDED IN A COMPROMISE TEXT, OR FOR THAT MATTER, IN A WESTERN WORKING PAPER, TO BE TABLED AT THE CONFERENCE AT AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT. WE SHARE THE VIEW PUT FORWARD AT THE BONN MEETING THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD NOW CONCENTRATE ON AGREEING ON A LIST OF POSSIBLE ELEMENTS WHICH, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, OUGHT TO BE INCLUDED IN A WESTERN POSITION PAPER. WE HAVE RECONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBLE STRUC- TURE OF SUCH A DOCUMENT AND HAVE COME OUT IN FAVOR OF RETAINING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN a PREAMBULAR PART AND AN OPERATIVE PART. THIS SERVES THE PRACTICAL PURPOSES OF IDENTIFYING AND DISCUSSING ALL POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR INCLUSION IN A TEXT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT ALL THESE ELEMENTS SHOULD BE RETAINED. THE FORMA? OF THE PRESENT TEXT REPRESENTS ONE OF SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES. THE TEX1` SHOULD THEREFORE BE TAKEN ONLY 361 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET AS EXEMPLIFYING POSSIBLE METHODS FOR SOLVING OUR PROBLEM. WE ARE NOT AMONG THOSE WHO WOULD FA-"7R AN EXPRESS REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLE V ON THE PEA :FUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. IN ?HE MADRID DOCUMENT, THERE IS NO EXPRESS REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLE II AS SUCH, BUT ONLY TO "THE DUTY OF STATES ?0 REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE." AN EXPRESS REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLE V COULD THEREFORE LEAD TO GIVING EMPHASIS TO SOME OF THE PRINCIPLES AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS, AND TO OPENING THE POSSIBILITY THAT OTHER PRINCIPLES ARE BROUGHT INTO PLAY, WHICH, IN TURN, COULD BLUR THE ALREADY COMPLICATED ISSUE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE. BELOW FOLLOWS THE NEW DRAFT TEXT: ELEMENTS FOR A TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE TO BE CONSIDERED, AS APPROPRIATE, BY THE ALLIES WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING THEIR POSI?IONS DURING THEIR INFORMAL CONTACTS AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. I. PREAMBULAR ELEMENTS 1) THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRM THEIR COMMON ADHERENCE TO.THE TEN PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN THE DECLARA- TION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPAT- ING STATES CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE IN CON- FORMITY WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 2) THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRM THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPEC? AND APPLY EACH OF THESE PRINCIPLES IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AND TO CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES IN THE SPIRIT OF THE SAID PRINCIPLES. 3) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE FURTHERMORE DETERMINED TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF TENSION THAT MAY EXIST AMONG THEM AND THUS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. 4) THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THAT IN THE CONCLUD- ING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING THEY HAVE AGREED TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MARE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHEN- ING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS. S) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO REINFORCE THE RELEVANT COMMITMENTS IN THE FINAL ACT CONCERNING THIS DUTY OF STATES. II. OPERATIVE ELEMENTS 1) THE OPERATING STATES SOLEMNLY DECLARE THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IN THEIR 362 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET INTERNA?IONAL RELATIONS IN GENCRAL, FROM ANY ACTS CONSTI- TUTING A THREAT OF FORCE OR A DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STA?E OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCON- SISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS STIPULATED IN THE CHARTER AND WITH THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. 2) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE RESOLVED THAT NO CONSIDERATION OF WHATEVER NATURE, WHETHER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILI?ARY OR OTHERWISE, MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED COMMITMENTS. 3) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE AGREED THA? THE USE OF FORCE BY A PARTICIPATING STATE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE CHARTER OF T$E UNITED NATIONS AND THE COMMITMENTS OF THE FINAL ACT WILL CONSTITUTE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF AGGRESSION. 4) THE PARTICIPA?ING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT A SET OF CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES COMPRISING THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION, ?HE EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ANb THE VERIFICATION OF THESE MEASURES ARE PARTICULARLY WELL SUITED TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USr OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS. 5) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE THEREFORE DETERMINED TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THAT DUTY OF STATES BY ADOPTING THE FOLLOWING SET OF CONCRETE, MUTUALLY COIiPLE- MENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTA?ION IN EUROPE: COMIiENTARY THE ABOVE TEXT REFLECTS OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE DISCUSSION SO FAR IN THE ALLIANCE ON THE QUESTION OF NON-USE OF FORCE. THE TEXT TARES INTO ACCOUNT TAE PREFERENCE OF SEVERAL DELEGATIONS THAT WE SHOULD BASE OURSELVES ON TEXTUAL ELEMENTS RATHER THAN ON A CONSOLIDATED TEXT. FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, THE ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN DIVIDED INTO A PREAMBULAR PART AND AN OPERATIVE PART. APPLYING THE "BUILDING BLOCK"-METHOD FAVORED BY SEVERAL DELEGATIONS, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONCENTRATE ATTENTION ON SOME ELEMENTS AND LEAVE OUT OTHERS WHEN CONSIDERING THE WESTERN APPROACH. SEVERAL OPTIONS FOR EXPRESSING REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE ARE STILL POSSIBLE, SUCH AS A CHAPTER OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, A PREAMBULAR TEXT, A CHAIRMAN'S S?ATEMENT OR A SEPARATE DOCUMENT, PERHAPS DESIGNATED AS A DECLARATION. 363 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 I. COMMENTS ON THE PREAMBULAR ELEMENTS RE PARR I.1: IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL VIEW THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO REAFFIRM THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF NATIONS, NO REFERENCE TO A REAFFIRMATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTICS OF STATES UNDER THE CHARTER IS RETAINED. THE AIM OF THIS PARAGRAPH IS TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT ANY TEXT ON TEE NON-USE OF FORCE IS SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VALIDITY AND CO-EQUAL STATUS OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF TEE FINAL ACT DECALOGUE. ONLY A BACKGROUND REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE TEN PRINCIPLES ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. RE PARR I.2: THIS PARR CONTAINS A MORE SPECIFIC REAFFIRMATION OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES. TEE AIM IS TO STATE THAT EACH OF THE PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE APPLIED ERGA OMNES AND COVERED IN ITS GLOBAL ASPEC?S. IN THIS WAY A GENERAL CONTEXT IS ESTABLISHED, WITHIN WHICH THE NUF IS PERCEIVED IN ITS PROPER PERSPECTIVE. RE PARR I.3: BASED ON PARR 1 AND 2 OF THE PREAMBLE TO THE CBM DOCUMENT OF THE FINAL ACT. THE AIM IS TO REFLECT THE CONTINUITY BETWEEN THE FINAL, ACT AND THE PROSPECTIVE RESULTS OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. RE PARR I.4: BASED ON THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING, MANDATE FOR TAE CDE. THE AIM IS TO QUOTE TEE MANDATE AS SPECIFICALLY AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING AND RETAIN A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE CONCEPT OF NON-USE OF FORCE. RE PARR I.S: THIS PARR REFLEC'S THE UNDERLYING OBJECTIVE OF REINFORCING THE ALREADY EXISTING NUF COMMITMENTS. IT IS AIMED AT STATING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS OF PARTICIPATING STATES TO REINFORCE THESE COMMITMENTS. II. COMMEN?S ON THE OPERATIVE ELEMENTS RE PARR II.1: THIS PARR IS INTENDED AS THE MAIN OPERA- TIVE DECLARATION, RESTATING A COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE PER SE AND IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. THE TEXT REFLECTS, AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE, THE WORKING OF PRINCIPLE II OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. WE HAVE DULY TAKEN THE POINT THAT THE QUESTION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF ARMED FORCE IS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF ,THE NUF PRINCIPLE, AND HAVE, ACCORDINGLY, DELETED A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO "ARMED FORCE." BUT IN THE MADRID IiANDATE NUF IS DISCUSSED IN THE PARTICULAR CONTEXT OF CSBM'S WHICH ARE MAINLY THOUGH NOT EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY MEASURES. WE SEE SOME DIFFICULTY IN OMITTING ANY REFERENCE TO THE ASPECT OF ARMED FORCE, BECAUSE A LINK BETWEEN THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND THE CSBM'S MUST BE ESTABLISHED IN SOME WAY. 364 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 THE CONCEPT, PUT FORWARD IN THE BONN DECLARATION, OF THE OVERALL NON-FIRST USE OF WEAPONS AS OPPOSED TO THE NON- FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS NOT INCLUDED, BUT MIGHT BE RESERVED FOR POSSIBLE USE AT A STAGE WHERE THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ONCE AGAIN WILL BE PUSHING THEIR IDEA OF THE NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. RE PARA II.2: UASED ON THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3314/XXIX, AR? 5, PARA 1, ON THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION. THE PARR HAS BEEN ADAPTED TO REFLECT CLOSER THE WORDING OF THAT RESOLUTION. RE PARA II.3: WE CONSIDER IT PREFERABLE TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO AGGRESSION WHICH IS A PAR?ICULARLY IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE USE OF FORCE. THIS PARA IS AN ADAPTATION OF THE TEXT OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3314/XXIX, AR? 2, STILL TARING INTO ACCOUNT THE POLITICAL NATURE OF CSCE COMMITMENTS. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE WOULD BE A RISK INVOLVED IN INTRODUCING HERE THE EXPRESSION "FIRST USE," AS IT COULD BE USED AS A LEVER BY THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. ACCORDINGLY, THIS PARR IS PHRASED SO AS TO AVOID ANY REFERENCE TO "FIRST USE" EVEN THOUGH RESOLUTION 3314/XXIX CONTAINS SUCH A REFERENCE. FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF RE PARA II.4: THIS PARA IS INTENDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING A CLOSE LINK BETWEEN THE CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES PROPOSED IN DOC SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND THE OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. THE TEXT RESTATES AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE THE CONTENTS OF THE MANDATE FOR THE CDE IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING. RE PARA II.S: THIS PARR WHICH ALSO REFLECTS THE MADRID MANDATE, IS INTENDED AS A PIVOTAL PARR, REFLECTING AND ESTABLISHING THE INHERENT CONNECTION BETWEEN A TEXT ON THE RENUNCIATION OF FORCE AND THE CONCRETE CSBM'S TO BE FURTHER DEVELOPED IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS OF E.G. A PROSPECTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMCNT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE COLON IS INTENDED FOR LINKING THE NUF PRINCIPLE, AS STATED ABOVE, TO THE CONCRETE CSBM'S AS A GENERAL QUALIFICATION. END TEXT. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 365 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08762 SUBJECT: USDEL CDE AMBASSADOR'S CHATHAM HOUSE PROGRAM REF: CURTIN/ORLEY TELCONS 1. CDE VIII -020 2. AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD USDEL CDE, WILL SPEAR A? CHATHAM HOUSE (LONDON) ON "THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AND US-EUROPEAN SECURITY RELATIONS" ON FEBRUARY 4, L986. WE UNDERSTAND THAT A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION AT THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE IS ALSO POSSIBLE. TRAVEL DETAILS WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. WE WILL REQUEST EMBASSY ASSISTANCE WITH GROUND TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS. 3. FOLLOWING IS BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON AMBASSADOR BARRY: ROBERT L. BARRY WAS NAMED U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY- AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN SEPTEMBER 1985. THE STOCKHOLM-BASED CONFERENCE, WHICH INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES OF 33 EUROPEAN NA?IONS, THE U.S. AND CANADA, WAS MANDATED BY THE MADRID REVIEW CONFERENCE ON SECURI?Y AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE IN 1983 FOR THE PURPOSE OF AGREEING ON MEASURES TO INCREASE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. AMBASSADOR BARRY, A CAREER IiINISTER IN THE U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE, WAS THE FIRST JOHN SLOAN DIC1iEY FELLOW IN RESIDENCE AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE IN 1984-1985. HE WAS ALSO DISTINGUISHED VISITOR AT THE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCED STUDY OF THE USSR AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. IN MORE THAN 20 YEARS IN THE U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE, AMBASSADOR BARRY HAS SPECIALIZED IN EAST-WEST RELA?IONS AND UN AFFAIRS. FROM 1981 UNTIL JULY 1984, HE WAS THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO BULGARIA. PRIOR TO THAT, HE WAS DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE FROM 1979-1981. AMBASSADOR BARRY DEAL? WITH THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE ON ASSIGNMENTS AS VICE-CONSUL IN ZAGREB, YUGOSLAVIA (1963-1965), SECOND SECRETARY A? THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW (1968-1970), AND DEPUTY PRINCIPAL OFFICER AT THE U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL IN LENINGRAD (1971-1973). IN WASHINGTON, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF SOVIET AFFAIRS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (1965-1967) AND AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THAT OFFICE (1975-1977). HE DIRECTED U.S. BROADCASTING TO THE SOVIET UNION IN 1973-1975 AS CHIEF OF THE USSR DIVISION OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA. AMBASSADOR BARRY SERVED AT THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UN IN 1970-1971; HE WAS DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF UN PGLITICAL AFFAIRS IN WASHINGTON IN 1977-78 AND THEN DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE BUREAU OF 366 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. HE RECEIVED A BACHELOR'S DEGREE SUMMA CUM LAUDE FROM DARTMOUTH COLLEGE IN 1956 AND AN K.A. DEGREE FROM COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY'S PROGRAM ON EAST CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1960. HE IS A GRADUATE OF THE US ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE AT GARMISCH-PARTENRIRCHEN, F.R.G., AND ATTENDED ORFORD UNIVERSITY, ENGLAND. FROM 1957-1960 HE WAS AN OFFICER IN THE U.S. NAVY ASSIGNED TO ATLANTIC FLEET DESTROYERS. AMBASSADOR BARRY IS MARRIED TO THE FORMER MARGARET CRIM; THEY HAVE TWO CHILDREN; THEIR HOME IS IN RINDGE, NEW HAMPSHIRE. BARRY END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED NNNN 367 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CONF IDENTIAL STOCRHOLM08788 SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, NOVEMBER 15, 1985 1. CDE VIII - 022 2. C - ENTIRE. TEXT 3. BEGIN .SUMMARY: AT THE NOVEMBER 15 PLENARY, CYPRUS INTRODUCED THE ELABORATED POSITION PAPER (SC.7) OF THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES. THE GDR, ITALY, AND IRELAND WELCOMED THE TABLING OF SC.7. ROMANIA OUTLINED ITS VIEWS ON CONSTRAIN? (LIMITATION) MEASURES AND VERIFICATION. END SUMMARY. 4. READING FROM THE TEXT OF THE ELABORATED NNA PAPER (SC.7), AMBASSADOR PAPADOPOULUS (CYPRUS) INTRODUCED THE DOCUMENT ON BEHALF OF CYPRUS, SWITZERLAND, AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, FINLAND, YUGOSLAVIA, AND MALTA. HE STRESSED THAT NOTHING IN THE FORMAT OF THE DOCUMENT -- INCLUDING THE ORDER OF EACH SECTION -- INDICATES A PRIORITY OF IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECTS INCLUDED. (FULL TEXT OF SC.7 SENT SEPTEL.) 5? THE GDR, ITALY, AND IRELAND WELCOMED THE DOCUMENT AS A POSITIVE STEP IN THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. NONE OF THE INITIAL REACTIONS TOUCHED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DOCUMENT. 6. AMBASSADOR CETERCHI (ROMANIA) OUTLINED HIS DELEGA- TION'S VIEWS ON CONSTRAINT (LIMITATION) MEASURES: -- I? IS NECESSARY TO AGREE IN CDE TO LIMIT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN TERMS OF THE NUMERICP.L STRENGTH AND DURATION OF THESE ACTIVITIES. -- ACTIVITIES COVERED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDARS SHOULD NOT EXCEED A CERTAIN NUMBER OF DIVISIONS AND NUMBERS OF TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT. -- ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED ON SHORT NOTICE NOT COVERED BY THE ANNUAL- CALENDAR SHOULD BE LIMITED IN NUMBER OF TROOPS, EQUIPMENT AND DIVISIONS TO A STRENGT$ OF ONE HALF OF TBEIR RESPECTIVE PARAMETERS FOR ACTIVITIES NOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. -- THE NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED ANNUALLY SHOULD BE LIMITED TO A NUMBER TO BE AGREED UPON. -- MANEUVERS SHOULD NOT BE CONDUCTED CLOSE IN SPACE AND TIME. RESTRAINT SHOULD BE SHOWN IN CONDUCTING MANEUVERS CLOSE TO "NATIONAL FRONTIERS." -- THE ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO ASSERTED THAT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION MUST BE PROVIDED FOR EACH MEASURE AGREED UPON. IN THIS CONTERT, VERIFICATION SHOULD CONSIST OF SEVERAL ELEMENTS: 1) OBSERVATION TO VERIFY THE NON- THLtEATENING NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY AND THE PARAMETERS ESTABLISHED FOR THE ACTIVITY; 2) NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS; 3) COMMUNICA?ION LINKS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMA- TION, INCLUDING ESTABLISHMENT OF TELEX LINKS FOR .RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, AN EXCHANGE OF MILITARY DELEGATIONS, 368 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 :.ND AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF REGULATIONS ON ACCRIDITID MILITARY PERSONNEL; 4) PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATIONS; AND S) "SPECIAL MISSIONS" TO ASCERTAIN THE FACTS IN CASES OF SERIOUS DOUBTS, WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN CLEARID UP BY OTHER KERNS. 7. AMBASSADOR CIARRAPICO (ITALY) OUTLINED THE QUES?IONS HE BELIEVES MUST BE RESOLVID IN EACH AREA OF NEGO?IATION PRIOR TO THE START OF DRAFTING; -- NOTIFICATION: THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH EXCLUDES INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AND AIR SPACE; THUS, REOPENING THIS QUESTION IS "YET ANOTHER BURDEN" TO REACHING AGREEMENT. THE OUT-OF- GARRISON AND STRUCTURAL PARAMETER PROPOSID BY THE WEST REMAINS THE MOST SIIiPLE AND VIABLE APPROACH. FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, NOVEMBER 15, 1985 -- OBSERVATION: DEFINING ACTIVITIES WHICH MUST BE NOTIFIID IS NOT RELEVANT TO DEFINE THE FEATURES OF AN OBSERVATION REGI?iE. THE OBLIGATORY NATURE OF OBSERVATION AND THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION SHOULD NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE TO WHAT ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. -- VERIFICATION: ON-SITE INSPECTION IS THE QUALITATIVE LEAP FORWARD NECESSARY FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. -- CONSTRAINING MEASURES: ANNUAL CALENDARS ENJOY A BROAD CONSENSUS, AND SHOULD INCLUDE ALL ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. THEREFORE, THE STRUCTURE AND FEATURES OF ANNUAL CALENDARS SHOULD BE DISCUSSID. OTHER CONSTRAINTS WILL BE EXAMINID "IF BALANCID." -- NUF REAFFIRMATION: A NUF REAFFIRMATION IS ONLY VALID TO THE EXTENT IN THE CONTERT OF AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE CSBM'S. THE EAST SHOULD GIVE UP ITS "PARALLEL APPROACH" TO NEGOTIATION OF NUF AND CONCRETE CSBM'S. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 369 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C'0 N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08782 SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE PROPOSAL IN PLENARY, NOVEMBER 1S, 1985 (SC.7) REF: S?OCRHOLM 8083 1. CDE-VIII - 023. 2. (C) SUMMARY. THE LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTO NIGHT HAS FINALLY COKE TO AN END FOR THE NNA WITH THE ?ABLING IN PLENARY ON NOVEMBER 1S OF A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL. REACHING AGREEMENT AMONGST THEMSELVES HAS BEEN A STRUGGLE WHICH, NO DOUBT, HAS BEEN GOOD PRACTICE FOR THE DAYS AHEAD AS THEY ARE CALLED UPON TO EXPLAIN AND DEFEND THEIR PROPOSAL WHICH MAY NOT BE EASY AS THEY MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY SPEARING WITH ONE VOICE; THEY OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE STILL DIFFERENCES IN THE GROUP. IN ORDER TO GET ALL BUT ONE ON BOARD (LIECHTENSTEIN REP WAS NO? AVAILABLE FOR FINAL CONSULTATIONS), THE PROPOSAL HAS CHANGED SOMEWHAT FROM THAT REPORTED, IN GENERAL TERMS, AT THE END OF ROUND SEVEN (REF A). CHANGES OF IN?EREST AND FULL ?EXT ARE PROVIDED BELOW. MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS FOLLOWS SEPTEL. END SUMMARY. 3. (C) LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTO NIGHT. AFTER MANY MEETINGS -- DAY, NIGHT, WEEKENDS -- COUPLED WITH THREATS AND CAJOLING, THE NNA ,FINALLY REACHED AGREEMENT ON THEIR PACKAGE OF CSBMS LATE WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 13 AND TABLED THE PROPOSAL IN PLENARY NOVEMBER 15 (SEE PLENARY CABLE SEPTEL.) IT IS CO- SPONSORED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF AUSTRIA, CYPRUS, FINLAND, MALTA, SAN MARINO, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, AND YUGOSLAVIA. LIECHTENSTEIN WILL, NO DOUBT, COME ON BOARD, BUT REP WAS UNAVAILABLE DURING FINAL CONSULTATIONS. THE PAPER HAS UNDERGONE SOME CHANGES SINCE U.S. DEL REPORTED ON ITS PROBABLE FRAMEWORK A? THE END OF ROUND SEVEN (REF A). CHANGES OF NO?E ARE INDICATED BELOW, ALONG WITH RATIONALE. THEY HAD A DIFFICULT TIME REACHING AGREEMENT AND OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGE THA? THEY HAVE JUST PAPERED OVER DIFFERENCES ON SOME SENSITIVE ISSUES. WE HAVE HEARD THAT THEY HAVE YET TO DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE THE PROPOSAL IN WORKING GROUPS. IN THE NNA'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING THE PLENARY, NNA AMBASSADOR'S FIELDED QUESTIONS ON ISSUES OF NATIONAL INTEREST, AT TIMES INDICATING THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED WERE NATIONAL VIEWS -- NOT A GROUP VIEW. U.S. DEL'S ANALYSIS FOLLOWS SEPTEL. 4? (C) CHANGES OF NOTE. --PROPOSAL NO LONGER SPECIFICALLY REQUIRES PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON UNITS PARTICIPATING IN A MANEUVER "BY ORGANIZATIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS," DUE TO YUGOSLAV RELUCTANCE TO SPECIFY NORMAL PEACETIME 370 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 LOCATIONS. INSTEAD, IN PARR 4.1 OF "GENERAL INFORMATION" SUB-CHAPTER OF "PRIOR NOTIFICATION" SECTION AND PARR 9 OF THE "ANNUAL CALENDAR" SECTION, IT TRIES TO FINESSE THE PROBLEM BY CALLING FOR PROVISION OF "ADDITIONAL RELEVAN? INFORMATION TO BE DEFINED ON THE UNITS PARTICIPA?ING IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES." --FOR THE SAME REASON, THE REFERENCES IN THE DOCUMENT TO "PEACETIME LOCATIONS" OR "SPECIFIED NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS" HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO READ SIMPLY "NORMAL LOCATIONS." (WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT A DEAL WAS STRUCK AMONG THE NNA THAT ANY WISHING TO DO SO COULD EXPRESS THEIR INTEREST IN AND ASK FOR INFORMATION ON "PEACETIME LOCATIONS" AS LONG AS NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE TERM "NORMAL LOCATIONS" OR TO THE AFOREMENTIONED PARRS 4.1 OR 9.) --THE DEFINITION OF MANEUVERS HAS BEEN SLIGHTLY FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE REWORKED BECAUSE OF FINNISH INSISTENCE THAT THE CONCEPT OF "MOVEMENTS" BE MAINTAINED ALONG WITH "MANEUVERS," OSTENSIBLY TO PRESERVE CONCEPTS SET OUT IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THUS, RATHER THAN REFERRING TO "RELOCATION OF SUCH FORMATIONS" IN TH$ CONTEXT OF A "COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISE," IT NOW REFERS TO "MOVEMENTS OF SUCH FORMATIONS" (SEE FIRST PARR OF "PRIOR NOTIFICATION" SECTION). THE DEFINITION OF "MOVEMENTS" AS "RELOCATIONS" NOT IN CONJUNC?ION WITH "COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISES" HAS BEEN DELETED. -- IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE "DIVISION" DEFINITION A? "2-5" VICE "3-5" UNITS (WHICH THE FINNS HAD FOUGHT FOR), THE FOLLOWING TWO CHANGES WERE MADE: 1. THE TRIGGERING MECHANISM FOR NOTIFICATION HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT REVISED. WHILE MAINTAINING THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER OF A DIVISION AS ONE OF THE CRITERIA TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION, A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO A NUMERICAL PARAMETER HAS ALSO BEEN INCLUDED AS ANOTHER ELEMENT TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION, WITH USE OF THE CONJUNCTION "OR." 2. A "DIVISION" IS NOW DEFINED AS EITHER "A MOBILE MILITARY UNIT, ETC." OR REPEAT OR "ANY OTHER GROUP OF FORCES OF EQUIVALENT CAPABILITY." --THE SECTION ENTITLED "NOTIFICATION" HAS BEEN RETITLED TO SPECIFIY PRECISELY WHAT IT ADDRcSSES, I.E. "NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE." 371 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 --THE CONSTRAINTS SECTION NOW COVERS "NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITES," RATHER THAN "NOTIFIABLE MILITARY MANEUVERS." AS THiS WAS A LAS? MINUTE MALTESE PROPOSAL, WE QUESTION WHEETHER THE INTENT OF THE CHANGE WAS TO ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE A VEHICLE BY WHICH TO JUSTIFY INCLUSION AT A LATER DATE OF A CONSTRAINT ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES. --IN THE "NON-USE OF FORCE" SECTION AN ADDITIONAL SENTENCE HAS BEEN ADDED, WE ASSUME BY MALTA, WHICH REFERS TO THE "INTERRELATION BETWEEN SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE, AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN." S. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF PROPOSAL. PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF AUSTRIA, CYPRUS, FINLAND, MALTA, SAN MARINO, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, YUGOSLAVIA. THE ABOVE-MENTIONED STATES, RENEWING THEIR COMMITMENT TO DOCUMENT CSCE/SC.3, EXPRESSING THEIR WISH TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FURTHER PROGRESS OF THE CONFERENCE, SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING: ------------------------------ PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ----------------------------- THE PARTICIPATING S?AYES WILL GIVE PRIOR NOTIFICATION TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, I.E. - THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORMATIONS AT OR ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED BELOW OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS IN COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISES AND - MOVEMENTS OF SUCH FORMATIONS AT OR ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL BETWEEN THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS AND THE EXERCISE AREAS AS WELL AS BETWEEN THE AREAS OF TAE DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE EXERCISES. FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARH, PREL SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE SUCH MANOUVRES WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION, WHENEVER THEY INVOLVE AT LEAST - NUMERICAL TOTALS (S) - TO BE DEFINED - OF FORCES PARTICIPATING IN THE ACTIVITY AS A WHOLE, EMPHASIZING MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER OR - ONE DIVISION OR EQUIVALENT FORMATION (ASTERISK 1) OR (ASTERISK 1) FOR THE PURPOSE OF TAE AGREEMENT A DIVISION OR EQUIVALENT FORMATION IS DEFINED AS - A MOBILE MILITARY UNIT STRUCTURED, PERMANENTLY OR TEMPORARILY, UNDER ONE COMMAND IN HEADQUARTERS, COMBAT AND SUPPORT zLEMENTS OR - ANY OTHER GROUP OF FORCES OR EQUIVALENT CAPABILITY CONTAINING 2-S UNITS ON BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL WITH 372 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST X TROOPS AND Y TANKS/ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES/HELICOPTERS OR A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST Z TANKS/ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES/HELICOPTERS. (END ASTERISK 1) - THREE AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE, AIR-MOBILE UNITS ON BATTALION LEVEL OR COMBINATIONS THEREOF AND A TOTAL NUMBER OF XX TROOPS OR A TOTAL NUMBER OF RX TROOPS AND A TOTAL OF YY SQUARE METRES OF SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY. PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THESE MANOEUVRES TARE PLACE AS WELL AS BY THOSE STATES CARRYING THEM OUT. PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL ALSO BE GIVEN BY STATES PARTICPATING IN THESE MANOEUVRES WHENEVER THEIR PARTICIPATION REACHES NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN 42 DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF THESE MILITARY MANOEUVRES IN A STANDARDIZED FORMAT CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: 1. GENERAL INFORMATION 1.1. TYPE AND DESIGNATION OF THE ACTIVITY 1.2. MAIN PURPOSES 1.3. TIIiEFRAME OF THE ACTIVITY 1.4. AREA OF THE ACTIVITY 1.5. LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE ACTIVI?Y 1.6. PARTICIPATING S?AYES 1.7. NUMBER AND TYPES OF PARTICIPATING DIVISIONS OR EQUIVALENT FORMA?IONS OF GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES 1.8. NUMBER AND TYPES OF PARTICIPATING AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIR-MOBILE BRIGADES OR REGIMENTS 1.9. NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ACTIVITY AND THE NUMBER OF TROOPS OF EACH PARTICIPATING STATE 2. INFORMATION ON PARITICPATING UNITS 2.1. NUMBER, TYPES, AND, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, NAMES OF UNITS OF EACH PARTICIPATING STATE INVOLVED IN THE ACTIVITY, DOWN TO AND INCLUDING - BRIGADE AND/OR REGIMENT LEVEL; EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES - BATTALION LEVEL IN CASE OF AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJEC?: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE AIR-MOBILE UNITS 2.2. NUMERICAL STRENGTH (MANPOWER) OF - DIRECTING STAFF, INCLUDING UMPIRES - EACH MAJuK UNIT - DIVISIONAL LEVEL OR ABOVE - BATTALION LEVEL IN CASE OF AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE 373 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 - ----~--- AND AIR-MOBILE UNITS 2.3. NUMBER AND/OR TYPE OF THE FOLLOWING (ASTERISK 2): - TANKS - OTHER ARMOURED FIGH?ING VEHICLES - RIVER CROSSING AND OTHER TYPES OF HEAVY ASSAULT ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT - LOGISTIC ASSAULT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT - SELFPROPELLED ARTILLERY AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (MORE THAN 100 MM) - OTHER ARTILLERY AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (MORE THAN 100 MM), AS WELL AS MOBILE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE LAUNCHERS - HEAVY LIVE AMMUNITION - COMBAT AIRCRAFT - COMBAT HELICOPTERS - TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT - TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS - NAVAL COMBATANTS - LANDING CRAFTS - AMPHIBIOUS. VESSELS, INCLUDING SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY - AUxILIARY AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS, INCLUDING SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY (ASTERISK 2) LEVEL OF DETAIL TO BE DEFINED. (END ASTERISK 2) 3. INFORMATION ON DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION 3.1. THE STARTING AND FINISHING DATES OF THE MOVEMENTS OF FORCES INVOLVED, WHENEVER THEY REACH NOTIFIABLE LEVEL, AS WELL AS THE PERIOD OF ABSENCE FROM THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS 3.2. DURATION OF EACH PHASE, TACTICAL PURPOSE AND CORRESPONDING GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS, INCLUDING STAGING AREAS, AND FINAL POSITIONS BEFORE RETURNING TO THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS 4. OTHER INFORMATION 4.1. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INFORMATION TO BE DEFINED ON THE UNITS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. 4.2. SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES AND ADDITIONS TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR(ASTERISR 3) AS WELL AS REASONS FOR SUCH CHANGES ~4.3. RELATION TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE 4.4. STATE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME -------------------------- ANNUAL CALENDAR OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ----------------------- THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL TRANSMIT TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES THE CALENDAR OF THEIR MILITARY 374 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND PLANNED FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR BEGINNING ON THE SUBSEQUENT JANUARY 1ST. THIS ANNUAL CALENDAR WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY YEAR, NO? LATER THAN OCTOBER 1ST, IN A STANDARD- IZED FOR;iAT CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING T_NFORMATION: 1. TYPE OF ACTIVITY 2. MAIN PURPOSES 3. TIMEFRAME OF THE ACTIVITY WITH ENVISAGED STARTING AND FINISHING DATES 4. AREA OF THE ACTIVITY S. LEVEL OF COIQiAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE ACTIVITY 6. STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE ACTIVITY 7. NUMBER AND TYPES OF THE PARTICIPATING DIVISIONS OR EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS OF GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES 8. NUMBER AND TYPES OF THE PARTICIPATING AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIR-MOBILE UNITS 9. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INFORMATION TO BE DEFINED ON THE UNITS PARTICIPATING IN NO?IFIABLE ACTIVITIES 10. NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ACTIVITY IN TERMS OF MANPOWER AS WELL AS THE NUMBER OF TROOPS OF EACH PARTICIPATING STATE (ASTERISK 3) SEE PAGE 6 ANNUAL CALENDAR PROPOSAL (END ASTERISK 3)' INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO MILITARY MANOEUVRES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS SET OUT BELOW. 1. THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS WILL BE EXTENDED SIMULTANfiOUSLY WITH THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. 2. IN ADDITION TO THE BASIC INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, GIVEN IN THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION, THE INVITATION WILL SPECIFY - STATE RESPONSIBILE FOR THE OBSERVATION PROGRAI4iE - THE PERIOD OF OBSERVa?ION - THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS INVITED PER PARTICIPA?ING STATE - THE LANGUAGES USED IN INTERPRETATION AND TRANSLATION DURING THE OBSERVATION. THE DEADLINE FOR ACCEPTING THE INVITATION WILL BE 21 DAYS BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION. IF NO REPLY IS GIVEN IN TIME, IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT. 3. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE SENT NOT LATER THAN 14 DAYS BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION TO FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST 375 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL,/NON-ALIGNED TABLE THOSE STATES WHICH HAVE ACCEPTED THE INVITATION OR WHICH REQUEST SUCH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. THE INFORMA?ION WILL INCLUDE - BASIC SITUATION AND ?LAIN PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY - MAPS OF THE AREA OF ACTIVITY WITH A SCALE TO BE SPECIFIED - GENERAL PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OBSERVERS - AUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT FOR THE OBSERVERS ' GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME 4. AT LATEST WHEN THE OBSERVATION BEGINS INFORMATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE OBSERVERS ON THE - DE?AILED OBSERVATION PROGRAMME - DIRECTING STAFF RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OBSERVATION - DETAILS OF PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS. S. THE OBSERVATION WILL COVER THE DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY, AS NOTIFIED, WHENEVER IT REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL, DURING PHASES TO BE DEFINED. 6. THE INVITATION WILL BE VALID FOR AT LEAST ONE OBSERVER FROM EACH PARTICIPATING STATE; IN CASE OF LARGER SCALE ACTIVITIES AT LEAST TWO OBSERVERS WILL BE INVITED. IN THE CASE OF PARTICULARLY LARGE ACTIVITIES AN EVER HIGHER NUMBER OF OBSERVERS COULD BE ENVISAGED. 7. WHILE THE OBSERVERS ARE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE WHERE THE ACTIVITY TARES PLACE, THEIR PERSONS AND PROPERTY, AS WELL AS THEIR LIVING QUARTERS, WILL BE GRANTED THE SAKE PRIVILEGES AND IMKUNITIES AS THOSE ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON`DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. 8. THE INVITED STATE DECIDES WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS. 9. OBSERVERS FROM ALL PTHER PARTICIPATING STATES BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WITH REGARD TO POSSI- BILITIES TO SUPPLEMENT THE OBSERVATION PROGR.4I~SE IN ORDER TO MEET PARTICULAR CONCERNS EXPRESSED. 16. THE INVITING STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF AC?IVITIES. OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE RELEVAN? INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE INVITING STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISION SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT. THE INVITING STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT OBSERVATION OF RESTRICTED INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS FORTIFICATIONS OR SIMILAR DEFENCE SITES. 17. OBSERVERS WILL BE GIVEN THE OFPORTUNITY TO COMI'iUNICATE WITH THEIR LASSIES AND/OR WITH THEIR HOME AUTHORITIES. 18. THE INVITING STATE WILL COVER THE COSTS OF BOARD AND LODGING DURING THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME. NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AT SHOR NOTICE 376 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 1. THE PAR?ICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION TO ALL OTHER PAR?ICIPATING STATES OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, WHICH ARE CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE, WHENEVER THEY REACH NOTIFABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2. 2. THE PARTICIPATING S?AYES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPA?ING STATES OF SUCH MILITARY MOVEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT IN CONJUNCTION WITH COMBA?- RELATED EXERCISES, OF MILITARY FORMA?IONS AT OR ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL TO AND FROM NORMAL LOCATIONS/STAGING AREAS, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, WHENEVER THEY REACH NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2. 3. NOTIFICA?ION WILL~BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPA?ING STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THESE MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS ?ARE PLACE AS WELL AS BY THOSE STATES CARRYING THEM OUT. NOTIFICATION WILL ALSO BE GIVEN BY STATES PARTICIPATING IN THESE ?MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS WHENEVER THEIR PARTICIPA?ION REACHES NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. 4. NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO THE START OF THESE MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS IN A STANDARDIZED FORMAT CONTAINING INFORMATION AS OUTLINED UNDER THE SECTION ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION WITH EXCEPTIONS TO BE DEFINED. S. T'HE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO MILITARY MANOEUVRES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE, WHEN THE DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY AT OR ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL EXCEEDS ... HOURS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS TO BE ELABORATED. FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE COMMANDERS AND TROOPS - TO BE BRIEFED ON UNIT LEVELS, TO BE DEFINED, BY COMMANDERS OR MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFF - TO BE PROVIDED WITH INFORMATION CONCERNING THEIR APPROXIMATE POSITION, GEOGRAPHICALLY AND IN RELATION TO UNITS REFERRED TO IN EARLIER BRIEFINGS. THEY WILL BE PROVIDED WITH APPROPRIATE MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION. 15. THE INVITING STATE WILL ALSO CONSIDER REQUESTS MADE BY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WITH REGARD TO POSSI- BILITIES TO SUPPLEMENT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME IN 377 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ORDER TO MEET PARTICULAR CONCERNS EXPRESSED. 16. THE INVITING STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF ACTIVITIES. OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE RELEVANT INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE INVITING STATE IN ACCORDiMICE WITH THE PROVISION SET OU? IN THIS DOCUMENT. THE INVI?ING STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT OBSERVATION OF RESTRICTED INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS FORTIFICATIONS OR SIMILAR DEFENCE SITES. 17. OBSERVERS WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO COI~UNICATE WITH THEIR EMBASSIES AND/OR WITH THEIR HOME AUTHORITIES. 18. THE INVITING STATE WILL COVER THE COSTS OF BOARD AND LODGING DURING THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMlSE. NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AT SHOR NOTICE 1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, WHICH ARE CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE, WHENEVER THEY REACH NOTIFABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2. 2. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF SUCH MILITARY MOVEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT IN CONJUNCTION WIT$ COMBAT- RELATED EXERCISES, OF MILITARY FORMATIONS AT OR ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL TO AND FROM NORMAL LOCATIONS/STAGING AREAS, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, WHENEVER THEY REACH NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2. 3. NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THESE MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS TAKE PLACE AS {,TELL AS BY THOSE STATES CARRYING THEM OUT. NOTIFICATION WILL ALSO BE GIVEN BY STATES PARTICIPATING IN THESE MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS WHENEVER THEIR PARTICIPATION REACHES NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. 4. NOTIFICA?ION WILL BE GIVEN AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO THE START OF THESE MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS IN A STANDARDIZED FORMAT CONTAINING INFORMATION AS OUTLINED UNDER THE SECTION ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION WITH EXCEPTIONS TO BE DEFINED. 5. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO MILITARY MANOEUVRES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE, WHEN THE DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY AT OR ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL EXCEEDS ... HOURS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS TO BE ELABORATED. ------------------ CONSTRAINTS ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES FROM USDEL CDE 378 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE 1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL ABIDE BY THE FOLLOWING CONSTRAINTS ON THE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN THIS SECTION. 2. NO INDIVIDUAL MILITARY MANOEUVRE WILL EXCEED FIVE TIMES~TSE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AND ITS DURATION AT OR ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL WILL NO? EXCEED 17 DAYS. 3. THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMI? ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICPATE IN MORE THAN A TOTAL OF FIVE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY HANEUVRES PER CALENDAR YEAR WHICH ARE OF A SItE LESS THAN TWO TIMES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL: MOREOVER, THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICIPATE (AS?FRISK 4) IN A TOTAL OF MORE THAN ONE SUCH MANOEUVRE AT THE SAME TIME. HOWEVER, IF SUCH MANOEUVRES ARE NOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR BY THE STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THEY TARE PLACE AS WELL AS BY. THOSE STATES CARRYING THEM OUT, THE TOTAL NUMBER PER CALENDAR YEAR AND THE NUMBER OF SUCH MANOEUVRES TARING PLACE AT THE SANE TIME WILL NOT BE RESTRICTED. 4. THE STA?ES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICIPATE (ASTERISK 4) IN MORE THAN A TOTAL OF FIVE MILITARY MANOEUVRES PER CALENDAR YEAR, WHICH ARE OF A SIZE OF TWO TIMES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL OR ABOVE. SUCH MANOEUVRES WILL BE NOTIFIED ALREADY IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR BY THE STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THEY TARE PLACE AS WELL AS BY THOSE STATES CARRYING ?HEM OUT. THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICIPATE (ASTERISK 4) IN A TOTAL OF MORE THAN TWO SUCH MANOEUVRES AT THE SAME TIME. HOWEVER, ONCE A YEAR TWO SUCH MANOEUVRES MAY BE COMBINED BUT NOT EXCEED A TOTAL OF SEVEN TIMES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. (ASTERISK 4) TO BE DEFINED. (END ASTERISK 4) OBSERVA?ION UPON REQUEST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES A PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH CONSIDERS THAT ITS NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS ARE AT STARE OR THAT THE CON?INUED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT IS SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED BECAUSE OF SPECIFIC CIRCUIiSTANCES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES CONTAINED IN THE PRECEDING SECTIONS, WILL BE ENTITLED TO REQUEST TO SEND OBSERVERS TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ON VERY SHORT NOTICE. THE REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITIES OR PRESUMED 379 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ---~--- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ACTIVITIES ARE CARRIED OUT. IT WILL DEFINE THE REQUESTED OBSERVATION AREA AND CITE THE RELEVANT MEASURES ON WHICH THE REQUEST IS BASED AS WELL AS STA?E THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST. THE STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A REQUEST WILL, WITHIN TWELVE HOURS AFTER RECEIVING THE REQUEST, INVITE THE REQUESTING STATE TO CARRY OUT THE OBSERVATION. THE MODALITIES AND GUIDELINES FOR SUCH OBSERVATION, INCLUDING EXCEPTIONS WHICH APPLY TO RESTRICTED AREAS, WILL BE DEFINED. IF OBSERVERS FROM A THIRD STATE TARE PART, THEY WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE WHOLE OBSERVATION TOGETHER WITH THE OBSERVERS FROM THE REQUESTING STATE, AND BE PROVIDED WITH THE SAME FACILITIES. AFTER A REQUESTED OBSERVATION HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT, T$E REQUESTING STATE, THE INVITING STATE AS WELL AS THE INVITED THIRD STATE, WILL EACH SUBMIT A REPORT TO FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES WITHIN ... HOURS UPON COMPLETION OF THE OBSERVATION. THE REQUEST AND THE ANSWER THERETO AS WELL AS THE REPORTS ON THE OBSERVATION WILL BE TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE FOLLOWING SECTION. ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH INFORMATION, NOTIFICATION AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH REGARD TO THE MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED --------------------------------------- 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR COMMUNICATION EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL TRANSMIT ALL COMMUNICATIONS FORESEEN IN THE PRECEDING SECTIONS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. SUCH COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE TRANSMITTED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE MODALITIES FOR RAPID COMMUNICATIONS SET OUT BELOW. THE PARTICIPATING STATES CAN ALSO MARE USE OF THE RAPID COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AND REQUEST CLARIFICATION AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AS WELL AS IN ORDER TO EXCHANGE VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES IN THE PRECEDING SECTIONS. 2. MODALITIES FOR RAPID COMMUNICATIONS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE TRANSMITTED WITHOUT DELAY AND AT ALL TIMES, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL KEEP TELECOMMUNICATION LINES ACCESSIBLE BETWEEN THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES 380 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 OF THE PARTICIATING STATES FOR TRANSMITTING AND RECEIVING PRINTED TEXT, CHARTS AND MAPS. ACCESS TO ALL SUCH COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE RESTRICTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CSCE PRACTICE. CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHORT MEETINGS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES, IN RELATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES IN THE PRECEDING SECTIONS, SHOULD ALSO BE ENVISAGED. SUCH MEETINGS COULD BE CONVENED - ON AN AD HOC BASIS, AT THE REQUEST OF ANY PARTICI- PATING STA?E, TO DEAL WITH EXCEPTIONAL SITUATIONS - AT INTERVALS AND DATES TO BE DECIDED BY THE PARTICIPATING STATES, TO PROCEED TO AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE ROUTINE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES NON-USE OF FORCE THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO TAE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR IMPROVED AND CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS, AND TAUS TO FURTHER THE PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURITY AND DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN TAE WORLD AS A WHOLE. TREY ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF TAE INTERRELATION BETWEEN SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE, AND SECURI?Y IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA. ALL TAE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN TAE FINAL ACT ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND, ACCORDINGLY, WILL ALL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TARING INTO ACCOUNT TAE OTHERS. RESPECT FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE - TAE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE FOR THESE PRINCIPLES WILL ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORMAL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND THE PROGRESS OF CO-OPERATION AMONG TAE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL FIELDS. TAE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE CONSCIOUS OF TAE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY WITHIN TAE CSCE._ TREY STRESS THAT TAE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE T$REA? OR USE OF FORCE IS A UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED OBLIGATION IN INTERNA?IONAL LAW, BINDING ALL STATES, AND THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH IT CONSEQUENTLY CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. TREY REAFFIRM TIiEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPEC? THIS PRINCIPLE, CONTAINED IN TAE FINAL ACT, SO AS ?0 ENSURE THAT, AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE, IT IS STRICTLY 381 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 AND EFFECTIVELY OBSERVED. NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE. THEY RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, ' FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH THE FINAL ACT, AND, ACCORDINGLY, - FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE,. DIRECT OR INDIRECT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANY STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF I?S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, REGARDLESS OF THIS STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THIS STATE RELA?IONS OF ALLIANCE. NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL. ?HE PARTICIPATING STATES S?RESS THEIR FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM. THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE EXISTING OR ARISING BETWEEN THEM. THEY ALSO EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO REINFORCE, IMPROVE AND DEVELOP THE METHODS AT THEZR DISPOSAL FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPU?ES. THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE-PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES. THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSISTANCE TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OR TO SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME OF ANOTHER PARTICIATING STATE. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TARE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPRESSION OF ACTS OF ?ERRORISM AND WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE' PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON T.~iEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL AC?IVITIES OF PERSONS, GROU:?S AND FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCQ; USDEL CD; USDEL NST 382 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRQRISM. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. THEY DECLARE, THAT THEIR E%ISTING .INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS DO NOT CONFLICT WITH THE PRESENT DOCUMENT. THEY CONFIRM ?HAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER T$E CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL. THE PAR?ICIPATING STATES ARE CONVINCED, THAT THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND THE EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EVERY PARTICIPATING STATE REQUIRE DETERMINED EFFORTS BY ALL OF THEM TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDEDICE, LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION, STRENGTHEN SECURITY FOR ALL AND PROMOTE DISARMAMENT. BY THEIR VERY NATURE CONCRETE CSBMS SERVE TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. END TEXT. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS SECRET S T A T E M E N T BY DR ~'vDRESTINOS N. ?APADOPOULOS HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF CY?aUS TO THE STOCRHO],M CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- Ar'0 SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARN.A ~lr'A1T IN EUROPE 15 NOVEMBEQ 1985 384 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 on behalf of the Delegations of Austria, Cyprus. Tinland, Malta, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia I have the honour to present a proposal, the text of which is now beinc* circulated by the Secretariat and which will later be distributed as document CSCE/SC.7. the above - mentioned countries renew their commitment to document CSCE/SC.3 submitted on March 9th, 1984, in which they presented a proposal which reflected their common view of the task of the Conference during its first stage. Since then the sponsors, during the work of the Conference in plenary and in working group sessions, have commented and discussed their ideas and concepts with the intention of presentinq,at an appropriate moment, a more detailed version of their original proposal, with a view to furthering the work of the Conference. The proposal now being introduces contains the following sections: The section on "Prior notificatl_cn of military activities" foresees that prior notifi?atior will be given, 42 days in advance, to all other participating States of military manoeuvres, covered by the mandate, i.e. - the engagement of military formations at or above the notifiable level outside their normal locations in combat-related exercises -~~ ~ and - movements of such formations at or above the notifiable level between their normal locations and the exercise areas as well as between the areas of the different phases of the exercises. 385 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET Such manoeuvres will be subject to prior notification, whenever they involve at lea:.t - numerical total(s) - to ba Eafined - of forces participating in the activity as whop, em}-tasizinq mobility and firepower or - one division or equivalent formation or - three amphibious, airborne; air-mobile units o:z battalion level or combinations therao~ and s total number of xx troops or a total number of xx troops and a total of yy square metres of shipborne loading capacity. sor the purpose of the agreement a division or e~~ivalent formation is defined as - a aobile military unit structured, permanently or temporarily, under one command in headquarters, combat and su>>port elements or - any other group of forces of equivalent capability containing T-S units on brigade/regiment level w~.th a total number of at least x troops and y tanks/armoured fighting vehicles/helicopters or a total number of at lea~:t z tanks/ armoured fighting vehicles helicopters. Psior notification will be g'?ven in a standardized format containing detailed informat~cn specified in our proposal. !!r. Chairman, I would like to draw atteati~~:, to the fact that these parameters for prior notification also ~:onstitute the notifiable level for all activities covered i:~ other sections of this proposal. Mr. Chairman, according to the subsequent section'"Annual caleniar of military activities", the participating States wil emit every year, not later than October 1st,- to all otter participating Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 States the calendar of their military activities subject to prior notification and planned for the next calendar year beginning on the subsequent Januazy 1st. The annual calendars will, in a standardized format, contain information as specified in our proposal. The next section deals with tht 'Invitation of observers to military activities subject to prior notification". Ne propose that the participating States invite observers from all other participating States to militu y manoeuvres subject to prior notification. The invitation will be extended simultaneously with the prior notification. This section contains detailed provisions on the information to be gives to the observers as to the purpose, the basic situation and the progress o! the activity. This information and the working conditions laid down in the propo:al should enable them to evaluate whether the activities are carried out in conformity with the prior notification and whether they are non-threatening in nature. J-ccordiaq to the next section "Notification and observation -~~~~~~ of military activities carried out at short notice" the participating States will give notification of military manoeuvres, which are carried out at short notice. The participating States will also give notification of such military movements which are not in conjunction with combat- related exercises, of military formations at or above notifiable level to sad from normal locations/staging areas, covered by the mandate. whenever they read notifiable level. Notification will be given at tae earliest possible opportunity prior to the start of these manoeuvres and movements. ? 387 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET The sponsors propose that the participating States invite observers from all other participating States to military manoeuvres carried out at short notice, when the duration of the activity at oz above notifiable lwel axcads a certain number of hours, in accordance with provisions to be elaborated. In the next section concerning "Constraints on certain military activities" we propose that no individua litary manoeuvre will exceed five times the notifiable le~~el and that its duration at or above notifiable lwal will not exceed 17 days. Furthermore, States will neither permit on Chair rnnz territory nor carry out or participate in, more than a total isf five notifiable military manoeuvres per calendar year wlsich are of a siz? less than two times the' notifiable lwelf ex~raover, the States will neither permit ~~n their own territory nor carry out or participate in a total ~f more than one such manoeuvre at the same time. However, if such manoeuvres are notified in the annual calendar the total number per calendar bear and the number of such manoeuvres taking place at the same time will not be restricted. The States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or participate in more than a total of five military manoeuvres per calendar year, which era of a size cf two times the notifiable level or above. Such manoeuvres will be notified already in the annual calendar. The 3tatas will neither permit on their owns territory nor carry out or participate in a total of more than two such manoeuvres at the same time. However, once a year two such manoeuvres may be combined but not exceed a total of seven times the notifiable level. 388 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 The section "Observation upon raauest of militarv activities" states the general condition: and outlines the aodalitiss for a participating State to request to send, on very short notice, observers to another ;~articipatinq State. J1s the CSCE process takes place out3ide military alliances, the requested State will in addition invite observers from a third participating State wi?:h Mich it does not maintain relations of military allian~:e. _ The request, and the answer thereto, as well as the reports on the observation will be transmitted in accordance with the procedures for rapid communications. The section "!-rranaements for dealing with information, notification and rapid exchange of views with regard to the measures to be adopted" outlines the modalities for using telecommunication lines between the par'ticipatinq States for the rapid transmission of communications foreseen in the preceding sections. In the section on 'Consultative arrangements" the sponsors propose that arrangements be envisaged for short meetings of representatives of all the participating States, in relation to the implementation of the measures contained in the preceding sections. ? - on an ad hoc basis, at the request of any participating State, to deal with axceptio;~l situations - at intervals and dates to ~a decided by the participating States, to proceed to an excZange of views on the routine implementation of the measures. 339 .SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 The section on the "Non-use of force" contains an elaboration on this principle. =t is stressed that the principle of refraining from the lbreat or use of force is a universally recognised o:oligation is international law, binding all States, and that n~~n- eompliance with it consequently constitutes a violation of international law. The sponsors are also convinced that the situation i? Europe and the equ:1 respect for the 1e43timate security in~:erests of every participating State regLire determined efforts by all participating States to build mutual confidence, lessen military confrontation, strengthen security for all ~md promote disarmament. Ne believe that by their very nature concrete CSBMs ~;erve to give effect and expression to the duty of States i:o refrain from the threat or use of force. Likewise, we recall that the peaceful settlement of c.isputea is an essential complement to the non-use of force. Mr. Chairman. .. this completes the presentation of the general contents of our proposal. Sponsors will later individually take up various questions in more detail. Mr. Chairman, the countries sponsoring this proposal also wish to stress that nothing in its format, including the order of the sections, is intended as indicat..aq any relative priority or importance. 1111ow me to recall that our lirs~: proposal SC.3 advocates that the negotiations in Stockho':m should aim at timely and 390 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 .SECRET substantial progress in order to provide the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting with sut~icient new elesents whoa considering the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament In Europe in order to deal also with disarmament. It is our hope and wish that today's proposal contributes to such progress and to the successful outcome of this Conference. 391 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08860 SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEE?INGS, NOVEMBER 11-15, 1985 1. CDE VIII - 29 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN CDE WORKING GROUPS FOR THE WEER OF NOVEMBER 11-15 THE EAST CONCENTRATED ITS FIRE ON ALLEGED WESTERN FOOTTHtAGGING IN DISCUSSING TE[: NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) AND ON THE INCLUSION OF INDEPE~dDEN? NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES. IN CONTRAST, NATO SPEAKERS FOCUSED ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, SLICE[ AS THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH, AND TRIED TO MINIKIZE DISCUSSION OF THE NAVAL AND AIR ISSUE. THE NNA, ENTIRELY FOCUSED ON FINALIZI]tG ITS LONG AWAITED PAPER, WAS SILENT ALL WEER. FOR THE ]'UTURE, NATO WILL DEVELOP NEW ARGUMENTS BASED ON SC.1 TO PROMOTE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND WILL ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE ALLIANCE COORDINA?ION FURTHER. WE ANTICIPATE NO CHANGE IN EASTERN TACTICS. FIND SUMMARY. 4. EAST: IN CDE WORKING GROUP MEE?INGS FOR 7HE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 11-15, THE EAST FOCUSED ON TWO MAJOR THEMES: ALLEGED WESTERN FOOTDRAGGING IN DISCUSSING THE'NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF); AND THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CSBM'S. GRINEVSRY (USSR) OPENED THE FOOTDRAGGING THEME IN THE NOVEMBER 11 MEETING OF WORKING GROUT' AB, AND THE SAME LINE WAS PURSUED IN THE NUF CLUSTER AS THE SOVIETS TRIED TO PAIN? THE WEST AS STALLING ON NUF, NOT LIVING UP TO TAE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT AND (WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO TAE U.S.) ABANDONING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DUBLIN AND STRASBOURG PLEDGES TO DISCUSS THE NON-USE OF FARCE PRINCIPLE IN PARALLEL WITH CSBM'S. HOWEVER, AS THE WEER DEVELOPED SOVIET STATEMENTS SEEMED TO REFLECT THAT TREY WERE NOT SEEKING SIMPLE PARALLELISM, BUT DOUBL:: LINKAGE, TYING PROGRESS ON NUF TO PROGRESS ON CSBM'S AN1) PROGRESS ON CONCRETE CSBM'S TO THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES. THE EAST HAMMERED ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN ALL WORKING GROUPS EXCEPT NON-USE OF FORCE, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS IN "HE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION GROUPS. THEIR OB.fECTIVE WAS CLEARLY TO ELICIT SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIE;~ UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WHICH THEY COULD THEN itSE TO JUSTIFY SEPARATE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION CAF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WE[ETAER INDEPENDENT OR COMBINED WITH GROUND ACTIVITIES. S. THE EAST ALSO EMPLOYID THE THEME OF WESTERr FOOTDRAGGING IN THE CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS WORKING GROUP, ACCUSING THE WEST OF DISTORTING THE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT BY REJECTING CEILINGS. IN THE NUF GROUP, THE VARIATION WAS THAT THE WEST HAD "VIOLATED" THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT BY ENGAGING IN A PHILOSOPHICAL 392 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER NUF WAS A CSBM. THE EAST TRIED -- UNSUCCESSFULLY -- TO MARE USE OF THE STATEMENT BY FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER IN SUPPORT OF "CONCRETIZATION" OF NUF TO DRAW THE FRG INTO DEFINING SPECIFIC TYPES OF FORCE TO BE BANNED. ?HE FRG, HOWEVER, WAS PREPARED FOR THE EASTERN ASSAULT AND EXPLAINED ?HAT GENSCHER'S STATEMENT HAD REFERRED TO ?HE NEED FOR CONCRETE CSBM'S, NO? FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE. IN A WEAR ATTEMPT TO BUTTRESS THE EAST'S CASE THAT A NUF REAFFIRMATION IS A CSBM, HUNGARY ARGUED THAT IT MET THE VERIFIABILITY CRITERION OF THE MADRID MANDATE SINCE NON-COMPLIANCE WOULD BE AN ILLEGAL ACT AGAINST ANOTHER STATE OR GROUP OF S?AYES. IT DID NOT TARE MUCH IMAGINATION TO SEE WHAT SOLUTION THIS EASTERN ASSERTION HAS IN MIND: CONSULTATIONS WHICH A THREATENED STATE COULD CONVOKE. 6. THE EAST CONTINUED TO INTERPRET THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT AS LIMITING THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION TO NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES AND TO REJECT NATO'S INFORMATION MEASURE AS A SEPARATE MEASURE. 7. NATO: NATO TACTICS FOR THE WEER WERE TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON WESTERN PROPOSALS ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES SUCH AS THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION, AND FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, THE BASIC MODALITIES OF AN OBSERVATION REGIME (I.E., ALL SHOULD UE INVITED TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES), WHILE TRYING TO AVOID ADDRESSING THE AIR AND NAVAL ISSUE. AS THE LATTER OFTEN SEEMED TO BE THE ONLY ISSUE WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD SERIOUSLY ADDRESS, DISCUSSION WAS NOT PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVE. WHERE AND WHEN NATO TACTICS WORKED, THE ALLIANCE MET WITH SOME SUCCESS IN DEMONSTRATING THAT THE EAST WAS NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY EVEN ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, SUCH AS THE CONTENT OF ANNUAL FORECASTS AND THE OBLIGATORY NATURE OF OBSERVATION. HOWEVER, WHEN THE EAST MANAGED TO TURN THE DISCUSSION TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE WAS SPOTTY AT BEST. 8. THE WEER STARTED OUT WELL IN THE NOVEMBER 12 NOTIFICATION GROUP WITH HANSEN (U.S.) AND OTHER NATO SPEAKERS MAKING THE CASE THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE NOTIFICATIONS OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH THAN IN THE CORRESPONDING WTO PROPOSALS. OUT PROBLEMS DEVELOPED IN THE INFORMATION/VERFICATION AND COMMMUNICATIONS CLUSTER AND IN THE OBSERVATION GROUP WHEN THE FRENCH MILITARY ADVISOR (MERIC) STATED FRANCE'S WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS WHAT INFORMATION NATO WOULD PROVIDE UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND ACCEPTED MORE LIBERAL OBSERVATION OF 393 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET 25X1 FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THE FRENCH (WHO ARE CLEARLY OUT IN FRONT OF THE ALLIANCE ON THIS ISSUE) WERE ROUNDLY CRITICIZED IN CAUCUS POST-MORTEMS FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE ON THE NAV,~I. AND AIR ISSUE, BUT THE SITUATION HAS BROUGHT A POTENT::ALLY SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM TO THE ALLIANCE'S ATTENTION-- NATO IS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN ANY DETAIL INFOI:MATION TO BE INCLUDED IN NOTIFICATION OR IN THE OBSERVATION BRIEFING OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNDER TH1; FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. 9. THE WES? HAD MORE SUCCESS IN THE NUF GROUF WHERE, UNDER SOVIET ATTACK FOR FOOTDRAGGING, SEEMINGLY FORTHCOMING WESTERN RESPONSES SUPPORTING A NUF REAFFIRMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A SET OF CSBM'S SEEMED TO THROW THE EAST OFF BALANCE. 10. THE NNA: THE NNA, WHICH WAS IN THE FINAL THROES OF PUTTING ITS LONG AWAITED PAPER INTO FINAL FORM, WAS SILENT ALL WEER. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY OUR NNA CONTAC?S, THAT THEY MAY BE NO MORE VOCAL THIS +iEER (NOVEMBER 18-22), AS THE DELICATE INTERNAL COMPROMISES REQUIRED TO GET FINAL APPROVAL OF THEIR PAPER 'TIGHT NOT WITHSTAND A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THEIR VARI)US PROPOSALS. IN LIGHT OF THIS WE HAVE BEEN ASRE:~ BY OUR NNA FRIENDS NOT TO PROBE T00 DEEPLY T00 SOON I:~iTO THE INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THEIR PAPER. 11. THE FUTURE; ANTICIPATING NO LETUP IN EASTERN PRESSURE ON NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES, THE NAT!) CAUCUS HAS 'TASKED THE MINI-CAUCUSES FOR THE NOTIFICATON AND OBSERVA?ION GROUPS 'TO PRODUCE NEW ARGUMENTS, B~-SED ON SC.1, TO BE USED IN SUPPORT OF THE FUNCTIONAL ~?PPROACH. AS SEVERAL CAUCUS MEMBERS, LED BY FRANCE AND TF[E NETHERLANDS, FEEL THAT SC.1 HAS TO BE FURTHER IiEVELOPED IN THIS AREA, THE MINI-CAUCUSES WILL ALSO CONS]DER POSSIBLE QUESTIONS TO BE POSED TO CAPITALS AND TO BRUSSELS THAT WOULD GO BEYOND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IN SC.1. TURKEY, ON THE OTHER HAND, BELIEVES THAI FOR NOW WE SHOULD STICK WITH SC. 1 AS TABLED AND THAT TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING AT THIS TIME AMOUNTS TO A NET SOVIET GAIN WITHOUT THEIR HAVING TO NEGOTIATE FOR IT OR TO OFFER A QUID PRO QUO. IN THE INTERIM, THE ALLIANCE WILL CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON OUR OWN PROPOSALS AND MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO LIMIT DISCUSSION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. ALSO, IN RESPONSE TO WIDESPREAD ALLIED CRITICISM, INCREASED EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO COO:tDINATE ALLIANCE INTERVENTIONS AND TO AVOID PROBLEMS EX:?ERIENCED IN THE PAST WEER WHEN T00 MANY WESTERN SPEAKERS WANTED THE FLOOR AND T00 OFTEN STRAYED OFF THE AGREED 'THEME, CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EAST TO SEIZE THI: AGENDA. ON NUF, THE WEST WILL CONCENTRATE ON D:[SCUSSING FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 394 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARR, PREL SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, A NUF REAFFIRMATION IN THE CONTEX? OF NEGOTIATION OF A COMPLETE SET OF CSBM'S. SOME WESTERN DELEGATIONS (E.G. ITALY, NETHERLANDS, DENMARK), HOWEVER, BELIEVE WE MUST SOON GO BEYOND THIS MINIMALIST POSITION AND BEGIN TO DISCUSS, AMONG OURSELVES AT FIRST, WHA? NUF LANGUAGE WE COULD EVENTUALLY ACCEPT. WITH REGARD TO THE NNA PAPER, IT IS NOW BEING STUDIED, AND, FOR THE TIME BEING, THE WEST WILL CONFINE I?SELF TO CLARIFYING QUESTIONS COMPARING THE PAPER WITH OUR OWN PROPOSAL. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 395 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET C 0 N?F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08881 SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL (SC. 7) REF: STOCRHLM 08782 1. CDE VIII - 030. 2. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEX?.) 3. SUMMARY. THIS CABLE CONTAINS U.S. DEL CD.s'S PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF TAE RECENTLY TABLED NNA PROPOSAL, SC.7, AS WELL AS INFORMATION ON NNA ATTITUDES. THE TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF THE NUF 1~ORTION OF THE NNA PAPER IS CONTAINED SEPTEL. END SUMMARY. 4. A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME. REGRESSION itND PURPOSEFUL AMBIGUITY. THE NNA ROSE DOES NOT ;iMELL AS SWEET AS IT DID WHILE BUDDING. THIS IS TFT~; INEVITABLE, HOWEVER UNFORTUNATE, OUTCOME OF NrfA BARGAINING AMONG THEMSELVES IN ORDER TO SECURE; A PROPOSAL ALL COULD ENDORSE, ALBEIT WITH VARYIrG DEGREES OF ENTHUSIASM. OF PARTICULAR NOTE IS THE FACT THAT THE PROPOSAL IS BUILT AROUND A PURPCSEFUL AMBIGUITY - IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT THE NNA ATTITUDE IS TOWARDS THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (THE AMBIGUITY REFLECTS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THOSE WHO LIRE IT AND THOSE WHO DON'T). THE PROPOSAL IS AMBIGUOUS ON THE QUES2ION OF WHETHER INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE COVERED. THIS AMBIGUITY, OF COURSE, AFFECTS TAE INTERPRETATION OF A VARIETY OF THE PROPOSALS INCLUDED IN THE PACKAGE. WHILE OPTICALLY EMPLOYING TAE STRUCTURAL TffitESAOLD OF A DIVISION, A CLOS1'sR READING REVEALS THAT TAE REAL OPERATIVE TARESHI)LD APPEARS TO BE A NUMERICAL ONE, AS TROOP NUMBER;i ARE A REY COMPONENT IN THE DIVISIONAL DEFINITION. ON OBSERVATION THE NNA SAY THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS :~AOULD BE INVITED TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES -- BUT IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE ACTIVITY WILL BE OBSERVED FROM ? START TO FINISH.. IT CONTAINS A CONSTRAINT MEASURE THAT IS UNBALANCED AND COULD~LIMIT NATO AND U.:. MILITARY PRACTICES, BUT NOT THE WTO'S. THE VERIFICA- TION MEASURE ("OBSERVATION BY REQUEST") CONTAINS A RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND PROVIDES FOR THIRD (NNA) PARTY PARTICIPATION IN ANY INSPEC?ION (OBSERVATION). 5. WHAT'S IN A NAME? TAE NNA HAVE INTENTIONALLY REFRAINED FROM LABELING TAE VARIOUS PROVISIONS IN SC.7 AS "MEASURES," IN ORDER TO AVOID WHAT TREY PERCEIVED TO BE A TRAP SC.1 CO-SPONSORS HAVE FALLEN INTO THROUGH USE OF THAT TERM. TAE MADRID MAND,~ITE CALLS FOR MEASURES TO BE "PROVIDED WITH ADEQUAT:; FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTEIIT." IN THE VIEW OF ONE SWEDE, SC.1 SPONSORS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DEMONSTRAzTE ADEQUATELY THAT EACH OF ITS MEASURES MEETS THAT CRITERION. (IN A RECENT WORKING GROUP A MEETING ON INFORMATION, VERIFIC~-TION, 396 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET AND COMMUNICATION, THE USSR HAS QUESTIONED THE VERIFIABILITY OF SC.1'S MEASURE 1 ON INFORMATION, LAYING THE GROUNDS FOR REJECTING I? AS A DISCRETE MEASURE.) THE NNA'S, ACCORDING TO THE SWEDE, REGARD THE VARIOUS PROVISIONS IN SC.7 AS "ELEMENTS" OF THEIR OVERALL PROPOSAL. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, HOW THEY BELIEVE SC.7'S ELEMENTS CAN BE VERIFIED. 6. THE TIME HAS COME THE WALRUS SAID, TO SPEAR OF MANY THINGS. SOME OF THE NNA WALRUSES, HOWEVER, INTEND TO LET THE NNA PROPOSAL SPEAR FOR ITSELF. DESPITE REPORTED ATTEMPTS BY SWEDISH AMB. LIDGARD TO ORGANIZE A SYSTEMATIC PRESENTATION AND PROMOTION OF THE VARIOUS SC.7 ELEMENTS BY DIFFERENT NNA MEMBERS IN THE RELEVANT WORKING GROUPS, IT APPEARS THAT MANY OF THE OTHER NNA'S WILL, FOR THE MOST PART, SIT QUIETLY AND SPEAR ONLY WHEN SPOKEN T0. BECAUSE OF THE FRAGILE COMPROMISES IN THE DOCUMENT, THERE IS CONCERN ON THE PART OF SOME NNA THAT T00 MUCH TALK COULD RESULT IN OPEN -- AND PREMATURE -- SPLITS IN THEIR TENUOUS SOLIDARITY. FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL,SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12355: DECL: OADR 'TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL AND, BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES, SOME NNA DON'T WANT OTHERS ?0 PUT THEIR OWN INTERPREPATION ON CERTAIN ISSUES. SOME, HOWEVER, HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY INTEND TO DISCUSS THE PACKAGE IN DETAIL. DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH WERE OBVIOUS IN WORKING GROUP MEETINGS THIS WEER. ON NOTIFICATION, SWITZERLAND OBLIQUELY SUPPORTED THE "OUT-OF-GARRISON" APPROACH, YUGOSLAVIA REJECTED IT, AND SWEDEN SUPPORTED THE COMPROMISE APPROACH REFLECTED IN SC.7. ON NUF, CYPRUS CONTINUED TO PUSH THE "CDE DIMENSION"/MANISFESTATION OF FORCE, WHILE AUSTRIA DELIVERED A LONG STATEMENT WITH A DECIDED WESTERN TWIST. NONETHELESS, THEY WISH TO AVOID OPEN SPLITS FOR THE TIME BEING. HOW LONG WILL THIS TENUOUS SOLIDARITY HOLD ? -- ACCORDING TO ONE NNA DELEGATE UNTIL IT BECOMES OBVIOUS THAT PARTICULAR APPROACHES REFLECTED IN THEIR PROPOSAL HAVE BEEN REJECTED BY WTO AND NATO. 7. PRELIMINARY U.S. CDE DELEGATION ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL, SC.7, FOLLOW. PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE MALTESE INSISTED ON A LAST-MINUTE CHANGE, THIS HEADING READ "PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS". THE DEFINITION WHICH THEN FOLLOWED (NOW IN THE FIRST TWO TICS) WAS AN ATTEMPT BY THE NNA T0~ DEFINE "MANEUVERS" IN A WAY IDENTICAL TO THE WESTERN .. 397 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET 25X1 "OUT-OF-GARRISON" CONCEPT. SOME NNA STILL SEIi THE MEASURE IN THIS WAY. NEVERTHELESS, THE SUBST::TUTION OF "ACTIVITIES" FOR "MANIIEVERS" IS A MOVE TOW~-RD THE SOVIET POSITION, ALLOWING. AN INTERPRETATION WlIICH COULD INCLUDE INDEPENDENT NAV_11. AND .AIR ACTIV]TIES. THIS COULD ALSO IMPACT ON THE CONSTRAINTS MEA:~URE, INASMUCH AS THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE WILL SE7' THE PARAMETERS FOR THE CONSTRAINTS MEASURE. MOREOVER, THE FINNS INSISTED ON SPLITTING THE DEFINITION OF MILITARY MANEUVER INTO TWO TICS SO AS TO H]GHLIGHT THE FACT T$AT MOVEMENTS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED DIFFERENT THAN MANEUVERS. BOTH THESE LAST MINUTE CHANGES, ACCEPTED BY THE NNA GROUP IN THE INTERESTS OF GAINING CONSENSUS, COULD BECOME AMMUNITION FOR THE EAST IN SUPPORTING ITS CLAIMS THAT MILITARY ACTIVITY MEANS MORE THAN THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, i.E., MILITARY aCTiviTY ALSO COVERS INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL AS WELL AS MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS). OTHER COMMENTS -- THE NNA HAVE REFUSED TO TARE A STANCE ON THB MEANING OF THE MANDATE; THEY ONLY NOTE THAT ML~ITARY MANEUVERS COVERED BY THE MANDATE WILL BE COVER:s'D. -- AS NOTED ABOVE, THE SEPARA?ION OF MANEUVER .AND MOVEMENT INTO TWO SUBPARAS HIGHLIGHTS A DISTINi;TION NOT FOUND IN SC-1'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. NEVERTHELESS, SOME NNA CLAIM THAT THE MOVEMENT OF U.S. FORCES TO OR THROUGH EUROPE WILL NOT BE C~-PTURED BECAUSE OF THE WAY ;THEY DESCRIBE THE NOTIFICATON. THRESHOLD, I.E., THE DIVISION. -- DESPITE ATTEMPTS TO INCLUDE A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD, THE REAL OPERATIONAL THRESHOLD IN SC-7 IS STILI. A NUMERICAL ONE, THE BOTTOM LINE BEING THEIR ATTF;2SPT TO DEFINE A GROUP OF FORCES EQUIVALENT TO A DIVISION: "2-S UNITS ON BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL WITH I.E., PLUS A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST X TROOPS AND Y TANKS/ARMOURED FIGH?ING VEHICLES/HELICOPTERS OR REPEAT FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12336: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL OR AT LEAST Z TANKS/ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES." THIS ESTABLISHES TWO POSSIBLE THRESHOLDS, BOTH NUMERICAL. -- BOTH NUMERICAL THRESHOLDS INCLUDE EQUIPMENT. THE VIEW AMONG SOME NNA WAS THAT THE EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD FOR DEFINING A DIVISION WOULD EXCLUDE U.S. MOVEMENTS (AND TRANSITS?} FROM THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREME;VT. IT WAS ALSO DESLGNED TO EXCLUDE THE SWISS MOUNT.~IN CORPS FROM CSBM OBLIGATIONS. ? ~ .398 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET ~ THE NNA PAVE DESCRIBED A DIVISION IN TERMS OF FROM TWO TO FIVE REGIMENTS/BRIGADES TO ACCOUNT FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN THE ORGANIZA?IONAL STRUCTURE OF DIFFERENT STATES. THIS RAISES THE QUESTION OF HOW MANY OF A DIVISION'S SUB-ELEMEN'!'S MUST BE OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS IN ORDER TO MEET THE THRESHOLD. BUT THIS APPARENT GAP IN LOGIC IS COVERED BY THE NUMERICAL THRESHOLD FOR TROOPS. ~ AS FUR?HER SOP TO THE FINNISH DELEGATION, THERE IS A REFERENCE TO NUMERICAL TOTALS "TO BE DEFINED". NEVER?$ELESS, IN THE VIEW OF SOME NNA DELEGATIONS, THE NUMERICAL TOTALS MIGHT BE NUMBERS OF STRUCTURAL UNITS; IN THIS VIEW, THE EKPHASIS ON MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER JUS?IFIES SUCH AN APPROACH. ~ ?HE EMPHASIS ON "MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER," HOWEVER, IS AMBIGUOUS AND COULD BE SEEN AS CORRESPONDING ONLY TO THE ARMOUR/MECHANIZED INFANTRY ASPECTS OF SC.1'S "MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS," AND DOESN'T SEEM TO CAPTURE INFANTRY ELEMENTS. -- FILLING IN THE BLANKS FOR THE VARIOUS NUMERICAL ?fIItESHOLDS IS JUDGED TO BE A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE NNA POSITION SINCE THESE FIGURES WILL DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTRAINT MEASURES THEY HAVE PROPOSED. VARIOUS NNA'S HAVE ASKED OUR ADVICE ON WHAT THE EQUIPMENT FIGURES SHOULD BE. -- THE COKPROMISE ON THE WORDS "OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL LOCA?IONS" VICE AN EARLIER FORMULATIO*T OF "SPECIFIED NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATION AREAS" WAS TO MEET YUGOSLAV CONCERNS ABOUT IDENTIFYING PEACETIME LOCATIONS. THIS LANGUAGE IS SUFFICIENTLY VAGUE AS ?0 CALL INTO QUESTION WHAT THESE LOCATIONS ARE. NONETHELESS, THE NEW ? LANGUAGE, AS WITH THE OLD, WAS DESIGNED BY MOST OF THE NNA TO SERVE AS THE EQUIVALENT OF "OUT-OF-GARRISON." REFERENCE TO COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISES WAS TO EXCLUDE SUCH AC?IVITIES AS HARVEST ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF WHERE THE EQUIPMENT PARAMETERS WOULD NOT NORMALLY BE MET. -- AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE UNITS ARE LUKPED TOGETHER IN, KORE-OR-LESS, A SINGLE CATEGORY WITH NOTIFICATION LEVELS AT A SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER LEVEL FOR AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE UNITS THAN IN SC-1 WHICH USES THE OOG CONCEPT AND THUS MARES AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES THE ONLY UNIQUE CATEGORY. -- AS SC-7 NOW READS, NAVAL ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE A CER?AIN CAPACITY FOR CARRYING TROOPS (SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY) COULD BECOME NOTIFIABLE WHETHER OR NOT AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ASHORE IS CONTEMPLATED. THIS IS THE SAME AS A REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY AN INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITY. -- UNDER ITEM 1.7, WE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO GIVE INFORMATION ON THE NUKBER AND TYPES OF EQUIVALENT 399 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET FORMATIONS OF NAVAL AND AIR FORCES. ~ ITEM 2.1 CALLS FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON PARTICIPATING FORCES DOWN TO T$E REGIMENT/BRIGADE FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMEN? OF NNA PROPOSAL LEVEL. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO PROVISION FOR AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AGAINST WHICH THIS COULD BE CHECKED. SOME NNA BELIEVE PARA. 4.1 ALLOWS FOR THE EXC1i~WGE OF NORMAL LOCATIONS SIMILAR TO THAT PROVIDED IN MEASURE 1 OF SC-l, BUT 4.1 IS SUFFICIENTLY VAGUE IN ORDER TO MEET YUGOSLAV CONCERNS ABOUT PROV[DING INFORMATION ON ACTUAL LOCATIONS. -- UNDER ITEM 2.1, HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE TO ;PROVIDE INFORMATION ON PARTICIPATING NAVAL AND AIR FORCES AT LEVELS EQUIVALENT TO REGIMENT/BRIGADE. -- UNDER ITEM 2.3, WE WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE T]iE NUMBER OF: COMBAT AIRCRAFT, COMBAT HELICOPTERS, TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS AND NAVAL COMl4ATANTS AS WELL AS AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS .AND AUXILIARY T1;:ANSPORTS (IDENTIFYING THEIR SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY). -- ITEM 3.1 FORESEES PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE STARTING AND FINISHING DATES OF THE MOVEMENTS OF FORCES; PUTTING THIS UNDER THE HEADING OF MIL]TARY ACTIVITIES WOULD SEEM TO INDh~ATE THAT SUCH MCVEMENTS WOULD INCLUDE BOTH NAVAL AND AIR MOVEMENTS. MOREOVER, IT CALLS.FOR PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE PERIOD OF TIME ABSENT FROM NORMAL LOCATIONS WHICH, IN THE CASE OF DUAL-BASED (LAND, AIR, OR NAVAL) FORCES, COULD MEAN FROM THEIR BASES IN THE U.S. I? MIGHT ALSO BE INTERPRETED AS A CALL FOR INFORMATION ON HOW LONG NAVAL UNITS BASED OUTSIDE THE ZONE WILL BE AWAY FROM BASES. ANNUAL CALENDAR ---------------- THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY WITH THIS PART OF SC-7 IS THAT IT ALSO CALLS FOR THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF AIR .AND NAVAL FORCES PARTICIPATING IN ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD BE FORECAST ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. POINT 9 ALLOWS THE PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, YET TI) BE DEFINED, ON UNITS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIABLE ~-CTIVITIES. THIS IS SEEN BY SOME NNA AS BEING INFORMATION ~-NALOGOUS TO THAT REQUIRED IN OUR MEASURE 1. THERE ARE MANY COMMON POINTS BETWEEN OBSERVATIGN IN SC-7 AND IN SC-1. THE NNA, LIRE US, INSIST THAT ALL ? 400 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET PARTICIPATING STA?ES BE INVITED ?0 ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. EVEN MORE THAN SC-1, SC-7 ASRS FOR THE PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. IT DOES, HOWEVER, HAVE ITS NEGATIVE, OR AT LEAST AMBIGUOUS, POINTS: -- AE~.AUSE OF THE AMBIGUOUS ATTITUDE OF THE NNA TO TAE FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION OF TAE MANDATE AND THE SUBSEQUENT AMBIGUITY ABOUT WAA? ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHICH ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION. -~ SC-7 CALLS FOR OBSERVATION WHEN THE THRESHOLD IS REACHED. THIS WOULD EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDE OBSERVATION OF "MOBILIZATION" ACTIVITIES AS DEFINED IN SC.1. (AND, WE UNDERSTAND, IS WHAT WAS INTENDED BY AT LEAST THE SWISS AND SWEDISH DELEGATIONS). IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR OBSERVATION OF TROOPS LEAVING THE GARRISON (OR NORMAL LOCATION) FOR TAE EXERCISE AREA. TAE PROPOSAL DOES SEEM TO PROVIDE FOR OBSERVATION OF TROOPS DEPARTING TAE ERERCISE AREA, BUT NOT NECESSARILY FOR OBSERVATION OF THEIR ACTUAL RETURN TO "GARRISON" OR "NORMAL LOCATIONS," ONLY FOR OBSERVATION OF "FINAL POSITIONS" BEFORE FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJEC?: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL RETURNING ?0 THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS. -- IN PARA. 6, THE NNA PROPOSAL SETS UP TAREE DIFFERENT (UNDETERMINED) THRESHOLDS FOR OBSERVA?ION AND ASSIGNS A DIFFERENT NUMBER OF OBSERVERS TO EACH. THE RATIONALE IS UNCLEAR. -- PARA. 14 CONTAINS TWO POTENTIAL PROBLEMS. THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION MAY NOT BE AS BROAD AS THA? PROVIDED FOR IN SC.1 AS SC.7 PROVIDES ONLY FOR OBSERVATION OF THE "MAIN ACTIVITIES." SC.1 PROVIDES FOR OBSERVERS "TO VIEW DIRECTLY ALL FORMATIONS ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY," AND, IN THE CASE OF OU?-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITIES, ALLOWS FOR OBSERVATION OF "ALL PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY . IN THE ZONE BETWEEN THE GARRISON AND THE AREA OF OUT OF GARRISON DEPLOYMENT." IN ADDITION, PARR 14 CALLS FOR TAE OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR UNITS CARRYING OUT MAIN ACTIVITIES. EVEN IF ONLY READ AS APPLYING TO OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, IT WOULD STILL CLASH WITH OUR POSITION SINCE WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNLESS THOSE ACTIVITIES ARE VISIBLE TO AN OBSERVER ON LAND WHO IS WA?CHING GROUND ACTIVITY. ------------------------------------------------------ NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVI?IES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE 401 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET THIS SECTION DEALS WITH ACTIVITIES NOT LISTEI- ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, E.G., ALERT ACTIVITIES. LIFE SC-1, IT ALLOWS OBSERVATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES IF THEY LAST LONGER THAN A CERTAIN NUMBER OF HOURS. -- RATHER THAN PROVIDING NOTIFICATION SIMULTANEOUSLY WZTH THE START OF THE ACTIVITY,~SC-7 CALLS FCR NOTIFIGTION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT PRIOR TO THEIR START. -- BOTH MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS ARE INCLUDED. HOWEVER, THE THRESHOLD CRITERIA FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION SHOULD APPLY. -- PARA. 2 IS SEEN BY SOME NNA AS A NON-CIRCU"iVENTION PROVISION WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE CARRYING OUT OF A MOVEMENT, NOT A MANEUVER, FOR PURPOSES OF IN?IMIDATION. CONSTRAINTS ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES '- HERE, EVEN MORE THAN IN PRIOR NOTIFICAIION, THE CHANGE FROM "MANEUVERS" TO "ACTIVITIES" MUST liE REGARDED WI?H GREAT CAUTION BECAUSE IT INDICA"ES THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRAINTS ON NAVAL AND AIR A(;TIVITIES. THIS IS CERTAINLY WHAT SOME NNA'S (YUGOSLAVIA, MALTA) WANT. -- PARA. 2 ESTABLISHES A NUMERICAL CEILING ON MILITARY MANEUVERS WHICH IS ESTABLISHED AT FIVE TIMES 7HE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL WERE TO BE 6000 TROOPS THEN THE CEILING WOULD BE 30,000 TROOPS. THUS THE DESIRE TO GET MORE NOTIFICATIONS THROUGH A LOWER T$ltESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION CONFLICTS WITH THE REQUIREMENT FELT BY MOST STATES, INCLUDING SOME NNA, TO BE ABLE TO EXERCISE AT SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER LEVELS. -- THIS ALSO LIMITS THE DURATION OF AN ACTIVITY TO 17 DAYS; THIS WOULD LIMIT A COMMANDER'S FLEXIBILITY TO EXECUTE OPTIONS FOR WEATHER DELAYS, EQUIPMEQT MALFUNCTIONS, ETC. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS 17 DAY LIMITATION APPLIES TO THE EXERCISE OR THE POINT AT FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA P~;OPOSAL WHICH THE THRESHOLD IS MET. PARA. 3 STIPULATES THAT NO STATE MAY CONDUCT MORE THAN FIVE ACTIVI?IES UP TO TWO TIMES THE NOTIF]ABLE LEVEL (E.G. TWO DIVISIONS) WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN PRE- NOTIFIED ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT SEEMS TO BE TO LIMIT BOTH THE SIZE AND ZHE NUMBER OF ALERT ACTIVITIES. POSSIBILITIES FOR ABUSE ARE LIMITED BY THE STIPULATION THAT ONLY ONE OF 402 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET THESE CAN BE CONDUCTED AT ANY TIRE. -- PARA. 4 IS A SECOND CEILING IN THAT IT LIMITS STA?ES TO FIVE MANEUVERS PER YEAR A? A LEVEL FROM TWO TO FIVE ?IMES THE THRESHOLD FOR PRIOR NOTIFICA?ION (E.G. FROM TWO TO FIVE DIVISIONS). SUCH aCTiviTIES MUST HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. -- BUT, TWO MANEUVERS OF THIS SIZE MAY BE CONDUCTED SIMULTANEOUSLY PROVIDED THE COMBINA?ION OF THE TWO DOES NOT EXCEID SEVEN TIMES THE THRESHOLD FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION. THIS IS A CHANGE INSISTED UPON BY SOME NNA WHO FELT THAT ALLOWING A TOTAL OF 10 TIMES THE THRESHOLD (E.G. 10 DIVISIONS) TO BE OUTSIDE NORMAL LOCATIONS AT ONCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A CONSTRAINT. THE SWISS INSISTED THEY MUST BE ABLE TO EXERCISE SIX DIVISIONS AT ONCE, HENCE THEY PURSUADED THE OTHER NNA TO AGREE TO SEVEN TIMES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. -- IN SUM, NATO ARGUMENTS ON THE CONSTRAINTS POINT WILL CENTER ON THE FACT THAT IT DOES NOT MEET OUR CRITERION: EQUALITY OF EFFECT. OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON SHOR? NOTICE THIS IS THE VERIFICATION MEASURE IN SC.7. IT DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM MEASURE 5 OF SC-1. IT: -- PROVIDES NO ROLE FOR NTM'S. THE NNA HAVE TAKEN A CUE FPOM WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE A VULNERABILITY IN SC-1. THEY HAVE WITNESSED THE SOVIT TACTIC OF FAUL?ING OUR CASE FOR REQUESTING INSPECTIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT INSPECTIONS WOULD CONSISTUTE A BONUS FOR STATES WITH A WIDE RANGE OF NTMS AN) PENALIZE THOSE STATES WITHOUT. -- PROVIDES FOR AN "OBSERVATION" REQUEST ONLY IF STIFF CONDITIONS ARE MET -- THAT THE STATE MAKING SUCH A REQUEST JUDGES THAT ITS NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS ARE AT STARE OR IF IT JUDGES THAT THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT IS SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED. -- CONTAINS AN ESCAPE CLAUSE ALLOWING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE A REQUEST FOR OBSERVATION. THE ESCAPE CLAUSE IS THE PRINCIPAL DEFICIENCY IN THE CONCEPT. IT ALLOWS THE REFUSAL OF A REQUEST ON THE GROUNDS OF SUPREME NA?IONAL INTEREST (WHATEVER THAT MAY MEAN). THESE GROUNDS WOULD INVARIABLY BE SUBJECTIVE. THE NNA, HOWEVER, HAVE CALCULATED THAT A REFUSAL WOULD CARRY A POLITICAL PRICE SINCE THE STATE REFUSING WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE AN ELABORATION OF ITS REASONS FOR REFUSING (ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD NOT DETER THE WTO FROM INVOKING "SUPREME NATIONAL~INTEREST"). SOME NNA ANTICIPATE FEW REFUSALS SINCE REQUESTS FOR OBSERVATION WOULD BE RESERVED FOR EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES. 403 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ~ SETS NO QUOTAS FOR THE NUMBER OF REQUES?S FAR OBSERVATION. NO QUOTAS ARE PROVIDED FOR SINCE THIS WOULD AVOID A SITUATION WHERE A STATE, HAVING ::XHAUSTED ITS, QUOTA, PERCEIVES A NEED TO REQUEST AN OBSERVATION. THE NNAS APPARENTLY HAVE CONSIDERED SCENARIOS :[N FROM USDEL CD? GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT; CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA P~:OPOSAL WHICH STATES ARE INDUCED TO EXPEND THEIR RATIOrf OF REQUESTS FOR SPURIOUS ACTIVITIES. SHOULD QUO?~,S BE SE?, HOWEVER, THERE IS AN ASSUMPTION THAT TEE SPONSORS OF SC-1 CAN ACCEPT A LOW INSPECTION NUMBER BECAUSE VARIOUS ALLIES CAN BE CALLED .UP TO CONT~UCT INSPECTIONS ON BEHALF OF OTHERS. -- CONTAINS A THIAD PARTY PROVISION, I.E., PARTICIPA- TION OF THE NNA IN ANY OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST. MEASURE S OF SC-1 SPECIFIES THAT THIRD PARTIES MAY BE INCLUDED IN AN INSPECTION AT THE DISCRETION OF THE INSPECTING STATE; THEY MAY BE ANY OTEIER PARTICIPATING STATE, OTHER THAN THE INSPECTED STATE. BY CONTttAST, SC-7 WOULD REQUIRE THE PAR?ICIPATION OF THIRD-PARTY, NON-ALLIED, S?AYES. THIS WOULD ENSURE THE NNAS AN ENHANCED ROLE IN THE VERIFICATION OF A CDE AGRE::MENT SINCE THEY WOULD BE T'HE THIRD PAR?Y IN ANY NATO OR WARSAW PACT REQUEST FOR OBSERVATION. -- IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE NNA HA'~E ELIMINA?ED THE POSSIBILITIES OF CONSULTATIONS B1'sFORE OBSERVATION BY REQUEST. MOREOVER, THE WORDING !)F THEIR PROPSOAL STIPULATES THAT THE STATE RECEIV::NG THE REQUEST WILL REPEAT WILL INVITE THE REQUESTNG STATES TO CARRY OUT THE OBSERVATION, PROVIDING, OF COURSE, THE "ESCAPE CLAUSE" IS NOT EXERCISED. 7'WO REASONS FOR REQUESTING AN INSPECTION ARE GIVEN; EITHER A STATE CONSIDERS ITS NATIONAL SECURITY ]NTERESTS ARE AT STARE OR THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF 1HE CSBMS REGIME IS SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED. THE YUGOSLAVS ATTEMPTED TO ELIMINATE THE SECOND CONDITION, BUT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. -- AT THE END OF AN OBSERVATION BY REQUEST, THREE REPORTS ARE REQUIRED; FROM THE OBSERVING STATE, THE THIRD-PARTY STATE AND THE STATE WHICH WAS OBSERVED. ------------------------------- ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH INFORMATION, NOTIFICATION AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH RE3ARD TO THE MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED. THIS SECTION APPEARS NOT TO CONTAIN ANYTHING OF .~N EXCEPTIONAL OR CONTROVERSIAL NATURE. INSTEAD OF CALLING FOR DEDICATED COMMUNICATION LINKS, IT CFL~RGES . - 404 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET STATES TO BEEP TELECOMMUNICATION LINES ACCESSIBLE INCLUDING FACILITIES FOR TRANSMITTING AND RECEIVING CHARTS AND MAPS. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, THIS SECTION MAY NOW BE BETTER THAN SC.1. A COMPROMISE HAS BEEN STRUCK BETWEEN THE SWISS CONCEPT OF "SALON DES AMBASSADEURS" CONVENED ON AN AD HOC BASIS (THE FIRST TICK) AND THE AUSTRIAN CONVICTION THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT OUGHT TO HEFT AT INTERVALS AND DATES ?0 BE DECIDED. THE SWISS HAVE WANTED TO AVOID THE INSTITUTIONALIZA?ION OF SUCH A CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENT WHILE THE AUSTRIANS APPEAR TO FAVOR SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. IT DOES EXCLUDE NUF CONSULTATIONS AND SEEMS TO AVOID THE PITFALL OF USING CONSULTATIONS AS A PRELIMINARY (OR SUBSTITU?E) FOR OBSERVATION ON REQUEST (VERIFICATION). NON-USE OF FORCE ANALYSIS ON THE NUF SEC?ION OF THE NNA PAPER WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. FROM USDEL CDE GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 405 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 -^--~- SECRET 25X1 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08841 SUBJECT: CSCE/CDE: REGISTERING ALLIED CONSENSUS ON A CUTOFF DATE REF: (A) STATE 3S390S (B) STOCKHOLM 8763 1. CDE VIII-031 - CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT. 2. AS INDICATED IN REFTEL (B) I BELIEVE STOC1~Ei0LM, NOT USNATO, IS THE PLACE TO~REACH CONSENSUS 011 THE CLOSING AND SCHEDULE FOR CDE. THIS PROCESS I;3 UNDER- WAY HERE AND A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION IS IN SII~IT. ATTEMPTING TO RECORD CONSENSUS IN BOTH PLACES AT ONCE WILL ONLY CONFUSE MATTERS. 3. THE NATO CAUCUS HERE WILL MEET TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE LATER TODAY. WE SUGGEST THAT USNATO HOLD OFF ON MAKING THE POINTS IN REF (A) UNTIL IT RECE]VES OUR REPORT OF THAT DISCUSSION. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 406 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08885 SUBJECT: ?EXT AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE 1. CDE VIII - 034 2. C - ENTIRE TERT 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE PRESENTS THE TEX? OF AND USDEL COMMENTARY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) PORTION OF THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED (NNA) DOCUMENT, SC.7, FORMALLY TABLED AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON NOVEMBER 15 ,. 1985. END SUMMARY. 4. THE NNA INTRODUCED THEIR LONG ANTICIPATED AND MUCH DEBATED DRAFT PACKAGE A? FRIDAY'S (NOVEMBER 16) PLENARY. THE FINAL SECTION OF THE 22-PAGE PACKAGE IS A 3-1/2 PAGE NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT CONTAINING 15 SEPARATE ELEMENTS. 5. THE NUF PORTION OF THE NNA PAPER IS A CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT OVER EARLIER DRAFTS WHICH INCLUDID UP TO 35 SEPARATE ELEMENTS. THE PRESENT TEXT IMPLICITLY REJECTS THE AMBI?IOUs AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS APPROACH ADVOCATED BY THE CYPRIOTS AND THE YUGOSLAVS, I.E., A STOCKHOLM DECLARATION GIVING A EUROPEAN DIMENSION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE, AND, INSTEAD, REFLECTS A MORE WESTERN APPROACH TO NUF. FOR ERAMPLE, THE DRAFT EMPHASIZES THE PRIMACY OF UN CHARTER LANGUAGE (ARTICLE 103) AND THE NECESSITY OF RAIN?AINING THE BALANCE OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. 6. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NNA PACKAGE WAS ONE OF THE WORST REP? SECRETS IN TOWN OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS. AFTER SEEING SOME OF THE EARLIER LEAKED VERSIONS OF THE NNA NUF TEXT, MOST NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE BREATHED A COLLECTIVE SIGH OF RELIEF AT THE TEXT EVENTUALLY TABLED. THE FIRST REAC?ION OF THE FRG REPRESENTATIVE WAS: "WHERE DO WE SIGN?" AND THERE'S THE RUB. EVEN IF WE WERE ABLE TO ACCEPT ALL THE NNA LANGUAGE -- AND WE'RE NOT -- BY APPEARING T00 EAGER TO EMBRACE THE NNA DRAFT WE MAY GIVE IT THE KISS OF DEATH. A WESTERN ENDORSED DOCUMENT WILL BE REJECTED IPSO FACTO BY THE EAST AND EVEN SOME OF THE NNA. THE NATO CAUCUS HAS BEEN DULY SENSITIZED TO THIS FACT OF CONFERENCE POLITICS AND WILL REACT ACCORDINGLY. FURTHERMORE, WHAT AT FIRST BLUSH MIGHT APPEAR TO BE UNCONTENTIOUS AND INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED NUF LANGUAGE, MIGHT NOT, UPON CLOSER READING, SERVE ALLIANCE INTERESTS IN STOCKHOLM. THEREFORE, FOR BOTH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS, USDEL BELIEVES WE SHOULD TARE A CAUTIOUS AND QUESTIONING APPROACH TO THE NNA NUF TEXT. 7. AS WITH ANY DOCUMENT CONCEIVED AND DESIGNED BY A COMMITTEE -- IN THIS CASE A GROUP OF VERY INDEPENDENT (READ: STUBBORN) NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED STATES RANGING FROM SWITZERLAND TO YUGOSLAVIA TO MALTA -- THE NNA NUF TEXT DEFIES CATEGORIZATION. IT IS A HODGEPODGE OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL ELEMENTS LARGELY DRAWN FROM THE HELSINKI 407 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 FINAL ACT. FORTUNATELY IT REPRESENTS BORE OF A LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR APPROACH, I.E., ONLY ELEMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL OF THE NNA, THIAN THE EARLIEP CHRISTMAS TREE APPROACH, I.E., CONTAINING EVERYBODY'S FAVORITE NUF ORNAMENT. IN ADDITION, THE FINAL VERSION ELI?lINATED THE EARLIER UP-FRONT REFERENCE TO THE FACT TEAT THE FOLLOWING NUF LANGUAGE CONTAINED AN "INDICATIVE LOT OF ELEMENTS," THEREBY SUGGESTING THAT THT; NNA ELEMENTS WERE NOT EXHAUSTIVE. THIS ORIGINAL REFERENCE WAS INTRODUCED BY THE SWEDES, PRESUMABLY IN ANTICIPATION OF EASTERN DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE "RESTRICTED" NATURE OF T.:iE NNA NUF TEXT. FORTUNATELY, THE SWISS AND AUSTRIANS ST:ZONGLY OBJECTED TO THE REFERENCE TO AN "INDICATIVE LI~iT OF ELEMENTS" AND THE REFERENCE WAS DROPPED IN THE FINAL VERSION. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, THE LENGTH (THREE AND A HALF PAGES) AND DETAIL (THERE IS, FOR EXAMPLE+ AN EXTENDED PARAGRAPH ON TERRORISM) O1' THE NNA TEXT MIGHT INVITE ELABORATION RATHER THAN CONDENSATION. LASTLY, IN ORDER TO BUY MALTA'S ACQUIESCENCE, 7TiE NNA ACCEPTED AN UNFORTUNATE REFERENCE TO "SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN" IN THE TEXT. GIVEN THE IMPORTAII'T ROLE THE NUF TEXT (AS WELL AS THE WHOLE NNA PACKAGE) IS LIKELY FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE TO PLAY IN WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS, IT IS INCUMBENT ON THE ALLIANCE TO ESTABLISH A COMMON LINE ON THE 'ACRAGE. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE OFFER SOME OF U.S. DELEGATION'S INITIAL THOUGHTS ON THE NUF PORTION OF THE NNA :~CUMENT. 8. NUF SECTION OF THE NNA DOCUMENT (WITH USDEL COMMENTS). NON-USE OF FORCE - TEX? - 1) THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR IMPROVED AND CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS, AND THUS TO FURTHER THE PROCESS OF INCREASING AND DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. THEY ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE INTER- RELATION BETWEEN SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE, AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA. ANALYSIS 'THIS LANGUAGE IS BASED ON SC.3 AND TFfE HELSINKI FINAI, ACT. IT INTRODUCES THE NEED FOR "IMPROVED AND CONSIS- TENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS (THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT) PROVISIONS." SUCH LANGUAGE, PARTICU- LARLY UP FRONT IN THE NUF TEXT, CLEARLY BUT- TRESSES THE WEST'S CASE REGARDING THE :~1ECESSITY OF IMPROVED IMI~LEMENTA- TION OF THE HF,~. FINALLY, IT IS UNFORTU- NATE THAT THE 1~NA CHOSE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 2) ALL THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND, ACCORDINGLY, WILL ALL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TARING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS. RESPEC? FOR THESE PRINCIPLES WILL ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORMAL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND THE PROGRESS OF COOPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL FIELDS. 3) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY WITHIN THE CSCE. TO APPEASE ?HE MALTESE BY PLACING A REFERENCE TO MEDITERRANEAN SECU- RITY EARLY IN THE NUF TEXT. THE SWISS CLAIM THAT THIS REFERENCE WAS THE LEAST HARMFUL OF THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE. ANOTHER OPTION, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS TO PLACE THIS REFERENCE IN THE NOTIFICATION SECTION OF THE TEXT. IN ANY CASE, PUTTING THE REFERENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF "SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE" REINFORCES THE MANDATE'S ZONE OF APPLICATION, ACCORDING TO THE SWISS. THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THIS PARR IS LIFTED DIRECTLY FROM THE HFA (AFTER THE "DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PAR- TICIPATING STATES") AND REINFORCES OUR POINT ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF BALANCE BETWEEN ALL PRINCIPLES OF THE HFA. THIS LANGUAGE IS ALSO LIFTED FROM THE HFA. THE "COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY" REFERS TO THE COMPLEMENTARITY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL TEN HFA PRINCIPLES AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, OASED ON OUR READING OF THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR ?AGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET OF HELSINKI. IT IS NOT, AS TFI: EAST WILL CLAIM, THAT BOTH POLI- TICAL, I.E,, DECLARA- TORY, AND MILITARY, I.E., CSBM S, AGREE- MENTS CAN ~ AFFECT SECURITY IM EUROPE. 4)THEY STRESS THAT THE PRINCIPLE THIS SENTErCE REFLECTS OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR THE JUS COCENS NATURE USE OF FORCE IS A UNIVERSALLY OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE, RECOGNIZED OBLIGATION IN INTER- I.E., THAT NUF IS A 'NATIONAL LAW, BINDING ALL STATES, UNIVERSAL NORM OF AND THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH IT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SUBSEQUENTLY CONSTITUTES A WHICH EXTENDS BEYOND VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. TREATY OBLIJATIONS. S)THEY REAFFIRM THEIR DETERMINA- TION TO RESPECT THIS PRINCIPLE, CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, SO AS TO ENSURE THAT, AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE, IT IS STRICTLY AND EFFECTIVELY OBSERVED. NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE. ? ~ 410 SECRET CYPRIOT DISP'7TE. MORE, CANNOT BE ? DIVORCED FROM THEIR UNIQUE PERSPECTIVE ON THE GREEK/TUtRISH/ WHO DETERMIrES NON- COMPLIANCE? ANY LANGUAGE SPONSORED BY THE CYPRIOTS, FURTHER- MIGHT WARRA!!T FURTHER ANALYSIS. ~IHAT DOES NON-COMPLIAPfCE WITH THIS OBLIGATION ENTAIL? MISCHIEVOUSLY INTRO- DUCED BY THli CYPRIOTS, HOWEVER, THi LAST PORTION OF 'fHE PHRASE, THIS SECTION IS AN AMALGAM OF Hl'A AND MADRID CONCLUDING DOCU- MENT LANGUAGE. IT, AS WELL AS THE PREVIOUS SECTION, REFLECTS A SLOPPY MIX OF' POLITICAL AND LEGAL COIiCEPTS OF NUF. FURTHERMORE, ITS ASSERTION THAT "NO CON- SIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED" TO WARRANT THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE IS UNCOMFORTABLY CATE- GORICAL. THE NUF PRIN- CIPLE CONTAINED IN THE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET 6) THEY RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLEC- TIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS. FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL UN CHARTER (ARTICLE 2(4)) IS BALANCED, FOR EXAMPLE, BY THE CHAPTER VII AUTHORI?Y OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DETERMINE A BREACH OF THE PEACE, E.G. AN ACT VIOLATING THE PRIN- CIPLE, INCLUDING MEASURES TAKEN PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER (INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF- DEFENSE). THE PRIMACY OF THE CHARTER'S PROVI- SIONS, WHILE NOTED LATER ON, IS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THIS SECTION. INTRODUCES ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER INTO THE CSCE CONTEXT. SUBJECT: TEX? AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE 7) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL THIS SECTION, PARTIALLY REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL AS WELL TAKEN FROM THE HFA, AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELA- REPRESENTS WHAT IS LEFT TIONS IN GENERAL, -- FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE ?ERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPEN- DENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NA'IONS AND WITH THE FINAL ACT, AND, ACCORDINGLY, -- FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANY STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, REGARDLESS OF THE STATE'S OF THE LONG (UP TO TEN SEPARATE ELEMENTS) LIST OF ELEMENTS OF THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE, FIRST INTRODUCED BY THE CYPRIOTS. THE SECTION WAS THE CORE OF THE EARLIER VERSIONS OF THE NUF TEXT. WE CAN, THEREFORE, BE THANKFUL THAT THIS SECTION HAS BEEN EMASCULATED. THE SECTION IS NOT,HOWEVER, IMPOTENT. BY DISCUSSING "ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" IT OPENS THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, OR TEXT UP FOR DISCUSSION CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF TYPES OF MANIFESTA- OF WHE?HER OR NOT THEY MAIN?AIN TION OF FORCE, A DIS- WITH THIS STATE RELATIONS OF CUSSION THE EAST WOULD 411 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET 8) NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION RESULTING FROM THE THREA? OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL. 9) THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL BEANS ANY DISPUTE EXISTING OR ARISING BETWEEN THEM. THEY ALSO EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO REINFORCE, IMPROVE AND DEVELOP THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL FROM USDEL 412 SECRET CERTAINLY i-ELCOME. FURTHERMORE, WHAT DOES "DIRECT OR INDIRECT" MEAN IN THIS CONTEXT. IF IT IS ALL-INCLUSIVE OF TYPES OF THE USE OF FORCE, IT IS UNNECES- SARY; IF IT IS NOT, IT INVITES SPECULATION AS TO WHAT TYPES OF FORCE ARE EXCLUDED AND, THEREFORE, .PERMISSIBLE. ON THE OTHFrt HAND, THE EAST WILL CERTAINLY HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE FINAL S1iNTENCE OF THIS SECTIOIi, WHICH CLEARLY AND POINTEDLY REJECTS THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE. HFA LANGUAGE;, WHICH THE CYPRIOTS WILL, NO DOUBT, CLAY: IS PERTI- NENT TO TURR.ISH "000U- PATION" OF CYPRUS. IT COULD ALSO, OF COURSE, BE INTERPRETED AS RELA- TING TO SOVIET POST-WAR POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE, GENERALLY, AND THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, SPECIFICALLY. BASED ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT 0;~ DISPUTES LANGUAGE IN THE HFA AND MADRID CONCLUDING DOCU- MENT WE WILL HAVE TO LOOK AT THIS SECTION MORE CAREFULLY TO DETERMINE IF IT PREJUD- ICES THE WEST'S POSI- TION ON PSOD AS DEVE- LOPED IN ATHENS FOR FUTURE MEETINGS ON THIS SUBJECT. THE SECTION, FOR EXAMPLE, CALLS PSOD "AN ESSENTIAL" ELF;M~NT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: TEXT AND~ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF AND, THEREFORE, LINKS DISPUTES. NUF AND PSOD KORE 10l THE PARTICIPATING STATES CO:YFIRM THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFI- CA!iCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FU!iDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE PR~~CESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL PE~iCE AND SECURITY AS WELL AS FO:R THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES. FIRMLY ?HAN PREVIOUSLY. THIS SECTION WAS INCLUDED BECAUSE OF STRONG SWISS INSISTENCE (THE SWISS SAID THEY WOULD NOT CO-SPONSOR THE FULL NNA PACKAGE WITHOUT A HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE IN THE NUF PORTION OF THE TEXT). IT IS THE FIRST TIME, IN OUR RECOLLECTION, THAT HUMAN RIGHTS HAS BEEN SO DIRECTLY AND PROM~NEN?LY LINKED TO SECURITY IN THE CSCE CONTEXT. WHILE WE, OF COURSE, MUST WELCOME THIS LINKAGE, WE SHOULD BE AWARE THA? THIS CREATES A PRECEDENT FOR ELEVATING THE STATUS OF THE OTHER TEN HFA PRIN- - CIPLES IN THE CDE CONTEXT. 111 THE PARTICIPATING STATES IF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CO'!TFIRM THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN REFERENCE BECAME KNOWN FR )M DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSIS- AS "THE SWISS OBSES- TA!iCE TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES SION," A TERRORISM OR TO SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER REFERENCE (OR THE PRE- ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE VENTION THEREOF) WAS VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME ADOPTED WITH EQUAL PAS- OF ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE. SION BY THE YUGOSLAVS. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION ?HE YUGOSLAVS, OF TO TARE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR COURSE, ARE MOST CON- THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION CERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF ACTS OF TERRORISM AND WILL OF CROATIAN EXILE TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES ORGANIZATIONS. THE IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE EARLIER LANGUAGE OF THE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR SECTION IS BORROWED THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION FROM THE HFA AND THE OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST LATTER FROIi THE MADRID ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING MEASURES CONCLUDING DOCUMENT TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES (P.34). GIVEN THE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 .7LbAl.1 ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM. 12) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. THEY DECLARE THAT THEIR EXISTING INTERNATIONAL COMMIT- MENTS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS DO NOT CONFLICT WITH THE PRESENT DOCUMENT. FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF IMPORTANCE AND THE LEGAL COMPLEXITIES INVOLVED WITH THE ISSUE, DEPA~T2iF.NT LEGAL EXPERTS MAY W?NT TO COMMENT ON PHIS PASSAGE. THE FIRST SlsNTENCE IS LIFTED FROM ARTICLE X OF THE HFA. THE SECOND SEN?ENCE, HI)WEVER, SEEMS TO ST~-ND ARTICLE X LOGIC ON ::TS HEAD. INSTEAD OF IfECLARING THAT THE PR~:SENT DOCU- MENT IS IN ('ONFORMITY WITH INTERN~.TIONAL LAW, THIS SECTIOr DECLARES THAT "THEIR (THE PARTI- CIPATING STA'TE'S) EXISTING INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS DO NOT CON- FLICT WITH THE PRESENT DOCUMENT." THUS, THIS A PRIORI LOGIC SEEMS TO? NNA NUF LANGUAG's POSITIVELY P'tEJUDGE T'HE COMMITMENTS ~JNDERTAKEN. FURTHERMORE, WHAT DOES "INTERNATION~~I. COMMIT- MENTS" MEAN? UN CHAR- TER? HFA? l1ILATERAL AGREEMENTS? BREZHNEV DOCTRINE? THIS SECTION, BASED ON THE HFA, REAI'FIRMS THE PRIMACY OF T'1:E UN CHARTER (ARTICLE 103). WHILE WE CAN FULLY SUP- PORT THE CONTENT, WE MAY HAVE SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS PLACEMENT. WHY IS IT NOT GIVEN A PR1llE OF PLACE EARLY IN THE NUF TEXT? 13) THEY CONFIRM THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTER- NATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLI- GATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL. . 414 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET 25X1 14) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE CONVINCED THAT THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND THE EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EVERY PARTICIPATING STATE REQUIRE DETERMINED EFFORTS BY ALL OF THEM TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, LESSEN MILITARY CON- FRONTATION, STRENGTHEN SECURITY FOR ALL AND PROMOTE DISARMAMENT. 1S) BY THEIR VERY NATURE CON- CRETE CSBM'S SERVE TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. BARRY END OF MESSAGE THE PASSAGE REFLECTS AN AMALGAM OF MADRID CON- CLUDING DOCUHENT AND SC.3 LANGUAGE AND CON- TAINS A STRANGE MIX OF POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME POLITICAL CONCEPTS. IT WAS INCLUDED AT THE INSISTENCE OF THE SWEDES AND THE YUGO- SLAVS. DOES THE "SITU- ATION IN EUROPE" REQUIRE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO "PROMOTE DISARMA- MENT" AS THE SOVIETS FREQUENTLY INSIST? DOES THE CALL FOR THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO "PROMOTE DISARMAMENT" PREJUDICE OUR POSITION ABOUT A POSSIBLE SECOND CDE STAGE? CAN DISARM- AMENT, A MEANS TO AN END, BE EQUATED WITH BUILDING CONFIDENCE OR STRENGTHENING SECURITY AS THIS PASSAGE SUGGESTS? THIS FIRS? SENTENCE IS A PARAPHRASE OF A MUCH MORE COMPLETE AND, IN OUR MIND, MORE EFFEC- TIVE REFERENCE TO THE LINKAGE OF NUF AND CSBM'S CONTAINED IN SC.3. NEVERTHELESS, THIS LINKAGE, I.E., THE NUF COMMITMENT IS A FUNCTION OF THE CSBM'S AGREED UPON, UNDER- SCORES THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT. 415 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SSCRET SUGJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING, NOVEMBER 15, 1985 REF: STOCZEIOLM 8763 1. C~ VIII - 027 2. C -ENTIRE TEXT BEGIN SUMMARY: THE NOVEMBER 15 SESSION OF THE ~c>~E NATO CAUCUS FOCUSED ON THE ALLIANCE'S PERFORMANCE IN THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) CRITICIZED FRANCE BOTH FOR INVITING EASTERN QUESTIONSi ON THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND FOR STATING THAT "ilE" (IMPLYING NATO) REJECT THE IDEA OF CEILINGSi AS A MEASURE OF CONSTRAIN?. GASCHIGNARD.(FRANCE). F~WE1'ER. WAS UNREPENTANT. TLERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THI CAUCUS NEEDED TO GENERATE BETTER DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS ~)N TAE BASIS OF SC.1. TO RESPOND TO EASTERN DEMANDS FOR PlORE DETAILS ON NATO'S PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. HOWEVER, TAE CAUCUS SPLIT ON THE; ISSUE OF ~R WE SHOULD DEVELOP POSITIONS THAT CA BEYOND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IN SC.1. TAE NETHERLANDS i,ED THOSE ARGUING THAT WE HAD TO FILL IN TAE "BLANKS" ON THIS ISSUE, WHILE THE U.S. AND TURKEY URGED A MORE CAU'IOUS APPROACH. WITH REGARD TO THE NNA PAPER, THE CAUCUS DECIDED TO LET THE NNA TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO EXPLAIN IT IN THE WORKING GROUPS. THE NNA, HOWEVER, FEAR SUCH AN EXERCISE COULD DESTROY THEIR TENUOUS UNITY. END SUMMARY 4. INFORMAL WORKING GROUP PERFORMANCE: BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) OPENED BY APPEALING FOR BETTER ALLIANCE COHESION AND AGAIN PRESSED STRONGLY FOR THE CAUCUS TO DESIGNATE NATO TEAMS FOR EACH WORKING CLUSTER. HE CRITICIZED "ONE DELEGATION" (FRANCE) FOR INVITING EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT. THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF FUI~~C- TIONALLY RELATED NAVAL, AND AIR ACTIVI1ff~S AND ZEROED Irt ON THE FRENCH AGAIN FOR STATING THAT CONSTRAINTS ARE NC~T CSBM'S AND FOR REJECTING THE IDEA OF CEILINGS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES. BUWALDA REMINDED THE CAUCUS THAT THIS WAS NOT THE ALLIANCE POSITION AND THAT DELEGATIONS WHICH FEEL SEC$ ; Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET THEY HAVE TO MAKE SUCH A POINT SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE DOING SO IN THEIR NATIONAL CAPACITY. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) WAS UNREPENTANT AND DEFLECTED BUWALDA'S CRITICISM BY SIMPLY IGNORING THE NAVAL AND AIR ISSUE (AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE FRENCH SEEM INTENT ON PLAYING THEIR OWN HAND) AND NOTING THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATO POSITION ON CONSTRAINTS, FRANCE HAD MADE THE TACTICAL DECISION TO REJECT CEILINGS NOW, SO THAT ANY ALLIANCE DECISION TO ACCEPT A CEILING LATER COULD BE MADE TO APPEAR AS A CONCESSION. WHILE SUPPORTING BUWALDA'S CALL FOR IMPROVED ALLIANCE COHESION, BARRY (U.S.) OFFERED SOME SUPPORT TO GASCHIGNARD BY OBSCRVING THAT ON THE CONSTRAINTS ISSUE THE CAUCUS SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE CONCLUSION THAT AN ACCEPTABLE CONSTRAINT CANNOT AND WILL NOT BE FOUND. BUWALDA'S TEAM SUGGESTION WAS STUDIOUSLY IGNORED BY ALL.' 5. AIR AND NAVAL: THE CAUCUS TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN TO PRESSURE NATO FOR MORE DETAILS OF OUR PROPOSAL ON THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. SOMC DELEGATIONS (NO'ABLY THE FRG, NETHERLANDS AND UK) BELIEVE THAT WE ARE VULNERABLE ON THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF DETAIL IN SC. 1. WHILE THERE WAS GENERAL UNDERSTANDING THAT WE COULD NOT GO BEYOND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IN SC.1 WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS AND BRUSSELS, THE CAUCUS SPLIT OVER WHETHER THIS WAS THE TIME TO SECR SUCH INSTRUCTIONS. THE NETHERLANDS, SPAIN AND FRANCE FELT THAT WE HAD TO FILL IN THE "BLANKS" IN SC.1 ON WHAT CAN AND CANNO' BE NOTIFIED UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THE U.S. AND TURKEY URGED MORE CAUTION. BARRY (U.S.) CONTENDED THAT WE SHOULD RALLY OUR ARGUMENTS AROUND SC.1 AND NOT BE EMBARRASSED iF WE HAVE TO BE EVASIVE ON CERTAIN ISSUES. BOLUKBASI (TURKISH DEPREP) FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL STRONGLY ARGUED THAT GIVEN PRESENT SOVIET "ATTITUDES" TOWARD SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF CSBM'S THIS WAS NOT THE TIME TO CONSIDER IMPROVEMENTS OR AMENDMENTS TO SC.1. SUCH CHANGES, HE SAID, SHOULD BE SAVED FOR THE END-GAME. CITRON (FRG) OBSERVED THAT THERE WERE TWO TASKS WHICH NEEDED TO BE PERFORMED; 1) ON THE BASIS OF SC.1, THE WEST NEEDS TO IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS TO BEST PROMOTE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (ALL AGREED); AND 2) QUESTIONS NEED TO BE DEVE:I.OPED ON STEPS GOING BEYOND SC.1, WHICH THE CAUCUS COULD THEN DECIDE TO REFER TO CAPITALS AND/OR BRUSSELS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO REFER 'MESS TWO QUESTIONS BACK TO THE RESPECTIVE NATO MINI- CAUCUSES FOR THE OBSERVATION AND NOTIFICATION GROUPS, WHICH WILL UNDERTAKE BOTH TASKS_AND REPORT TO-THE CAUCUS. SECRET. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 6. NNA.PAPER: THE CAUCUS DISCUSSED THE NNA PAPER BRIEFLY AND IN GENERAL CONFIRMED THE APPROACH DECIDED UPON ON NOVEMBER 13 (REFTEL). THE ENTIRE NNA PACKAGE WAS REFERRED FOR ANALYSIS TO THE RESPECTIVE NATO MINI- CAUCUSES, AND IN THE MEANTIME IT WAS AGREED TO LET THE NNA TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO EXPLAIN THEIR PAPER IN THE WORKING GROUPS WHILE THE ALLIANCE LIMITS ITSELF TO NON- LEADING, CLARIFYING QUESTIONS. (COMMENT; SINCE THE NOVEMBER 15 CAUCUS MEETING, USDEL HAS LEARNED FROM NNA CONTACTS THAT THE DELICATE BALANCE ENGINEERED AMONG TH: PAPER'S FRACTIOUS SPONSORS MAY NOT WITHSTAND A DETAILS) EXPLANATION. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED BY OUR NNA FRIENDS TO ADDRESS NON-CONTROVERSIAL QUESTIONS TO THEM FOR THE TI14E BEING AND TO AVOID PROBING T00 DEEPLY INTO THOSE AREAS OF THE PAPER WHERE JERRY-BUILT COMPROMISES MAY NOT WITHSTAND CLOSE INSPECTION. END COMMENT.) BARRY END OF MESSAGE -- SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SUUJECT: CDE WRpp_Up AND ANALYSIS, NOVEMBER 11-~5 18 1. CDE VIII - 028 9 5 2? C - ENTIRE TEXT ' 3. BEGIN SUMMARY; THE LONG AWAITED AND MUCH DELAYED COMPREHENSIVE NNA WORKING DOCUMENT SC THE LIGHT OF DAY ON NOVEMBER 15. THE BIRTHIOFLT~SNNA BABY WAS BOTH PROTRACTED (IT WAS FIRST EXPECTED IN EARLY OCTOBER) AND PAINFtJI, (COMPLICATIONS AROSE AS VARIOUS NNA FATHERS DISCLAIMED PATERNITY). THE HAPPY EVENT, WE HAVE AVOIDED DISPLAYING TOO ~CCHED AFFECTION. THE EAST, MEANWHILE, CONTINUES TO ARGUE THAT PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATING A COMPLETE PACKAGE OF CSBM'S, INCLUDING NATO'S PROPOSALS COVERING GROUND ACTIVITIES, IS CONTINGENT ON WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. FURTHERMORE, PROGRESS IN DRAFTING CSBM'S IS CONTINGENT ON COMPARABLE PROGRESS IN DRAFTING A ~' COMMITMENT'. THIS DOUBLE LINKAGE, OF COURSE, IS A RECIPE FOR STALEMATE. END SUMMARY. 4. NEW LEADERSHIP/OLD FACES: WITH THE ADVENT OF A NEW WORKING STRUCTURE MOST CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS EXPECTED THE EIGHTH ROUND OF THE CDE TO YIELD SOME PROGRESS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN MOSCOW, AFTERO ALL, HAD ALTERED THE TONE, IF NOT THE SUBSTANCE, OF ITS MESSAGE TO THE WEST. IN STOCKHOLM, THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN LESS POLEMIC AND MORE FORTHCOMING DURING THE SEVENTH ROUND. HOWEVER, CONTRARY TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF SOME, THE EAST HAS CHOSEN TO STALL ON SUBSTANCE: AND TO BLAME THE WEST FOR BLOCKING PROGRESS. WHY THEN, ON THE EVE OF THE U.S.-USSR SUMMIT, DID THE NEW LEADERSHIP CHOOSE TO SHOW ITS OLD FACE IN STOCKHOLM? 5. A RECIPE E'OR STALEMATE: HOW MUCH OF THE SOVIET APPROACH IS SUBSTANTIVE AND HOW MUCH IS TACTICAL IS DIFFICULT TO FATHOM. SUBSTANTIVELY, THE SOVIETS HAVE LITTLE NEW TO SAY ON WESTERN CSBM'S. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY WOULD LIKE THE WEST TO ADDRESS THEIR PROPOSALS ON NON-USF OF FORCC AND INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVI- TIES. THESE TWO SUBJECTS ARE NOT UNRELATED, IN THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE. THE SOVIETS WOULD CLEARLY LIKE TO ' 419 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SE REDEFINE THE M ~ AND TO CAPTURE U.S. AIR 4ND NAVAL ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE ZONE; FURTHERMORE, ,THEY WANT TO MAKE NUE' THE CENTERPIECE OF ANY AGREEMENT COMING c)UT OF STCXiKHOLM. THEY HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED ON BOTH C4U)ITS. NEITHER NATO NOR THE NNA HAVE ACCEPTED THIS PECULIAR EASTERN NOTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A SET OF ~JTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S. SINCE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN UNABLE RESORTED TO T C'~ICAL~SUBTERFUGES TOTAMAKE ~Y EVE ARGUES THAT PROGRESS IN NE IR POINTS. TME EAST NOW OF CSBM'S, INCLUDING NATO' pTRIOTING A COMPLETE PACKAG: ACTIVITIES, IS ONLY POSALS COVERING GROUND TIONS ON INDEPENDE1YTPp R AND NAVAL ACTIgITI~E~ ~~~~IA' )"BORE, PROGRESS IN DRAFTING CSBM'S IS CONTINGENT ON THE;R- COMPARABLE PROGRCSS IN DRAFTING A N~ DOUBLE LINKAGE, OF COURSE, IS A RECIPE FORISTA F.MATE.IS 6? THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT; THE EAST POINTS TO THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14 TO B CASE. THIS AGREEMENT, THE EAST CLAIMS, CAIU~LS ARTS PARALLEL PROGRESS TOWARD DRAFTING ON BOTH THE WEST, BY NOT DISCUSSING THE SOVIET NUF p ppOSALC,SBBy'S. ARGUING THAT ~,IHAS~NO'P FVLFI AND BY NfOT SUBMITTING ]TS OWN NUF LANGUAGE LLED ITS PART OF THE BARGAIN, ACCORDING^TO THE EAST. THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT, OF COURSE, SAYS NOTLING OF THE SORT. IT CALLS FOR "INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT FIGURE IN THE SUBSEQUENT PROCESS OF DRAFTING LANGUAGE (IN A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S" ~' AND CSBM'S) ? IN ANY CASE ~~T DRAFTING CAN GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT WILL SERVEEUSAONLYRIFEIT ENABLES US '0 MOVE AHEAD ON SUBSTANCE; IT WILL DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD IF IT BECOMES A TOPIC OF SERIOUS DEBATE AND AN EXCUSE FOR AVOIDING KEY ISSUES. FROM USDEL E.O.. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL 7. CODOT HAS ARRIVED; THE EAST HAS SAID, IN EFFECT, THAT ANY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES ARE PREMATURE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT AND IN ANTICIPATION OF THE LONG AWAITED AND MUCH DELAYED NNA DOCUMENT. THE EAST WAS NOT ALONE IN WAITING FOR GODOT. HOWEVER BECKETT'S CLASSIC, GODOT HAS FINALLY ARRIVED INATHE FORM OF A COMPREHENSIVE NNA WORKING DOCUMENT PLENARY ON NOVEMBER 15. THE BIRTH OF THE NNA,BpgYBWAS I.Y BOTH PROTRACTED AND PAINFUL. THE BABY WAS FIRST EXPECTEI) IN EARLY OCTOBER BUT DUE Tp'CpypLICATIONS, THE DATE HAD TO BE CHANCED ALMOST ON A WEEKLY BASIS. ONLY WHEN THE CONGENITALLY OPTIMISTIC SiIEDISH AMBASSADOR LIDGARD, THE CONFERENCE'S BEST REVERSE BAROMETER, BEGAN TO EXPRESS DOUBTS LAST WEEK THAT THE NNA COULD GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER DID WE SUSPECT THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT WAS IMMINENT. AS WITH ANY DOCUMENT CONCErVEU AND DESIGNED BY A COI~AlITTEE ( IN THIS CASF, AUSTRI.q, . '420 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CYPRUS, FINLAND, MALTA, SAN MARINO, SWEDEN, SWITZEKL.AND, YUGOSLAVIA, AND LIECHTENSTEIN), THE NNA PAPER DEFIES CATEGORIZATION. IN ORDER TO GET ALL OF THE NNA ON BOARD, THE PROPOSAL HAS BEEN CHANGED SOMEWHAT FROM EARLIER DRAFTS, E.G., REFERENCES IN THE DOCUMENT TO "NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATION" HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO "NORMAL LOCATIONS" TO MOLLIFY THE YUGOSLAVS, AND THE DEFINITION OF MANEWERS HAS BEEN SLIGHTLY REWORKED BECAUSE OF FINNISH INSISTENCE THAT THE CONCEPT OF "MOVEMENTS" BE MAINTAINED ALONG WITH "MANEUVERS." WHILE WE WILL CERTAINLY NEED TIME TO STUDY THE NNA TEXT MORE CAREFULLY, IT IS CLEAR THAT THESE ELEVENTH-HOUR CHANGES TO THE PACKAGE DO NOTHING TO ASSIST WESTERN CSBM CONCEPTS. (FULL ANALYSIS OF THE PAPER FOLLOWS SEPTEL.) 8. U.S. LINE. WHILE WE HAVE WELCOMED THE NNA DOCUMENT, WE WILL AVOID EMBRACING IT T00 WARMLY, BOTH BECAUSE WE HAVE CERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES, E.G. ON CONSTRAINTS AND CONSULTATIONS, AND BECAUSE A WARM WESTERN EMBRACE COULD BECOME THE KISS OF DEATH IN A CONFERENCE FULL OF JEALOUS SUITORS. WE HAVE SAID THAT THE PAPER IS AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT WHICH WILL BE, NECESSARILY, THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS. IT IS NOT, IN OUR VIEW, A COMPROMISE DOCUMENT, SINCE IT REFLECTS THE NNA'S SOVEREIGN SECURITY INTERESTS; IT DOES NOT REPRESENT AN ARBITRARY MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS.' OVER THE COMING WEEKS, BASED ON NNA EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR OWN PAPER, WE WILL BE QUESTIONING AND PROBING THE NNA. NATURALLY, WE WILL ATTEMPT TO DRAW OUT THE NNA ON POSITIONS WHICH ARE SIMILAR TO SC.1/AMPLIFIED. FOR THE TIME BEING, WE WILL?AVOID NEURALGIC POINTS FOR THE NNA, E.C. NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS, MOVEMENT VS MANEUVERS, TO GIVE THEM TIME TO GET THEIR OWN ACT TOGETHER. INTERESTINGLY, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, IN HIS FIRST COMMENTS ON THE PAPER, HAS ALREADY REJECTED CERTAIN NNA CONCEPTS, SUCH AS "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST." 9. TROUBLE SPOTS: SOME NATO CAUCUS MEMBERS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE ALLIANCE'S PERFORMANCE TO DATC IN THE INFORMAL WORKING CROUPS. THE UNREPENTANT FRENCH, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR CRITICISM. THE DUTCH HAVE BEEN MOST EXPLICIT IN THEIR CRITICISM. THE FRENCH, ACCORDING TO THE DUTCH, HAVE DEPARTED FROM COMMON ALLIANCE POSITIONS ON A SERIES OF ISSUES FROM NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND ASR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO CONSTRAINTS. THIS LACK OF ALLIANCE COHESION, IN THE DUTCH VIEW, CALLS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A "TEAM DE FILE" SYSTEM, I.E., COORDINATING TEAMS WHO WILL ALSO ACT AS PRIMARY SPEAKERS IN EACH WORKING GROUP WITHIN NATU. ct~nncNr Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET WHILE WE COULD SUPPORT THE STATED DUTCH COAL, I.E., IMPROVED COORDINATION OF WORKING GROUP INTERVENTIONS, WE CANNOT, AT THIS STAGE, SUPPORT THEIR RECOMMENDED MEAN:i TO ACHIEVE THIS END. THE TEAM DE FILE SUGGESTION WAS STUDIOUSLY IGNORED IN THE CAUCUS. OVER THE COMING WEEKS, MOREOVER, WE WILL FACE ANOTHER PROBLEM: THE PROLIFERl-- FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL TION OF DRAFT NUF TEXTS. WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE ITAL7:ANS AND THE FRENCH WILL SOON THROW THEIR NUF HATS INTO AN ALREADY CROWDED NATO RING (DENMARK AND CANADA HAVE ALREADY FLOATED NUF LANGUAGE WITHIN NATO AND THE SOVIETS, ROMANIANS, AND NNA HAVE INTRODUCED TEXTS IN STOCKHOLM;. FINALLY, EVERYBODY'S LEAST FAVORITE GADFLY HAS ALIGHTED AGAIN. THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN SECUR]TY MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, ACCORDING TO THE NEW MALTF;SE AMBASSADOR, IF WE ARE TO REACH AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. BARRY END OF MESSAGE " ? ? 422 SEC~r Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 UNCLAS S?OCRHOLM 08824 SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, 11/18/85 L. CDE VIII - 026 2. FOLLOWING IS THE STATEMENT AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, MADE TO THE CDE TODAY, NOVEMBER L8. 3. BEGIN TEXT: LAST WEER THE ATTENTION OF THIS CONFERENCE WAS DIRECTED INWARD -- ON OUR NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COLLEAGUES AND THE PROPOSALS WHICH THEY PRESENTED ON NOVEMBER LS. MY DELEGATION WELCOMES THE INTRODUCTION OF CONFERENCE DOCUMENT SC.7. WE RECOGNIZE THAT A VAST AMOUNT OF WORK HAS GONE INTO IT AND THAT IT HAS BEEN A DIFFICULT TASR TO NEGOTIATE COMMON POSITIONS ON REY NATIONAL SECURITY QUESTIONS AMONG A GROUP OF COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND VARIED NATIONAL DEFENSE PROBLEMS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE RESULTING PROPOSALS DO NOT REPRESENT AN EFFOR? TO DEFINE A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF EAST AND WEST, BUT RATHER AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE THE SOVEREIGN INTERESTS OF THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MADRID MANDATE. MY DELEGATION WILL GIVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO ALL ASPECTS OF SC.7 IN THIS CON?EXT. WHILE NOT WISHING TO PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME OF OUR STUDY OR ANTICIPATE THE EXPLANATIONS WHICH WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM SC.7'S CO-SPONSORS, I WANT TO SAY ?THAT I STILL BELIEVE THA? SC.L/AMPLIFIED PROVIDES THE BEST BASIS FOR A MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH ARE VERIFIABLE AND HAVE REAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. BUT AS WE PURSUE OUR EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND FOR AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT, WE WILL TARE FULL ACCOUN? OF SC.7 AS A SERIOUS AND INDEPENDENT CONTRIBUTION TO OLTR WORR. IN SC.L/AMPLIFIED AND SC.7, WE NOW HAVE TWO DETAILED, FULLY DEVELOPED NEGOTIATING DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE CONFERENCE. THIS WEER, MR. CHAIRMAN, AT LEAST PART OF OUR ATTENTION IS DIRECTED OUTWARDS -- ON GENEVA AND THE MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WHICH WILL BE TARING PLACE TOMORROW AND WEDNESDAY. I WOULD LIRE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT WHAT THE .UNITED STATES SEERS IN GENEVA AND HOW WE BELIEVE THIS CAN AFFECT OUR WORK HERE. PERSONALLY, I HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN EACH OF THE US-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETINGS SINCE L972 AT VARIOUS LEVELS AND IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES. THEREFORE, I PERSONALLY SEE THE GENEVA MEETING AS A RESUMPTION OF A PROCESS WHICH HAS BEEN INTERRUPTED FOk 1V0 LONG. MY GOVERNMENT REGRETTED THAT, IN VIENNA IN L979. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO AGREE TO REGULARLY SCHEDULED SUMMIT MEETINGS AND A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRE? SERIES OF REGULAR MEET?NGS AT SUBORDINATE LEV):LS. AND WE REGRETTED THAT EVENTS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS SINCE THEN MADE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS THE EXCEP4ION RATHER THAN THE RULE. SO IT IS OUR HOPE THAT GENEVA WILL MARK THE RESUMPTION OF A PP.OCESS WHERE OvR LEADERS CAN GRAPPLE WITH ISSUES AND TRY TO CLEAR THE ATMOSPHERE. BUT AN AGREEMENT TO HOLD MORE MEE?INGS IS NOT ALL THAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE ACHIEVED IN GENEVA. WE HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN ALL FOUR AREAS ON THE US AGENDA: ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL ISSUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS. ON ARMS CONTROL, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS ON THE COMPLEX NUCLEAR ISSUES BEING NEGOTIATED BY OUR DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA. BUT 'iE HOPE TO ACRIEVE SOME FURTHER CLOSURE OF US AND SOVI::T POSITIONS, THUS EASING THE TASK OF OUR GENEVA NEGOTIATORS. IN OTHER AREAS, INCLUDING THE STi)CRHOLM CONFERENCE, WE HOPE TO FORGE A BETTER BASIS OF UNDERSTANDING WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN FROM USDEL CDE E.O. L2356: DECL: N/A TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, LL/L8/85 OTHER NEGOTIATING FORUMS. SINCE US AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON REGIONAL ISSUF;S ARE SO FAR APART, AGREEMENT ON THEM WOULD SEEM BEYOND OUR . GRASP. BUT DISCUSSION OF THESE QUESTIONS AT TFE HIGHEST LEVEL, SUPPLEMENTING THE CONTINUING BILATERAL DIALOG WE HAVE HAD IN RECENT MONTHS, CAN DO FOP OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD WHAT THIS CONFERENCE IS TRYING TO DO FOR EUROPE -- REDUCE TENSIONS, MINIMIZE THE DANGERS OF MISCALCULATION, AND FOSTER A CONTEXT OF RESTRAINT. ON BILATERAL ISSUES, WE BELIEVE SOME IF NOT ALL OF THE AGREEMENTS WE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING FOR MANY MONTIiS WILL BE READY FOR SIGNATURE IN GENEVA. ADDRESSING THE NATION BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR GENEVA, PRESIDENT REAGAN SPOKE ELOQUENTLY ABOUT THE VALUE OF EXCHANGES OF YOUNG PEOPLE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS WHICH WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT ON CULTURAL EXCANGES WHICH SEEMS READY FOR SIGNATURE. AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RI~;IiTS IS, REGRETTABLY, UNLIKELY; IT IS NOT EVEN AN AGREED AGENDA ITEM. BUT THE QUESTION WILL SURELY BE DISCUSSED, AND SOME HUMANITARIAN CASES REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN RE;iOLVED IN THE PRE-SUMMIT PERIOD. NATURALLY, WE HOPE MIRE WILL BE DONE. MR. CHAIRMAN, US OBJECTIVES AT THE GENEVA ME]:TING RESEMBLE IN SOME iiA1fS OUR GOALS HERE IN STOCKHOLM. IN BOTH PLACES WE WANT TO REAFFIRM AND GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO T$E PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE THROUGH Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SPECIFIC, CONCRETE MEASURES AND AGREEMENTS. IN BOTH PLACES WE WANT TO BUILD CONFIDENCE, RIDUCE SUSPICION AND AVOID MISCALCULATION. COMPLIANCE, COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION ARE CENTRAL TO OUR POSITION IN GENEVA AS WELL AS STOCKHOLM. THERE IS NO DOUBT, THEN, THAT WHA2 HAPPENS IN THE TALKS BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL BE RELEVANT_TO OUR WORK HERE. THE COMPLEX MULTILATERAL ISSUES OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ARE NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO RESOLUTION IN BILATERAL MEETINGS, HOWEVER ELEVATED; BUT, AS A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF MY GOVERNMENT SAID LAST WEER, THE US SEEKS PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT WITH REGARD TO THE APPROACHES WHICH THE US AND THE USSR WILL TAKE TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE: THIS COULD ACT AS A CATALYST FOR OUR WORK HERE AND HELP TO ASSURE THAT WE MARE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS ON THE ISSUES TO MARE AN AGREEMENT POSSIBLE BEFORE TIME RUNS OUT ON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE NEXT SUMMER. IT IS, OF COURSE, POSSIBLE THAT THE GENEVA MEETING WILL NOT RESULT IN CLOSER APPROACHES ON OUR ISSUES HERE. MY GOVERNMENT WOULD REGRET THIS, BUT IT WOULD IN NO SENSE DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OR TO THE ENERGY WE WILL DEVOTE TO ACHIEVING IT. MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE, NO ,MATTER WHAT THIS WEEK BRINGS. IT IS TIME FOR US TO GET ON WITH IT. BARRY END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED 425 SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET CONF IDENTIAL STOCICHOLM08916 SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 20, 1985 REF: STOCKHOLM 8839 1. CDE VIII - 03S 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CDE NATO CAUCUS CONSIDERED A NEW PROPOSAL FOR THE 1986 CALENDAR THAT WOULD SCHEDULE FOUR SESSIONS WITH A JULY 18 ?ARCET DATE FOR COMPLETING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AND AN ABSOLUTE CUTOFF DATE OF SEPTEMBER 19. USDEL CAN SUPPORT THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF THIS PROPOSAL AND ANTICIPATES A FAVORABLE CAUCUS DECISION, ALT$OUGH CANADA CONTINUES TO ARGUE TxAT A CONSENSUS WILL BE NEEDED TO ADJOURN PRIOR TO T3E NOVEMBER 4 VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE. THERE WILL BE A SPECIAL CAUCUS SESSION TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE T;iE QUESTION, PROBABLY NOVEMBER 25. WE T$INR A SA'T'ISFACTORY SOLUTION IS WITHIN REACH. THE CAUCUS FURTHER DETERMINED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BEGIN TO ASR QUESTIONIi ON THE NNA PAPER DESIGNED TO $IGHLIGHT PARALLELS BETWEEN THEIR PROPOSALS (SC.7) AND SC.1. FOR T$E LONGER TERTi, THE CAUCUS WILL CONSIDER TACTICS DESIGNED TO BREAK FRAGILE NNA UNITY ON POINTS W$IC$ ARE NOT IN OUR INTER]iST. THE UR AND PORTUGAL VOICED CONTINUED CONCERN ABOUT ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE IN RESPONDING TO THE WARSAW PACT 0!f T$E FUNCTIONAL APPROAC$ TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIE:~. THE CAUCUS DISCUSSED WIT$OUT RESOLUTION T$E QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF NNA COORDINATORS TO BE EMPLOYED IN ?FfE WORRING GROUPS. END SUMMARY. 4. 1986 CALENDAR; THE REY ISSUE REMAINS THE CUTOFF DATE. A DRAFT PROPOSAL TO T$E CONFERENCE GRID GROUP ON THE 1986 CALENDAR WAS TABLED AS A "COMPROMISE NON-PAPER" BY T$E CANADIAN AND DUTC$ DEPREPS (OUR REPS ON THE GRID GROUP) FOR CAUCUS CONSIDERATION. IT PROPOSES FOUR SC$EDULED SESSIONS IN 1986 BEGINNING ON JANUARY 21. THE T$IRD SESSION WOULD CONCLUDE JULY 18 (THE TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT), AT WHICH TIME THE CONFERENCE COULD DECIDE BY CONSENSUS TO CONCLUDE, BUT A FOURT$ SESSION IS PROPOSED FOR AUGUST 19 - SEPTEMBER 19, IF NECESSARY "TO COMPLETE THE DRAFTING OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT." IT NOTES THAT NO CDE MEETINGS WILL PARE PLACE DURING THE VIENNA PREPCON OR MAIN REVIEW MEETIN~3S, AND STATES THAT THIS DECISION CAN ONLY BE ALTERED Bi CONSENSUS. USDEL SUPPOR?S THE THRUST OF THIS PROPOSAL BUT WILL TRY TO AMEND IT SO THAT IT IS CLEAR TH,~T EDITING SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY SEPTEMBER 19. TIiIS IS ESSENTIALLY THE FRENC$ POSITION. CAUCUS CONSENSUS IS BUILDING FOR T$E SEP?EMBER 19 CUTOFF. DELWORT$ (CANADA), HOWEVER, CONTINUES TO EXAMINE THE ENTRAILS OF C:>CE DOCUMENTS FOR THEOLOGICAL GUIDANCE AND HAS DETERMINED 426 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 THAT THERE MUST BE A CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN OR SUSPEND THE CONFERENCE, AND THUS, IN HIS VIEW, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO WORK UNTIL NOVEMBER 4 (OR EVEN BEYOND). ALTHOUGH SOME OTHERS (UR, PORTUGAL) DO NOT DISAGREE WITH DELWORTH'S READING RF THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, NO ONE IS LIKELY TO SUPPORT HIM IN BLOCKING AN EMERGING CAUCUS CONSENSUS. IT IS THE USDEL'S VIEW THAT WE CAN ENGINEER A FAVORABLE CONCLUSION TO THIS DISCUSSION HERE IN STOCKHOLM. A SPECIAL CAUCUS SESSION WILL DEAL EXLUSIVELY WITH THIS TOPIC NEXT WEER. S. DEALING WITH THE NNA: AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.) OBSERVED ?HAT HIS NNA CONTACTS INDICATE THAT DETAILED EXPLANATIONS OF THE NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7) WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING FOR FEAR SUCH EXPLANATIONS MIGHT UNRAVEL THE NNA'S POORLY WOVEN UNITY. BARRY ALSO REPORTED THAT NNA REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ENCOURAGED THE WEST ACTIVELY TO QUESTION THEIR PROPOSAL, WITH THE CAVEAT THAT NATO SHOULD AVOID THOSE AREAS OF THE PAPER WHERE COMPROMISES AND INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES MIGHT NOT .WITHSTAND CLOSE SCRUTINY. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH BARRY'S SUGGESTION THAT FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WE SHOULD DEVELOP QUES?IONS TO PUT TO THE NNA THAT HIGHLIGHT PARALLELS BETWEEN THEIR PAPER AND SC.1, WHILE AVOIDING FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 20, 1985 THE NNA'S SORE POINTS. FOR THE LONGER TERM, HOWEVER, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR EDES'S (UR) SUGGESTION THAT IT MAY BE IN OUR INTEREST TO BREAK NNA UNITY ON A NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH WE DO NOT LIRE -- E.G., THEIR VARIATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, THE DETAILS OF THEIR NO?IFICATION AND OBSERVATION REGIMES AND THEIR NON- USE OF FORCE (NUF) PROPOSAL. DELWORTH (CANADA) ADDED THAT THE NNA'S HOUSE OF CARDS IS LIKELY TO FALL OF ITS OWN ACCORD. (COMMENT: IN FACT, WE HAVE ALREADY HEARD DIVERGENT VIEWS EXPRESSED ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE BY THE CYPRIOT AND AUSTRIAN REPRESENTATIVE, AND SEVERAL DIFFERENT SHADES OF THEIR POSITION ON INFORMATION FROM AUSTRIA, SWEDEN AND FINLAND DELEGATIONS. END COMMENT.) ONLY FRANCE WAS VOCAL IN OPPOSING THIS LINE AS GASCHIGNARD CAUTIONED AGAINST EMBARRASSING THE NNA OR REDUCING THEIR INFLUENCE, WHICH WE MAY NEED LATER. HOWEVER, EVEN DELWORTH, WHO USUALLY "SWIMS" WITH THE CAUCUS "WETS," SUPPORTED EDES ON THIS "GET TOUGH" TACTIC, ALTHOUGH HE ALSO ADVOCATED A LONGER TERM STRA?EGY WHICH WOULD USE OUR QUESTIONS ON THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF SC.7 AS A MEANS CF DISCOVERING CONSENSUS LANGUAGE. IN RESPONSE TO THE LATER POINT, CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) ECHOED AN EARLIER ITALIAN WARNING THAT WE HAVE TO AVOID GIVING . 427 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ANY IMPRESSSION THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTI~,TE ON THE BASIS OF THE NNA PROPOSALS. FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF EDES'S PROPOSAL WAS PUT INTO ABEYANCE UNTIL AF'~ER THE CAUCUS HAS HEARD A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF SC.'1 FROM THE ~.AUCUS MINI-CLUSTER COORDINATING GROUPS. 6. AIR AND NAVAL: THE CAUCUS CONTINUES TO A,WI-IT THE MINI-CAUCUSES REPORT ON NEW ARGUMENTS TO BE US~~ IN RESPONDING TO EASTERN QUESTION ON THE MODALITI~:S OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN REGARD TO THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL. ACTIVITIES. THE IR AND PORTUGAL WERE PARTICULARLY AGITATED ON THIS ISSUE. EDES (UR) OBSERVED THAT NATO IS VULNERABLE AND NEED: TO DEVELOP PLAUSIBLE ARGUPff.NTS FOR OUR POSITION, IN RESPONSE TO THE EAST'S "REASONABLE QUESTIONS." HE ADDEL THAT OUR PRESENT STANCE RUNS THE RISK OF LOSING THE ARGUMENT FOR THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. (COMMENT: OF IRONIC INTEREST WAS GASCHIGNARD'S (FRANCE) STATEMENT THAT HE DID NOT THINK WE HAD TO BE IN A HURRY TO DEVELOP ANSWERS FOR THE EAST, WHEN, IN FACT, IT HAS BEEN HIS OWN MILITARY ADVISOR WHO HAS BEEN ROUNDLY CRITICIZED FOR WELCOMING EASTERN QUESTIONS ON THIS ISSUE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT TTiE FRENCH DELEGATION RECENTLY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BEEP QUIET ON THIS ISSUE. END COMMENT.) 7. COORDINATORS: THE CAUCUS CONSIDERED, INCON:LUSIVELY, A HOST OF OPTIONS ON THE QUESTION Of HOW MANY NYA 000R- DINATORS SHOULD BE EMPLOYED IN THE WORKING CLUSTERS. KEY FACTORS CONSIDERED WEAE THAT: 1) THE NNA CAN A~;REE TO TWO COORDINATORS (NATO'S CURRENT POSITION), ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD PREFER FIVE; 2) IF ONLY TWO ARE EMPLOYED, THEY WOULD LIKELY BE LOIBL (AUS?RIA) AND LIDGARD (SW]:DEN) WITH RAHILUOTO (FINLAND) HELD IN RESERVE FOR LA?ER (PERHAPS FOR WORKING GROUP AB); AND 3) THE EAST, ALTHOUG1i APPARENTLY WILLING TO ACCEPT TWO COORDINATORS, i~OUL,D PREFER TO HAVE FOUR, WITH ONE FOR EACH GROUP EX(:EPT INFORMATION/VERIFICATION (A-2) WHICH WOULD BE SZBSUMED UNDER OTHER CLUSTERS; THUS ACHIEVING THE SOVIET;' OBJEC- TIVE OF ELIMINATING THOSE TOPICS AS INDEPENDENT MEASURES. THE CAUCUS PREFERENCE CONTINUES TO BE FOR TWO 000RDIN- ATORS (WHILE HOLDING OPEN THE OPTION OF MORE LATER), WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) WHO IS S7VBBORNLY INSISTING ON FIVE COORDINATORS BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY WORK LOAD. THOSE OF OUR ALLIES WHO ARE MOST EAGER TC DRAFT (NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, CANADA) ALSO PROPOSED, WITHOUT ATTTtAC?ING MUCH SUPPORT, TT;AT COORDINATORS BE BROUGHT IN BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION, I.E., IN EARLY DECEMBER. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN ` 428 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08980 SUBJECT: AMBASSADORIAL STATEMEN? IN CDE 11/22/85 1. CDE VIII - 037 2. FOLLOWING ARE THE REMARKS MADE BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY. HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, TO THE CDE TOD.:Y, NOVEMBER 22. 3. BEGIN TEXT: AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS WEER I WENT OUT ON A LIMB SOMEWHAT AND TALKED ABOUT WHAT MIGH? BE ACHIEVED IN GENEVA AND HOW THIS MIGHT AFFECT OUR WORK HERE. I GUESS IT'S ONLY FAIR TO MEASURE MY EXPECTATIONS AGAINST THE REALITY OF THE PAST FEW DiAYS. I WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT MY RATHER MODEST PLAN HAS BEEN OVER-FULFILLED. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS CAME IN THE INTENSE, PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV,.OR THAT THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE MINDS ON SUCH FUNDAMENTALS AS IDEOLOGY AND NATIONAL PURPOSE. AS THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED YESTERDAY IN GENEVA SAYS, SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON A NUMBER OF CRUCIAL ISSUES. BUT, AS SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID BEFORE LEAVING GENEVA YESTERDAY, WE MAVE A PROCESS UNDERWAY WHICH CAN LEAD TO A MORE STABLE AND CONSTRUC?IVE RELATIONSHIP -- A "FRESH START" AS PRESIDENT REAGAN PUT IT. PROFESSIONAL COMMUNIQUE READERS LIRE OURSELVES DEVELOP FAVORITE PASSAGES THEY PORE OVER. LET ME PICK OU? A FEW FROM THE GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT WHICH SErM PARTICULARLY RELEVANT TO OUR WORK HERE. FIRS?, THE TWO LEADERS "AGREED ABOUT THE NEED TO IMPROVE US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE." SECOND, THEY EXPRESSED A "STRONG DESIRE TO SEER COMMON GROUND ON EXISTING PROBLEMS." THIRD, "THEY EMPHASIZED THE IMPERATIVE OF PREVENTING ANY WAR BETWEEN THEM, WHETHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL." FOURTH, THEY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR CONFERENCE HERE IN STOCKHOLM AND "STATED THEIR INTENTION TO FACILITATE, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPA?ING STATES, AN EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE." THERE ARE MANY OTHER IMPOR?ANT POINTS MADE IN THE JOINT S?ATEMENT, BUT THESE FOUR SEEM PAR?ICULARLY RELEVANT. WHAT DO THESE STATEMENTS MEAN FOR US HERE? LET ME BEGIN BY SAYING WHAT THEY DO NOT MEAN. PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAVE NOT ROBBED US OF OUR MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD. THEY HAVE NOT TAKEN THE SUBSTANCE OUT OF OUR HANDS AND RESOLVED OUR PROBLEMS FOR US. INDEED, THEY COULD NOT; THIS IS A MULTILATERAL FORUM WHF:kE ALL MUST CONTRIBUTE TO SOLD?IONS ON THE BASIS OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY. WHAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAVE 429 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET PROVIDID TO US -- AND TO OTHER BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATING FORUMS -- IS A POLITICAL IMPULSE, AS SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID -- PERHAPS A BIT OF ELECTRIC SHOCK DESIGNID TO SERVE AS A CATALYST TO OUR WORK. IN HIS REPORT LAST NIGLiT TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS ON HIS RETURN FROM GENEVA, PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT THE TWO LEADERS MEANT ?0 GIVE A BOOST TO OUR EFFORTS HERE IN S?OCRHOLM, AND TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA AND ELSEWHERE AS WELL. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HE TOLD ME BEFORE THE GENEVA MEETING; AS I SAID ON NOVEMBER LL, THE PRESIDENT INSTRUCTID ME ON NOVEMBER 5 TO REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENHANCE SECURITY AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN EUROPE. FROM USDEL CDE USIA FOR P/PFE E.O. L2356: DECL: N/A TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE SUBJECT: AMBASSADORIAL STATEMENT IN CDE 11/22/35 WE ALL KNOW WHAT THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD LOOK LII:E. IT WILL EVOLVE FROM THE WORKING STRUCTURE; ZT WILI. INCLUDE A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE AS WELL AS SPECIFIC, MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONFII)ENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. WE ALL ACCEPT THIS HERE IN THIS ROOM. WE ALSO KNOW HOW AN AGREEMENT MUST BE PRODUCID, IT WILL BE THE RESULT OF STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO IDEP(TIFY COMMON GROUND, NOT EFFORTS TO WIN DEBATING POIDfTS ON AREAS IN WHICH WE DISAGREE. THIS MEANS SETTIN(~ ASIDE AREAS WHERE THERE IS NO CONVERGENCE IN HOPES TEAT THE MOMENTUM ACHIEVID IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS W]LL CARRY US THROUGH SOME PAINFUL COMPROMISES. ABOVE ALI,, PROGRESS REQUIRES THAT WE NOT REFIGHT PROCIDURAL BATTLES OR ENGAGE IN THEOLOGICAL DISPUTES. WE DON'T HAVE THE TIME ?0 IMITATE THE CHURCH COUNCILS OF THE MIDDLE AGES. MY DELEGATION IS READY TO PURSUE THIS APPROACH, AS ARE THE OTHER SPONSORS OF SC 1. WE DON'T HAVE TIME FOR ANY OTHER. WE ARE READY TO COOPERATE WITH THE DELEGATION OF T$E SOVIET UNION AND WITH ALL OTHER DELEGATIONS HERE IN THE SPIRIT OF GENEVA WHICH HAS EMERGED THIS WEER. END TEXT. BARRY END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED 430 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CONF IDENT IAL STOCRHOLM09110 SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR JOINT COMMUNIQUE REF: A) GUNDERSEN/$URTON TELCON NOVEMBER 26, - B) STOCKHOLM 8979 1. CDE VIII - 044. 2. C - ENTIRE TERT. 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSRY CLAIMS THAT THE WORD "BOTH" IS PRESENT IN THE RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSIONS OF THE CDE PORTION OF THE GENEVA JOINT COMMUNIQUE. NEVERTHELESS, GRINEVSRY HAS ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE USDEL'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMMUNIQUE, I.E., IT IS A STATEMENT MEANT TO GIVE A POSITIVE "POLITICAL SIGNAL" TO THE STOCKHOLM AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS AND, THEREFORE, THE CONFERENCE SHOULD NOT INVOLVE ITSELF IN THEOLOGICAL DEBATES AS TO THE MEANING OF SPECIFIC WORDS OR PHRASES. AC?ION REQUESTED IN PARA 8. END SUMMARY. 4. IN A NOVEMBER 26 CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR BARRY SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSRY CLAIMED THAT THE CDE PORTION OF THE ENGLISH TEXT OF THE GENEVA JOINT COMMUNIQUE INCLUDED THE WORD "BOTH" WHEN REFERRING TO CSBM'S AND NUF, I.E., THEY REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR A DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE /BOTH/ MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE." THE SOVIETS AND SOME OF THEIR ALLIES IN CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS HAVE ALREADY P~.LUDED THE UNOFFICIAL RUSSIAN LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE (PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA) WHICH INCLUDES THE PHRASE "RAR TAR I" IN THE ABOVE SENTENCE, WHICH ALSO CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO "BOTH AND" IN ENGLISH. AS NOTED REF B, ADDING "BOTH" TO THE TEXT GIVES EMPHASIS TO THE SOVIET APPROAC$ WHICH SEPARATES MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CSBM'S AND THE "CONCRETIZATION" OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. BARRY SAID OFFICIAL U.S. TEXT DID NOT USE THIS WORDING AND THAT HE ASSUMED I? APPEARED ONLY IN THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION AND WAS THUS NOT AUTHENTIC. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WOULD DOUBLE CHECK WITH WASHINGTON IF GRINEVSRY WOULD CHECK WITH MOSCOW. 5. BASED ON REF TELCON, IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE WORD "BOTH" DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE ENGLISH VERSION OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE. FURTHERMORE, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE WORD "BOTH" WAS DROPPED BY U.S. AND SOVIET NEGOTIATORS BY MUTUAL CONSENT IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEXT (THE WORKING LANGUAGE) DURING THE DISCUSSION IN GENEVA OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE. FINALLY, WE ARE INFORMED THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS YET TO RECEIVE FROM THE SOVIETS THEIR OFFICIAL RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF THE ENGLISH TEXT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE AND IS DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE APPROPRIATE BILATERAL CHANNELS. 431 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 6. IN ANY CASE, IN S?OCICHOLM WE HAVE CONVEYED THE STRONG MESSAGE TO GRINEVSRY AND OTHERS THAT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE IS A POLITICAL STATEMENT THAT, AS SECRETARY SHULTZ NOTED, SHOULD SERVE AS "A POLITICAL IMPULSE" TO OUR WORK HERE. IT IS AN AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO IMPROVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, MOREOVER, AND S;30ULD SET THE TONE FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS HERE AND ELSEWHERE. FINALLY, THE JOINT STATEMENT STRESSES THE MULT[LATERAL NATURE OF THE CSCE PROCESS. THEREFORE, FOR US HERE IN STOCKHOLM TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A THEOLOGICAL DEBATE REGARDING THE MEANING OF SPECIFIC WORDS OR PHRASES OF THE JOIN?, I.E., BILATERAL STATEMENT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE "SPIRIT OF GENEVA." FUR"HERMORE, SUC$ A DEBATE WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE; A STERILE THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION MIGHT EVEN BE DESTRUCTIt~E, COMING SO CLOSE ON THE HEELS OF AN IMPOR?ANT MEETING ~IHICH HAS PROVIDED US WITH A "FRESH START" IN STOCKHOLM ~.ND ELSEWHERE. 7. GRINEVSRY HAS AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH IN PRINCIPLE AND HAS NOT PRESSED THE ISSUE, ALTHOUGH SOME OF' HIS FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR JOINT COMMUNIQUE EASTERN MINIONS, E.G. THE GDR AMBASSADOR, HAVE ALLUDED TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE TO BUTTRESS THE EASTERN APPROACH TO NUF. 8. ACTION REQUESTED: DELEGATION RECOMMENDS THAT THE MATTER BE TAKEN UP WITH THE SOVIETS IF THEY PERSIST IN USING THE UNOFFICIAL RUSSIAN LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE TEXT, I.E., INCLUDING THE RUSSIAN TERM "RAR .I", BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 432 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 CONF IDENT IALSTOCRHOLM08979 SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 22, 1985 1. CDE VIII - 038. 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. PEGIN SUMMARY: THE NOVEMBER 22 PLENARY FEATURED POSITIVE U.S. AND SOVIET CHARACTERIZA?IONS OF THE SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. MALTA, REPORTING ON THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED MEETING OF ECONOMIC EXPERTS OF MEDITERRANEAN MEMBERS OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, STRESSED ITS DESIRE TO MERGE MEDITERRANEAN FORA WITH THE CSCE PROCESS. END SUMMARY. 4. DRAWING FROM THE U.S.-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT, PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPOR? TO CONGRESS, AND COMMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ, AMBASSADOR BARRY STRESSED THAT THE SUMMIT IS, THE START OF A PROCESS DESIGNED TO LEAD TO A MORE STABLE, CONSTRUCTIVE RELATION- SHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN THIS CONTEXT, BARRY SAID THE SUMMIT PROVIDES A POLITICAL IMPULSE -- A CATALYST -- TO THE WORK OF CDE. HE POINTED OUT THA? SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS MUST BE RESOLVED IN STOCKHOLM, BECAUSE CDE IS A MULTILATERAL FORUM IN WHICH ALL STATES ENJOY SOVEREIGN EQUALITY. HE URGED PARTICIPANTS TO SET ASIDE AREAS IN WHICH THERE IS NO CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS, AND TO AVOID DEBILITATING PROCEDURAL AND THEOLOGICAL DISPUTES. AMBASSADOR BARRY PLEDGED TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIETS AND OTHER DELEGATIONS -- IN THE "SPIRIT OF GENEVA" -- IN ORDER TO PRODUCE A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT. (FULL TEXT FOLLOWS SEPTEL.) 5. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY CHARACTERIZED THE SUMMIT AS HAVING "EXCEEDING IMPORTANCE" TO IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-SOLIE? RELATIONS. HE CITED GORBACHEV'S NOVEMBER 21 PRESS CONFERENCE, THE PCC MEETING IN SOFIA, AND HE REVIEWED SOVIET ARMS CONTROL "INITIATIVES" AS FURTHER PROOF OF THE SOVIET INTENTION TO FIND NEW SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. WHILE GRINEVSKY ADMITTED THERE WERE "MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF OPINION" AND IMPORTANT QUESTIONS WERE NOT SOLVED, HE NONETHELESS SAID WORK WILL CONTINUE TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR QUOTED THE SECTION ON CDE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT, AND NOTED SIMPLY THAT "THE TEXT SPEARS FOR ITSELF." 6. BEGIN COMMEN?: WE HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION WHAT IS SAID TO BE THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE JOINT COP4~SUNIQUE WHICH INCLUDES THE PHRASE "RAK TAR I" IN THE SECOND SENTENCE, WHICH CAN BE TT.ANSLATED INTO "BOTH AND" IN ENGLISH. THE SENTENCE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH THUS READS: " .~. . THEY REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR A DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 INCLUDE /BOTH/ MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLC CSBM'S /ANT/ GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE." ADDING "BOTH" TO THE TEXT GIVES EMPHASIS TO THE SOVIET APPROACH WHICH SEPARATES MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CSBM'S AND THE "CONCRETIZATION" OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. ACCORDING TO SOVIET THINKING, "CONCRETIZATION" MEANS DEVELOPMEN? AND ELABORATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. ACCORDINGLY, THE SOVIETS GAN BE EXPECTED TO TRY TO EXPLOIT THEIR VERSION OF THE COMMUNIQUE. WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THA? T.3E COMMUNIQUE SPEAKS FOR ITSELF AND THAT IT IS IN~;ONSISTENT WITH THE "SPIRIT OF GENEVA" TO ENGAGE IN THEOLi)GICAL DEBATES ON THE MEANING OF THE COMMUNIQUE LANGU,~GE. 7. AMBASSADOR GAUCI (MALTA) NOTED THAT MEDITERRANEAN ECONOMIC EXPERTS OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT REI;ENTLY MET IN VALETTA TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC PROPOSALS ON TR~-DE, COMMUNICATIONS, AND RESEARCH; SPECIFIC RECOMME1fDATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS RESULTED FROM THIS MEETING. GAUCI ALSO STRESSED MALTA'S DESIRE TO MERGE MEDITERRANEAN PROCESSES WITH EUROPEAN PROCESSES, IN THE CONTF;XT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER OF THE HELSINKI FINAL AC7'. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 434 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLK 09109 SUBJECT: CDE: "SPIRIT OF GENEVA" IN STOCKHOLM 1. CDE VIII-044 - CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEX?. 2. SUMMARY: THE SOVIETS ARE HIN?ING TO US THAT THEY READ THE GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT AS A MA*iDATE TO RELEASE THEIR STRANGLEHOLD ON MILITARY MEASURES IN CDE. THE QUALIFICATIONS ARE THAT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WILL ONLY COME AFTER COORDINATORS HAVE BEEN APPOINTED. THE CSBM- NUF LINKAGE WILL REMAIN IN PLACE. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW THESE ATMOSPHERICS WILL TRANSLATE INTO REALITY. END SUMMARY. 3. WE HAVE DEVOTED THE LAST FEW DAYS TO DETERMINING HOW THE SOVIETS INTERPRET GENEVA AS A MANDATE FOR CDE. OUR LINE, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, IS THAT THE GENEVA JOIN? STATEMENT WAS INTENDED TO GIVE A POLITICAL IMPULSE TO THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS. OUR INTEN?ION IS NOT TO ARGUE OVER INTERPRETA?IONS OF THE WORDING OF THE CDE PARAGRAPH BU? TO GET ON WITH AN EFFORT TO FIND COMMON GROUND ON CSBMS. IN AN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN OUR HOLD ON THE HIGH GROUND, WE HAVE PUBLICLY PLEDGED OUR READI- NESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION (AND ALL OTHERS) TO THIS END. 4. THE SOVIETS BEGAN TO RESPOND PRIVATELY IN A SERIES OF BILATERAL CONTAG?S ON NOVEMBER 25/26. (BARRY/ GRINEVSRY, DASD FEITH/GRINEVSRY, DASD FEITH AND MEMBERS OF US DEL/TATARNIROV, SOLOMENRO, ROZANOV ET AL., DASD FEITH AND GDR AMBASSADOR BURRING) SEVERAL REY POINTS EMERGED;. -- GRINEVSRY SEEMS TO AGREE 'THAT WE SHOULD AVOID PUBLIC ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE CDE PARAGRAPH IN THE GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT AND ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE. (BARRY/GRINEVSRY) -- THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE PREPARED TO SET ASIDE NAVAL (AND POSSIBLY AIR) ACTIVITIES ISSUES AND MOVE AHEAD ON IDENTIFYING COMMON GROUND ON CSBMS. GRINEVSRY TOLD BARRY THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO PLACE NAVAL AND-AIR ISSUE IN BRACKETS AND DISCUSS CSBH CONCEPTS WHERE THERE WAS COMMON GROUND. IN DISCUSSION WITH FEITH, ROZANOV SUGGESTED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE US POSI?ION ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND THAT THIS NEED NO? BE AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS. AMBASSADOR BURRING (GDR) IN A BILATERAL WITH FEITH ALSO HINTED AT WTO SOFTNESS ON NAVAL ISSUE WHILE CLAIMING A SPECIAL GDR INTERES? IN AIR ACTIVITIES OVER THE ZONE. -- GRINEVSRY TOLD BARRY THAT THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN RESUMING SUBSTANTIVE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US HERE. THIS WAS TRIED BRIEFLY DURING ROUND 6 WHEN THERE WERE MEETINGS BETWEEN US AND SOVIET MILITARY; NOTHING SUBSTANTIVE CAME OF THIS. THE SUGGESTION IS THA? SOME PROGRESS COULD NOW BE MADE PROVIDED THAT WE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ARE PREPARED TO SAY A LITTLE ABOUT OUR VIEW CAN HOW NUF SHOULD BE TREATED. GRINEVSRY SUGGESTED THE C~UT-OF- GARRISON CONCEPT AS ONE WHERE BILATERAL PROGRESS COULD BE !BADE SINCE "WE ARE BOTH SAYING THE SAME THING IN DIFFERENT WORDS." S. GRINEVSRY'S MAIN QUALIFIER IN ALL THIS WAS THAT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS COULD NOT BE MADE IN PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE WORKING GROUPS. ONLY WHEN COORDINATORS HAD BEEN APPOINTED AND POSITION SHIFTS COULD BE RECORDED PRIVATELY WOULD THINGS BEGIN TO HAPPEN. BARRY'S MAIN QUALIFIER WAS THAT THE WES? WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE THAT COORDINATORS WOULD STICK TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE OCTOBER 14 AGREEMENT SETTING UP THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE; WE WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS CHOSEN - AND THE NUMBER CHOSEN - WOULD NOT PREJUDICE OUR PROPOSALS. 6. COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST HINT OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON SUBS?ANCE WE HAVE SEEN SINCE AMBASSADOR G0~)DBY'S DISCUSSION WITH GRINEVSRY IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER. PART OF THIS IS NO DOUBT SIMPLY A REACTION ?0 THE EME1tGENCE OF THE NNA PAPER AND THE FACT THAT THEY WERE AFRAID TO MARE A MOVE UNTIL THE SUMMIT WAS OVER. BUT PART PLAY BE A RESULT OF THE BOOST WE RECEIVED FROM THE GENES-A JOINT FROM USDEL CDE E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR TAGS: PAR, CSCE, PREL, CDE SUBJECT: CDE: "SPIRIT OF GENEVA" IN STOCKHOLM STATEMENT AND THE SUMMIT'S "FRESH STAR?." IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW THESE ATMOSPHERICS WILL TRANSLATE INTO REALITY. BARRY -END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Remarks made by Ambassador v, ~, Gauci in Plenary 22 November 1985 Mr. Chairman. In October 2, 1984, the Maltese Delegation to the CDE brought to the attention of al l? participants the positive results and solemn undertakings agreed to by the Foreign Ministers of all the Mediterranean members of the non-aligned aiovement,~in the historic first meeting held in Valletta on 10 and 11 September 1984. The text of the Valletta Declaration was at that time made available to all, and hence I will not repeat the details. I am glad to be able to report today that a follow-up meeting of economic experts has just been completed in Valletta this month. while taking note of developments of interest to the Mediterranean region that have occurred in the intervening period - most notably the discussions held in this-forum - the economic experts examined in depth proposals on economic co-operation between themselves and with European countries which could be further developed. and made specific recommendations which will be taken up at Ministerial level at a subsequent stage early next year. The proceedings of the Venice Seminar on economic, scientific and cultural co-operation in the ~ a~M"' Mediterranean were fully into account. The proposals concentrated principally on trade, communications and research. It wild therefore be noted. Mr. Chairman. that the decision of the non-aligned countries to concert views and devise ? joint activities for strengthening co-operation is gaining strength and finding avenues for implementation. It is. as we indicated previously, a process which parallels and derives inspiration from the proceedings taking place in this forum within the CSCE process, as defies ~ by the Mediterranean - Chapter of the Helsinki Final Act. It is our earnest desire -..-.. _. that these processes will eventually merge. And our participation here wi I 1 seek to bring thi s about . 437 SECR$T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Mr. Chairman. I was glad to note the outcome of the recent Geneva summit between the United States President and the General Secretary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in so far as. it relates not only t~ the CDE meeting. but also to all other aspects of bilateral arn~ international relations. It is our sincere hope that the dialogue thus having been restored. after its regrettable i:~terruption for far too many precious years, will now herald a new spirit of what I might perhaps call the "entente ess~antielle" - the realisation that we all inhabit a small a~zd fragile planet, and that we can only survive as long as we all pull in the same direction towards disarmament, justice acid peace throughout the world. 438 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09070 SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, NOVEMBER 18-22, 1985 REF: STOCKHOLM 8860 1. CrE viii - 043 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE SOVIET UNION CLEARLY WAS AWAITING THE SUMMIT TO SEE WHICH WAY THE WIND WOULD BLOW IN STOCKHOLM. MARKING TIME IN A NUMBER OF MEETINGS, 1TiE EAST WAS LESS COMBATIVE THAN LAST WEER, ALTHOUGH IT CONTINUED TO PUSH ITS TWO BASIC THEMES: 1) THE WEST IS TO BLAME FOR FOOTDRAGGING IN STOCKHOLM AND 2) GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES MUST BE INCLUDED IN A CSBM'S REGIME. AT THE SAME TIME NATO COORDINATED ITS STATEMENTS MORE EFFECTIVELY IN THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS, ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUALS OCCASIONALLY STRAYED OFF THE RESERVATION. NOW FREE TO ELABORATE ON THEIR NEW PROPOSAL, THE NNA EXPLAINED SC.7'S "INTERLINRAGES" AND IN SO DOING DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATION EMERGED. END SUMMARY. THE EAST: 4. THE SUMMIT AND STOCKHOLM: IN CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS DURING THE WEER OF NOVEMBER 11-15, THE USSR CLEARLY WAS WAITING FOR THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT TO DETERMINE WHIC$ WAY THE WIND WOULD BLOW IN STOCKHOLM. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIETS WERE FAR LESS COMBATIVE THAN THEY HAD BEEN THE WEEK HEFORE (REFTEL), ALTHOUGH THEY PUSHED THE SAME THEMES: 1) THE WEST IS BLOCKING PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM AND 2) AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, IN ADDITION TO GROUND ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE CSBM'S TO BE AGREED IN STOCKHOLM. THEY TRIED TO HANG THE WEST BY ITS OWN ROPE, REQUESTING SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN COMBINATION WITH NOTIFIABLE GROUND ACTIVITIES, IN OTHER WORDS UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THEY ALSO CRITICIZED SC.1'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AND THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER AS BEING NARROW CONCEPTS BECAUSE THEY EXCLUDE AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. 5. NUF: DISCUSSION WAS MORE HARMONIOUS IN THE NUF MEETING THAN LAST WEER WHEN THE WEST WAS ACCUSED OF VIOLATING THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT. SOVIET REP RARHI7ANINOV IMPLICITLY ACCEPTED A U.S. STATEMENT (BY NOT REJECTING IT ON THE SPOT) THAT THE USSR HAD ACCEPTED THE NOTION THAT THE ADOPTION OF CONCRETE AND MANDATORY CSBM'S WOULD MARE THE USE AND THREAT OF USE OF FORCE LESS LIKELY. RARHZSANINOV CLEARLY WAS PLEASED BY THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE NATO (NETHERLANDS) EXPLORATION OF HIS OUTLINE FOR A NUF AGREEMENT PRESENTED TO THE GROUP AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND. 6. ROMANIA'S "DECLARATION:" ROMANIA SUBMITTED DETAILED CONTENTS OF A NUF "DECLARATION, AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET TEE FUTURE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT." ACCORDING TO :tOMANIA, THE DECLARATION WOULD CONSIST OF FOUR "BUILDING BLOCKS," THREE OF WHICH .CONSIST OF EASTERN-STYLE DECLARATORY ' LANGUAGE, WHILE THE FOURTH WOULD CONTAIN CSBM'S TO BE AGREED UPON. 7. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: THE EAST YET AGA:[N WAS MUTE ON THE SUBJECT OF INFORMATION. AS LONG AS THE MEETING FOCUSED ON INFORMATION, THE GDR CHAIRMArr WAS NOTICEABLY ANXIOUS TO GAVEL THE MEETING CLOSED. THE EAST CAME TO LIFE, HOWEVER, WHEN NATO TURNED THI: DISCUSSION TO VERIFICATION. THE SOVIET UNION CIAIMED THAT THE WESTERN POSITION ON INSPECTIONS HAD CRINGED: INSTEAD OF BEING RESERVED FOR EXCEPTIONAL CASES AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, INSPECTION NOW WAS "ROUTIIiE." (BEGIN COMMENT: THIS S?ATEMENT MAY HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO HIGHLIGHT THE WEST'S ISOLATION ON THIS ISSUE IN LIGHT OF A SWEDISH STATEMENT ON THE ROLE OF "OBSERVATION BY REQUEST" (SEE PARR 11 BELOW). END COMMENT.) THE SOVIETS AND EAST GERMANS ALSO REJECTED THE DUTCH "ULTIMATUM" THAT WITHOUT ADEQUATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, INSPECTION THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT. NA?0: 8. ON AND OFF THE RESERVATION: THE WESTERN ALL;[ANCE HAS HELD TOGETHER~AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED UNDER THE NEW DEMANDS OF THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. NATO SPEAKERS HAVE FOCUSED ON SC.1'S CENTRAL CONCEPTS -- THE 0()G CON= CEPT AND THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER -- AND HAVE STI;ESSED THAT SC.1 PROVISIONS WOULD RESULT IN A GREATER NZfMBER OF NOTIFIED AC?IVITIES THAN WOULD THE WTO'S PROPOSALS. HOWEVER, THERE INEVITABLY HAVE BEEN OCCASIONS WHEN INDIVIDUALS HAVE STRAYED OFF THE RESERVATION -- A.S WHEN THE FRENCH MILREP CALLED VERIFICATION A "POLITICAL" MEASURE AND WHEN THE DUTCH MILREP SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT WITHOUT ADEQUATE INSPECTION (THE MANDATE CALLS FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION). MOREOVER, A NUMBER OF NATO DELEGATIONS ARE CALLING FOR BETTER ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND AGAINST INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A CSBM'S REGIME. AND FINALLY, WITH YET ANOTHER (ROMANIAN) NUF TEXT ON THE TABLE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE MORE TROUBLE HOLDING BACK THOSE OF OUR ALLIES WHO ARE EAGER TO DRAFT NATO NUF LANGUAGE. THE NNA: 'l. INTERLINRAGES AND DIFFERENCES: NNA SPEAKERS ;iTRESSED THE "INTERLINICAGES" AMONG DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF S1;.7, E.G. THE USE OF THE SAME PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICAT:[ON, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET OBSERVATION AND CONSTRAINTS. (BEGIN COMMENT: WE HAD HEARD BEFORE THE NNA TABLED THEIR PAPER THAT THEY REALIZED THAT THESE INTERLINKAGES WOULD POSE PROBLEMS FOR THEM WHEN THEY TRIED TO BREAK THEIR PACKAGE UP FOR DISCUSSION IN THE WORKING GROUPS. END COMMENT.) IN ADDITION, NOW FREE TO DISCUSS THEIR PROPOSAL, DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE NNA GROUP QUICKLY SURFACED. WHILE THE CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR CONTINUED TO PUSH FOR HIS CDE/CSCE DIMENSION (THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE), AUSTRIA DELIVERED AN IMPOR- TANT STATEMENT ON NUF WHICH SHARED FAR MORE WI?H THE WEST'S STATED POSITION THAN WITH THOSE OF THE EAST OR OF HIS CYPRIOT COLLEAGUE. 10. COMMON GROUND ON OBSERVATION: NNA SPEAKERS (SWEDEN AND FINLAND) ASSERTED THAT THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE THAT EVERY NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY SHOULD BE OBSERVED, ON THE PURPOSES OF OBSERVATION AND ON THE OBLIGATION TO INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. THE USSR WAS QUICK TO DISABUSE ALL OF THE NOTION TEAT COMMON GROUND EXISTED ON THESE PRINCIPLES, INSISTING THAT NOTHING COULD BE DECIDED UNTIL THE REAL QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE -- WHAT WOULD BE OBSERVED -- HAD BEEN RESOLVED. 11. OBSERVATION BY INVITATION VS. OBSERVA?ION BY REQUEST: THE NNA BLURRED THE DISTINCTION WHICH THE WEST HAS SOUGHT TO PRESERVE BETWEEN OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION BY CALLING OBSERVATION THE "PRINCIPAL FORM OF VERIFICA- TION;" FINLAND NOTED THAT OBSERVATION WOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION FOR SMALL STATES WITHOUT NTK'S. ACCORDING TO NNA THINKING, INSPECTIONS, OR "OBSERVATIONS BY REQUEST" AS THEY PREFER TO CALL THEM, WOULD BE USED AS A LAST RESORT FOR SUSPECTED UNNOTIFIED ACTIVITIES. 12. INFORMATION: AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND CALLED FOR A MUCH BROADER EXCHANGE OF INFORMA?ION THAN WOULD OCCUR IN THE NARROWEST CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION. THE LATTER ARGUED THAT THE EXCHANGE OF BOTH STATIC AND DYNAMIC INFORMATION IS IMPORTAN? MILITARILY, ESPECIALLY FOR STATES WITHOUT NTM'S. THE SWISS MILREP NOTED THAT IT WOULD EQUALIZE THE ABILITY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE AND PUSHED FOR THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION. 13. ANNUAL FORECASTS VS. CALENDARS: SWEDEN SPARRED A PROCEDURAL DEBATE OVER THE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMEN'S AGREE- FROM USDEL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, MENT ON INFORMAL STRUCTURE BY REFUSING TO ANSWER AN FRG QUESTION REGARDING THE NNA'S ANNUAL CALENDAR PROPOSAL IN THE MEETING ON CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS. (BEGIN FYI: THE NNA LONG HAVE INSISTED THAT THEIR ANNUAL CALENDAR IS 441 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET 25X1 PART OF THEIR SYSTEM OF NOTIFICATION AND, THUS, SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE NOTIFICATION MEETING. END FYI.) THE U.S. TRIED TO SUPPORT THE FRG BY SHOWING THAT 18E SUB- STANCE OF THE NATO AND NNA CALENDAR PROPOSALS IS NEARLY IDENTICAL AND DOES NOT MERIT SABOTAGING THE GEYTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT. A NUMBER OF OUR ALLIES PRIVATELY W~~RRY THAT UNLESS AGREEMENT IS REACHED TO DISCUSS DIFFERE~dT CALENDAR PROPOSALS IN THE SAKE MEETING, THIS WILL PRESEI~iT PROBLEMS WHEN WE MOVE TO DRAFTING AND WILL SET A DANGEROUS PRECE- DENT WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD UTILIZE IN THE FUTURE TO MOVE DISCUSSION OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATI01~ TO THE NOTIFICATION MEETING. 14. THE MALTESE MARKER; MALTA LAID A CLEAR Mi~RKER BOTH IN THE JOINT WORKING GROUP (AB) AND IN THE PLE1(ARY MEE?- ING TEAT AN AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM WOULD HAVE "0 INCLUDE THE "MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION" OF EUROPEAN SECUI:ITY. THE MALTESE AMBASSADOR INSISTED THA? GROUND, AIR Al!tD NAVAL ACTIVITIES BE CONSIDERED EQUALLY AND CALLED THl; MALTESE PROPOSAL (SC.S) "A SUPPLEMENT TO SC.3 -- OR SC,7," INDICATING THAT WE WILL BE HEARING MORE IN THE FUTURE ABOUT MALTA'S MEDITERRANEAN PROPOSALS. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 442 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09066 SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, - NOVEMBER 18-22, 1985 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 8881, B) STOCKHOLM 8789 1. CDE VIII - 042 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7) MOVED ONTO CENTER STAGE STOCKHOLM TO LESS THAN A ROUSING RECEPTION. THE PURPOSEFUL AMBIGUITIES AND AWKWARD COMPROMISES CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSAL ALREADY HAVE BEGUN TO UNRAVEL UNDER CLOSER SCRUTINY. NATO HAS BEGUN TO QUESTION SC.7 ACTIVELY IF GINGERLY WHILE STILL FOCUSING ITS EFFORTS ON PROMOTING THE WESTERN PACKAGE. THE EAST HAS LARGELY STAYED CLEAR OF T$E NNA PROPOSAL WHILE DEVELOPING ITS OWN TWISTS ON SUCH WESTERN CONCEPTS AS THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. END SUMMARY. 4. NATO: AFTER DEVOTING T00 MANY HOURS TO GRANDILOQUENT IF UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF NATO TACTICS AND PROCEDURES. IN THE WORKING GROUPS, THE CAUCUS ULTIMATELY DECIDED TO LEAVE MOST TACTICAL DECISIONS TO THE INDIVIDUAL NATO MINI-CLUSTERS. ACCORDINGLY, THE MINI-CLUSTERS HAVE DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED THEIR OWN APPROACHES. REGARDING THE NNA PROPOSAL, THE WEST HAS BEGUN TO QUESTION SC.7 ACTIVELY BUT GINGERLY, WITH A VIEW TOWARDS HIGHLIGHTING PARALLELS BETWEEN SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND ASPECTS OF THE NNA PAPER. IN WORKING GROUP B, NATO SPEAKERS ARE BEGINNING TO IDENTIFY AREAS OF COMMON GROUND. AT THE SAME. TIKE, NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE TRIED TO AVOID GIVING ANY IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE PREPARED ?0 NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF SC.7. ON NUF, WHERE, ABSENT A FORkAI. NATO PROPOSAL, NO COMMON GROUND CAN BE IDENTIFIED, THE WEST HAS TRIED TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CSBM'S AND THE NUF COMKITMENT. ALONG THESE LINES, THE WEST WAS ABLE TO GET THE SOVIETS TO AC~NOW- LEDGE AT THE LAST WORKING GROUP THAT THE ADOPTION OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONCRETE AND MANDATORY CSBM'S WOULD MAKE THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE LESS LIKELY. S. WHILE THE MINI-CLUSTERS WRESTLED WITH THE PROSAIC ISSUES OF WORKING GROUP TACTICS, THE CAUCUS TACKLED THE COSMIC ISSUES, E.G. WHEN TO START AND STOP WORKING IN 1986. THESE SEEMINGLY FRIVgLOUS PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, HOWEVER, DO HAVE LONG-TERM SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS. WHO SHOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, DETERKINE THE UL?IMATE FATE OF THE CDE -- STOCKHOLM OR VIENNA? THERE SEEMS TO BE A CONSENSUS IN THE CAUCUS THAT IT MUST BE VIENNA. A "COMPROMISE NON-PAPER" WAS FLOATED IN THE CAUCUS WHICH CALLS FOIL FOUR SCHEDULED SESSIONS IN 1986, BEGINNING JANUARY 21. THE THIRD SESSION WOULD CONCLUDE JULY 18 (THE TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETING A CONCLUDING DOCUKENT), 443 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET ' 25X1 AT WHICH TIME THE CONFERENCE COULD DECIDE BY :ONSENSUS TO CONCLUDE, BUT A FOURTH SESSION IS PROPOSED FOR AUGUST 19 - SEPTEMBER 19, IF NECESSARY "TO COMPLETE 'fHE DRAFTING OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT." THE PAPER NOTES TiAT NO CDE MEETINGS WILL TARE PLACE DURING THE VIENNA PRI:PCON OR MAIN REVIEW MEETING AND STATES THAT THIS DECI'iION CAN ONLY BE ALTERED BY CONSENSUS. WE SUPPORT THE THRUST OF THIS PROPOSAL, AND CAUCUS CONSENSUS SEEMS TO 13E BUILDING FOR THE SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE. HOWEVER, Cr~NADIAN AMBASSADOR DELWORTH CONTINUES TO EXAMINE THE 1~iTRAILS OF CSCE DOCUMENTS FOR THEOLOGICAL GUIDANCE AND HIS DETERMINED THAT THERE MUST BE A CONSENSUS TO ~-DJOURN OR SUSPEND THE CONFERENCE AND THUS, IN HIS VIEW, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO WORK UNTIL NOVEMBER 4 (OR EVEN BE~'OND). 6. TAE CAUCUS WAS ALSO UNABLE TO ESTABLISH A COMMON LINE ON THE QUESTION OF HOW MANY NNA COORDINATORS :;HOULD BE EMPLOYED IN THE WORKING CLUSTERS. THIS QUEST]ON, IN OUR VIEW, IS NOT AS PRESSING AS THE CALENDAR ISSUE. THE CAUCUS PREFERENCE CONTINUES TO BE FOR TWO COORDINATORS (WHILE HOLDING OPEN THE OPTION FOR MORE LATER). NEITHER THE NNA NOR THE EAST APPEARS WILLING TO LAY THEIR CARDS ON THE TABLE AND PREFERS TO HAVE NATO PUT IN THE OPENING FROM USDEL E'. 0. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, BID. THOSE OF OUR ALLIES WHO ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO MOVE INTO DRAFTING (NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, CANADA), ACCORDINGLY, ARE THE MOST ANXIOUS TO SOLVE THIS ISSUE, PREFERABLY BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION. WE ARE IN NO SUCH HURRY. 7. NNA: THE NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7) DRAFTED WITH SUCH PAINSTAKING IMPRECISION, IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO 1JNRAVEL UNDER EVEN THE MOST GENTLE QUESTIONING FROM TH1: WEST. ON NUF, AUSTRIA AND CYPRUS CLASHED OVER HOW BE;iT TO REAFFIRM THE NUF COMMITMENT; THE AUSTRIANS WAN" A SHORT UNAMBIGUOUS REAFFIRMATION BASED ON THE UN CHAR"ER; THE CYPRIOTS, AN ELABORATION OF THE MANIFESTATION t)F FORCE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT. ON INFORMATION, AUST)>e of the three component elements can be artifically excluded from our calculations, if we want 'ab initio' to devise a comprehensive, rational regime. Even though some individual countries may lay great~ar or lesser emphasis on one or other of the component elements ~~f its own armed services, and on those of others, the common factor again emerges that the armed services form an intergrated and inter-related whole, and cover the land, sea and air-spaces comprising acid surrounding Europe. This, Plr. Chairman, is not a mere whim, or a dogged insistence on logic. It is also a highly significant. factor of our work here in Stockholm. Since the signature of the Flelsinki Final Act, the ground Forces situation is Central Europe teas more or less remained static, perhaps with an overall slight reduction in man- power terms. A proposal for a further reduction is ~~oon to be tabled at the MHFR talks right now. Hy contrast, activities in the internal and external maritime spaces of Europe have increased both in number and in scope; thQy have in fact increased significantly in the 1980's. There has also been a rise in reported violations of air space. The sea and air spaces ad3oining Europe are gaining in importance for many reasons. These developments are considered likely to continue. The exercises by one side attract substantial reconnaissance from others. Since we are enjoined to propose confidence-building measures which are militarily significant, surely we cannot overlook what Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRE? is actually Happening on Europe's doorstep, while considering only the activities within Europe's courtyard. i might add that most analysts see less danger of a crisis arising within Europe itself. It is the more volatile periphery of Europe where the greatest danger lies, and where consequently the major efforts at confidence-building should be concentrated. A start was in fact considered necessary thlvugh a bilateral agreement to prevent accidents at sea. Hut that by itself is not enough. Many have stressed the need for clarity in our terms. i agree completely that our final product should be understood in the same terms by all participants. -- by the man-in-the-street, in fact. we therefore owe it to ourselves to start from the very beginning with a rational and comprehensive approach. Surely, in such an exercise, we cannot afford to turn facts, logic, geography and history upside down, if we wish to set off on to a good start. No mandate can ride roughshod over realities. Sensibly t_he Madrid mandate does not attempt to do so. It explicitly recognises the obvious. After having made this general statement, I do not wish to repeat arguments already adduced. Like all others, I sense that the time for that is behind us, that our respective positions should by now be known and understood, and that we should henceforth enter the phase of negotiation, with all open and accommodating determination to succeed. It is precisely for this reason that my delegation devoted precious priority time to the negotiations within the NNA group so as to produce SC7. we consider it a basic and comprehensive document covering all aspects of our work under our mandate. It is precisely because we recognise the linkage and direct relevance of the various recommended measure of information, notification, observation, verification and constraints that we have favoured the continuity provided by the comprehensive structure of SC7. It is our understanding that all aspects of our work can thus be covered under this umbrella approach, and that an informal arrangement for better co-ordination of our discussions will now add a new impetus to our work. As I indicated in my previous statement, it is now 501 time to consider adequate numerical and structural paramenters for Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET -b- all types of military activities, in the knowledge that even military activities which may for purposes of. convenience be described as indpendent cannot be disassQ~iated functionally from their unitary state control. ~n other words, the functional element is always present, irrespective of which arm of the services moves first, and of the time-frame involved. There is no inherent cor~t'adiction between .the temporarily independent and the fum=tionally-linked -- the link is permanent, structural and real -- two sides of the same coin. In any case. since our entire planet can now be criss- crossed in less than thirty-six hours, the rele~~ance of the time- factor has practically disappeared. The "out of normal location" conce>>t in SC7 consequently covers all contingent components of the armed sc:rvices, including of necessity point-to-point transportation of military personnel within the European zone of application, especi~~lly those in close proximity to the territory of participating states. The ultimate objective is after all to reduce, not to preser~~e~r even to increase-- the risk of confrontation. so much prevalent in the present situation. we should also ai^ to respect, not disregard, genuine security pre- occupations. Like others, I sense that a.number of encouraging signs are finally emerging. we should now apply our collective skills to devising parameters which meet the demands of expressed concerns, and of factual realities. At the appropriate time we will ourselves make some modest suggestions. One aspect in particular deserves t~ be fully explored to its maximum potential. As I indicated previously, surface naval activities provide a unique scope for a qualitative advance in our work. The numbers of units involved, though numerous and large in themselves, are small in comparison to the other branches of the armed services. They can easily all be seen and :individual units distinguished from one another-even by Lhe legenciary man-in-the street. They can also be counted and observed wi1:h reaonable and reassuring accuracy. Their movements and foruiatic-ns can be monitored constantly by independent and non-intrusive survE~illance. Quite often -- as others have rightly pointed out, their excercises are reported in the press. It is thus relatively uncomplicated to pro~?ide prior Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 to eliminate apprehension, to reduce the chance of miscalculation and the risk of accident, to turn naval "war games" into a real exercise of confidence-building. we can therefore in this case quite .,~ easily wake virtue out of necessity. and give an early and welcome boost to the process of confidence-building, in an effective, relatively uncomplicated wanner. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to apologise if I have taken up somewhat .more time than I had intended, but you will appriciate that, as we enter a ?ore intensive phase in our work, it is important that our perspectives should be clear. we feel the legitimate necessity of sounding our particular concern at the unacceptably high level of armed confrontation in . the Mediterranean, which. as we have explained in the past. is a direct result of European security concerns. The massive naval deployment in the Mediterranean is not an independent phenomenon, but a direct result of its geo-strategic-connection-with the mainland; it is an immutable feature of Europe's past, present and future history. The message therefore clearly reads both ways -- security cannot be reduced in Europe, unless it is equally reflected in the Mediterranean and vice-versa. we are prepared to leave to others the role of protagonists in the defence of the logic of confidence-building measures on the European land mass. Our main concern lies in Europe's adjoining sea -- Europe's window to its closest neighbours. Without that window, Europe cannot breathe. And. as we all know, to breathe is to live. That therefore is a question of survival. And since, as has rightly been pointed out, our final outcome will be a first step, but still an investment for the future, let us endeavour to give to our product the added benefit of inspiring and generating confidence within a wider audience, to those who have at least as much interest in lessening tension and increasing confidence as we do, so that parallel regional processes will comple ment and strengthen each other to mutual benefit. we all stand to gain from this approach, as surely as we will falter if we do not follow Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 201~2/1~1/3~0 : CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 ~i/ REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS '~ . SBCAET CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY S T A T E M E N T BY DR ANDRESTINOS N. PAPADOPOULOS HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF CYPRUS TO THE ST(iCKHOLM' CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BU]LDING MEASURES AND DISARMA,NENT IN EUROPE 6 DECEMBER 1985 S04 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Mr. Chairman, It augurs well, at this stage of our Conference, that the point statement, issued on 21 November 1985, at the end of the Geneva meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbatchev, contains a paragraph on our Conference. We welcome this statement and wish to underline "the intention of the two sides to facilitate, together with the other participating States, an early and successful conclusion of the Conference". Our expectation is that the great importance they attach to the Stockholm Conference and their expressed intention to facilitate our work will soon be translated into practical terms, so as to reach tangible results, the soonest possible. To this end, my delegation would like to see, before the end of this session, the continuation of our work under co-ordinators and a smooth transition towards drafting. The ,joint statement, further reaffirms "the need for a document which would include mutually acceptable confidence and security building measures and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of the non-use of force". It is expected, therefore, that this document would cover both the CSBMs and the non-use of force. My delegation is in favour of one concluding document, but it prefers to see a separate section on the non-use of force. This textual arrangement accommodates not only those who give a narrow interpretation to the Madrid mandate, but also those who believe, as my delegation does, that a solemn declaration on the non-use of force should, as a political text, have a separate identity. After all, the ,joint statement puts on an equal footing CSBMs and non-use of force. In our view the non-use of force is this Conferenr_e'a political theme par excellence, a theme which found its rightful place in the gentlemen's Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 a~'eement of 14 October 1985, because the participating States are conscious of the complementary nature of the political and military as?ects of security within the CSCE context, a reality we cannot escape from. The point statement indicates that the concludin; document would give concrete expression and effect to the principle ~f the non-use of force. What better concrete expression of the principle could one have than a.Z all-embracing, solemn declaration which through the l:.nkage to "sufficiently incisive measures", to use the words of Ambassador Cii-rrapico, would give effect to the principle of the non-use of force, within the CSCE context? This same linkage was highlighted on 29 November 1985 by S1:ate Secretary Dr Mdreas Meyer-Landrut of the Federal Republic of Germany, who underlined that his Government's main objective is to reinforce the prohibition of force "by seeking agreement on substantive and militarily significant confidence-and security-building measures that effectively limit the possibilities of using force". 'Such an agreement", he stressed, "would lend greater emphasis, effect and credibility t~ the validity of this fundamental principle". Here, at the Conference, the discussion of this issue benefitted from many contributions. There are arguments, put forward cluring this session, which I would like to address today. The distinguished representative of France, in his statement of 5 November 1985, referring to the remarks of his delegation about what should not be accepted, mentioned inter alia "le fait de privil~gier 1'un des dix principes du Dbcalogue en n~gligeant lour interd~pendance". The answer to this argument lies in the mandate, which singles out the principle of the non-use of force because of its relevance to our task, and enunciates that concrete actions should be undertaken so as to give effect and expression to the d+3ty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations. As far as the interdependence of the non-use of force principle with the other principles of the Decalogue is concerned, a close study of documen~; SC.7 shows that 506 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET this point was not neglected and .hat at least six out of the tan principles are referred to therein, a i'act whioh attracted the attention of the French delegation at one of our informal meetings. Ambassador Gaschignard, implicitly referring to a Cypriot argument, further stated "on nous r~p~te que la CDE ne saurais se limiter ~ recopier un principe et qu'il conviendrait done de le d6velopper, de lui donner 'une dimension CDE ou CSCE "' and offered the following comments: "Nous ne pouvons actuellement que r~pondre premi~rement, que nous ne repartirons pas a z6ro; depuis dix ans 1'Acte final existe et fait pantie de notre experience commune. Nous n'allons pas le rer~diger. Deuxi~mement, en tout tat de cause, le principe de non-recours ~ la force ne peut que demeurer identique a lui-meme sans alteration. Troisi~mement, la reaffirmation du principe de non-recours n'a de sens que si elle vient couronner un resultat substantiel sun le plan des mesures concrdtes." These comments call for the following remarks: The fart that the U.N. Charter had already existed for thirty years when the Final Act was drafted did not inhibit our representatives in Helsinki from elaborating on the principle of the non-use of force and further clarifying its meaning. A close student of the Helsinki process, Dr. Sizoo, in his talking points of 24 September 1985 also reached the conclusion that "the Final Act represents already an elaboration of what might be drawn from relevant UN texts in the CSCE context with respect to the non-use of force principle". I had the opportunity to put forward legal arguments in that respect in my statement of 28 June 1985 and I would not like to repeat them. I only want to reaffirm that if, 40 years after the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, we try to give to the principle of the non-use of force its CDE dimension, we are not rewriting the principle; the principle is there and what we are trying to do is to adapt it to our needs and use it for the purpose of confidence-and security-building. The distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Grinevsky, in his statement of 11 November 1985 aptly pointdd out that "the UN Charter or the Final Act, for all their significance, have not eYha~isted and 507 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET cannot exhaust all the ways and forms of the manifeat~ition of the non-use of force principle because life does not stand still. Therefore, it is incumbent on us to determine, taking into account, th~~ topical requirements of the European reality, which of these forma and way:s are moat suitable at present for elaborating a mutually acceptable agreement on the non-use of force". Moreover, the fact that the Final Act is part of our common experience invites simple questions: What are the lea sons of this experience, are we satisfied with the way the principle of the nor.-use of force has ao far been implemented, if not, how can we make it mcre effective? The answers to these questions suggest that we should look at it from various angles so as to get as much enlightenment as we can, because we agree that the principle is "identical to itself", or, to put it as the British delegation wants it, that the principle is not to be reinvented. What we propose is to use it for our purpose and act in accordance with the Biblical teaching that "No one lights a lamp and puts it in a c311ar, but rather on the lamp-stand so that those who enter may see the ligzt". My last remark concerns the contention that the reaffirmation of the principle of the non-use of force would have a meaning only if it crowned a substantial result in the field of concrete measures.. We sincerely look forward to achieving this substantial result, i.e. mea:cures which would have, among other qualities, a discouraging effect on F~11 those who do not . consider it as their duty to refrain from the threat o:~ use of force - but we would like to hear what exactly it is that we a:~e reaffirming. The distinghished representative of Italy, Ambassador Ciar:~apico, in his statement of 15 November 1985 expresses a similar idea, but makes a step forward when he says that "It would be more useful and productive to evaluate the constituting elements of the reaffirmation of the non-use of force i n a context that takes into account the prcgress we could gradually achieve in the field of concrete measures, to which such a principle must be linked". In an_effort to set in motion a meaningful and result-oriented dialogue,.~re have invited answers to the questions why __ we reaffirm, what we reaffirm, within what context and for what purpose. It is high time to have some reaction to these question:;. 508 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Aa to how best to reafffirm the principle of the non-use of force, a question put by Ambassador Mevik in his statement of 5 November 1985, Cyprus, along with the other Neutral and Non-Aligned participating States has proposed in Document SC.7 a set of ideas which we believe give an appropriate answer to the question. A close study of SC.7 reveals that what lies in the background is the overriding concern to maintair. international peace and security. Within this context is seen the commitment to the Final Act - of course no merely academic commitment, for the need is stressed for improved and consistent implementation of all its pro~isiens. Experience so far has proved that what we need is implementation and respect for all the principles set forth in the Final Act, an attitude which would certainly encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of co-operation among the participating States in all fields and consequently make the use of force unlikely. The principle of the non-use of force is considered as a universally recognized obligation of international law, a norm of international life which should be stricly and effectively observed. Hence, no consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle. The expression "no consideration" excludes any legal permissiveness and intends to cover all possible motivations, whether political, economic, military or other. Non-compliance with the principle, with only one exception - the inherent right of individual or collective self- defence in cane of an armed attack - constitutes a violation of international law. This violation entails a series of consequences, political, legal, moral and other, which are squarely assumed by the culprit. Any advantage, such as territorial occupation or acquisition, resulting from resort to the threat or use of force, is illegal and will not be recognised by the international community as legal, since "ex injuria non jus oritur". SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET In enunciating and reaffirming the principle of the ron-use of force as contained in the Final Act, SC.7 takes a small step further concerning the aspect of manifestation of force - it specifies the Qanifeatation of force as direct or indirect. My delegation had the opportunity in the past to suggest exploration of this aspect of the concept of the non-use of forge. Since the drafters of the Helsinki Final Act, in their search for clarity, thought it advisable to specify the use of force as direct or indirect, my delegation sees no reason why we should not do the acme with the threat of force and mention its concretR and direct exoreaaion, namely t>be manifestation of force, since our purpose is to cover all acts which constitute use of force - from the threat or manifestaticn to the actual use of force. If in theory at least, manifestations of force could be taken as threats because of their intimidating character, there are cases in practice where the element of escalation is clearly discernible, leading from a simple and veiled threat to a concrete and overt rtsnifeatation of force. Against Chia background, the reference in SC.7 to direct or indirect manifestation of force is a positive contribution to the search for clarity. In my statement of 28 June 1985, in an effort to ~.hrcw more light on the concept of the non-use of force I addressed such questions as how the use of force is manifested, what is to be protected and what duties it imposes. That analysis demonstrated that the principle of the non-use of force is the expression of several principles contained in the decalogue of the Helsinki Final Act. SC.7 particularly refers inter alia to peaceful settlement of disputes, human rights and fundamental freedoms and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. The CDE dimension to the principle of the non-use of force is given by SC.7 th*ough the reference to "the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security within the CSCE" and to the fact that "by their very nature concrete CSHMs serve to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force". It is evident that our determination to promote by all means_the increased effectiveness of the principle of the non-use of force implies positive, intensive and determined actions. And here comes the linkage of the 510 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET principle to the measures, as the fulfilment of this duty require th+ adoption of concrete CSBMs, militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable. It is expected that these measures will have a discouraging effect on all those who do not consider it as their duty to refrain from the threat of use of force and will act as operational barriers against the violation of this duty. Progress in the process of confidence- and security-building would certainly contribute towards the effectiveness of the principle through the adoption of additional measures, designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe, strengthen security for all and promote disarmament. Equal respect for the legitimate security interests of every pa^ticipating State requires determined efforts in this direction. Within the context of the desire to promote by all means the effectiveness of the principle of the non-use of force we might even explore the possibility of adopting such supportive measures as deemed appropriate, which by their positive nature would further contribute towards confidence- and security- building. So much for the non-use of force. I would like now to revert to a question which preoccupies us all. This is the lack of progress in the Conference. Two weeks before the end of the session we are still in the exploratory phase. At one stage it was argued that it was necessary to have an N + N paper. SC.7 is there, and the comments so far made about its contribution to our deliberations are encouraging. What we need now is to continue our informal work under co-ordinators who will steer us to the drafting stage as rapidly as possible. As I said earlier, we need such a decision urgently so as to have at least the co-ordinators for the last week of this session. This would greatly help our work next year. Another decision which we must take before we leave is the one concerning the work programme for 1986. It is, I believe, a shared view that we cannot afford procedural discussion on thta issue in the coming 511 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 y~aa, M rgweewewa rgouid de ~eaekei st #hia ?esaiea ~ rA as~eearat ter a full programme not allowing our precious time to be wasted. Such an agreement should provide for the completion of our work before the preparatory meeting of the Vienna follow-up, as small dele~ationa like mine would find it difficult to follow two meetings simultaneously. Under the circumstances my delegation prefers to have as an adjournment date for this Conference the 19th September 1986, hoping that before the end of the summer common determination and political pragmatism would secure a global agreement here in Stockholm. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET USSR PLENARY STATEMENT DELIVERED DY GEN TATARFJIKOV, DEC 6, 1985 COMRADE CHAIRFAAFJ, ?ODAY WE WOULD LIKE ?O .EXPRESS SEVERAL IDEAS ON THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICA?ION OF LARGE SCALE EXERCISES OF ARMED FORCES. THE HANDA?E HAS CLEAR AND PRECISE PROVISIONS ON ?NAT SCORE. PERMIT ME ?0 QUOTE ?HEM AND I ASK YOU IN ADVAtJCE TO FORGIVE THIS LONG QUO?ATION: "ON ?HE OASIS OF ECiUALITY OF RIGtJTS, CiALANCE AND RECIPROCITY, E4UAL RESPECT FOR TFtE SECURITY IN?CRCSTS OF ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING S?AYES, ANO OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OOLIGATIOtJS CONCERNING CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-DUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMEN? ItJ EUROPE, THESE COtFIDENCE- AFJD SECURITY-t3UILDIFJG MEASURES WILL COVER ?HE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA (AS?FRISK OMITTED iN TIIE RUSSIAN ORIGINAL) AfJD AIR SPACE. THEY WILL DE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND POLZ?ICALLY OINDING AWD WILL DE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORt4S OF VERIFICATi0tJ WHICFI CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTEtJT. AS FAR AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA (ASTERISK OMITTED IN TIIE RUSSIAN ORIGINAL) AND AIR SPACE IS CONCERNED, TFIE MEASURES 41ILL DE APPLICADLE TO TFIE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STA?ES TAKING PLACE TFIERE WHEtJEVER THESE ACTIVITIES AFFECT SECURITY ItJ EUROPE AS WELL AS COtJSTITUTE A PAR? OF ACTIVITIES ?AKItJG PLACE WIITFIIFJ TIIE WFIOLE OF EUROPE AS REFERRED TO AOOVE, WIIICII THEY WILL AGREE TO tJOTIFY. NECESSARY SPECIFICATIONS WILL OE MADE THROUGH THE tJEGOTIATIOtJS OtJ THE CONFIDENCE- At:O SECURITY-DUILDING MEASURES AT THE COtJFEREtJCE." WE FIRMLY AND CONSISTEtJTLY .4OFIERE TO THESE PROVISIONS AND WE DO NOT IN?END TO CHANGE ANY?FIIWG IIJ TIIE MANDATE. THERE IS NO MENTIOtJ IN 7HE MANDATE TO ?IIE EFFECT TItAT OtJLY GROJtJD FORCE ACTIVITY IS COVERED DY COtJFIDEtJCE-DUILDING MEASURES. IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS THAT TFIE COtJFIDEIJCC-OUILDItJG MEASURES WHICH iT IS INCUt4DEtJT UPOtJ US TO ADOPT MUST OC CXTEtJDED TO ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY, NOT JUST TO GROUND FORCE EXERCISES. HOWEVER, A NUt4DER OF DELEGATIONS ARC STILL TRYIFJG TO READ TIIE MAFJDATE SO THAT THE COPJCEPT OF "MILITARY ACTIVITY" IS REPLACED DY TFIE CONCEPT OF "LAtJD ACTIVITY". THE tgATTER F1AS DEEM PURSUED TO THE POItJT OF CMAKItJG) STATEMENTS WHICtI ARE SIMILAR TO THIS: "AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITY IS tJOT COVERED DY CONFIDENCE-DUILDING MEASURES SItJCE IT IS OUTSIDE THE MANDATE OF ?IIE CONFERENCE." IF WE USE TFIE WORDS OF DISTItJ(lUISiIED HEAD OF DCLEGATIOt1 AMOASSADOR DCLWOR?H, THEFJ ONE CAN ALSO ASK THE QUCSTIOtJ: IS THIS "AN ATTEMPT TO GIVE NEW DEFINITIONS TO DASIC COtJCEPTIOtJS AtJD TERMINOLOGY?" OUT PERHAPS THIS IS BEItJG DONE IN ORDCR TO REPLACE SUDS?AtJTIVE tJEGOTIA?IOtJS ON TFIE GIVEtJ ISSUE WITH T11E DEVLOPMENT OF A FRUITLCSS DISCUSSION ON THE ItJTERPRETATION OF TIIE MAJJDAT~? WE THINK THAT IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO DEAL WITH THIS NOu TFIA? WE HAVE ENTERED TFIE PHASE OF tJEGOTIATIOtJS OFJ SPECIFIC ISSUES. ?HEREFORE, LET'S MOVE FROM GEtJERALITIES DACK TO THC DOCUMENTS ON ?HE NEGOTIATING TADLE. DEVELOPING TFIE FINAL ACT 513 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 AND IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THC MANDATE OF '~'HE CONFERENCE, WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT CONFIDENCE-DUILDING MEASURES COVER NOT ONLY GROUND FORCE EXERCISES, DUT ALSO AIR AND pAVAI, EXERCISES, THAT IS, ?HE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY ACTIVITY. AS A RESULT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MEASURE DYNAMIC, t9trLTI-PURPOSE SERVICES OF TFIE ARMED FORCES, HEAVILY E4UIPPEO WITH MODERti WEAPONS, SUCH AS ?IIE AIR FORCE AtJO NAVY, WHICH REPRESENT A SIGNIFICAtJT THREAT TO EUROPE, WOULD BE PLACED UNDER CONTROL. OUR PROPOSALS ARE MILL?ARILY SIGINIFICAIJT Aq0 REPRESENT A oUALITATIVE STEP FORWARD FOR CONFIDENCE-DUILDIFJG MEASURES AS COMPARED WITFt THE FIELSINKI FINAL ACT. WHAT HAVE WE HEARD FROM OUR PARTNERS OtJ T o AMDASSADOR DARRY SAID ?HE FOLLOWING ON OC?ODERI18SCOREY GOVERNMENT AND, I ASSUME, THC GOVERNMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES CANNOT ACCEPT EMPTY FORMULA?IONS PROMISIFJG SECURITY FOR OUR PEOPLES, DUT DOING NOTHING TO SATISFY THESE PROMISES." W{IqT CAtJ ONE REPLY TO ?ttA?? WE COMPLETELY AGREE WI'~H SUCFI AN ASSESSMENT. IF WE ARE TALKItJG ABOUT EMPTY FORMULA?IONS,, WE REALLY CAN A?TRIBUTE TO THEM NOTIFICATION OF ONLY OUT-OF-l;ARRISON ACTIVITY OF ONLY GROUND FORCES. SUCFI tOTIFICATION REALLY WOULD NOT SAFEGUARD ?HE SECURITY FOR OUR PEOPLES ABOUT WFIICFF At~DASSADOR DARRY SPOKE. WIiAT ARE T{IE COAUTHORS OF SC.1 CALLING ON l S TO DO? TO KEEP IN ?FFE FIELD OF VISION ONLY ONE ASPECT OF MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM THE WHOLE TRIAD -- GROUND FORCES, W11ICH, DY TFIE WAY, TODAY ARE ALREADY COVERED DY COtJFIDENCE-DIJILDItIG MEASURES AIJD NEED ONLY FUR?HER DEVELOPt1EtJ?. THIS IS JUS WFIAT PROPOSING. pU? T WE ARE AT THE SAME TIME IN ACCORDANCE WITH TILE MAtJDATE WE MUST PUT INTO OPERATION.,p0DIFI0NAL MEASURES WHICH ARE OF A MORE SIGtJIFICANT CHARACTER, WHICH COYER MILITARY ACTIVITY DOTH IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND IN ? AIR SPACE. OUT HE ADJOINING SEA AREAS (SIC) AND rSS IS TO MOVE AHEAD EXPEDITIOUSLY, COORDINATORS MUS'.' BE ENCOURAGED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE ON THE BASIS 0!' INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITS! ALL DELEGATIONS. TAltLING OF NEW TEXTS BY INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS IN WORKIN(~ GROUE' MEETINGS STRIKES ME AS A TACTIC WHICH WILL HINDEE;, NOT ADVANCE, OUR WORK. AND SINCE WORKING GROUP SESSIONS AND INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AS THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS INTENSIFIES, I SUGGEST THAT WE CONSIDER WAYS OF PROVIDING MORE 'LIME FOR THIS BY INTRODUCING MORE FLEXIBILITY INTO OUF WEEKLY PROGRAMS. L2. MR. CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER LEADERS OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE HAVE FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED OUR DESIRE FOR MORE RAPID PROGRESS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE REITERATED THIS COMMITMENT IN TEIEIR COMMUNIQUE OF DECEMBER L2-L3, WHICH CONFIRMED THAT THE ALLIANCE IS "ACTIVELY WORKING FOR AN EARLY AGREEMENT, CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE. THIS WOULD E;KBODY A SUBSTANTIAL SET OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONFI)ENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, COVERING THE WHOLE; OF EUROPE, AND GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT Ti) THE EXISTING DUTY OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO REFR~~IN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE." L3. IT MUST ALSO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT, AS THE NA"0 MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE REMINDS US, THE STOCKHO[M CONFERENCE IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS. WHEN THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING CONVENES NEsXT FF~LL, ITS TASK WILL BE NOT ONLY TO EVALUATE PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM BUT ALSO TO CONSIDER THE OUTCOME OF THE OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS FORUM, THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL E'ORUM AND THE BERN MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS, AS WELL A: THE PERFORMANCE .OF PARTICIPATING STATES IN FULFILLING ALL OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THIS REQUIREMENT FOR BALANCE, SPECIFIED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, IS FOUNDED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE PROCESS OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY MUST BE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL -- THAT IS, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN, AS WELL AS MILITARY L4. HERE IN STOCKHOLM WE HAVE'-AN OPPORTUNITY TO MA{E A 590 , SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO THAT BROADER OBJECTIVE AND HELP LOWER THE BARRIERS WHICH NOW DIVIDE EUROPE EAST FROM WEST. TO DO S0, WE MUST PROCEED NOW PURPOSEFULLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY TO PUT FIRMLY IN PLACE MEASURES WHICH WILL HAVE AN EFFECTIVE AND POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE REALITIES OF THE EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION. I BELIEVE WE WOULD DO WELL TO HEED THE ADVICE OF THE AMERICAN MAN OF LETTERS OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, WHO SAID: "I FIND THE GREAT THING IN THIS WORLD IS NOT SO MUCH WHERE WE STAND, AS IN WHAT DIRECTION WE ARE MOVING: TO REACH THE PORT OF HEAVEN, WE MUST SAIL SOMETIMES WITH THE WIND AND SOMETIMES AGAINST IT -- BUT WE MUST SAIL, AND NOT DRIFT, NOR LIE AT ANCHOR." THE TIME FOR STANDING IS OVER; IF WE ARE TO REACH OUR GOAL, THE TIME FOR MOVING HAS ARRIVED. OUR DIRECTION IS CLEAR, AND MY DELEGATION, FOR ONE, IS COMMITTED TO PURSUING IT. L5. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. BARRY END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED NNNN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09767 SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS: THE 198b CALENDAR REF: STOCKHOLM 9680 1. CDE VIII - 087 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CONFERENCE REACHED AGREEMENT DECEMBER 19 ON A COMPLETE WORKING CALENDAR FOR 1986 WHICH CONTAINS FOUR SESSIONS AND AN ADJOURNMENT DATE OE' SEPTEMBER 19 (SEE REFTEL FOR TEXT). IN ORDER TO SECURE SOVIET AGREEMENT THE TEXT ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT THIS PROCEDURAL FACT CAN BE CHANGED BY A CONSENSUS AND IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE ADJOURNMENT DATE DOES NOT TERMINATE CDE WHOSE ULTIMATE FATE CAN ONLY BE DECIDED BY THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING. NATO WAS ABLE TI) MOVE TOWARD THIS AGREEMENT ONLY AFTER FRANCE FINALLY JOINED A CAUCUS CONSENSUS TO SUPPORT THE NNA CALENDAR PROPOSAL, IF THE EAST AND NNA WOULD ACCEPT AS A TITLE OF THE SCHEDULE "COMPLETE WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986, INCLUDING THE AD.rOURN- MENT DATE." 4. ON DECEMBER 13, THE FRENCH DELEGATION FINAC,I.Y JOTNE'~ IN A CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON A NATO POSITION ON THIw 1~8b CALENDAR. THE FRENCH ACCEPTANCE CAME AFTER INTf.N:E: BEHIND-THE-SCENES CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN GASCHtGNA~L~ (FRANCE), BARRY (U.S., AND CAUCUS CHAIRMAN OF' THE: DAYj AND OTHER KEY CAUCUS MEMBERS. PRINCIPAL E[..h.ME:N'1'ti OE' THE. COMPROMISE WERE THAT THE FRENCH WOULD ACCEPT THE: SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE, FOUR SESSIONS AND THE NNA PROPOSED DATES FOR ALL FOUR SESSIONS IF THE NNA AND EAST FIRST ACCEPTED AS THE TITLE OF THE SCHEDULE.' "FULL +~ORK PROGAM FOR 1986, INCLUDING THE ADJOURNMENT DATE." IN FRANCE'S VIEW, EASTERN AND NNA ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PIT[.E WOULD SATISFY THE FRENCH REQUIREMENT FOR AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF A CUTOFF. THIS COMPROMISE WAS NO'(' ARRIVED AT EASILY AND EVEN THREATENED TO COLLAPSE OVER THE DETAILS OF HOW NATO REPS TO A COFFEE GROUP SH01![.D PRESENT THE. ALLIANCE'S POSITION (E.C., TABLE A FUL1. PAPER, DISCUSS ONLY THE TITLE FIRST WITHOUT A PAPER, TABLE A PAPER BRACKETING THE OPENING DATE OF THE FOURTH SESSION, ETC.). FORTUNATELY, BARRY (U.S.), WHO HAIi ACTED AS HONEST BROKER BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE REST OF THE CAUCUS ON THIS ISSUE, WAS IN THE CHAIR AND CON1iINCED ALL THAT THEIR INTERESTS WOULD BE PROTECTED. THE CAUCUS MANDATED BARRY (U.S.), BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) AND DELWORTH (CANADA) TO PRESENT THE NATO PROPOSAL TO NNA AND EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES. S. IN THE DECEMBER 17 COFFEE GROUP MEETING, THE EAST WAS NONCOMMITAL IN RESPONSE TO THE NATO PROPOSAL, HUT VOICED TWO QUESTIONS: 1) DID-NATO'S PROPOSALS~FOR A 592 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SEPTEMBER 19 ADJOURNMENT DATE MEAN THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD NOT BE EXTENDED EVEN IF WE WERE ONLY A FEW WORKING DAYS AWAY FROM AN AGREEMENT?; AND 2) WAS NATO REALLY TRYING TO STOP CDE ALTOGETHER ON SEPTEMBER 19 (RATHER THAN LEAVING THAT DECISION THE THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING)? EASTERN REPS DUTIFULLY BUT UNENTHUSIASTICALLY MADE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO SCHEDULE ONLY THE FIRST.TWO SESSIONS OF 1986 ((X>MrlENT: EASTERN CONTACTS HAD ALREADY BEEN UNUSUALLY CANDID IN INDICATING STRONG NON-SOVIET EASTERN SUPPORT FOR A FULL CALENDAR. END COMMENT.) GIVEN THE SHORT TIME REMAINING TO REACH A DECISION ON THIS ISSUE, BARRY (U.S.) CRAFTED A PROPOSAL FOR NEW LANGUAGE TO ANSWER EASTERN CONCERNS AND PERSONALLY WORKED WITH GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) AND GRINEVSKY (USSR) TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS PALATABLE TO THE KEY PROTAGONISTS. BARRY PROPOSED INSERTING THREE SENTENCES IN THE TEXT OF THE CALENDAR AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD: 1) ACKNOWLEGE THAT THE COMPLETE WORK PROGRAM WOULD COMPRISE FOUR SESSIONS; 2) IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE FATE OF CDE IS IN THE HANDS OE VIENNA AND NOT STOCKHOLM; AND 3) ACKNOWLEDGE THE PROCEDURAL FACT THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD CHANGE THE WORK PROGRAM AT ANYTIME IF THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO DO S0. ON DE:CEM$F:H 18, THE NATO CAUCUS ACCEPTED BARRY'S PROPOSAC WITH SOMA MINOR MODIFICATIONS. ONCE AGAIN IN ORDbk T~.) "GKE~Sr. THE SKIDS" FOR THE NEXT COFFEE GRUUr MEETING, BAitRY CONTACTED GRINEVSKY BILATERAL[..Y . GR T Nf.:VSK Y I NU I CATEf ~ THAT, WITH THE NEW LANGUAGE PROPOSE; BY THE: ALi.iANCE, HE, BELIEVED HE COULD NOW ACCEE+T (SUBJECr TO MOSCOW'S CONCURRENCE) A FULL 1986 CALENDAR INCLUDING AN ADJOURN- MENT DATE OF SEPTEMBER 19 AND FOUR SESSIONS (SEF REFTEC. FOR FULL TEXT). IN THE COFFEE GROUP MEETING OF DECEMBER 18, THE NNA QUICKLY ACCEPTED THE NATO PROPOSAL. EASTERN REPS INDICATED THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL ON DECEMBER 19. AT EASTERN BEHEST SOME MINOR DATE CHANGES TO THE ORIGINAL NNA PROPOSAL WERE AGREED TO (KEY CHANGE MOVES THE 1986 START DATE BACK TO JANUARY 28). THE FULL CALENDAR WAS FORMALLY ADOPTED BY THE DECEMBER 20 PLENARY. COMMENT: USDEL BELIEVES THAT 1986 CALENDAR ADOPTED FULLY PROTECTS OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF A COMPLETE SCHEDULE, A CLEAR ADJOURNMENT DATE, AND NO OVERLAP WITH THE VIENNA PREPCON ON MAIN MEETINGS. WHILE FRENCH TACTICS WERE POTENTIALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, THE ALLIANCE WAS FORTUNATE IN THAT THIS TIME, AT LEAST, THEY COST US NO SUBSTANTIVE PRICE. END COMMENT. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL NNNN 593 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET 25X1 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKIiOLM 09680 SUBJECT: CDE WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986 1. CDE VIII - 81 2. C- ENTIRE TEXT. 3. FOLLOWING IS TEIE TEXT OF TAE DECISION OF TEE CONFERENCE ON THE WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986. THIS DECISION EAS BEEN APPROVED BY NATO AND THE NNA. THE EAST BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT IT, BUT THE SOVIETS NEED TO GET SPECIFIC APPROVAL FROM MOSCOW. FINAL AGREEMENT IS EXPECTED MIDDAY TOMORROW (12/19), IN WATCH CASE THE DECISION WILL BE ADOPTED BY TAE PLENARY FRIDAY (12/20). 4. BEGIN TEXT: COMPLETE WORK pROGRplQiE FOR 1936, INCLUDING THE ADJOURNl~NT DATE THE COMPLETE WORK PROGRA~Q~E FOR 1986 WILL COMPaISE FOUR SESSIONS. IT IS AGREE THAT THE 19TH SEPTEMBER, TAE LAST 1~1Y OF THE FOURTH SESSION, WILL BE TAE DATE ON WHICH TAE ;;TOCRHOLM CONFERENCE WILL ADJOURN, TARING INTO ACCOUNT T]iE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF TAE PL-DRID CONFERENCE AND THE DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI PREPARATORY TAE WORK PROGRAPQiE FOR 1986 M AY BE MODIF IED B Y CONSENSUS ANNEX: . FIRST SESSION: JANUARY 28 TO MARCH 1 4 7 WEEKS SECOND SESSION: APRIL 15, TO MAY 23 6 WEEKS THIRD SESSION: JUNE 10 TO JULY 18 6 WEEKS FOURTH SESSION: AUGUS? 19 TO SEPT 19 5 WEEKS TOTAL 24 WORKING WEEKS END TEXT. BARRY END OF MESSAGE CONFIDE NTIAL 594 ~~ SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09770 SUBJECT: EIGHTH SESSION, TWO YEARS OF CDE 1. CDE VIII - 090. 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 3. SUMMARY: THE ENO OF THE EIGHTH SESSION OF CDE ALSO MARKED TWO YEARS OF PREPARATORY NEGOTIATION IN WHICH SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND POSITIONS HAVE BEEN REPETITIVELY AIRED. TO THE CASUAL OBSERVER IT COULD APPEAR THAT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PROGRESS. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE FEW MAJOR CONCESSIONS, IT IS EpUALLY TRUE THAT THEIR POSITION IN THIS MULTI-LATERAL. FORUM DOES NOT ENJOY MUCH CREDIBILITY, EVEN AMONG OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT. THE OUTLINES OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE IN TERMS OF A FINAL AGREEMENT HAVE EMERGED THIS SESSION IN CLEARER THAN EVER TERMS. WHILE THE SOVIET POSITION ON AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES DOES NOT ENJOY GREAT CREDIBILITY OR SUPPORT IN THE CONFERENCE, IT WILL CONTINUE TO CAUSE DISCOMFORT AMONG SOME PARTICI- PANTS. NEVERTHELESS, THEIR POSITION IS AN ISOLATED ONE WHICH THE CONFERENCE IN GENERAL ACKNOWLEDGES WILL REMAIN ISOLATED AND THEREFORE UNTENABLE. WITH THE ADVENT OF THE EXPANDED AND MORE DETAILED NNA PROPOSAL, IT HAS BECOME MORE EVIDENT THAT MOST WESTERN CONCEPTS HAVE WON GENERAL APPROBATION. ALTHOUGH MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE, THERE SEEMS TO BE GROWING SUPPORT FOR SOME FORM OF INSPECTION. THE: TWO AREA:i WHERE: WE APPEAR TO BE MOST AT ODDS WITH THE SENSE OF THE CONP'ERENCF ARE 1) THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON THE STRUCI'URf.' AND ORGANIZATION OF GROUND FORCES AND LAND-BASED AIR FORCE'S AS A SEPARATE MEASURE DISTINCT FROM OTHER NOT1F'ICA'tION MEASURES AND 2) CONSTRAINTS. WHILE wE ANTIrrPATE PRES- SURE TO PRESENT IN WRITTEN FOEtM A WESTERN POSITION ON THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE, THE CONFERENCE HAS MOVED SUBSTANTIVELY TOWARD THE MINIMALIST POSITION WE ADVOCATE. WESTERN COHESION AND PERFORMANCE IN THE WORKING GROUPS HAS CONTTNUED TO IMPROVE IN PREPAR TION FOR THE INTENSIFIED NEGOTIATIONS EXPECTED IN THE COMING YEAR. MAJOR PROCEDURE PROBLEMS HAVE FOUND ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION; NNA COORDINATORS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED AND THE WORK CALENDAR FOR 1986 HAS BEEN ADOPTED COMPLETE WITH A COMMITMENT TO ADJOURN THE THE FOLLOWING AREAS: - -- ALTHOUGH LITTLE OPTIMISM REMAINS THAT A SEPARATE MEASURE ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WILL WIN CONSENSUS IN A FINAL DOCUMENT, THE CONFERENCE APPEARS TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROVISION OF DETAILED INFORMATION MUST BE AN INTEGRAL ASPECT OF ANY CSBMS REGIME. - -- THE CONFERENCE HAS ACCEPTED AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL PLANS OR FORECASTS OF 'NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES IN 595 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 sECRET THE FORMAT OF AN ANNUAL CALENDAR. -- ALTHOUGH IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO PUSH T1{ROUGH THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT EXACTLY AS IT APPEARi IN THE WESTERN PACKAGE, THERE IS REASON T'0 BELIEVE '.'HAT THE BASIC CONCEPT CAN WIN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT THRt)UGH DEFINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE E,WAY FROM NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS .IN THE: ZONE. THE: SOVIETS, FOR THEIR PART, HAVE ACKNOWI,EDGEU THIS :ESSION THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO NOTIFY ALL EXERCISE ACTIVITIES WHICH EXCEED AN AGREED THRESHOLD. -- A COMBINATION THRESHOLD STRESSING STRUCTURE BUT INCLUDING NUMERICAL TOTALS FOR EQUIPMENT AND tkc~0l`~S SEEMS TO BE WITHIN REACH, ALTHOUGH THERE IS ST[L[. SOME' CONFUSION ABOUT WHICH ELEMENT OF ELEMENTS OF A CO~NBINED THRESHOLD WOULD ACTUALLY TRIGGER A NOTIFICATION A;JD THUS BE THE ELEMENT WHICH WOULD BE THE BASIS OF TI{E MONITORING AND VERIFICATION TASK. - THE SOVIETS HAVE INFORMED THE USDEL BILATERALLY THAT THEY CAN ACCEPT A SEPARATE THRESHOLD FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF AMPHIBIOUS~ACTIVITIES. TE(IS WOULD SEEM T'0 PREPARE THE WAY PROGRESS IN THIS AREA, BUT THIS ISSUE IS STILL CLOUDED BY THE ISSUE OF NC 1' [ h' Y I Iv::; NAVAL ACTIVITIES (SEE BELOW). - MUCH COMMON GROUND EXISTS IN THE' CUNE~E:HENGF. ON THE QUESTION OF INVITING OBSERVERS TG N:~1 1 r ~ Afil.E: ACTIVITES. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIE'I:y HAVE' BF.E;N SLJW IN ACKNOWLEDGING THE REQUIREMENT TU [N~ l lr. ALI. OB.~~'tt.'E:k~ AND THE NNA (AS WELL AS SOME ALL IE.S) 1 MPAR~; MORE: V :;R I F' l - CATION POTENTIAL TO OBSERVATION THAN WE WOULU WISH. -- WITH REGARD T'0 VERIFICATION, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO VERBALLY EXPRESS THEIR REJECTION OF ON~?SITF: INSPECTION. YET, OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT CAMP ARE FAR LESS CATEGORICAL. THIS SESSION DTD N()T SEE AS MUCH DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT IN THE WORKING CROUPS AS WE MIGHT HAVE WISHED. SOVIET ATTE;MFTS TO EXPLOIT PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS T'0 DENEGRATE THE' IMPORTANCE OF AN INDEPENDENT INFORMATION EXCHANGE ENGENDERED A GREATER EMPHASIS BY TT{E WEST ON MEASUFE's ONE. NEVERTHELESS, THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ISSUE HAS BEEN ADDRESSED BY THE NNA COUPLED WITT{ CONSISTENT WESTERN INSISTANCE THAT ON-SITE INSPECTION MUST BE PART OF A FINAL OUTCOME GIVES RISE: TO CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM. THE EIGHTH SESSION SAW REMARKABLE LITTLE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE PLACE OF NTM IN THE: VERIFICATION PROCESS, DESPITE SOVIET EFFORTS T'0 ASSIGN THEM A MAJOR ROLE. - -- AS USUAL, TTiE ROMANIANS HAVE BEEN THE CONST~I,NT CHAMPION OF COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION. THE NNiI HAVE HARDLY MENTIONED THIS ASPECT OF SC-7 AND THE WEST HAS SUCCESSFULLY SKIRTED EVEN DISCUSSING, ITS OWN IDEAS FOR DEDICATED COMMUNICATION LINKS TO BE USED IN CON1~tEC- TION WITH CSBMS IMPLEMENTATION. THE U.S. ~IEND~ FRANCE; . 596 ~ SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 HAVE BEEN AT THE FOREFRONT IN KEEPING THIS QUESTION OFF THE DISCUSSION AGENDA. IT HAS BEEN INFREQUENTLY RAISED BY THE SOVIETS AND THEIR CLOSEST FRIENDS, BUT INDICATIONS REMAIN THAT THE PACT SEES CONSULTATIONS AS A PRELUDE TO ANY POSSIBLE INSPECTIONS. - -- ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT OUT OF THE WOODS, THE WEST MAY HAVE HAD ITS GREATEST SUCCESS STORY IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE. WITH THE USDEL PLAYING A STRONG ROLE AMONG THE ALLIES AND TAKING A SOMEWHAT LOWER PROFILE IN THE ACTUA[. WORK[NG GROUP, EVEN THE "WETS" HAVE BEEN TOUGH IN ADHERRINC TO COORDINATED POSITIONS. THE SOVIETS HAVE SEEN UNIMAGINA- TIVE AND INFFFFCTIVF IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO PRY A NUE' TEXT FROM THE WESTERN GROUP. AT THE SAME TIME, THE WORKING GROUP HAS VIRTUALLY IGNORED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, SC-6. AND, DESPITE UNHELPFUL UTTERANCES BY THE CYPRIOT, THE: SOVIETS GENERALLY EVALUATE THE NNA POSITION AS BEING CLOSER TO THE WEST AND, NOT WISHING TO ALIENTATE~ THE NNA, HAVE BEEN AT A LOSS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE NUF LANGUAGE IN SC-7. - -- DESPITE THE CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN SC-7, NOT EVEN THE EAST HAS BEEN QUICK TO SING ITS VIRTUES. AMONG THE NNA, YUGOSLAVIA REMAINS MOST ADAMANT THAT REAL LIMITATIONS OR CEILINGS MUST BE AGREED 'dITH A CORRESPONDING REJECTION OF WESTERN INSISIENCE :nAT THE ANNUAL FORECAST WILL HAVE A CONS1'NATNINt; EFE'ECT. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS THE YUGOSLAVIAN WHG S~: Y[ Y SUI;GF ~Tb.D THAT THE ANNUAL CALENDAR COULD SERVE AS A CON~ih.AIN~ IF A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO LIMIT THE POSSIBILITY (CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF SC-1'S MEASURE TWv') 1ii~T AN UNLIMITED NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES NOT ANNOUNCF:I) ON THE; ANNUAL CALENDAR COULD BE HELD AT SHORT NOTICF'. 5. DESPITE DISPARATE INDICATIONS DURING THIS SF.~~[UN THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BACK AWAY FROM THEIR UNTENABit? POSITION ON THE NOTIFICATIONS OF INDEPENDENT AIR ANG NAVAL ACTIVITIES, GENERAL TATARNSKOV SEEMED DETERMINEn TO MAKE THIS THE ISSUE UPON WHICH PROGRESS DEPENDED IN EACH OF THE WORKING GROUP SESSIONS. THUS, IT MATTERED LITTLE WHICH OF THE WESTERN CSBMS PROPOSALS THE DISCUS- SION FOCUSSED UPON, TARTARNIKOV FOUND A WAY TO INJECT NAVAL AND AIR. HIS INSISTENCE THAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN BOTH EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE MUST BE COVERED SEEMED TO INTENSIFY TOWARD THE END OF THE SESSION. SOME CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS SAW SOVIET FOCUS ON AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AS AN INDICATION OF A WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE, AND EVENTUALLY ADOPT, THE WESTERN FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. USDEL, HOWEVER, EXPOSED THE SOVIET TACTIC AS AN ATTEMPT TO TURN THE E'UNCTIONAL APPROACH INTO A RUBBER BAND SO EXPANDABLE THAT IT COULD BE USED TO JUSTIFY ARGUMENTS FOR INCLUDING INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITES FN A NOTIFICATf~N REGIME 597 r SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 THEREBY DESTROYING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. 6. ALTFIOUCH GENERAL TATARNIKOV OCCUPIES A PREDOMINANT POSITION IN THE EASTERN GROUP, THERE APPEARS TO BE DIFFERENT NUANCES IN THE EASTERN POSITION. ROZANOV, WIE] HAD BEEN ASSUMED TO BE THE NOMINAI DEPUTY, ciAS FREQUENTLY APPEARED MORE CONCILIATORY IN PUBLIC AND GENTLY CRITICAL OF THE MILITARY IN PRIVATE. HE HAS APPEALED TO USDEL FOR A GREATER ROLE TO BE PLAYED BY TME "POLITIKI" (POLITICAL DEi.EGATES) BECAUSE THIsY ARE MORE SKILLED IN THE ART OF COMPROMISE. OTHER K1sY EASTERN PLAYERS (IF THERE ARE ANY), E.G. KONARSI:Y OF POLAND AND BUEHRING OF THE GDR, ARE ALMOST FRAM: IN EXPRESSING THEIR THEIR UNDERSTANDING IN PRIVATE THAT THE MANDATE EXCLUDES INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES. THEY URGE GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS AND POLITICAL PRESTIGE AND CALL FOR WESTERN COMPROMISES ON OTHER ISSUES. NATO 7. AT THE END OF THE EIGHTH SESSION, MEMBERS OF THE NATO CAUCUS CAN STILL BE CATEGORIZED ALONG FAMILIAR LINES. THE "WETS" ARE EAGER TO ACCEPT ANYTHING THAT GIVES THE ALLUSION OF PROGRESS, OFTEN MlITHOUT DUE RECOGNITION TO THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENr,E.S. THIS TAxE:S OUR PATIENCE AND DIDACTIC SKILLS AS WE MU ~'~ REPEATEDLY ADO A LTTTL,E STARCH WHILE ASSIST INi~ IN DIi~ ING OUT THE WETS. NEVERTHELESS, NORMAL CAUCUS DIVISIONS --E4SILY OBSERVABLE IN THE DREARY AND OFTEN JUVENILE DEBATES OF THE NATO CAUCUS-- HAVE NOT SURFACED IN THE PUBL[C SESSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE. APART FROM THE PECUI.IARTIES OF THE FRENCH, WHO DO NOT BELONG TO THE "WET" CA14P, THERE HAVE BEEN REMARKABLY FEW PUBLIC DEVIATIONS FROM COMMON POSITIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS. 8. ONE OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THIS SESSION THEREFORE HAS BEEN A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE WAY THE ALLIES HAVE COORDINATED THEIR EFFORTS AND STRENGTHENED "'HEIR INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCES IN THE WORKING GROUPS. i~ITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE VOLATILE FRENCH MILITARY REF', WESTERN EXPERTS HAVE UNDERSTOOD THE REQUIREMENT E'OR UNIFIED TACTICS IN ARGUING A UNIFIED POSITION ON SUB- STANIVE POINTS. JCS REPS HAVE PLAYED A KEY ROLE 1N MANAGING THE MORE ADVENTURESOME AMONG THE MILITARY GROUP. WHILE SUCH ALLIES HAVE BEEN KEPT ON A SHCRT LEASH IN PUBLIC, THERE STILL REMAIN SOME BASIC DIFFERENCES ON SUBSTANCE WHICH WILL REQUIRE CONTINUED ATTENTION. THE ITALIANS AND THE FRENCH MILREP, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE UNCONVINCED ABOUT THE TACTICAL WISDOM OF NATO'S SUBSTANTIVE POSITION ON THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION TO BE SUPPLIED ON NAVAL AND AIR ELEMENTS NOTIFIED AS PART OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND THEY URGE GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON WHAT IS TO BE OBSERVED. THE NETHERi.ANDS, IN PARTICULAR, IS CONVINCED'THAT THE WEST'~LL?HAJE TO 598 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 BE IN A POSITION TO ACCEPT SOME LIMITATIONS MEASURE; WE EXPECT THEM TO PUSH THIS VIEW AMONG OTHER LIKE-MINDED AND A? EVERE. AND, NOT SUPRISINGLY, SEVERAL ALLIES ARE MUCH MORE FLEXIBLE ON THE NUF ISSUE THAN WE THINK NECESSARY OR ADVISABLE AT THIS POINT. OTHER ISSUES 9. 1986 WORK PROGRAM: WHILE THE EXPERTS WERE TOTAI.t.Y OCCUPIED WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONFERENCE, MUCH OF THE AMBASSADORS' TIME WAS OCCUPIED WITH PROCEDURAL ISSUES. FOR MOST OF THE SESSION, THE ALLIANCE WRESTLF(~ WITH THE 198b CDE CALENDAR ISSUE WITH A POSITIVE SOLUTION BEING ACHIEVED IN THE WANING MOMENTS. FOR WELL OVER A MONTH, THE FRENCH BLOCKED ANY NATO CALENDAR PROPOSAL WHILE TOUTING THEIR POSITION, PUBLICALLY ANNOUNCED BY MITTERAND, THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MUST ADJOURN BY JULY 18, 1986. USDEL SUPPORTED THIS POSITION AS LONG AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN CAUCUS AGREEMENT TO AN ABSOLUTE ADJOURNMENT BEFORE THE PREPCON FOR THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING. ONLY IN THE FINAL WEEK DID THE FRENCH FINALLY COME AROUND AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN A COMMON ALLIED COMMITMENT TO A COMPLETE CALENDAR FOR 1986 WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A UA'I'>r, FOR ADJOURNING THE CONIr'ERENCE. AFTER INITIAL HESITATION BY THE USSR ANU MALTA, WHO OPTED FOR AN ESSENTIALLY OPEN-ENDED t98b CALENDAR, THE FINAL PLENARY OF THE; YEAR ALOE?'rr:~~ A WOKt~. PROGRAM FOR 1986 WHICH PROVIDES FOR FOUR SF,S.SION~ ANt~ SETS SEP 19, AS THE FINAL DAY OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THt CDE FOR 1986. 10. COORDINATORS: AS THE EXPLORATORY PHASE OE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS --WHOSE CHAIRMANSHIP WAS ROTATED AMONG ALL DELEGATIONS-- PROCEEDED, CONFERENCE SUPPORT GREW FOR INSTALLING NNA COORDINATORS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL CSCE PRACTICE. AT U.S. PROMPTING, THE NATO GROUP PROPOSED THAT ONLY TWO COORDINATORS (ONE EACH FOR WORKING GROUP-A AND WORKING GROUP-8) BE AGREED INITIALLY. THE NNA REJECTED THIS APPROACH AS WELL AS A SUBSEQUENT SUGGESTION THAT THE TWO COORDINATORS MIGHT BE SUPPLEMENTED BY FIVE ADDITIONAL ASSISTANTS. THE NNA COUNTER PROPOSAL TOOK THE STARCH OUT OF WESTERN ARGUMENTS FOR ONLY TWO COORDINATORS WHEN THEY SUGGESTED THAT SWITZERLAND PROVIDE COORDINATORS FOR TWO OF THE SUB-GROUPS ESTABLISHED BY A 14 OCTOBER "GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT", ONE DEALING WITH INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/ COMMUNICATION AND THE OTHER WITH ANNUAL FORECASTS AND OTHER CONSTRAINING MEASURES. THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR WOULD COORDINATE THE NOTIFICATION GROUP, THE FINNISH AMBASSADOR THE OBSERVATION GROUP, AND THE AUSTRIAN THE GROUP DEALING WITH NUF. AFTER DETERMINING THAT 1) THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH DRAFTING, 2) THAT SC-7 WOULD NOT SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS, 3) THAT ENGLISH WOULD BE THE 599 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 SECRET LANGUAGE USED WHEN DRAFTING BEGINS AND 4) THAT :YO ONE INDIVIDUAL WOULD COORDINATE MORE THAN ONE GROUP THE NNA PROPOSAL WAS ACCEPTED. DURING THE ONE WEEK fN WHICH THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS IMPLEMENTED, NNA COORDINATORS PLAYED A GENERALLY MODEST ROLE WITH PROCEEDINGS HARDLY DIFFERENT THAN UNDER A ROTATING CHAIRMANSHIP. 11. DRAFTING: THE CONFERENCE IS POISED FOR DR~,FTING. COORDINATORS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED, INFORMAL MECHANISMS ARE IN PLACE AND THE LINE HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY CRAWN DEFINING THE SUBSTANCE ON WHICH DRAFTING WILL OCCUR. HOWEVER, THE SNAIL'S PACE OF THF. CONFERENCE COUPLED WITH THE PECULIARITIES OF "DRAFTING" IN C'SCE MIGHT MEAN THAT WEEKS COULD CO BY BEFORE ANY TEXT aCTUA[[Y BEGINS TO TAKE SHAPE. NEVERTHELESS, DRAFTING (HO'~IEVfrR I? IS DEFINED) IS THE NEXT STEP OF THE CONFERENCES' AND ITS FURTHER POSTPONEMENT CAN NO LONGER BE IN THE ITS OF THE WESTERN POSITION. 12. RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INTERPRETATION: MOSCOW SUi~PLIED ~~ IN ~E LANGUAGE BOOTH HAVE CONTINUEII TO BF ~~ RESPONSIVE TO TAE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SOVIET DELE- GA?ION THAN TO TAOSE OF THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT. DURING TAE LAST WEEa OF THE SESSION THIS PRACTICE BECAME A CONFERENCE ISSUE AS THEY INSISTED ON USING THE RUSSIAN WORD FOR "LIMITATIONS" WHEN INTERPRE'T[N~ THE ENGLISH WORD "CONSTRAINTS". DESPITE USDEL FE'f Oft" ~ TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO WHAT WE CONSIDER A SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM, THE SOVIET DELF,GAC[t~N HAS TO DATE BEEN RELUCTANT TO COOPERATE WITH EITty?F+ TAE USDEL OR THE SECRETARIAT. WE NOTE THAT T1{E INTERPRETATION/TRANSLATION PROBLEM CAN BE EXPE;CTE:I) TO CONTINUE AND WILL IN THE FUTURE REQUIRE SIGNIFICA!(1' EXPERTISE AND CONSTANT VIGILANCE TO PROTECT WESTERN SUBSTANTIVE INTERES'iS. HANSEN END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL 600 SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9 Secret Secret Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9