SOVIET BLOC, NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED AND NATO COUNTRY STATEMENTS AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) 3 FEBRUARY - 30 APRIL 1987 VOLUME II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 500
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
?SPorpt?
Soviet Bloc, Neutral/Nonaligned
and NATO Country Statements
at the Geneva Conference on
Disarmament (CD)
3 February 30 April 1987
Volume II
Reference Aid
-sr
IR 87-10010
June 1987
Copy 30
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
Soviet Bloc, Neutral/Nonaligned
and NATO Country Statements
at the Geneva Conference on
Disarmament (CD)
3 Februar 3 April 1987
Volume II
Reference Aid
Secret
IR 87-101)10
June 1987
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4
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? r? _
SECRET
STATE GENEVA TEL [phone]
SECRET GENEVA 01784
EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
BODY
TAGS: FARM, UNGA, COG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS; FEBRUARY 17, 1987,
AMBASSADOR HANSEN'S STATEMENT.
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-003. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE PREPARED STATEMENT
DELIVERED BY U.S. ACTING CD REPRESENTATIVE LYNN
HANSEN AT THE FEBRUARY 17 PLENARY MEETING OF THE
FIFTH ROUND OF U.S.-SOVIET INTENSIFIED CW BAN
DISCUSSIONS. THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED IS
BEING REPORTED BY SEPTEL.
3. BEGIN TEXT.
MR. AMBASSADOR:
-- YESTERDAY, THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS
BEGAN MOUND V OF THE ACCELERATED BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE
DISCUSSIONS ARE BEING HELD PURSUANT TO THE COMMITMENT
TO ACCELERATE WORK ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN MADE BY
PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AT
THEIR NOVEMBER 1985 SUMMIT MEETING.
-- IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO RECALL THE
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT WAS READ TO THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON FEBRUARY 5 BY THE DIRECTOR
OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
KENNETH ADELMAN. THIS MESSAGE IS A CLEAR AND
AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY. ALLOW
ME TO QUOTE:
-" ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TASKS FACING YOU
IS THE WORKING OUT OF A COMPREHENSIVE, EFFECTIVELY
VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THIS TASK IS MADE
EVEN MORE DIFFICULT BY THE FACT THAT CAPABILITIES FOR
CHEMICAL WARFARE ARE INCREASING AND THAT, CONTRARY TO
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE BEING USED
IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD. YOU HAVE A HEAVY
RESPONSIBILITY. FOR AS YOU CONSIDER THE PROVISIONS OF
A CONVENTION, YOU MUST MAKE SURE THAT A GLOBAL BAN WILL,
IN FACT, ELIMINATE THE CAPABILITY FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS
TO BE USED AGAINST FUTURE GENERATIONS. AN EFFECTIVE
CONVENTION WILL REQUIRE AN UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE OF
OPENNESS ON THE PART OF ALL STATES.
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- - I REAFFIRM THE COMMITMENT MADE BY THE UNITED
STATES IN 1984 WHEN WE TABLED OUR DRAFT CONVENTION
BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS WORLDWIDE. THE UNITED STATES
DELEGATION WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO WORK FOR THE TOTAL
ELIMINATION OF THESE TERRIBLE WEAPONS AND FOR THE
VERIFICATION PROVISIONS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THEY
NEVER AGAIN ENTER THE ARSENALS OF THE WORLD'S ARMIES."
-- THIS IS, OF COURSE, THE FIRST ROUND IN WHICH I HAVE
PARTICIPATED. I REGRET VERY MUCH THAT IT IS THE TRAGIC
DEATH OF AMBASSADOR LOWITZ THAT HAS LED TO MY BEING HERE.
I CONSIDER MY POSITION AS HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES
DELEGATION TO BE A PRIVILEGE, AS WELL AS A VERY WEIGHTY
AND CHALLENGING RESPONSIBILITY.
-- THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS A NEW LEADER AS WELL.
AMBASSADOR NAZARKINE, MY COLLEAGUES AND I WELCOME YOU
AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU AND YOUR STAFF.
-- AT THIS POINT, I WOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE THE MEMBERS
OF THE UNITED STATES' DELEGATION.
-- MR. AMBASSADOR, BEFORE DISCUSSING SUBSTANTIVE
QUESTIONS IN DETAIL, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE U.S.
DELEGATION HAS NOTED WITH INTEREST THE IMPORTANT SOVIET
STATEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT THIS MORNING.
I WILL TOUCH ON IT ONLY BRIEFLY IN THIS STATEMENT
BECAUSE THERE HAS NOT YET BEEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE IT
THE VERY CAREFUL STUDY IT DESERVES. WE WILL STUDY IT AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE AND RESPOND IN A PROMPT AND SERIOUS
MANNER.
-- I WOULD NOW LIKE TO PRESENT VIEWS OF MY DELEGATION
ON THE ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH DURING THIS
ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS. THESE ISSUES ARE: ELIMINATION OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES, DECLARATION OF
THE LOCATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES AND
ASSOCIATED VERIFICATION MEASURES, CHALLENGE INSPECTION,
AND BILATERAL MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE PRIOR TO
SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION. WE CAN ALSO ACCEPT THE
SOVIET SUGGESTION TO DISCUSS NON-PRODUCTION. I WILL
DISCUSS EACH ISSUE BRIEFLY IN TURN.
-- THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION
FACILITIES HAS BEEN THE FOCAL POINT OF THE PREVIOUS
FOUR ROUNDS. AS A RESULT OF THESE INTENSIVE
DISCUSSIONS, THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES HAVE MOVED
CLOSER TOGETHER. HOWEVER, THE INFORMAL DISCUSSION
PAPER JOINTLY DEVELOPED BY THE TWO SIDES CLEARLY SHOWS
THAT A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT POINTS NEED TO BE RESOLVED
BEFORE A MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION IS IN HAND. FOR
EXAMPLE, AGREEMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN REACHED: (1) ON
WHETHER TO SPECIFY THAT CONVERSION OF SPECIALIZED
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BUILDINGS WILL BE AN EXCEPTION; (2) ON THE TYPES OF
ACTIVITIES THAT MAY NOT BE CONDUCTED IN CONVERTED
BUILDINGS; AND (3) ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF ON-SITE
VERIFICATION IN CONVERTED BUILDINGS.
-- U.S. EXPERTS BELIEVE THAT, IN MOST CASES, IT WOULD
BE IMPRACTICAL TO CONVERT A SPECIALIZED BUILDING THAT
HAD BEEN USED FOR PRODUCTION OF SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL
CHEMICALS. COMMENTS BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION SUPPORTED
THIS TECHNICAL JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET POSITION,
AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, CONTINUED TO BE THAT CONVERSION OF
SPECIALIZED BUILDINGS SHOULD BE PERMITTED IN ALL CASES.
ON THE OTHER HAND, THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT CONVERSION
SHOULD BE ALLOWED ONLY AS AN EXCEPTION.
-- RETENTION OF THE MAJORITY OF SPECIALIZED BUILDINGS,
EVEN IF THEY WERE MODIFIED TO MEET PREVAILING
COMMERCIAL STANDARDS, WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO RESUME
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION THAN IF THE BUILDINGS WERE
DESTROYED. I HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL BRING ITS
FORMAL POSITION INTO LINE WITH THE LIMITED PRACTICAL
POSSIBILITIES FOR CONVERSION BY AGREEING THA, AS A
GENERAL RULE, SPECIALIZED BUILDINGS WOULD BE DESTROYED
AND THAT CONVERSION WOULD BE PERMITTED ONLY AS AN
EXCEPTION.
-- OBVIOUSLY, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF VERIFICATION
REQUIRED AT A CONVERTED BUILDING HAS A DIRECT
RELATIONSHIP TO WHAT THE CONVERTED BUILDING IS USED FOR.
IN THE U.S. VIEW, USING SUCH A BUILDING FOR HANDLING
SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS OR CORROSIVE CHEMICALS
WOULD GIVE RISE TO SERIOUS CONCERNS. A MUCH SIMPLER AND
MORE DESIRABLE APPROACH WOULD BE TO REQUIRE THAT A
CONVERTED SPECIALIZED BUILDING MAY NOT BE USED FOR
HANDLING SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS OR CORROSIVE
CHEMICALS AND TO PLACE CORRESPONDING CONSTRAINTS ON THE
TYPES OF EQUIPMENT THAT COULD BE PRESENT.
-- DURING ROUND IV, THE SOVIET SIDE ASKED FOR U.S. VIEWS
ON HOW A CONVERTED FACILITY SHOULD BE MONITORED. IN THE
U.S. VIEW, A CONVERTED FACILITY MUST BE SUBJECT TO
MONITORING INDEFINITELY IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY
LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE. A FACILITY CONVERTED
TO A USE NOT INVOLVING CHEMICAL PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING
WOULD NEED TO BE MONITORED BY SYSTEMATIC ON-SITE
INSPECTIONS, AT A FREQUENCY TO BE DETERMINED. A FACILITY
CONVERTED TO PERMITTED CHEMICAL PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING
WOULD NEED TO BE MONITORED BY DATA REPORTING AND
SYSTEMATIC ON-SITE VERIFICATION, WHICH MAY INCLUDE
ON-SITE INSTRUMENTS IN ADDITION TO INSPECTIONS. THE
FREQUENCY OF INSPECTION, AS WELL AS THE USE OF
INSTRUMENTS, IS TO BE DETERMINED. STUDIES ARE UNDERWAY
IN WASHINGTON TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR SUCH DETERMINATIONS.
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-- IN CONTRAST TO THE PRODUCTION FACILITIES ISSUE, THE
ISSUE OF EARLY DECLARATION OF STOCKPILE LOCATIONS, WHICH
INCLUDES ASSOCIATED VERIFICATION MEASURES, HAS HARDLY
BEEN DEALT WITH IN THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. THE
UNITED STATES ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EARLY
DECLARATION OF STOCKPILE LOCATIONS AND TO THE
ASSOCIATED ON-SITE VERIFICATION MEASURES. WITHOUT THESE
PROVISIONS, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE
NECESSARY LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN THE STOCKPILE
DECLARATION.
-- MR. AMBASSADOR, IN YOUR PLENARY STATEMENT IN THE CD
THIS MORNING, YOU PRESENTED SOVIET VIEWS ON THE STOCKPILE
ISSUE WHICH SEEM TO CONTAIN MAJOR CHANGES IN THE SOVIET
POSITION. OBVIOUSLY, WE WILL STUDY THIS CONSTRUCTIVE
STATEMENT VERY CAREFULLY. I HOPE THAT DISCUSSIONS DURING
THIS ROUND WILL SHOW THAT THERE ARE NO LONGER ANY
IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES ON THIS IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE
MULTILATERAL CONVENTION. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, NUMEROUS
DETAILED PROVISIONS YET TO BE DEVELOPED IN THIS AREA, AS
WELL, THAT ARE ESSENTIAL FOR AN EFFECTIVE REGIME.
-- A THIRD ISSUE IN THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IS
CHALLENGE INSPECTION. THIS IS, OF COURSE, A VERY
IMPORTANT ISSUE. IT MAY WELL BE THE MOST IMPORTANT,
BECAUSE AN EFFECTIVE CHALLENGE PROVISION IS ESSENTIAL
FOR DEALING WITH THE POTENTIALLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS OF
UNDECLARED STOCKPILES AND UNDECLARED PRODUCTION
FACILITIES.
-- THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED
INTENSIVELY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ROUND IV. THE
DISCUSSION WAS USEFUL, ALTHOUGH THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO
SIDES REMAINED FAR APART. THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUED TO
INSIST ON A MECHANISM TO SCREEN CHALLENGE INSPECTION
REQUESTS AND ON A RIGHT OF REFUSAL AS WELL. THE U.S.
SIDE, FOR REASONS WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED EXHAUSTIVELY,
BELIEVES THAT SUCH FEATURES WOULD MAKE A CHALLENGE
INSPECTION REGIME INEFFECTIVE.
-- THE SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT IN THE CD THIS MORNING
ALSO DEALT WITH THE ISSUE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION. IT
APPEARS TO CONTAIN SOME INTERESTING NEW ELEMENTS,
ALTHOUGH IT ALSO APPEARS THAT MAJOR DIFFERENCES CONTINUE
TO EXIST. AS SOON AS WE HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO
STUDY THE SOVIET STATEMENT, THE TWO SIDES COULD ALSO
EXPLORE THE CHALLENGE ISSUE BILATERALLY IN GREATER DETAIL.
-- NEVERTHELESS, I WOULD LIKE TODAY TO PRESENT BRIEFLY
U.S. VIEWS ON POSSIBLE MISUSE OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION
PROVISION.
-- THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ARGUED THAT A SCREENING MECHANISM
AND A RIGHT OF REFUSAL ARE NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH
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POSSIBLE MISUSE OF THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION.
THE UNITED STATES CERTAINLY RECOGNIZES
THE RISK OF MISUSE. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE
REMEDIES PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE POSE A SERIOUS RISK
OF MISUSE AS WELL. A RIGHT OF REFUSAL, FOR EXAMPLE,
COULD EASILY BE USED TO BLOCK LEGITIMATE REQUESTS FOR
INSPECTIONS. ADOPTING THE APPROACH ADVOCATED BY THE
SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD ONLY SUBSTITUTE ONE PROBLEM
FOR ANOTHER.
-- BOTH SIDES ACKNOWLEDGE, I BELIEVE, THE POWERFUL
DETERRENT INHERENT IN THE POSSIBILITY OF RECIPROCAL
CHALLENGE INSPECTION REQUESTS. A PARTY WILL BE VERY
CAREFUL IN MAKING A REQUEST IF IT KNOWS THAT IT MAY
PROVOKE A REQUEST IN RETURN. HOWEVER, CONCERN HAS BEEN
EXPRESSED THAT IF A STATE HAS LITTLE TO LOSE, IT WILL
NOT BE DETERRED FROM MISUSING THE CHALLENGE PROVISION.
THE UNITED STATES APPROACH WAS DESIGNED WITH THIS RISK IN
MIND. CHALLENGE REQUESTS WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, NOT BE
MADE FREQUENTLY. REQUESTS FROM STATES NOT ON THE FACT-
FINDING PANEL WOULD BE SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY A MEMBER OF
THE PANEL. INSPECTIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED UNDER
PROCEDURES AGREED IN ADVANCE AND DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE
INTRUSION INTO MATTERS NOT RELEVANT TO RESOLVING THE
CONCERN THAT PROMPTED THE INSPECTION REQUEST. WE WOULD
LIKE TO KNOW THE REACTION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO
THESE SAFEGUARDS. WE ARE CERTAINLY PREPARED TO CONSIDER
ANY SOVIET SUGGESTIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF
PREVENTING ABUSE OF THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION
SO LONG AS SUCH ALTERNATIVE MEANS PRESERVE THE SAME HIGH
STANDARD OF EFFECTIVENESS.
-- MR. AMBASSADOR, THE UNITED STATES ALSO ATTACHES
CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO ITS 1984 PROPOSALS FOR
BILATERAL EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION OF DATA BEFORE
SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION. WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND
THE APPARENT RELUCTTNCE OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO PROVIDE
IN CONFIDENCE THE KINDS OF INFORMATION THAT THE UNITED
STATES HAS ALREADY MADE PUBLIC IN THE CD ON JULY 10,
1986. IT SEEMS STRANGE, AS WELL AS TROUBLING TO US,
THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT EVEN ADMITTED OFFICIALLY
THAT IT POSSESSES THE KIND OF WEAPONS THAT ARE THE
SUBJECT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS.
-- THE U.S. DELEGATION CONTINUES TO SEEK OPENNESS ON
THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING ITS CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PROGRAM. WE ARE STILL AWAITING A CONSTRUCTIVE
AND DETAILED SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE 1984 PROPOSALS I
MENTIONED. I HOPE THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE WILL COME
DURING THIS ROUND. THE LACK OF A RESPONSE CAN ONLY
PROLONG THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN.
-- DURING THIS ROUND, THE TWO SIDES ALSO NEED TO
CONTINUE EFFORTS TO CONVERT THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE
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ON BILATERAL INSPECTION REPRESENTATIVES INTO DETAILED
MEASURES. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER THE SOVIET
SIDE CAN AGREE THAT THESE REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE
OBSERVERS RATHER THAN MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION TEAM. IN ROUND III, THE SOVIET SIDE SEEMED
TO FAVOR THE OBSERVER APPROACH, BUT, IN ROUND IV, IT
SEEMED TO BACK AWAY FROM THIS APPROACH.
-- BEFORE CONCLUDING, I WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH BRIEFLY ON
THE SUBJECT OF NON-PRODUCTION, WHICH WAS RAISED BY
SOVIET EXPERTS AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE ROUND. THE
U.S. SIDE IS, OF COURSE, LOOKING FORWARD TO RECEIVING
THE CLARIFICATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS IT REQUESTED DURING
ROUND IV. SINCE THEN, AN ADDITIONAL POINT HAS ARISEN
THAT NEEDS CLARIFICATION. AS THE SOVIET SIDE IS AWARE,
THE U.S. POSITION IS THAT INSPECTIONS OF APPLICABLE
COMMERCIAL FACILITIES SHOULD BE UNPREDICTABLE IN THEIR
TIMING. OUR STRONG IMPRESSION FROM THE INTERSESSIONAL
DISCUSSIONS IS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SUPPORTS THIS
APPROACH AS WELL. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IN
PREVENTING POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING IF THE SOVIET
POSITIONS WERE CLEARLY STATED.
-- MR. AMBASSADOR, THESE ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES
THAT EXIST AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE ARE
OTHER ISSUES WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED IN DUE
COURSE. BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL NOW TO FOCUS ON THOSE
PROVISIONS WHICH ARE KEY TO AN EFFECTIVE BAN AND ARE
MAJOR OBSTACLES IN THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. IN
FULFILLING THE COMMITMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE
UNITED STATES DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO PRESENT ITS
VIEWS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THE VIEWS OF THE
SOVIET DELEGATION AND TO A JOINT EFFORT TO SEARCH FOR
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. END TEXT.
4. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
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SECRET
STATE GENEVA TEL [phone]
SECRET GENEVA 01803
EXDIS
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, FEB 16, 1987
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-004. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY --
-- FIRST MEETING OF ROUND V WAS HELD AT
EXPERTS LEVEL ON FEBRUARY 16.
-- TOPICS DISCUSSED WERE: (1) SCHEDULE FOR
ROUND V BILATS; (2) AGENDA AND ORDER OF TOPICS;
(3) AN INVENTORY OF UNRESOLVED OPICS. U.S.
DEL REBUFFED SOVIET DEL SUGGESTION THAT RECENT
SWEDISH NON-PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION BE
USED AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.
END SUMMARY.
3. URPOSE AND SCOPE --
-- THIS INITIAL MEETING OF THE ROUND V BILATS
WAS LIMITED TO DISCUSSIONS OF AGENDA, SCHEDULE,
LISTING OF UNRESOLVED TOPICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTERS RELEVANT TO FURTHER MEETINGS. SOVIET
DEL PROVIDED A LIST OF TEN DELEGATES HEADED BY
AMB. YOURI K. NAZARKINE. NEW NAMES ON DEL LIST
ARE ANDREY E. GRANOVSKY (MFA) AND VITALI M.
GANJA (MOD). THE SIDES AGREED TO START FORMAL
DISCUSSIONS AT A FEBRUARY 1 PLENARY MEETING.
4. SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS FOR ROUND V --
-- SOVIET DEL PROPOSED A HIGHLY STRUCTURED
SCHEDULE OF 14 MORE MEETINGS WITH FIVE MEETINGS
PER WEEK FOR THREE WEEKS. THEY PROPOSED A
SEQUENCE OF TWO EXPERTS MEETINGS ON A SPECIFIC
TOPIC FOLLOWED BY AN AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL MEETING
AT WHICH EXPERTS MIGHT BE PRESENT. THE FORMAL
SESSION WOULD OPEN (FEB 17) A D CLOSE (MAR 6)
WITH PLENARY MEETINGS.
-- U.S. DEL PRESENTED A SCHEDULE OF EIGHT
MEETINGS COMPOSED OF THREE PLENARY MEETINGS
AND FIVE EXPERTS MEETINGS BETWEEN FEB 17 AND
MAR 5. U.S. DEL CRITICIZED SOVIET SCHEDULE
AS NOT ALLOWING SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE
PREPARATIONS BETWEEN MEETINGS NEEDED TO MAKE
DISCUSSIONS PRODUCTIVE.
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-- AGREEMENT ON THE SCHEDULE WAS DEFERRED
UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF AMB. HANSEN ON FEB 17.
5. AGENDA AND ORDER OF TOPICS FOR ROUND V BILATS
-- SOVIET DEL PROPOSED FOUR TOPICS FOR
DISCUSSION: (1) CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES; (2)
BILATERAL MEASURES; (3) CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS;
AND (4) OTHER QUESTIONS (TO INCLUDE NON-PRODUCTION).
-- U.S. DEL INSISTED, AND SOVIETS AGREED, THAT
DECLARATION AND VERIFICATION OF STOCKPILE LOCATIONS
BE ADDED.
-- AGREEMENT ON SEQUENCE OF TOPICS WAS DEFERRED
UNTIL THE FEB 17 ARRIVAL OF AMB. HANSEN.
6. INVENTORY OF UNRESOLVED TOPICS --
-- U.S. AND SOVIET DELS VERBALLY INVENTORIED
UNRESOLVED TOPICS. U.S. INVENTORY WAS BASED
ON JANUARY 14 PAPER "CW: PRINCIPAL
OUTSTANDING TREATY ISSUES (U)" (CIRCULATED IN
WASHINGTON TO CW IG MEMBERS).
-- SOVIET DEL ACCEPTED A L U.S. TOPICS AND
ADDED A FEW.
-- IN DISCUSSING THE TOPIC OF CHALLENGE
INSPECTION AS AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE, SOVIET
DEL PROPOSED THAT SWEDISH PON-PAPER "SOME
PRINCIPLES AND ELEMENTS TO GUIDE A SYSTEM
OF AD HOC ON-SITE INSPECTION IN A CONVENTION
ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS" BECOME THE BASIS FOR
DISCUSSIONS. U.S. DEL RESPONDED THAT SINCE
THE DOCUMENT WAS STILL CHANGING AND NOT PUT
IN FINAL FORM BY AMB. EKEUS, IT WAS NOT
USEFUL TO DISCUSS IT BILATERALLY (SWEDISH
PAPER DATAFAXED TO WASHINGTON FEB 12).
&7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
ADMIN
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STATE GENEVA
SECRET GENEVA 01871
EXDIS
SECRET
TEL [phone]
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
BODY
TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS; FEBRUARY 17, 1987,
AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN'S STATEMENT
1. THIS IS CW BILAT -005. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE PREPARED STATEMENT DELIVERED
BY USSR CD REPRESENTATIVE YURI NAZARKIN AT THE FEBRUARY
17 PLENARY MEETING OF THE FIFTH ROUND OF U.S.-SOVIET
INTENSIFIED CW BAN DISCUSSIONS. THE DISCUSSION WHICH
FOLLOWED IS BEING REPORTED BY SEPTEL.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
MR. AMBASSADOR,
-- THE FIFTH ROUND OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN
TALKS ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
STARTS TODAY. IT WILL BE TAKING PLACE IN A
QUALITATIVELY NEW SITUATION GENERATED IN THE
MULTILATERAL TALKS ON THE CONVENTION ON A
COMPREHENSIVE AND COMPLETE BAN OF THESE WEAPONS.
-- IN THE COURSE OF THE PRECEDING ROUNDS OF
BILATERAL TALKS, EXTENSIVE WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED
ON A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES. SOME RESULTS OF
THIS WORK HAVE ALREADY BECOME THE PROPERTY OF
THE MULTILATERAL TALKS, CONTRIBUTING TO AGREEMENT
ON A NUMBER OF PROVISIONS OF THE FUTURE CONVENTION.
WE HOPE THAT FOLLOWING THE CURRENT ROUND, THE
USSR AND THE U.S. WILL BE ABLE TO AUGMENT THEIR
CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACTIVIZATION OF THE TALKS ON
THE CONVENTION.
-- DURING THE PERIOD THAT ELAPSED SINCE THE LAST
ROUND OF SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS, THE SOVIET UNION
CARRIED OUT AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF THE STATE OF
AFFAIRS IN BOTH THE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL
TALKS OF ITS POSITIONS ON UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND
THE APPROACHES OF OTHER STATES TO THEM. WE HAVE,
OF COURSE, PAID PROPER ATTENTION TO THE POSITION
OF THE UNITED STATES, AND TO THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED
BY THE U.S.
-- TODAY, AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT, THE USSR DELEGATION PRESENTED SOME
_
SECRET
310
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c7r*-
? 0;0000....
Departi?lent of StaFI
PAGE 11 OF 12 GENEVA 01172 DO OF N 2113432 032 $503113 PAGE III GENEVA 11372 II OF I14 2113432 032
? I,*
? TO DESTROY ALL CN STOVES, RATNEAar
?. 1'1110 TO DIVERT OVAL-mint( CNEMICALS FOP-
_________?? .
---? -COMICIAL INDUSTRIAL USE.
?
C.s= AGREEMENT THAT CONVERSION OF CV PRODUCTION..
ClUllOINGS WOULD BE PERMITTED ONLY AS AN
EXCEPTION.
?
? 1.1 _
7-::-?? INFO ACOA-Ill /11.1 Al CAR
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INTO DOC WASNOC
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
ARERIASSY MOSCOW
? ANEMASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
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HUH SS ION USNA10
SECRET GENEVA 11172
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ACOA FOR MA; 00C FOR OP/ISA; JCS FOR 33/0
SUM FOR 050/ISP; VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
?
E. O. 12356: OEM: OAOR
TAGS; Pall, NW., COG, UR, US
sus.tEct, CONFERENCE ON DISARMANENT -0.1. USSR.- ?
E$4 BILATERAL DENICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, PLENARY MEETING,
;: 7
X..?FEIRUARY. 17, 15117
REFS: Al GENEVA 111714 IlLAT-11131 II STATE 144171
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SP, D/GAC
D/ I1 S/ART
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JO.'-'41G1EENENT TO POT INCAPACIIANTS IN
'CATEGORY" CHEMICALS TO BE SAANC01.
?-?????? "ALSO; THEY WILL NOT INSIST ON INCLUSION OF CATEGORY I
Of IRRITANTS CS, CM AS LONG AS A SPECIAL
? REGIME IS DEVISED FOR THEM.
MA/ I SP
WC
S.
X
1. TN1S IS Cu BILAT-116., ISECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY
AT FEBRUARY 17 OPENING PLENARY MEETING OF -
FIFTH BILATERAL CV ROUND, SOVIET DEL HEAD
NAIARKINE REVIEWED SEVERAL AREAS OF SOVIET
MOVEMENT IN CV NEGOTIATIONS AND CALLED ION U.S.
TO CHANGE ITS 1314 POSITION AND OVIONSTRATE
FLEXIBILITY BY MAKING CONCESSIONS. O.S. DEL MEAD
NANSEN REVIEWED U.S. POSITIONS IN KEY AREAS MIMI
REWIRE BILATENAL DISCUSSION. NE CHASTIZED THE
SOVIETS FON TIEI1 ATTEMPT TO GET TII: th:. TO MAKE
CONCESSION: IN ITS 1334 PROPOSAL. C0/311 DID NOT
REPRESENT A nuINALIST PROPOSAL; RATHER IT
WAS AND IS SEEN AS A WAY OF ENSURING THAT U.S..
? SECURITY INTERESTS WERE PROTECTED. ENO SUMMARY.
S. SOVIET STATEMENT ?
? SOVIET DEL HEAD L0BASSADOR NAEARKINE1
DEL I VERED & PREPARED STATEMENT (SEPTEL) IN
WICK NE REITERATED THE SOVIET 'PROPOSALS'
MADE IN THE CD PLENARY EARLIER IN THE DAY
(TEXT OF SOVIET CD STATEMENT DATAFAXED TO ACDAI
AND NOTED ADDITIONAL POINTS OF FLEXIBILITY.
NE OFFERED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS U.S. DEL
HAD ON THEN. IN PARTICULAR, NAZARKINE CITED
TIE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN THE SOVIET POSITION
TO MEET U.S. CONCERNS:
A. EARLY DECLARATION OF LOCATIONS OF CV STOCKS
AND SUBSEQUENT VERIFICATION.
ALERT COPY
sow I ET READINESS TO ADD MORE CHEMICALS
to CHTErmeT F.
F. NA1ARKINE HOPED INA1 WORK ON THE JOINT
PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES COULD BE
COMPLETED, AS WELL AT ONE ON INC ISSUE OF
PAVING A RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS
WEN INSPECTIONS OCCUR ON EACN?OTHERS
TERRITORY. ADDITIONALLY, HE HOPED THAT THE
BILATERAL T.01131111 AT INC ARRANGEMENTS PAPER
COULD BE FINISHED DURING THIS ROUND.
1.. HE SAID THAT TIE USSR WOULD NOT OBJECT
.1.`?., ? TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL THAT THE DEFINITION OF
A CV PRODUCTION FACILITY INCLUDE ANY FACILITY
FOR PRODUCTION or SINGLE-PURPOSE CHEMICALS
4.? THAT ME NOT IN THE SUPER-TOXIC LEINA). CATEGORY.
R. HE NOTED THAT THE USSR IS PREPARED TO
EXCHANGE IDEAS ON ALL ISSUES UNDER NEGOTIATION
INCLUDING CHALLENGE INSPECTION, TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT ALL PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. HE
FURTHER STATED THAT THE TWO DEES SHOULD -
EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE RECENT SWEDISH CHALLENGE.
INSPECTION NON-PAPER '
HE CONCLUDED By NOTING THAI THE SOVIET UNION-
PAD PRESENTED A 'WNW OF COMPROMISE PROPOSALS '
aND THAT THEY EXPECTED THE SAME FROr. THE U.S. -
a
4. U.S. STATEMENT --
k. IN HIS STATEMENT CRET a.), U.S. DEL HEAD
IsaisASSADOR HANSEN) ovoTED THE MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT REAGAN INC WAS READ BY AT.DA DIRECTOR
AOELMAN ik THE FEBRUARY L CD PLENARY. THIS
MESSAGE REAFFIRMED THE U.S. 1311 COmmlImENT
FOR A WORLD-WIDE CD IAN AND FOR VERIFICATION
PROVISIONS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT CHEMICAL
WEAPONS WOULD NEVER AGAIN RE STOCKPILED.
11. OMEN SET FORTH THE FOLLOWING AS THE
ISSUES THAT THE U.S. WISHED TO ADDRESS:
II) ELIMINATION OF CV PRODUCTION FAOILITIES,
12) DECLARATION OF THE LOCATIONS OF CV
STOCKPILES ANO ASSOCIATED VERIFICATION
MEASURES, (3) CHALLENGE INSECT tow, AND
141 BILATERAL MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE -
PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION.
C. DRAWING ow GUIDANCE 1REF II HANSEN STATED
THAT, VITN RESPECT To THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE
WERE I CV FACILITY WAS PERMITTED TO BE
CONVERTED TO CIVIL USE, THE CONVERTED FACILITY
MUST BE SUBJECTED 10 MONITORING INDEFINITELY.
A FACILITY CONVERTED TO USE NOT INVOLVING
CHEMICAL PRODUCTION WOULD NEED TO BE MONITORED
SECRET 313A
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? _I"!
? ? ?
A
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^ .4
,
?? PAGE 12 14 12 GENEVA 11172 SI Of SA 2117432
^ Iv SYSTEMATIC ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, AT A FREQUENCY
TO 1E DETERMINED. IN A001TioN, A FACILITY
CONVERTED TO PERMITTED CHEMICAL PRODUCTioN vOMO
ALSO BE SUBJECT TO THE ABOVE rum IT MUST HE
MONITORED NV DATA REPORTING AND RAISE 1Y ON-SITE
INSTRUMENTS.
?
Department-of State
D. NANSEN ACKNOWLEDGED INC RECENT STATED
SOVIET SHIFT IN POSITION ON CV STOCKPILE
DECLARATIONS AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE
INC U.S. ATTACHES TO EARLY DECLARATION or
STOCKPILE MATIONS AND TO ASSOCIATED
VERIFICATION MEASURES.
,E. ON THE CNAILENGE INSPECTION, MANSEN STATED
THAT SOVIET INSISTANCE ON A MECHANISM TO SCREEN
1(go(sYS AND ON A RIGHT Or REFUSAL WOULD MAKE
A CHALLEHGE INSPECTION REGIME INEFrECTIVE. NE
SAID THAT THE U.S. WA: PREPARED TO CONSIDER
SOVIET SUGGESTIONS roe ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF
PREVENTING ABUSE Of THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION
PROVISION AS LONG AS SUCH ALTERNATIVES PRESERVED
INE sAmE NIGH STANDARD OF EFFECTIVENESS. NAHUM
SAID THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS THE SWEDISH
Nom-PAPER AS THE SOVIETS SUGGESTED.
a
I. NANSEN SAID TIE U.S. DELEGATION CONTINUED
TO SEEK OPENNESS ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET
UNION CONCERNING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM.
LACK or RESPONSE TO U.S. PROPOSALS FOR ADVANCE
BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE WOULD ONLY PROLONG THE
NEGOTIATIONS ON A CU BAR.
S. PLENARY DISCUSSION --
A. NAZARKINE EMPHASIZED TNAT THE SOVIET UNION
HAD PRESENTED nal PROPOSALS AND IDEAS TO MEET
U.Z. CONCERNS, RUT ON TIE OTHER NAND, IN ITS
STA7EMENT, THE U.S. SIDE NAD CONFIRMED ITS 1384
POSI7104 AND REPEATED U.S. CRITIC!SM Or
s0vir7 PssiTioNc. NE URGED THE I.E. Sim TO
SNOW FLEXIBILITY TO SEEK A SOLUTION TC THE
NEGOTIATIONS, AND THUS MAKE MUTUAL CONCESSIONS
IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT.
INCOMING
1132 SS091.1 PAGE II GENEVA 111172 SO OF S4 2119435 1632
FOR TIE U.S. TO HE NONE FLEXIBLE AND PROVIDE
coNcEssIoNs.
I. NAIARKiNE REVIEWED THE CHANGING [NARA:TER
OF THE CV NEGOTIATIONS SINCE 1976. NE STATED
THAT IT APPEAREC TO NMI NOV THAT THE NEGOTIATION:
NAD ENTERED A NEW STAGE IN WHICH THE POSITION:
ARE UNDERSTOOD AND NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MULTILATERAL .
ARENA ARE MOVING WELL. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PROCEDURES
FOR THE CONDUCT OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD CHANGE.
NE RECOMMENDED THAT DURING THE CURRENT ROUND,
UNION NE TERMED A THREE-WEEK 'MARATHON, THE TWO -
DELEGATIONS :Homo ADDRESS ONE ISSUE AFTER ANOTHER,
RELYING ON DISMISSION RATHER THAN ON PREPARED
STATEMENTS.
C. NAZARKINE AGAIN PUSHED FOR DISCUSSION OF
ME SWEDISH NON-PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION
AND NOTED TRE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS WILLING
TO REFER THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE TO
MOSCOW.
D. FINALLY, NAZARKINE ALSO PUSHED FOR JOINT
DEVELOPMENT OF A PAPER ON THE RECIPROCAL
EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS DURING INSPECTIONS ON
EAU OTHERS SOIL.
?
E. NANSEN FORCEFULLY COUNTERED THE SOVIET CALL
ALERT COPY
-- NE NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD STOPPED CW
PRODUCTION IN ISIS. TIE SOVIETS HAD NOT STOPPED
PRODUCTION, BUT SAS PRODUCED THE voRLD'S.
e.AARGEST STOCKPILE. HE REMAINED THAT THE
SOVIETS GNAT STARTED TO SNOV INTEREST IN MOVING
FORWARD ON A CV BAN LAST YEAR.
?
^ NANSEN STATED THAT THE U.S. 1914 POSITION
1C31/311114 WAS NOT A "NAXIMALIST POSITION, BUT
ONE WORKED OUT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY TO ENSURE TIE ELIMINNTION
Of cu. THE IDEAS AND CONCEPT: IN C0/91/1 WERE
NOT PUT ON A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT BASIS RUT,
HE REMINDED, TNEY REFLECT CONDITIONS UNION ARE
SEEN AS VITAL TO PROTECT U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS.
? NANSEN CONTINUED BY STATING THAT THE U.S. WAS
IN GENEVA TO WORK OUT A BASIC CONVENTION THAT
WOULD MAKE CV A THING OF THE Pat AND WAS NOT
IN A'TURKISN RUG BAZAAR TO IARTER PRICE.
.. NE NOTED TIE DISTRUST BETWEEN THE TWO
COUNTRIES AND STATED THAT MISTRUST GROWS WHEN
THE SOVIETS WILL NOT EVEN ACKNOWLEDGE CV
P055655 ION.
F. IN RESPONDING TO NAZARKINE"S SUGGESTION
FOR A "NARATNON.LIKE" APPROACH DURING THIS
BILATERAL ROUND, NANSEN SAID THAT INTENSITY
IS NOT A MATTER Or TM, roc WE HAD ALREADY
BEEN NEGOTIATING FOR OVER TEN YEARS. INTENSITY.
RESULTS FRON ADDRESSING THE SUBSTANCE
SERIOUSLY. NANSEN RECOMMENDED THAT THIS WORK
PROCEED ON THE BASIS or THREE EXPERTS MEETINGS
PER WEEK WITH ADDITIONAL MEETINGS OF AMBASSADORS
AS REQUIRED. THIS WOULD ALLOW FOR PREPARATION,
EVALUATION AND CONSULTATION WITH WASHINGTON.
G. NAZARKINE ACCEPTED HANSEN'S PROPOSAL.
AGREEMENT WAS ALSO REACHED ON AGENDA Topics
FOR ROUND V: III CU PRODUCTION FACILITIES;
CD BILATERAL MEASURES; 01 CW STOCKPILE
DECLARATIONS AND VERIFICATION; MI CHALLENGE
INSPECTIONS; AND CO CV NON.PRODUCTION,
6. CDPIMENt: LACK OF SOVIET REFERENCE TO
' 1614 U.S. PROPOSALS FOR BILATERAL DATA
EXCHANGE AND FOR NTN-RELATED PROVISIONS
WAS NOTABLE. END GWENT.
. -2, MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
SECRET 3138
SS0,161
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SECRET
STATE GENEVA TEL [phone]
SECRET GENEVA 01967
EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
BODY
TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, SOVIET DRAFT
TEXT ON RECIPROCAL PARTICIPATION OF USSR AND U.S.
REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS
1. THIS IS CW BILAT -007. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE SOVIET TEXT FOR
RECIPROCAL PARTICIPATION OF SOVIET AND U.S.
REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE
INSPECTIONS ON EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY. THIS
TEXT WAS PROVIDED TO THE U.S. DEL DURING A
CW EXPERTS BILAT MEETING ON FEBRUARY 20, 1987.
THIS PAPER WILL BE FURTHER DISCUSSED DURING
AN EXPERTS MEETING SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 27.
DISCUSSIONS OF FEB 20 ARE REPORTED SEPTEL.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
(TITLE) RECIPROCAL PARTICIPATION OF USSR AND U.S.
REPRESENTATIVES, IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS
ON THE RESPECTIVE U.S. AND USSR TERRITORIES
STIPULATED BY THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (INFORMAL WORKING DOCUMENT)
-- GUIDED BY THEIR DESIRE TO ENHANCE MUTUAL
CONFIDENCE AND STRENGTHEN ASSURANCE OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AIMS AND PROVISIONS OF
THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS, THE USSR AND THE U.S. AGREE TO ASSURE
PARTICIPATION OF USSR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES,
ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY, IN INTERNATIONAL
ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ON THE RESPECTIVE U.S. AND
USSR TERRITORIES WHICH WILL BE SPECIFIED BY THE
CONVENTION. THE SIDES SHALL PROCEED FROM THE
APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS IN ARTICLE IX OF THE
CONVENTION.
-- THE EXISTENCE OF THIS UNDERSTANDING AND ITS
USE SHOULD NOT AFFECT THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. AS THOSE OF STATES
PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION.
-- EACH SIDE MAY UTILIZE THIS UNDERSTANDING
WITH RESPECT TO ANY INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE
SECRET
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INSPECTIONS -- BOTH ROUTINE AND CHALLENGE --
ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE WITH THE
PURPOSE OF VERIFYING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONVENTION.
-- THE SIDES WILL ASSIGN THEIR SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE PARTICIPATION IN
INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS AND WILL EXCHANGE
LISTS OF SUCH REPRESENTATIVES NOT LATER THAN
DAYS AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE
CONVENTION. THE LISTS ARE SUBJECT TO UPDATING
AS NEEDED. THE SIDES SHALL UNDERTAKE THE
NECESSARY MEASURES TO ASSIST THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE
INSPECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING.
-- THE SIDES WILL UTILIZE THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE
MECHANISM TO ASSIST IN THE CONSIDERATION OF ISSUES
PERTAINING TO THE RECIPROCAL PARTICIPATION OF USSR
AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE
INSPECTIONS ON THE RESPECTIVE USSR AND U.S. TERRITORIES.
-- THE SIDE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION IS TO TAKE PLACE SHALL, WITHOUT DELAY,
INFORM THE OTHER SIDE OF IT. HAVING RECEIVED SUCH
INFORMATION, THE OTHER SIDE MAY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
ITS RIGHT TO REQUEST THE PARTICIPATION OF ITS
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THIS INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION. IN THIS CASE, THE SIDE ON WHOSE
TERRITORY THE INSPECTION IS TO TAKE PLACE WILL
SATISFY THE REQUEST.
-- THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES SHALL ACCOMPANY
THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM IN THE CAPACITY
OF AN OBSERVER AND SHALL ENJOY THE SAME PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES AS THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION TEAM. HE WILL, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE
THE POSSIBILITY TO CARRY OUT HIS ACTIVITIES
WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE ASSIGNMENTS FACING THE
INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM, PARTICIPATE IN ALL
ENDEAVORS CARRIED OUT BY THE INSPECTION TEAM.
HE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS
RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT OF THE INSPECTION TO THE
RECEIVING SIDE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WILL NOT
INTERFERE IN THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM'S
EXECUTION OF ITS ACTIVITIES, WILL NOT INTERFERE
IN THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THIS TEAM AND THE
RECEIVING SIDE, AND WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN WRITING
THE TEAM'S REPORTS TO THE BODIES OF THE CONVENTION.
-- THE SIDE WHICH SENT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
SHALL COMMUNICATE TO THE OTHER SIDE, USING THE
BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM, THE BASIC
CONCLUSIONS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON
SECRET
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THE RESULTS OF HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
AND NOT LATER THAN DAYS AFTER THE COMPLETION
OF THE INSPECTION. END TEXT.
4. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
SECRET
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STATE GENEVA
SECRET GENEVA 01968
EXDIS
SECRET
TEL [phone]
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
BODY
TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, EXPERTS
MEETING, FEBRUARY 19, 1987
REF: STATE 44071
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-008 . (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY --
-- FEBRUARY 19 EXPERTS LEVEL MEETING WAS DEVOTED
TO DISCUSSION OF JOINT U.S.-SOVIET PAPER ON
CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. SOVIET SIDE APPEARED
EAGER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THIS PAPER.
THEY QUICKLY AGREED TO ACCEPT U.S. POSITION THAT
SPECIALIZED CW BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT MAY BE
CONVERTED ONLY AS AN EXCEPTION, BUT SAID THEY
WOULD HAVE TO STUDY OTHER CHANGES WHICH DEL
PROPOSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDANCE (REFTEL).
PAPER WILL BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AT FEBRUARY 23
MEETING. END SUMMARY.
3. AT FEBRUARY 19 MEETING U.S. AND SOVIET
EXPERTS REVIEWED JOINT U.S.-SOVIET PAPER ON
DEFINITION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION
FACILITY AND ASSOCIATED ELIMINATION AND
VERIFICATION MEASURES. SOVIET SIDE EMPHASIZED
THAT IT WISHED TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM
"PRAGMATICALLY," TAKING ACCOUNT OF U.S.
VIEWS. SOVIET SIDE QUICKLY ACCEPTED EARLIER
U.S. PROPOSAL THAT CONVERSION OF EQUIPMENT
AND BUILDINGS BE ALLOWED ONLY AS AN EXCEPTION,
REFLECTING CHANGE IN POSITION ANNOUNCED AT
FEBRUARY 18 CD PLENARY. HOWEVER, THEY SAID
THEY WOULD HAVE TO STUDY LANGUAGE CHANGES
PROPOSED BY U.S. SIDE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ROUND V GUIDANCE (REFTEL).
4. SOVIETS ASKED WHETHER U.S. STILL OPPOSES
SOVIET POSITION THAT CONVERTED SITES BE USED
ONLY FOR NON-MILITARY PEACEFUL PURPOSES.
IN THEIR VIEW, WHILE INSPECTION OF SUCH
FACILITIES WOULD BE ONE SAFEGUARD AGAINST
RECONVERSION, LIMITING THE ACTIVITY IN THE
CONVERTED FACILITY TO NON-MILITARY PURPOSES
SECRET
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SECRET
WOULD BE STILL ANOTHER. U.S. REPS POINTED
OUT THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD IMPOSE SPECIAL
RESTRICTIONS ON CONVERSION OF U.S. FACILITIES,
WHICH ARE MOSTLY ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.
PER GUIDANCE, DEL SAID ISSUE WAS CURRENTLY
UNDER STUDY IN WASHINGTON.
5. WITH REGARD TO EQUIPMENT FOR PRODUCING
CHEMICAL MUNITION PARTS, SOVIETS ASKED FOR
EXPLANATION OF U.S. PROPOSAL FOR DESTRUCTION
OF NON-STANDARD EQUIPMENT. SOVIET SIDE
REQUESTED THAT U.S. DEL PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF
SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE
DESTROYED. SINCE MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT USED
FOR PRODUCING CW MUNITIONS IS COMMON TO
CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS PRODUCTION, THEY
WERE CONCERNED THAT A SPECIAL DESTRUCTION
PROVISION MIGHT INVITE A CHALLENGE INSPECTION
THAT COULD CREATE MORE DOUBTS THAN IT WOULD
SOLVE. U.S. REPS SAID PROVISION WAS NEEDED
TO PREVENT RETENTION OF SPECIAL FORMS AND
DIES THAT WERE USED ONLY FOR CW PRODUCTION.
6. DELS AGREED ADDITIONAL WORK IS REQUIRED BY
EXPERTS TO SOLVE REMAINING DIFFERENCES.
BOTH SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF
THE JOINT PAPER DURING EXPERTS MEETING ON
FEBRUARY 23. SOVIETS APPEAR TO WANT A FINAL
AGREED PAPER BY THE END OF THIS ROUND OF
DISCUSSIONS.
7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
SECRET
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STATE GENEVA
SECRET GENEVA 02221
EXDIS
SECRET
TEL [phone]
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
BODY
TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, EXPERTS MEETING,
FEBRUARY 20, 1987
REFS: (A) GENEVA 1976 (CW BILAT-000)
- (B) 86 STATE 339047
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-009. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY --
-- AT MEETING OF EXPERTS ON FEBRUARY 20, SOVIET
DEL PROVIDED AND EXPLAINED A PAPER WHICH FLESHED
OUT THE PREVIOUSLY AGREED PRINCIPLE THAT EACH
SIDE WOULD PARTICIPATE IN INSPECTIONS OF THE
OTHER SIDE. THE SOVIETS ALSO PROPOSED THAT
PERMANENT POSITIONS FOR THE U.S. AND USSR ON THE
INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE BE THE SUBJECT OF A
CONFIDENTIAL "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT." U.S. DEL
PRESSED SOVIETS ON U.S. 1984 PROPOSAL FOR EARLY,
PRIVATE BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA. FOR THE FIRST
TIME SOVIETS ENTERED INTO EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, BUT
DID NOT MOVE AT ALL TOWARD U.S. POSITION. END
SUMMARY.
3. TOPICS --
-- THE THIRD EXPERTS MEETING OF ROUND V BILATS,
HELD FEBRUARY 20, WAS DEVOTED TO A DISCUSSION
OF BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS, SPECIFICALLY, U.S./USSR
OBSERVERS FOR INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS OF THE
OTHER SIDE AND EARLY, PRIVATE BILATERAL DATA
EXCHANGE.
4. U.S./USSR OBSERVERS FOR INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS --
-- SOVIET DEL PRESENTED A PAPER ON "RECIPROCAL
PARTICIPATION OF USSR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES,
IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ON THE
RESPECTIVE U.S. AND USSR TERRITORIES STIPULATED
BY THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS" (REF A).
THE PAPER, WHILE GENERALLY IN LINE WITH U.S.
VIEWS (REF B), CONTAINS UNACCEPTABLE REFERENCE
TO INSPECTIONS ON "USSR TERRITORIES" RATHER THAN
BROAD FORMULA NECESSARY TO COVER ALL SOVIET BASES
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REGARDLESS OF LOCATION. THE PAPER PROVIDES FOR
THE EXCHANGE OF LISTS OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PERTAINING TO FORTHCOMING
INSPECTIONS, "OBSERVER" STATUS FOR U.S./USSR
REPRESENTATIVES, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE
U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES AND THE COMMUNICATION
OF COMMENTS TO THE INSPECTED STATE.
-- U.S. DEL WELCOMED SOVIET PAPER AND SAID
IT WOULD RESPOND AFTER GIVING PAPER CAREFUL
STUDY.
-- U.S. DEL QUESTIONED SOVIETS AS TO THE
REPORTING CHAIN OF U.S./USSR OBSERVERS WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAMS. SOVIETS
ENVISION OBSERVER REPORTS GOING BACK TO THE
OBSERVER'S GOVERNMENT. OBSERVER'S GOVERNMENT
WOULD THEN FORWARD ITS COMMENTS TO INSPECTED STATE.
5. CONFIDENTIAL AGREEMENT ON STAFFING INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTORATE --
- SOV DEL PROPOSED A "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT"
WHEREBY U.S. AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS WOULD TRY
TO ENSURE THAT AN AMERICAN HEADED THE SECTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE RESPONSIBLE
FOR INSPECTIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT
A SOVIET HEADED THE SECTION RESPONSIBLE FOR
INSPECTIONS IN THE U.S. SOVIET RATIONALE FOR
THIS WAS INCREASED CONFIDENCE IN EACH SIDE'S
KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITIES/EVENTS IN THE OTHER
COUNTRY. THEY CITED AS PRECEDENT UN POSITIONS
WHICH ARE TRADITIONALLY HELD BY THE SAME COUNTRY.
THEY SAID THERE MAY ALSO BE A SIMILAR IAEA
ARRANGEMENT. THE SOVIETS EMPHASIZED THIS WAS
A CONFIDENTIAL PROPOSAL. U.S. DEL QUESTIONED
SOVIETS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR MULTILATERAL
ACCUSATIONS OF U.S./USSR MONOPOLY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTORATE. SOVIET DEL POINTED OUT THAT THE
INSPECTION TEAMS IN THE U.S. OR USSR WOULD
CONTAIN INSPECTORS FROM A VARIETY OF COUNTRIES.
U.S. DEL AGREED TO REFER THE MATTER TO WASHINGTON
FOR CONSIDERATION.
6. EARLY, PRIVATE, BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE --
-- U.S. DEL PRESSED SOVIETS HARD AND AT LENGTH
ON THE NEED FOR PRIVATE BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE
PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF CONVENTION.
-- SOVIET DEL RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE THE
U.S. ATTACHES TO THIS MEASURE, BUT THEY REMAINED
UNCONVINCED OF ITS NECESSITY PRIOR TO SIGNATURE.
HOWEVER, RATHER THAN REJECTING THE CONCEPT OUT
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OF HAND AS IN THE PAST, SOVIETS TOOK A
"PERSUADE ME" ATTITUDE WHEN DISCUSSING THE TOPIC.
THEY RAISED HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE
CONVENTION MIGHT NOT BE SIGNED OR RATIFIED EVEN
AFTER THE EARLY EXCHANGE. THEY ALSO ASKED WHAT
WOULD HAPPEN IF THE ACCURACY OF THE DATA PROVIDED
WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER SIDE. FINALLY, THEY
CITED EXAMPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH DATA
EXCHANGE HAD NOT LED TO AN
AGREEMENT (MBFR) OR TO U.S. RATIFICATION (SALT II, TTBT
AND PNET.
-- U.S. DEL COUNTERED THAT EARLY DATA EXCHANGE
WAS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE WHICH COULD
HELP GIVE BOTH SIDES CONFIDENCE THEY NEED TO
HAVE BEFORE SIGNING THE CONVENTION. THE DATA
EXCHANGE WOULD PROCEED IN TWO STAGES, FROM
GENERAL TO SPECIFIC, ALLOWING BOTH SIDES TO
ASSESS ITS VALIDITY AND WORK OUT PROBLEMS BEFORE
A CONVENTION WAS SIGNED. THIS WOULD ALSO ALLOW
AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE SOME OF THE PROPOSED
VERIFICATION MEASURES. U.S. DEL POINTED OUT
EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGES
AND REJECTED INSINUATION THAT THE U.S. MIGHT
TRY TO TAKE SOVIET DATA WITH NO INTENTION OF
SIGNING OR RATIFYING THE CONVENTION.
-- U.S. DEL POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. HAD
PUBLICLY PROVIDED IN JULY 1986 THE KIND OF
DATA BEING DISCUSSED, AND NOW ASKED THE
SOVIETS TO PROVIDE COMPARABLE DATA PRIVATELY.
SOVIET DEL COUNTERED THAT THERE WERE "CERTAIN
DISCREPANCIES" BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET
DATA REGARDING U.S. SITES. THEY PROMISED
ELABORATION IN TWO TO THREE WEEKS FROM A
BOOK RECENTLY PUBLISHED IN MOSCOW.
-- SOVIET DEL ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. INTENDED
THE DATA EXCHANGE TO INCLUDE ALL U.S. BASES
INCLUDING THOSE IN EUROPE. U.S. DEL SAID YES.
7. COMMENT: THIS MEETING REPRESENTS FIRST
TIME SOVIETS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO HAVE EXCHANGE
OF VIEWS ON U.S. DATA EXCHANGE PROPOSAL, WHICH
THEY HAVE VIRTUALLY IGNORED SINCE IT WAS
PRESENTED TWO-AND-A-HALF YEARS AGO. THEY
CAST THEMSELVES, HOWEVER, IN A SKEPTICAL
LISTENING AND QUESTIONING MODE AND WERE
UNWILLING TO MOVE TOWARD U.S. POSITION, TO
MAKE COUNTER PROPOSALS OR DISCUSS DETAILS.
SOVIETS MERELY HINTED THAT MAYBE SOMETHING
COULD BE WORKED OUT LATER. U.S. RESPONDED
THAT PUTTING OFF ISSUE WOULD SIMPLY PROLONG
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. END COMMENT.
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8. THE NEXT EXPERTS MEETING WAS SCHEDULED
FOR FEBRUARY 23 TO DISCUSS THE DECLARATION
OF STOCKPILE LOCATIONS.
9. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE
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SECRET
STATE GENEVA TEL [phone]
SECRET GENEVA 02222
EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
BODY
TAGS: FARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, FEBRUARY 23, 1987
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-010. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY--
-- THE FOURTH EXPERTS MEETING OF U.S./SOVIET
BILATERALS FOCUSSED ON (1) DECLARATION AND INTERIM
MONITORING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES AND (2)
JOINT PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. SOVIETS
HAD NO PROBLEM WITH U.S. APPROACH TO CW STOCKPILE
MONITORING REQUIREMENTS REFLECTED IN CD/516. THEY
ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR AND AGREED TO THE USE OF
ON-SITE SENSORS, REMOTE MONITORING OF THESE SENSORS,
AND ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION THROUGH ON-SITE INSPECTORS.
CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF DRAFT JOINT DISCUSSION PAPER
ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES RESULTED IN SOVIET AGREE-
MENT WITH U.S. POSITION ON SEVERAL PREVIOUSLY DISAGREED
POINTS. SEVERAL MAJOR POINTS REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED,
HOWEVER. END SUMMARY.
3. AT MEETING OF EXPERTS ON FEBRUARY 23, TWO
TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED: MONITORING DECLARED
CW STOCKPILE LOCATIONS AND CW PRODUCTION
FACILITIES.
4. MONITORING DECLARED CW STOCKPILE LOCATIONS --
A. IN RESPONSE TO U.S. QUESTION, SOVIET REP
(BERDENNIKOV) STATED THAT PHRASE "PERMANENT
USE OF INSTRUMENTS", AS USED IN NAZARKIN'S
FEB 17 PLENARY SPEECH IN SECTION ON STOCKPILE
MONITORING, COULD INCLUDE REMOTE MONITORING
OF THOSE INSTRUMENTS, JUST AS IN THE CASE OF
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING. THE SOVIET SIDE
COULD AGREE TO THE USE OF MONITORING DEVICES,
TO ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, OR TO A COMBINATION
OF BOTH IF NECESSARY, FOR VERIFICATION.
B. SOVIET REP SAID THAT CW STOCKPILE SITES WOULD
CONTINUE TO BE OPEN TO MANDATORY CHALLENGE ON-SITE
INSPECTION AFTER THE CW STOCKS HAD BEEN REMOVED.
C. U.S. REP PRESSED FOR SOVIET REACTION TO U.S.
CD WORKING PAPER, "THE DECLARATION AND INTERIM
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MONITORING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES"
(CD/516; JUL 13, 1984). DOCUMENT ILLUSTRATES
U.S. POSITION THAT USE OF A COMBINATION OF
REMOTELY-MONITORED ON-SITE SENSORS AND SYSTEMATIC
ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ARE ESSENTIAL FOR STOCKPILE
MONITORING. SOVIET REP SAID THAT THEY ARE
PREPARED TO ACCEPT REMOTE MONITORING OF ON-SITE
DEVICES AND THE OTHER VERIFICATION METHODS SUGGESTED
IN THE PAPER.
-- U.S. DELOFF (LOVELACE) ALSO HIGHLIGHTED FACT
THAT PERIODIC STOCKPILE SAFETY CHECKS MUST CONTINUE.
STOCKS CANNOT BE SIMPLY SEALED UP UNTIL THEY ARE
FINALLY REMOVED FOR DESTRUCTION. THESE SAFETY REQUIRE-
MENTS RESULT IN A DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT WHICH WILL REQUIRE
A COMPLEX MONITORING SYSTEM AND CONTINUING INFORMATION
FLOW TO THE MONITORING BODY. PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY
ARISES BETWEEN TIME OF FIRST INSPECTION AND TIME
MONITORING SYSTEM IS FULLY OPERATIONAL.
-- SOVIET REP AGREED WITH U.S. COMMENTS AND STATED
THAT THERE MAY BE A HIGH REQUIREMENT FOR ROUTINE ON-
SITE INSPECTIONS, POSSIBLY EVEN CONTINUOUS PRESENCE OF
INSPECTORS DURING SOME PERIODS, SUCH AS THE PERIOD PRIOR
TO INSTALLATION OF SENSORS. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE
PREPARED TO ACCEPT WHATEVER IS REQUIRED TO ENSURE AN
EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME.
D. THE SOVIET SIDE SAID IT BELIEVED A DIFFERENT
DETAILED PLAN FOR MONITORING WILL BE DEVELOPED
FOR EACH DECLARED SITE BASED ON THE MODEL
AGREEMENTS CONCEPT. THE DETAILED PLANS SHOULD
NOT BE INCORPORATED INTO THE BODY OF THE CONVENTION.
HOWEVER, THE CW CONVENTION SHOULD INCLUDE A
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO
ENSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.
5. CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) PRODUCTION FACILITIES--
A. DELEGATIONS CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF THE JOINT CW
PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER DEVELOPED DURING PREVIOUS TWO
ROUNDS.
B. THE TWO SIDES DISCUSSED AT LENGTH HOW TO FORMULATE
THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "CW PRODUCTION FACILITY."
SOVIET REP EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT A STATE COULD EVADE
DECLARATION REQUIREMENTS BY ARGUING THAT PRODUCTION OF
A NERVE AGENT HAD NOT BEEN "FOR CW PURPOSES." US REP,
WHILE SHARING CONCERN ABOUT LOOPHOLES, SOUGHT TO AVOID
INCLUDING FACILITIES THAT HAD ONLY MADE SMALL QUANTITIES
OF AGENTS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL, PROTECTIVE OR RESEARCH
PURPOSES. SOVIETS ACCEPTED U.S. POINT. TWO SIDES
AGREED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO BASIC DIFFERENCES
AND THAT TOPIC SHOULD BE TAKEN UP AGAIN AT A LATER
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MEETING.
C. SOVIETS ACCEPTED CONCEPT OF "MAIN PRODUCTION TRAIN"
PROPOSED BY U.S. DEL PER ROUND IV GUIDANCE PAPER
(86 STATE 343781). THEY ALSO ACCEPTED VIRTUALLY ALL
AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY U.S. DEL PER ROUND V GUIDANCE
(STATE 44071, PARA 38).
D. IN TWO CASES, SOVIETS SOUGHT TIGHTER RESTRICTIONS
THAN THOSE PROPOSED BY U.S. DEL PURSUANT TO INSTRUC-
TIONS. THEY SOUGHT TO NARROW OPTION FOR REUSE OF
SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT AND TO TIGHTEN UP U.S. REFERENCE
TO "PREVAILING COMMERCIAL INDUSTRY STANDARDS FOR
FACILITIES NOT PRODUCING SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL OR
CORROSIVE CHEMICALS." (COMMENT: U.S. HAD CRAFTED ITS
ORIGINAL LANGUAGE ON REUSE OF EQUIPMENT TO PROTECT U.S.
CHEMICAL COMPANIES FROM DESTRUCTION OF THEIR FACILITIES
IF THEY HAD PROVIDED PINACOYL ALCOHOL FOR BINARY
PROGRAM. OBVIOUSLY, THIS ARGUMENT CANNOT BE USED WITH
SOVIETS, SINCE U.S. INTEREST IN NERVE AGENT SOMAN IS
CLASSIFIED. PROPOSAL RELATING TO INDUSTRY STANDARDS
SEEMS TO BE A "NON-SEQUITUR" WITHOUT PRACTICAL EFFECT.
END COMMENT.)
E. SOVIET SIDE SAID THAT THEY WOULD NO LONGER INSIST
THAT REUSE OF CONVERTED CW PRODUCTION BUILDINGS BE
RESTRICTED TO NON-MILITARY PURPOSES. THEY COULD ACCEPT
USE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY COULD
NOW ACCEPT EITHER APPROACH AND IT WAS UP TO THE U.S.
TO INDICATE WHICH APPROACH IT PREFERRED. PER
INSTRUCTIONS, U.S. REP SAID THE ISSUE WAS BEING STUDIED
IN WASHINGTON.
F. IN ORDER TO MEET U.S. CONCERNS, THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED
U.S. SUGGESTION THAT THE WORD "BUILDING" SHOULD INCLUDE
UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES.
G. AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED ON HOW EXCESS PRODUCTION
CAPACITY FOR DUAL-PURPOSE KEY PRECURSORS SHOULD BE
ADDRESSED. SOVIET SIDE ARGUED THAT U.S. LANGUAGE
(DRAWN FROM ROUND IV GUIDANCE) WOULD CREATE A LOOPHOLE
SINCE IT COVERED ONLY CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT A STATE
DECLARED HAD MADE KEY PRECURSOR CHEMICALS FOR CW USE
IN THE PAST. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED
CONCERN THAT SOME WESTERN CHEMICAL PLANTS THAT HAD
FURNISHED KEY PRECURSORS FOR THE IRAQI CW PROGRAM,
SUCH AS THOSE MENTIONED IN A RECENT BBC DOCUMENTARY,
WOULD NOT BE COVERED. U.S. REP NOTED THAT SOVIET
APPROACH ALSO COVERED PLANTS THAT HAD NEVER PROVIDED
KEY PRECURSORS FOR CW PRODUCTION AND SAID THAT BROADER
ISSUE OF EXCESS CAPACITY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN
CONNECTION WITH CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING REGIME.
H. SOVIET DEL ALSO RAISED THE BASIC QUESTION OF
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WHETHER MILITARY MUNITIONS HARDWARE FACTORIES SHOULD
FALL WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF A CW PRODUCTION FACILITY.
BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE PRODUCTION OF METAL PARTS
FOR CW WOULD NORMALLY BE AN AUXILLARY PART OF THE
PLANTS PRODUCTION PROCESS. FOCUS SHOULD REMAIN ON
DESTRUCTION OF THE SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT USED FOR CW
HARDWARE PRODUCTION. THE CONVENTION SHOULD NOT IMPACT
ON NON-CW RELATED ACTIVITIES OF FACILITIES.
I. SOVIET DEL SUGGESTED THAT UNRESOLVED SECTIONS
(KEY PRECURSORS, MUNITIONS HARDWARE) BE DROPPED IN
ORDER TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON THE CURRENT PAPER SO IT
COULD BE INTRODUCED IN CD. WORK COULD CONTINUE ON
OMITTED SECTIONS. U.S. REP REPLIED THAT THESE ISSUES
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED NOW RATHER THAN LATER. DISCUSSION
WILL CONTINUE ON PAPER DURING A FUTURE EXPERTS MEETING.
6. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO DISCUSS THE CHALLENGE
INSPECTION ISSUE AT THE WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, CW
EXPERTS MEETING.
7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
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STATE GENEVA
SECRET GENEVA 02377
EXDIS
SECRET
TEL [phone]
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
BODY
TAGS: FARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, EXPERTS MEETING,
FEBRUARY 25, 1987.
REFS: (A) STATE 42809
- (B) GENEVA 2145
- (C) STATE 51601
1. THIS IS CW BILAT -011. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
-2. SUMMARY --
-- AT FEBRUARY 25 MEETING ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION,
U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS ADDRESSED: (1) RELEVENT
FACILITIES AND ACCESS QUESTION, (2) POSSIBLE
ALTERNATIVES TO UNRESTRICTED ACCESS, (3).SAFEGUARDS
AGAINST MISUSE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION, AND
(4) SOVIET VIEWS ON U.S. PROPOSAL FOR MANDATORY
(ARTICLE X) AND NON-MANDATORY (ARTICLE XI)
CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN U.S. DRAFT TREATY
(CD/500). U.S. DEL EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE
U.S. ATTACHES TO TREATY PROVISION FOR MANDATORY,
SHORT-NOTICE CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF ALL RELEVANT
FACILITIES TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS PROPOSED BY
POSSIBLE CLANDESTINE CW STOCKS AND PRODUCTION
FACILITIES.
-- SOVIETS SAID THEY ALSO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO
CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND COULD ACCEPT EITHER UK
OR SWEDISH CHALLENGE INSPECTION VARIANTS AS BASIS
FOR NEGOTIATION. SOVIETS SAID THEY WILL ACCEPT
MANDATORY ONSITE INSPECTION FOR ALL DECLARED
LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES, INCLUDING THOSE NOT
SUBJECT TO ROUTINE INSPECTION.IN OTHER CASES,
ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS UP TO AND INCLUDING
PARTIAL ACCESS COULD BE AGREED UPON. SOVIETS
SAID THEY APPRECIATE UNDECLARED STOCKS POSE
DIFFICULT PROBLEM AND WISH TO SOLVE PROBLEM IN
WAY WHICH MEETS THE CONCERNS OF BOTH THE
CHALLENGER AND THE CHALLENGED STATE. SOVIETS
ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT U.S. "TWO-TIERED"
APPROACH--I.E., ARTICLE X AND XI AND DISTINCTION
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SITES--PROVIDE BASIS
FOR DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT. THEY SUGGESTED
U.S. DELETE ARTICLE XI.
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-- DISCUSSION WAS DETAILED AND WIDERANGING, WITH
SOVIETS SEEKING TO CONVEY ATTITUDE OF FLEXIBILITY.
POSITIONS REMAIN FAR APART. HOWEVER, IN SOME
RESPECTS SOVIET POSITION NOW SEEMS AT LEAST
SLIGHTLY STRICTER THAN THAT IN UK PROPOSAL.
END SUMMARY.
3. FEBRUARY 25 EXPERTS MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO
CHALLENGE INSPECTION. DRAWING ON GUIDANCE
(REF A), U.S. DEL EXPLAINED U.S. POSITION AND
PRESSED SOVIETS TO CLARIFY THEIR POSITION.
-- SOVIETS SAID THEY ALSO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO
CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND COULD ACCEPT EITHER UK
OR SWEDISH CHALLENGE INSPECTION VARIENTS AS BASIS
FOR NEGOTIATION. SOVIETS SAID THEY WILL ACCEPT
MANDATORY ONSITE INSPECTION FOR ALL DECLARED
LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES. IN OTHER CASES.
ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS UP TO AND INCLUDING
PARTIAL ACCESS COULD BE AGREED UPON. SOVIETS
SAID THEY APPRECIATE UNDECLARED STOCKS POSE
DIFFICULT PROBLEM AND WISH TO SOLVE PROBLEM IN
WAY WHICH MEETS THE CONCERNS OF BOTH THE
CHALLENGER AND THE CHALLENGED STATE. SOVIETS
ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT U.S. "TWO-TIERED"
APPROACH--I.E., ARTICLE X AND XI AND DISTINCTION
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SITES--PROVIDE BASIS
FOR DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT. THEY SUGGESTED
U.S. DELETE ARTICLE XI.
4. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS --
-- U.S. REP (MIKULAK) OPENED THE DISCUSSION
BY NOTING THE IMPORTANCE U.S. ATTRIBUTES TO
A PROVISION FOR MANDATORY, SHORT-NOTICE
CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF ALL RELEVANT FACILITIES
AS BOTH A DETERRENT AND A WAY TO RESTORE
CONFIDENCE WHEN CONCERNS ARISE. HE EMPHASIZED
THE NEED TO ADDRESS EFFECTIVELY THE PROBLEMS
POSED BY POSSIBLE UNDECLARED CW STOCKPILES
AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES.
-- SOVIET REP (BERDENNIKOV) REPLIED THAT
SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERS CHALLENGE INSPECTION
ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND DIFFICULT ISSUES
IN THE CW BAN NEGOTIATIONS. CHALLENGE INSPECTION
IS A NECESSARY PART OF A CW BAN AND THE USSR
FAVORS AN EFFECTIVE CHALLENGE INSPECTION SYSTEM
WHICH WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE
CONCERNS OF ALL PARTIES. IN 1986, THE USSR
HAD TAKEN A MAJOR STEP BY AGREEING TO USE UK
CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL AS THE BASIS FOR
NEGOTIATIONS AND WAS INTERESTED IN U.S.
DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON THIS PROPOSAL AS WELL AS
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ON THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL (REF B). HE SAID THE
SOVIET SIDE WAS OPEN-MINDED; IT COULD ACCEPT
EITHER PROPOSAL AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION
AND WAS ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THE DIFFICULTIES
THE U.S. HAS WITH THE UK PROPOSAL. HE NOTED
U.S. OPPOSITION TO PROPOSALS THAT PROVIDE FOR
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REVIEW OF REQUESTS AND STRESSED
THAT THE UK PROPOSAL, WHICH THE USSR CAN ACCEPT
AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, HAS NO SUCH FILTER.
(COMMENT: THIS REMARK TENDS TO CONFIRM PRIVATE
INDICATION TO DELOFF THAT SOVIETS ARE BACKING
AWAY FROM THE CHANGES THEY PROPOSED TO THE EK
PROPOSAL, SUCH AS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REVIEW OF
REQUESTS. END COMMENT.)
-- U.S. DEL REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION
OF EITHER THE UK OR SWEDISH PROPOSALS. INSTEAD,
U.S. SIDE NOTED (1) NEED TO MEET REQUIREMENTS OF
U.S. PROPOSAL, WHICH PROVIDES FOR SHORT-NOTICE,
MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF ANY SUSPECTED
SITE; (2) U.S. CONCERNS THAT ANY RIGHT OF REFUSAL
WILL ENABLE A STATE INTERESTED IN VIOLATING THE
TREATY TO ESTABLISH SANCTUARIES AND MISUSE THE
RIGHT OF REFUSAL; AND (3) GREAT DIFFICULTIES
U.S. SIDE WOULD HAVE WITH CONCEPT OF SUBMITTING
CHALLENGE INSPECTION REQUESTS TO ANY VOTING
PROCEDURE.
5. RELEVANT FACILITIES AND ACCESS QUESTION --
-- THE SOVIET SIDE SAID THAT IT WOULD ACCEPT
MANDATORY CHALLENGE ON-SITE INSPECTION WITH
NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL FOR ALL LOCATIONS AND
FACILITIES DECLARED UNDER THE TREATY, EVEN
THOSE NOT SUBJECT TO ROUTINE INSPECTION.
- BERDENNIKOV SAID THE USSR WAS PREPARED
TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO ANY SITE CONNECTED WITH
CW. IN THIS RESPECT, THE USSR WANTED "ABSOLUTE
TRANSPARENCY" BUT WAS CONCERNED THAT THE
CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION NOT BE MISUSED.
THE SOVIET SIDE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE
EFFORTS BY A PARTY TO SEEK UNWARRANTED ACCESS
TO NON-CW-RELATED SITES TO OBTAIN STATE
SECRETS. THE PROBLEM WAS WHERE TO DRAW THE
LINE BETWEEN WHAT IS RELEVANT AND WHAT IS NOT.
PLANTS WITH A CW PRODUCTION CAPABILITY SHOULD
BE COVERED. IN OTHER CASES, ALTERNATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE AGREED UPON. THE NATURE
OF THE ARRANGEMENTS -- BEGINNING WITH PROVISION
OF DATA AND GOING UP TO PARTIAL ACCESS -- WOULD
DEPEND ON THE SPECIFIC CASE.
-- U.S. SIDE COUNTERED THAT THE ISSUE WAS
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WHERE SUSPICIONS AS TO CLANDESTINE PRODUCTION
AND STOCKPILING MIGHT BE MOST LIKELY TO ARISE.
FOR EXAMPLE, THE UNITS WHICH MIGHT EMPLOY CW
MIGHT NOT BE CHEMICAL TROOPS. THESE UNITS
AND THEIR STORAGE SITES WOULD BE APPROPRIATE
TARGETS FOR MANDATORY CHALLENGE. VIOLATIONS
ARE MORE LIKELY TO OCCUR AT SECURED SENSITIVE
MILITARY SITES THAN AT SITES TO WHICH ACCESS
IS NOT RESTRICTED. SINCE STOCKS CAN BE MOVED
QUICKLY, ANY DELAY WOULD FAVOR A VIOLATOR.
U.S. SIDE SAW NO REASON WHY ANY MILITARY
FACILITY MIGHT NOT BE RELEVANT TO A CW
CONVENTION. IF SOME SITES WERE EXCLUDED
FROM CHALLENGE, THE CONVENTION COULD NOT BE
EFFECTIVE.
^ BERDENNIKOV REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE
REALIZES THAT THE PROBLEM OF UNDECLARED
STOCKPILES IS A VERY DIFFICULT ONE. IT HAD
BEEN THE SUBJECT OF THE MOST RECENT UK-SOVIET
CW DISCUSSIONS (REF C). THE SOVIET SIDE HAD
ASKED THE BRITISH HOW THEIR CONCEPT OF
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES WOULD DEAL WITH CASES
OF SUSPECTED CW STOCKS AND WHETHER THERE
WOULD BE ALTERNATIVES TO INSPECTING THE SITE
WHERE THE WEAPONS ARE. THE BRITISH HAD LITTLE
TO SAY BUT HAD SAID THAT PARTIAL ACCESS MIGHT
BE SUFFICIENT. THE SOVIET SIDE FAVORS
CARRYING OUT CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS IN THE
SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME AND IS INTERESTED IN
RESOLVING THE PROBLEM IN A WAY WHICH MEETS THE
CONCERNS OF BOTH THE CHALLENGER AND THE CHALLENGED
STATE. (NOTE: AT RECEPTION SAME EVENING SOVIET
DELOFF SMIDOVICH VOLUNTEERED SEPARATELY TO TWO
U.S. DELOFFS THAT HE FOUND PERSUASIVE THE U.S.
ARGUMENTS THAT ON-SITE ACCESS WAS THE ONLY
WAY TO RESOLVE CONCERNS ABOUT CLANDESTINE STOCKS.)
-- U.S. SIDE POINTED TO THE INCONSISTENCY
IN THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR VERY STRICT VERIFICATION
OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND SOVIET RELUCTANCE
TO PERMIT CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN OTHER AREAS.
- BERDENNIKOV RESPONDED THAT THE TWO
SITUATIONS WERE NOT COMPARABLE. THE SOVIET
UNION FAVORS MANDATORY CHALLENGE OF CHEMICAL
INDUSTRY SITES WITH A POTENTIAL FOR CW
PRODUCTION. HOWEVER, ADDED SOVIET CHEMICAL
INDUSTRY REP, THERE ARE ALSO SENSITIVE
NON-CW-RELATED PARTS OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY.
HE CITED EXAMPLES CONNECTED WITH MILITARY OR
SPACE-RELATED PROGRAMS.
-- U.S. SIDE REPLIED THAT U.S. IS PREPARED
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TO SUBMIT SUCH A SITE TO MANDATORY CHALLENGE
INSPECTION; U.S. EXCLUDES NO/NO SITES.
6. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES --
-- U.S. SIDE PROBED THE SOVIETS ON ALTERNATIVE
MEASURES AND HOW THEY ENVISAGE THEM WORKING.
DEL MADE CLEAR U.S. DOES NOT RULE OUT ALTERNATIVE
MEASURES. HOWEVER, THE MEASURES WOULD HAVE TO
OCCUR QUICKLY AND IF AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE
REACHED ON SUCH MEASURES, THEN AN INSPECTION
MUST OCCUR.
-- THE SOVIETS SAID THAT THE INSPECTION
SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE SHORTEST TIME AND
THAT ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE
USED TO NULIFY THE OBJECTIVE OF THE CHALLENGE
INSPECTION. PROCEDURES COULD BE ELABORATED
TO FACILITATE THE ARRIVAL OF THE INSPECTION
TEAM AT THE SITE IN QUESTION AS QUICKLY AS
POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, THE CHALLENGER COULD NOT
SIMPLY HAVE CARTE BLANCHE ACCESS.
-- SOVIET SIDE SAID IT DID NOT PRECLUDE
ANY ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. THEY CITED AS
EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES:
(1) AN AIR SURVEY, (2) ANALYSIS OF
INDUSTRIAL WASTE WATER, AND (3) PARTIAL
ACCESS.-
7. MISUSE ISSUE --
-- U.S. SIDE ASKED WHETHER SOVIETS WERE
CONCERNED PRIMARILY ABOUT POSSIBLE U.S.-
SOVIET BILATERAL ACTIONS. IN SUCH CASES,
U.S. REPS NOTED THE ABILITY OF A STATE TO
RETALIATE WOULD DETER IMPROPER REQUESTS.
IF, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED
ABOUT STATES "WITH NOTHING TO LOSE," THE
FACT-FINDING PANEL WOULD SCREEN OUT SUCH
REQUESTS.
- BERDENNIKOV REPLIED THAT IN TIMES OF
STRAINED RELATIONS, ONE SIDE MIGHT FIND IT
POLITICALLY USEFUL TO MISUSE THE CONVENTION.
THE USSR CONSIDERS THAT THE NNA WILL NOT
ACCEPT THE FACT-FINDING PANEL.
8. DISCRIMINATION ISSUE --
-- THE SOVIETS ASKED ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN U.S. ARTICLE X AND ARTICLE XI AND
ABOUT ACCESS TO PRIVATE DWELLINGS AND
TERRITORY UNDER THE U.S. PROPOSAL. BERDENNIKOV
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SAID THAT "THE BIGGEST PROBLEM" ARTICLE X
POSES FOR THE SOVIET SIDE IS THAT IT IS
BASED ON A DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT-
OWNED OR CONTROLLED SITES, ON THE ONE HAND,
AND PRIVATE SITES, ON THE OTHER. BECAUSE
OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET
SYSTEMS, THIS COULD RESULT IN A DISCRIMINATORY
SYSTEM. THE FACT THAT THE UK AND SWEDISH
PROPOSALS DO NOT MAKE A DISTINCTION OF THIS
SORT MAKES THEM MORE ATTRACTIVE THAN ARTICLE X
TO THE SOVIET SIDE. SOVIET DEL ASKED WHAT
PURPOSE ARTICLE XI SERVES AND WHETHER IT WAS
REALLY NECESSARY SINCE U.S. WAS ARGUING
EVERYTHING COULD BE COVERED BY ARTICLE X.
BERDENNIKOV CALLED THE U.S. APPROACH "TWO-
TIERED." THE USSR, ON THE OTHER HAND,
THINKS THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFERENTIATION
BETWEEN SITES AND THAT THE SAME CHALLENGE
INSPECTION REGIMES AND ONE SET OF PROCEDURES
SHOULD APPLY TO ALL RELEVANT LOCATIONS AND
FACILITIES.
-- U.S. SIDE EXPLAINED THAT ARTICLE X WAS
DEVELOPED TO REACH ANY ACTIVITY OR LOCATION
WHICH COULD BE SUSPECTED OF A CW TREATY
VIOLATION IRRESPECTIVE OF OWNERSHIP. THE
U.S. PROPOSAL IS NOT INTENDED TO BE
DISCRIMINATORY. HOWEVER, IF THE SOVIET SIDE
HAS SUGGESTIONS FOR ELIMINATING PERCEIVED
DISCRIMINATORY ASPECTS, THE U.S. SIDE WOULD
LIKE TO HEAR THEM.
- BERDENNIKOV SUGGESTED THAT ELIMINATING
ARTICLE XI AND DEALING WITH THE "PRIVATE
DWELLING" PROBLEM BY MEANS OF A FOOTNOTE
MIGHT BE ONE SOLUTION. HE ASKED WHETHER
THE U.S. SIDE WAS PREPARED TO SAY PRIVATE
DWELLINGS DO NOT INCLUDE PRIVATELY-OWNED
LAND AND WHETHER THE U.S. COULD ASSURE
UNDELAYED ACCESS TO DWELLINGS.
-- U.S. NOTED THAT ARTICLE XI PROVIDED A WAY FOR
STATES NOT ON THE FACT-FINDING PANEL TO MAKE NON-MANDATORY
CHALLENGE INSPECTION REQUESTS. RESPONDING TO SOVIET
DOUBTS THAT THE NNA MOULD ACCEPT VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE
U.S. APPROACH, U.S. SIDE SAID THAT IN OUR VIEW THE U.S.
PROPOSALS CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED. THE NNA IS
RELUCTANT TO GET EMBROILED IN ANY U.S.-SOVIET
DISAGREEMENT. HOWEVER, IF MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON CAN
REACH AGREEMENT, THEN THE NNA WILL ACCEPT BOTH ARTICLE
X AND XI. AS FOR DWELLINGS, THE TERM "PRIVATE" IS NOT
A USEFUL ONE. SOME HOMES IN THE U.S. ARE PUBLICLY-
OWNED, AND THE U.S. PROPOSAL CONCERNS HOMES OR
RESIDENCES IRRESPECTIVE OF OWNERSHIP. THE U.S. DOES
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NOT ANTICIPATE DELAYS IN OBTAINING ACCESS AND CAN ASSURE
THE SOVIET SIDE THAT IT WILL COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF THE CONVENTION.
-- U.S. SIDE THEN ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET
SIDE WOULD ACCEPT ARTICLE X IF ARTICLE XI
WERE REMOVED. BERDENNIKOV REPLIED THAT THE
U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD THEN BE QUITE DIFFERENT
AND THAT IF THE TWO SIDES COULD ALSO WORK
OUT ALTERNATIVE MEASURES THEN THE SIDES
WOULD BE "ON THE RIGHT TRACK." ALSO, IF THE
U.S. COULD CONVINCE THE SOVIETS OF THE
FEASIBILITY OF THE FACT-FINDING PANEL, THAT
COULD BE DISCUSSED AS WELL.
9. COMMENT --
-- DISCUSSION WAS MOST LIVELY, DETAILED AND
WIDE-RANGING TO DATE ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION.
SOVIETS WENT TO SOME EFFORT TO CONVEY
ATTITUDE OF FLEXIBILITY. THEIR APPROACH
REMAINS COMPLETELY UNSATISFACTORY IN KEY
RESPECTS, HOWEVER. WHILE POSITIONS REMAIN
FAR APART, SOVIETS NO LONGER SEEM TO BE
TRYING TO WATER DOWN THE UK PROPOSAL. IN
SOME RESPECTS, FOR EXAMPLE, WILLINGNESS TO
ACCEPT MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN SOME
CASES, SOVIET POSITION IS AT LEAST MODESTLY
STRICTER THAN THE UK PROPOSAL. END COMMENT.
10. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. RUSHING
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
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STATE GENEVA
SECRET GENEVA 02371
EXDIS
SECRET
TEL [phone]
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
BODY
TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) DISCUSSIONS,
AMB. NAZARKIN VIEWS ON CW AND OTHER ISSUES
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-012 . (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY--
-- ACTING U.S. REP TO THE CD HANSEN AND SOVIET REP
NAZARKIN MET ON 25 AND 26 FEBRUARY 1987 IN ONE-ON-ONE
SESSIONS WHERE PRINCIPAL TOPIC WAS THE NEGOTIATIONS
ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION. NAZARKIN REPEATEDLY
SAID THAT CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS THE KEY TO THE
NEGOTIATIONS AND CITED SOVIET FLEXIBILITY TO
REACH AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH HE CITED A REQUIREMENT
FOR A RIGHT OF REFUSAL TO PREVENT ABUSE. IT IS NOT
YET POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER A BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF
DATA BEFORE FINALIZATION OF AN AGREEMENT, NAZARKIN
SAID. NAZARKIN SHOWED INTEREST IN THE U.S.
INVITATION TO VISIT THE CW DESTRUCTION FACILITY
AT TOOELE, UTAH AND INQUIRED BRIEFLY ABOUT THE
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY PROCESS AND CHEMICAL
WEAPONS MODERNIZATION. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THE NEXT
BILATERAL ROUND BEGIN IN APRIL. ON NON-CHEMICAL
ISSUES, NAZARKIN EXPRESSED PESSIMISM ABOUT POSSIBILITIES
FOR AGREEMENT IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING EXPERTS MEETING
DUE TO RESUME IN MARCH. HE ALSO NOTED THE PRESENCE
OF CSCE EXPERT GEN. MIKHAYLOV IN KARPOV'S ARMS CONTROL
DEPARTMENT IN THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY. END
SUMMARY. - ?
3. IN FEBRUARY 25 AND 26 MEETINGS WITH AMBASSADOR
HANSEN, SOVIET CD REP NAZARKIN CHARACTERIZED CHALLENGE
INSPECTION AS THE KEY ISSUE IN THE CW NEGOTIATIONS.
THE SOVIET UNION HAD LOOKED MOST FAVORABLY ON THE
UK PROPOSAL, IT BEING THE ONLY COMPROMISE ON THE
HORIZON, BUT REALIZED IT DID NOT HAVE WIDESPREAD
SUPPORT AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED. NEVERTHELESS,
NAZARKIN EXPLAINED, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE
MAKING ADDITIONAL ROVES TOWARD THE UK PROPOSAL IN
THE NEAR FUTURE. THEY ARE NOW STUDYING THE LATEST
SWEDISH IDEAS AND ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD
THEM. THE MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THE U.S. APPROACH,
AS EMBODIED IN ARTICLE X, IS THE POSSIBILITY OF
FRIVOLOUS INSPECTIONS AND ABUSE. NAZARKIN OFFERED
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THAT THE SOVIET SIDE ACCEPTED THAT THERE ARE BUILT-IN
DETERRENTS TO EITHER SOVIET OR U.S. ABUSE, BUT SUCH
DETERRENTS WOULD NOT APPLY TO SOME OTHER SIGNATORIES
OF A MULTI-NATIONAL AGREEMENT. HE ARGUED THAT A
STATE MUST BE ALLOWED TO REFUSE AN INSPECTION ON
THE GROUNDS OF SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST AND
ATTEMPTED TO PORTRAY THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT AS
ESTABLISHING SUCH A PRECEDENT. HANSEN REJECTED
THE RELEVANCE OF THE STOCKHOLM PROVISIONS TO
ANY ARMS REDUCTION REGIME. NAZARKIN REITERATED
SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD FLEXIBILITY
TO REACH AGREEMENT ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION.
-- REFERRING TO THE PACE WITH WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE
APPEARS TO BE MOVING TOWARD U.S. POSITIONS IN THE CW
NEGOTIATIONS, NAZARKIN SAID HIS WAS RESULT OF A
CONSCIOUS POLITICAL DECISION TO SEEK A CW CONVENTION.
THE MILITARY HAD GRUMSLED, BUT THEY HAD BEEN INFORMED
AND THE POLITICAL DECISION WOULD DOMINATE.
NAZARKIN CLAIMED HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET
SIDE HAD FAILED TO ACCEPT THE USG INVITATION LAST FALL
TO ATTEND A DEMONSTRATION AT THE U.S. ARMY CW DESTRUCTION
FACILITY AT TOOELE, UTAH. BUT HE ALSO STATED THE SOVIETS
DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE REASON FOR THE DEMONSTRATION IN
THE FIRST PLACE. HANSEN REITERATED THE INVITATION
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO SPECIFIC TIMES OR TERMS. (COMMENT:
NAZARKIN RETURNED TO THIS ISSUE DURING THE SECOND
CONVERSATION, DEMONSTRATING AN INTEREST IN A POSSIBLE
ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION. END COMMENT.) NAZARKIN
THEN SUGGESTED THE NEXT ROUND BEGIN IN APRIL. HANSEN
REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT WOULD NOT ALLOW ENOUGH
TIME FOR PREPARATION AND THAT THE U.S. WAS THINKING
OF EARLY IN THE SUMMER CD SESSION.
NAZARKIN SAID THERE IS NOT YET ANY POSSIBILITY FOR
A BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA BEFORE AN AGREEMENT
IS FINALIZED. HE POINTED THE FINGER AT THE
MILITARY, STATING THAT THE POLITICAL SIDE HAS
NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS ABOUT
THE NEED FOR A BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE. THE
DELEGATION, HE SAID, WAS TRYING TO "FIND SOMETHING"
TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE OR THE QUESTION OF
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. MOSCOW WAS NOT CONVINCED
OF U.S. WILLINGNESS TO COMPLETE THE CONVENTION
AND FEARED THEY WOULD BE GIVING AWAY MILITARY
SECRETS FOR NOTHING.
-- THE CAPABILITY OF THE WESTERN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
TO MANUFACTURE TOXIC CHEMICALS AND LETHAL AGENTS
CONTINUES TO BE OF SIGNIFICANT CONCERN, ACCORDING
TO NAZARKIN. THE ANSWER TO SOVIET CONCERNS IN
THIS AREA, HE NOTED, WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL
NEGOTIATION OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION.
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NAZARKIN CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE CONSIDERED THE
QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH STATES, LIKE IRAQ,
WHICH WOULD BE NON-SIGNATORIES TO A POSSIBLE
CW CONVENTION. BUT, HE OPINED, POLITICAL
PRESSURE WOULD FORCE SUCH STATES TO COMPLY.
NAZARKIN ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE CONGRESSIONAL
PROCESS OF ALLOCATING MONEY TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS
MODERNIZATION. HANSEN NOTED THAT THERE ARE
CONGRESSIONAL DEBATSEVERY YEAR ON NEARLY EVERY
SUBJECT WHEN MONIES ARE APPROPRIATED AND
ALLOCATED, BUT THAT BINARY PRODUCTION WAS NOW
ASSURED BY DECISIONS ALREADY MADE.
4. PESSIMISM PERMEATED NAZARKIN'S VIEWS ON THE
POSSIBILITY FOR SUCCESS AT THE BILATERAL NUCLEAR
TESTING EXPERTS MEETINGS TO RESUME IN MARCH.
HE RETURNED TO THIS SUBJECT AT LEAST THREE
TIMES, INDICATING HE DID NOT BELIEVE AN AGREEMENT
ON AGENDA WOULD BE POSSIBLE. HE CITED U.S.
PRECONDITIONS, I.E., AGREEMENT TO DIRECT
MEASUREMENT BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER ISSUES
COULD TAKE PLACE. NAZARKIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE
SOVIETS USE A METHOD SIMILAR TO CORRTEX WHICH
HE REFERRED BY ITS ACRONYM MIZ (PRONOUNCED MEEZ).
-- HE NOTED THAT THE DIRECTIVE TO NRDC TO TURN OFF ITS
MONITORING DEVICES CONSTITUTED DE-FACTO NOTIFICATION
OF 26 FEBRUARY SOVIET TEST AND CITED THE NAMING OF
LOCATION, THRESHOLD AND PURPOSE AS EVIDENCE OF "NEW
SOVIET THINKING".
5. LT GENERAL KONSTANTIN MIKHAYLOV (SOVIET MILITARY
NEGOTIATOR AT THE BELGRADE AND MADRID CSCE MEETINGS)
WHO WORKED FOR COL GEN CHERVOV IN THE ARMS CONTROL
SECTION OF THE GENERAL STAFF HAS RETIRED FROM THE SOVIET
ARMY AND IS KARPOV'S DEPUTY IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S
ARMS CONTROL DEPARTMENT. (COMMENT: POLISH AMB.
TURBANSKI TOLD HANSEN THAT THE POLES ARE NOW ORGANIZING
A CLONE OF KARPOV'S DEPARTMENT WHICH, IT IS EXPECTED,
WILL BE HEADED BY POLISH CDE AMBASSADOR KONARSKY.
END COMMENT.)
6. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.RUSHING
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
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STATE GENEVA
SECRET GENEVA 02418
EXDIS
SECRET
TEL [phone]
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
BODY
TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) DISCUSSIONS, EXPERTS
MEETING, FEBRUARY 27, 1987
1. THIS IS CW BILAT -013. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY --
-- FEBRUARY 27 EXPERTS MEETING FOCUSSED ON CHEMICAL
INDUSTRY MONITORING, BILATERAL OBSERVER ARRANGEMENTS
AND ELIMINATION OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES.
-- TWO SIDES ALMOST FINISHED TEXT OF JOINT PAPER
ON OBSERVER ISSUE AND AGREED ON FURTHER ASPECTS
OF JOINT PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES.
END SUMMARY.
3. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING ("NON-PRODUCTION")--
-- U.S. REP ASKED FOR SOVIET RESPONSE TO U.S.
DEL QUESTIONS FROM PREVIOUS ROUND CONCERNING
AMB. ISSRAELYAN'S STATEMENT ON 5 NOV 86 DEALING
WITH NON-PRODUCTION.
-- SOVIET REP NOTED THAT SOME QUESTIONS HAD ALREADY
BEEN ANSWERED IN AMB. NAZARKIN'S STATEMENTS. HE
THEN PROVIDED RESPONSES TO U.S. QUESTIONS ON SOVIET
CONCEPT OF "MULTIPURPOSE TECHNOLOGY" AND ON REGIME
FOR COMMON INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS USEFUL FOR CW.
-- WITH REGARD TO MULTIPURPOSE TECHNOLOGY, SOVIET
AIM IS TO PREVENT FACILITIES THAT PRODUCE COMMERCIAL
SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS (STLC) FROM BEING
DIVERTED TO PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS.
-- SOVIET REP CITED LIST OF EQUIPMENT IN 1986
AUSTRALIAN WORKING PAPER (CD/698) AS POSSIBLE BASIS
FOR DISCUSSING CHARACTERISTICS OF "CONVERTIBLE"
FACILITIES. (COMMENT: LIST WAS ORIGINALLY DRAFTED
BY U.S. AS POSSIBLE "WARNING LIST" TO AID CW NON-
PROLIFERATION EFFORTS. END COMMENT.)
-- WITH REGARD TO COMMON INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS,
SOVIET VIEW WAS THAT DECLARATION OF THE LOCATION
OF THE FACILITY AND EXCHANGE OF DATA WOULD BE
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SUFFICIENT FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES. HOWEVER,
SOVIET DEL WAS READY TO DISCUSS ROUTINE ON-SITE
VERIFICATION INSOFAR AS OTHER DELS WANTED TO.
-- U.S. REP OBTAINED CONFIRMATION THAT SOVIET
POSITION IS THAT ANY DECLARED FACILITY WOULD BE
SUBJECT TO MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION, EVEN
IF IT IS NOT SUBJECT TO ROUTINE INSPECTION.
-- U.S. REP PRESSED FOR EXAMPLES OF STLC
COMMERCIAL CHEMICALS MADE ON A SIGNIFICANT
SCALE. SOVIET REPS RESPONDED WITH TWO EXAMPLES:
CARBAMATES -- TOXIC CHEMICALS NOT MADE ON A
LARGE SCALE, AND SUBSTANCES WITH AN ETHYL-PHOSPHORUS
BOND (KEY PRECURSORS). WHILE REFUSING TO DISCUSS
SPECIFICS, THEY INDICATED THAT LATTER TYPE OF
COMPOUND IS PRODUCED IN THE USSR, AS WELL AS IN
THE WEST.
-- U.S. REP ALSO PRESSED SOVIETS TO JUSTIFY
THEIR PROPOSAL FOR SEPARATE CATEGORIES FOR STLC
COMMERCIAL CHEMICALS AND FOR KEY PRECURSORS,
SINCE THE REGIMES PROPOSED SEEMED TO BE THE
SAME. SOVIETS RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS NO
DIFFERENCE IN THE REGIMES PROPOSED, BUT THAT
IT COULD BE COMPLICATED TO PRODUCE A MIXED
LIST.
-- U.S. DELOFFS THEN PRESSED FOR INFORMATION
ON THE KINDS OF INSTRUMENTS TO BE USED TO MONITOR
COMMERCIAL FACILITIES. SOVIET REPLIED THAT THE
SAME KINDS OF INSTRUMENTS USED FOR MONITORING
STORAGE AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES COULD BE USED.
THEY CITED CONTINUOUS GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY AND MASS
SPECTROMETRY AUGMENTED BY SAMPLING, AS EXAMPLES.
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS WOULD HAVE TO
BE NEGOTIATED. SOME DATA, BUT NOT ALL, WOULD
HAVE TO BE TRANSMITTED OFF-SITE. (KUZMIN NOTED,
HOWEVER, THAT AS A STUDENT HE AND OTHER STUDENTS
HAD FOOLED THEIR PROFESSORS WITH FALSIFIED GAS
CHROMATOGRAPHY DATA.)
-- U.S. DELOFF QUESTIONED WHETHER THE ANALYSIS
OF DATA SHOULD BE GENERAL OR COMPOUND SPECIFIC,
AND POINTED OUT THAT SPECIFIC INFORMATION
PRESENTS A HIGHER CHANCE OF TECHNICAL LOSS.
SOVIETS RESPONDED THAT A COMBINATION WOULD BE
BEST. PART OF THE SAMPLES COULD BE ALALYZED
ON SITE, PART ELSEWHERE SO NO ONE COULD ARGUE
INSTRUMENT DEFECTS.
-- U.S. DELOFF SUGGESTED THAT BOTH TRE INSPECTED
FACILITY AND THE INSPECTORS SHOULD HAVE THE
SAME EQUIPMENT IDENTICALLY CALIBRATED. SOVIETS
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AGREED.
-- U.S. DELOFF RAISED THE QUESTION OF TRAINING
INSPECTORS, CITING IAEA PROBLEMS. SOVIETS
RESPONDED THIS WAS A PROBLEM TO WORK OUT IN THE
FUTURE. U.S. DEL SUGGESTED STANDARDIZED INSPECTION
PROCEDURES TO AID INEXPERIENCED INSPECTORS.
SOVIETS AGREED IT WAS A POSSIBILITY, BUT POINTED
OUT AGAIN THAT NOT ALL PROBLEMS COULD BE FORESEEN,
SO SOME DETAILS MUST WAIT FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATION.
-- U.S. REP ASKED FOR SOVIET VIEWS ON THE LISTS
OF CHEMICALS. SOVIETS SAID THAT A DEFINITION OF
THE TERM "KEY COMPONENTS" WOULD FACILITATE
AGREEMENT ON LISTS. U.S. REP SAID THAT TERM
"KEY COMPONENTS" RELATED TO A SPECIFIC WEAPONS
SYSTEM AND WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THE BROADER U.S.
APPROACH (I.E., IT IS NOT IMPORTANT WHERE THE
REACTION OCCURS BUT THAT THE PRODUCT CAN BE
RAPIDLY APPLIED ON THE BATTLEFIELD) IS A BETTER
APPROACH. HE PRESSED SOVIETS TO EXPLAIN WHY U.S.
APPROACH WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. IN RESPONSE TO
SOVIET REQUEST FOR U.S. TO SUGGEST A COMPROMISE,
U.S. REP PROPOSED A NEW, NEUTRAL TERM "SPECIAL
KEY PRECURSOR." SOVIETS SAID THEY WOULD DECIDE
LATER BUT THOUGHT IT MIGHT LEAD TO POSSIBLE
SOLUTION.
4. BILATERAL INSPECTION PAPER --
-- U.S. REP EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. REWRITE OF
THE SOVIET PAPER USED SIMPLER LANGUAGE AND REARRANGED
THE PIECES, BUT THAT VIRTUALLY ALL ELEMENTS HAD
BEEN RETAINED. HOWEVER, U.S. HAD MODIFIED SOVIET
PROPOSAL FOR REPORTING TO THE OTHER SIDE AFTER THE
INSPECTION, AND HAD INCLUDED MATERIAL ON THE
NUMBER OF OBSERVERS. SOVIETS SAID MOST OF U.S.
TEXT WAS ACCEPTABLE BUT THAT THEY WERE STUDYING
(I.E., SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS) U.S. IDEAS ON THE
NUMBER OF OBSERVERS. (NOTE: U.S. DEL HES PROPOSED
THAT AT LEAST T 0 U.S. OR SOVIET OBSERVERS ECCOMPANY
THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM ON EACH OTHER'S
TERRITORY. END NOTE.) THE DISCUSSION ON REPORTING
AFTER THE INSP C IK CENTERED ON THE SOVIET POSITION
THAT PROBLEMS SHOULD BE RAISED IMMEDIATELY AND
DISPOSED OF AS OPPOSED TO THE U.S. POSITION THAT
SOME PROBLEMS MIGHT NOT BE IMMEDIATELY APPARENT AND
MIGHT SURFACE ONLY AFTER A NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS.
BOTH SIDES AGREED TO DEVELOP NEW LANGUAGE.
5. CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES --
-- SOVIETS RESPONDED TO U.S. PROPOSALS FOR
CHANGES IN THE JOINT PRODUCTION FACILITIE
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APER BY ACCEPTING HANGES AT THE EXPERTS
EEVEL. THESE CHANGES INCLUDED THE FULL
U.S. POSITION IN MONITORING CONVERTED FACILITIES.
6. NEXT MEETING --
-- AGREED TOPICS FOR NEXT EXPERTS MEETING (MAR 2)
ARE BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE, BILATERAL OBSERVERS,
AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES.
7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. RUSHING
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE
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qwrpw,
SECRET GENEVA 02588
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD); U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, EXPERTS MEETING,
MARCH 2, 1987
REF: GENEVA 02221 (CW BILAT -009)
1. THIS IS CW BILAT -014. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY --
-
-- AT MARCH 2 EXPERTS MEETING DELS RESOLVED
REMAINING DIFFERENCES ON JOINT PAPER ON U.S.!
SOVIET OBSERVERS FOR INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS.
DESPITE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, SEVERAL
BRACKETED POINTS REMAIN IN JOINT PAPER ON
ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION
FACILITIES. END SUMMARY.
3. JOINT PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES --
-
-- DISCUSSION CONTINUED ON REMAINING POINTS
OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THIS
PAPER.
A. ELIMINATION OF EQUIPMENT --
-- THE SOVIET SIDE SOUGHT TO ENSURE THAT
EQUIPMENT USED TO PRODUCE BINARY PRECURSORS
DF AND QL WOULD BE DESTROYED. U.S. REP
DRAFTED LANGUAGE TO SPECIFY THAT EQUIPMENT
THAT HAD BEEN USED FOR PRODUCTION OF A SUPER-
TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICAL OR A SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICAL
WITH AN ALKYL-PHOSPHORUS BOND MUST BE DESTROYED
AND COULD NOT BE RETAINED FOR PERMITTED
PURPOSES. SOVIET SIDE AGREED TO PROPOSED
U.S. LANGUAGE.
B. CONVERSION OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES --
-
-- SOVIET REP REEMPHASIZED THAT SOVIET SIDE
COULD ACCEPT CONVERSION OF BUILDINGS TO
PERMITTED MILITARY USES. ON THE OTHER HAND,
SOVIETS ALSO COULD AGREE THAT BUILDINGS
COULD NOT BE USED FOR ANY MILITARY ACTIVITIES
AT SUCH FACILITIES. IT WAS UP TO THE U.S. SIDE
TO DECIDE WHAT IT WANTED. U.S. REP STATED THAT
THIS WAS BEING LOOKED AT IN WASHINGTON AND U.S.
DEL COULD NOT PROVIDE AN ANSWER AT THIS TIME.
C. EXCESS PRODUCTION --
-- IN DISCUSSION ON ISSUE OF EXCESS PRODUCTION
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CAPACITY FOR KEY PRECURSORS, THE SOVIET SIDE
SAID THAT THE U.S. APPROACH TO THS DECLARATION
AND MONITORING OF FACILITIES WHICH PRODUCE KEY
PRECURSORS FOR CW PURPOSES WAS DISCRIMINATORY.
THEY SAID THAT UNDER THE U.S. APPROACH IT
WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PROVE THAT WESTERN
COMMERCIAL FACILITIES HAD PRODUCED KEY PRECURSORS
FOR CW PRODUCTION AND ANY EXCESS CAPACITY WOULD
ESCAPE EFFECTIVE CONTROL. SOVIET REP (SMIDOVICH)
PROPOSED A TWO-TRACK DECLARATION PROCEDURE FOR
CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT PRODUCE THESE KEY
PRECURSORS: (1) THE DECLARATIONS FOR FACILITIES
WHICH HAVE PRODUCED KEY PRECURSORS FOR CHEMICAL
WEAPONS WOULD GO BACK TO JANUARY 1, 1946,
(2) IN THE CASE OF OTHER FACILITIES WHICH PRODUCE
THE KEY PRECURSORS FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES, ONLY
CURRENT PRODUCTION WOULD BE DECLARED.
-- U.S. REP REPLIED THAT EXCESS CAPACITY IS MOST
LIKELY TO EXIST AT FACILITIES THAT FORMERLY MADE
KEY PRECURSORS FOR CW PURPOSES. AFTER THE CONVENTION
COMES INTO FORCE, THIS PRODUCTION CAPACITY IS LIKELY
TO BE IDLE. THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOCUSSES ON THIS
PROBLEM.
-- SOVIET SIDE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL REVIEW ALL THE DATA DECLARED ON KEY
PRECURSOR PRODUCTION AND CAPACITY AND DETERMINE
WHAT EXCESS PRODUCTION CAPACITY MUST BE ELIMINATED.
U.S. SIDE QUESTIONED THIS APPROACH. TO AVOID THE
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL'S PASSING JUDGMENT ON A STATE'S
INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY, QUESTIONS OF EXCESS CAPACITY
SHOULD BE RAISED AND WORKED OUT BILATERALLY. IF A
PARTICULAR PROBLEM IS NOT RESOLVED, THEN A STATE
COULD TAKE THE QUESTION TO THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FOR REVIEW.
-- SOVIET REP (BERDENNIKOV) ALSO SUGGESTED THE
FOLLOWING POSSIBILITIES FOR ELIMINATING EXCESS
KEY PRECURSOR CAPACITY: (1) CONVERSION TO
PRODUCTION OF OTHER CHEMICALS USED FOR PERMITTED
PURPOSES, (2) PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE CONVENTION, AND (3) IF CONVERSION IS NOT
POSSIBLE OR NOT DESIRED, DESTRUCTION OF THE EXCESS
CAPACITY. HE AGREED THAT ELIMINATION WOULD BE
VERIFIED BY PROCEDURES USED TO VERIFY ELIMINATION
OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES.
-- FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF NEED TO DEAL
WITH MARKET FLUCTUATIONS AND COMPETITION,
THE SIDES NOTED THAT JUDGMENT ABOUT EXCESS
CAPACITY SHOULD BE BASED ON NATIONAL
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PRODUCTION AND THAT MORE DISCUSSION IS
REQUIRED ON THIS ISSUE. (COMMENT: AT
END OF DISCUSSION SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO
ACCEPT LANGUAGE ON ISSUE PROPOSED BY U.S.
DEL FOR PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER ON
THE CONDITION THAT U.S. ACCEPT ANALOGOUS
LANGUAGE FOR ARTICLE VI (CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
MONITORING. HOWEVER, U.S. DEL RESISTED
TRADEOFF AND ISSUE REMAINS UNRESOLVED.
END COMMENT.)
-- ON FACILITIES PRODUCING CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
HARDWARE AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR CW EMPLOYMENT,
THE SIDES AGREED: (1) IF THE FACILITY ONLY
PRODUCED PARTS FOR CW, THEN IT MUST BE DECLARED
AND ELIMINATED,AND (2) IF THE FACILITY PRODUCED
PARTS FOR OTHER MUNITIONS AS WELL, THE SPECIALIZED
EQUIPMENT (DIES, MOLDS, ETC.) MUST BE REMOVED AND
THEIR DESTRUCTION VERIFIED.
-- PAPER AS IT NOW STANDS REFLECTS SOVIET
ACCEPTANCE OF ALL POINTS OF U.S. POSITION.
4. JOINT PAPER ON U.S./SOVIET OBSERVERS FOR
INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS --
-
-- SOVIETS SAID THEY COULD ACCEPT U.S.
PROPOSAL THAT AT LEAST TWO OBSERVERS FROM
ONE SIDE WOULD ACCOMPANY THE INTERNATIONAL
TEAM PERFORMING AN INSPECTION ON THE OTHER
SIDE.
-- SOVIETS AGREED THAT RESULTS OF OBSERVER'S
REPORTS SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE OTHER SIDE
PROMPTLY. U.S. REP NOTED THAT IT MAY ONLY
BE AFTER A NUMBER OF SUCH INSPECTIONS THAT
AN UNFAVORABLE TREND OR SITUATION IS REALIZED.
THE SIDES EVENTUALLY AGREED THAT PROBLEMS
NOTED BY OBSERVERS SHOULD BE COMMUNICATED
PROMPTLY AND NOT LATER THAN 90 DAYS FOLLOWING
THE INSPECTION. IN ADDITION IT WOULD BE SPECIFIED
THAT PROBLEMS NOTED AFTER A SERIES
OF INSPECTIONS WOULD BE REVIEWED DURING THE
ANNUAL BILATERAL MEETINGS.
- BERDENNIKOV ASKED WHETHER U.S. SIDE
HAD ANY REACTION TO SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR
U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN PARTS
OF THE INSPECTORATE RESPONSIBLE FOR
INSPECTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE (REFTEL).
U.S. REP REPLIED THAT DEL DID NOT EXPECT GUIDANCE
DURING THE CURRENT ROUND.
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5. MAIN TOPIC AT MARCH 3 CW EXPERTS MEETING WAS
ADVANCE DATA EXCHANGE. CRITERIA AND CONTENT OF
SCHEDULE 1 (PROHIBITED) CHEMICALS ALSO WERE
DISCUSSED. (SEPTEL).
6. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
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SWAP'?
SECRET GENEVA 02618
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, EXPERTS MEETING
MARCH 3, 1987
REF: GENEVA 2221
1. THIS IS CW BILAT -015 . (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY --
-- MAIN TOPIC OF MARCH 3 EXPERTS MEETING
WAS EARLY DATA EXCHANGE. US DEL EMPHASIZED
IMPORTANCE OF 1984 U.S. PROPOSALS AND PRESSED
SOVIETS TO RESPOND SERIOUSLY. SOVIETS
REPLIED THAT THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT POLITICAL
COMMITMENT OF U.S. AND "OTHERS" (I.E., FRANCE)
TO CONCLUDING A CONVENTION, PARTICULARLY IN
VIEW OF EMPHASIS U.S. IS PUTTING ON MOVING
FORWARD WITH ITS BINARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.
NONETHELESS, SOVIET DEL WAS NOT CLOSING THE
DOOR TO POSSIBILITY OF EARLY DATA EXCHANGE.
SOVIET SIDE EMPHASIZED THAT SOMETHING COULD
WELL BE WORKED OUT IF U.S. GAVE CLEAR SIGNAL
OF ITS COMMITMENT TO GO AHEAD WITH A CW BAN.
-- BOTH SIDES ALSO REVIEWED PROGRESS DURING
THE ROUND AND AGREED TO SEEK A MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO DIFFERENCES OVER
GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULE 1 (PROHIBITED)
CHEMICALS AND CONTENT OF THIS LIST. IN
ADDITION, SOVIET MILREP SUGGESTED TO U.S.
MILREP THAT MILREPS HAVE MILITARY DISCUSSIONS
DURING NEXT ROUND. END SUMMARY.
3. BILATERAL EXCHANGE --
-
-- AT MARCH 3 EXPERTS MEETING, U.S. DEL
PRESSED SOVIETS ON NEED FOR MOVEMENT ON U.S.
1984 PROPOSAL FOR BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE
PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF A CONVENTION. DEL
STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE TO U.S. AS A
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE, FACT THAT ISSUE HAD
HARDLY BEEN DISCUSSED PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 20
MEETING (REFTEL), AND NEED FOR BALANCE BETWEEN
PROGRESS ON MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES.
-- SOVIET REP (BERDENNIKOV) REPLIED THAT
SOVIET SIDE WAS NOT CLOSING DOOR TO EARLY
DATA EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, IT WANTED TO SEE
WHAT PROGRESS IS MADE ON OTHER ASPECTS OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SPECIFICALLY CITED
NEED TO WORK OUT CHALLENGE INSPECTION
PROVISION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES. THAT
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ISSUE, HE SAID, WAS FAR MORE COMPLICATED.
DATA EXCHANGE, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD
DEPEND ON A POLITICAL DECISION BY THE SIDES
TO ACHIEVE A CONVENTION. IN THIS CONTEXT,
THE USSR DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE U.S.
WAS CONTINUING ITS BINARY PROGRAM. THE
SOVIET SIDE HAS DOUBTS AS TO THE COMMITMENT
OF THE U.S. AND "OTHERS" TO A BAN AND IS
CONCERNED NOT TO DIVULGE MILITARY SECRETS
NEEDLESSLY. (NOTE: BERDENNIKOV MADE CLEAR
TO U.S. REP AFTER THE MEETING THAT THE "OTHERS"
THE USSR HAS IN MIND IS FRANCE.) HOWEVER,
ONCE THE POLITICAL COMMITMENT IS ESTABLISHED,
THEN THE DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE COULD BE
WORKED OUT. THEN THE QUESTION OF STAGES
WOULD NOT BE IMPORTANT -- ASIDE FROM, PERHAPS,
ON A DECLARATION OF POSSESSION OF CW. BERDENNIKOV
THEN ASKED HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE U.S. ATTACHED TO
A SOVIET DECLARATION OF POSSESSION.
-- U.S. REP RECOMMENDED THAT THE SOVIET
SIDE PAY ATTENTION TO WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN
SAYS. HE NOTED THAT IN HIS FEBRUARY 5
STATEMENT TO THE CD, THE PRESIDENT HAD
REAFFIRMED THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO A COMPREHENSIVE
CW BAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE U.S. SIDE IS
TROUBLED BY THE FACT THAT THE USSR DOES NOT
EVEN ADMIT THAT IT HAS CW, EVEN THOUGH SUCH
AN ADMISSION WOULD NOT AFFECT SOVIET SECURITY
IN ANY WAY. NATURALLY, THS U.S. WOULD ATTACH
MORE IMPORTANCE TO A DECLARATION ON POSSESSION
OF CW IF IT WERE PART OF A PROCESS, RATHER
THAN AN ISOLATED EVENT. THE U.S. HAD PROVIDED
GREAT AMOUNTS OF DATA ON ITS CW STOCKPILE AND
DID NOT FEEL ITS SECURITY WAS THEREBY DIMINISHED.
AS FOR WHY THE U.S. IS GOING AHEAD WITH THE
BINARY PROGRAM, IT WOULD BE MOST UNWISE FROM A
SECURITY STANDPOINT FOR THE U.S. TO PUT ALL ITS
EGGS IN THE TREATY BASKET. U.S. REP THEN
ASKED WHETHER SOVIET SIDE WAS LINKING MOVEMENT
ON DATA EXCHANGE TO CHALLENGE ISSUE.
BERDENNIKOV SAID THAT THE USSR TOOK THE
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS AT FACE VALUE. HOWEVER,
THE USSR ALSO NEEDED PRACTICAL SIGNS OF
MOVEMENT ON THE U.S. SIDE. AT PRESENT, HE
SAID, EVERYONE SEEMED TO BE SIMPLY WAITING FOR
THE SOVIET SIDE TO COME FORWARD WITH MORE AND
MORE CONCESSIONS. THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT
WANT TO SINGLE OUT ANY ISSUE. HOWEVER, CHALLENGE
INSPECTION WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND
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DIFFICULT ISSUES. BERDENNIKOV THEN ASKED HOW
THE U.S. ENVISAGED THE DATA EXCHANGE OCCURRING.
NOTING THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IF
THERE WERE TO BE AN UNDERSTANDING, HE ASKED
ABOUT THE TIME PERIOD, WHETHER LOCATIONS AS
WELL AS QUANTITIES WOULD BE INVOLVED, AND HOW
CHALLENGE INSPECTION WOULD BE USED.
-- U.S. REPS REPLIED THAT IT WAS PREMATURE
TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF TIME PERIOD AND THAT
CHALLENGE REQUESTS COULD WELL BE PART OF THE
PROCESS. CHALLENGES WOULD NOT BE MADE JUST
TO CHECK THE PROCEDURES BUT TO RESOLVE A
SPECIFIC CONCERN.
4. SCHEDULE 1 LIST AND GUIDELINES --
-- U.S. REP ASKED SOVIET REP TO CLARIFY HIS
EARLIER SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS
PREPARED TO FIND A SOLUTION TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE SIDES OVER THE GUIDELINES
(CRITERIA) FOR SCHEDULE 1 (PROHIBITED)
CHEMICALS AND THE CHEMICALS ON THIS LIST.
(NOTE: DIFFERENCES CENTERED ON DESCRIPTION
OF KEY PRECURSORS FOR BINARY SYSTEMS -- WHICH
U.S. INSISTS NOT BE SINGLED OUT FOR SPECIAL
TREATMENT -- AND SOVIET REFUSAL TO AGREE TO
INCLUDE IN THE LIST CERTAIN CHEMICALS OF
CONCERN TO THE U.S., WHILE INSISTING THAT
THE RIOT CONTROL AGENTS CS AND CR BE INCLUDED.)
SOVIET REP INDICATED SOVIET SIDE WAS INTERESTED
IN A "PACKAGE DEAL" WHEREBY IT WOULD AGREE TO
INCLUDE IN THE LIST ALL CHEMICALS U.S. HAS
PROPOSED AND TO DROP TERM "KEY COMPONENTS" IF
A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION COULD BE
DEVISED TO MAKE SURE BINARIES ARE IMPLICITLY
COVERED BY THE GUIDELINES. DELS DISCUSSED
POSSIBLE FORMULATIONS AND AGREED SUBJECT WOULD
BE TAKEN UP AGAIN IN MULTILATERAL CONTEXT.
(COMMENT: U.S. REPS WERE CONVINCED THAT ISSUE
COULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED ON THE SPOT TO U.S.
SATISFACTION BUT HELD BACK IN ORDER TO SLOW
PACE OF DISCUSSIONS. END COMMENT.)
5. REVIEW OF THE ROUND --
-
-- U.S. REP SAID THAT FRANK EXCHANGE DURING
THE ROUND WAS SIGN THAT THE REAL CONCERNS OF
BOTH SIDES WERE BEING LAID OUT. HOWEVER,
THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN PROGRESS IN THE MULTI-
LATERAL AND BILATERAL FORA HAD TO BE ADDRESSED,
PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE BILATERAL
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DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE.
-- SOVIET REP SAID THAT THE DISCUSSIONS HAD
BEEN USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. HOWEVER, THE
SOVIET SIDE FELT THE IMBALANCE WAS IN THE
OTHER DIRECTION. HE CITED THE SOVIET MOVEMENT
ON THE STOCKPILE LOCATION ISSUE AND THE PROGRESS
ON THE "KEY" PRODUCTION FACILITIES ISSUE. ONCE
THE LATTER ISSUE WAS RESOLVED ALL ARTICLE VI
(PERMITTED ACTIVITIES) ISSUES COULD BE
RESOLVED MUCH MORE EASILY. THE SOVIET SIDE
HOPED THE U.S. SIDE UNDERSTOOD THE SOVIET
POSITION ON DATA EXCHANGE; THE SOVIET SIDE
WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE.
ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, SOVIET REP CITED SOVIET
UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO MOVE
TOWARDS A CONVENTION. A CLEAR U.S. SIGNAL
WOULD FACILITATE PROGRESS. HOPEFULLY, EVENTS
WOULD SHOW THAT SOVIET CONCERNS IN THIS REGARD
WERE NOT JUSTIFIED.
6. SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR MILITARY TALKS --
-- AT THE END OF THE MEETING, SOVIET MILITARY
REP GANJA PROVIDED U.S. MILREP (GARDNER) A
COPY OF MOST RECENT VERSION OF SOVIET
UNCLASSIFIED PUBLICATION ON THE U.S. MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT, "FROM WHENCE THE THREAT?" RE
REFERRED TO THE SECTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR
THE MILITARY REPS ON THE TWO SIDES TO DISCUSS
MILITARY ISSUES AT THE NEXT ROUND. U.S. MILREP
SAID HE WOULD REFER THIS SUGGESTION TO WASHINGTON.
7. COMMENT --
-
-- SOVIETS ARE LESS RELUCTANT THAN PREVIOUSLY
TO DISCUSS DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE, ALTHOUGH
POSITIONS REMAIN FAR APART. PARTICULARLY
INTERESTING WAS INDICATION THAT DECLARATION
OF POSSESSION OF CW IS NOT A SENSITIVE ISSUE.
DEL SUSPECTS THAT SOVIETS MAY PLAN TO
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE CW AND THEN PRESS
OTHER "CLOSET CW STATES" TO MATCH THEIR OPENNESS.
-- LATE COMMENT: SOVIET AMB. NAZARKIN MADE
VERY LOW KEY BUT UNMISTAKABLE ANNOUNCEMENT IN
CD PLENARY MEETING ON MARCH 5 THAT THE USSR
POSSESSES CW. END COMMENT.
-- SOVIET "PACKAGE DEAL" ON SCHEDULE 1 WOULD
ELIMINATE ALLUSIONS TO BINARIES. THEIR
CONCERN TO ENSURE BINARIES ARE FULLY COVERED
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COINCIDES WITH U.S. POSITION THAT ALL CW
BE CAPTURED BY THE CONVENTION. END COMMENT.
BE CAPTURED BY THE CONVENTION. END COMMENT.
8. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
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SECRET GENEVA 02622
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, U.S./USSR
INFORMAL POINT PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-016. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. THIS IS AN INFORMAL POINT PAPER PREPARED
AD REFERENDUM TO CAPITALS BY U.S. AND SOVIET
CW BILATERAL DELEGATIONS. BRACKETED LANGUAGE
IS INDICATED BY //. BEGIN TEXT:
MARCH 2, 1987
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES
1. POSSIBLE DEFINITION
THE TERM "CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY":
(A) INCLUDES ANY EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS ANY
BUILDING HOUSING SUCH EQUIPMENT, THAT WAS
DESIGNED, CONSTRUCTED OR USED SINCE JANUARY 1, 1946:
(I) AS PART OF THE STAGE IN THE PRODUCTION
OF CHEMICALS ("FINAL TECHNOLOGICAL STAGE")
WHERE THE MATERIAL FLOWS CONTAIN ANY SCHEDULE 1
CHEMICAL, OR ANY OTHER CHEMICAL THAT HAS NO USE
FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES ABOVE . . . KILOGRAMS PER
YEAR BUT CAN BE USED FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PURPOSES; OR
(II) FOR FILLING CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
(B) DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY FACILITY WITH AN
ANNUAL CAPACITY FOR SYNTHESIS OF CHEMICALS
SPECIFIED IN SUBPARAGRAPH 1(A) (I) ABOVE
THAT IS LESS THAN . . . KILOGRAMS.
2. POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR ELIMINATION,
INCLUDING VERIFICATION
(A) GENERAL
-- CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES
SHOULD BE ELIMINATED.
-- ELIMINATION AND ITS VERIFICATION SHOULD
BE CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO AGREED GUIDELINES.
-- THE DETAILED PLANS FOR ELIMINATION, AS
WELL AS CORRESPONDING VERIFICATION MEASURES,
SHOULD BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL AND THE STATE PARTY TO ENSURE THAT THE
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AGREED GUIDELINES ARE MET.
-- THE ELIMINATION PROCESS SHOULD BE VERIFIED
BY SYSTEMATIC INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTION.
(B) ELIMINATION OF EQUIPMENT
-- SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE PHYSICALLY
DESTROYED. AS AN EXCEPTION, CERTAIN SPECIALIZED
EQUIPMENT MAY BE USED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES,
PURSUANT TO AGREED CONDITIONS.
-- SUCH AN EXCEPTION MAY ONLY BE REQUESTED FOR
SPECIFIC PIECES OF EQUIPMENT IN THE MAIN PRODUCTION
TRAIN: (A) AT A FACILITY THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN
CONVERTED TO PERMITTED PURPOSES, OR (B) AT A
FACILITY THAT PRODUCES CHEMICALS FOR PERMITTED
PURPOSES, BUT WAS ALSO DESIGNED, CONSTRUCTED,
OR USED TO PRODUCE A CHEMICAL FOR CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PURPOSES THAT IS NEITHER A SUPER-TOXIC
LETHAL CHEMICAL NOR A SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICAL WITH
AN ALKYL-PHOSPHORUS BOND. ALL OTHER SPECIALIZED
EQUIPMENT AT THE FACILITY MUST BE DESTROYED.
-- "SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT" IS:
.
THE MAIN PRODUCTION TRAIN, INCLUDING
ANY REACTOR OR EQUIPMENT FOR PRODUCT SYNTHESIS,
SEPARATION OR PURIFICATION AND ANY OTHER
EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE
PRODUCT, OR WOULD BE IF THE FACILITY WERE OPERATED.
. ANY CHEMICAL WEAPON FILLING MACHINES.
. ANY OTHER EQUIPMENT SPECIALLY DESIGNED,
BUILT OR INSTALLED FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
FACILITY AS A CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION
FACILITY, AS DISTINCT FROM A FACILITY CONSTRUCTED
ACCORDING TO PREVAILING COMMERCIAL INDUSTRY
STANDARDS FOR FACILITIES NOT PRODUCING SUPER-
TOXIC LETHAL OR CORROSIVE CHEMICALS. (EXAMPLES
INCLUDE EQUIPMENT MADE OF HIGH-NICKEL ALLOYS
OR OTHER SPECIAL MATERIAL; SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
FOR WASTE CONTROL, WASTE TREATMENT, AIR FILTERING,
OR SOLVENT RECOVERY; SPECIAL CONTAINMENT ENCLOSURES
AND SAFETY SHIELDS; NON-STANDARD LABORATORY
EQUIPMENT USED TO ANALYZE TOXIC CHEMICALS FOR
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES; CUSTOM-DESIGNED PROCESS
CONTROL PANELS; DEDICATED SPARES FOR SPECIALIZED
EQUIPMENT.)
-- "STANDARD EQUIPMENT" COULD BE REUSED FOR
PERMITTED PURPOSES UNDER AGREED CONDITIONS.
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OTHERWISE IT MUST BE DESTROYED.
-- "STANDARD EQUIPMENT" INCLUDES:
. PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT WHICH IS GENERALLY
USED IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND IS NOT INCLUDED
IN THE TYPES OF "SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT;"
. FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT, GUARD AND SECURITY/
SAFETY SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT, MEDICAL FACILITIES,
LABORATORY FACILITIES, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.
(C) ELIMINATION OF BUILDINGS
-- THE WORD "BUILDING" SHOULD INCLUDE UNDERGROUND
STRUCTURES.
-- SPECIALIZED BUILDINGS SHOULD BE PHYSICALLY
DESTROYED. AS AN EXCEPTION, SUCH BUILDINGS MAY
BE CONVERTED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES, PURSUANT TO
AGREED CONDITIONS.
-- "SPECIALIZED BUILDING" IS:
. ANY BUILDING CONTAINING SPECIALIZED
EQUIPMENT IN A PRODUCTION/FILLING CONFIGURATION;
. ANY BUILDING WHICH HAS DISTINCTIVE FEATURES
WHICH DISTINGUISH IT FROM BUILDINGS NORMALLY USED
FOR CHEMICAL PRODUCTION OR FILLING ACTIVITIES NOT
BANNED BY THE CONVENTION.
-- "STANDARD ("NON-SPECIALIZED") BUILDINGS"
COULD BE REUSED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES UNDER
AGREED CONDITIONS. OTHERWISE, THEY MUST BE
DESTROYED.
-- "STANDARD BUILDINGS" MEANS BUILDINGS
CONSTRUCTED TO PREVAILING INDUSTRY STANDARDS
FOR FACILITIES NOT PRODUCING SUPER-TOXIC
LETHAL OR CORROSIVE CHEMICALS.
(D) GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR REUSE OF EQUIPMENT
OR BUILDINGS
-- ALL PLANS FOR REUSE OF EQUIPMENT AND BUILDINGS,
AS WELL AS CORRESPONDING VERIFICATION MEASURES,
SHOULD BE AGREED BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND
THE STATE PARTY.
-- THE REUSE OF EQUIPMENT OR BUILDINGS SHOULD
TAKE PLACE IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE FACILITY
IN QUESTION IS NO MORE CAPABLE OF BEING RECONVERTED
TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION/FILLING THAN ANY
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SIMILAR FACILITY USED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES. TO
THE EXTENT THAT A BUILDING OR ANY PART OF THE
REMAINING FACILITY HAS SPECIAL FEATURES (TO BE
SPECIFIED) IN EXCESS OF THOSE NEEDED BY FACILITIES
NOT PRODUCING SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS OR
CORROSIVE CHEMICALS, E.G., SPECIAL AIR FILTERING
AND SPECIAL CONTAINMENT MEASURES, THEY MUST BE
REMOVED OR MODIFIED. IN INSTANCES WHERE IT IS
NOT POSSIBLE TO CONVERT A BUILDING TO MEET THESE
STANDARDS, THE BUILDING MUST BE DESTROYED.
-- EQUIPMENT OR BUILDINGS SHOULD BE REUSED ONLY
FOR //NON-MILITARY PEACEFUL// (NOTE: SOVIETS
CAN ACCEPT WITH OR WITHOUT ERACKETED PHRASE.
U.S. DEL HAS NO GUIDANCE.) PERMITTED PURPOSES.
FURTHERMORE, EQUIPMENT OR BUILDINGS SHOULD NOT
BE REUSED FOR PRODUCTION/FILLING OF CHEMICALS
IN SCHEDULE 1, OTHER SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS,
OR CORROSIVE CHEMICALS. TO ENSURE THIS, THE
FACILITY WILL NOT CONTAIN ANY EQUIPMENT SPECIALLY
NEEDED FOR HANDLING SUCH CHEMICALS, INCUDING
LINED OR HIGH-NICKEL ALLY PIPING OR VESSELS FOR
ANY LOW-PRESSURE CONTAINMENT AREAS.
-- INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORS SHOULD MONITOR THE
DISMANTLING OF EQUIPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS.
-- ALL CONVERTED FACILITIES, INCLUDING
FACILITIES CONVERTED BEFORE A STATE BECAME A
PARTY, SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATORY ON-SITE
INSPECTION AND THEN TO SUBSEQUENT MONITORING
FOR THE LIFE OF THE FACILITY AS FOLLOWS:
- (A) FACILITIES CONVERTED TO A USE NOT
INVOLVING CHEMICAL PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING
WILL BE MONITORED BY SYSTEMATIC ON-SITE INSPECTIONS
AT A FREQUENCY TO BE DETERMINED.
- (B) FACILITIES CONVERTED TO PERMITTED
CHEMICAL PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING WILL BE
MONITORED BY DATA REPORTING AND SYSTEMATIC
ON-SITE VERIFICATION. (THE INCLUSION OF
ON-SITE INSTRUMENTS IN ADDITION TO INSPECTIONS
SHOULD BE EXPLORED.) FREQUENCY OF INSPECTION,
AS WELL AS THE USE OF INSTRUMENTS, IS TO BE
DETERMINED.
-- PERMITTED ACTIVITIES MAY CONTINUE DURING
CONVERSION.
-- INFORMATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED IN THE DETAILED
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PLANS FOR ELIMINATION ON, INTER ALIA, THE PRECISE
LOCATION, IDENTITY AND PURPOSE OF REUSE OF EQUIPMENT
AND ON THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH BUILDINGS ARE TO BE
REUSED.
-- EQUIPMENT AND BUILDINGS SHOULD BE REUSED WITHIN
A REASONABLE TIME (FOOTNOTE: A SPECIFIC PERIOD
SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED); THEY SHOULD NOT BE "MOTHBALLED."
AS AN EXCEPTION, SMALL STANDARD PARTS, SUCH AS
VALVES, FITTINGS, ETC., MAY BE RETURNED TO STOCKPILES
OF LIKE PARTS.
-- INITIAL AND FOLLOW-UP ON-SITE INSPECTION
SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT AS REQUIRED TO ENSURE THAT
THROUGH THE REUSE OF EQUIPMENT, THE RECEIVING
FACILITY HAD NOT BEEN MADE SUITABLE FOR RAPID
CONVERSION TO CW PRODUCTION.
3. RELATED MEASURES
(A) FACILITIES FOR PRODUCTION OF KEY PRECURSORS
411.
-- ANY FACILITY USED TO PRODUCE //FOR CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PURPOSES// (NOTE: SOVIETS HAVE BRACKETED)
A KEY PRECURSOR FOR WHICH THE NEED FOR PERMITTED
PURPOSES EXCEEDS . . . . KILOGRAMS PER YEAR
SHOULD BE DECLARED AND MONITORED UNDER ARTICLE VI
("PERMITTED ACTIVITIES").
-- IT SHOULD BE DEMONSTRATED TO THE SATISFACTION
OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL THAT THERE IS A LEGITIMATE
NEED FOR THE FACILITY AND THAT USAGE (PERCENT OF
RATED CAPACITY) FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES IS CONSISTENT
WITH PREVAILING INDUSTRY STANDARDS.
-- IF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL DETERMINES THAT THE
CAPACITY IS GREATER THAN THE PREVAILING INDUSTRY
STANDARD WOULD JUSTIFY FOR DEMONSTRATED LEGITIMATE
NEEDS, THE EXCESS CAPACITY SHOULD BE DESTROYED,
OR CONVERTED TO OTHER PERMITTED PURPOSES. THE
DESTRUCTION OR CONVERSION OF THE EXCESS CAPACITY,
AND THE VERIFICATION OF THESE ACTIONS, SHOULD
BE CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE V THAT GOVERN ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES.
/AB) FACILITIES FOR PRODUCING CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
AND SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS
EMPLOYMENT.
-- FACILITIES USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PRODUCTION
OF: (A) NON-CHEMICAL PARTS FOR CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
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OR (B) SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS
EMPLOYMENT, SHOULD BE DECLARED AND ELIMINATED.
THE ELIMINATION PROCESS AND ITS VERIFICATION
SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO THE PROVISIONS
OF ARTICLE V THAT GOVERN ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL
PRODUCTION/FILLING FACILITIES.
-- ALL EQUIPMENT FOR PRODUCING NON-CHEMICAL PARTS
FOR CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WHICH IS NOT STANDARD
EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE DESTROYED. SUCH EQUIPMENT,
WHICH MAY INCLUDE SPECIALLY DESIGNED MOLDS AND
METAL-FORMING DIES, MAY BE BROUGHT TO A CENTRAL
LOCATION FOR DESTRUCTION, WHICH SHOULD BE CONFIRMED
BY ON-SITE INSPECTION AT THE DESTRUCTION SITE.
-- ALL BUILDINGS AND STANDARD EQUIPMENT USED FOR
PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE CONVERTED TO
PERMITTED PURPOSES, WITH CONFIRMATION AS NECESSARY
THROUGH CONSULTATION OR CHALLENGE INSPECTION.
-- PERMITTED ACTIVITIES MAY CONTINUE WHILE
DESTRUCTION OR CONVERSION PROCEEDS.// (NOTE:
SOVIETS BRACKETED ENTIRE SECTION DEALING WITH
MUNITIONS, PENDING AUTHORIZATION TO ACCEPT TEXT.)
(C) FACILITIES FOR PRODUCING COMMON COMMERCIAL CHEMICALS.
-- FACILITIES PRODUCING CHEMICALS IN SCHEDULE //3//
//IV// SHOULD BE DECLARED AND MONITORED UNDER
ARTICLE VI (PERMITTED ACTIVITIES). PLANTS PRODUCING
OTHER COMMON COMMERCIAL CHEMICALS NEED NOT BE
DECLARED OR MONITORED, EVEN IF THEY PRODUCED
PRECURSOR CHEMICALS THAT WERE USED IN TURN FOR PRODUCING
CHEMICAL WEAPONS. END TEXT.
3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
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SECRET GENEVA 02620
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, U.S.-USSR INFORMAL
POINT PAPER ON BILATERAL REPRESENTATIVES AT ON SITE
INSPECTIONS.
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-017. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. THIS IS AN INFORMAL POINT PAPER PREPARED
BY U.S. AND SOVIET CV BILATERAL DELEGATIONS
AD REFERENDUM TO CAPITALS. THERE ARE NO POINTS
OF DISAGREEMENT. BEGIN
TEXT:
MARCH 2, 1987
PARTICIPATION OF US AND USSR REPRESENTATIVES
IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ON THE
OTHER SIDE'S TERRITORY
GENERAL PROVISIONS
-- TO ENHANCE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IN FULFILLMENT
OF THE OBJECTIVE AND PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION
ON PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE U.S. AND
THE USSR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEND SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVES TO PARTICIPATE, ON THE BASIS OF
RECIPROCITY, IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS
CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO THE CONVENTION OF THE OTHER
SIDE.
-- THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE IN IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE UNDERTAKING TO COOPERATE WITH OTHER PARTIES,
CONTAINED IN ARTICLE IX OF THE CONVENTION. IT
WOULD NOT AFFECT THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF
THE U.S. OR USSR AS PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION,
NOR WOULD IT IMPEDE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL
ON-SITE INSPECTIONS PURSUANT TO THE CONVENTION.
-- EACH SIDE COULD UTILIZE THIS ARRANGEMENT WITH
RESPECT TO ANY INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTION--
WHETHER ROUTINE OR CHALLENGE--OF THE OTHER SIDE.
RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES
-- THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ACCOMPANY
THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM AS OBSERVERS
AND SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO OBSERVE ALL OF ITS
INSPECTION-RELATED ACTIVITIES. IN ADDITION, THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO
DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, OR REQUESTS
CONCERNING THE INSPECTION TO OFFICIALS OF THE SIDE
BEING INSPECTED ("RECEIVING SIDE").
-- THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD NOT
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INTERFERE IN THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM'S
EXECUTION OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, NOR INTERFERE
IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TEAM AND THE
RECEIVING SIDE. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES
SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN PREPARATION OF THE
TEAM'S REPORT TO THE RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL
BODY UNDER THE CONVENTION.
-- THE SIDES SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY
MEASURES TO ENABLE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES
TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS.
-- THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ENJOY
THE SANE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES AS THE
MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM.
GENERAL PROCEDURES
-- THE SIDES SHOULD EXCHANGE LISTS OF SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVES NOT LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER
THE DATE ON WHICH THE CONVENTION IS IN FORCE
FOR BOTH SIDES. THEY SHOULD UPDATE THE LISTS
AS NECESSARY.
-- WHEN ONE SIDE ("RECEIVING SIDE") IS NOTIFIED
THAT IT IS TO BE SUBJECT TO AN INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION, IT WOULD INFORM THE OTHER SIDE
("OBSERVING SIDE") WITHOUT DELAY. THE OBSERVING
SIDE SHOULD WITHOUT DELAY INFORM THE RECEIVING
SIDE WHETHER IT WILL EXERCISE ITS RIGHT TO SEND
ITS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN
THIS INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION.
-- THE SIDES SHOULD USE THE BILATERAL
CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN
THEM TO CONSIDER QUESTIONS RELATED TO PROCEDURES
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ARRANGEMENT FOR
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES, AS WELL AS ANY CONCERN
ARISING FROM OBSERVATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION. THE OBSERVING SIDE SHOULD COMMUNICATE
TO THE RECEIVING SIDE ANY CONCERNS ARISING
FROM OBSERVATION OF A PARTICULAR INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION PROMPTLY, BUT NOT LATER THAN 90 DAYS
FROM THE END OF THE INSPECTION. DURING THE
ANNUAL MEETINGS ENVISIONED IN THE BILATERAL
CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, THE SIDES SHOULD
JOINTLY EXAMINE THE OBSERVATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTIONS FOR THE PREVIOUS YEAR AND ENDEAVOR
TO RESOLVE ANY CONCERNS. IN ADDITION, PROBLEMS
THAT BECOME APPARENT ONLY AFTER A SERIES OF
INSPECTIONS SHOULD BE PROMPTLY COMMUNICATED
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TO THE RECEIVING SIDE AND THEN DISCUSSED PROMPTLY
BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.
-- DETAILED PROVISIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
THIS ARRANGEMENT FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES
SHOULD BE DEVELOPED BILATERALLY AT THE SAME
TIME THAT RELATED PROVISIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE RELATED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF THE
MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ARE BEING DEVELOPED.
SUCH BILATERAL PROVISIONS SHOULD INCLUDE SPECIFIC
TIME FRAMES FOR NOTIFICATIONS, SPECIFIC MEASURES
TO FACILITATE ARRIVAL OF OBSERVERS, AND GUIDELINES
FOR THE NUMBER OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES AT A
SPECIFIC INSPECTION. (THE NUMBER SHOULD BE SMALL,
BUT AT LEAST TWO REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE
PERMITTED.) END TEXT.
3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
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SECRET GENEVA 02623
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, MARCH 5, 1987,
AMBASSADOR HANSEN'S STATEMENT
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-018. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE PREPARED STATEMENT
DELIVERED BY U.S. ACTING CD REPRESENTATIVE
LYNN HANSEN AT THE LAST MEETING OF THE
FIFTH ROUND OF U.S.-SOVIET INTENSIFIED
CW BAN DISCUSSIONS. BEGIN TEXT.
MR. AMBASSADOR,
-- THIS MEETING MARKS THE END OF THE FIFTH ROUND
OF ACCELERATED BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS PURSUANT TO
THE NOVEMBER 1985 SUMMIT COMMITMENT BY PRESIDENT
REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. FOR THAT
REASON, I WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT A BRIEF, PRELIMINARY
ASSESSMENT, BOTH OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND OF
BILATERAL WORK OF SPECIFIC ISSUES.
-- THE BILATERAL COMMITMENT IN NOVEMBER 1985 CLEARLY
HAS LED TO AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORK ON A
COMPREHENSIVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. THIS IS VISIBLE
BOTH IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AND IN THESE
BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. IN THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS,
THIS POSITIVE TREND BECAME APPARENT IN ROUND III AND
DEVELOPED FURTHER IN ROUND IV.
-- AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS ROUND, AND CONTINUING
THROUGH THE ROUND, THERE HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE SOVIET POSITION AND THE PACE HAS ACCELERATED
FURTHER. WE CONSIDER THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET
POSITION AS VERY IMPORTANT AND CONSTRUCTIVE ONES.
WE WELCOME THEM.
-- YOU APPRECIATE, I AM SURE, THAT THE POLITICAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, AND THEIR SPECIFIC
IMPACT ON FUTURE WORK IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
NEGOTIATIONS, ARE BEING CAREFULLY AND INTENSIVELY
ASSESSED IN WASHINGTON.
-- WHILE THIS ASSESSMENT IS TAKING PLACE, U.S.
REPRESENTATIVES WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY,
STEADILY, AND DELIBERATELY. WE WILL CONTINUE TO FULFILL
THE COMMITMENT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE IN GENEVA IN
NOVEMBER 1985 AND THAT HE REAFFIRMED IN HIS MESSAGE TO
THE CD ONE MONTH AGO.
-- AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR OTHERS TO
REALIZE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT BE RUSHED INTO
AN INEFFECTIVE AGREEMENT. "GETTING IT RIGHT" IS
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IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
AND ITS ALLIES. ONCE A CONVENTION IS AGREED, IT WILL BE
IN FORCE FOR A LONG TIME. THEREFORE, MY DELEGATION WILL
CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT ISSUES BE EXAMINED THOROUGHLY
AND THAT EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS BE FOUND. WE WILL INSIST
THAT THE MANY DETAILS REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A
CONVENTION BE WORKED OUT CAREFULLY. THIS WORK WILL TAKE
MORE THAN A FEW WEEKS OR A FEW MONTHS.
-- LET ME NOW TURN MORE SPECIFICALLY TO THE BILATERAL
DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE OVER THE LAST THREE
WEEKS. OVERALL, WE CONSIDER THAT THIS ROUND HAS BEEN
MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN PREVIOUS ROUNDS.
-- DURING THIS ROUND, THE TWO SIDES PREPARED A JOINT
PAPER ELABORATING ON THE EARLIER AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE
FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES
IN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS ON EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY.
THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISHMENT.
-- THE TWO SIDES ALSO RESOLVED MANY POINTS OF
DIFFERENCE IN THE JOINT PAPER ON ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. ONLY A FEW BRACKETED
POINTS NOW REMAIN. THIS IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISH-
MENT.
-- THESE PAPERS, WHICH WERE PREPARED AD REFERENDUM TO
CAPITALS, WILL BE PROMPTLY REVIEWED IN WASHINGTON. IT
IS, OF COURSE, POSSIBLE THAT CHANGES MAY BE SUGGESTED
AS A RESULT OF THIS REVIEW. THE RESULTS OF THE REVIEW
WILL BE COMMUNICATED PROMPTLY TO YOU.
-- IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO INFORM THE
SOVIET DELEGATION THAT MY AUTHORITIES HAVE REVIEWED
THE JOINT PAPER ON BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
RESULTING FROM ROUND IV. THEY HAVE FOUND THE PAPER
TO BE ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT MODIFICATION. WE WOULD LIKE
TO KNOW WHETHER MOSCOW ALSO FINDS THE PAPER TO BE
ACCEPTABLE.
MR. AMBASSADOR,
-- IN THE U.S. VIEW, THE SUBJECTS OF EARLY DATA EXCHANGE
AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION HAVE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE AT
THIS STAGE OF WORK ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. DURING
THIS ROUND, THE DISCUSSIONS OF THESE TWO TOPICS WERE
SOMEWHAT MORE DETAILED AND USEFUL THAN IN PREVIOUS
ROUNDS, ALTHOUGH NOT SATISFACTORY FROM THE U.S. VIEWPOINT.
THE TWO SIDES STILL SEEM TO BE FAR APART ON BOTH OF
THESE CRITICAL ISSUES.
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-- THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS EXCHANGE AND
CONFIRMATION OF DETAILED DATA BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE SOVIET UNION BEFORE SIGNATURE OF A CONVENTION
TO BE ESSENTIAL TO BUILDING THE CONFIDENCE NECESSARY
FOR ENTERING INTO AN AGREEMENT TO GIVE UP ITS CHEMICAL
DETERRENT. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION
DOES NOT RULE OUT SUCH AN EARLY EXCHANGE, BUT SEEKS A
GUARANTEE THAT THE CONVENTION WILL BE COMPLETED ONCE DATA
IS PROVIDED. SUCH GUARANTEES ARE NOT POSSIBLE. CERTAINLY,
A SATISFACTORY PROCESS OF EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION WOULD
MAKE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION VERY PROBABLE.
ON THE OTHER HAND, WITHOUT SATISFACTORY PROCESS OF DATA
EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION, THE COMPLETION OF THE
CONVENTION WOULD BE IN DOUBT.
???
-- IN OUR VIEW, THE BUILDING OF THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE
MUST BE A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS, RATHER THAN A ONE-TIME
ALL-OR-NOTHING AFFAIR. THAT IS WHY THE UNITED STATES
PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF DATA IN TWO STAGES. FIRST, GENERAL
DATA WOULD BE EXCHANGED, AND THEN MORE DETAILED DATA.
CERTAINLY, "TWO" IS NOT A MAGIC NUMBER. OTHER STATES
COULD BE CONSIDERED. AND THE EARLIER THE PROCESS BEGINS,
THE BETTER. SOVIET FAILURE TO DEAL MORE DIRECTLY AND
CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH OUR CONCERNS IN THIS REGARD CAN ONLY
PROLONG THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THESE REASONS,
WE BELIEVE THE DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE SHOULD BE A KEY ELEMENT
IN FUTURE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS.
-- WHILE EMPHASIZING THE CRITICAL ROLE OF EARLY DATA
EXCHANGE IN BUILDING CONFIDENCE, I DO NOT WANT TO
MINIMIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF OTHER STEPS AS WELL. THE
INCREASING SERIOUSNESS OF THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
CONTRIBUTES TO BUILDING CONFIDENCE. A FURTHER
CONTRIBUTION COULD BE MADE, FOR EXAMPLE, THROUGH A JOINT
VISIT OF U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TO THE U.S.
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION FACILITY AT TOOELE, UTAH. AS YOU
KNOW, AN INVITATION HAS ALREADY BEEN EXTENDED TO THE
SOVIET SIDE. THIS INVITATION REMAINS OPEN. WE HOPE
THAT YOU WILL NOT IGNORE THIS OPPORTUNITY. WE ARE
AWAITING YOUR RESPONSE.
-- WITH REGARD TO THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE, THIS
ALSO REMAINS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.
WHILE WE WELCOME THE CHANGES MADE IN THE SOVIET POSITION
ON FEBRUARY 17, IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT THE SOVIET
APPROACH, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, WOULD STILL NOT PROVIDE
THE NECESSARY HIGH LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS. FOR EXAMPLE,
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES SUCH AS OBSERVATION FROM A DISTANCE
OR NEAR-SITE WATER SAMPLING CANNOT RESOLVE A QUESTION
OF SUSPECTED CLANDESTINE STOCKPILES. THE ONLY WAY TO
TELL WHETHER A MUNITIONS BUNKER CONTAINS CHEMICAL
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WEAPONS IS TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE BUNKER. THIS IS NOT
A MATTER OF OPINION; IT IS A FACT.
-- THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES THAT FUTURE DISCUSSIONS
OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION FOCUS ON MEANS FOR PREVENTING
ABUSE OF A MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION. WE
HOPE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE, RATHER THAN CONTINUING TO
INSIST ON A RIGHT OF REFUSAL IN MANY INSTANCES, WILL BE
PREPARED TO JOIN THE U.S. SIDE IN EXAMINING OTHER
POSSIBLE SAFEGUARDS IN THE INTERESTS OF FINDING A MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.
-- TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF NON-PRODUCTION, I NOTE THAT
THE TWO SIDES HAD CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS, ALTHOUGH
THIS ISSUE WAS NOT A CENTRAL ONE IN THIS ROUND. IDEAS
RELATED TO SCHEDULE 1 WERE EXPLORED THAT SEEM HELPFUL,
BUT REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. HOWEVER, I WOULD NOTE THAT
THE U.S. SIDE IS STILL AWAITING A RESPONSE TO ITS
FEBRUARY 17 REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE SOVIET
POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF RANDOM, I.E., UNPREDICTABLE,
TIMING OF INSPECTIONS AT DECLARED COMMERCIAL FACILITIES.
-- MR. AMBASSADOR, I WILL BE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON
SOON, ALONG WITH MOST OF MY COLLEAGUES. I CAN ASSURE
YOU THAT WE WILL BE DISCUSSING DEVELOPMENTS DURING THIS
ROUND WITH OUR AUTHORITIES, WHO HAVE A VERY DEEP INTEREST
IN THESE DISCUSSIONS AND IN THE EFFECTIVE PROHIBITION
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RESUMING
DISCUSSIONS AFTER THIS PERIOD FOR REVIEW AND FURTHER
PREPARATION. END TEXT.
3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
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UNCLAS GENEVA 02630
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS (ROUND V):
PRESS STATEMENT:
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-019. (UNCLAS -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS RELEASED TO THE PRESS
AT 1700 HOURS, MARCH 5, 1987 BY U.S. DEL.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
FROM FEBRUARY 16 TO MARCH 5, DELEGATIONS FROM
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS HELD BILATERAL
DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA ON THE PROHIBITION OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE TALKS WERE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE NOVEMBER 1985 AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT
REAGAN AND SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV
TO ACCELERATE EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE AN EFFECTIVE
AND VERIFIABLE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
GENERAL AND COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS AND TO INTENSIFY BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
AT THE EXPERT LEVEL ON ALL ASPECTS OF A
CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF
VERIFICATION.
THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY AMBASSADOR
LYNN HANSEN, ACTING U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT. THE SOVIET
DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY AMBASSADOR YURI
NAZARKIN, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT. END TEXT.
4. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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SECRET GENEVA 02730
VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, MARCH 5, 1987.
TEXT OF AMB. NAZARKIN'S PLENARY STATEMENT.
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-002 (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT)
2. BEGIN TEXT--
STATEMENT BY
THE HEAD OF THE USSR DELEGATION YU. K. NAZARKIN
AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS ON THE
PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
GENEVA, MARCH 5, 1987
MR. AMBASSADOR,
-- USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN THE COURSE OF THE
FIFTH ROUND OF SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ABOUT TO BE COMPLETED
TODAY, AND, WE HOPE, THIS WORK WILL PERMIT US TO MOVE
AHEAD WITH THE TASK OF PREPARING THE CONVENTION. AS
A RESULT OF NEW PROPOSALS ON THE DECLARATION OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES, BROUGHT FORTH BY THE
SOVIET UNION ON FEBRUARY 17, 1987, THIS ISSUE, AS
SHOWN BY OUR DISCUSSIONS, WAS PRACTICALLY RESOLVED.
WE SPEAK OUT FOR THE USE OF MAXIMALLY EFFICIENT METHODS
OF STOCKPILE VERIFICATION INCLUDING PERMANENT USE OF
INSTRUMENTS. IT APPEARS TO US THAT, FOR MAKING THIS
SITUATION MORE SPECIFIC, ONE COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
PROVISIONS IN THE DOCUMENT CD/516 PRESENTED BY THE
U.S. WE PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT THE QUESTION OF
STOCKPILES WAS, IN PRINCIPLE, RESOLVED BETWEEN THE
USSR AND THE U.S. DELEGATIONS.
-- THE CENTRAL ISSUE ON WHICH NOTICEABLE PROGRESS WAS
ACHIEVED IN THE COURSE OF THIS ROUND IS THE ISSUE OF
CHEMICAL WEAPON-PRODUCING FACILITIES. WE ARE PREPARED
TO REPORT THE DOCUMENT DEVELOPED BY OUR DELEGATIONS TO
OUR CAPITAL. WE PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT, IN ORDER
TO FINISH WORKING OUT THE DEFINITION CONTAINED IN THIS
DOCUMENT, IT IS STILL NECESSARY TO AGREE ON THE THRESHOLDS
WHICH ARE PROVIDED FOR IN ITEMS (A) (I) AND (B) OF THE
U.S. PROPOSAL. ACCORDING TO OUR VIEW, THEY SHOULD BE
LOW THRESHOLDS MEASURED IN KILOGRAMS AS IT IS INDICATED
IN THE WORKING DOCUMENT. WE ARE AWAITING FURTHER, MORE
DETAILED INFORMATION ON THIS MATTER FROM THE U.S.
DELEGATION. AS FOR THE SECTION ON POSSIBLE ELIMINATION
MEASURES, INCLUDING VERIFICATION, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS
A MATTER OF FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, AND BUILDINGS WHICH
ARE INCLUDED IN THE DEVELOPED DEFINITION OF A CHEMICAL
WEAPONS-PRODUCING FACILITY.
-- I WOULD LIKE TO ESPECIALLY DWELL ON SECTION III
OF THE DEVELOPED DOCUMENT ENTITLED, "RELATED MEASURES".
REGREATABLY, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE COMPLETE
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AGREEMENT ON THIS SECTION. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE
THAT THE PHRASE, "FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES" UNDER
ITEM (A) OF THIS SECTION WHICH SPEAKS OF KEY PRECURSORS,
CREATES A LOOPHOLE FOR BRINGING OF A CONSIDERABLE PART
OF INSTALLATIONS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF SUCH CHEMICALS
OUT FROM UNDER THE REGIME OF THE CONVENTION UNDER THE
PRETEXT THAT THEY ARE ALLEGEDLY BEING PRODUCED NOT FOR
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES. IT WILL, IN ANY CASE, MOST
LIKELY BE DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH WHICH KEY PRECURSORS
WERE DIRECTED TOWARD CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND
WHICH ONES TOWARD PERMITTED PURPOSES. THIS IS WHY WE
ARE PROPOSING THAT THE CONVENTION ENCOMPASS ALL
PRODUCTION OF KEY PRECURSORS, WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE
ACTIVITY IN ANY CASE, INDEPENDENT OF THE FACT WHETHER
THESE PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN THE PAST WERE OR WERE
NOT USED FOR PURPOSES OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE CAPACITY
THRESHOLD WHICH IS TO BE ESTABLISHED PROVIDES FOR, IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROVISIONS ON EXCESSIVE CAPACITIES,
A CRITERION WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE
PRODUCTION OF KEY PRECURSORS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PURPOSES FROM THE REST OF THE PRODUCTION OF KEY
PRECURSORS.
-- WE COUNT ON BEING ABLE TO RESOLVE IN THE NEAREST
FUTURE THE ISSUE OF KEY PRECURSORS-PRODUCING FACILITIES.
-- ANOTHER UNRESOLVED QUESTION IN SECTION III REMAINS
THE ISSUE ON FACILITIES FOR THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL
MUNITIONS AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR THE USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. WE ARE THANKFUL TO THE U.S. DELEGATION FOR
PROVIDING DETAILS ON THIS PROPOSAL IT MADE. THEY WILL
BE REPORTED TO OUR CAPITAL SUBSEQUENT TO WHICH A
DECISION WILL BE MADE ON THE USSR POSITION ON THIS
ISSUE. AT THIS STAGE, WE DO NOT CONSIDER OURSELVES
BOUND IN ANY WAY BY THE TEXT CONTAINED IN SECTION III,
ITEM (B).
-- IN THE COURSE OF EXCHANGING VIEWS, ON THE ISSUE OF
NON-PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN COMMERCIAL
INDUSTRY, WE PROVIDED ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS
WHICH WERE PROPOSED TO US BY THE AMERICAN SIDE AT THE
PRECEDING ROUND. AS FAR AS WE UNDERSTAND, OUR REPLIES
CONTRIBUTED TO THE CLARIFICATION OF THESE QUESTIONS.
AS FOR THE OTHER QUESTIONS OF THE U.S., THE REPLIES,
AS NOTED BY BOTH SIDES, WERE PROVIDED EARLIER IN THE
COURSE OF MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. IN
THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT ROUND, WE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO
RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF CATEGORY I LISTS OF CHEMICALS
TO WHICH, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE U.S. SIDE ASCRIBES
A GREAT DEAL OF IMPORTANCE. WE HOPE THAT OUR PROPOSALS
WILL SOON LEAD TO A MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. I WISH
TO STRESS THAT THE DELEGATION OF THE SOVIET UNION
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BELIEVES THAT WE WENT MORE THAN HALF-WAY TO MEET THE
U.S. POSITION IN THIS MATTER. WE THINK THE CONVENTION
SHOULD PROVIDE FOR A RELIABLE PROHIBITION AND DESTRUCTION
NOT ONLY OF UNITARY BUT ALSO OF BINARY AND MULTI-COMPONENT
CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND, BY THE WAY, NOT ONLY OF ITS KNOWN
EXAMPLES AND TYPES, BUT SHOULD ALSO BLOCK THE APPEARANCE
OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS WITH THE USE OF STILL UNKNOWN
CHEMICALS. WE HOPE THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION SHARES WITH
US THE AIM OF COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF ANY CHEMICAL
WEAPONS.
-- I WOULD LIKE TO DWELL ESPECIALLY ON THE QUESTION
WHICH, AS WE SEE IT, IS THE MAJOR ONE OUT OF ALL THE
REMAINING UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS; THAT IS, ON CHALLENGE
INSPECTIONS. WE PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT CHALLENGE
INSPECTIONS SHOULD BECOME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE
MECHANISM GUARANTEEING COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION
BY ALL PARTIES TO IT AND SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN
EFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION OF THE VIOLATION OF THE
CONVENTION NO MATTER BY WHOM. WE ARE EMPHASIZING THIS
IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS AS A PRE-
VENTION OF VIOLATIONS. AS WE SEE IT, CHALLENGE
INSPECTIONS AS SUCH, IN PRACTICE, SHOULD BE AN
EXCEPTIONALLY RARE, AN EXTRAORDINARY PHENOMENON, YET
THE POSSIBILITY TO CARRY THEM OUT SHOULD RENDER VIOLATIONS
OF THE CONVENTION A POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE MATTER.
WE HOPE THAT THE U.S. SIDE SHARES THIS APPROACH OF OURS.
-- AS WE SEE IT, A FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE
ISSUE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION TOOK PLACE DURING THIS
ROUND. THIS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO
UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER. I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THE FACT
THAT WE MET THE U.S. POSITION HALF-WAY, AGREED WITH THE
AUTOMATIC NATURE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS IN FULL IN
CASES WHEN THERE IS SUSPICION THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE
USED, OR WITH RESPECT TO DECLARED FACILITIES OR LOCATIONS
ACCORDING TO THE CONVENTION. WE ARE ALSO FOR HAVING
THE INSPECTION CONDUCTED IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE
PERIODS, SO THAT THE STATE IN VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION
WOULD NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO COVER UP ITS TRACKS.
MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE CONVENTION SHOULD NOT
HAVE ANY FORBIDDEN ZONES FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS,
OTHERWISE, IT IS PRECISELY IN THESE FORBIDDEN ZONES
THAT VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION WILL TAKE PLACE,
SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, CLANDESTINE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
STOCKPILES.
-- AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE
FACT THAT WE ARE NOT DEVELOPING AN AGREEMENT ON COMPLETE
AND COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT, BUT RATHER, A CONVENTION
ON THE PROHIBITION OF AN IMPORTANT WEAPON, YET STILL
ONLY ONE TYPE OF WEAPONS, NAMELY, CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
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THEREFORE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION SHOULD
NOT INTERFERE WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES, INCLUDING
MILITARY ACTIVITIES, NOT RELATED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
MOREOVER, IF OTHER TYPES OF ARMS ARE NOT TOUCHED UPON
BY THIS CONVENTION, IT MEANS THAT STATES MAY HAVE
SECRETS RELATED TO THESE OTHER TYPES OF ARMS, THEIR
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING, AND THE LIKE.
I COULD NOTE IN PARENTHESES THAT IN MANY INTERNATIONAL
DOCUMENTS DEVELOPED WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE U.S.,
INCLUDING THE DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONVENTION,
THE RIGHT OF STATES TO HAVE CLOSED LOCATIONS AND REGIONS
IS ACKNOWLEDGED. THUS, THE TASK CONSISTS OF SETTING UP
A SYSTEM OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS SO THAT ON ONE HAND,
EFFECT IVENSSS WOULD BE ASSURED AND ON THE OTHER HAND,
NO DAMAGE WOULD BE DONE TO THE SECURITY OF STATES IN
AREAS IN NO WAY RELATED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
-- AS WE SEE IT, A GOOD WAY TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE IS
PROVIDED FOR BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DOCUMENT, CD/715.
THE MAIN IDEA OF THIS PROPOSAL--THE POSSIBILITY TO
PROPOSE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES WHICH WOULD SATISFY THE
STATES MAKING THE REQUEST--IS VIEWED BY US AS THE KEY
WHICH COULD FACILITATE THE FINDING OF MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE
DECISION WHICH WOULD OBJECTIVELY CORRESPOND TO THE SCOPE
OF PROHIBITION OF THE CONVENTION BEING DEVELOPED.
-- AS FOR THE APPROACH CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT CD/500,
PERTAINING TO THE U.S. DELEGATION, WE CANNOT AGREE WITH
THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN IT:
- -- THE DISCRIMINATORY NATURE WITH RESPECT TO
STATE PROPERTY;
^ -- THE LACK OF POSSIBILITY TO PROPOSE AND AGREE ON
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES IN THOSE CASES WHEN FULL
ACCESS TO ONE OR ANOTHER LOCATION OR FACILITY
IS IMPOSSIBLE;
- -- AUTOMATIC INSPECTIONS IN ALL CASES.
-- ONE SHOULD MOREOVER TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT
THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF STATES PARTY TO THE
CONVENTION WILL TURN OUT TO BE IN AN UNEQUAL POSITION
VIS-A-VIS THE FIVE STATES-MEMBERS OF THE FACT-FINDING
GROUP, WHICH WILL APPARENTLY BE UNACCETABLE.
-- IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE SOONER THE U.S. SIDE
INTRODUCES CORRECTIONS INTO ITS APPROACH, THE BETTER
IT WILL BE FOR A SPEEDY CONCLUSION OF A CONVENTION.
-- FINALLY, ONE SHOULD DWELL ON THE ISSUE OF
BILATERAL MEASURES. WE SHARE THE VIEW THAT A HIGHER
LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES WOULD
CONTRIBUTE TO A SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION OF CHEMICAL
DISARMAMENT. A LOT HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED IN THIS
RESPECT. OUR DELEGATIONS AGREED ON A DOCUMENT ON A
BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM, AND WE CONFIRM THE
FACT THAT WE AGREE TO SUCH A DOCUMENT. AS WE UNDER-
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STAND IT, THE U.S. SIDE IS DOING THE SAME. IN THE
COURSE OF THIS ROUND, OUR EXPERTS DEVELOPED A MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING ON THE PARTICIPATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE OTHER SIDE IN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS ON USSR
AND U.S. TERRITORIES. WE EXAMINED THIS DOCUMENT, ON
THE DELEGATION LEVEL, AND CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT
WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEND IT TO OUR CAPITAL FOR
CONSIDERATION, SHOULD THE AMERICAN SIDE BE PREPARED
TO DO LIKEWISE.
-- WE KNOW WHAT GREAT IMPORTANCE THE U.S. SIDE
ASCRIBES TO THE QUESTION OF DATA EXCHANGE ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. AND HERE, TOO, WE MET THE U.S. WISH HALF-WAY:
WE AGREED TO HAVING SUCH AN EXCHANGE TAKE PLACE AFTER
THE SIGNING BUT PRIOR TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE
CONVENTION. FINALLY, HAVING TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE
U.S. VIEWPOINT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF HOW HAVING THE
INFORMATION ON THE POSSESSION OR NON-POSSESSION
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WE MADE A STATEMENT AT TODAY'S
PLENARY MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN
WHICH IT IS DIRECTLY STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION, AS
WELL AS THE U.S., ARE STATES POSSESSING CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. WE HOPE THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION WILL ?
APPRECIATE THIS STEP OF OURS AS A CONTRIBUTION TO
CREATING AND STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE IN THE FIELD
OF THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
-- THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE,
TOGETHER WITH THE U.S., THE CONSIDERATION OF FURTHER
STEPS TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE. WE FEEL THAT AN
IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF
CONFIDENCE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES WOULD BE THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF AN UNDERSTANDING ON ONE OF THE CENTRAL
ISSUES OF THE CONVENTION--ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS.
BUT IT, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, REQUIRES STRIVING FOR AN
UNDERSTANDING NOT ONLY ON OUR PART, BUT FLEXIBILITY
ON THE PART OF BOTH SIDES. END TEXT.
3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
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PAGE 61
SEP,R ET
, FILE
Department of State
GENEVA 02732 81 OF 06 06138IZ
ACTION OFFICE ACOA-I2
WLM
INFO
/082 Al
INFO
656-6I
INFO
556-61
I 11 GNI I NG
2701 J2039 6601672 PAGE 61 GENEVA 82732 01 OF 06 061901Z 2701 002151 6501672
0E/0359Z DELS HOD USEFUL, DETAILED CISCUSSIONS ON
10-81 /002
??
OCT-81 /062 Al WLM
OCT PASS ACDE
CHALLENGE ANC DATA EXCHANGE ISSUES. IRONICALLY,
SOVIET POSITION ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS NOV
05/83521 MORE STRINGENT THAN THE UN POSITION, SINCE
SOVIETS SUPPORT MANDATORY INSPECTION IN TWO
06/19321 CASES.
-- ALSO, AT BEGINNING OF ROUND SOVIETS
06/19231 ANNOUNCED IN THE CD THAT THEY CAN AGREE TO
PROMPT DECLARATION OF CW STOCKPILE LOCATIONS
WITH EXTENSIVE ON-SITE VERIFICATION. AT END
OF ROUND THEY ACKNOWLEDGED IN ANOTHER CD
STATEMENT THAT THE USSR POSSESSES CHEMICAL
WEAPONS.
06/1906Z -
-- SOVIETS CONTINUE TO CRITICIZE ARTICLE
STRONGLY AND TO INSIST ON A RIGHT OF REFUSAL
ACTION OFFICE EUR-02
INFO MR-01 550-81 SSS-01 SSI-02 SS-01 0-01 P-02 7-01 C-81
SARN-I1 INR-61 L-01 PA-81 OCT-01 PM-8I SP-01 SRT-0l
SNP-01 ACDA-01 SSSC-01 SDEL-03 /027 Al WLM
OCT PASS INRE ASCE CIAE DODE
INFO AC011-81 X-81 /002 A4 GAN
ACTION SS-06
INFO LOG-00 AOS-06 550-00 /000 W
132213 0619031 /38
0 8618582 MAR 17
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASNDC IMMEDIATE 6752
INFO DOE VASHDC
JCS WASHDC
SECDEF WASNOC
AMEMIASSY BONN
AMEMIASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION MATO
USDEL NIFR VIENNA
SECRETSECTION II OF 06 GENEVA 02732
EXDIS
ACOA FOR MA; DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/001N;
SECDEF FOR OSO/ISP
VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL:
TAGS: PARM UNGA, COG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CIO: US-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND V
WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS
REF: U0
VO
IC/
MO
1E/
STATE 644871 (ROUND V GUIDANCE/
STATE 34378f-'1GUIDANCE ON PRODUCTION FACILITIES)
STATE 33914/ (GUIDANCE ON BILATERAL OBSERvERSI
GENEVA 86134 (ROUNO CW BILAT-868I
GENEVA 2626 (LW BILAT-017)
GENEVA 2622 ICW 0ILAT-016/
I. THIS IS CW BILAT-621. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY/OVERALL ASSESSMENT --
-- FIFTH BILATERAL ROUND, HELD IN GENEVA
DURING THREE-WEEK PERIOD ENDING MARCH 5, WAS
NOTABLE FOR SOVIET EXPRESSIONS OF WILLINGNESS
TO ACCEPT VIRTUALLY ANYTHING THE U.S. PROPOSED
ON ISSUE OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND ON
BILATERAL OBSERVER ARRANGEMENT. ON THE OTHER
NAND, REY ISSUES OF MANDATORY CHALLENGE
INSPECTION AND BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE,
ARE STILL FAR FROM RESOLUTION.
()
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IN MOST CASES. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NOW
FRAGMENTARY SIGNS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT
EVENTUALLY ACCEPT ARTICLE X, PARTICULARLY
IN A BILATERAL CONTEXT, AFTER MOVING THROUGH
SEVERAL INTERMEDIATE POSITIONS.
-- TWO SIDES WORKED OUT AN INFORMAL POINT
PAPER BASED ON U.S. PROPOSAL FOR SOVIET
OBSERVERS AT INSPECTIONS OF U.S. SITES AND
VICE VERSA. INFORMAL POINT PAPER ON
ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION
FACILITIES HAS ONLY A FEW UNRESOLVED POINTS.
END SUMMARY.
3. DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES --
A. U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS MET TEN TIMES
IN GENEVA BETWEEN 16 FEBRUARY AND 4 MARCH FOR
FIFTH ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS PURSUANT TO THE 1985
SUMMIT AGREEMENT TO INTENSIFY BILATERAL
DISCUSSIONS. (THIS REPRESENTS THREE FEWER
MEETINGS THAN IN PREVIOUS ROUND.) FIRST AND
LAST MEETINGS WERE AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL,
THE OTHERS AT EXPERTS LEVEL.
B. PRIMARY TOPICS WERE: CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CV)
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S;:.UET
Department of State
GENEVA 02732 02 OF 36 0619021
ACTION OFFICE ACDA-11
INFO SSS-01 /013 Al WLM
ia.
2762 070359 :S01673
INFO SSS-01 10-111 /001.
,S/S--0
11
PAGE 01 GEMEVA a2732 02 Or 06 251902Z 1'32 Z:2359 ! 161
06/0359Z DID NOT ENGAGE IN POLEMICS ON BINARIES,
NOR DID THEY iNTRODUCE EXTRANEOUS SUBJECTS.
06/03521 B. SOVIETS WERE nu:m LESS FORTHCOMING ON
BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION
06/1933Z THAN OTHER VERIFICATION-RELATED AREAS. HOWEVER,
THEY WERE LESS RETICENT THAN IN PREVIOUS ROUNDS,
PARTICULARLY ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. BOTH
ISSUES, HOWEVER, REMAIN FAR FROM RESOLUTION.
ACTION OFFICE EUR-112
INFO MR-11 550-01 SSS-01 55I-02 SS-01 0-01 P-62 7-01 C-01
SARN-11 INR-11 L-01 PA-11 OCT-01 PM-01 SP-01 SART-01
ACOA-11 SSSC-01 50E1-03 SCSC-01 /028 Al WLM
OCT PASS IMRE NSC( CIAE DODE ACDE
INFO ,ICDA-It X-01 /002 Al GAK
ACTION 55-01
INFO LOG-11 ADS-01 SS0-00 /080 W
132317. 0619041 /38
0 0618511 MAR 17
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASP= IMMEDIATE 6753
INFO DOC WASHDC
JCS MASI=
SECOEF WASNDC
AMEMIASSY BONN
AMEMRASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMIASSY PARIS
AMEMSASSY VIENNA
USMISSION USNATO
USOEL MIFR VIENNA
SECRETSECT1ON 02 OF 86 GENEVA 02732
EXDIS
ACOA FOR MA; DOE FOR OP/ISA; JCS FOR .15/0DIN;
SECDEF FOR 050/ISP
VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
B. 0. 12356: CUL:
TAGS: FIRM UNGA, CDG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR
PRODUCTION FACILITIES, BILATERAL OBSERVER
ARRANGEMENT, BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE, AND
CHALLENGE INSPECTION. IN ADDITION, THE
SIDES DISCUSSED ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
MONITORING MON-PRODUCTIONPLANI-INTERIM
MONITORING.
C. DISCUSSION OF IlLATERAL OBSERVER ARRANGEMENTS
RESULTED IN INFORMAL POINT PAPER USED ON U.S.
APPROACH (TEXT REF F). 'INFORMAL POINT PAPER
ON CV PRODUCTION FACILITIES THAT WAS JOINTLY
DEVELOPED IN ROUND III AND IV WAS FURTHER
ELABORATED, BUT NOT COMPLETED. (TEXT REF F).
IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH PAPERS
ARE TO It REVI(VED IN CAPITALS AND NAT THIS
COULD RESULT IN SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES.
4. SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS --
A. ROUND V WAS NOTABLE FOR STATED SOVIET
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT VIRTUALLY ANYTHING THE
U.S. PROPOSED ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES
AND BILATERAL OBSERVER ISSUES. THIS
REPRESENTS A FURTHER MANIFESTATION OF THE
MORE BUSINESS-LIKE SOVIET APPROACH ALREADY
APPARENT IN ROUNDS III AND IV. SOVIETS
C. WHILE SOVIETS PRESSED TO REACH AGREEMENT
06/19061 ON CV PRODUCTION FACILITY ISSUE, IN THOSE AREAS
WHERE U.S. HAD DETAILED MATERIAL TO PUT FORWARD,
THEY WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS IT AND IN MOST
3688
CrrInT
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CASES ACCEPTED THE U.S. PROPOSALS.
S. ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES --
A.. CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES --
-- U.S. DEL PUT FORWARD CHANGES IN U.S. VIEWS
AS INSTRUCTED REF A. THESE POINTS WERE ACCEPTED
BY SOVIETS. IN ADDITION, MOST POINTS REMAINING
UNRESOLVED FROM PREVIOUS ROUND WERE AGREED ON
BASIS OF THE U.S. APPROACH REF B.
-- IN ORDER TO HELP ENSURE AN ORDERLY,
DELIBERATE PACE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, U.S. DEL
DID NOT PRESS TO COMPLETE PRODUCTION
FACILITIES PAPER. IN FACT, U.S. DEL SOUGHT
TO ENSURE THAT AT LEAST A FEW POINTS REMAINED
FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. DEL BARELY MANAGED
THIS SINCE SOVIETS ACCEPTED VIRTUALLY ALL
U.S. PROPOSALS.
-- REMAINING ISSUES ARE RELATIVELY MINOR:
G1 WHETHER OR NOT CONVERTED BUILDINGS CAN
BE USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES MOVIETS CAN
ACCEPT EITHER SOLUTION; U.S. DEL HAS NO
INSTRUCTIONS), MI WHETHER SAME APPROACH
TO ELIMINATION OF EXCESSIVE PRODUCTION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4
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PAGE 91 GENEVA 92732 03 OF 06 0619942
ACTION OFFICE *CDA-12
INFO 555-11 /093 Al WLM
270A 003269 5S01674
06/93592
INFO 555-91 10-11 /902.
00/93552
00/1935:
ACTION OFFICE EUR-112
INFO 110-91 SSO-OI SSS-OI SSI-92 55-01 0-01 P-02 1-01 C-01
SARN-11 INR-11 L-111 PA-01 OCT-01 P11-01 SP-01 SAR1-01
SNP-91 ACOA-01 SSSC-91 SDEL-03 SCSC-11 /028 Al WLM
OCT PASS INRE NSCE CIAE DODE ACDE
INFO ACA-SI A-11 /OM A4 GAN
VS-0
1:ICEING
PAGE 01 GENEVA 02732 03 OF 06 0619041 2704 1017360 5.7.067J
WITH =PLAINTS 4eour AN INSPECTION YEARS
AFTER IT HAD TAKEN PLACE. U.S. DEL RESISTED
SOVIET EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A STRICT TIME
LIMIT AND SOUGHT SPECIFIC RECNNITION OF
THE RIGHT TO RAISE CONCERNS BASED ON A PATTERN
OF EVENTS SPREAD OVER TIME. FINAL TEXT
ENCOURAGES PROMPT COMMUNICATION OF COMPLAINTS
BUT REFLECTS U.S. CONCERN AS WELL.
-- SOVIETS ALSO SUGGESTED "GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT'
WHEREBY INSPECTORATE SECTION FOR THE USSR
00/:9072 WCULD BE HEADED BY AN AMERICAN AND THE AMERICAN
SECTION BY A SOVIET.
ACTION 55-08
Itao LOG-01 ADS-01 SSO-90 /000 W
132336 01:9042 '3/
0 0618582 MAR 87
FM usmissom GENEVA
TO SECSTATE MASI= IMMEDIATE 6754
INFO DOE WASHDC
JCS WASHOC
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMOASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION USNATO
USDEL MR VIENNA
SECRETSECTION 93.0F 96 GENEVA 02732
EXOIS
ACDA FOR MA; DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN;
SECDEF FOR 050/ISP
VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL:
TAGS: PARR UNGA, COG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD). US-USSR
CAPACITY THAT IS AGREED FOR ARTICLE V
(PRODUCTION FACILITIES) SHOULD ALSO BE
APPLIED TO CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FACILITIES
UNDER ARTICLE VI W.S. - NO, SOVIETS - YES),
ALSO SOVIET DEL BRACKETED"SONT1Y-NEGOTIATED
TEXT ON MUNITIONS HARDWARE PRODUCTION,
PENDING AUTHORITY FROM.MOSCOW TO ACCEPT IT.
-- SOVIETS EXPRESSED SWAG INTEREST IN
INTRODUCING AGREED MATERIAL INTO CD
DISCUSSIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. U.S. SAID
IT WAS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS THIS BEFORE
PAPER HAD BEEN REVIEWED IN CAPITALS.
B. BILATERAL OBSERVER ARRANGEMENT --
-- DRAFT JOINT PAPER BECAME POSSIBLE WHEN
SOVIETS ACCEPTED U.S. PROPOSAL THAT SPECIAL
U.S./SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES FUNCTION AS
OBSERVERS RATHER THAN AS MEMBERS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM. DEL BELIEVES
PAPER REFLECTS SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF ALL
POINTS OF U.S. POSITION (REF C).
-- PRINCIPAL SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WAS TO
ENSURE THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT SURPRISE THEM
C. BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE --
-- THIS TOPIC WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL FOR
THE FIRST TIME AT TWO EXPERTS MEETINGS.
-- U.S. DEL STRESSED THAT SATISFACTORY
BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE IS A PRECONDITION
FOR SIGNATURE OF THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION
AND THAT SOVIET FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE U.S.
PROPOSAL WOULD AFFECT THE MULTILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS.
-
-- SOVIETS HINTED THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERING
PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT THEY POSSESS CW.
(SOVIETS DID OBLIQUELY ACKNOWLEDGE THIS IN
MARCH 5 PLENARY STATEMENT.) THEY ALSO SAID
THEY DID NOT RULE OUT PROVIDING DETAILED
DATA BEFORE SIGNATURE, BUT STRESSED THAT THIS
COULD BE DONE ONLY WHEN IT WAS CERTAIN THAT THE
CONVENTION WOULD BE COMPLETED. THEY SAID
THEY WANTED A CLEAR POLITICAL COMMITMENT
NOT ONLY FROM THE U.S., BUT ALSO OTHERS (SUCH
AS FRANCE). IN SUM, THE SOVIETS WINKED AND
SMILED, BUT GAVE NO COMMITMENT.
D. CHALLENGE INSPECTION --
364C C.
errnrr
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sr.ET
Department of State
GENEVA 82732 24 OF 26 J615361
ACTION OFFICE ACOA-82
INFO 555-91 /On Al WLM
2715 022361 2201677
26/24282
INFO 555-Il 10-11 /Or,. AL..W?M
.s/so
I LI
PAGE 21 GENEVA 02732 24 or 26 361906: 2715 02361 ::c:o
BUT REITERATED SOVIET CONCEXN ABOUT PO2SI8LE
ABUSE OF MANDATORY CHALLENGE.
26/83552 -- BASED ON SOVIET STATE".ENTS IN ROUND V,
ONE 4OULD CONCLUDE THAT THEY ARE DEAD SET
06/19401 AGAINST A MANDATORY CHALLENGE PROVISION
ALONG THE LINES OF U.S. ARTICLE X. HOWEVER,
IT MAY BE USEFUL TO SPECULATE ON HOW FAR
THE SOVIETS MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE WILLING TO
MOVE.
ACTION OFFICE E112-12
INFO KR-11 550-11 SSS-81 55I-22 55-81 0-91 P-02 1-81 C-01
SUN-Il INN-91 1-91 P6-21 OCT-01 P11-01 SP-81 SART-01
SNIP-11 ACDA-01 SSUI81 50(1-03 SCSC-01 /028 A1 WtM
OCT PASS INRC IISCE CIAE DODE ACDE
INFO ACDA-11 X-11 /202 64 CAN
ACTION 55-91
INFO 106-111 ADS-111 SS0-00 /800 W
132454 2619072 /38
0 1618582 MAR 87
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASNOC IMMEDIATE 6755
INFO DOE WASNOC
JCS WASNOC
SECOEF WASNOC
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMIASSY MOSCOW
AMEMOASSY PARIS
AMEMIASSY VIENNA
USNISSION USNATO
USDEL IMER VIENNA
SECRETSECTION 114.0f 96 GENEVA 02732
EXDIS
ACOA FOR MA; DOE FOR DP/ISA; ICS FOR J5/00111:
SECOEF FOR 050/ISP
VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12366: DECL:
TAGS: PUN UNGA, COG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ICD): us-ussa
BOTN SIDES STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF
CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE. IN VIEW OF
INSTRUCTIONS MEF AI TO KEEP CHALLENGE
ISSUE IRON DOMINATING DISCUSSIONS, U.S.
DEL LINITED DISCUSSION OF.1SSUE7t0 A
SINGLE MEETING.
-- CURRENT SOVIET POSITION, AS LAID DOWN
IN FEBRUARY 17 CD PLENARY STATEMENK ANO
CLARIFIED IN BILATERAL DiSCUSSIONS, PROVIDES
FOM MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS IN TWO
CASES -- FOR ALLEGATIONS OF CW USE AND
FOR ACTIVITIES AT ALL DECLARED FACILITIES.
NET RESULT IS THAT SOVIET POSITION NOW GOES
FUITNER TNAN THE JULY 1986 UK PROPOSAL.
-- SOVIETS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST
IN UK CONCEPT OF 'ALTERNATIVE MEASURES AND
DISCUSSED SPECTRUM Of POSSIBILITIES, INCLUDING
PARTIAL ACCESS.
-- U.S. DEL PRESSED SOVIETS HARD ON NEED FOR
MANDATORY CHALLENGE PROVISION TO DEAL WITH
UNDECLARED STOCKS AND UNDECLARED PRODUCTION
FACILITIES. SOVIET DELOFF LATER ACKNOWLEDGED
PRIVATELY PERSUASIVENESS OF U.S. ARGUMENTS,
26/19892 -- SINCE SUMMER 1986 THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS
THAT A MANDATORY CHALLENGE PROVISION WOULD
BE MORE ACCEPTABLE ON A BILATERAL BASIS THAN
3680
ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS. THE SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT IN A BILATERAL CONTEXT THE POSSIBILITY OF
A RETALIATORY CHALLENGE WOULD PROVIDE A POWERFUL
DETERRENT TO ABUSE. THEY CONTINUE TO EXPRESS
CONCERN, HOWEVER, ABOUT ABUSE BY THIRD PARTIES
WHO MAY HAVE LITTLE TO LOSE. THIS CONTINUING
THEME SUGGESTS THAT EVENTUALLY THE SOVIETS
MIGHT BE RECEPTIVE TO A BILATERAL OUTCOME
ON THIS ISSUE.
-- WHILE EVIDENCE IS QUITE FRAGMENTARY, THE
CHANCES THE SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT A MULTILATERAL
PROVISION FOR MANDATORY CHALLENGE BASED ON
ARTICLE X MAY BE IMPROVING AND CERTAINLY
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED NEGLIGIBLE. THEIR
CURRENT STRESS ON 'ALTERNATIVE MEASURES' MAY
BE ONE IN A SERIES OF INTERMEDIATE POSITIONS.
ANOTHER INTERMEDIATE SOVIET MOVE MIGHT BE TO
CLAIM TO TAME ARTICLE X AS THE 'BASIS FOR
DISCUSSION' AND THEN SUGGEST CHANGES TO WATER
DOWN THE MANDATORY ASPECT.
-- STRAWS IN THE WINO THAT INDICATE THAT
POSSIBLE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF ARTICLE X
EVENTUALLY ARE:
- REPEATED COMMENTS BY SOVIET REPS THAT
CrrIDET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-n1iRRPnnni nn nt-Int-14 A
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SiS
kb0.17 1k(
PAGE 11 GENEVA 82732 05 OF 06 2619082 2719 302362 SC1560 PACE 11 GENEVA 82732 05 OF 06 0519092 2719 020262 2?:0151
26/0082 NOT USE TERM "BINARY" AND i:OULC BE BROAD
ACTION OFFICE Acu-02 ENOUGH TO COVER CHEMICALS NOT USED IN BINARIES.
INFO SSS-01 /803 Al WLM THESE CHEMICALS WOULD BE REFERRED TO AS "SPECIAL
05/03512 KEY PRECURSORS." WHILE P;OPOSAL APPEARS
INFO 555-81 10-01 /Oa Ac:EPTABLE, DEL HAS DELAYED ACCEPTANCE IN OROER
06/19552 TO MODERATE PACE OF DISCUSSIONS.
ACTION OFFICE EUR-12
INFO MR-01 550-81 SSS-81 55I-02 53-01 0-01 P-02 T-81 C-81 -- AS INSTRUCTED, DEL PRESSED SOVIETS TO
SARA-81 INR-81 L-01 PA-01 OCT-81 PM-01 SP-01 :ART-01 ELABORATE POSITION ON TIMING OF INSPECTIONS
50-11 ACDA-81 SSSC-11 SDEL-83 SCSC-01 /028 A1 KM TO MAKE CLEAR THEY ACCEPT U.S. V:EW THAT
OCT PASS INRE NSCE CIAE DODE ACDE IN:PECTION TIMING BE RANDOM (UNPREDICTABLE/.
06/19102 THEY SAIO THEY AGREE BUT U.S. DEL WILL ZEEK
INFO ACDA-01 X-01 /012 A4 CAN TO NAIL THIS DOWN IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS.
ACTION SS-08
INFO LOG-01 ADS-81 SSQ-08 MOO W
132555 0615092 /38
-- DEL ALSO PRESSED FOR SOVIET VIEWS ON USE
OF INSTRUMENTS. THEY APPEAR TO ACCEPT
EXTENSIVE USE OF INSTRUMENTS.
0 0618582 MAR 17 F. MISCELLANEOUS --
Fm USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE wASHDC IMMEDIATE 6756 -- NO REFERENCE AT ALL WAS MADE TO NATIONAL
INFO DOE 'IASI= TECHNICAL MEANS INTMI BY EITHER SIDE.
JCS WASHOC
SECDEF WASHDC -- SOVIETS DID NOT RAISE ISSUE OF MULTINATIONAL
AMEMBASSY BONN CORPORATIONS.
AmEmBASSY LONDON _
AmEMBASSY MOSCOW -- DATE FOR NEXT ROUND IS TO RE SETTLED THROUGH
AMEHBASSY PARIS DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. U.S. SUGGESTED MEETING AGAIN
AMEMBASSY VIENNA EARLY IN SUMMER CD SESSION, OUT SOVIETS INDICATED
USMISSION uSNATO INTEREST IN APRIL.
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
-- SOVIETS ATTEMPTED TO BUILD SENSE OF
SECRETSECTION OS .OF 06 GENEVA 02732 MOMENTUM BY SUGGESTING A DETAILED PRESS
RELEASE 1E ISSUED AT THE END OF THE ROUND
EXDIS AND BY PROPOSING ?ELS MEET EVERY DAY.
THEY DID NOT PRESS EITHER POINT WHEN U.S.
AcDA FOR MA; DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DOIN; DEL REJECTED THEIR APPROACH.
SECOEF FOR 050/ISP
VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE 6. RECOMMENDATIONS/REQUESTS -.
E.O. 12356: DECL:
TAGS: PARM UNGA, COG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR
THEY HAVE A LOT MORE FLEXIBILITY ON CHALLENGE
)( ISSUE.
. SOVIET DELOFF'S ACKNOWLEDGEOMENT OF
PERSUASIVENESS OF U.S. ARGUMENTS-ABOUT
UNDECLARED STOCKS.
- 'FAVORA1LE SOVIET POSTURE ON SWEDISH
CHALLENGE PROPOSAL. .
- -- PREDICTION BY RELIABLE AND WELL-INFORMED
SENIOR CD SECRETARIAT OFFICIAL THAT AFTER
SEVERAL INTERMEDIATE POSITIONS SOVIETS WOULD
ACCEPT THE U.S. PROPOSAL.
E. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING --
-- SOVIETS OFFERED TO COMPLETE SCHEDULE 1
(BANNED CHEMICALS) LIST ALONG LINES PROPOSED
BY U.S. IN EXCHANGE FOR AN AGREED GUIDELINE
FOR SCHEDULE 1 THAT INCLUDES, INTER ALIA, A
REFERENCE TO FORMATION OF AGENTS IN MUNITIONS
AND DEVICES. LIST WOULD INCLUDE PINACOLYL
ALCOHOL, COLOROSOMAN/CHLOROSARIN, SAXITOXIN,
AND SULFUR MUSTARDS, BUT NOT RIOT CONTROL
AGENTS CS AND CR. AGREED GUIDELINE WOULD
368 E
A. DEL REOUESTS WASHINGTON REVIEW OF PAPERS
ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND ON BILATERAL
rrnrirT
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PAGE 01 GENEVA 02732 06 OF 06 2619102 2727 2C11363 :S01612
ACTION OFFICE ?COA-02
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we
06/04012
SYS-6
PAGE 01 GENEVA 02732 06 OF 06 0619102 2727 032363 52016
MINIMO DETERRENT UNTIL END OF THE TEN-
YEAR DES:RUCTION PERIOD.
05/03562 E. DEL RECUESTS GUIDANCE ON THE SOVIET
INFO 555-01 10-01 /002. SUGGESTION FOR A "SENTLEMAN'S taREEMENT:
35/19571 CONCERNING STAFFING OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ACTION OFFICE EUR-12 INSPECTORATE (PARA 58 ABOVE).
INFO MR-01 SSO-01 555-91 55I-02 55-01 D-01 P-02 1-91 C-91
SARN-91 INR-91 L-01 PA-01 OCT-01 PM-91 SP-91 SART-01 F. DEL NOTES INCREASING NEED IN THE OILATS
57-111 ICDA-Ii SSSC-01 50E1-93 SCSC-01 /021 Al ULM AND IN THE CD TO DISCUSS ACTUAL VERIFICATION
OCT PASS (NRC NSCE CIAE DODE ACDE HARDWARE AND URGES INCREASED ATTENTION TO
06/19122 DEVELOPING U.S. IDEAS ON SUCH HARDWARE.
INFO ACDA-01 6-01 /002 AN GAB
ACTION 55-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-09 SSO-09 /909 W
132709 0613112 /31
0 0611512 MAR 87
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 6757
INFO DOE WASHDC
JCS WASNOC
SECEIEF WASNDC
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMSASST PARIS
AMEMIASSY VIENNA
USMISSION MATO
USDEL MIFR VIENNA
SECRETSECTION 06 OF 96 GENEVA 02732
EXDIS
ACDA FOR MA; DOC F04 DP/ISA; JCS FOR JS/DDIN;
SECEIEF FOR OSO/ISP
VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL:
TAGS: PARR UNGA, COG, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR
OBSERVER ARRANGEMENTS, COMPLETION OF WORK
UNDERWAY ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES ISSUE,
AND FURTHER GUIDANCE ON ISSUE OF MILITARY USE
OF CONVERTED FACILITIES.
B. DEL REQUESTS CLARIFICATION OF GUIDANCE
CONCERNING AUGUST MI UNITED STATES PROPOSAL
ON NON-CONCEALMENT MEASURES. ROUND V GUIDANCE
APPEARS TO DEAL ONLY WITH RELATED'Ill.S. PROPOSAL
ON MEASURES TO ENHANCE HIM MONITORING. (DEL
ALSO NOTES THAT DRAFT INF TREATY INCLUDES
NON-CONCEALMENT PROVISION.) .
C. DEL RECOMMENDS THAT SOVIETS BE TOLD AT
SENIOR LEVEL THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS PRIOR
TO NEXT ROUND THAT THEY NEED TO RESPOND MORE
SERIOUSLY TO U.S. PROPOSAL FOR EARLY DATA
EXCHANGE IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO MOVE AHEAD.
D. DEL RECOMMENDS THAT WASHINGTON PREPARE
GUIDANCE ON THE SCHEDULE FOR STOCKPILE
DESTRUCTION, SINCE THIS IS AN INCREASINGLY
IMPORTANT ISSUE THAT IS PREDOMINANTLY
BILATERAL IN CHARACTER. GUIDANCE SHOULD
ALLOW STATES WITH SMALL STOCKPILES (E.G.,
FRANCE AND POSSIBLY U.S.) TO MAINTAIN
369F
7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
erpncT
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SRCRFT
SECRET GENEVA 02747
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD); U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, PLENARY MEETING,
MARCH 5, 1987
REFS: (A) CW BILAT -020 (NAZARKIN SPEECH)
(B) CW BILAT -018 (HANSEN SPEECH)
(C) CW BILAT -013 (CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER)
(D) CW BILAT -014 (BILATERAL OBSERVERS PAPER)
1. THIS IS CW BILAT -024. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY --
-- AT THE MARCH 5 CLOSING PLENARY OF ROUND V,
CW BILATERALS, SOVIET AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN
SPOKE AND CHARACTERIZED THE TALKS AS USEFUL.
HE THEN REVIEWED BOTH THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF
THE ROUND AND THE REMAINING AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT,
STRESSING CHALLENGE INSPECTION. AMBASSADOR
HANSEN SAID RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET
POSITION ARE BEING CAREFULLY ASSESSED IN
WASHINGTON AND STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT
BE RUSHED INTO AN INEFFECTIVE AGREEMENT. HANSEN
NOTED ADVANCES DURING THE ROUND, BUT EMPHASIZED
NEED FOR SOVIETS TO DEAL MORE SERIOUSLY WITH
U.S. PROPOSAL FOR EARLY DATA EXCHANGE. END SUMMARY.
3. SOVIET STATEMENT --
A. SOVIET AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN DELIVERED
A PREPARED STATEMENT (REF A) IN WHICH HE
LISTED THE "USEFUL WORK" ACCOMPLISHED
DURING THIS ROUND. HE SAID THE CW
STOCKPILE LOCATION ISSUE WAS RESOLVED
IN PRINCIPLE AND SUGGESTED THE 1984
U.S. WORKING PAPER ON STOCKPILE
MONITORING (CD/516) AS BASIS FOR VERIFICATION
APPROACH.
B. NAZARKIN SAID THAT THE CENTRAL ISSUE
ON WHICH NOTICEABLE PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED
WAS CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES.
THE SOVIET DEL WAS PREPARED TO SEND THE
U.S.-USSR JOINT PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT (REF C)
BACK TO MOSCOW FOR REVIEW.
- NAZARKIN NOTED THE FOLLOWING UNRESOLVED
POINTS IN THE CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER:
- -- THRESHOLDS OF PRODUCTION OF STLC'S
FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES. (HE SAID THEY
SHOULD BE MEASURED IN KILOGRAMS);
- -- THE PHRASE "FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PURPOSES" IN THE SECTION ON KEY PRECURSOR
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PRODUCTION COULD CREATE A LOOPHOLE BY
EXCLUDING A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF FACILITIES
FROM THE REGIME THAT ALLEGEDLY ARE NOT
PRODUCING CHEMICALS FOR CW PURPOSES;
- -- SECTION WHICH DEALS WITH THE PRODUCTION
OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
FOR USE IN CW;
C. ON CATEGORY 1 CHEMICALS NAZARKIN NOTED
SUGGESTIONS BY SOVIET SIDE WHICH HE HOPED
WOULD SOON LEAD TO A SOLUTION;
D. ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION NAZARKIN SAID THE
SOVIETS AGREED TO "AUTOMATIC" CHALLENGE
INSPECTION IN THE CASE OF CW USE OR WITH
REGARD TO DECLARED CW FACILITIES. THEY ALSO
AGREED ON THE NEED FOR TIMELINESS IN CHALLENGE
INSPECTIONS. HOWEVER, THEY STILL SUPPORT THE
RIGHT OF REFUSAL IN INSTANCES IF NECESSARY TO
PROTECT MILITARY SECRETS NOT RELATED TO CW.
NAZARKIN REFERRED TO THE STOCKHOLM DECLARATION
IN WHICH THE PRINCIPLE OF CLOSED
AREAS IS ACKNOWLEDGED. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE
UK PAPER, CD/715, WITH ITS PROVISION FOR
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES, MIGHT PROVIDE A BASIS
FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. NAZARKIN
THEN LISTED SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO U.S. CHALLENGE
INSPECTION PROPOSAL. HE CITED THE FOLLOWING:
- -- DISCRIMINATION AGAINST STATE-OWNED
PROPERTY;
-- NO POSSIBILITY FOR ALTERNATIVES TO
INSPECTION;
- -- AUTOMATIC INSPECTION IN ALL CASES;
- -- INEQUALITY OF MOST CONVENTION
PARTICIPANTS WITH REGARD TO THE FACT-FINDING
GROUP.
E. NAZARKIN ANNOUNCED SOVIET AGREEMENT
ON THE PAPER ON THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE
MECHANISM, DEVELOPED IN PREVIOUS ROUND.
HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS REFERRING THE
PAPER ON U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES
ON INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAMS TO MOSCOW
(REF D).
4. U.S. STATEMENT --
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A. AMB. HANSEN BEGAN (REF B) BY NOTING THAT
SINCE THE BILATERAL COMMITMENT ON CW AT
NOVEMBER 1985 SUMMIT, THERE HAS BEEN A CLEAR
INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORK ON A CW BAN.
FURTHERMORE, IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
SOVIET POSITION HAVE FURTHER ACCELERATED
THE PACE. THE IMPACT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS
IS BEING ASSESSED IN WASHINGTON.
-- U.S. DEL WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE
CONSTRUCTIVELY, STEADILY, AND DELIBERATELY.
HOWEVER, U.S. WILL NOT BE RUSHED INTO AN
INEFFECTIVE AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF THE
POTENTIAL THREAT TO OUR SECURITY AND THAT
OF OUR ALLIES. U.S. DEL WILL CONTINUE TO
INSIST ON WORKING OUT THE DETAILS REQUIRED
TO IMPLEMENT A CONVENTION.
B. AMB. HANSEN THEN REVIEWED THE WORK OF
THE CURRENT ROUND OF BILATERALS, WHICH HE
CHARACTERIZED AS "MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN
PREVIOUS ROUNDS." TWO PAPERS (ON BILATERAL
OBSERVERS AT INSPECTIONS AND ON ELIMINATION
OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES) HAD BEEN
PREPARED AD REFERENDUM TO CAPITALS (REF C,D).
THE RESULTS OF THE U.S. REVIEW WILL BE
COMMUNICATED PROMPTLY TO THE SOVIETS.
THE U.S. HAS ALSO COMPLETED REVIEW OF
THE JOINT PAPER ON BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS AND FINDS IT ACCEPTABLE
WITHOUT MODIFICATION.
C. THERE ARE SEVERAL OUTSTANDING CRITICAL
ISSUES WHICH, ALTHOUGH DISCUSSED, REMAIN
UNRESOLVED:
- -- EARLY BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE IS
AN IMPORTANT MEASURE TO BUILD CONFIDENCE.
IT MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE SIGNATURE OF
A CONVENTION. THE EXCHANGE OF DATA IS NOT
A GUARANTEE OF A COMPLETED CONVENTION, BUT
IT IS NECESSARY. THIS TOPIC SHOULD REMAIN
A KEY ELEMENT IN FUTURE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS.
A JOINT U.S.-SOVIET VISIT TO THE U.S.
DESTRUCTION SITE AT TOOELE, UTAH WOULD
ALSO BE USEFUL IN BUILDING CONFIDENCE.
- -- CHALLENGE INSPECTION WITHOUT RIGHT
OF REFUSAL IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE HIGH
CONFIDENCE IN THE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE
WITH A CONVENTION. FUTURE DISCUSSIONS OF
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CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD FOCUS ON SAFEGUARDS
AGAINST ABUSE OF A MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION
PROVISION.
D. ON THE ISSUE OF NON-PRODUCTION, CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCUSSIONS OCCURRED IN THIS ROUND, AND FURTHER
STUDY OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON CATEGORY 1 MUST
BE DONE. THE U.S. AWAITS CLARIFICATION OF THE
SOVIET POSITION ON RANDOM, I.E., UNPREDICTABLE
TIMING OF INSPECTIONS AT DECLARED COMMERCIAL
FACILITIES.
5. PLENARY DISCUSSION --
A. AMB. NAZARKIN POSED THREE QUESTIONS:
(1) WHAT WAS THE U.S. OBJECTIVE IN
INVITING SOVIETS TO TOOELE?
(2) WOULD THE U.S. ALLOW INSPECTORS INTO
MUNITIONS BUNKERS CONTAINING MON-CHEMICAL
MUNITIONS AS PART OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION?
(3) WHY WAS U.S. ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION
OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON RANDOM INSPECTION
OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY? THIS POINT HAD
BEEN ADDRESSED IN THE FEBRUARY 17 SOVIET
CD PLENARY STATEMENT. NAZARKIN NOTED THAT
IN HIS FEBRUARY 17 SPEECH HE HAD REFERRED
TO THE IAEA MODEL FOR SYSTEMATIC INSPECTION
IN WHICH THE VERIFICATION AUTHORITY SELECTS
THE FACILITIES AND THE TIMING OF SYSTEMATIC
INSPECTIONS, THEREFORE ALLOWING FOR RANDOM
INSPECTION.
AMB. HANSEN SAID U.S. WOULD PERMIT
INSPECTION OF BUNKERS. THE U.S. IS
PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE LOSS OF SECRETS
IN SUCH A SITUATION; HOWEVER, FURTHER
WORK SHOULD BE DONE TO FIND WAYS TO
MINIMIZE SUCH LOSS.
-- WITH REGARD TO THE TOOELE VISIT, AMB.
HANSEN SAID NON-ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION
WOULD CREATE A SENSE OF SOVIET OPPOSITION
TO OPENNESS AND CALL INTO QUESTION THEIR
WILLINGNESS TO DECLARE FACILITIES AND HAVE
OSI'S, WHICH ARE FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF A
CONVENTION. ON THE TECHNICAL SIDE, THE
U.S. WANTS TO DEMONSTRATE ITS DESTRUCTION
METHODS AND ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO OBSERVE
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SRT
THE SECURITY AND SAFETY TECHNOLOGY WHICH
MIGHT BE APPLICABLE TO THE CONVENTION. A
VISIT TO TOOELE WOULD ALSO BEGIN TO DEAL
WITH THE PROCEDURES FOR THE VERIFICATION
OF DESTRUCTION.
C. HANSEN SUGGESTED FURTHER EXPERTS' DISCUSSION
ON RANDOM INSPECTION. HE STATED THAT THE U.S.
WANTED TO PREVENT A SITUATION IN WHICH ILLEGAL
CW MATERIALS COULD BE ROVED FROM ONE SITE TO
ANOTHER TO PREVENT DISCOVERY BECAUSE THE TIMING
OF INSPECTION OF A STATES' FACILITIES WOULD
BE KNOWN IN ADVANCE.
5. NEXT ROUND --
-
-- AT END OF THE SESSION SOVIETS ASKED
WHAT U.S. HAD IN MIND FOR THE DATES OF THE
NEXT ROUND.
-- HANSEN SAID U.S. WOULD RESPOND FORMALLY
LATER THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. RESUMING
IN THE EARLY PART OF THE SUMMER CD SESSION
WOULD PROVIDE TIME FOR REVIEW AND FURTHER
PREPARATION.
6. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
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CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 02968
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND V TELEGRAM
LIST
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-023. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF REPORTING TELEGRAMS ON THE
U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CW DISCUSSIONS HELD IN GENEVA
DURING THREE-WEEK PERIOD ENDING MARCH 5, 1987.
ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES: RMIKULAK,
CW BILAT GENEVA DATE TIME
NUMBER NUMBER GROUP
BTUA
ABBREVIATED SUBJECT/
TOPIC
003
01784
181724ZFEB87
HANSEN 2/17 STATEMENT
004
01803
1911172FEB87
2/16 EXPERTS MTG
(GENERAL)
005
01871
201236zFEB87
NAZARKIN 2/17 STMT
006
01872
201242ZFEB87
2/17 PLENARY MEETING
007
01967
231048ZFEB87
DRAFT USSR TEXT
(RECIPROCAL PARTICI-
PATION OF OBSERVERS)
008
01968
231052ZFEB87
1/19 EXPERTS MTG (CW
PRODUCTION FACILITIE
009
02221
261544ZFEB87
2/20 EXPERTS MTG
(BILATERAL OBSERVERS
010
02222
261545ZFEB87
2/23 EXPERTS MTG
(STOCKPILE DECLARA-
TIONS/CW PRODUCTION
FACILITIES)
011
02377
021309ZMAR87
2/25 EXPERTS MTG
(CHALLENGE INSPECT 10
012
02371
021117ZMAR87
AMB. NAZARKIN VIEWS
ON CW
013
02418
021730ZMAR87
014 02588 051407ZMAR87
CW BILAT
NUMBER
015
GENEVA DATE TIME
NUMBER GROUP
02618 051656ZMAR87
016 02622 051706ZMAR87
017 02620 051701ZMAR87
2/27 EXPERTS MTG
(BILAT OBSERVERS/CHE
INDUSTRY/CW PRODUCTI
FACILITIES)
3/02 EXPERTS MTG (CW
PRODUCTION FACILITIE
BILAT OBSERVERS)
ABBREVIATED SUBJECT/
TOPIC
3/3 EXPERTS MEETING
(EARLY BILATERAL
EXCHANGE)
US/USSR INFORMAL POINT
PAPER (CW PRODUCTION
FACILITIES)
US/USSR INFORMAL POINT
PAPER (BILATERAL REP'S
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SECRFT
OSI)
AT
018
02623
051712ZMAR87
3/5 PLENARY MEETING
019
02630
051759ZMAR87
3/5 PRESS STATEMENT
ENDING ROUND V
020
02730
06186ZMAR87
3/15 PLENARY (AMB.
NAZARKIN'S SPEECH)
021
02732
061858ZMAR7
WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS
022
02747
071112ZMAR87
3/5 PLENARY MEETING
(N.B. THIS MESSAGE WAS
INCORRECTLY NUMBERED
023
FLACK
END OF MESSAGE
?11???
375
SECRET
024. PLEASE CORRECT.)
ROUND V TELEGRAM LIST
CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRETGENEVA 04562
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR
BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, DATE OF NEXT
ROUND
1. THIS IS CW BILAT-024. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT)
2. AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN, HEAD OF THE SOVIET CD
DELEGATION, HAS PROPOSED TO ACTING U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE HANSEN JUNE 15 AS THE STARTING
DATE FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF US/SOVIET CW
BILATERALS. REQUEST WASHINGTON PROVIDE
APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE SOONEST.
3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.385
3 February 1987
ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 3 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m.
President.
Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China)
GE.87-60034/7000E 177
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CD/PV.385
2
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 1987 session
and the 385th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.
Today we are all saddened by the sudden loss of a colleague and friend
who devoted all his energies to the work of the Conference.
Ambassador Donald Lowitz will always be remembered by us as a man of
integrity, competence and good will who not only represented his country with
distinction, but also gained our friendship and respect. He was our President
at the opening of the 1985 session, when he had just been appointed to lead
his country's delegation, and he showed then those professional and personal
qualities which we all came to admire so much. On behalf of the Conference on
Disarmament and of the delegation of China, I extend to the delegation of the
United States of America and to his family our deeply felt condolences and
sympathy at such a tragic moment. Now may I suggest that we observe a
minute's silence in memory of our esteemed colleague.
I now give the floor to the representative of Peru,
Ambassador Morelli Pando.
Mr. MORELLI PARDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Speaking, on behalf
of the Group of 21, I wish to say that we are deeply grieved by the death of
Ambassador Donald Lowitz, the representative of the United States of America.
Ambassador Lowitz passed away at a time when he was dedicated heart and
soul to his high office and when it was expected that he would continue to
serve for a long time as the representative of a country that carries
considerable weight in world affairs.
From his assumption of his post, together with the presidency of this
body, at the beginning of the 1985 session, Ambassador Lowitz was held in high
esteem by his colleagues for the way in which he performed his official
duties, for his outstanding academic qualifications and for his personal
qualities, which are now remembered with gratitude and respect.
The Group of 21 wishes on this occasion to express its condolences to the
delegation of the United States of America, and, through it, to the
United States Government, as well as to the wife and other members of the
family of Ambassador Lowitz.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Peru for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the
German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.
Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): We were profoundly shocked and
grieved to learn of the sudden and totally unexpected passing away of the Head
of the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament,
His Excellency Ambassador Donald Lowitz. With this tragic event I would like
to offer the heartfelt condolences of the Group of socialist countries.
Together with the other delegations we mourn, in Ambassador Lowitz, a diplomat
who served his country for several years in the Conference on Disarmament. We
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3
(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
have lost a colleague whose personal integrity, intellectual qualities and
sincerity were valued by everyone. His abilities were particularly manifest
two years ago when he chaired the Conference as a fair and even-handed
President. May I ask the United States delegation to convey to the family of
Ambassador Lowitz, as well as to his Government, my Group's deepest sympathy.
Ambassador Lowitz will be long remembered as an outstanding person. We shall
miss him here.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
the German Democratic Republic for his statement. Now I give the floor to the
representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.
Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Thank you, Mr. President. I have the honour to
make the following statement on behalf of the Western Group of States members
of the Conference on Disarmament.
Exactly two years ago, on 4 February 1985, Ambassador Donald Lowitz
presented his letter of appointment by the President of the United States
of America as United States Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. Just
two days ago, this past weekend, Ambassador Lowitz died in Geneva. He was
57 years of age, he had shared 35 of those years with his wife, Shana, with
whom he had children and then grandchildren. Ambassador Lowitz was at this
Conference for a relatively short time but the mark he left here will endure
for a very, very long time.
As Don Lowitz often said himself, he was not a professional diplomat, in
the sense that he had not spent all of his professional life in the conduct of
foreign relations. Indeed, he often described himself as simply a lawyer from
Chicago. Yet Donald Lowitz showed us all the craft, the skill of diplomacy at
its highest. He was scrupulously honest. He never sought to mislead anyone.
He listened hard to all points of view and, I suspect, especially to those
with which he thought he might conceivably have difficulty. Thus, his
scrupulous personal honesty was also translated into fairness to others. He
joined argument and negotiation vigorously, seeking to leave no one in any
doubt or lack of clarity about the position of the Government that he was so
proud to represent, and which he represented completely faithfully. And, when
compromise could be reached, he would show generosity of spirit and join in
that compromise.
The Western States members of this Conference mourn the loss of a valued
colleague and friend. We know that the purposes of this Conference were
greatly served by Donald Lowitz's presence at it. We feel great sympathy
towards his wife, Shana, and the members of his family. Their loss is as
grave as it was sudden and we collectively convey this expression of sympathy
to the Lowitz family. We know, too, that the Government and people of the
United States of America have lost an immensely skilled official and devoted
public servant and we ask the Acting Head of the delegation of the
United States of America to convey to the United States authorities our
expression of sympathy for their loss of Ambassador Donald Lowitz. He
combined qualities of personal integrity, patriotism and deep religious faith
in a way that was rare and of inestimable value to all and we will all miss
him.
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Australia for his statment. The representative of the United States
of America, Mr. Barthelemey, has asked for the floor, and I now give him the
floor.
Mr. BARTHELEMEY (United States of America): The United States delegation
acknowledges with gratitude the expressions of condolence that have just been
offered by yourself, and by representatives of the Group of 21, the Group of
socialist States and the Western Group on the sad occasion of the death of the
leader of the United States delegation, Ambassador Donald Lowitz. We have
also been moved by the generous words spoken to us by other colleagues here.
The delegation will ensure that they are transmitted to Mrs. Lowitz and her
family, as well as to Washington.
Ambassador Lowitz's death was, of course, a great shock to us. He had
just returned to Geneva from the United States eager to renew the pursuit of
the diverse goals of this Conference, in particular the chemical weapons
negotiations. Ambassador Lowitz was immensely proud to have been chosen by
President Reagan to represent the American people in this unique negotiating
Conference and in the United Nations, for he believed profoundly that nations
must be steadfast in the defence of their freedom and security but must also
summon the will and wisdom to reduce weaponry and the danger of war.
In the two years that he served here, Donald Lowitz gained not only the
respect, but also the affection of his delegation. The statements we have
heard this morning are testimony to the esteem of his colleagues as well. It
is a respect and affection that he earned by his integrity in representing the
views of his Government; by his painstaking attention to all aspects of the
issues and his quick grasp of their subtleties; by his willingness to listen
carefully to the views of others; by his generosity of spirit and by his wit
and good humour. We shall miss Don Lowitz very much.
Mrs. Lowitz has graciously consented to the request of the United States
delegation that I share with you a message to her from the President of the
United States, Ronald Reagan. I would like to read that message:
"February 2, 1987. Dear Mrs. Lowitz, I was saddened to learn of the
death of your husband. Please accept my heartfelt condolences.
Ambassador Lowitz will be remembered as a public servant of the highest
distinction. As United States representative to the Conference on
Disarmament and to the United Nations First Committee he pursued with
imagination and energy the security of the United States. His
negotiations toward a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons and other
important United States arms control efforts promoted world peace and
stability. In all of his efforts his deep humanity won him the affection
and respect of his colleagues, both American and foreign. We shall all
miss Ambassador Lowitz. Our best tribute to him will be to continue to
pursue the goals to which he was dedicated and to pursue them in the same
humane spirit he constantly exhibited. Signed, Ronald Reagan."
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
the United States for his statement. I thank everyone. We shall now continue
with our proceedings.
I am sure that all members join me in extending our thanks to
Ambassador Alan Beesley, of Canada, for the brilliant manner in which he
presided over the Conference during the month of August and the
inter-sessional period. His rich diplomatic experience, tact and dedication
to the work of the Conference were brought to bear in resolving a number of
delicate questions facing the Conference at the time.
On behalf of the Conference, allow me to extend a warm welcome to the
First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
His Excellency Mr. Yuli Vorontsov, who will be addressing the Conference later
today. I need hardly elaborate on Mr. Vorontsov's great knowledge in matters
of disarmament, which makes him an eminent leader of the Soviet delegation in
bilateral talks on nuclear and space arms. I am sure that members will be
following his statement with particular interest.
I would like also to bid farewell to our colleagues who have left the
Conference during the inter-sessional period to follow other pursuits: the
representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sutowardoyo; the representative of
Italy, Ambassador Franceschi; the representative of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan; and the representative of
Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas. Both Ambassador /ssraelyan and Ambassador Vidas
chaired this Conference during their tenure as representatives of their
countries. The very effective manner in which they discharged their duties
was appreciated by all of us. We wish all the above representatives every
success in their future endeavours. I should like to recall that
Ambassador Issraelyan was one of the deans among the representatives to the
Conference on Disarmament, which he joined upon its constitution in its
present form. He is also a veteran. He served his country with distinction
and won the respect of all his colleagues.
As President of this Conference, I would also like, on behalf of you all,
to extend a warm welcome to the new representatives who are joining us for the
first time: Ambassador Hacene, of Algeria: Ambassador Barbosa, of Brazil:
Ambassador Morel, of France; Ambassador Pugliese, of Italy;
Ambassador Yamada, of Japan; Ambassador Dolgu, of Romania;
Ambassador Nazarkine, of the USSR; and Ambassador Rosin, of Yugoslavia. We
are sure all these new delegates and colleagues will support us in handling
the difficult tasks confronting us in the coming weeks and I am sure that we
are all looking forward to co-operating with them in our daily work.
I wish also to note the presence among us of the Director-General of the
United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Erik Suy, who has very kindly provided
effective servicing for the Conference during his tenure in office in Geneva.
I understand that he will be leaving us soon and I extend to him all our best
wishes for his future personal and professional life. May I also extend a
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(The President)
cordial welcome to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs,
Mr. Jan Martenson, who is present at our proceedings today. In doing so, I
should like to note that he will soon be leaving this important function and
assuming others which will keep him also in close contact with the
Conference. He has served as Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
for more than seven years and during that period his department has serviced
this Conference with devotion and effectiveness. I am sure we all thank him
for that and wish him every success in his new post.
Now, as President of the Conference, I have the honour to present to the
Conference a message by the State Councillor and Foreign Minister of the
People's Republic of China, Wu Xuegian, which reads as follows:
"On the occasion of the commencement of the work of the Conference
on Disarmament in 1987, I wish to extend, on behalf of the Chinese
Government, our warm congratulations and cordial greetings to the
distinguished representatives from various countries. Nineteen eighty-six
was designated as the International Year of Peace. Over the year, the
people of the world expressed their earnest desire for world peace in
various ways, demonstrating their determination to strengthen unity,
safeguard peace and oppose war. The continuous expansion of the forces
for peace has become an irresistible historical trend.
However, the turbulent world situation shows that the danger of war
is not yet past. Regional conflicts remain unsettled and the arms race
continues unabated, posing a grave threat to world peace and security.
The world's people strongly demand that the countries which bear a
'special responsibility' for putting an end to the arms race conduct
serious negotiations in conformity with the trend of the times so as to
reach an early agreement contributing to the maintenance of world peace
without prejudice to the interests of other countries and that they
fulfil in real earnest the obligations of 'taking the lead' in
drastically reducing armaments.
The preservation of world peace and security and the realization of
genuine disarmament are the common aspirations of the people of all
countries and also the main task of the Conference on Disarmament. China
has always held that the question of disarmament concerns the security
interests of all countries and that all countries, big or small, strong
or weak, should have equal rights to join in the discussion and
settlement of the question. The institution of the Conference on
Disarmament has changed the situation in which only a few countries
monopolized disarmament negotiations and it has provided the small and
medium-sized countries with an important forum for participation in the
settlement of disarmament questions. As the sole international body for
multilateral disarmament negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament has
over the past few years done a great deal of useful work in pushing
forward the international disarmament process. The non-aligned and
neutral countries have played an important role in this respect.
However, for reasons known to all, the Conference on Disarmament has made
little progress on most of the major issues, much to the dissatisfaction
of the people.
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(The President)
China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It opposes
the arms race and actively supports and advances proposals and
propositions on disarmament which contribute to the maintenance of world
peace and security. It has also taken serious major steps of practical
significance concerning disarmament. This fully demonstrates the Chinese
Government's sincerity in disarmament. Together with the people of other
countries, the Chinese people will make unremitting efforts to build a
world of lasting peace, prosperity and development, as well as equality
and co-operation.
The Chinese Government attaches great importance to the role of the
Conference on Disarmament and has taken an active part in its work.
China is ready to work with the other member States participating in the
Conference for progress in the negotiations on various disarmament issues
and to make contributions to the early realization of genuine
disarmament. I wish the Conference on Disarmament fresh progress in
1987."
This concludes the message by Minister Wu.
I should like now to give the floor to the Secretary-General of the
Conference, Ambassador Miljan Komatina. In his capacity as personal
representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, he will read
out a message addressed to the Conference by the Secretary-General.
Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The
message of the Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament reads as
follows:
"Today, more than ever before, the tasks before the Conference on
Disarmament engage the anxious interests of all, in East or West, North
or South, who are cognizant of the deadly dangers created by an
unrestrained arms race in this nuclear age. The whole community of
nations will keenly watch the Conference's work and hope for auguries of
success in the vast endeavour of lessening these dangers.
The past year has witnessed some remarkable developments. The
meeting between the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the United States of America at Reykjavik was a most significant
event: it showed what possibilities are open, in dialogue at the highest
leadership level, for taking radical initiatives on crucial disarmanent
issues which have been bogged down in indecisive negotiations for years.
The proposals and ideas that were discussed were indicative of the
positive evolution in the intentions and positions of the two most
powerful States.
Nineteen eighty-six also recorded some progress in multilateral
forums. The agreement in Stockholm, the two Conventions concluded in
Vienna under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
successful conclusion of the Biological Weapons Review Conference and the
progress made by the Conference on Disarmament in elaborating the
chemical weapons ban are noteworthy examples of a constructive approach
towards the issues of disarmament and international security.
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(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the
Conference and Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General of the United Nations)
The deliberations on these issues during the forty-sixth session of
the General Assembly also contributed to the promotion of international
dialogue. Furthermore, activities during the International Year of Peace
put a focus on the elemental issue of human survival. The year ended
with a wide international consensus for the strengthening of the role and
efficacy of the United Nations without which the international order
would be even more precarious.
These are all reassuring signs, but they have not yet changed the
sombre realities facing us all. Concrete disarmament agreements still
elude us and the gap between words and deeds has not narrowed. The same
year that encouraged some hope also furnished vivid and alarming
reminders of how even seemingly reliable technology can go wrong and of
how war continues to take its high toll in human life and the assets of
nations.
The responsibility resting on your Conference in matters of vital
importance for the future of mankind can hardly be exaggerated. The goal
of curbing the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and moving
towards substantial disarmament agreements leading to the final
elimination of nuclear weapons needs to be vigorously pursued. Pending
the realization of that goal, all practicable measures for the prevention
of war, particularly nuclear war, need to be taken so as to bring about
an immediate decrease in the risks stemming from the existence of today's
enormous arsenals of weapons.
A most important and urgent matter of disarmament is the complete
cessation of nuclear weapon tests and no efforts can be spared in the
elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. To that end, fresh and
perhaps innovative proposals are needed which would lend a decisive
impetus to your efforts and complement other endeavours in this field.
Your negotiations on a global chemical weapons ban have now reached
a crucial stage and assumed a growing sense of urgency in the light of
present realities. Elements for early success in your negotiations are
not wanting. What is needed is the manifestation of a genuine
willingness to make the necessary political compromises which would
facilitate the conclusion of a convention even this year.
The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the prevention of
the arms race in outer space needs to be translated into a co-operative
undertaking by your Conference to create conditions for negotiating
agreements on this vital matter. This is now one of the essential areas
in which concerted action can be taken for strengthening international
peace and security.
The tasks before your Conference as a unique representative
negotiating forum are indeed difficult, but in no way unsurmountable,
given the universal desire for a more secure world in which our scarce
human and material resources could be utilized for the fullest, economic
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(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the
Conference and Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General of the United Nations)
and social development of all societies. In discharging its
responsibilities, the Conference would certainly benefit from more
high-level political attention by all its members.
I pledge my full support to the efforts of the Conference, which I
consider essential not only for the completion of multilateral
disarmament agreements, but also for the promotion of the general process
of disarmament at all levels.".
This concludes the message of the Secretary-General, but I have been asked by
the Secretary-General to convey on his behalf to the delegation of the
United States and to the family of Ambassador Lowitz the expression of his
heartfelt condolences and deepest sympathy.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Personal
Representative of the Secretary-General for his statement. Allow me to invite
him to convey to Mr. Perez de Cuellar our thanks for his message and for the
interest he shows in our work.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations has also addressed a letter
to us transmitting the resolutions and decisions on disarmament adopted by the
General Assembly at its forty-first session. That letter has been circulated
today by the secretariat as document CD/733.
I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of Mexico,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Sweden, the Chairman of the
Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and the representative of Australia.
I now give the floor to the first speaker of the 1987 session, the
distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Those of us who
have had occasion to participate for some time in the work of this "single
multilateral disarmament negotiating body" can, on the basis of our
experience, say that the two months in which the task of guiding our
deliberations presents the greatest difficulties are without doubt the first
and last months of each session.
For this reason we are gratified that you are presiding over the work of
the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February which is now starting
and which marks the beginning of its 1987 session. The skill which you
displayed during previous consultations and your valuable participation as
representative of China in the First Committee during the recent session of
the General Assembly are guarantees of the efficiency with which we are sure
you will discharge the important duties that are now entrusted to you, and in
connection with which you may count on the wholehearted co-operation of the
delegation of Mexico.
I should also like once again to extend to your predecessor,
Ambassador Beesley, the distinguished representative of Canada, our warmest
congratulations on the outstanding way in which he performed his duties from
1 August 1986.
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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
My delegation also associates itself with the tribute paid by the
Conference on Disarmament to the memory of Ambassador Donald Lowitz as well as
with the fully justified and well-deserved words of farewell you addressed to
those who have left or are about to leave the Conference and your words of
welcome to those who, in one way or another, are just beginning to participate
in our work.
In embarking today on the ninth session of the Conference on Disarmament,
it is most appropriate that we should bear in mind what the United Nations
General Assembly stated emphatically at its last session, which happened to
coincide with the so-called International Year of Peace, in its
resolution 41/86 M, adopted on 4 December by the impressive majority of
133 votes in favour, on the item entitled "Report on the Conference on
Disarmament".
In this resolution which, for a number of reasons, should serve as a
guide in our work this year,' the Assembly:
Expressed its conviction that this Conference, as the single multilateral
negotiating body on disarmament, "should play the central role in substantive
negotiations on priority questions of disarmament".
It reaffirmed that the establishment of ad hoc committees "offers the
best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items
on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament".
It called upon the Conference on Disarmament "to further its mandate more
earnestly through negotiations and to adopt concrete measures on the specific
priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in particular those relating to
nuclear disarmament", and for that purpose established relevant committees
with appropriate negotiating mandates.
At that forty-first session, the General Assembly adopted over
60 resolutions which, in one way or another, cover all the disarmament items
on the agenda of the Conference. Of these various resolutions, I shall
confine my present statement to an examination of the resolution which is the
most important among those relating to the first of these items, namely, the
prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing; of the resolution on the prevention of
an arms race in outer space; of the main resolutions dealing with the
cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prevention
of nuclear war, including all related matters as well as, finally, of the
decision on the comprehensive programme of disarmament which, this year, is of
particular importance in the light of the action taken by the Assembly in the
sense that, noting the recommendation contained in the report submitted by the
Conference, it decided that work on the elaboration of the programme be
resumed at the beginning of the Conference's 1987 session "for the purpose of
completing that task during the first part of that session and submitting a
complete draft of the programme to the General Assembly at that time", namely,
during its forty-first session which, as we know, was not done.
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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
The first of the resolutions to which I have just referred, namely,
resolution 41/46 A, was adopted on Wednesday, 3 December 1986, by 135 votes in
favour, and is entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions". Although
its text is more concise than in previous years, it contains all the essential
and relevant elements. In its first preambular paragraph it is recalled that
the item, which had been examined for more than 30 years and on which the
General Assembly had adopted more than 50 resolutions, was a basic objective
of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which
it had repeatedly assigned the highest priority.
The resolution stresses that, on eight different occasions the
General Assembly had condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that,
since 1974, it had stated its conviction that the continuance of
nuclear-weapon testing "will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the
danger of nuclear war". Reference is also made to what was stated by the
Secretary-General at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on
12 December 1984, at which the highest administrative official of the
United Nations emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a
greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons, and that
the desired comprehensive test-ban treaty was undoubtedly "the litmus test of
the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament".
Another of the preambular paragraphs emphasizes that the three
nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the 1963 Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water
undertook in article 1 of that Treaty to conclude a treaty resulting in the
permanent banning of all nuclear-test explosions, including all those
explosions underground, and that such an undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in
the Preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding
commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.
In the next paragraph, the Assembly recalls that the same three
nuclear-weapon States, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Union, in the report they submitted on 30 July 1980 to the Committee on
Disarmament after four years of trilateral negotiations, stated, inter alia,
that they were "mindful of the great value for all mankind that the
prohibition of all nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments will
have" as well as "conscious of the important responsibility placed upon them
to find solutions to the remaining problems", adding furthermore that they
were "determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and
persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion".
The preamble to the resolution I am referring to also contains a new
element, since it refers to something that happened after the adoption of the
1985 resolution, namely, the so-called "Mexico Declaration" which was adopted
at Ixtapa on 7 August 1986 and in which the leaders of the six countries
associated under the five-continents peace and disarmament initiative affirmed
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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
that they "remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial today
than bringing to an end all nuclear tests", adding that "Both the qualitative
and the quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race,
and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons
testing".
In the operative part of its resolution, the Assembly began by
reiterating once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues
unabated, "against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States",
reaffirming its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all
nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest
priority and would constitute "a contribution of the utmost importance to the
cessation of the nuclear-arms race".
The Assembly once more urged the three depositary Powers of the Treaty of
Moscow and the Non-Proliferation Treaty "to abide strictly by their
undertakings" to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test
explosions of nuclear weapons and to expedite negotiations to this end. It
went on to appeal to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in
particular to the threq depositary Powers already mentioned "to promote the
establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1987 session of an
ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral
negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions".
The resolution ends with a recommendation to the Conference that this
ad hoc committee should "comprise,- two working groups dealing, respectively,
with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty,
and compliance and verification", and with an appeal to the States
depositaries of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 "to bring to a halt
without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally
agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria".
As we all know, by virtue of the decision announced in July 1985, it will
be one year and a half at the end of this week since the Soviet Union began to
abide by a unilateral moratorium that took effect on 6 August of that year.
It is for this reason that the Group of Six, consisting of the Heads of State
or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the
Prime Minister of Tanzania, issued a joint declaration at the end of last year
in which, among other things, they stated:
"There is no justification for nuclear testing by any country. We
appeal once again to the United States to reconsider its policy on
nuclear testing so that a bilateral moratorium can be established. Our
offer to help ensure adequate verification of such a moratorium remains
valid. We are ready to start implementing it at any moment."
It will be recalled that the same Heads of State or Government who, in
the Delhi Declaration of January 1985, had stated that "Two specific steps
today require special attention: the prevention of an arms race in outer
space, and a comprehensive test ban treaty", reverted to this question in the
following terms in a new Declaration, adopted in Ixtapa on 7 August 1986:
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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
"We reiterate our demand that an arms race in outer space be
prevented. Space belongs to humanity, and as participants in this common
heritage of mankind, we object to the outer space of our Earth being
misused for destructive purposes".
Although, in addition to the resolution that was approved, three other
draft resolutions were submitted in the First Committee on this item -- one
sponsored by China, the second by a group of Western States and the third by a
group of socialist States -- no decision was taken on them at the request of
their respective sponsors. Then there was the draft resolution sponsored by
many members of the so-called Group of 21 among whom, as in the previous year,
the representatives of Sri Lanka and Egypt played a particularly important
role in its elaboration and in the usual round of consultations; after the
original text had been amended by its sponsors this draft resolution was
adopted in plenary by the General Assembly on 3 December by a vote which can
certainly be described as one of the most impressive of the session, namely,
154 votes in favour, none against and only 1 abstention -- that of the
United States.
That resolution, namely, resolution 41/53, like that of the previous
year, is very long and as usual consists of a preamble and an operative part.
In the preamble, the General Assembly, after recognizing the.common interest
of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes, reaffirms the commitments assumed by the States parties to the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in
accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and
in particular their undertaking not to place in orbit around the Earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons
in outer space in any other manner.
In the preamble the General Assembly also reaffirmed paragraph 80 of the
Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which
it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further
measures should be taken and "appropriate international negotiations held in
accordance with the spirit of the Treaty".
In the operative part of the resolution I am discussing, it is worthwhile
highlighting the following two appeals: the first is contained in paragraph 4
and addressed to all States, in particular those with major space
capabilities, "to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of
outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer
space" in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and
promoting international co-operation and understanding.
The second appeal is contained in paragraph 9 and is addressed to the
United States and the Soviet Union, which are urged to pursue intensively
their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early
agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the
Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral
sessions so as to facilitate its work.
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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
Finally -- just as I did a year ago -- I have intentionally kept until
last the following three quotations from operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 8,
since they all refer expressly to the Conference on Disarmament:
In paragraph 5, the Assembly reiterated that the Conference on
Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, "has
the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements,
as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its
aspects".
In paragraph 6 the Assembly expressly requested the Conference on.
Disarmament "to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an
arms race in outer space".
Lastly, in paragraph 8 of its resolution, it requested the Conference "to
re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of
its 1987 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion
of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in
outer space in all its aspects".
As regards the item that has invariably been the second item on the
agenda of this multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, namely, the
one entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race.and nuclear disarmament",
resolution 41/86 F whose title is the same as the item and which was adopted
on 4 December by 130 votes in favour, recalls, in its preamble, the danger
posed by nuclear weapons to mankind and to the survival of civilization and,
after a number of other equally pertinent considerations, goes on in its
operative part to;
Affirm that the existence of bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms "in
no way diminishes the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the
Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of the nucelar-arms race and
nuclear disarmament".
In the same operative part the resolution goes on to request the
Conference on Disarmament "to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning
of its 1987 session to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to
submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate
multilateral negotiations of agreements" that would bring about a "substantial
reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to,their ultimate
elimination".
As regards the third item on our agenda, the main resolution adopted by
the Assembly at its last session is, in my opinion, resolution 41/86 G
entitled "Prevention of nuclear war" which, on 4 December, received 134 votes
in favour in the plenary of the Assembly. This resolution, after stating that
"it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of another world war, which would inevitably be a
nuclear war" and noting with "grave concern" that the Conference on
Disarmament had once more been unable to start negotiations on the question
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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
during its 1986 session, again requests this Conference "as a matter of the
highest priority" to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the
subject "at the beginning of its 1987 session".
Coming to the last point in my brief review, namely, the question of the
comprehensive programme of disarmament, I shall today simply recall what has
been on the agenda of the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum
since 1980 and what the Conference recommended in its last report to the
Assembly -- which endorsed that recommendation in its decision adopted
unanimously on the subject on 4 December -- namely, that the elaboration of
the draft programme should be concluded "during the first part" -- namely, the
part that is beginning today -- of this year's session with a view to
submitting "a complete draft of the programme to the General Assembly" at its
forty-first session which, as we know, has not yet been concluded. At some
later date I shall discuss the background of this question in greater detail
and also examine with the attention it deserves another of the more important
items on our agenda, namely, the elimination of chemical weapons.
In concluding this, my initial, statement, I should like to stress that
what it suggests can be summarized as follows*
The need, this year, to establish without further delay an ad hoc
committee "with the objective of -- and I emphasize these four words which
represent a significant concession by the sponsors of the draft which
constituted the basis of resolution 41/46 A -- with the objective of carrying
out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of
nuclear-test explosions".
The need for the Conference "to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an
adequate mandate ... with a view to undertaking negotiations" to prevent an
arms race in outer space, in accordance with resolution 41/53 which, as I have
already mentioned, was adopted by 154 votes in favour, none against and with
only 1 abstention.
The need to establish forthwith an ad hoc committee for the purpose
described in resolution 41/86 P, which was adopted by 130 votes in favour, on
the second item on the Conference's agenda concerning the cessation of the
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
The need to establish without delay a subsidiary body which, in
accordance with the provisions of resolution 41/86 G, adopted by 134 votes in
favour, would deal with what the Assembly had every reason to describe as "the
most acute and urgent task of the present day", namely, the prevention of
nuclear war.
The need to concentrate efforts and display a real spirit of flexibility
and mutual concession so that the draft comprehensive programme of
disarmament, on which we have been working since 1980, can be completed and
submitted to the Assembly at its forty-first session, as we ourselves
suggested last year and as the Assembly expressly requested in the decision it
adopted unanimously on 4 December last.
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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
The points I have summarized above are all the more urgent if they are
viewed in the light of two factors. The first is that the year we are
embarking upon will mark the first decade of this multilateral disarmament
negotiating forum and that, during the nine years of its existence, contrary
to what happened with its predecessors, it has been unable to approve a single
treaty or convention on the subject. The second factor concerns what the
Assembly stated at its last session and which / took the liberty of quoting at
the beginning of my statement, namely, that it is vital that the Conference
should "further its mandate more earnestly through negotiations ... in
particular those relating to nuclear disarmament".
It must also be borne well in mind that, at their recent Reykjavik
meeting, Secretary-General Gorbachev and President Reagan "came very close to
reaching agreements which would have been historic in their sweep and
significance ... could have paved the way for the complete elimination of all
nuclear weapons".
The authors of this sensible view that I have just quoted are the six
leaders who, since 1984, have been submitting concrete proposals concerning
disarmament and peace. They include Miguel de la Madrid, the President of
Mexico who, in his statement at the United Nations on 24 September, expressed
the following opinion that I feel constitutes an appropriate epilogue to my
own statement with which, in accordance with our time-honoured tradition,
initiates for us today the 1987 discussions of the Conference:
"In the Declarations that we have signed", said the President of
Mexico, "first at New Delhi in 1985 and just last month in the Mexican
city of Ixtapa, we have stated that it is incumbent upon all men and all
peoples, and not just those Governments which possess the technical
capacity to wreak total destruction, to make efforts to halt the arms
race. ...
Our statements, whose legitimacy flows from the fact that they
express the wishes of all mankind, are but the first in a series of
efforts that the international community will have to undertake, in the
hope of eradicating nuclear weapons.".
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Mexico for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.
I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, His Excellency the First Deputy Foreign Minister,
Mr. Yuli Vorontsov.
Mr. VORONTSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): Comrade President, thank you for the warm words of welcome
addressed to me. It is pleasant to be here once again in the midst of
large-scale disarmament. On behalf of the Soviet delegation, may I
congratulate you on occupying the responsible post of President of the
Conference on Disarmament and wish you success in the discharge of your
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(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)
complicated duties. We express the hope that under your guidance the
Conference will succeed in engaging in businesslike negotiations on a wide
range of questions relating to arms limitation and disarmament. In your
person, Comrade President, we also welcome the 'representative of the People's
Republic of China, our great socialist neighbour whose Government has
repeatedly stated its interest in solving questions of nuclear disarmament, of
preventing an arms race in outer space, of banning nuclear-weapon tests and of
prohibiting chemical weapons -- in other words, of virtually all those issues
which take pride of place in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.
I also have pleasure in greeting the distinguished representative of
Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, whom I met within these walls over 20 years
ago. The tireless activity of the dean of the disarmament corps has earned
wide recognition and has been marked by the award to him of the Nobel Peace
Prize. All of us listened with great interest to his thoroughgoing statement
concerning the tasks of the Conference on Disarmament. We should like to wish
success to the distinguished representatives of Algeria, Brazil, Italy,
Romania, France, Yugoslavia and Japan who have recently been appointed as
heads of delegations, Ambassadors Hacene, Barboza, Pugliese, Dolgu, Rosin and
Yamada. We should also like to thank Ambassador Beesley, who was in the Chair
in August 1986 and represented the Conference on Disarmament with distinction
during the intersessional period.
May I, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, express my most profound
condolences to the delegation of the United States of America with regard to
the sudden demise of their Head, Ambassador Lowitz. I should like to ask for
our condolences to be conveyed to Mrs. Lowitz and to her family.
I should also like to introduce the new Head of the Soviet delegation,
Ambassador Yuri Nazarkine, who is well known to many of you and who has the
necessary experience in the field of disarmament negotiations, including at
this Conference, and experience of work in preparing treaties and agreements.
/ should like to wish him and the Soviet delegation he heads successful and
fruitful activity.
This session of the Conference on Disarmament is opening at a difficult,
a crucial time. To prevent the world from moving towards the abyss of the
nuclear self-annihilation of mankind to which we are all being criminally and
irresponsibly pushed by the high priests of the arms race, by those enamoured
of fabulous profits on armaments, by the fanatical advocates of the military
orientation of each and every scientific discovery, it is now more urgently
necessary than ever before to have new political thinking, new conduct by
States. It is necessary, in sum, to break the sequence of years of senseless
accumulation of the most sophisticated weapons of death, necessary resolutely
to engage in creating a just, non-violent world, necessary to direct our
efforts towards ensuring the survival of mankind and releasing its priceless
intellectual and vast material potential for the purposes of development.
The Conference on Disarmament can make a concrete and invaluable
contribution to this process. The Conference in essence embodies the idea of
a world conference on disarmament. In its work there participate all the
nuclear-weapon States, which have special responsibility for the elimination
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(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)
of the nuclear threat. But not only they. In the efforts to ensure reliable
security for all, the contribution of every State is weighty and important;
this issue is the common responsibility of all the members of the world
community.
The Soviet Union fully realizes its share of responsibility. A year has
elapsed since, on 15 January 1986, the Soviet Union took an initiative
unprecedented in its scope and purposes by puttting forward a programme for
the elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical weapons, before the end of this century. This programme
has become the nucleus of the concept fixed by the twenty-seventh Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of a comprehensive system of
international security. As a result of a joint initiative by socialist
countries in the United Nations, a wide-ranging, democratic international
dialogue has begun on comprehensive security for all.
The plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union held a few days ago demonstrated the resolve of the Soviet
people in their desire to implement the decisions of the
twenty-seventh Congress of the Party. We are openly talking about the need to
think and act in a new way, as the realities in our country and in the world
as a whole require. The plenary meeting noted that, under the leadership of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, all sound forces in Soviet society
are resolutely in favour of profound, revolutionary transformations in all
spheres of our lives, the galvanization of socialist development and the
practical implementation of the great humanitarian ideals associated with the
theory of socialism.
We are now restructuring our national economic machinery in keeping with
objective economic laws and freeing ourselves from the accumulation, as a
result of the ignoring of scientific approaches to economic development, of
serious defects in the operation of planning and management institutes and in
management practice, style and methods. Priority is being given to the
consistent introduction of self-management into the life of work collectives
and to the creation of conditions that will enable every worker to feel
himself truly the master of his enterprise. Elections are being introduced
for senior managerial posts and the conditions for the operation of a
competitive system for the selection and replacement of other supervisory
staff are in the course of being defined. Simultaneously with this, methods
are being introduced for managing economic activity by means of material and
financial incentives rather than by directives.
Of course, economic and scientific progress is not an end in itself. Its
fruits will be enjoyed fully by all Soviet people. Moreover, our basic
premise is that, by increasing our economic potential, we shall be able to
assist to a greater and qualitatively better degree in the development of the
world economy and to make a weightier contribution towards helping the
developing countries.
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(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)
Restructuring is already more than merely an idea for our further
advances it is the reality in which the multi-million population of the
Soviet Union. lives, thinks and works. Its implementation and the introduction
of new, transformative ideas are inconceivable without genuine democracy,
which is why the plenary session put the serious, thorough democratization of
Soviet society on a pinnacle as the lever whereby our main force, the people,
can be fully involved in the solution of the problems confronting us.
We are convinced that democracy, openness, criticism and self-criticism
are the guarantees for the sound development of Soviet society. Democracy and
openness are inseparable from socialism, whose main principle is "everything
on behalf of man, everything for the good of man". It is natural, therefore,
that man, the means for the comprehensive development of his creative
potential, and the satisfaction of his material and spiritual needs were at
the centre of the plenary session's attention. "We want to turn our country
into a model of a highly-developed State, into a society of the most advanced
economy, the broadest democracy and the most humane and the highest moral
standards, where the working man will feel himselea full and equal master".
These words spoken at the plenary session by the General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, determine our thinking, our hopes and our
practical actions.
The Soviet people associate with the restucturing, the speeding up of
development and the democratization their vital interests, the fate of the
country and its international prestige. It is clear to every unprejudiced
person that the attainment of our creative goals is possible only in
conditions of peace and security. We do not conceal the fact that the
implementation of our plans as defined by the Party Congress and the January
plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
plans for the most significant restructuring and the acceleration of the
development of our entire country, would be furthered by the reduction of
international tension and the cessation of the squandering of efforts and
resources on the arms race, which is senseless and deadly dangerous to all
mankind. We are in favour of the creation of a climate of trust conducive to
the organization of a wide-ranging international distribution of labour and to
the mutual enriching of the cultural lives of peoples.
We do not set concern for our own security against the interests of the
security of other States and peoples. In the modern world -- a world that is
interdependent, that is in many respects one and that is too fragile for
military rivalry and wars -- political realism demands that the indivisibility
of security be recognized. No country can achieve security for itself alone,
by acting on its own or together with a narrow group of allies, by relying
solely on military technology, whether on Earth or in space. In the Delhi
declaration which was signed by the leaders of the Soviet Union and India and
has enriched the world community with a concrete presentation of the
principles of a non-violent world free from nuclear weapons, it is stressed,
and I quote, "Instead of the 'balance of terror', there must be comprehensive
international security ... East and West, North and South, regardless of
social systems, ideologies, religions or races, must unite in a common
devotion to disarmament and development".
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(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)
Reykjavik has given us precise awareness of the fact that a nuclear-free
world and the resolution of the crucial problems in the nuclear and outer
space area is no Utopia but a real possibility. Although the hope that the
meeting in Reykjavik would lead to early practical results has not been borne
out, the negotitions in the capital of Iceland have taken the cause of nuclear
disarmament to an unprecedentedly high frontier from which the outline of a
nuclear-free, secure world is clearly visible. The Soviet Union is, through
active and presistent practical actions at all the negotiations under way,
reaffirming its desire to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.
Here in Geneva, the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space
weapons are under way. We are not withdrawing a single one of the proposals
aimed at the sharp reduction and subsequent elimination of all nuclear devices
and the guaranteeing of a peaceful space that we put forward at Reykjavik.
Moreover, we are crystallizing our proposals and manifesting in practice a
readiness to find constructive outcomes by doing our utmost to impart dynamism
to these negotiations. Hence, in the negotitations on nuclear space weapons,
the Soviet side has put forward a proposal aimed at moving the discussions on
at last from endless debate into the constructive channel of practical
preparation of documents. Work on reaching agreement on the documents in
question has already begun. We are counting on achieving success in this
important task. People expect real results from us. We hope that they
understand this in Washington too and that they will positively respond to our
efforts there. However, one has the impression that in Washington they are
for the present occupied with other business.
Upon the conclusion of the current round of negotiations, we intend, in
keeping with the United Nations recommendations, to inform the Conference on
Disarmament of the results. We are convinced that openness is bound to be one
of the most powerful factors of movement towards a nuclear-free world too.
The results of Reykjavik have become the common heritage of all countries
and peoples to whom it is of vital interest that nuclear weapons should be
eliminated and that the arms race should not spread into outer space as well.
The productive interaction of States both large and small is necessary as
never before for the continued existence and progress of mankind.
In these circumstances, it is especially intolerable that the great
negotiating potential of the Conference on Disarmament is being far from fully
used. The reason for this is well-known: some people would not like
businesslike negotiations to be conducted here on disarmament issues or real
agreements to be achieved. Joint efforts are needed to wrench the Conference
out of the "procedural quagmire" and to embark upon a search for constructive
decisions and forward-leading compromises.
A priority measure on the way towards the curbing of the arms race and
the subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons is, as the United Nations has
recognized, the banning of nuclear-weapon tests. Hence, their attitude to the
prohibition of nuclear explosions attests in the most eloquent fashion to
States' attitude to the whole range of disarmament questions and is a test, a
litmus test, of their good will and of the concordance of their words and
deeds.
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(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)
The most striking proof of our willingness to promote progress on the
nuclear-test-ban que tion is our repeatedly extended unilateral moratorium on
nuclear explosions. Today is the 547th day of silence on our nuclear test
sites, silence that will continue until the first American test of this year.
And even were we to be forced into resuming nuclear explosions -- and, as a
well-known Soviet scientist has so eloquently put it, "the button for the
Soviet test sites is on the desk in the White House" -- we would not cease
even then our persistent efforts in favour of the commencement of full-scale
negotiations on this problem, negotiations which we are prepared to conduct
with a delegation of any composition and in any forum -- with, of course, the
participation of the United States. One such forum is undoubtedly the
Conference on Disarmament.
It is incumbent on the Conference to begin, without a single day's
postponement, the preparation of a treaty that would put an end to nuclear
tests and, in particular, to resolve the issues pertaining to the structure
and sphere of application of the treaty and to its observance and
verification. And we urge you to move from discussions to actions. The time
has come to create an ad hoc committee endowed with appropriate powers. It is
time, finally, to get down to real business, to achieve tangible results. The
Soviet side is prepared positively to consider all proposals furthering
progress in this extremely important, this key area.
We are convinced that the focus of the Conference's attention should be
the programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, which
both sets concrete goals and fixes clear deadlines for their achievement. The
Conference could consider such concrete questions of nuclear disarmament as
the cessation of the production of fissionable and fusionable nuclear
materials for the purposes of developing and creating weapons, the order of
elimination of nuclear aramaments, and fundamental approaches to the
monitoring of multilateral nuclear disarmament measures.
The solution to the question of nuclear disarmament is inseparably linked
with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It would be unforgiveable
if, after being wrested from the nuclear nightmare, mankind was thrust into a
laser/space nightmare. The time has come for active negotiations and
practical work, rather than abstract discussion, on finding effective measures
to prevent an arms race in outer space. The view is about here and there that
the "serious" negotiations on this problem should be conducted, not in the
meeting hall of this Conference, but rather on a bilateral basis, in the
Soviet and American missions. We think otherwise. We are convinced that, in
the matter of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, there is not and
cannot be any division of the negotiations into "serious" and "unserious". We
are in favour of being guided by the most serious approach to any negotiations
on this crucial problem that has now arisen before mankind.
The Conference has good potential for businesslike and concrete
discussion of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer spacn. This
problem affects all States and is a case in which the Conference could not
only become the generator of useful ideas, but also engage in concrete
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(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)
negotiations on certain aspects of this problem. For instance, in our view,
the Conference could engage in the businesslike consideration of the question
of the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against
the Earth. After all, from outer space it is possible to select as a "laser
target" not only Soviet cities, but any town in any "disobedient" country.
The Conference could also consider the possibility of creating a system of
international verification guaranteeing unswerving compliance with an
agreement of the kind in question and, in particular, study the idea of an
international inspectorate. Such an inspectorate, for instance, would have
the right of access for the purpose of carrying out on-site inspections to all
facilities designed for the launching and deployment in outer space of space
devices and to the corresponding launch vehicles.
Bearing in mind as the ultimate goal the banning of the deployment of
armaments in outer space, the Conference could begin the elaboration of
partial, but important measures leading to this goal. In particular, the
Conference could consider the possibility of drawing up an international
agreement guaranteeing immunity for artificial Earth satellites which do not
carry weapons of any sort on board. In this connection, it would also be
desirable to study the possibilities of eliminating existing anti-satellite
systems. For our part, we suggest banning weapon systems of the
"space-to-space", "space-to-Earth" and "Earth-to-space" kinds. We should like
to stress that the USSR, manifesting good will, continues to refrain from
placing anti-satellite systems in outer space.
An area in which the most urgent action is today required from the
Conference is indisputably that of negotiations on the ptohibition of chemical
weapons. The Soviet Union considers it essential that every effort be made to
complete the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition and elimination of
chemical weapons this year. Such a possibility does really exist, whatever
those whom it does not suit may say. To drag out this work now, when most of
the questions of principle have been solved, would be truly criminal. I have
a suggestion to make to the participants in the Conference: let chemical
disarmament become the first example of peaceful, rather than military
progress in international politics.
The preparation of a convention on the elimination and prohibition of
chemical weapons would mean a significant increase in trust, including in the
military sphere, and would give the lead for the solution of complicated
problems of disarmament. It would be a striking confirmation of the viability
of the multilateral approach to disarmament and would greatly increase the
prestige of the Conference, which bears full responsibility vis-a-vis the
international community for negotiations on chemical weapons.
It is gratifying to note that progress achieved in many areas at the
negotiations is the result of a series of Soviet proposals and steps made in
the Conference on Disarmament last year, as well as of constructive
initiatives by many other countries, including the United Kingdom, Sweden and
Pakistan.
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(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)
We are not closing our eyes to the difficulties. Nor do we consider
that, having put forward our proposals, we can sleep on our laurels. I should
like to inform the members of the Conference that our experts in Moscow are
continuing their intensive work on the search for breakthrought on the
questions outstanding.
At the same time, the efforts of a mere one country, and even the efforts
of a mere majority of countries, are not enough for the drawing up of the
convention. We hope that the United States will truly join the search for
compromises. Now at the negotiations the time has come when what is needed is
the ability to rise above "author's pride" in one's own approaches and to put
to the forefront the task of finding a common approach. There is no other way
to success. This applies both to the United States and to all other
countries, including the Soviet Union.
And yet one further point. There remain in the negotiations few unagreed
major questions that require a political solution. However, there are a lot
of, as it were, minor technical issues, which as a whole make up a swamp that
is difficult to cross. Let's not get bogged down in it, let's take a critical
look at whether everything that is now being discussed at length in working
groups and sub-groups is really necessary for an effective Convention.
I should like to wish every success to the Ambassador of Sweden,
Rolf Ek6us, as the future Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons
in the organization of the final stage of the agreeing of a convention on the
prohibition of chemical weapons. May Mr. Ekeus go down in diplomatic history
as the last leader of negotiations on this issue.
In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that at this year's
session progress will be made on the many procedural obstacles and the cause
of real disarmament will move forward. And it is necessary to look
purposefully ahead because, if we once again open the quarrel between the past
and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future, whereas what is
at issue here is the future of mankind itself.
May I wish all the participants in the Conference success in the
discharge of the responsible tasks before them.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank His Excellency the
First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for
his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give
the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, whom I welcome
again amongst us.
Mt THEORIN (Sweden): It was with a deep sense of sadness and distress
that the Swedish delegation learned about the death of
Ambassador Donald Lowitz. In Ambassador Lowitz, the delegates to the
Conference had a trusted and always reliable friend. He served his Government
with distinction and skill. In the small community of delegates dedicated to
the great task of disarmament, his intelligent, articulate and steadfast
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(Ms Theorin, Sweden)
representation of his Government's position and interest was looked upon with
respect and admiration. We deeply regret that the Conference can no longer
benefit from the lucid and penetrating intellect of Donald Lowitz. We will
badly miss his strong sense of humour and his warm personality. The memory of
Donald Lowitz is inscribed in the annals of the Conference on Disarmament. We
mourn with the delegation of the United States and we ask the leader of that
delegation, Mr. Barthelemy, to convey to Mrs. Shana Lowitz and the children of
Donald Lowitz and to the Government of the United States our heartfelt
condolences and deep sympathy.
May I express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you, Ambassador Fan, in
the Chair as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of
February. My delegation is looking forward to working with you. I assure you
of the full support and co-operation of my delegation in your important task
to launch our work effectively. I wish also to extend to your predecessor,
Ambassador Beesley, of Canada, my sincere thanks for the skilful way in which
he guided the Conference during the closing months of its previous session and
up to the opening of this session.
And finally, I would like to extend a heartfelt welcome to those other
colleagues who have joined us since August. Ambassador Hacene, of Algeria,
Ambassador Barbosa, of Brazil, Ambassador Morel, of France,
Ambassador Pugliese, of Italy, Ambassador Yamada, of Japan, Ambassador Dolgu,
of Romania, Ambassador Nazarkine, of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Kosin, of
Yugoslavia. I wish to pledge to our new colleagues the full co-operation of
the delegation of Sweden.
My delegation listened with the greatest attention to the important
statement by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Mr. Yuli Vorontsov.
The Conference on Disarmament today reassembles at an important moment.
Will disarmament be given a chance? Or will yet another lost opportunity be
added to the list that is far too long? The next weeks and months may well
determine whether progress can be made building on what was achieved in
Reykjavik. The next weeks and months will determine whether the possibility
now to advance towards a nuclear test ban will be wasted in Nevada and
Kazakhstan. The United States has announced its intention to carry out a new
test this very week. The Soviet Union has made it clear that it will, if that
occurs, follow suit and abandon its unilateral testing moratorium. It would
indeed be deplorable if such fireworks should mark the opening of this
session. It would amount to nothing less than an affront to international
efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban. Many far-reaching disarmament
proposals have lately been made, with a culmination at the dramatic Reykjavik
meeting. But developments since have been slow. Though all proposals are
said to remain on the table, we have seen no reports of outstanding
differences being narrowed or even jointly defined. To stall negotiations is
to gamble, not only with high stakes, but against the odds.
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(Ms Theorin, Sweden)
The concerns of the non-nuclear States are legitimate and must be met.
The world expects major steps because major steps are needed. The world
expects bilateral and multilateral negotiations to reap the fruits of a new
international climate. The world expects the nuclear Powers to show boldness
and determination at the negotiating table and restraint on testing grounds
and in weapons laboratories. Not the other way round, as is today the case.
For the multilateral negotiations, a constructive dialogue between the major
nuclear Powers is essential. Equally important: results in multilateral
negotiations improve international political relations in general.
In Europe, the most over-armed of all continents, the Stockholm Conference
achieved militarily and politically significant results. A breakthrough was
made for the principle of on-site inspection of compliance with treaties on
disarmament and confidence-building. Last September, a successful review
Conference of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention was held in here in
Geneva. Also at that Conference, progress was made regarding measures to
strengthen and enhance the Convention. During the latest session of the
General Assembly, the First Committee produced consensus resolutions on such
traditionally controversial topics as verification and compliance. In
addition to established priority issues in the nuclear field, increased and
appropriate attention was paid to the conventional arms race. Several
resolutions acknowledged progress made here in the Conference on Disarmament
on a chemical weapons convention. On the main issue of a nuclear test ban, a
development took place that should give the Conference a good opportunity
finally to agree on a mandate to deal with all aspects of the matter.
The latest statistics of nuclear explosions published by the Swedish
Defence Research Institute, although still preliminary for 1986, show that
unilateral measures in the field of disarmament make a difference. Mainly as
a result of the Soviet Union's moratorium, the total number of explosions has
decreased: from 55 in 1984 to 30 in 1985 and 21 in 1986. The Soviet Union
carried out 27 explosions in 1984, 7 in 1985 and none in 1986. The
United States carried out 17 tests in 1984, 15 in 1985 and 12 in 1986. France
continues to test on more or less the same level as before: 8 explosions were
registered during 1986. One British test was registered in 1986, while no
Chinese test was registered.
In 1986, the Conference on Disarmament was again unable to establish a
committee with a view to negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty.
However, while positions remained locked on the question of a mandate, one
sensed a greater openness in the debate of the issue. And substantial
progress was made by the Group of Scientific Experts, which agreed on an
ambitious working plan for the future, including a second global data
collection and analysis test in 1988.
Later on, the Reykjavik meeting was close to producing an agreed formula
on how to deal with the matter between two major nuclear Powers. Seemingly
this involved an approach in stages, which we regret, since the time is more
than ripe to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive treaty. In the view of
some, I may add, this goal is put off to a distant future. It is even said
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(Ms Theorin, Sweden)
that it should be preceded by the elimination of nuclear weapons. One may
wonder what is the purpose of a test ban once nuclear weapons are abolished.
Nuclear weapons development is taking place now and to halt it a test ban is a
necessity now. This is the case with regard to both the present and the
possible future nuclear-weapon States.
In the General Assembly, Sweden was pleased to note an improved political
climate on the test ban issue. This improvement was translated into a certain
convergence of views expressed in resolutions on the matter. The resolution
on the urgent need for a comprehensive test ban treaty, introduced by
Australia, attracted positive votes from an overwhelming majority of
non-aligned States and for the first time from the group of socialist States,
while this year the United States did not oppose it. The resolution on a
cessation of all nuclear test explosions, introduced by Mexico, attracted a
greater number of positive votes from the group of Western States than ever
before. Sweden, as co-sponsor of both resolutions, appreciates the
flexibility shown by various delegations.
Diplomacy is to accommodate without losing sight of the goal. For my
country, the voting pattern by which these resolutions were adopted was a
significant development. It makes the call for practical work on a
comprehensive test ban treaty in this Conference still more authoritative. It
is time for the convergence in the General Assembly to be translated by us
into a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. This Conference
cannot abdicate its responsibility for what has been our professed goal for
25 years -- a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is time for the Conference on
Disarmament to start practical work on its first agenda item. All relevant
matters should be addressed: scope and content, as well as compliance and
verification.
The informal meetings held during last year's session of the Conference
on Disarmament on the substance of the agenda item, "Cessation of the nuclear
arms race and nuclear disarmament", were both constructive and worthwhile.
Continued efforts should lead to more structured and formalized deliberations
under this item.
Although delegations from all groups have stated that they attach the
utmost importance to the item "Prevention of nuclear war", unfortunately no
agreement on how to deal with the issues involved has so far been reached.
New efforts should be made to bring about progress on the matter.
It is unfortunate that the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to
make progress on the question of negative security assurances for
non-nuclear-weapon States. The obstacles reflect basic differences of opinion
on this issue. The most fundamental element of an effective negative
assurance is legally binding undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States not to
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.
These nom-nuclear-weapon States should not have to make any further
commitments beyond that of staying nuclear-weapon free. This commitment
should be formalized by adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by
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(Ms Theorin, Sweden)
participation in an established nuclear-weapon-free zone, or in other agreed
ways, giving it international legal effect. The threat of an arms race in
space has assumed an increasingly prominent place on the disarmament agenda.
Possible future systems for defence against ballistic missiles have become a
fundamental problem in bilateral negotiations between the United States and
the Soviet Union. Development and deployment of anti-satellite systems would
be destabilizing and trigger an arms race in outer space. ASAT developments
are a source of concern for the increasing number of countries having civilian
space programmes.
Sweden is gratified that discussions have taken place in the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space during the past two
years. That Committee's deliberations have, to a degree, been useful in
sorting out issues in this field. The existing body of international law
relating to an arms race in space is in many respects inadequate. We must
negotiate additional measures, for example, a ban on space weapons, including
development, testing and deployment of ASAT systems and their destruction.
Existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral ones, must be strictly
adhered to. The ABM Treaty is a case in point. The Ad Hoc Committee should
continue its work during this year's session. Its considerations can be
further broadened and deepened within the framework of its mandate. There are
still a variety of legal aspects that should be further analysed. An
overview of the technical aspect of space weapon development is called for.
The setting up of an informal working group of technical experts could be
considered.
The international context of the negotiations on chemical weapons gives
cause for serious concern. Chemical weapons have been used by Iraq in the war
with Iran, disregarding rules of international law. In Europe, very large
chemical weapons stockpiles exist and further development, production and
deployment of such weapons is under way. Major military Powers have prepared
themselves to carry out chemical warfare. The worldwide spread of chemical
weapons is a clear possibility, in some cases even a definite probability.
There is no alternative to the conclusion of a comprehensive convention
banning all chemical weapons.
After almost two decades of work and negotiation, it has been possible to
address most of the elements which are necessary ingredients of a treaty. A
structure and the early drafts of the treaty have been developed. We must not
allow the steady pace of negotiations, and the smooth functioning of this
multilateral negotiating body, to lull us into accepting slow progress and a
long-term perspective. If that happens, weapons development will overtake us
and ruin our efforts. In order to further the negotiations, all countries
producing or considering the production of chemical weapons, unitary as well
as binary, should refrain from it during the course of the negotiations.
Disarmament can never be furthered through increased armaments. Against this
background, any production of chemical weapons is regrettable. My Government
attaches the utmost importance to this negotiation and will spare no effort to
assure its urgent and successful conclusion.
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(Ms Theorin, Sweden)
A number of problems remain and must now be addressed vigorously. One is
the regime for declaring and verifying existing stockpiles of chemical
weapons. Another is the search for an effective, but not excessive system for
international challenge inspections. The general narrowing of positions on
verification that has been demonstrated lately should help to facilitate
agreement on this issue. A third major problem is verification of future
non-production of chemical weapons. Steps have been taken towards generally
acceptable verification regimes applicable to different categories of
chemicals. Such a verification system should, of course, not hamper
legitimate activities of the chemical industry. Other important problems to
be solved are questions related to the functioning of the Consultative
Committee and its organs, including the Executive Council and the Technical
Secretariat.
I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Committee
Chairman during the past session, Ambassador Cromartie, of the United Kingdom,
for his energetic and efficient performance of this function, characterized by
his deep insight in the field. The continued work should be organized in a
most effective way, corresponding to the requirements of this stage of the
negotiating process. I rest assured that all members of the Conference will
actively support efforts to speed up the negotiation to make possible an early
conclusion of a convention.
Last year's summer session of the Conference took place in the aftermath
of the Chernobyl accident. Many delegations pointed out the dangers connected
with all nuclear activities, civilian or military, and the geographical
dimensions of the risks involved. In Vienna, two international Conventions
have been elaborated with efficiency and speed. They aim at improving
arrangements for countries to alert and assist each other in the case of a
nuclear accident. The Conventions have already entered into force. The IAEA
General Conference has also adopted resolutions calling on competent fora to
deal with the prohibition of military attacks against nuclear installations.
Sweden regrets proposals by some countries to elaborate a convention on this
matter in the framework of the IAEA. The prohibition of attacks against
nuclear installations is indeed a disarmament issue, in view of the mass
destruction which such attacks would cause. And, while not opposing any
bilateral or regional arrangement on this matter, we prefer a global
approach. The forum is here, in the Conference on Disarmament. in 1984,
Sweden put forward a draft treaty on radiological weapons. The proposal aims
at prohibiting radiological weapons, as well as attacks on nuclear facilities,
causing mass destruction through radiation. Mass destruction -- the very
title of the agenda item -- is the link which justifies this approach.
Instead of suggesting the moving of the item from one international body to
the other, delegations should this year try to address the substantive
outstanding dispute.
Circumstances oblige me once again to draw the attention of the
Conference to the somewhat perennial question of the expansion of its
membership. It is far from reasonable that candidates are kept waiting year
after year for a decision. I hope that a satisfactory solution of the matter
will be arrived at during this session.
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(Ms Theorin, Sweden)
The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament
is scheduled to take place in 1988. Sweden will take an active part in that
special session, as well as in the important preparatory work preceding it.
The special session should reconfirm the conviction of the international
community that there is no task more urgent for mankind than to achieve
nuclear disarmament. Bearing in mind the priority of the nuclear issue, the
scope could be broadened. For our part, we would be pleased if the special
session also addressed such crucial questions as conventional disarmament, the
prevention of an arms race in outer space, the naval arms race and the need
for confidence-building measures on a global level.
Twenty-five years ago the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was
established here in Geneva. Sweden joined it as one of eight members not
belonging to any of the military alliances. The record of that Committee and
that of its successors, the CCD and the CD, deserves close examination. The
Geneva disarmament bodies have been instrumental in producing such agreements
as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Bacteriological Weapons Convention, the
Sea-Bed Treaty and the ENMOD Convention. It is a record that well stands
comparison with what has been achieved in negotiations between the nuclear
Powers. On several crucial disarmament issues, particularly when nuclear
weapons are the subject, the functioning of these multilateral bodies has,
however, been severely hampered. The comprehensive test ban is a case in
point. This has not been due to lack of dedication, deftness or derring-do on
the part of negotiators here in Geneva. It is because the conferences have
been denied, by nuclear Powers, the leeway necessary to fulfil their role.
They have even been denied the prerogative to negotiate on main items of their
agenda.
Today we have an excellent opportunity to reinforce confidence in the
ability of the Conference on Disarmament to perform its task. We must proceed
with and conclude a treaty outlawing chemical weapons. We must get
negotiations going on a comprehensive test treaty. We must, on all items on
our agenda, demonstrate the potential and viability of multilateral
disarmament negotiations. Political and military decision-makers, all over
the world, are preparing plans for war and for new rounds of the ever
accelerating arms race. If peace and disarmament is to become a reality, it
must also be planned for and vigorously pursued. As the saying has it, "They
sow the wind, they will reap the storm". If we sow weapons, we will reap
war. But if we sow seeds of disarmament, we will reap peace. The work has
been going on for 25 years here in Geneva. Time is running short. We will
not have 25 more years to try it out.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the distinguished
representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words addressed to
the President. We have exhausted the time available to us this morning though
we still have two members listed on our list of speakers. Furthermore, we
also have some organizational matters to consider. Accordingly, I will
suspend the plenary meeting and resume it at 3.30 p.m. sharp in order to
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(The President)
continue our deliberations. As agreed by the Conference, after we have
listened to the last speaker for today we shall hold an informal meeting to
consider the provisional agenda and programme of work for the Conference. If
we reach agreement at that informal meeting, we shall resume the plenary
meeting in order to adopt any decision resulting from the informal meeting.
Also, at the request of the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, I wish to inform
the members of that Group that they will meet here at 3 p.m. for a brief
consultation and will be provided with interpretation service. The plenary
meeting of the Conference is suspended.
The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and reconvened at 3.30 p.m.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare that the
385th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. First of
all, I will give the floor to Ambassador Cromartie, of the United Kingdom, the
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to introduce the report
of the Committee. Now I give the floor to him.
Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I should like first to
tell you of the profound shock with which I heard the news of the death of
Ambassador Don Lowitz, whom we mourn both as a colleague and as a friend. He
arrived in this Conference two years ago this week and we admired the courage
and skill with which he stepped, at his first meeting, into the Chair which
you now occupy to preside with success over the Conference for the month of
February. Thereafter we were able to admire the ability and integrity with
which he conducted his official function as leader of the United States
delegation and we enjoyed friendship with him and with his family. He would
have been sitting next to me today and it is with sorrow that I realize I
shall see him no more. I should be grateful if the United States delegation
would accept my deep condolences and convey them to his widow, Shana, whom we
remember with affection and sympathy, and to their children.
I should now like to speak as outgoing Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee
on Chemical Weapons to present the report which was adopted by the Committee
on 29 January and which is now before you as document CD/734. This report
covers the work carried out during the intersessional period on the basis
recommended in the Committee's last report, CD/727, of 21 August, and approved
by the Conference on 28 August.
The Conference requested that the Committee should resume its work under
its existing mandate for a session of limited duration during the period
12-30 January 1987 on issues under Articles III, IV, V, VI and IX and the
parts of Article II relevant to Articles V and VI: that consultations should
be undertaken on those issues by the Chairman in the meantime in preparation
for the resumed session: and that for that purpose open-ended consultations
of the Ad Hoc Committee should be held between 24 November and
17 December 1986, including, where necessary, meetings with full services:
and that the Committee should report to the Conference on Disarmament on its
work during the intersessional period. It is this report that I am giving to
you today.
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(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)
The substantive results of the work in question are before you in
document CD/734. The open-ended consultations were very well attended and
took place in an atmosphere that demonstrated the keen interest of delegations
in this work. Mr. Rowe, of Australia, and Mr. Poptchev, of Bulgaria,
continued their work as Chairmen of Working Group A and Working Group B
respectively with great dedication and enthusiasm. The Ad Hoc Committee owes
a great debt of gratitude to them for the way in which they pursued during the
intersessional period the work they had undertaken in the 1986 session, the
results of which are contained in the Committee's previous report, CD/727, of
21 August 1986.
When the Committee met again in formal session, on 12 January, it decided
that the progress achieved in informal consultations warranted an updating of
the rolling text of the draft Convention to incorporate the addition of common
ground identified during the intersessional period. This revised version is
contained in appendix I to the document before you, CD/734, with the
recommendation, in paragraph 9(a), that this appendix should be used for
further negotiation and drafting of the Convention. Active work was still
continuing until the last day. Two other papers of the Chairman of Working
Group A were placed in appendix II so that they could be available for further
work in the 1987 session.
As Mr. Wisnoemoerti, of Indonesia, who was Chairman of Working Group C
in 1986 and who clarified the issues under Articles VIII and IX, left at the
end of the most recent session of the Conference, in August 1986, / undertook,
in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee, extensive consultations with many
delegations on the subject of article IX and its relation to the Convention as
a whole. I am most grateful to those of you who spent the time to give me the
benefit of your perceptions both from your national and regional points of
view and from the points of view of any Groups to which your countries
belong. As a result of those consultations, / came to the conclusion that it
would not at this stage help the Conference's work to attempt multilateral
consideration of the text of Article IX. I was, however, agreeably surprised
by the extent of common ground which I found. I therefore recorded in the
Committee's report that / had detected a convergence of views on four points:
firstly, that confidence in the Convention should be built up and maintained
by routine inspection of declared facilities; secondly, that provisions under
Article IX were needed for any party to give voice to its suspicions that
another party was not complying with its obligations and to have confidence
that these suspicions would be promptly allayed by agreed procedures;
thirdly, that such procedures should be regarded as a fundamental source of
confidence in the Convention and recourse to them should be a rare event;
fourthly, that once these procedures had been invoked, a very short time for
resolution of the issue was essential both for reasons inherent in the nature
of chemical weapons as well as for wider political reasons. These points do
not, of course, form part of the rolling text, which contains provisionally
agreed treaty language subject to reservations expressed by square brackets or
footnotes.
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(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)
As you will see from our latest version of the text, appendix 1 of the
report before you represents a considerable advance on what was contained in
the appendix to our previous report, CD/727. In the light of the agreement at
the very end of the previous session on a new text for Article IV,
Working Group B, under the chairmanship of Mr. Poptchev, has developed an
improved and more comprehensive structure for Articles III, iv and V of the
Convention, which deal with initial declarations of chemical weapons and
production facilities for their elimination. This represents an important
step forward and I hope that it will provide a good foundation for further
work on this subject, where there are important points remaining to be
resolved, including the questions of declaration of location of stocks and of
the definition of production facilities. In the absence of a resolution of
this last point, it seemed premature to tackle the questions remaining to be
resolved under Article II on definitions.
In any case, Working Group A was very fully occupied with work which
continued until the report before you went to press. The new text of
Article V/ developed during our previous session has been further developed
under the able and energetic guidance of Mr. Rowe to comprise three schedules
of chemical substances of concern under a chemical weapons convention, with
corresponding annexes on regimes to deal with them. The Article now provides,
for the first time, for an undertaking for each State Party to declare data on
the relevant chemical substances and facilities which produced them and to
subject the chemicals and facilities covered in Annex II and Schedule 2 to
monitoring by data reporting and routine systematic international on-site
inspection. This undertaking represents an important step forward. Taken
together with the provisions of Annexes 1 and 3 of Article VI, it will make an
important contribution to the confidence required for the Convention to be
concluded.
This accords with the first of the four points of convergence that I
mentioned earlier, namely that confidence in the Convention should be built up
and maintained by routine inspection of declared facilities. During the
transitional period in which stocks of chemical weapons and their production
facilities are eliminated, further measures will be required, and remain to be
elaborated, to give confidence that States Parties are complying with their
obligations in this respect. As I told you earlier, I also detected a
convergence of view that provisions under Article /X would be required to
underpin confidence in the Convention we are negotiating. This crucial issue
remains to be resolved. The execution of all these measures of verification
will require the establishment of an effective organization under Article VIII
of the treaty. This task may prove to be as complex as Article VI has proved
this year. The development of Article V/ so far establishes that this
organization will have a long-term, detailed routine task to perform. Further
work on this Article in conjunction with Article VIII will be required to
ensure that the provisions of the draft convention together provide the
necessary confidence in the draft Convention as a whole to enable it to be
concluded.
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(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdbm)
Finally, I should like to express my warm thanks to all delegations for
the way in which they have, during my year as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee
on Chemical Weapons, contributed positively and constructively to the common
task of negotiating in this Conference, the sole multilateral negotiating
forum in the field of disarmament, a draft Convention to ban chemical weapons
altogether.
Our special joint thanks are due to the Chairmen of the three
Working Groups, Mr. Rowe, of Australia, Mr. Poptchev, of Bulgaria and
Mr. Wisnoemoerti, of Indonesia, for their tireless work and for the great
contribution they have made to .the fruitful result of our year's work. I am
sure that I speak for all members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons
in expressing our deep gratitude to the United Nations Secretariat for the
support and help that they have given to the Committee in its work, especially
to the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and his staff, who
have made a great contribution to the Committee's work, and to all the
interpreters and translators, who have enabled us to operate in all the
languages of the Conference.
I have now discharged the function with which the Conference entrusted me
at the beginning of its last session. In doing so, I am delighted that, as a
result of a decision of the Conference in August, roan hand over this task to
Ambassador Ekeus, of Sweden. I know that the Chair of the Committee could not
be in better hands. I offer my heartfelt best wishes for the forthcoming
session and pledge to him as Chairman the co-operation and support of the
delegation of the United Kingdom.
As I have the floor, let me say as the representative of the
United Kingdom, that I congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of
the office of President. I know that you will discharge it with all the
wisdom traditional in your country. And let me say finally a word of thanks
to your predecessor, Ambassador Beesley, of Canada, for the great diplomatic
skill with which he conducted the presidency in the month of August.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Chairman of the
Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for his introduction to the report of the
Committee contained in document CD/734 and I also thank him for his kind words
addressed to the Chair. I wish to say to Ambassador Cromartie that we all
admire his outstanding performance as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on
Chemical Weapons, and also to thank him for his introduction to the fruitful
results of one year's work. I would also like to say that, by his well-known
diplomatic ability and his personal charm, he has been instrumental in
securing substantial progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.
During our informal consultations we agreed that, on 5 February, at our
next plenary meeting, I will submit the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Chemical Weapons to the Conference for adoption. At the end of the morning
session on 5 February, we will re-establish that Ad Hoc Committee and we will
appoint Ambassador Ekeus, of Sweden, as Chairman.
I now give the floor to the last speaker on my list, the representative
of Australia, Ambassador Butler.
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Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Australia has great hopes at this 1987 session
of the Conference on Disarmament. I believe, Mr. President, that there is a
Chinese saying that says that "Even a journey of a thousand miles starts with
its first steps"; our first steps this year are in your hands and this is one
of the sources of our hope, or our optimism. /t gives great satisfaction to
my delegation to see you in the vital opening month of our 1987 session
presiding over the Conference on Disarmament as head of the delegation of
China. China's depth of culture and historical experience is well known and
is deeply felt by the Australian Government and people. We have admired the
determination and the resolve of the Chinese people in pursuing the goals of
modernization and have been struck by the strides that China has made in
multilateral work on disarmament. This was most recently reflected in the
significant initiatives China took at the latest session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations. Australia also appreciated the very
important declaration by China that it would no longer conduct nuclear tests
in the atmosphere. We look to the historic wisdom of China and to your
obvious personal abilities to get us started on the right path, on the right
journey in 1987. My delegation will give you full support in your efforts
this month and not least because of the strong and ever-growing relationship
that exists between our two countries as neighbours in the Asia and Pacific
region.
I want to express, too, our thanks to your predecessor,
Ambassador Beesley, for the efforts he made in August, a difficult month for
the Conference on every occasion. I would like, too, to pause briefly to
express congratulations to him for his election in the meantime as a member of
the International Law Commission. I also want to join others who this morning
have welcomed new heads of delegations who have joined us here at the
Conference table.
I said that we have great hopes at this 1987 session of the Conference on
Disarmament. There are a number of reasons why we hold this view and I will
mention a few of them briefly.
First, last year at Reykjavik we saw the end of the first period of
renewed vigour in United States/Soviet negotiations on major issues in arms
control and disarmament. That period began in November 1985, at the Geneva
summit meeting, and a year later, indeed a relatively short time later, there
were exposed at Reykjavik the main elements of a truly significant agreement
between the two major military Powers. Our understanding is that, while an
agreement was not able to be sealed at Reykjavik, its elements remain
substantially intact and work is proceeding on securing not only a
far-reaching agreement, but an agreement which would be a beginning not an
end, one which would lead naturally to even further measures of arms control
and disarmament. This real possibility must and should have a positve
influence on what we will seek to do and will be able to do in this Conference
in 1987. It validates our confident expectations of momentum in this
Conference this year.
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(Mr. Butler, Australia)
Second, there was the progress we made in our own work last year. Two or
three years ago, times were hard in this Conference. Debates were sharp and
positions often very divergent. But last year a degree of convergence started
to emerge. In several areas of our work there was a sense that the Conference
was on the move, that differences were being narrowed and that progress was
being sought with new determination.
Third, the same process of convergence and reconciliation of important
differences was evident at the most recent session of the General Assembly of
the United Nations. This was perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the
resolutions adopted on nuclear testing and chemical weapons. Again,
delegations set aside the narrow expression of differences of view and
approach and strove instead to seek common ground. This spirit still exists.
We detect a widespread willingness to continue this flow of events and to
develop it.
We have heard a good deal of criticism of the multilateral disarmament
system and machinery during the past few years. There is no doubt that some
of that criticism has been valid, but surely it is wise, at least on some
occasions, to put these things into an historical perspective.
It has always been the case, for example, certainly throughout this
century, that there has been a multilateral conference on disarmament in
Geneva and real disfunctionalities between what that conference could do and
the realities of the military power held by certain States. Yet, in spite of
that degree of disfunctionality, the various versions of the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva have added incrementally to international law and
practice in the field of arms control and disarmament. / think this was a
point made this morning by Ms Theorin, the distinguished leader of the Swedish
delegation. I think the point is this: if one looks at the corpus of such
law and practice that has been agreed upon in Geneva this century, the value
of historical perspective is revealed as in a flash. To put it simply the
agreements and practices negotiated in Geneva have proven indispensable to the
management of international relations and to attempts to maintain the peace in
our difficult and increasingly complex age.
I would like now to address briefly three items on our Conference agenda
which have definite priority for my Government. The first of them is a
nuclear-test ban treaty.
Towards the end of our set- an last year, the gap between members of the
Conference on this vital subject was closing. This process of convergence was
further revealed at the General Assembly in the resolutions which were adopted
on this subject, both in terms of the substance of the resolutions and in the
voting patterns on them. There was also the resumption of discussions between
the United States and the Soviet Union on this subject.
Signific:_c aevelopments took place too in the work of the Ad Hoc Group
of Scientific Experts and in proposals for the establishment of an
international seismic monitoring network for the verification of a test-ban
treaty, one of which was made by my own Government. May I again at this
moment urge the Conference to take a decision to establish that network, along
the lines, for example, of our proposal.
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(Mr. Butler, Australia)
On the central issue, that of a nuclear-test ban treaty, we see no reason
why the last step cannot be taken very soon and an ad hoc committee of this
Conference on a nuclear-test ban treaty established. We believe that this can
be done and done quickly, and my delegation stands ready to participate in
removing the last obstacles.
This is not to say that other work external to this Conference, either in
bilateral discussions or by particular groups of States, should not continue.
However, the missing piece is at hand and that piece is the resumption of work
in this Conference on bringing into existence a verifiable treaty, preventing
all nuclear test explosions by all States in all environments for all time.
I now turn to chemical weapons. We have stated repeatedly in this
Conference that the Australian Government attaches high priority to the
conclusion of a multilateral convention which would ban the development,
production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. We believe
that such an objective is clearly in sight. There is a new spirit in the
negotiations and this was evident throughout the 1986 session of the Chemical
Weapons Committee. It was reflected in particular in the process which was
recorded in the intersessional consultations during November, December and
January. The advances made in the negotiations are reflected in the report
containing the revised rolling text of the Convention which
Ambassador Cromartie presented this afternoon. This momentum which was
generated under the dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie must be
sustained.
In fact we must increase the tempo of our negotiations during 1987 so
that the opportunity which clearly exists of concluding a convention this year
may be realized. This requires two things: concentration upon resolution of
the main outstanding issues, and tailoring of the working arrangements of the
Committee in the most effective way. The Committee has concentrated its work
during the past year on matters relating to Articles III, IV, v, VI and IX.
While all these Articles will continue to require further attention, we
consider it is now imperative to focus in a concentrated way on other specific
issues.
Four of these are of central importance: declaration and verification of
chemical weapons stocks; chemical weapons production facilities;
non-production of chemical weapons; and challenge inspection. There has
already been a considerable amount of effort devoted to the discussion of
these issues and to the formulation of appropriate provisions for inclusion in
the Convention, but a solution to all aspects of these issues has remained
elusive. They are difficult and complex, but it is not beyond our ability to
solve them. Our ability to find solutions was demonstrated in the latter part
of the 1986 session, which resulted in progress, good progress being made on
Articles III, IV, V and VI.
The subject of challenge inspection is recognized as one of the most
important issues needing solution. A range of proposals has been put forward
in relation to it, but we believe that an appropriate provision can be arrived
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(Mr. Butler, Australia)
at if the issue is taken up in a concentrated way. A solution to challenge
inspection would give a significant impetus to the negotiations as a whole.
Thus we think that the challenge inspection issue should be given prominence
during the 1987 session.
We have mentioned the desirability of focusing our work on specific
issues in a concentrated way. This would require an adjustment to the way in
which we have organized the Committee's work in the past. We are very
pleased that the incoming Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Committee,
Ambassador Elceus, is envisaging such an approach. We fully support the idea
of focused consideration of clusters of issues, providing, of course, that
there can be flexibility in relation to when particular issues might be taken
up depending on the progress being made. It is through such an approach that
we believe that the momentum that has been so much in evidence during 1986
will be sustained and that the objective to which we are all committed will be
achieved.
As further evidence of Australia's commitment to this objective, we would
like to record that since the last plenary meeting of the 1986 session of the
Conference the Australian Government has taken further action in support of
its view that chemical warfare is abhorrent. On 26 November 1986, Australia
withdrew its reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The 1925 Geneva
Protocol, although a valuable international agreement, is less than perfect.
In view of the many reservations to the Protocol, it cannot be said
categorically that it prohibits all use of chemical weapons. By withdrawing
its own reservation and by its active pursuit of a comprehensive chemical
weapons convention, Australia aims to strengthen the international norms
against chemical warfare.
Australia has also been concerned about the proliferation of chemical
weapons. To ensure that Australia does not inadvertently contribute to the
problems of chemical weapon use through chemicals exported from Australia
being secretly diverted to the manufacture of chemical weapons, eight
chemicals which could be misused in this way were placed under strict export
controls by us in 1985. The Australian Government has recently decided that
an additional 22 chemicals which could be used in making chemical weapons will
be placed under Australian export controls, bringing to 30 the number of such
chemicals for which export permits will be required. Although Australian
Ministers decided in December 1986 that an additional 22 chemicals would be
controlled, I have to make clear :hat the full implementation of this
decision, this firm decision, i still in train. The Australian export
control list will, we hope, serve as a model for all chemical exporting
nations. The measures we have implemented to control the export of these
chemicals is intended to reduce the risk of chemical warfare. But export
controls, while a valuable measure, are not a substitute for a comprehensive
chemical weapons convention. So we will continue to give our full support to
the maintenance' - that important objective, an objective which is in sight
and is one of our expectations for 1987.
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(Mr. Butler, Australia)
I turn now to outer space. On the question of a convention of an arms
race in outer space, the position of the Australian Government is clear: such
an arms race should never take place. We accept that it is the basic
commitment of the major Powers involved to prevent an arms race in outer
space. That is what they have said, and we accept it and we want to see that
commitment honoured. We believe that the multilateral community, whose
interest in this issue is beyond question, can make an important contribution
towards achieving this goal. We believe that the work of this Conference has
a central place in this effort and should be resumed this year without
delay. It would be distressing in the extreme if the resumption of that work
were to be delayed by mere procedural arguments. The task is urgent and the
job at hand is large. We hope, Mr. President, that the Conference's Ad Hoc
Committee on Outer Space will be well into its working stride before you leave
the Chair of this Conference.
At an earlier point in this statement I mentioned initiatives that have
been taken by groups of States outside the strict confines of the Conference
on Disarmament or the multilateral disarmament system. One such initiative
which came to fruition in 1986 was the entry into force of the Treaty of
Rarotonga, the treaty establishing a South Pacific nuclear-free zone. On
8 August 1985, I informed the Conference of the decision taken on 6 August by
the Heads of Government of the 13 member countries of the South Pacific Forum,
at its meeting in Rarotonga in the Cook Islands, to endorse the draft.
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and subsequently to open it for
signature. The text of the Treaty and its draft Protocols was transmitted to
the Conference on 16 August 1985 in document CD/633. Today I wish to inform
the Conference that the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of
Rarotonga, entered into force, with the deposit of the eighth instrument of
ratification, on 11 December 1986. Just one and a half years after it was
opened for signature, the Treaty of Rarotonga is in operation. There is now
a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone stretching from the Equator in the north to
the Antarctic in the south and from the west coast of Latin America to the
west coast of Australia. The States which have ratified the Treaty are:
Fiji, the Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Niue, Western Samoa, Kiribati, New Zealand and
Australia. The South Pacific has therefore become the second populated
region, that is, after Latin America, to establish a nuclear-free zone, one
which covers a truly significant portion of the surface of this Earth. As
illustration of that significance, I have asked the secretariat now to
distribute to the Conference a map of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.
The Treaty of Rarotonga provides that: no South Pacific country which
becomes a Party to the Treaty will develop, manufacture, acquire or receive
from others any nuclear explosive devices; there should be no testing of
nuclear explosive devices in the South Pacific; there will be no stationing
of nuclear explosive devices in the territories of participating States;
nuclear activities in the region, including the export of nuclear material,
are to be conducted under strict safeguards to ensure exclusively peaceful,
non-explosive use; South Pacific countries shall retain their unqualified
sovereign rights to decide for themselves such questions as access to their
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(Mr. Butler, Australia)
ports and airfields by vessels or aircraft of other countries; international
law with regard to freedom of the sea will be fully respected; and finally,
performance of obligations by Parties will be subject to strict verification.
The Treaty also bans the dumping of radioactive waste at sea in the region and
in this it compliments the SPREP Convention concluded in 1986 for the
environmental protection of the South Pacific region. The Treaty of
Rarotonga reflects deeply-felt and longstanding concern in the South Pacific
region about nuclear testing, the ocean dumping of nuclear wastes and the
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It expresses the strong
community of interests which members of the South Pacific Forum share in
environmental and security matters and, in the words of the Treaty's Preamble,
the determination of the Parties to ensure "that the bounty and beauty of the
land and the sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their people and
their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace".
There are three Protocols to the Treaty and they were opened for
signature on 1 December 1986. The first of them invites France, the
United States of America and the United Kingdom to apply key provisions of the
Treaty to their South Pacific territories. The other two Protocols
respectively invite the five nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against Parties to the Treaty and not to test nuclear
explosive devices within the Zone.
It is our firm view that the Treaty of Rarotonga constitutes an important
contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the region it covers
and is a significant nuclear arms control agreement. Its significance in this
respect would be further enhanced if those nuclear-weapon States which have
been invited to sign the Protocols to the Treaty relevant to them did so as
expeditiously as possible. One State, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
did so on 15 December of last year, and Australia welcomed this.
A significant feature of the Treaty of Rarotonga is that the
South Pacific Forum, which produced the Treaty, is an association of regional
Governments which traditionally operates by consensus. Members of this
Conference will be sensitive to the difficulties associated with the process
of arriving at a consensus in producing arms control and disarmament
agreements, and aware that, in coming to an agreement, the interests of all
participants must be taken into account. The Treaty of Rarotonga is a
document which is a product of just that process, a consensus document agreed
to by a number of States, a number in fact numerically equivalent to a third
of this Conference.
I have said that this Treaty is an important arms control measure. No
nuclear weapons are stationed on the territory of the South Pacific States.
This Treaty provides a strong guarantee that this will remain the case. The
Treaty also creates verification mechanisms with respect to this
undertaking. Other areas where a similar undertaking has been
institutionalized, with the overwhelming support of the international
community, are Antarctica, Latin America, outer space and the sea bed. The
Treaty of Rarotonga marks an important additional contribution towards
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(Mr. Butler, Australia)
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive
devices, a contribution with significant consequences both for the
South Pacific region and for neighbouring regions. It is a major
contribution towards preventing a sizeable part of the globe becoming yet
another location in which the geographical spread of nuclear weapons could
occur. The prohibition of the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory
of South Pacific countries is of particular importance in this regard. It
extends beyond the obligations that these countries have entered into under
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As I mentioned
earlier, the text of the Treaty of Rarotonga was circulated to this Conference
in 1985 in document CD/633. Since then, following consultations by a
South Pacific Forum delegation of officials with all the prospective Protocol
States, the Protocols have been adopted in final form by the South Pacific
Forum, meeting at Suva in August 1986. The final text of the Protocols has
been circulated today jointly by the delegations of Australia and New Zealand
as an annex to document CD/633. That has been placed on the table of
delegations today. The text of the Treaty proper, including all the annexes,
with the exception of the amended Protocols circulated today, remains
identical to what is contained in CD/633.
I referred earlier to the history of multilateral disarmament efforts in
Geneva. One thing that is clear about these efforts is that, in spite of
occasional very difficult periods, they have never remained static. We
believe the multilateral disarmament machinery is today undergoing a process
of change. The reason for this is that States value the machinery and they
want to see it made more effective. In New York, where this subject has been
increasingly vigorously discussed, we have made clear that we welcome attempts
being made to review and upgrade our machinery. We believe that this should
include a reshaping of the agenda of multilateral negotiations to enable us to
respond very directly to the central realities of armaments and their impact
on the maintenance of peace and security. The multilateral disarmament
process would be better served if this Conference, for example, could focus
its attention on a number of priority agenda items. There is a strong case
for streamlining the current agenda by setting aside items that are less
urgent or relatively unsuited to consideration by the Conference at the
present time. We particularly hope that we can conclude our work on a
comprehensive programme of disarmament and, in conformity with the resolution
of the General Assembly at its forty-first session, submit our conclusions to
the General Assembly before the end of that session.
Australia believes in this Conference and in its role of ensuring that
disarmament plays its proper part in the maintenance of peace and security.
May I add that, in my firm view, this Conference is a better place for having
had my friend, Donald Lowitz, sit at its table.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Australia for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Conference
and to the country that I represent. That concludes my list of speakers for
today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I now give the floor
to the Ambassador of Mexico.
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Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Forgive me for
having made so bold as to ask for the floor again after my lengthy statement
this morning, but it will, I think, be understood that, as the representative
of a country, Mexico, whose capital serves as the headquarters of the body set
up under the first treaty to have established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an
inhabited area, I should not wish to let pass the occasion on which
Ambassador Butler has informed us of the entry into force of the Treaty of
Rarotonga without extending to him, and asking him to convey to all the
members of the new zone, the congratulations of the delegation of Mexico to
the Conference on Disarmament. I believe that the first special session of
the General Assembly was very right when it said in its Final Document -- and
I quote the words of paragraphs 60 and 61 -- that "the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among
the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament
measure" and that, as it added in paragraph 61, "the process of establishing
such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the
ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons".
For that reason, I reiterate my congratulations to Ambassador Butler and to
the State or States he represents.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the distinguished
representative of Mexico for his statement. Does any other member wish to
take the floor? I see none. I now give the floor to the Secretary-General of
the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, for a statement concerning the services
allocated to the Conference.
Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): As
you know, the United Nations continues to face a financial emergency
necessitating reductions and the reprogramming of a number of its activities.
As was the case during the second part of the 1986 session, the Conference
needs to consider how to implement the target reduction of 30 per cent in
services allocated to it. Intensive consultations were held at Headquarters,
as well as in Geneva, in order to ensure the best prevailing conditions for
the work of the Conference and for its servicing. The outcome of these
consultations was that, in order that the work of the Conference would be the
least impaired while bringing about the required rate of saving, it was
better, on the basis of the experience of the second part of the 1986 session,
to concentrate on reducing the number of weekly meetings rather than imposing
a 30 per cent reduction in the duration of the annual session. As was the
case for the second part of the 1986 session, those savings would mean in
practice the allocation to the Conference of 10 meetings per week, with full
servicing and 15 meetings per week also with full servicing, during the
sessions of the Seismic Group. Therefore, the Conference will be afforded two
daily meetings with full servicing throughout the whole of the 1987 session,
plus one additional daily meeting when the Seismic Group is in session.
Furthermore, should the Conference establish a higher number of
committees than in 1986, it should be envisaged to hold their meetings
consecutively with other committees or working groups. This practice was put
into effect in the past and prevented the wastage of allocated resources in
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(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the
Conference and Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General of the United Nations)
the event that the time allocated for each meeting had not been fully
utilized. May I recall that predecessors of the CD developed a system of
punctuality, whereby all meetings would start no later than five minutes after
their scheduled time of commencement. Of course, the substantive secretariat
will always be available to service informal consultations in case members
wish to intensify their activities beyond the allocation of meetings with full
services. As in the case of the 1986 session, it will not be possible to hold
meetings in the evenings or during weekends with full servicing.
May I also recall the measures accepted by the Conference at the informal
meeting held on 22 April 1986 concerning documentation. In order to implement
these decisions and to bring about savings in the cost of documentation, we
hope that documents will be presented in good time, since there is no overtime
for the technical staff of Conference Services and therefore it will not be
possible to meet last-minute deadlines.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Secretary-General
of the Conference for his statement. During the informal consultations that
we held before the opening of the session, I noted that there was general
agreement among members on the services to be provided by us, as outlined by
the Secretary-General. This being the case, we shall proceed accordingly.
In conformity with Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure, the Secretariat has
circulated working paper CD/WP.251, entitled "Provisional agenda for
the 1987 session and programme of work on the Conference on Disarmament".
intend now to suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of
the Conference to consider that working paper. The plenary meeting is
suspended.
The meeting was suspended at 4.35 p.m. and reconvened at 4.45 p.m.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 385th plenary meeting on
Disarmament is resumed. I put before the Conference for decision the agenda
for the 1987 session and the programme of work for the first part of the
session, as contained in working paper CD/WP.251, dated 30 January 1987. In
doing so, / wish to make the following statement on behalf of the Conference:
"The Conference will also intensify its consultations on the item
dealing with the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, bearing in mind
that the Conference recommended in its last report to the
General Assembly, and the Assembly supported this recommendation in the
decision it adopted on this matter, that the elaboration of the programme
should be completed during the first part of the 1987 session for
submission to the General Assembly before the closure of the latter's
forty-first session.".
If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the
working paper. 1/
It was so decided.
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(The President)
I should like to express my appreciation to the members for their
assistance in adopting quickly our agenda for 1987 and the programme of work
for the first part of the session.
As agreed during our informal consultations, I intend to put before the
Conference for adoption at the opening of our next plenary meeting, the report
of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/734,
which was introduced today by its Chairman, Ambassador Cromartie of the
United Kingdom. Also on that occasion, we shall re-establish, at the end of
the morning meeting, that Ad Hoc Committee and appoint Ambassador Ekeus of
Sweden as its Chairman. As you know, there is no need to re-establish the
Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which can
start its work immediately.
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on
Thursday, 5 February at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.
Note
I/ Later issued as document CD/735.
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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.386
5 February 1987
ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 5 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m.
President:
GE. 87-60143/71].7E
?
Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China)
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the
386th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the outset, I wish
to extend, on behalf of the Conference, a warm welcome to the Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States of America, the
Honourable Kenneth L. Adelman, who is to address the Conference today as first
speaker. Mr. Adelman is well-known to us, as he has visited the Conference
before. We also know of the important responsibilities which have been
entrusted to him and, for that reason, I am sure that members will follow his
statement with special interest. I should also like to welcome warmly the
Deputy Foreign Minister of Cuba, His Excellency Mr. Ratil Roa Kouri, who will
also speak today at the Conference. Mr. Roa Kouri is an experienced
diplomat, who has served as Permanent Representative of Cuba to the
United Nations and, in that capacity, has been actively involved in
disarmament matters. His statement will also be of particular interest to us.
As announced at our last plenary meeting, I intend now to put before the
Conference for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons
on its work during the period 12-30 January 1987, as contained in
document CD/734. You will recall that the report was introduced by
Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom at the same plenary meeting.. If
there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the report
of the Ad Hoc Committee.
It was so decided.
I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the
United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Cuba,
Federal Republic of Germany and Poland.
I now give the floor to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency of the United States of America, the Honourable Kenneth L. Adelman.
Mr. ADELMAN (United States of America): Mr. President, before I make my
statement today, I want to take this opportunity, on behalf of the
United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, to extend our
congratulations and best wishes to you as you guide the work of this
Conference in the opening month of its 1987 session. On two occasions during
the past three years I have had the privilege to lead an arms control
delegation to your country, China, for discussions of arms control issues; it
is a pleasure to be speaking under your presidency today.
The United States delegation also extends its congratulations to
Ambassador Beesley of Canada, who so ably guided the work of the Conference in
August and through the inter-sessional period. The United States delegation
joins in the welcome that has been extended to the new heads of the
delegations of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
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(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)
Two years ago, when I first addressed this Conference on Disarmament, I
was sitting on the podium with Donald Lowitz at my side; he was serving as
President for that month. Since then, you have had the good fortune to know
Don as I've known him for all my adult life: as a warm and wonderful person,
who served his country whenever called upon -- and I asked him to do so more
than two years ago now -- and who believed in this Conference and its goals
and who believed in all of you. You saw this side of Don. I had seen him as
a marvellous husband to Shana -- herself such a perfect embodiment of what's
fresh and caring about America -- and as a fabulous father to Amy, Teddy and
Josh and a loving grandfather to David. How they will all miss him. How we
will all miss him.
I understand that you have already heard from President Reagan on his
tribute to Don. Let us, as the President said, pursue the goals Don pursued
and, by so doing, give a living monument to his work here. I would now like
to convey to you the President's greetings at the opening of this session;
the President's words:
"As the Conference on Disarmament resumes its work in 1987, I would
like to extend my wishes for a productive session. Although the opening
of the Conference has been darkened by the sad and untimely loss of our
Ambassador, Donald Lowitz, I am certain we can join together in making
progress in this forum as a fitting testimonial to his memory.
Your work constitutes an important and integral part of efforts
undertaken by the international community to make our world a more
peaceful place. The issues with which you deal are complementary to
those being addressed bilaterlly between the United States and the
Soviet Union. The promise of Reykjavik, which has given us the vision of
a world with significantly reduced levels of nuclear weapons, has become
an indicator of what is possible. It inevitably draws attention to the
issues on your agenda and should encourage you in your efforts to
increase international stability and co-operation.
One of the most important tasks facing you is the working out of a
comprehensive, effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. This task
is made even more difficult by the fact that capabilities for chemical
warfare are increasing and that, contrary to international agreement,
chemical weapons are being used in various parts of the world. You have
a heavy responsibility. For, as you consider the provisions of a
convention, you must make sure that a global ban will, in fact, eliminate
the capability for chemical weapons to be used against future
generations. An effective convention will require an unprecedented
degree of openness on the part of all States.
I reaffirm the commitment made by the United States in 1984 when we
tabled our draft convention banning chemical weapons worldwide. The
United States delegation will make every effort to work for the total
elimination of these terrible weapons and for the verification provisions
necessary to ensure that they never again enter the arsenals of the
world's armies.
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(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)
Your efforts in this and in other fields are to be commended. We
are committed to working with you in the Herculean task of bringing
stability to a still insecure world and in achieving responsible
solutions to the problem of reducing the world's arms."
In the two years since I last spoke to this forum, the world has
witnessed some dramatic developments in arms control. I would like to single
out especially the remarkable meeting between President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik last October, in which I had the
privilege of participating. From the United States perspective, Reykjavik
marked an historic turning-point in our arms control dialogue with the
Soviet Union. Why is that? Because for the first time, we engaged the
Soviet Union in serious negotiations -- not just public initiatives, but
serious, hands-on negotiations during those dramatic two days -- on the
subject of deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms.
This was the goal that President Reagan has been striving for ever since
he entered office, ever since he first proposed the "zero-zero" option for
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and deep strategic arms reductions
(START) in 1981 and 1982. At that time, you may remember, there were many
people in our own country and elsewhere who argued that such ambitious arms
reduction proposals had no real place in the arms control dialogue. Many, if
not most, claimed that these deep-cuts proposals were too far-reaching and
could never be the basis for productive negotiations with the Soviet Union:
the Soviet Union would just never entertain such deep cuts as we envisioned.
But, when the Soviet Union walked out of the arms talks at the end of 1983 --
a walk-out that was totally unjustifiable, I might add, due to the INF
situation -- many of these same critics reiterated their arguments, believing
that events had vindicated their views.
But President Reagan persisted. And his persistence has paid off in a
real shift in the arms control agenda. Now at last -- at long last, if you
ask me -- the two sides are talking in nuclear arms control about agreements
that, if signed -- and if fully complied with, which is another thing
altogether -- would effect real and deep reductions in offensive nuclear
arsenals, particularly those systems that are most destabilizing, that are
most threatening in the world. No more are we looking at arrangements like
the SALT accords of the 1970s, which permitted vast growth in the arsenals of
both sides -- a fourfold increase in the number of Soviet strategic nuclear
weapons since SALT I was signed in 1972 and an increase in our own arsenal in
response to that fourfold increase on the Soviet side. Thanks to
President Reagan's persistence, the agenda in nuclear arms control is now, I
believe, irreversibly, deep offensive weapons cuts.
There is another development to which I would call your attention, a
development that has occurred outside the field of arms control proper, but
which, if it were to come to pass, could have potentially broad ramifications
for arms control and surely for the deliberations of this forum, for the
future of the Conference on Disarmament. That is the increasing discussion of
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(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)
"openness", or glasnost, in the Soviet Union itself. Indeed, First Deputy
Foreign Minister Vorontsov addressed it here two days ago and we talked about
it last night during our long evening together. It is not clear where this
focus might lead, it is not clear what glasnost, is to mean and how it is to
unfold, or if the openness that the Soviet Union talks about now will be
genuine openness by the standards of a truly open society. We can speak
conditionally and we can express hope, a deep hope) we can say that, if this
interest in openness on the part of the Soviet Union were indeed to prove
real, if it were indeed to prove enduring, we could very much find ourselves
standing on the threshold of a new era for the cause of arms control and
disarmament.
For openness and arms control go together, hand in hand, they go together
on at least two levels. First, there is a clear connection between openness
and international trust, between peace and the open society. Andrei Sakharov,
that great world hero and a Soviet hero, has spoken of "the indissoluble bond
between international security and trust on the one hand, and respect .for
human rights and an open society on the other". Societies that respect the
rights of their citizens, that respect freedom of speech, that respect freedom
of religion, that respect freedom of the press, that respect freedom of
assembly, these kinds of societies that defend the rights of individuals to
criticize their leaders, to vote for their leaders in office and out of
office -- such societies also keep their international treaty commitments.
Such societies can be expected to behave in a fashion that promotes world
peace. Such societies do not crave new territory. Such societies do not
menace their neighbours. Looking at the history of the United States, it is
impossible to find any time in our history when we went to war, engaged in
war, against another open society, another democratic society. In fact, I
don't believe that history shows one example of two free countries ever going
to war with one another, because free peoples just don't choose to go to war.
Conversely, as President Reagan said not long ago, "a Government that breaks
faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign Powers".
Second, there is a direct, practical link between openness and progress
in arms control. That link lies in the problem of verification, in which I
know this Conference is so interested and on which you have heard so much over
the years. Verification has always defined the outer frontier of what we can
achieve in arms control. We can control effectively only what we can verify
effectively. But verification is often directly limited in turn by the degree
of openness permitted by the States that subscribe to an arms control
agreement.
In an open society like the United States, relevant information on
defence programmes is readily available. That is why, when dealing with open,
democratic societies, one does not have to rely exclusively on what we call
"national technical means" or elaborate verification mechanisms to verify arms
agreements. Often in the past I have been asked about the Soviet ability to
verify our arms control agreements and I say basically that all the
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(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)
Soviet Union needs to verify our compliance with arms control is a
subscription to various open publications in the United States --
The New York Times, The Washington Post, Aviation Week, and publications like
that -- because, if there were ever a case where the United States violated an
arms control agreement, it would be readily available in the open press.
That is one reason why the United States has called for greater openness
in all nations. Since 1982, when I worked with many of you here in this room
there in the First Committee at the United Nations, the United States has
consistently pressed for resolutions on disarmament and openness in the
United Nations General Assembly and I am sure Jan Martenson will remember
that, in 1982, we introduced a resolution on disarmament and openness and it
was adopted by the General Assembly as I remember, by consensus. This
resolution explicitly stated the connection between advancing disarmament and
advancing openness and free discussion and free dissemination of information
in all nations. It encouraged all nations to advance the cause of openness as
a way of advancing the cause of disarmament as a way of advancing the cause of
arms control.
And basically this is my message to you today: the path to more
ambitious arms control, in all areas, lies through the gateway of greater
openness. To quote Dr. Sakharov, once again, the issue here "is not simply a
moral one, but also a paramount, practical ingredient of international trust
and security".
The world is still very far from achieving this kind of openness, which
is one reason why arms control remains a very painstaking, very difficult,
very timely business. Take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on
defence spending. You all know just as well as I do how slow and careful we
must be in terms of arms control and how frustrating is a lot of the pace of
the arms control talks, because all of us in this room grapple with the issue
on a daily basis. But take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on
defence spending, something that the United Nations has also been discussing
for a good number of years.
In 1985, according to our best estimates, the United States and the
Soviet Union each devoted around $250 billion to defence. Figures on
United States defence spending are, of course, widely available in open
sources. They are broken down by category. They are extensively discussed.
They are scrutinized in the United States Congress -- probably scrutinized a
little too much, if you ask me -- but they are scrutinized in the
United States Congress and elsewhere in our society. Figures for Soviet
defence spending, on the other hand, must be derived from careful analysis.
Why? Because published Soviet figures bear absolutely no relationship to the
reality of the Soviet defence effort.
In 1985, for example, the Soviet Union claims to have spent
20.3 billion roubles on defence. Assuming the official exchange rate of
approximately $1.50 per rouble, that comes to less than $35 billion. Now,
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(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)
that is a ridiculously small sum -- some 15 per cent of what they really
spend -- for the declared defence budget of a State regarded as a military
super-Power. It bears no relationship at all to the $250 billion figure I
mentioned a moment ago, which suggests what it would cost the United States to
mount an effort equivalent to the present Soviet defence effort. There is no
way in the world that the Soviet Union could be mounting its current defence
effort on a declared budget of 20.3 billion roubles. It is spending many,
many, many times that, and we all know that.
Or again, take the public statements of the two sides on the issue of
strategic defences. The United States Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), of
which you have heard some, I am sure, in this room, is an openly declared
programme. Its budget is published and voted on by the United States
Congress. Its activities are reported to the Congress, where it is widely
discussed and debated. The President of the United States often discusses the
programme in his speeches. In fact I have personally found it hard to stop
him from discussing the subject of SDI at any time, in his speeches or
otherwise.
Yet to this day, even as we negotiate on defence and space issues with
the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union continues to deny that it has the
equivalent of an SDI programme of its own. We know this denial to be false.
I believe everybody in. this room knows the denial to be false. We know that
the Soviet Union began investigating several advanced strategic defence
technologies before we did, years before. We know it is extensively engaged
in exploration and development of these technologies. We know, for example,
that the Soviet Union has an extensive laser research programme which involves
about 10,000 scientists and expenditure of resources worth approximately
$1 billion a year just on that kind of laser research programme. And we know
it is researching a host of other technologies, advanced technologies, as well.
Can it surprise anyone that our progress in arms control if often slow
and halting when there is such a lack of openness and honesty between
Governments about even such an elementary fact as this one?
There is, in short, almost no area of arms control in which greater
openness would not lead to greater openness on the way to greater progress.
In some of these areas, lack of openness is among the most crucial barriers to
a meaningful agreement. Thus, my message to you today can be summed up as
this: unless the Soviet Union moves to the openness it now talks about,
accomplishments in arms control are just going to be limited, if not thwarted
altogether. That movement towards greater openness is necessary for progress
on an issue like the one this Conference has before it.
Of the tasks before you, my Government, as you know, considers the
negotiations on achieving a comprehensive and effectively verifiable global
ban on chemical weapons to have the highest priority. International
negotiators have been striving to remove the chemical weapons threat since the
late nineteenth century. Here it is 198/. Nearly a century has passed
since the Hague Conference prohibited use of chemical projectiles, in 1899.
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(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)
Yet the world finds that the problem of chemical weapons remains; indeed, as
the world edges toward the twenty-first century, the chemical weapons danger
continues to grow. Shockingly, we have witnessed use of chemical weapons by
some nations in this decade and even during the past year.
It is high time that chemical weapons use was rendered a thing of the
past. It is high time that these barbaric weapons were banished from the
face of the earth. But it is obvious that, if these weapons are to be
banned, a thorough and effective mechanism of verification is necessary. My
country will just not accept, and no free nations should accept, a ban on
chemical weapons without sound machinery of verification.
A chemical weapons ban without confidence of compliance will be no more
effective than the Hague Conference's 1899 prohibition on use of artillery
containing poison gas, which did nothing to prevent extensive use of chemical
weapons in the First World War. The use of chemical weapons, as I remember,
produced some 1 million casualties. It will be no better than so many of
the misguided disarmament measures of the 1920s and 1930s, which, the great
Americal commentator, Walter Lippmann, said, were "tragically successful in
disarming the nations that believed in disarmament" while permitting aggressor
nations to maintain and expand their own arsenals. Until an effectively
verifiable chemical weapons ban is in place, the American people will insist,
and rightly's?, that the United States maintain adequate chemical forces to
deter use of these heinous weapons by an aggressor.
While the establishment of procedures for the effective verification of
arms control agreements is often extremely demanding both technologically and
politically, in the case of chemical weapons, the challenges are especially
great. The toxic chemicals which are or could be used as agents of warfare
are in general not very different from a variety of substances having
legitimate civilian use. Clearly, the chemical process equipment used in
their production can be found in the legitimate manufacture of pesticides or
corrosives. Chemical agents can be stored in bulk, facilitating
transportation as well as concealment. Chemical munitions have no particular
characteristics which distinguish them from other types of munitions. They
are too small and easily transported and concealed.
Thus, as I mentioned before, the issue of openness goes to the heart of
achieving a chemical weapons ban. Article III of the rolling text of the
draft Convention on chemical weapons (CD/734) requires each State Party to
declare whether it possesses chemical weapons. And yet today the
United States is the only country in this room, the United States is the only
country in the world, that publicly admits to having chemical weapons and has
made public its stockpile locations. That, to me, is astonishing --
especially when so many countries are pressing the urgency of a chemical
weapons ban. Some are even criticizing the United States for holding up
progress and for developing chemical weapons.
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(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)
The production of chemical weapons is not illegal. The use of chemical
weapons is illegal. Since it signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the
United States has never used chemical wweapons; others have -- others, who do
not even publicly admit to possessing chemical weapons, they heave used them;
others, with representatives in this very room, they have used chemical
weapons. The world expects better than this.
The United States openly declares its possession and development of
chemical weapons. The Soviet Union, along with other nations, does not.
The world expects better than this.
The United States has presented publicly an extraordinary amount of
information concerning its binary weapons programme. The details are known
to everyone. The Soviet Union has told us nothing about its chemical weapons
programme. The world expects better than this.
The United States has invited all members of this Conference to examine
procedures for the destruction of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has yet
to accept this invitation, which is still outstanding. The world expects
better than this.
The United States will devote some $500 million under the fiscal 1987
defence budget to the elimination of its current chemical munitions stocks.
The Soviet Union, apparently, has no similar chemical weapons elimination or
demilitarization programme. The world expects better than this.
The United States has maintained a unilateral moratorium on the
development of chemical weapons for 17 years. The Soviet Union has never
stopped producing chemical weapons and it continues today to expand its
facilities and to expand its capabilities. The world expects better than this.
It is because of this sad state of affairs, because of this glaring lack
of openness in the realm of chemical weapons, that we are more than ever
convinced that confidence in compliance is essential to a chemical weapons
ban. We are more than ever convinced that nothing less than an inspection
regime institutionalizing the right of short-notice access upon demand to any
location or facility suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons will
effectively deter non-compliance -- that is, of course, the
challenge-inspection provision of Article X of the United States draft
convention, CD/500.
But every article of the convention must be designed to contribute to
this overall objective of confidence in compliance. And, to be effective,
each provision must be clearly and unambiguously defined, written, and
understood. It will do little good to have broad agreement on the basic
provisions concerning permitted and prohibited activities if inspection
procedures are inadequate or if they are imprecise.
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(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)
At present, it is a point of consensus among all our Governments that
each State Party will provide international access to its destruction sites,
its production facilities to be eliminated, and its facilities for producing
permitted chemicals. But the working out of precise procedures for all these
tasks had only just been begun by Ambassador Lowitz and his fine delegation.
And the vital question of how to ensure confidence in compliance with regard
to undeclared sites still remains at issue.
But, again and again, wherever we turn in this negotiation, we run up
against the same problem: it is precisely the absence of openness, the
absence of glasnost, that is standing in the way, blocking further progress.
In the draft Convention, I count no less than 13 different types of
declarations that each State Party must be expected to make about its
stockpiles and about their destruction, about its chemical weapons production
facilities and about their elimination, and about its chemical industry.
Article IV is a key element in this series of declarations -- calling for
the declaration of all stockpiles. Everyone agrees that each State Party
should declare the amount and composition of its stockpile. Everyone agrees
with the basic objective that the complete stockpile should be destroyed. And
yet the Soviet Union continues to reject two particular "openness"
provisions; each is necessary if we are to have confidence that this
objective is fulfilled. One is the early and complete declaration of the
stockpile locations and on-site verification to ensure that the declaration
reflects reality. The second is on-site monitoring of the stocks until
destruction to ensure that some weapons are not clandestinely diverted to
undeclared sites before destruction. And it is obvious that we face the
serious risk that a State will not declare all its stockpile locations or the
entire amount of its stockpile.
The consequences of lack of openness in this realm are unfortunate, and
they are not lost on world opinion. I think the 1983 Yearbook of the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) identified the
problem -- and identified the solution -- as well as anyone did:
-Faced with a high degree of uncertainty about Soviet CW intentions,
Western defence authorities have no prudent option but to assume that
they pose a threat. If it decided to do so, the Soviet Government could
probably find a way for reducing the ambiguities attaching to its CW
stance in Western (and non-aligned country) eyes without at the same time
jeopardizing Soviet security to the point of net detriment. Yet even
though the need for such mistrust-reducing measures is so evidently
growing, it seems that Moscow has not chosen to act in such a manner, a
failure which is becoming more and more conspicuous and damaging".
And that is from the Stockholm Institute (SIPRI).
Clearly, there is a gap between the way certain States conduct business
today and the way they promise they will behave under a convention banning
chemical weapons. And it is simply not possible for a nation to yield
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(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)
national control over its own defence to an international agreement -- as we
will be asked to do when we have a convention ready for signature -- on the
basis of a mere promise of a new and better pattern of behaviour by other
States like the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union says it is interested in real openness. Good. But will
its deed& in this forum match its words? We hope so. We hope to see signs of
real glasnost, here in the CD, in the coming weeks and months, otherwise I
fear our work will be even slower and more difficult.
I believe that a turn by the Soviet Union to real glasnost would
transform our discussion and sweep away a host of difficulties that have been
blocking your progress here. I believe it could remove the barriers that some
have attempted to erect to the inspection procedures absolutely essential to
make a chemical weapons ban worth the paper it is printed on. Genuine
openness, real glasnost, were it to emerge in the Soviet Union and in the
Soviet Union's dealings with the rest of the world -- nothing could be more
welcome to the United States of America. Nothing could do more to make
possible progress in the relationship between our two Governments. Nothing
would so improve the prospects, not only for real advances in arms control,
but for the entire cause of world peace. Nothing would be a better tribute to
your dedicated and important work. Nothing could be a better monument to
Donald Lowitz's work and to his life.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States of America for his
statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair personally and to the
country the Chair represents. I wish also to thank him for conveying the
message of the President of the United States of America to the Conference on
Disarmament. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkine.
Mr. NAZARKINE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): Comrade President, I endorse your greetings in connection with the
presence at today's meeting of the distinguished Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Cuba, Comrade Raul Rao, and the Director of the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Adelman. Allow me also to thank you and
those distinguished delegates who expressed words of welcome to me on my
appointment as representative of the Soviet Union to the Conference on
Disarmament. It is also a pleasure for me to transmit to my predecessor,
Ambassador Issraelyan, the warm wishes expressed by yourself and by
distinguished representatives.
The opening day of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament,
3 February this year, was "celebrated" by an event that constituted an open
challenge to the entire world community which is seeking to remove the threat
of nuclear war and to strengthen the foundations of peace. On the day when
there were heard in this room the statements of Alfonso Garcia Robles, the
distinguished representative of Mexico and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize,
and other distinguished representatives in favour of the cessation of nuclear
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testing, the United States carried out
explosions at the test site in Nevada,
maliciously timed to coincide with the
Conference on Disarmament.
(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)
another in the series of nuclear
an explosion as it were deliberately,
opening of the current session of the
One cannot but agree with the opinion voiced by the distinguished
representative of Sweden, Maj Britt Theorin, literally a few hours before the
receipt of the news of the explosion, that such fireworks to mark the opening
of this session "would amount to nothing less than an affront to international
efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban". This affront shows Washington's
real attitude towards the opinion of the world community, which has called
upon the United States time and again to reconsider its negative stance on
nuclear testing and to join the Soviet moratorium.
By conducting another nuclear explosion, the United States has
demonstrated flagrant disregard for the calls of the non-aligned movement, for
the constructive proposals by the leaders of the "Delhi Six", for the views of
parliaments and for the apirations of all people on Earth demanding the
cessation and banning of all nuclear tests.
The United States Administration carried out a nuclear explosion -- and I
wish particularly to emphasize this -- in a situation in which the
Soviet Union had been strictly observing for a year and a half and had
extended five times the moratorium on all nuclear explosions that it had
declared in August 1985. It is deplorable that the present United States
Administration has not responded positively to the call from the USSR to join
its peace initiative and has carried out another nuclear explosion, the
twenty-fifth since the Soviet Union declared its unilateral moratorium. Thus,
the United States has ignored the numerous decisions of the United Nations
General Assembly, including the resolutions of the forty-first session calling
for the cessation of nuclear testing once and for all. For example,
resolution 41/46A, as you know, explicitly calls upon the Soviet Union, the
United States and Great Britain to bring to a halt, without delay, all nuclear
test explosions. It also indicates the ways to achieve such a halt: "either
through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral
moratoria, which should include appropriate means of verification", that is,
exactly what the Soviet side has done in practice.
By carrying out the first nuclear explosion of 1987 in Nevada, the
United States has also put an end to the silence at Soviet test sites. As the
Soviet Government has repeatedly warned, the Soviet Union will be compelled to
resume nuclear testing after the first nuclear explosion by the United States
in 1987. In connection with what happened in Nevada on 3 February, the
Soviet Union no longer considers itself bound by its unilateral moratorium on
all nuclear explosions and will resume at the appropriate time the execution
of its own programme of nuclear testing. We will not let the United States
achieve military advantages. At the same time, the Soviet delegation is
authorized to declare that the Soviet Union will be prepared, on the basis of
reciprocity, to stop the implementation of its test programme if the
United States halts its nuclear testing.
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(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)
The purpose of American nuclear tests is well known. It is to test
fundamentally new types and classes of nuclear arms intended above all for the
implementation of the notorious "Star Wars" programme. The United States
stubbornly refuses to cease nuclear testing for it cherishes an unrealizable
dream: to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, primarily
through the development of third-generation nuclear weapons, including
fundamentally new means of laser-beam warfare.
Even today we do not think that the door leading to a solution to the
question of halting nuclear testing has been definitively slammed shut. It is
not our intention to cease our persistent efforts in favour of the
commencement of negotiations on a nuclear-test ban, negotiations which we are
prepared to conduct in any framework and in any forum -- with, of course, the
participation of the United States. As you may recall, in his statement at
the plenary meeting on 3 February, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the
USSR, Yuli Vorontsov, pointed out that the Conference on Disarmament is
undoubtedly one such forum.
The Soviet Union is in favour of the participants in the Conference
engaging without delay -- I repeat, without delay -- in the elaboration of a
treaty on a complete and general nuclear-test ban by the members of the
Conference. We are in favour of establishing an ad hoc committee on this
subject in the framework of the Conference and of endowing it with appropriate
powers. In short, we are in favour of moving at last from words to practical
work.
There are no reasons, except false and fictitious ones, preventing
agreement on a nuclear-test ban. There was a time when the United States
argued that it would be impossible to verify such an agreement, but now,
thanks to Soviet initiatives, these so-called arguments have been dispelled
once and for all. The Soviet Union is willing -- and this has repeatedly been
affirmed at the highest level -- to see any measures of verification in this
field. It has been clearly stated by the Soviet side that such verification
could be implemented both by national technical means and on the basis of
international procedures, including on-site inspections.
When the United States was no longer in a position to use the
verification issue for delaying a solution to the question of the cessation of
nuclear testing, it advanced new arguments. It now argues that nuclear tests
can only be ceased in the event of complete nuclear disarmament and that, so
long as nuclear arsenals exist, there is need for nuclear testing. However,
to put the question in that way is to do nothing more than to deny the
existence of the problem of a nuclear-test ban as an issue in its own right in
the field of disarmament. After all, since 1954, when this question first
appeared on the agenda of international disarmament negotiations, it has been
understood that the cessation of nuclear testing is a significant measure in
the limiting of the nuclear arms race and a step towards nuclear disarmament,
and that its implementation will in fact put an end to qualitative improvement
of nuclear weapons, lead to their elimination and promote the conclusion of
radical agreements on the reduction and elimination of these weapons. The new
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(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)
American logic puts the cart before the horse. After all, nobody would take
it into their head to argue that nuclear tests will be needed even when all
nuclear arsenals have been destroyed. That line of argument, too, is nothing
more than yet another unsuccessful attempt to justify the unjustifiable, that
is, the unwillingness of the United States Administration to start curbing the
nuclear arms race.
Kr. Adelman, who has, unfortunately, already left the room, today put
forward the usual collection of well-worn conjectures against the
Soviet Union, the aim of which is to cover up the United States
Administration's unwillingness to move towards arms-reduction and disarmament
measures. But there is a reliable sign, a litmus test of States' attitude to
disarmament and that is their attitude to the cessation of nuclear tests. We
are in favour of such a ban. The United States, and this they confirmed on
3 February, is against it. In this way, they have shown their true attitude
to the problem of disarmament. It is significant that Mr. Adelman did not
feel it possible even to mention the question of a nuclear-test ban, which, as
you know, is item number 1 on our agenda.
As to the specific questions which are the subject of negotiations and
which Mr. Adelman touched upon in his statement in a polemical tone, we
prefer, not polemics, but businesslike negotiations. We have been and will
continue showing our attitude to these questions at the negotiating table, in
the form of constructive proposals and not by declarations. Unfortunately,
the United States prefers declarations, polemics. Behind this lies their
aspiration to continue and strengthen the arms race.
Once again we appeal to the United States to stop and heed the voice of
dozens upon dozens of States, the voice of hundreds of millions of people on
our planet. At stake is the survival of mankind, the salvation of human
civilization.
The Soviet delegation has explicit instructions from its Government to do
everything necessary to reach a solution on the question of the complete
prohibition of all nuclear tests as a priority measure towards the attainment
of the principal objective of containing the nuclear arms race and
subsequently eliminating nuclear arms. I would like to express the hope that
we shall be supported in this undertaking by all members of the Conference who
hold dear the cause of preserving peace on Earth.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I would now inform
the Conference of a change in the order of the list of speakers, the speakers
next in line having agreed to a request put forward by the Co-ordinator for
the Group of 21, who would like to make a statement at present. For this
reason, I now give the floor to the Co-ordinator for the Group of 21,
Ambassador Morelli-Pando.
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Mr. MORELLI-PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): I have requested the
floor at this time with the permission of distinguished delegates, who had
requested their inclusion on the list of speakers, the distinguished delegates
of Cuba, the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, in order to make, as you
have just explained, the following statement on behalf of the Group of 21
(continued in English):
"The Group of 21 expresses its deepest regret and disappointment at
the announcement of the new nuclear-weapon test by one of the
super-Powers on 3 February, the opening day of the 1987 session of the
Conference on Disarmament.
The international community has been discussing for 30 years the
question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The General Assembly
in that period of time has adopted more than 50 resolutions on this
matter, to which the United Nations has assigned the highest priority.
As stated in the Final Document of the first special session devoted
to disarmament, the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States
within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be
in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to
the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the
development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
This action ignores the insistent appeals made recently by the
international community for the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. In
Harare last year, the Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned
countries state in their Political Declaration, inter alia, that 'the
continuance of the nuclear-weapon testing fuels the nuclear arms race and
increases the danger of nuclear war'. In January 1985, in New Delhi, the
Heads of State or Government of Argentina, India, Greece, Mexico, Sweden
and Tanzania called for an immediate halt to nuclear-weapon testing
preparatory to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The same appeal was
reiterated by the Group of Six in the Mexico Declaration and in the Joint
Declaration of December 1986, in which it was stated that 'There is no
justification for nuclear testing by any country. We appeal once again
to the United States to reconsider its policy on nuclear testing so that
a bilateral moratorium can be established'. Thus, this new
nuclear-weapon test also frustrates the hopes of the international
community for a joint moratorium.
In light of the above, and bearing in mind that the aforesaid
super-Power's decision not only greatly increases the risk involved in
its bilateral nuclear-arms race with the other super-Power, but also
affects the interest of the international community as a whole, in which
the neutral and non-aligned countries play a significant role, the
Group of 21: reaffirms its call for the multilateral negotiation of an
agreement on the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, and demands
that this objective be fulfilled in the Conference on Disarmament.".
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Co-ordinator of the
Group of 21, the Ambassador of Peru, for his statement. The next speaker on
my list is the representtive of Cuba, His Excellency the Deputy Foreign
Minister, Mr. Raul Roa Kouri. I now give the him the floor.
Mr. RAUL ROA KOURI (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): First of all, I
wish to express the appreciation of my delegation for the work done in the
past few months by the distinguished Ambassador of Canada in fulfillment of
his duties as President and to welcome the distinguished representative of the
People's Republic of China, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, to whom has fallen the
difficult task of presiding over this Conference during the month of February,
a time of particular significance since it is the occasion for establishing
the guidelines for our work for the entire session. Knowing your diplomatic
skill, we are sure, Sir, that under your presidency the deliberations of this
disarmament negotiating body will gain momentum. It goes without saying that
the Cuban delegation, which represents a country struggling for peace, will
contribute to that effort to the full extent of its abilities.
The delegation of Cuba wishes also to extend its condolences to the
delegation of the United States of America on the demise of
Ambassador Donald Lowitz.
In beginning the work of the new session, the Conference must redouble
its efforts to reach the objectives that were at the origin of forum. The
danger of a conflagration persists and, rather than diminishing, is growing
daily.
The intensification of the arms race, the enormous quantity of weapons
already accumulated, the advances of technology in the perfecting of means of
destruction, particularly in the nuclear sphere, constitute the greatest
threat there has ever been to the survival of mankind. It is for that reason
that all peoples urgently demand the adoption of measures to prevent nuclear
war and promote disarmament.
The declaration adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the
Non-aligned Movement meeting at Harare is a genuine expression of that demand
for peace. The hundred or so countries that comprise the Movement proclaimed
themselves in favour of the banning of the use of nuclear weapons, the
freezing of their development, production, stockpiling and deployment and the
cessation of all new production of fissionable material for military
purposes. This stand in favour of disarmament and peace, which has been
restated throughout the 25 years of the Movement's existence, was renewed on
this occasion, with the greatest priority being given to the issues of nuclear
armament.
At their meeting in Zimbabwe, the Heads of State or Government therefore
generally welcomed the broad programme for nuclear disarmament according to a
schedule and with fixed deadlines submitted by the Soviet Union, whose
objectives and priorities are aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons from the face of the earth. Being convinced likewise of the enormous
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(Mr. Raul Roa Kouri, Cuba)
importance of the suspension of nuclear-weapon tests for the halting of the
arms race, our countries also expressed themselves on the need to establish a
moratorium on all tests.
Accordingly, they not only took note of the initiatives of the Heads of
State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and of the
first President of the United Republic of Tanzania, but also expressed their
satisfaction at the unilateral moratorium declared by the Soviet Union in
August 1985 and extended several times and appealed to the United States to
join the Soviet Union in that action, while urging the Soviet Union to
maintain its moratorium. It is appropriate, in this context, to draw
attention to the latest statement made by the Soviet Government extending the
moratorium on testing so long as the United States did not stage ahy further
nuclear tests -- which, it has been announced, it unfortunately did some hours
ago, thus going against the interests of peace and disregarding the clamour of
international public opinion. This and no other has been the United States
Government's portentous greeting to the present session of this Conference on
Disarmament.
The resumption of nuclear testing is a serious matter that will poison
both the environment and the international political climate still further and
will complicate negotiations between the two great nuclear Powers while
raising new obstacles to the work of this Conference. But this challenge to
the international community is not the only thing contributing to the
heightening of tension. We would also mention the decision of the
United States Government to cease respecting the SALT II Agreement by adding
to its arsenal, without dismantling another aircraft as the Agreement provides
to remain within the established limit, its 131st heavy bomber capable of
transporting long-range cruise missiles.
In the present situation, that is a new factor of disturbance that
increases distrust, particularly as the decision was premeditated and a
further expression of the militaristic policy that it is desired to continue
developing.
Another question that deserves our attention and that was also examined
by the summit Conference of the non-aligned is the extension of the arms race
into outer space. The Heads of State or Government meeting at Harare
expressed their deep concern at the preparations under way to extend the arms
race into outer space and vigorously reaffirmed the principle that outer space
is the common heritage of mankind and must be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes to the benefit of all countries, whatever their level of economic or
scientific development, and be open to all States.
Consequently, they urged this Conference urgently to begin negotiations
with a view to arriving at agreements to prevent the extension of the arms
race, in all its aspects into outer space and to promote the possibility of
co-operation in the sphere of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
while emphasizing the imperative need to halt the development of
anti-satellite weapons, to dismantle existing arsenals, to prohibit the
introduction of new weapons systems and to ensure that the treaties in force
preserve outer space for peaceful purposes.
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(Mr. Raul Roa Kouri. Cuba)
In taking stock of what happened last year in the sphere of disarmament,
special mention must be made of the meeting that took place at Reykjavik on
11 and 12 October between the highest-ranking leaders of the Soviet Union and
the United States, a meeting which came very close to achieving significant
progress in arms reduction that, if they could continue going forward along
those lines in bilateral or multilateral negotiations, would obviously have
great importance for all mankind. The persistence of one of the parties, the
United States, in continuing to develop what is termed the Strategic Defence
Initiative to its ultimate consequences has prevented the realization of the
agreements that had in principle been reached. That negative policy has
earned the opprobrium of public opinion, which contrasts it with the
willingness of the other party to give up nuclear weapons, to agree on a plan
for their total elimination within a fixed time-frame, to propose guarantees
for all as regards verification and, finally, to adopt effective measures to
ensure the peaceful use and prevent the militarization of outer space before
it is too late and the situation becomes irreversible.
The Conference on Disarmament has a great responsibility in the efforts
being exerted to eliminate the dangers of war by altering the course of that
negative policy for world peace. It is, therefore, imperative to get the
Conference out of the deadlock it now finds itself and to attempt by every
means to attain a convergence of views that will make possible progress in the
negotiations on all the items on the agenda. If the negotiations on the
prohibition of chemical weapons are crowned with success this year, there is
no doubt that a great step will have been taken. Still fresh in our memory
are the scourges affecting the Vietnamese people as a result of the criminal
use of defoliant chemicals by the United States army.
We must not lose sight of the fact that whatever arrangement that may be
made as regards disarmament measures will have a beneficial influence on the
budgets of the immense majority of international community by releasing, for
their devotion to disarmament, the resources that are today being criminally
squandered upon arms production and that this would alleviate in great measure
the present economic crisis, by which all are affected in one way or another.
Furthermore, the Conference is, in our view, duty-bound to pay attention
to the resolutions of the General Assembly. It is inadmissible that, year
after year, the agreements reached in the Assembly, which reflect the
attitudes and aspirations of the immense majority of the international
community, should be cast aside. The Conference cannot operate in a vacuum.
It must link its work with what is being demanded by that public opinion that
is, in turn, an echo of the aspirations of peoples and of their need to live
in a climate of peace and trust in order fully to develop their capabilities.
This negotiating body has a key role to play in the sphere of disarmament and
a major responsibility of contributing by its efforts to rendering
international relations more healthy.
Given the fait accompli of a resumption of nuclear testing by the
United States which is, objectively, the serious event with which we are
confronted today, we believe it is timely for the Conference to pay urgent
heed to the opinion of the Assembly, which gives the greatest priority to this
matter, since as the resolution that gained overwhelming support during the
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(Mr. Ratil Roa Kouri, Cuba)
Assembly's forty-first session puts it, the permanent prohibition of all
explosions would constitute "a contribution of the greatest importance for the
cessation of the nuclear-arms race". In conformity with the provisions of
that resolution, our Conference should create an ad hoc committee to draft 1.
treaty on the banning of nuclear tests. My delegation trusts that the
Conference will not fail to do this. We hope that, in this 1987 session, the
Conference on Disarmament will shoulder its great responsibilities and take
steps seriously and definitively to resolve the grave problems before it.
Cuba, of course, will lend its resolute support to that end.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Deputy Foreign
Minister of Cuba for his statement and the kind words addressed to the
President. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic
of Germany, Dr. Wilfried Bolewski.
Mr. BOLEWSKI (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, it gives
great satisfaction to my delegation to see you, as the representative of the
People's Republic of China, presiding over the Conference on Disarmament
during this opening month.
My delegation would like to stress the usefulness of our inter-sessional
consultations and regular sessions in November, December and January which
have provided us.with a number of clarifications and useful discussions.
There has been continuous general recognition of the urgent need for a ban on
chemical weapons and speakers have expressed their desire for further
constructive deliberations.
My Government has emphasized on many occasions that it attributes the
highest priority to the negotiations of a worldwide ban on CW. In this
context, permit me also to quote from the North Atlantic Council Communiqu?f
12 December 1986: "At the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, we seek a
convention which meets our objective, the general, complete and verifiable
prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all existing
stockpiles".
The North Atlantic Council further states: "If the Soviet Union is
prepared to take a constructive attitude on all aspects of an effective
verification regime, such an agreement is within reach. We appeal to the USSR
to join us in overcoming the outstanding obstacles".
At this point, my delegation would like to reaffirm the position of my
Government on the need for effective verification. Our wish is that agreement
be reached as soon as possible on a system of verification which effectively
prevents the production of chemical weapons. It must be impossible for any
contracting party to evade the inspections required for the attainment of this
goal. Of decisive importance is verification expecially in areas where there
is a danger of chemical weapons production. The inspections must therefore be
tailored to the very purpose of the convention prohibiting chemical weapons.
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(Mr. Bolewski. Federal Republic of Germany)
Our object is and remains, for example, to control super-toxic lethal
chemicals which are suitable for CW, not dangerous substances of the chemical
industry in general. But even if a total control of the chemical industry
were feasible or acceptable -- not only of the commercial industry, but of any
chemical industry -- this would not render superfluous challenge inspections,
because even such a total control would not mean that there could not be
undeclared or unknown facilities and stocks which might present a risk. That
is why my delegation insists on the necessity for any challenge inspection not
to be limited to declared facilities, but to cover all possible installations
and all locations. This, then, in turn will be a factor reacting upon the
regular controls.
The pre-condition to make challenge inspection a really satisfying
operation is the acceptance of such a demand for control as a rule. But there
are other elements on which consensus does not seem to be achieved yet. This
concerns, for example, a further pre-condition, namely that the demand of a
challenging State should prevail and not be made dependent upon a
plebisciterian machinery of any sort. In our view, majority results or
minority failures are hardly apt procedures, even if they are called
democratic, to solve international security problems -- and this is what we
are dealing with here. If a State perceives an imminent danger to its
security, then that State -- no State -- will want to rely on a multilateral
process to accept or discard its perception. In addition to that, we might
run the risk of establishing the right of veto for one or even more groups in
the international supervising body, depending upon the qualifications chosen
for representation in that body. A right of veto or a blockimg minority would
be a completely new element in an international convention, the central logic
of which is to guarantee all States equal rights to security and equal duties
to contribute towards its realization.
As for on-challenge inspections, we continue to regard the British
proposal as the basis of a solution that answers the need for stringent
verification while taking account of the legitimate interests of the
participating countries in terms of protection.
My delegaqtion stands ready to help in any way to ensure that decisive
steps towards a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons are taken in
1987.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. I also thank him for his
kind words addressed to the President and to the country which the President
represents. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland,
Ambassador Stanislav Turbanski.
Mr. TURBANKSI (Poland): Permit me to begin by expressing to the
delegation of the United States, my delegation's and my own profound
condolences on the sudden, unexpected and untimely death of
Ambassador Donald Lowitz, whose funeral will take place today in Chicago. It
is still difficult to believe that he will no longer be with us. His
exceptional personal qualities which so many representatives have pointed out
in this hall and his contribution to the work of the CD will be long
remembered by us.
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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
Comrade President, as it is for the first time that I take the floor
under your presidency, allow me to congratulate you wholeheartedly on assuming
this important and, especially at the beginning of the session, undoubtedly
difficult function. My delegation is very pleased to see you, Ambassador
representative of the People's Republic of China, a great socialist State wit.
which my country, Poland, enjoys traditionally friendly relations in all
spheres, presiding over the first month of the 1987 session of the Conference
on Disarmament. We are convinced that your diplomatic skill and personal
qualities will make this month to be remembered as an example of good work and
efficiency. We wish you a successful presidency and pledge full co-operation
and support in your efforts. May I also take this opportunity to express my
delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Beesley of Canada, who
presided in the last month of the 1986 session of the Conference and in the
inter-sessional period.
It is also a pleasure for me to welcome our new colleagues, the
Ambassadors and heads of delegation of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan,
Romania, the USSR and Yugoslavia, and to wish them a most successful stay in
Geneva. And last, but not least, I welcome the presence at our today's
meeting of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Cuba, Comrade Raul Roa Kouri, and
the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Mr. Kenneth Adelman. I have listened with interest to their statements, so
different in their tune and the messages they contained.
Speaking as co-ordinator of the Group of socialist States for item 4,
chemical weapons, I wish to express our satisfaction over the Conference's
adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, together
with the substantial annexes reflecting, as they do, the state of affairs in
our work on a CW convention. The results achieved are a convincing
demonstration of the usefulness and fruitfulness of the work during the
inter-sessional period, i.e. of both the informal consultations and the
resumed session of the Ad Hoc Committee.
In this connection, I would like to express our thanks to
Ambassador Cromartie, of the United Kingdom for his skillful chairing over the
Committee's work, his personal devotion and contribution to the achieved
results. May I also extend our gratitude to Mr. Rowe, of Australia, and
Mr. Poptchev, of Bulgaria, who, also during the January session, chaired
Working Groups A and B respectively, as well as to Mr. Bensmail and other
staff of the Secretariat and technical services.
The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on which we shall decide
later today already in the first week of the session has, in our view, more
than just procedural meaning. It points to the willingness of the
Conference's members to restart without any unnecessary delay further work on
a convention banning chemical weapons. We believe that is also an indication
of the feeling that 1987 should bring us to the completion of this task.
Indeed, an early finalization of the draft Convention is within our reach, and
1987 is most propitious for concluding the negotiations.
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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
This no doubt optimistic event at the outset is a good omen for our
further work. We are deeply convinced that similar efficiency will be a
guiding principle in the Ad Hoc Committee's work throughout the session of
1987.
On the part of the socialist States, I assure you, no effort will be
spared in the search for mutually acceptable solutions, as was stressed
recently at the Berlin meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of socialist
States. We do have our own position, but we also do realize that at the
outcome of these negotiations there has to be only one common position based
on a compromise.
We expect that the same approach will be taken by others and we appeal to
all delegations to contribute their share to the compromise solutions which
are sought for. In this connection, let me draw your attention to the
statement of the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR,
Comrade Yuli Vorontsov, who said:
"What is now required at the negotiations, is to be able to shed
'parental feelings' toward the apptoaches one proposes and to concentrate
on finding a common approach.".
The rolling working text of the future Convention represents quite an
extensive area of agreements, including most of the fundamental issues.
The time has come to make necessary political decisions which would open
the way to a successful solution of some of the outstanding issues. There is
no need to repeat what we all know, i.e. what the areas of agreement are, or
to point out issues where political solutions are needed. It seems, however,
that both last year's session and the inter-sessionsal period have
demonstrated clearly the growing significance of the overall problem of
verification, both verification of non-production of chemical weapons in
commercial industry and challenge verification. We are of the opinion that
verification measures should be in the centre of our work. The verification
system should provide confidence for all States parties that the provisions of
the convention are observed. We should be careful to close all loopholes
which may either open the way to re-emergence of chemical weapons or become a
constant source of misunderstandings.
The socialist countries will continue their activity and flexibility in
search for possible solutions to these important issues, as well as to all
other still unresolved questions.
We call on all States participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee
on Chemial Weapons to join in a common effort toward an early conclusion of a
convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It would contribute to the
strengthening of international security and confidence and would enhance the
credibility of this body.
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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
Our Group is very pleased that at this very decisive stage of our
negotiations the work of the Ad Hoc Committee will be chaired by
Ambassador Ekeus, of Sweden, whose contribution to the progress achieved so
far is considerable. We support Ambassador Ekeus' intention of giving a
strong boost to the Committee's work. We are certain that both the method and
the programme of work he is to put forward will serve this goal. His personal
experience as previous Chairman of the Committee, and as long-time
co-ordinator in the Group of 21 is a good guarantee that the 1987 session
will close with a result which would enable the Conference to finalize its
work on agenda item 4.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Poland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.
Now I give the floor to the Co-ordinator of a group of socialist countries,
Ambassador Rose, of the German Democratic Republic.
Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): I have asked for the floor in
order to make a statement on behalf of a group of socialist countries, but,
before coming to that, I would like cordially to congratulate you,
Comrade President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on
Disarmament. We are pleased to see in the Chair a very experienced and
outstanding representative of socialist China, a country with which the German
Democratic Republic enjoys friendly relations. These ties received fresh
impetus through last year's visit to China by Erich Honecker, Chairman of the
Council of State of the German Democratic Republic. I wish to assure you,
Mr. President, of my delegation's unqualified support in the discharge of your
responsible duties.
Also, I should like to thank Ambassador Beesley, of Canada, once more for
the job well done as Conference President at the end of last year's session.
My delegation is pleased to see in our midst the Deputy Foreign Minister of
Cuba, Mr. Rail Roa, and I listened with great interest and attention to his
important speech.
Now I will read the joint statement of a group of socialist countries:
"We deplore and condemn the nuclear-weapon test which the
United States conducted on 3 February 1987, the very day the 1987 session
of the Conference on Disarmament opened and 547 days after the
Soviet Union's testing sites fell silent. With this move, militarist
circles have tried in their specific way to counteract the efforts of
States and peoples to ward off the danger of nuclear disaster and have
shown their indiferrence to the demands of the international community,
as expressed in numerous United Nations resolutions, in the declarations
of the 'Delhi Six' and in strong appeals launched by peace forces all
over the world.
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(Mr. Rose. German Democratic Republic)
The USSR has stated that it cannot put up ad infinitum with the
disadvantages resulting for its security and that of its allies from
extending its unilateral moratorium to almost one and a half years and
that it would have to resume nuclear testing after the first
United States nuclear explosion in 1987. Thus, the Soviet Union has made
it clear that the button for touching off nuclear-weaspon tests at
Semipalatinsk is located right in Washington. Regrettably, this has
fallen on deaf ears.
Even so, we still possess the means to agree on immediate measures
to end all nuclear-weapon testing. The lasting impact of the unilateral
moratorium will reside in the fact that the feasibility of such a step
has been demonstrated to everyone. Fatalism and resignation are out of
place. They would only aid the plans to carry the nuclear-arms race into
outer space through a third generation of nuclear weapons and to destroy
targets on Earth from outer space.
With this in mind, we appeal to all those willing to avert the
nuclear threat from mankind to start working, without any further delay,
on dependable agreements aimed at halting all nuclear-weapon tests. The
Conference on Disarmament is certainly the proper forum for that. It
should at once set up a committee to begin drafting a nuclear-test ban
treaty, including provisions for strict international verification. We
are prepared to consider seriously all proposals to this effect, from
whatever side they may come.".
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): That concludes my list of
speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this
stage? I see none. Then we take up the following items.
As agreed at our last plenary meeting, I shall now proceed to put before
the Conference for adoption the draft decision on the establishment of the
Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the appointment of its Chairman, as
contained in document CD/WP.252 which has just been circulated. If there is
no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision. 1/
It was so decided.
May I, on behalf of the Conference, extend to the representative of
Sweden, Ambassador Ekeus, our warm congratulations on his appointment as
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I am sure that all
members join me in wishing him a successful tenure in that important office,
which he has already held with the utmost competence and person commitment,
advancing substantially the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.
Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, I would like to thank you and,
through you, the members of the Conference for the confidence the Conference
has placed in me and, through its decision, in my delegation. On this
occasion, I would only state one thing and that is that results can only be
achieved if all members of the Conference work together in the same direction
and that progress can only be achieved through joint efforts.
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Ambassador of
Sweden, Ambassador Ekeus, for his statement.
I should like now to refer to other questions. The secretariat has
circulated all requests received from non-members concerning their
participation in the work of the Conference. They are as follows: Norway,
Finland, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Viet Nam, Austria, Denmark
and Greece. I have requested the secretariat to prepare the relevant draft
decisions, which I intend to put before the Conference at our next plenary
meeting, on Tuesday, 10 February. As usual, we shall first have a brief
informal meeting to consider those requests and later, at a resumed plenary,
we will formalize the agreements reached at the informal meeting. We shall
also take up then the question of the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc
Committees under item 6 on the agenda, entitled "Effective international
arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States sgainst the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons", and item 7, "Radiological Weapons".
I have requested the secretariat to circulate today an informal paper
containing a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its
subsidiary bodies during the coming week. You will notice there that the
Ad Hoc Committees on Chemical Weapons and on the Comprehensive Programme of
Disarmament will start their work immediately. Of course, the timetable is
merely indicative and subject to change, if neCessary. On that understanding,
and if there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the
timetable.
It was so decided.
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on
Tuesday, 10 February, at 10.30 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.
Note
1/ Later issed as CD/736.
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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.387
10 February 1987
ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m.
President:
GE. 87-60162/7121E
Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China)
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the
387th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.
In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will listen to
statements in plenary meetings and consider the establishment of subsidiary
bodies on items of the agenda and other organizational questions. In
conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing
to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.
As agreed at our last plenary meeting, I intend to convene an informal
meeting, immediately after we listen to those members listed to speak today,
in order to consider the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committees on
"Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and on "Radiological
weapons". We shall also then examine requests by non-members to participate
in the work of the Conference.
I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Argentina,
Japan, Bulgaria and Peru. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my
list, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cimpora.
Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Thank you,
Mr. president. At the outset I wish to say that the Argentine delegation
places the greatest confidence in your ability to exercise the very
responsible duties of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in the
first month of its annual session. Under its rules of procedure the
Conference on Disarmament each year is obliged to engage in a process of
setting up .subsidiary bodies and establishing mandates for them that requires,
from the person occupying the Presidency, great diplomatic ability, which
fortunately for us you possess in a most noteworthy degree, so as to give the
Conference the initial impetus that will set in motion he negotiations on
disarmament and these are its very raison d'etre. We therefore have no doubt
that at the end of your term as President you will have made to the Conference
on Disarmament a positive contribution, for which in advance we extend our
heartiest congratulations and offer you our closest co-operation. Through
you, Sir, I should also like to extend to Ambassador Beesley of Canada the
appreciation of the Argentine delegation for the diplomatic tact and keen
political insight with which, as President, he carried to fruition the work of
the Conference on Disarmament in August of last year. It is a sad duty indeed
to extend to the delegation of the United States of America the most heartfelt
condolences of the Argentine delegation on the untimely demise of
Ambassador Lowitz, a man esteemed by us all for his moral and political
qualities in the service of his country. My delegation extends a warm welcome
to the new members of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Kemal Hacene
of Algeria, Ambassador Rubens Barbosa of Brazil, Ambassador Pierre Morel of
France, Ambassador Aldo Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Chusei Yamada of Japan,
Ambassador Gheorghe Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Marko Kosin of Yugoslavia,
and Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin of the Soviet Union.
Mr. President, we can never dwell sufficiently upon the first session of
the General Assembly devoted to disarmament where agreement was reached on an
international strategy to take decisive action on the problems before us in
this field. In particular, it was then agreed to establish a strategy for
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(Mr. Campora, Argentina)
nuclear disarmament and the growing risks of nuclear war, and machinery was set
up in the disarmament field by the establishment of a deliberative body, the
United Nations Disarmament Commission, and a negotiating body, the Conference
on Disarmament.
The Final Document adopted by consensus on that occasion provided the
appropriate framework for initiating the disarmament process. What had to be
done from that moment on was to translate into practical terms the provisions
of the Final Document and continue along the avenue that was to lead us to the
conclusion of binding and effective international disarmament agreements.
Regrettably, in the intervening four years between the first and second
special sessions no tangible result was reached. In addition, if we had to
take stock of the second special session of the General Assembly itself, the
salient feature would be the inability to agree on a single measure, however
modest, to limit the risks of nuclear war. And yet on that occasion it was
very clear that mankind's primary concern was the threat of nuclear
annihilation.
As we begin, this month, the ninth session of the Conference on
Disarmament, we should ask ourselves what has been achieved to date. Looking
back we can reach one unquestionable conclusion, which is that the initiatives
undertaken do not offer any solution to the priority problems of disarmament
nor to the increasingly urgent requirements generated by the nuclear and space
arms races. It is clear also that for the two military alliances the quest
for military pre-eminence that goes hand in hand with the accumulation of
weapons has been more important than the search for international security
through the disarmament process.
The situation faced by the sole multilateral negotiating body on
Disarmament derives chiefly from the fact that certain Powers and their allies
take the view that negotiations on disarmament, especially nuclear
disarmament, should be confined exclusively to a bilateral framework. This is
only one symptom of a totalitarian attitude that seems to be based on the
utterly unacceptable idea that the force of nuclear weapons grants them the
omnipotent and exclusive right to decide how, when, where and to what extent
this question is to be negotiated. It should be emphasized once again in this
forum that no country is prepared to surrender its right to participate in a
negotiating process that affects its very survival.
It would seem that in setting aside the urgent priority questions in this
field of disarmament that have been defined and agreed in the Final Document,
the Conference on Disarmament has gradually been losing sight of the gravity
and urgency of the situation it faces. Were this tendency to continue, there
is a danger that the credibility of the multilateral process could be
completely lost. This state of affairs, certainly not created by the
Group of 21, indicates the need to endow the sole multilateral disarmament
negotiating forum with a new resolve and a new sense of urgency in its work.
This requires, among other things, that we should be carefully selective in
our efforts and concentrate our attention upon those items which, by their
effects, have the greatest importance and priority.
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(Mr. Cgmpora, Argentina)
On the eve of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted
to disarmament, the Conference still has a chance to give its work the impetus
that will yield the concrete results which the international community has been
demanding. It would suffice, as a first step, for us to fulfil the mandate
entrusted to us in paragraph 120 of the Final Document and to leave to the
appropriate body the deliberative work which, important though it may be, is
stripped of any great efficiency in a forum such as this. At the same time we
should establish a preliminary method that will ensure appropriate
complementarity between bilateral and multilateral disarmament endeavours.
The situation we face today, as has repeatedly been said by other
distinguished colleagues in this Chamber, is extremely critical for the
multilateral negotiating body if it does not begin negotiations on the chief
items upon its agenda. Questions such as the negotiation of a treaty that
will prohibit nuclear-weapon tests, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race,
measures to prevent nuclear war, the necessity to avoid an arms race in outer
space and the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament cannot be
delayed any further. Nor can we accept that progress on these items should
depend upon something so haphazard as the relations between the two principal
nuclear-weapon States and their allies. The Conference on Disarmament should
not confine its work to the negotiation of questions which, in our judgement,
lack the necessary priority, as is the case, among other things, of what are
generally referred to as radiological weapons.
We recognize that the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests
will not in and of itself bring about the reduction of existing nuclear-weapon
arsenals, nor will it imply a limitation of the geographical proliferation of
nuclear weapons throughout all regions, particularly in the seas and oceans.
However, we do believe that this measure would contribute to halting the
qualitative development of these weapons and would make it possible
simultaneously to tackle the question of the cessation of their production and
deployment throughout the world.
The commencement of those negotiations would serve to strengthen
confidence, thus tending to reduce risks of nuclear weapons, and would
contribute also to the adoption of additional measures preventing the outbreak
of nuclear war and permit the appropriate functioning of multilateral crisis
management centres which, in our opinion, it is urgent to establish.
Similarly, the various aspects and problems involved in the broad subject
of outer space should be the object of our consideration. If this Conference
does not respond with the necessary firmness and determination in dealing with
this question, both from the standpoint of the interests of the space Powers
and from the standpoint of the non-aligned countries, developments in this
sphere will continue to accelerate until they lead to another ruinous arms
race that will increase the risks of nuclear war.
This rationale, which compels us to take a consistent approach to
disarmament, leads me back to my point of departure, namely the
Final Document. This is so because the strategy set forth in that Magna Carta
of disarmament, has as its ultimate aim general and complete disarmament, and
it therefore requests, in paragraph 109, that the then Committee on
Disarmament should "undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of
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(Mr. Cgmpora, Argentina)
disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to
ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective
international control becomes a reality in a world in which international
peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order
is strengthened and consolidated".
It clearly emerges from this that there is an essential prerequisite of
agreeing on calendars for the fulfilment of the Programme and for each stage
of its implementation. Along this same line of thinking, as regards nuclear
and space weapons, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament cannot mean or
imply any backward movement, however small, with respect to the Final Document
of the first special session devoted to disarmament, in particular as regards
paragraph 51.
For my country, disarmament is not just one subject among many; rather
it is one which is given the most serious attention at the highest level of
Government. The active presence of the President of Argentina in the context
of the initiative of the Group of 6 and his participation in the eighth Summic
of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement serve to
illustrate the degree of our concern and our resolve to take up this challenge
with the urgency and earnestness that it requires.
Let me conclude my statement today by repeating some of the ideas
expressed by President Alfonsin in his message to the Conference on
Disarmament in 1985.
President Alfonsin said:
"The aim of my Government is to give expression to its policy
through deeds which confirm our intentions rather than through words
alone. This applies to our conduct both in internal affairs and in the
field of foreign policy. In simple terms, we propose to preach by
example rather than with words.
"Our actions in government contribute to peace and international
co-operation because we neither believe nor accept that the threat or use
of force should be an instrument of policy. This attitude does not imply
the renunciation of principles or any lessening of our determination to
protect legitimate national interests. Above all, our position is the
expression of a stubborn faith in the capacity of man to settle disputes
by peaceful means, through dialogue and negotiation, because nothing is
lost from peace while everything can be forfeited as a result of war and
violence."
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President
personally. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan,
Ambassador Yamada.
Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Mr. President, I would like to express my sincere
congratulations to you on your assumption of the Presidency in this important
opening month of the Conference; under your pre-eminent leadership we will no
doubt embark on a fruitful undertaking. May I also express my gratitude to
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(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
you, Mr. President, and other representatives, for the kind words of welcome
extended to me. It is a sad duty for me to offer my heartfelt condolences to
Mrs. Shana Lowitz and the United States delegation on the untimely demise of
Ambassador Donald Lowitz. May his soul rest in peace, for we will carry on
his work for the cause of peace.
At the beginning of the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament
for 1987, I wish first of all to state that this is a year of critical
importance in determining the future of disarmament negotiations, and those of
us who are engaged in disarmament tasks have a joint responsibility to the
international community to make further intensive efforts. The adoption last
year by the General Assembly of resolution 41/60 G, calling for the convening
of the third special session on disarmament in 1988, sets a date towards which
we must carry forward our substantial work. It is with this perception that I
wish to enunciate the views of my delegation on the arms control negotiations
between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America, and on the major agenda items of our Conference, especially those of
a nuclear-test ban and chemical weapons.
With regard to the United States-Soviet arms control negotiations, we
wish to witness that in year 1987 they will succeed in giving effect to the
progress thus far achieved.
Speaking at the University of Belgrade, Yugoslavia, on 15 January, my
Prime Minister, Mr. Nakasone, renewed his calls on the two Powers to work for
early agreement at the nuclear and space talks, keeping in mind the following
five points.
First. the United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear disarmament
should be such as to enhance the sense of strategic stability between the East
and the West, and to contribute to the strengthening of the peace and security
of the world.
Second, in the negotiations for reductions of nuclear weapons,
"globalism" should be fully adhered to, and, in the case of the long-range
intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF), they should ultimately be
completely removed from Europe and Asia alike.
Third, in the negotiations, whatever is practicable should be undertaken
and realized steadily on a step-by-step basis. In order to realistically move
the negotiations even a step forward, it may have to be considered to separate
the INF negotiations from others and to reach early agreement thereupon.
Fourth, the security of the world should be safeguarded with
consideration for the overall balance of all systems of weaponry. We must pay
attention to the international efforts now being exerted in this direction for
arms control and disarmament, including chemical and other conventional
weapons.
Fifth, East-West dialogue should be expanded and deepened.
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(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
The United States-Soviet exchanges following the Reykjavik meeting do
not, I regret to say, warrant optimism. We hope, however, that during the
seventh round of the nuclear and space talks now taking place here in Geneva,
the negotiators of the two Powers will continue to search for common ground
for agreement in a business-like atmosphere.
I now wish to take up the work of the Conference which is entrusted with
the task of multilateral disarmament negotiations by the international
community.
The fact that this Conference, since its establishment by the first
special session on disarmament to this day, has produced no disarmament
convention, should be a source of serious concern to us. I am not overly
pessimistic, but I would rather like to focus our attention on the
Conference's potentiality. The five nuclear-weapon States and States
representing the various economic and social systems as well as regions of the
world are gathered here to work seriously for disarmament. The Conference has
at its disposal many interesting ideas put forward by various States, as well
as accumulated expert knowledge and experience in the field of disarmament.
It is my belief that if we skillfully draw upon the potentiality of the
Conference with our wisdom and determination, there is a real possibility for
the Conference to move substantially forward this year.
Allow me to begin with the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests.
As is well known, Japan has consistently considered the realization of a
comprehensive nuclear-test ban as being the priority item in the field of
disarmament, and strongly wishes to see a resumption of substantial work by
the Conference on the issue. We believe that the following circumstances hold
out prospects for recommencement in 1987 of this long-suspended work.
First, there now seems to be a genuine desire on the part of a number of
member States that substantial work be resumed. In the General Assembly last
year, a great majority of non-aligned countries and socialist States, in
contrast to their previous abstentions, voted in favour of the
resolution 41/47 which Japan co-sponsored, calling for various actions to be
taken in order that a CTB treaty may be concluded at an early date. We are
encouraged by the wide support shown for the resolution, in particular, the
call on the Conference on Disarmament, in its operative paragraph 2(a), to
"commence practical work on a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of the
1987 session."
Secondly, there is now a widening common perception as to the subject
matter of the work. Resolution 41/46 A lists "contents and scope" of a treaty
and "compliance and verification" as the subject matter of the work which, in
comparison to the similar resolution of the previous year, shows a more
realistic approach, an approach which we view favourably.
Thirdly, all groups now seem to share a more or less common perception of
the importance of verification in developing a CTB regime.
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(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
A comprehensive nuclear-test ban has serious implications for the
security concerns of all States. Verification measures to ensure compliance
are therefore essential. It is from such a perspective that my Government
has, in a number of ways, contributed to the work on verification, including,
in particular, the proposal in June 1984 for a step-by-step approach, whereby
those nuclear tests which are at present verifiable would be prohibited, and
as progress is made in verification technologies, the scope of prohibition
would be expanded, finally arriving at a comprehensive prohibition. It is
also well known that other Western States such as Australia, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom have made concrete
proposals which stress the need for adequate verification measures.
We welcome the fact that the socialist States, at the 1986 session of th
Conference, began to attach importance to verification measures with regard ee
a CTB. As Mr. Petrovsky, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, state,3
in his intervention on 24 June, "the Soviet Union favours the strictest
possible verification of the ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site
Inspection and making use of all achievements in seismology". He went on to
state that the Soviet Union does not favour any loopholes in the regime for ar
on-site inspection and that "Should any ambiguous situation arise when, for
example, an exchange of seismic data would make it difficult to determine
whether or not there had been a nuclear explosion or an underground tremor dse
to some other reason, that would in fact be just the case when an on-site
inspection would be required". 7 do hope that such positive statement h7 try.1
socialist States with regard tc the problem of verification, will he
translated into concrete proposals in the course of substantial work r)n.
The non-aligned and neutral States have also stressed the need for
specific measures of verification with regard to a CTB, and have made cie
their willingness to co-operate actively. For example, the "Doc,Iment iss
at the Mexico Summit on Verification Measures" by the Leaders of the
Six Nations, in August 1986 in Ixtapa, Mexico, recognizes the i7lpoftan,77
verification and expresses the preoaredness of the six counries to
participate in on-site inspections at the nuclear-test sites cf the
United States and the Soviet Union, and in monitoring of the territories of
the two States outside of the test sites.
As I have discussed, there exists now, in the Conference, a general
expectation for the commencement of substantial work on a CTB. There is
common perception of the subject matter of the work. There are rece,gnition
the importance of verification and willingness to participate in its
implementation. Now is the chance to resume substantial work on a CTB.
Lastly, the Conference has, in the past three years, failed to esteblie
an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1 because of the mandate issue. Whal
great loss this has been to all members of the Conference! Given the
common perception of the subject matter of the work, we may well wonder
whether the so-called negotiating mandate is absolutely necessary at this
present time. The draft mandate of a group of Western countries (CD/521)
provides that the ad hoc committee is to resume its work "with a view to
negotiation of a treaty", while the non-aligned sponsored resolution 41/46 A
of the General Assembly lays down that the ad hoc committee is to be
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(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
established "with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation
of a treaty". We cannot but note that there could be much in common between
the two.
Since July 1986, talks have been under way between United States and
Soviet experts on the entire scope of issues related to nuclear testing. They
can also have a positive impact on the work in the Conference.
It must be possible for us to proceed in a spirit of co-operation to
establish an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate to commence
substantial work on a CTB at the beginning of this session. Indeed, it would
be our collective responsibility to do so. Mr. President, may I call upon you
to make the best use of your eminent leadership for the establishment of the
ad hoc committee. As far as my delegation is concerned, I pledge our full
co-operation.
The conclusion of a CTB treaty will necessitate the establishment of an
international seismic monitoring network as an indispensable international
mechanism to ensure compliance. In this connection, we highly value the
Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test (GSETT) 1984,
presented last year, concerning an exchange and analysis of Level I data, as
well as the agreement by the experts to begin work directed towards the design
of a modern international system based on the expeditious exchange of
wave-form (Level II) and parameter (Level I) data and on the processing of
such data at International Data Centres. We had, in April 1986, presented our
ideas on an exchange of Level II data with like-minded countries, and,
following up the results of the Canadian Workshop in October 1986 for data
communication experts, we began an experimental exchange of Level II data in
December 1986 with several interested countries. We will report on the
results of this experiment to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts this
year. May I take this opportunity to thank the Canadian Government for its
sponsorship of this useful workshop.
Useful ideas on the organization of an international seismic monitoring
network indispensable for verifying compliance with a CTB treaty have been
presented by Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Sweden and
others. Discussions on this important question of organization would require
much work. From this point of view also, I earnestly hope for an early
establishment of an ad hoc committee on CTB.
A comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, in the form of a convention
widely acceptable the world over, is another item on which we hope to see
further progress during the course of this year.
The Ad hoc Committee, in 1986 and January 1987, has identified those
substances to be controlled under a future convention and has begun the
drafting of the regimes to which these substances would be subject, as well as
streamlining the provisions concerning the destruction of chemical weapons and
their production facilities. I would like to take this opportunity to express
my delegation's appreciation of these results and to extend our sincere
gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ian Cromartie of
the United Kingdom, and the Chairmen of the Working Groups, Mr. Richard Rowe,
Mr. Petar Poptchev and Mr. Noegroho Wisnoemoerti. Many countries called for
r-N
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(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
the convention to be concluded in the course of this year, and my delegation
for one is certainly prepared to do its share to enhance the work under the
new Chairman, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden.
Much time and effort have already been spent on the chemical weapons
negotiations, and they are now at an advanced stage. They are very
complicated and extensive in detail. As such, they do not lend themselves
easily to immediate and simultaneous solutions. I should therefore like to
propose that we concentrate our energies on those problems which will require
agreements on principles: namely, articles of the convention and some of its
annexes, leaving those other problems of a technical and procedural nature for
extended consideration by experts.
In the view of my delegation, the priority questions are as follows:
First, the definition of chemical weapons is one of the basic issues of
the convention. It is a most complicated and difficult problem. But the
definition should, in principle, be understood to be "substances of particular
relevance to chemical weapons" and related munitions. In drafting, the focus
up to now has been placed on the prohibited substances under Article VI.
Would that be sufficient? We should probably also take into consideration
those substances as will be declared under Article IV.
In this connection, my delegation thinks that the convention should not
create impediments for the legitimate activities of the chemical industry for
peaceful purposes, and thus feels that due significance should be given to the
general purpose criterion. It is therefore imperative that the concept of
"permitted purposes" be given careful attention in drafting the definition.
Second, with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons, the
declaration of location of stocks, together with the declarations on the
entirety of the stockpile and on its composition, should be made at an early
point in time following the entry into force of the convention. These
declarations should be verified by on-site inspection.
In this connection, my Government welcomed the presentation in July 1986
by the United States delegation of a document in which detailed information on
United States stockpiles and plans for their destruction were given. It was a
courageous step helpful to the negotiations. If the other countries
possessing chemical weapons were to follow suit, during the course of the
negotiations, it would greatly contribute to the solution of the problems we
now face, in particular, with regard to Articles IV and V.
Third, in Article VI, which deals with the question of permitted
activities, we should strive to develop common language on the verification
measures to be applied to each of the categories of substances.
There is much work to be done, also, on the issues of thresholds for the
control of various chemical substances, the concept of militarily significant
quantities, the mechanism for revising lists of chemicals, the cost factor,
and so on. We feel however that these problems might be better assigned to
the experts for their consideration and advice. It would be more productive
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(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
for the Ad Hoc Committee to agree on the basic utility of these concepts in
implementing Article VI, and then proceed to work out the body of Article VI
and its annexes.
With regard to the substances on which there is no agreement as to
whether they should be included in a particular list or regime, we suggest
that it would do no harm to put them aside temporarily by putting them on a
preliminary list, returning to settle the question of the outstanding
substances once the regimes to which they would be subject are more developed.
Fourth, as regards the organizational questions in Article VIII, we feel
it appropriate to maintain the present draft text for the time being. When
the various substantive provisions on the destruction of chemical weapons and
their production facilities, regimes for permitted activities, challenge
verification, and so forth are developed, there will be a need for a thorough
review. The organs of the convention will need to be fully worked out and be
in existence by the time of the entry into force of the convention. As they
require extensive work, my delegation thinks that these, including the
financial clauses, would be another set of problems which we could delegate
for expert consideration at an appropriate time.
Fifth, there seems to be common understanding on a challenge inspection
regime under Article IX, that this inspection is to be of an exceptional
nature to be conducted within a short time scale. However, when we get down
to working out the details of its implementation, the divergences seem to be
as wide as ever. In order to overcome this impasse, we must develop our
thoughts as to whether we are pursuing a rectifying effect as regards possible
contraventions of the convention or the restoration of confidence among the
parties to the convention, whether our aim is to drive the offending party out
of the convention regime, or whether bilateral solutions may possibly be
contemplated. We should review existing proposals and engage in quiet and
informal discussions to seek a solution to the problem.
I have already said that the chemical weapons negotiations are at an
advanced stage. We must organize ourselves to deal with this new stage in a
most effective way.
My delegation has advocated a work process where we concentrate on one
item for a given week and move on to another, rather than deal with several
questions in three separate working groups at the same time. I am pleased to
note that the organization of work suggested by Ambassador Ekeus is along the
lines of our thinking. We might meet as the Ad Hoc Committee for several days
each month so as to assess the situation in the Working Groups, to consolidate
areas where there has been progress and give directives where there has been
little progress.
Rather than spending day after day in various meetings, we need also to
bear in mind the utility of "breathing spaces", so as to allow delegations to
develop their thoughts and to consult with capitals. To this end, we may need
to reduce the frequency of meetings within the framework of carefully
formulated schedules.
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(Mr. Yamada, Japan)
To sum up, we should aim to built substantive agreements one by one at
this advanced stage.
Besides the CTB and chemical weapons, we are also expected to make
substantial progress, during this spring session, on the Comprehensive
Programme of Disarmament.
The position of my delegation with regard to the various subjects on this
item were stated in the Ad Hoc Committee. To recapitulate, we feel that the
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should by its nature be adopted by
consensus, both here in the Conference and at the General Assembly; that the
various measures it envisages and their means of implementation should be of a
realistic character, accurately reflecting the present international
situation; and that the review of the Comprehensive Programme should be an
entirely different thing from the special sessions on disarmament which would
have political significance in the light of the international situation
prevailing at the time. My delegation stands ready to make its contribution,
under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, in
furthering our work to develop the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
There are other agenda items such as outer space which are equally
important, but I shall defer them to another opportunity.
In beginning my statement, I stated my belief that this is an important
year to work for disarmament, in view of the third special session scheduled
for 1988. I also touched upon the potentiality of this Conference.
We should not become overly pessimistic or blame others for lack of
progress. Let us reaffirm our joint responsibility and focus our efforts on
those areas where progress seems possible. And we can, through dialogue and
co-operation, fulfil our joint responsibility to the international community
and share in the fruits of such progress.
Allow me to conclude my first intervention in the Conference with a
personal note. In 1945 I was a boy of 14 years old attending a school in the
beautiful city on the river Delta facing the inland sea. There was an old
castle, temples, schools, inns, shops and houses. Almost in an instant they
were all gone and people were suffering beyond description. There now stands
a monument on which it is inscribed "Let it never happen again". I would like
to pass on to all of you what a nuclear catastrophe really is, for I witnessed
myself what it was like. I pledge to you, Sir, that I will work with you for
a world where we can live together free from the fear of nuclear weapons.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Japan for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. I
now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.
Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Thank you, Comrade President. It is a great
pleasure for me to see you in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament
during the opening month of its 1987 session, representing a great country
which bears special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security. You are willing, I am sure, to perform your duties in a most
efficient manner. Your high professional and diplomatic skills have already
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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)
brought about some concrete results. In the spirit of the existing friendly
relations between our two countries, you may rely, Comrade President, on the
co-operation of the Bulgarian delegation. I wish to pay tribute to the
successful work done by Ambassador Beesley of Canada who presided in August
and during the intersessional period. It is a pleasure for me to welcome in
our midst our new colleagues, Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa
of Brazil, Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy,
Ambassador Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Nazarkin
of the USSR, and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. My delegation looks forward
to co-operating with them. On a sad note, I wish to extend our heartfelt
condolences to the delegation of the United States of America in connection
with the passing away of Ambassador Donald Lowitz.
The year 1986 will remain memorable as "the International Year of
Peace". The President of the State Council of the People's Republic of
Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, sent a message on 29 January last to the
.Secretary-General of the United Nations, which contains the assessment of my
Government on a period that was difficult and complex, but rich in important
international events. In his message, President Zhivkov informed the
Secretary-General of the efforts that my country has been deploying for the
implementation of the lofty'ideals of the International Year of Peace,
including the establishment, in the Balkans, of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and
a chemical-weapon-free zone.
There is no doubt that the year 1986 will remain, in the annals of
disarmament, intricately linked with the Statement of
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of 15 January. In that Statement the
Soviet Union put forward a large-scale programme to eliminate by the year 2000
all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and to build a world without nuclear
weapons. This programme has been largely recognized as an example of new,
dynamic political thinking, as an expression of determination to undertake
radical steps called for by the nuclear-space age.
In 1986 silence continued to reign at the Soviet nuclear-test sites. The
Soviet unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions was an important
gesture of political goodwill. It had no other aim than to create the most
propitious conditions for solving one of the most urgent tasks of our time:
the achievement of an agreement on a comprehensive ban of nuclear-weapon tests.
An event of great political importance was the Summit Meeting in
Reykjavik. It demonstrated once again the necessity of bold, non-traditional
approaches to the solution of the most acute problems of today. What is more,
it proved that it was possible to cut, in a not-so-distant future, through the
Gordian knot of the nuclear-arms race; and to reduce and do away with the
danger of nuclear catastrophe.
In Reykjavik, the Soviet Union made sweeping proposals for a balanced
reduction of nuclear arsenals, to be followed by their complete elimination.
Regrettably, the United States was unable to negotiate its own half of the
way. It remained prisoner to its illusions of reaching military superiority
through the deployment of its Star Wars weapons.
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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)
In his message to the United Nations Secretary-General,
President Todor Zhivkov stated, inter alia:
"We all have been deeply impressed by the Reykjavik Meeting between
the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
Mikhail Gorbachev, and the President of the United States,
Ronald Reagan. This Meeting has given rise to great expectations in
world public opinion and among the nations of the world. Notwithstanding
the fact that the American side could not muster enough determination to
accept the historic proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the
Reykjavik Meeting will, undoubtedly, remain as one of the most
significant events during the International Year of Peace. We hope that
sound reason will prevail and that the dialogue will continue on from
where it was interrupted."
The International Year of Peace was also remarkable for a number of
important political initiatives: the Budapest proposal by the Warsaw Treaty
Member States on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in
Europe; the Harare Declaration of Non-Aligned leaders; the "Six States"
initiatives; and the proposals of the socialist countries in the
United Nations for the setting up of a comprehensive system of international
peace and security.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Xavier Perez de Cuellar,
rightly pointed out in his message of 3 February to the Conference that the
agreement in Stockholm, the two IAEA conventions concluded in Vienna, the
results of the Biological Weapons Review Conference and the progress made by
the Conference on Disarmament in its negotiations on the chemical weapons ban,
"are noteworthy examples of a constructive approach towards the issues of
disarmament and international security". The recent entry into force of the
South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty was also an encouraging event.
Speaking in terms of disarmament, may I emphasize that 1986 would have
been a better year had the United States Administration joined the Soviet
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Nineteen eighty-six would have been
a better year if the United States of America had not rejected all proposals
to start negotiations on a comprehensive treaty to ban all nuclear-weapon
tests. Nineteen eighty-six would have been a better year if the United States
of America had not continued its preparations for waging Star Wars.
Nineteen eighty-six would have been a better year if the United States
Administration had not decided to violate the SALT-2 Treaty.
On 3 February 1987, the very day the Conference on Disarmament began its
annual session, the United States Administration offered an affront to the
international community by conducting its twenty-fifth test since the
beginning of the Soviet moratorium. Thus, the United States Administration
did everything possible to force the USSR to take a decision for resuming its
nuclear testing.
My delegation could not agree more with the phrase that Mr. Adelman
considered it appropriate to repeat so many times in his statement here on
5 February last, namely that "The world expects better than this!".
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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)
The year 1986 confirmed that a new kind of political thinking is
necessary, one that is in line with the new realities of our times. It is
imperative to break with the century-old pattern of thinking and behaviour,
resting on the acceptability and admissibility of war as a means of solving
international disputes. For today, it is widely recognized that a nuclear war
cannot be won and must newer be fought. The world situation must not be
allowed to become such that peace and security no longer depend on the common
sense or will of governments and peoples, that they become hostage of military
and technological logic. This is the reason why we welcomed the
Delhi Declaration, signed by the leaders of the USSR and India, in which it is
stated that "the building of a world free of nuclear weapons and violence
requires a revolutionary restructuring in the minds of men and bringing up
nations in a spirit of peace, mutual respect and tolerance".
The Bulgarian delegation cannot help repeating that, in its view, the
establishment of ad hoc committees offers the best available machinery for the
conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the
Conference. In this vein my delegation believes that it is high time for the
Conference on Disarmament to undertake concrete and substantive work on the
items related to nuclear disarmament.
My delegation attaches highest priority to item 1 of our agenda:
"Nuclear Test Ban". In our submission, the results of the
forty-first regular session of the United Nations General Assembly have
created favourable prerequisites to overcome the stalemate in our work. Any
unbiased analysis of resolution 41/64 A and resulotion 41/47 cannot bflt lead
to the conclusion that there is a convergence and reconciliation of
differences in them. The Bulgarian delegation considers that on the basis of
these resolutions a compromise solution can and must be found, that a
consensus can and must be reached to set up an ad hoc committee with a mandate
which would allow the Conference to proceed to substantive work. The existing
convergence of views must be translated into an agreement, words must be
matched by deeds.
The Soviet Union and the United States bear a particular responsibility
for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the achievement of nuclear
disarmament. In Reykjavik, the framework for agreements relating to the first
stage of nuclear disarmament was clearly defined. It is quite natural that so
many hopes are pinned, now, on the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva.
This, however, does not mean and cannot mean that the Conference on
Disarmament nught to sit idle on its agenda item 2. My delegation believes
that the Conference has to proceed with an in-depth and structured discussion
on all aspects of that issue, including the conditions for adherencP by all
nuclear-weapon States to the efforts aimed at ending the nuclear-arms race and
achieving nuclear disarmament.
In its resolution 41/86 G, the United Nations General Assembly requested
the Conference to undertake negotiations "with a view to achieving agreements
on appropriate and practical measures which could be negotiated and adopted
individually for the prevention of nuclear war". It requested also the
Conference to establish, for that purpose, an ad hoc committee on the
subject. This resolution perfectly reflects the considered view of my
delegation on item 3 of our agenda. At the same time it is appropriate to
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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)
note that my delegation's flexibility is well known, both officially and
unofficially. We would like to reiterate our readiness to co-operate in order
to break away with the deadlock on item 3.
As to item 4, my delegation would like to express its satisfaction with
the results achieved by the Conference at its 1986 session and during the
inter-sessional period. Under the able guidance of Ambassador Cromartie of
Great Britain, the Ad Hoc Committee succeeded in resolving a number of
important issues related to the chemical weapons stocks, the chemical weapons
production facilities and the activities not prohibited by the convention.
It is gratifying to note that the progress achieved at informal
consultations warranted an updating of the rolling text of the draft
convention to incorporate the addition of common ground identified during the
inter-sessional period.
We share the view that momentum has been generated, and it must be
sustained. In fact, it is necessary for the Conference to intensify its
efforts by increasing the tempo of its negotiations. We believe that in 1987
our objective should be to finalize the convention on the prohibition of
chemical weapons. While we do not tend to underestimate the remaining
difficulties, we think that this objective is not beyond the reach of the
Conference. There is no doubt in our mind that the Conference made a very
wise decision in giving, at this crucial stage of the negotiations, the
steering wheel of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons into the hands of
Ambassador Rolf Ekeus.
My delegation holds the view that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Space should resume its activities as soon as
possible.
There is no lack of valuable ideas and specific proposals in the
Conference. We believe it is important now to focus the Committee's attention
on the elaboration of significant measures conducive to guaranteeing the
peaceful uses of outer space and preventing an arms race in it. This
Conference should concentrate on the elaboration of an agreement or
agreements, for instance on ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth
satellites. In this context, it is warranted to explore the possibility of
elimination of existing anti-satellite systems. In other words, what my
delegation would like to see on item 5 is deeds.
With respect to item 8, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, by
consensus, a decision for the Conference to conclude the elaboration of the
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during the first part of its
1987 session, and to submit a complete draft of the Programme before the end
of its forty-first regular session.
Having co-sponsored this decision, my delegation would like to assure the
distinguished Chairman of our Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Garcia Robles, that
he can rely on our full support and co-operation in the work on the
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)
The United Nations General Assembly has already taken a decision to
convene its third special session devoted to disarmament. At the first
plenary meeting of the Conference, the distinguished representative of Mexico
rightly recalled that for nine years now the Conference on Disarmament has
been unable to adopt even a single treaty, even a single convention.
We are afraid that it might be a fatal blow to the credibility of this
Conference, if it presents to the third special session devoted to disarmament
a report along the lines of the reports it has been submitting to the regular
sessions of the General Assembly during the past nine years. It is high time
for the Conference to make a breakthrough. We must find a way out of the
vicious circle with respect to nuclear disarmament and proceed to
business-like negotiations on a nuclear-test ban. We must have no less an
objective than to agree upon a convention which would ban the chemical
weapons. We must adopt a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. To put it
in a nutshell, we all must move forward at the 1987 session of the Conference
on Disarmament.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Bulgaria for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President,
and to the country the President represents. I now give the floor to the
representative of Peru, Ambassador Morelli Pando.
Mr. MORELLI-PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, at
the outset I wish to congratulate you and express my delegation's pleasure at
the fact that a person of such great eminence should be presiding over this
session, representing a country of such great world influence as China. It
gives me particular pleasure to express my delegation's satisfaction at the
work done by the distinguished representative of Canada as President of thiE
Conference. I wish to extend to the delegation of the United States the
condolences of my delegation at the premature and highly regrettable loss
occasioned by the decease of Ambassador Lowitz for his country and for all of
us who knew him. I extend a welcome to the distinguished delegates of
Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union.
Year after year, ever since it received its mandate from the
Final Document of 1978, this Conference has been going through a ritual of
good intentions every February and a great chorus of frustration every August,
and it is well known that, as in other disarmament forums, that ritual tends
to follow the mercurial changes in relations between the major Powers,
particularly the super-Powers. As we begin the 1987 session, the question
arises this year, as in so many other years: is February going to be a season
of good intentions? That question is especially relevant today in the light
of the Reykjavik Summit. The meagre results of bilateral summits in recent
years have become habitual, indeed predictable. This time it is understood
that Reykjavik will go down in history as significantly different from
previous summits, but it is not yet known whether that difference will in the
final analysis have a positive sense and, if so, what its scope will be.
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(Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru)
Another question therefore arises, as to whether this Conference, as the
sole multilateral negotiating forum, is going to receive the same information
as was received by the General Assembly concerning what occurred at
Reykjavik. If that is the case, if we are going to receive partial and
mutually divergent reports about the achievements of the latest summit, then
the proposal of the Group of 21 at our previous session that the Conference
should be informed in February 1987 of the results of the bilateral
negotiations that have taken place and any others that may be under way will
not have been heeded. Obviously that proposal provided and continues to
provide coherent, reliable and realistic foundations for multilateral
negotiations which cannot be avoided and which we must not continue to
postpone. Some statements in the plenary meeting last Thursday illustrate
the difficulties faced by the Conference on Disarmament with respect to what I
have said and with respect to other disturbing developments. And it was no
coincidence that the Group of 21 at that same meeting expressed its view on
the sensitive and urgent item of nuclear-weapon tests.
That statement of the Group of 21 significantly took into account the
resolutions of the General Assembly as well as the Non-Aligned Statement of
Harare and the more recent statement of the six Heads of State or Government,
and concluded, in conformity with those documents, by voicing an explicit and
significant demand that the Conference on Disarmament should negotiate and
conclude a treaty on this issue which is of the highest priority. As
requested in General Assembly resolution 41/46 A, opportunely commented on and
highlighted at our inaugural meeting by the distinguished Ambassador of
Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, the creation of an ad hoc committee to
address the question of a nuclear-weapon-test ban would be a major step
forward and in the present circumstances would allow some hope of a
convergence in the determination of the super-Powers to seriously negotiate a
process which, in the final analysis, is a multilateral concern. Needless to
say, other multilateral efforts should take place side by side with the
Conference on Disarmament, in the context both of the Moscow Treaty of 1963
and of the Non-Proliferation Treaty whose preamble contains an undertaking to
put an end to vertical proliferation, an issue profoundly and naturally
linked, with horizontal non-proliferation. The delegation of Peru hereby
reiterates its support for the principles and standards of that Treaty, whose
continuity must be assured and whose acceptance should be extended so that the
credibility of its fulfilment will be enhanced.
Other types of convergent co-operation deserve attention. The six Heads
of State or Government have offered their co-operation for the fulfilment and
verification of general agreements in that area. Peru believes that other
countries should rally to this suggestion, and therefore, within the bounds of
its possibilities and bearing in mind the appropriate training of its experts
in seismology we offer our co-operation as and when it may be required.
In our plenary we have heard the views expressed by the distinguished
representatives of Australia and Mexico with respect to the implementation of
the Treaty of Rarotonga. As the representative of a country which is a full
member of the Tlatelolco Treaty and the only country of the south-east Pacific
area belonging to this forum I also wish to welcome the fact, that despite the
nuclear threat hanging over mankind, it has proved possible, following in the
wake of the Tlatelolco Treaty, to establish a second nuclear-weapon-free zone
in a populated geographical area.
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(Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru)
The link between the two treaties is clear and therefore if they are
fully implemented this will mean, having in mind Ambassador Butler's fine turn
of phrase, a zone of application extending from the west coast of Australia to
the west coast of the corresponding part of Latin America and from the Equator
down to the Antarctic, which in turn is governed by an appropriate
international status.
It is worth emphasizing a process that was begun by Latin America and is
now being continued by the countries of the South West Pacific through the
Treaty which has just entered into force and which fully marks the progress
that was to be expected of non-nuclear-weapon countries 20 years after the
adoption of the Tlatelolco Treaty. I refer to the definition of nuclear
devices and their comprehensive prohibition, and in particular to the
inclusion of a third protocol, relating to nuclear tests vis-?is the five
Great Powers.
Peru, whose legitimate interest coincides with that of other countries of
the Permanent Commission of the South Pacific has a clear position on nuclear
tests.in that area, specifically with a view to the preservation of vital
marine resources. But Peru also believes that these problems cannot. be
conceptually divorced from the highly qualitative competition in testing which
has existed and may continue to exist between the super-Powers. Likewise we
must bear in mind that what occurred, vis-A-vis the nuclear Powers, with the
two additional protocols of the Tlatelolco Treaty may now begin to happen with
the additional protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty: I refer to the highly
qualified statements made by those Powers when they subscribe or ratify these
additional instruments. The Tlatelolco Treaty expressly affirmed in its
preamble that it did not constitute an end in itself. It could not, since to
a great extent it depends for its refinement and full application upon the
respect and support of the nuclear Powers. We may assume that this will also
be the case as regards the Rarotonga Treaty.
The delegation of Peru hopes that, in line with the possible advances in
the prohibition of nuclear tests, we may also make progress on the items
concerning the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the prevention of
nuclear war, as the Group of 21 has tirelessly been proposing. We hope for a
positive increase in the exchange of views which is already being reflected in
our report to the General Assembly, with a view to reaching tangible results
at this Conference.
With respect to the established continuity of the ad hoc committees on
items 4 and 8 of our agenda, my delegation wishes to state the following.
With regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, we once again express our
hope that the efforts currently under way to achieve a comprehensive and
global treaty in this field may be completed this year, as has continually
been requested by the competent international forums and also significantly
and recently, by the Second Review Conference of the Treaty prohibiting
biological weapons. Recognition should be given to the work done recently by
the Ad Hoc Committee under the expert guidance of the distinguished
representative of Great Britain, and now entrusted to the distinguished
representative of Sweden, from whose guidance we may hope for very good
results.
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(Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru)
With respect to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of
Disarmament, we again express our hope that under the prestigious leadership
of Ambassador Garcia Robles it may fulfil its mandate to submit the draft
programme, as desired and expected, to the forty-first session of the
General Assembly.
The delegation of Peru will adhere to the position formulated by the
Group of 21 with regard to the re-establishment of the committees on items 5,
6 and 7 of the agenda.
With respect to the first, item 5, prevention of an arms race in outer
space, we are prepared to participate actively in discussing and considering
this increasingly urgent priority item of the Conference on Disarmament,
chiefly in the light of the concept of the peaceful uses of space and the
possible analogies between such uses of outer space and the uses contemplated
in the Convention on the Law of the Sea. The delegation of Peru firmly
believes that this year the Ad Hoc Committee should be given a broader mandate
than last yea's which was its first, and an appropriate programme of work.
The prospects that lie before the Conference on Disarmament this year are
uncertain because of the state of world affairs and because of the record of
its own activities in recent years, with such scant results. But even though
there are some auspicious signs, in this forum, will it be enough to achieve
some additional partial results for us to be able to say that our annual work
has been done? In my delegation's judgement, the time has come for some
far-reaching thinking about the purposes of this Conference, thinking that
will lead to conclusions worthy of being included in our report to the
General Assembly.
For example our work, as is natural, is governed by our agenda, but the
latter does not take into account the interrelationship that exists between
those items, as if they existed in their own airtight compartments. It does
not seem acceptable that the obvious need to have ad hoc committees should
rule out a comprehensive yearly deliberation.
As I ventured to point out in August last year, we have systematically
been excluding from our agenda certain items which the General Assembly
entrusted to us. It is true that these items do not yet deserve the
establishment of ad hoc committees, but nothing would prevent us from being
truly comprehensive in our yearly deliberations, and not excluding those items
that have so far been postponed.
Along the same line of thinking, and bearing in mind the request made in
this Conference that it should be informed about the bilateral negotiations,
we should establish whether we are talking only about bilateral negotiations
and only with respect to the items specifically included in the present
agenda. My delegation believes that this Conference should also be informed
about regional negotiations on the reduction of military forces and the
implementation of confidence-building measures, that is, items which, like the
question of conventional weapons, are specifically included among those
entrusted to us by the General Assembly.
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(Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru)
The distinguished representative of Argentina has very rightly pointed
out that this year the Conference on Disarmament should give due attention to
the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament
scheduled for 1988. My delegation believes that this is exactly what is
needed with a view to this very important event, as well as in relation to
other related ones. We regret that in 1986 our Conference did not show
interest in another item that has been postponed, the issue of disarmament and
development, which should be dealt with this year at the conference referred
to by several General Assembly resolutions.
Mr. President, the delegation of Peru once again expresses its best
wishes for your success in the important tasks entrusted to you in this
initial period, in the belief that they will lead to tangible and auspicious
progress in this eminent negotiating forum.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Peru for his statement and I thank him for the kind words addressed to the
President himself and to the country which the President represents. I now
give the floor to Ambassador Butler, the Ambassador of Australia.
Mr. BUTLER (Australia): At our first plenary meeting this year, on
3 February, I had the honour of joining with the representative of the
delegation of New Zealand in circulating to the Conference the final text of ?
the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, a Treaty which had then entered into
force. May I say just quickly that I am very grateful to the distinguished
Ambassador of Peru for the references that he has just made to the Treaty of
Rarotonga and for the analysis of its importance which he shared with us.
When we circulated those Protocols, we were able to announce that Protocols 2
and 3 had been signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I thought
it would be interesting if I reported briefly to the Conference this morning
that at 10 o'clock Suva time today, 10 February 1987, Protocols 2 and 3 of the
Treaty of Rarotonga were signed by your country, Mr. President, by the
People's Republic of China. The Protocols were signed by
Ambassador Ji Chaozhu in Suva, that being the place where the Treaty of
Rarotonga is deposited. May I take this opportunity, Mr. President, of saying
to you personally that Australia, and I am sure I can speak for New Zealand in
this context, very much welcomes the action that your Government has taken.
Thank you.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Australia for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today.
Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none.
As announced earlier and agreed at our last plenary meeting, I intend now
to postpone the plenary meeting and convene, in five minutes' time, an
informal meeting of the Conference to consider the re-establishment of the
Ad Hoc Committees on "Effective international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
and on "Radiological weapons", as well as requests from non-members to
participate in the work of the Conference.
The plenary meeting was suspended at 12.15 p.m. and resumed at 12.25 p.m.
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 387th plenary meeting of
the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.
As a result of our discussions at the informal meeting, I wish first to
put before the Conference for decision document CD/WP.253, dealing with the
re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on "Effective international
arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons". If I hear no objection, / shall consider that the
Conference adopts the draft decision. 1/
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): May I now turn to
document CD/WP.245, relating to a draft decision on the re-establishment of
the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. If there is no objection, I
shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision. 2/
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I suggest now that we take up
those requests contained in documents CD/WP.255 to 266, containing draft
decisions on the participation of Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Portugal,
Turkey, Zimbabawe, Viet Nam, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Bangladesh.
Since consensus was noted at the informal meeting on each of the requests
received from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference, we
agreed to take up at the resumed plenary all draft decisions together. If
there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft
decisions. 3/
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): As there is no other business
to consider, / intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary
meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday,
12 February 1987 at 10.30 a.m.
The meeting rose at at 12.50 p.m.
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Notes
1/ Later issued as CD/737.
2/ Later issued as CD/738.
3/ CD/WP.255:
"In response to the request of Norway and in accordance with rules 33
to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to
invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1987 at plenary
meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under
items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."
CD/wP.256:
"In response to the request of Finland and in accordance with rules 33
to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to
invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1987 at plenary
meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under
items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."
CD/WP.257:
"In response to the request of New Zealand and in accordance with
rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the
present to invite the representative of New Zealand to participate during 1987
at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established
under item 4 of its agenda."
CD/WP.258:
"In response to the request of Portugal and in accordance with rules 33
to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to
invite the representative of Portugal to participate during 1987 at plenary
meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under
items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."
CD/WP.259:
"In response to the request of Turkey and in accordance with rules 33
to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to
invite the representative of Turkey to participate during 1987 at plenary
meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under
items 4, 7 and 8 of its agenda."
CD/WP.260:
"In response to the request of Zimbabwe and in accordance with rules 33
to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to
invite the representative of Zimbabwe to participate during 1987 at plenary
meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under
items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."
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CD/WP.261:
"In response to the request of Viet Nam and in accordance with rules 33
to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to
invite the representative of Viet Nam to address during 1987 the plenary
meetings of the Conference on item 8 of its agenda."
CD/WP.262:
"In response to the request of Austria and in accordance with rules 33
to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to
invite the representative of Austria to participate during 1987 at plenary
meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under
items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."
CD/WP.263:
"In response to the request of Denmark and in accordance with rules 33
to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to
invite the representative of Denmark to participate during 1987 at plenary
meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4
of its agenda."
CD/WP.264:
"In response to the request of Greece and in accordance with rules 33
to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to
invite the representative of Greece to participate during 1987 at plenary
meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under
items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."
CD/WP.265:
"In response to the request of Spain and in accordance with rules 33
to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to
invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1987 at plenary
meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under
items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda."
CD/WP.266:
"In response to the request of Bangladesh and in accordance with rules 33
to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to
invite the representative of Bangladesh to participate during 1987 at plenary
meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under
items 6 and 8 of its agenda."
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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.388
12 February 1987
ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m.
President:
GE. 87-6O187/5828e
Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China)
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the
388th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.
At the outset, I should like to cordially welcome in our midst the
Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, His Excellency
Dr. Klaus TOrnudd, who is addressing the Conference today as our first
speaker. In doing so, I also wish to thank him for his interest in our work,
as he has visited the Conference before. In conformity with its programme of
work, the Conference will listen to statements in plenary meetings and
consider the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda and
other organizational questions. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the
rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant
to the work of the Conference.
I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of Finland,
Romania, New Zealand and Hungary.
I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Under-Secretary
of State for Political Affairs of Finland, His Excellency Dr. Klaus Tornudd.
?4
Mr. TORNUDD (Finland): Mr. President, I wish to begin by expressing my
thanks for the warm words of welcome you addressed to me. May I, for my part,
congratulate you upon your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on
Disarmament for the month of February. I am sure that your well-known
experience and skill will guide the work of the Conference in the most
efficacious way. May I also offer our heartfelt condolences to the
United States delegation, and through it, to the family of
Ambassador Donald Lowitz. The sudden passing away of Ambassador Lowitz, whom
I had the honour to meet on several occasions, has deprived the United States
of an educated public servant, and the Conference of an able negotiator.
The Conference on Disarmament is resuming its work at a time of uncommon
flux in international disarmament efforts. Much has happened since the
Conference last assembled in this Chamber less than six months ago.
The Reykjavic summit meeting showed that there is indeed a real
possibility of radical reduction of nuclear weapons. After so many years of
fruitless effort, bilaterally and by this Conference, Reykjavik is a harbinger
of hope despite its immediate outcome.
The Stockholm Conference showed that patient and painstaking multilateral
negotiation of complex and militarily significant issues can pay off. The
achievement of a new regime of confidence- and security-building measures in
Europe has already inspired initiatives designed to move Europe towards lower
levels of conventional forces and armaments on a regional scale.
Finland welcomes the fact that, after Reykjavik, both the Soviet Union
and the United States have reaffirmed their commitment to a continued search
for agreement on the outstanding issues dividing them. Effective and
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(Mr. Tornudd, Finland)
verifiable agreements on reducing nuclear weapons and preventing an arms race
in outer space between the two Powers with the largest arsenals would truly
enhance their security and that of everyone else.
We note with satisfaction the extension of the United States-Soviet arms
control dialogue to new areas. The formal negotiations that began last month
on establishing nuclear risk reduction centres in Moscow and Washington deal
with an aspect of the nuclear equation that is often overlooked in discussion
of the ways and means to prevent nuclear war. In the final analysis,
preventing nuclear war from arising by miscalculation or misunderstanding is
no less important than preventing it from arising by calculation or design.
In our view, efforts to reduce nuclear weapons and prevent their
accidental or deliberate use would be greatly assisted by an equal effort to
end their testing. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty would do much to
retard and eventually end the development of ever more sophisticated nuclear
weapons. Moreover, it would put pressure on those who might still harbour
nuclear ambitions to desist from their folly, thus strengthening one of the
key instruments of international security, the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
We regret the fact that the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear
testing did not lead to the start of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban
treaty, bilaterally or by this Conference.
We continue to believe that a comprehensive test-ban treaty with adequate
verification provisions is achievable right now. However, we also recognize
that, even on this important question, the best should not be the enemy of the
good. At the present juncture, step-by-step negotiations, firmly geared to
the generally accepted goal of ending all nuclear tests in all environments
for all time, would seem to offer the best available means out of the
deadlock. We welcome the willingness of both sides to explore a gradual
approach to this important issue.
The Conference on Disarmament has already done a considerable amount of
useful work on the subject of a test ban. That work needs to be continued
bearing in mind the possibility of interim steps. One such step might well be
the establishment by the Conference of an international seismic monitoring
network based on existing facilities around the world, as recently recommended
in General Assembly resolution 41/47.
Clearly, confidence in a comprehensive test ban requires that it be
verifiable. Mandated by this Conference, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific
Experts has done valuable work in laying the necessary technical groundwork
for reliable monitoring of seismic events for verification of a test ban. We
welcome the steps toward developing an international data exchange system now
underway. This work would be further assisted if all States conducting
nuclear explosions were to provide the Secretary-General of the United Nations
with information concerning these explosions as requested by General Assembly
resolution 41/59 N.
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(Mr. Tornudd, Finland)
Finland participates actively in the work of the Group of Scientific
Experts. With government funding, the University of Helsinki has for some
years conducted a special seismological project for this purpose. In view of
the new and demanding tasks the GSE set for itself at its last meeting, the
Government of Finland has recently decided to allocate considerable additional
resources to the project as of this year.
Since 1980, Finland has co-operated with Zambia in establishing a seismic
network there and training Zambian personnel to operate it. Zambia
participated with success in the Level I data exchange experiment organized by
the GSE in 1984. We look forward to Zambian participation in the even more
complex Level II data exchange experiment scheduled for 1988.
Since I last spoke from this rostrum one year ago, considerable progress
has been achieved with regard to another priority item on the agenda of this
Conference, the elaboration of a convention to ban chemical weapons. Although
a number of critically important issues remain to be settled, the pace of
progress over the past year gives rise to the hope that the remaining
problems, too, can be solved in the not too distant future. We wish the new
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekeus of
Sweden, every success in his important task.
Challenge inspection is undoubtedly the major unresolved issue at this
point. We are glad to note that, as last year's Chairman of the
Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie of the
United Kingdom, noted in his report to the Committee, a convergence of views
now exists on at least four points. Enlarging this common ground to the point
of consensus -- by working out the appropriate detailed procedures to
everyone's satisfaction -- poses a challenge of its own. Perhaps
differentiation by types of challenge inspection objects and accumulating
experience from on-site inspections might help to solve this problem.
We are heartened by the progress made in developing regimes for the
verification of various categories of chemicals relevant to the convention.
For the first time, there is now a provisional list of at least nine known
chemical warfare agents which will be banned, except for small-scale
production for research, medical or protective purposes. Important work has
also been done in developing detailed verification measures for such
production. We believe that in perfecting these measures care should be taken
not to hamper basic research routinely undertaken in university laboratories
or elsewhere.
It is clear that effective verification of the chemical weapons
convention requires, in addition to data reporting, both on-site inspections
and the use of modern monitoring equipment.
Monitoring equipment for verification purposes has been studied and
tested by the Finnish chemical weapons verification project since 1972. As
part of our continuing effort to help to provide the necessary technical means
for assuring confidence in the convention, the Finnish project is hosting,
tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, a special workshop in Helsinki. The
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(Mr. Tornudd, Finland)
workshop, convened at expert level, will address questions of automatic
monitoring in terms of detection of alleged use, verification of destruction
and verification of non-production. The results of the workshop will be
communicated to all members of the Conference on Disarmament in written form
as soon as they are available.
We welcome the fact that the Conference on Disarmament will continue to
deal with the question of preventing an arms race in outer space.
Substantive, although rather preliminary, discussions have already been held
in the past. Bearing in mind the fact that the extensive use of outer space
for some military purposes, such as early warning and verification, clearly
contributes to international security, continued discussion should, in our
view, focus on preventing the weaponization of outer space. A ban on
anti-satellite weapons should be a priority objective in this context.
Multilateral efforts at this Conference would thereby complement, for the
common good of all, the bilateral effort of those two who bear the primary
responsibility for preventing an arms race in outer space.
The Conference on Disarmament could also play an important role in
furthering naval disarmament. This aspect of disarmament has for too long
been overlooked. We are encouraged by the fact that the idea of bringing the
burgeoning naval arms race under closer scrutiny, and eventually control, is
gaining momentum. The United Nations Disarmament Commission will deal with
this question again at its next annual session in May. As the single
multilateral negotiating body for disarmament, this Conference could
complement the work of the UNDC by taking up, in an appropriate manner, some
aspects of this problem for more concrete action. Finland has recently drawn
attention to the importance of naval confidence-building measures in her own
region, Northern Europe, where the adjacent sea areas are the scene of growing
military activity.
Finally, as a representative of a non-member State I wish to take this
opportunity to re-empbasize the continuing active interest of my country in
the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that our contributions
have been useful and we look forward to all new opportunities to participate
in disarmament efforts in the future as well. We remain ready to assume
membership in the Conference on Disarmament.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank His Excellency the
Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his statement
and for the kind words addressed to the President.
I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu.
Ambassador DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): Comrade President,
it is with great pleasure that I associate myself with previous speakers in
extending to you my warmest congratulations on your accession to the
Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in this month that begins our
session, a month that is so important for the subsequent pursuit of our work.
Our satisfaction is all the greater in that you are the representative of the
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(Ambassador Dolgu, Romania)
People's Republic of China, a great socialist State with which the Socialist
Republic of Romania has close and exemplary relations of friendship and
co-operation in every field. We are confident that given your abilities in
the conduct of our work, the Conference will have the most auspicious
conditions for accomplishing its duties. Mr. President, through you I should
also like to pay tribute to the outgoing President, Ambassador Alan Beesley of
Canada, for the excellent work that he did and express to him my delegation's
gratitude. I thank you, Comrade President, for your words of welcome for
those of us who are taking our seats at the heads of our delegations for the
first time here and through you I also thank the other colleagues who extended
their welcome to me. It is a painful duty for me to convey my very sad
condolences to the delegation of the United States on the untimely death of
Ambassador Donald Lowitz.
I wish to take this opportunity to share some thoughts reflecting the
position of Romania, the view of President Nicolae Ceauiescu, on the problems
of halting the arms race and of disarmament, problems which are included in
the agenda of this forum.
The effort and concern to participate in the solution of these problems
are an essential component of my country's foreign policy. An essential
component because the problem of halting the arms race and moving on to
disarmament is, as we see it, in itself the fundamental problem of the
contemporary world.
Because of the events which marked it, last year was not the year of
peace as our peoples had proclaimed through the United Nations.
International relations continued to be characterized by particularly serious
tensions, because all the negative processes and phenomena that feed these
tensions persisted. But last year did not elapse without leaving some
lessons behind. It led us to reconsider some of the basic ideas that have
underpinned military and political thinking in the post-war period. It has
become clear, for example, that a nuclear war cannot be waged without ending
in the annihilation of civilization and of the very conditions for life on our
planet. Last year also led us to a better understanding of the disastrous
impact of the arms race on the state of health of the world economy. And
again, last year, developments led us to realize ever more forcefully that in
the suspicion-arms race spiral each of the two terms is both a cause and an
effect and that the vicious circle they constitute can be broken, as the
outcome of the Stockholm Conference showed, when all States display political
will. All States, be they large and powerful and endowed with nuclear weapons
or small or medium-sized and with limited military potential, all States, I
say, have the right to be involved and to become involved in efforts to build
a world without nuclear weapons.
If we wish to survive, it is essential to give up the time-worn idea that
nuclear arms strengthen defence capacity and thereby contribute to maintaining
peace, and we must move on to the adoption and application of real nuclear
disarmament measures. The most fruitful approach -- the one that we
support -- is the comprehensive approach to disarmament problems: nuclear
disarmament measures should be accompanied by a substantial reduction of
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(Ambassador Dolgu, Romania)
conventional arms, troops and military expenditure. The latter, in Romania's
view, should be reduced by at least 50 per cent by the year 2000. An initial
step in that direction could be the implementation of the proposal contained
in the Appeal and programme of the States members of the Warsaw Treaty for a
25 per cent reduction in arms, troops and expenditure by the end of the next
decade. By simultaneously tackling nuclear and conventional disarmament in
the framework of a comprehensive programme, this approach covers the complex
realities of our world and the security perceptions of different States.
As regards arms control and disarmament, there is no lack of ideas and
proposals for action. What is lacking is action. More than ever, what is
needed is to move from words to deeds. Having this in mind, and prompted by a
desire to make at least a modest and symbolic contribution to this difficult
transition, my country has set itself the task of unilaterally carrying out a
5 per cent reduction of its arms, troops and military expenditure. This
measure was adopted by a popular referendum last November. It would have been
desirable for such a reduction to take place on a multilateral basis, but
given the enormous scale of destructive potentialities, such unilateral
actions seem possible to undertake without hurting the security interests of
the States concerned. Measures of this kind may contribute to building
confidence and to establishing the right climate for halting the arms race and
moving on to real disarmament measures.
This decisive moment in the evolution of international life requires that
all States step up their efforts and give new dynamism to the activities of
organs and conferences in the field of disarmament and the activity of the
entire system established for negotiations on disarmament. It goes without
saying that by the military potential they possess the United States, the
Soviet Union and the other nuclear Powers have a special responsibility in
beginning and fostering the disarmament process. It is therefore natural to
expect negotiations and meetings between the Soviet Union and the
United States to lead to substantial and rapid results. But other States
whose existence is also threatened and which are also directly affected by the
political, economic and social consequences of the arms race cannot confine
themselves to the role of spectators. With regard to the foremost problem of
our day halting the arms race and moving on to disarmament, they should be
able to express their views and they should be able to make their
contribution.
The Conference on Disarmament has a unique, leading role in the
negotiating system on disarmament. It is the only multilateral negotiating
organ of which all the nuclear-weapon States, as well as the principal States
having considerable military potential, are members.
Unfortunately we must observe, as other speakers before me have done,
that in the period since its creation the results achieved by the Conference
have been minimal. It is imperative that the potential of the Conference be
more effectively used and that it apply itself to the drawing up of concrete
agreements in the field of disarmament so that it can truly become a
negotiating forum. In this regard we share the view that negotiating
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(Ambassador Dolgu, Romania)
structures, i.e. ad hoc committees should be set up for each priority
disarmament issue. Finally, what is of the essence is to begin a concrete
dialogue on all the questions on the Conference's agenda.
In view of the importance of disarmament problems in the sessions of the
United Nations General Assembly, in view of the great number of resolutions
adopted on these issues, many of them touching directly upon the activity of
this Conference, we feel that the Conference's work should be based to a
greater extent on the relevant United Nations resolutions which are the
embodiment of the will of the overwhelming majority of the States of the
world.
As regards the specific items on the Conference's agenda, the Romanian
delegation wishes to make the following comments and proposals at this stage:
As regards nuclear disarmament, these issues are at the forefront, quite
rightly, of the Conference's agenda. As I have already stressed, due to its
view of disarmament, Romania places nuclear disarmament at the forefront of
its concerns. On the basis of this absolute priority, my country has always
favoured effective negotiations aimed at ending the nuclear arms race and for
the conclusion of agreements on the halting of production and development, on
the reduction and finally on the elimination of nuclear weapons. In this
spirit Romania welcomed and supported the proposals of the Soviet Union
regarding the stage-by-stage elimination of all nuclear weapons by the
year 2000. We feel that new efforts should be undertaken on the basis of the
proposals submitted at the Soviet-American summit in. Reykjavik in order to
achieve as soon as possible appropriate agreements for a halt to the arms race
on Earth and in space.
As a European country, Romania attaches special importance to the need to
achieve this year an agreement, even one that is separate from the overall
"package", for the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe,
with a view ultimately to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the
European continent.
Similarly, as a country situated in the Balkan region, Romania favours
and is working for the transformation of that part of the continent into a
zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons and of foreign military bases. At
the same time we support the creation of such zones in the north and centre of
Europe as well as in other continents. In that spirit we welcome the recent
entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga establishing a nuclear-weapon-free
zone in the South Pacific.
As regards the work of the Conference, we believe it is high time for us
to cease dealing with nuclear questions in very general terms, and for these
issues to become the specific subject of negotiations. Romania attaches a
particular importance and high priority to the cessation of all nuclear
testing which could and should constitute a first step in the direction of
nuclear disarmament. Public opinion in my country learned with legitimate and
deep concern of the new underground nuclear tests conducted by the
United States and expressed its firm disapproval of this event. Romania,
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(Ambassador Dolgu, Romania)
which welcomed the Soviet Union's decision to institute a unilateral
moratorium on its nuclear tests, considers it of the greatest importance that
the United States should join in that measure. Such an act would be an
important step towards creating the necessary conditions to move on to
negotiations designed to conclude an agreement capable of ending nuclear
tests. The establishment of such a moratorium by both parties as well as by
the other nuclear Powers would constitute evidence of their willingness
effectively to embark upon the path towards the cessation of the arms race and
progress towards disarmament. In the present international circumstances,
where there is a real risk of the annihilation of our civilization and of life
itself on our planet it is more necessary than ever to refrain from any action
which could increase tension and unleash a further arms build-up.
The Romanian delegation firmly advocates that the problem of prohibition
of nuclear testing should occupy a central place in the work of this session.
We therefore favour the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this item. In
view of the importance and gravity of this problem of nuclear tests, Romania
proposes the convening of an international conference on a nuclear-test ban.
Such a conference could be entrusted with debating all aspects involved in
this problem, including the role of non-nuclear-weapon countries in the
negotiation of an international nuclear-test-ban treaty and the application of
a reliable and effective system of monitoring the provisions of such a
treaty. The Conference on Disarmament could be the appropriate betting for
the preparation of such a conference. As an interim step the Conference could
also call for the establishment of a moratorium on all nuclear tests.
Romania welcomes the idea of the creation of a network of seismic
stations in different countries which, through the exchange of data and
information, could contribute to monitoring the implementation of a future
treaty banning all nuclear tests. We are prepared to participate in this with
the technical means available to us.
In the view of the Romanian delegation, the prevention of an arms race in
outer space should also constitute a priority objective of negotiations in the
Conference. Of considerable practical importance would be the prompt
re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with dealing with all
aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the beginning of
negotiations on this issue. In our conception it is necessary that priority
be given to the cessation of all actions militarizing space, the convening of
an international conference and the conclusion of a general treaty on the use
of space exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Romania attaches great importance to the total prohibition and final
elimination of chemical weapons, and thus to the preparation by the Conference
of a draft convention. The results achieved to date by the Ad Hoc Committee
on Chemical Weapons under the skilful guidance of Ambassador Cromartie to whom
we wish to express the Romanian delegation's gratitude, represent remarkable
steps towards the elaboration of the text of the convention. Several
delegations that have already spoken have stressed the importance and urgency
of developing a text of this convention as well as their willingness to exert
the necessary efforts for resolving the problems or issues that remain
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(Ambassador Dolgu, Romania)
pending: notably verification of non-production of chemical weapons by
civilian industry, challenge inspection, declaration and verification of
stocks of chemical weapons and other problems. In all these areas,
verification remains the key problem. The agreed measures should be such as
to inspire confidence that the provisions of the convention will be respected
by all States parties. It is on that aspect in particular that we shall have
to focus our attention during the process of searching for generally
acceptable solutions. As regards the verification provisions, especially
on-site inspection, we suggest using the formulas contained in the document oE
the Stockholm Conference. In our view, the monitoring system agreed upon
should not in any way affect the development of the chemical industry for
peaceful purposes, or the enhancement of the technical and scientific
potential of each country.
Like other delegations, we hope that under the skilful chairmanship of
the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekeus, the
Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will this year be able to carry to its
conclusion the task entrusted to it.
Romania favours the stepping up of negotiations aimed at the drafting of
a convention prohibiting radiological weapons as part of the efforts towards
nuclear disarmament. Such a convention could at the same time facilitate
co-operation between States in the peaceful use of radiation and radiation
sources while providing a suitable verification system with the participation
of all States. We favour the achievement of an agreement containing a
commitment by States not to resort to attacks against peaceful nuclear
facilities likely to produce radiation and endanger the areas concerned. A
subject that also deserves attention in our view is the need to ensure the
safe operation of all peaceful nuclear facilities. Likewise, our delegation
is in favour of the Conference addressing all aspects of the production of new
types of weapons of mass destruction, and concrete measures for prohibiting
them.
I shall not dwell on the importance of the Comprehensive Programme of
Disarmament. I have already stressed that in Romania's view true movement
towards disarmament can emerge only from an integrated approach to all its
aspects. I will therefore confine myself to expressing the hope that under
the chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Mexico,
Ambassador Garcia Robles, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme
of Disarmament will be able to fulfil its tasks during this year. The
drafting of the text of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will
constitute a concrete contribution by the Conference on Disarmament to
preparations for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament.
To conclude I wish to quote some words recently pronounced by
President Nicolae Ceaupscu. They seem to me particularly significant in this
forum.
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(Ambassador Dolgu, Romania)
"Present international circumstances are such that nothing can be
more important today than moving on to concrete disarmament measures, to
the adoption of measures capable of freeing mankind from the danger of a
world war of annihilation. It is essential that we should do everything
possible to halt the arms race, and above all the nuclear arms race, in
order to ensure peace, the vital right of all peoples to existence, to
freedom, to life and to peace."
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President
and to the country that the Chair represents.
In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its
387th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of
New Zealand, Mr. Graham.
Mr. GRAHAM (New Zealand): Mr. President, my delegation extends its
congratulations to you on your election to the Presidency of this important
body. We hope that under your early guidance, the Conference will realize its
potential this year in contributing to a saner and more stable security order.
New Zealand has jointly submitted with Australia the final text of the
Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The Protocols were
finalized over the past year following consultations with each of the
nuclear-weapon States. They were adopted in final form by the South Pacific
Forum last August and opened for signature on 1 December.
It is gratifying to see that, with Australia's ratification, the Treaty
of Rarotonga has now entered into force. A majority of South Pacific Forum
countries now constitute the Zone.
The adherence of China and the Soviet Union to Protocols 2 and 3 is also
welcomed. The Treaty and its Protocols meet the basic criteria for
nuclear-free zones stipulated by the major nuclear Powers. New Zealand trusts
that the sincerity with which the zone States have undertaken their
obligations will be acknowledged by all nuclear Powers. We believe they will
do so, and we look forward to their eventual adherence to the Protocols.
The South Pacific region, which covers one sixth of the surface of the
planet, is now nuclear-free in the accepted United Nations definition of the
term. Together with the contiguous zones of Latin America to the east and the
Antarctic to the south, a very sizeable part of the Earth's
surface -- 40 per cent -- is free from the permanent deployment of nuclear
weapons. The zones established by the Antarctic and Tlatelolco Treaties
served as admirable precedents for our work, and we pay tribute to those who
had the wisdom and foresight to conceive and negotiate those treaties.
The South Pacific is relatively fro fr= strategic rivalry and
confrontation. It is this situation which we seek to preserve as a strong and
vital endowment to future generations. The Treaty is an arms control
agreement not only of regional but also of global importance. The world has
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(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)
changed dramatically in recent decades, and global security has become an
interwoven tapestry of security commitments and relationships that form an
indivisible whole. All countries of our world community, whether related in
adversarial terms or not, are now mutually dependant upon one another for
their common security and survival. In the South Pacific we have made a
solemn security commitment by renouncing the possession and testing of nuclear
weapons and their deployment in our territories. Nuclear weapons have no part
to play in the security of the South Pacific. They offer no defence and their
presence itself is destabilizing. We have made a common recognition that
nuclear weapons provide an illusory protection, and that the survival and well
being of our planet depends upon a lesser reliance on such weapons than that
which prevails today.
We in New Zealand seek an alternative to the system of nuclear deterrence
at some future stage as the basis of international security. A global
security system can only rest on something other than the threat of planetary
degradation and our collective self-extinction. The risk of nuclear
deterrence failing gives us all limited time in which to work. For our part,
we will see to it that nuclear weapons stay out of New Zealand. We have
declared that we do not wish to be defended by nuclear weapons. We see the
Rarotonga Treaty as a small but significant step towards greater global
security. It is New Zealand's hope that the Conference on Disarmament this
year will reflect the same sense of urgency that galvanized our work in the
South Pacific and that we shall see substantive progress during the session
this year.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his
statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.
I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary,
Ambassador Meiszter.
Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Mr. President, please allow me to express to you
the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the responsible
office of the President of the Conference on Disarmament. I am especially
honoured to welcome in the Chair the representative of a State with which my
country has increasingly good relations in all fields of social activity, the
representative of a State which displays profound interest in an ongoing
contribution to the cause of making disarmament efforts more efficient. I am
confident that your patient guidance and diplomatic skills will help our
Conference to break the vicious circle of feverish activities on one hand and
fruitlessness on the other prevailing in this body during the past years. My
words of appreciation go also to Ambassador Beesley of Canada who presided
over our proceedings in an exemplary way during the closing month last year.
The composition of this body has considerably changed since we closed our
session last August. Some colleagues have left us to take up other
responsibilities somewhere else, or departed under tragic circumstances like
Ambassador Donald Lowitz, a man whose personal integrity, correctness and
human warmth will leave a feeling of emptiness in us. May I express my
profound condolences and sympathy over the sudden demise of our respected
colleague, and request the delegation of the United States to transmit the
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(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)
same to the Government of the United States, to Shana Lowitz and to her
mourning family. I would like to join other representatives speaking before
me and welcome our newly arrived colleagues, the representatives of Algeria,
Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia,
offering to them friendship and co-operation as we had with their respective
predecessors. I feel privileged to welcome again in our midst the
Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Klaus Tiirnudd of Finland, and
to welcome as well Mr. Graham of New Zealand, and express my appreciation over
their interest displayed and contribution made to the work of this Conference
which will certainly be carefully studied by my delegation.
Mr. President, at the beginning of this session I feel it appropriate to
have a glance at the international situation. Our work is conducted under its
conditions and is expected in its turn to produce a favourable feed-back
effect on it.
Approximately a year ago, when making my statement before this body on
the same occasion, I characterized the international conditions prevailing at
that time as "a shade clearer" than it had been in the preceding years. I
attributed this to the fact that the results of the Summit Meeting in
November 1985 between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan were
significant and had some favourable influence on the general atmosphere of
international relations. Now, a year later, one can see -- fornately -- the
continuation of that promising tendency. Significant events have taken place
in the international arena, which have contributed to improving the situation,
even if not to the extent hoped or desirable. Elements of detente and
confrontation continue to co-exist, and our task is consequently to decrease
the confrontational element.
An outstanding event of high-level diplomacy was the Reykjavik meeting
between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. The understanding
in Reykjavik proved that courageous initiatives pursued with vigour and fresh
thinking may produce results which had seemed unrealistic before. There are
results from Reykjavik, even if not in the form of international written
instruments. The understanding on the 50 per cent reduction of strategic
nuclear arms and the accord reached on the elimination of United States and
Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and on a radical cut in
missiles of this type in Asia are all elements of such importance that they
can hardly be overestimated. The proposal of the Soviet side to consolidate
the regime of the ABM Treaty and the initiation of full-scale talks on a total
nuclear-test ban added special significance to the above-mentioned meeting.
The greatest importance of the accords reached in Reykjavik is that they
proved that nuclear disarmament is a real possibility. Mutually agreed
elements of the Reykjavik accords are being followed up here in Geneva at the
bilateral talks, hopefully with concrete results.
Another instance of the favourable trend is the successful completion of
the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe. The document concluded there carries a reaffirmation
of the commitment by the participating States to refrain from any use of armed
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(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)
forces inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, and contains
far-reaching measures on confidence-building coupled with real provisions for
verification, including inspections carried out on site.
One can say even more. Despite its evident shortcomings we consider that
the communique issued at the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council
of 12 December 1986 carries a possibility of negotiating on the proposals put
forward in the Budapest Declaration of June 1986. Let me remind the
distinguished colleagues that the text of the Budapest declaration was
submitted to the attention of this body last June by my delegation.
These are but a few positive aspects of the present situation. They do
not imply in any way that we forget that the controversial international
situation is fraught with grave tensions. They only mean that the world is
becoming increasingly aware of the fact that contradictions and problems
cannot be solved by the policy of force, but rather through co-operative
efforts and readiness for mutual accommodation.
It means further that the awareness of the mutual interdependence of
States has deepened to an extent never seen before. A number of problems have
emerged -- partly as a consequence of the continuing arms race -- the solution
of which is unimaginable in the framework of national policies alone.
Problems and dangers threatening mankind have a global dimension, and
consequently they lend themselves only to a treatment that is global in
character.
It is also becoming evident that security cannot be ensured by military
means only. Even the most powerful States, those possessing the most
destructive weapons, cannot feel secure if they represent a menace to any
other State's national security. National security cannot be ensured
unilaterally, it is more and more interrelated with international security.
To put it shortly: security has become indivisible, it can only be universal
and equal for all. That necessarily implies that the security of no State can
be ensured to the detriment of that of others. Security policies should be
pursued on the basis of co-operation, keeping in mind the security interests
of others also.
Another relevant and important recognition of our times is the broadening
of the concept of security. Security is not just a question of military
balance, but the elimination of imbalances in the world economy and joint
solutions for the problems of mankind: economic co-operation, opportunities
for contacts among peoples, respect for human rights and for the basic rules
of civilized conduct of States in international relations.
On the basis of such considerations, the delegation of the Hungarian
People's Republic proposed in the name of its allies in the Warsaw Treaty
Organization the idea of the "Establishment of a comprehensive system of
international peace and security" at the forty-first session of the
United Nations General Assembly.
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(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)
The aim of launching this idea has been to initiate a process of
collective thinking, to hear the views and ideas of our partners. We started
with the understanding that such a system could only be the product of
collective thinking. Proceeding on this basis we hopefully can arrive at
collective actions on this crucial issue too.
In our view, the establishment of a comprehensive system of international
peace and security calls for an ever deepening international co-operation in
all fields of international relations. The immediate aim of such co-operation
is to prevent the danger of nuclear catastrophe threatening the very existence
of mankind, and to promote arms control and disarmament. It is indispensable
in this context to establish an appropriate system for harmonizing different
interests, to adjust the character, aim and level of military forces to the
criterion of adequate security, and to effect a radical reduction in the
accumulated arsenals of military hardware.
This line of thinking leads me to the actual tasks of the Conference on
Disarmament, which has a role to play in one of the vital aspects of the aim I
mentioned a minute ago. The priorities in our work here are apparently agreed
to by almost all: nuclear test ban, prohibition of chemical weapons,
prevention of an arms race in outer space'.
There is a growing international consensus that nuclear-weapon testing
should be banned once and for all. My delegation is certainly of this view.
Nuclear testing is the engine of the arms race in the so-called "conventional
nuclear field" as well as in the development of the new "exotic types" of
third-generation categories. With nuclear testing going on, any effort in the
field of nuclear disarmament may well prove a futile exercise.
The proceedings of the First Committee and the resolutions adopted there
indicate a certain convergence of views which calls for an appropriate
follow-up here in the Conference also. In our view it is imperative for the
Conference to set up an ad hoc committee and to proceed to practical work
without delay, with the aim of preparing a treaty that would effectively ban
all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States everywhere and would
contain provisions, acceptable to all, preventing the circumvention of this
ban by means of nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. The negotiations
should comprise all relevant aspects of the future treaty including scope and
verification.
The 18-month unilaterial moratorium by the USSR laid the groundwork for
the successful achievement of the aim of a CTB. It is unfortunate and
deplorable -- to say the least -- that the United States responded with a
nuclear-weapon test to the calls of the international community on the very
opening day of this Conference.
The prohibition of chemical weapons figures high among the priorities of
our agenda. It is a subject where the Conference could produce a tangible
result this year, restoring its worn prestige.
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(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)
Last year's work in the Ad Hoc Committee, and complemented by the two
rounds of intersessional work, yielded a reliable basis which offers a real
possibility for a breakthrough. In saying that, I would like to express my
delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom for
the able guidance he rendered to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.
Major issues related to verification in the field of CW stocks and their
destruction, CW production facilities and the non-production of chemical
weapons are generally agreed upon, and the main lines of methods of
verification have been drawn up.
On-challenge inspection has been generally accepted as part of the
international verification system. Realistic guidelines have been spelled out
for conducting such an inspection. Many delegations, including those most
concerned, accepted the British proposal as a basis for work.
In our view all the necessary prerequisites are at hand now to accomplish
the work on the convention this year. What is needed is a firm determination,
and a good deal of efficient diplomatic professional work. It is encouraging
to know that Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden has already made the first steps to
gear the work of the Ad Hoc Committee to a higher level of efficiency.
The degree of priority of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer
space has greatly increased in the face of the events taking place in the
development of new weapons systems designed for operation in outer space. The
work done last year by the Ad Hoc Committee has produced fairly good results.
The exchange of views proved that there is a need and room for developing
further the international legal regime for keeping the arms race out of this
area. The present system of international legal instruments is evidently not
sufficient to prevent the technological arms race from moving into the outer
space. It needs to be complemented. We are of the opinion that the
Conference is an appropriate place to do this work, parallel with efforts made
at other forums. The Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space should be re-established
without wasting time on procedural aspects, and should start working with a
view to concrete measures. It should concentrate on such particular issues as
banning the use of force in outer space, space weapons, prohibiton of ASAT
weapons systems and the protection of satellites.
Dwelling only on the three priority issues before our Conference does not
in any way mean that we disregard other subjects on our agenda. I will return
to them later at the appropriate time as our work moves on.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative for
his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President and to the
country that the President represents.
That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish
to take the floor? I see none. Now we will proceed to other proceedings.
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(The President)
Before we adjourn, I should like to turn to another subject. As you are
aware, at its 9th plenary meeting on 8 February 1979, the then Committee on
Disarmament decided to hold its plenary meetings on Tuesdays and Thursdays,
beginning at 10.30 a.m. The Secretary-General of the Conference held
consulatations with the co-ordinators of the various groups and reported to
them on certain additional measures that could be taken to make maximum use of
the resources allocated to the Conference. As a result of his consultations,
a consensus has emerged on two questions which may lead to additional
economies by the Conference.
The first aspect requires a decision by the Conference in order to ensure
that there is agreement in changing the times established by the
1979 decision. In this connection, I should like to propose that we begin the
plenaries and other meetings of the Conference at 10.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m., so
that we could use the maximum three hours which are normally allocated for
meetings wth full services. In doing so, I wish to note that we will be
receiving a high-level visitor on Thursday, 19 February, and that arrangements
have already been made in connection with that visit. On that particular
occasion, we shall start the plenary meeting at 10.30 a.m., in order to avoid
any disruption in the programme of activities of such a distinguished
visitor. With that exception, I believe that we could now agree that all
meetings of the Conference, be they plenaries or meetings of subsidiary
bodies, should start at 10.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The second aspect relates to
the need to start punctually each plenary meeting. You will recall that,
already at the Group consultations, I noted that in previous years it was the
practice of the negotiating body to open its plenary meetings not later than
five minutes after the scheduled time. I do hope that we can reach an
understanding to the effect that this practice is adhered to.
The Secretariat is circulating, at my request, an informal paper
containing a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its
subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable is merely
indicative and subject to change, if necessary. On that understanding, if
there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): Does any member wish to take
the floor? I see none.
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on
Tuesday, 17 February, at 10.00 a.m.
The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.
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17 February 1987
ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 February 1987, at 10 a.m.
President:
GE. 87-60205/7218E
Mr. Fan GUOXIANG (China)
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the
389th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.
In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its
consideration of agenda items 1, entitled "Nuclear Test Ban" and 2, "Cessation
of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".
In conformity with Rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member
wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.
I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sri Lanka, the Federal Republic
of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and Egypt.
I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkine.
Mr. NAZARKINE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): Thank you, Comrade President. As you know, yesterday, 16 February,
Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union addressed the participants in the
International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World for the Survival of Humanity, in
Moscow. The text of this statement has been distributed in a press release
and any delegation that so wishes has the opportunity of reading it.
Speaking on the reorganization of society which is under way in my
country, Gorbachev emphasized that for the Soviet Union, in order to
concentrate on the constructive endeavours to improve the situation in our
country, peace is necessary. Our desire to make our country better will hurt
no one, with the world only gaining from this. Reorganization, to stress its
international aspect, is an invitation to any social system to compete with
socialism peacefully for the benefit of general progress and world peace. But
for such competition to take place and unfold in civilized forms worthy of
mankind in the 21st century, we must have a new outlook and overcome
mentalities, stereotypes and dogmas inherited from a past which is gone, never
to return.
We have come to the conclusion, said the Soviet leader, that in today's
complex and contradictory world, new approaches and methods are required for
solving international problems. These conclusions make us reconsider
something which once seemed axiomatic, and fully realize that with the advent
and improvement of nuclear arms the human race has lost its immortality. It
can only be regained by destroying nuclear weapons. The nuclear Powers must
go beyond their nuclear shadow and enter a nuclear-free world, thus ending the
alienation of politics from the general human ethical norms. A nuclear
tornado, said General Secretary Gorbachev, will sweep away both socialists and
capitalists alike, the just and the unjust alike.
Referring to the Soviet disarmament initiatives, the Soviet leader noted
that none of our proposals attempts to leave out any of our weapons from the
negotiations. Our principle is simple: all weapons must be limited and
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(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)
reduced, and those of wholesale annihilation eventually scrapped. He
stressed, in particular, that the Soviet Union had expressed its readiness to
have chemical weapons totally abolished.
Comrade President, negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban have a long
history, but only recently did the prospect of a successful conclusion already
in the very near future become evident. This is an important result of
constructive initiatives and efforts made by many countries including Poland,
the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Sweden, Pakistan, Indonesia,
Great Britain, Australia and other countries, and by the Chairmen of the
Ad Hoc Committee and its Working Groups. A breakthrough in the negotiations
became apparent last year, when the Soviet Union, building upon the
fundamental provisions of the statement of 15 January 1986, put forward
several series of proposals which contributed to accelerating the negotiations
and reaching agreement on quite a number of sections of the future convention.
I believe there is every reason to regard the current session of
negotiations as a decisive one. What we have now is not just the framework
for a future convention but also solutions to most of the fundamental issues
and, moreover, agreed texts of many provisions of a future convention.
At the same time, a number of questions are yet to be resolved. Among
them I would mention declaration and verification of chemical-weapon stocks
and challenge inspections. Further work is required on provisions relating to
non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry, the definition of a
chemical-weapons production facility and elimination measures, the scope of
the prohibition and various others. The "procedural" articles of the
convention too, are not to be forgotten -- the procedure for the signing of
the convention and its entry into force, its depositary, etc. We are
therefore required to act most promptly and comprehensively so as to reach
agreement on all outstanding issues and finalize the text of the convention
and open it for signature.
We agree with Ambassador Butler, the head of the Australian delegation,
who said on 3 February 1987, referring to the objectives currently facing the
participants of the negotiations, that "we must increase the tempo of our
negotiations during 1987 so that the opportunity which clearly exists of
concluding a convention this year may be realized".
The only way to succeed is to seek mutually acceptable solutions and to
negotiate, taking into account each other's legitimate concerns.
The Soviet delegation commends the energetic efforts of Ambassador Ekeus,
the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, aimed at a successful conclusion of the
negotiations.
In the inter-sessional period of the work of the Conference on
Disarmament, the Soviet Union explored in depth all aspects of the state of
affairs of the negotiations; its own position on the outstanding questions
and the way other countries approach them. In doing so we looked above all
for possible solutions to these questions and instructed our experts to act
accordingly.
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(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)
In today's statement the USSR delegation wishes to present its proposals
and ideas on the solution to a number of questions concerning the future
convention with a view to facilitating more intensive negotiations and further
progress therein.
I have already referred to chemical-weapon stocks. They are the subject
matter of Article 4, "chemical weapons", of the draft convention which is now
under discussion and negotiation. Agreement has already been reached on a
number of important provisions of that article, including those relating to
declarations of volumes of stocks, their methods of destruction, and
verification of operations of chemical-weapon destruction facilities. So far,
however, it has not been possible to come to an agreement on the provisions in
the convention relating to declarations of locations of chemical-weapons
stocks and to international verification of such locations. Agreement has
been hampered by a number of perfectly legitimate national security concerns
expressed, for example, by the delegation of France and my delegation. We,
for our part, have once again weighed up all the factors, viewed them in the
context of the need for speedy progress at the negotiations and the concerns
expressed by a number of countries, including the United States, which attach
particular importance to finding a solution to this very question as rapidly
as possible.
As a result, we have come to the conclusion that with a view to finding a
speedy solution to this question it would be advisable to agree to the
proposal to provide, immediately after the convention enters into force,
access to chemical weapons for the purposes of systematic international
on-site verification of declarations of chemical-weapon stocks.
In our view each State party to the convention should, not later than
30 days after its entry into force, make a declaration containing detailed
information on the locations of chemical-weapon stocks (storage facilities) at
the time of the convention's entry into force, both in its national territory
and elsewhere under its jurisdiction or control. Such a declaration,
inter alia, would specify the precise location of each storage facility, the
quantity and composition of the chemical weapons in each location, methods of
storage indicating the name of each chemical, munition types and calibres,
etc. A State party should, within 30 days after the convention enters into
force, take measures to ensure a closure of chemical-weapon storage facilities
and prevent movement of stocks other than movement for their elimination.
For the purposes of effective verification of closed chemical-weapon
storage facilities, it is necessary to provide for systematic international
verification with permanent use of instruments, including verification of the
correctness of declarations, closure of storage facilities, installation by
inspectors of devices for this purpose and periodic checks on such devices,
presence of inspectors at the time when chemical weapons are moved out of the
facility for elimination, sealing of the means of transport, etc. Upon
complete removal of all chemical weapons from the facility, an international
inspection team would draw up a statement certifying this fact.
We expect that the proposals we have presented will enable us to agree
promptly and without delay on the provisions relating to declarations of
chemical weapons.
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(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)
A number of other issues relating to Article 4, "chemical weapons", of
the convention, are to be considered in the near future. We express our
willingness to reach agreement on all outstanding issues in that article,
including those related to the time-frame, order and methods of elimination.
Bearing in mind that the proposal that a State party should have the right to
divert chemical weapons has caused difficulties, we have carefully weighed up
all the pros and cons of the proposal: we now proceed on the assumption that
all chemical weapons are to be destroyed.
The Soviet delegation hopes that our flexible approach will make it
possible to find solutions to the above-mentioned issue and will help
accelerate the negotiations. We also call upon other delegations to join in
these efforts and to present concrete proposals for mutually acceptable
solutions.
In his statement yesterday, General Secretary Gorbachev, referring to
problems of verification, said inter alia: "Now that we are coming to
consider major measures for actual disarmament affecting the most sensitive
area of national security, the Soviet Union will be pressing for the most
stringent system of supervision and verification, including international
verification. There must be complete certainty that the commitments are
honoured by all."
That is precisely why the Soviet Union gives priority to negotiating an
agreement on effective international verification of compliance by all States
parties with their obligations under the convention. Such verification should
not only effectively ensure confidence in the destruction of chemical weapons
and facilities for their production but also effectively preclude any rebirth
of chemical weapons anywhere and in any country.
The negotiations on verification machinery are based on a general
understanding that the basis will be a system of "routine" international
inspections. On the other hand, it has also been recognized that such
international inspection should be complemented by on-site challenge
inspections so that the whole verification mechanism of the Convention may be
particularly reliable. Thus challenge inspections would serve above all the
purpose of preventing breaches of the convention. Ultimately they would
ensure the possibility of implementing international verification with regard
to any activities relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical
weapons. These principles should be taken fully into account in elaborating
specific procedures for such challenge inspection.
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the participants in the
negotiations, despite agreement on a number of important aspects, still
encounter great difficulty in finalizing agreements on challenge inspection.
We believe that basically these difficulties have a perfectly objective and
real basis: States may indeed have certain locations and facilities which are
not relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Access
to such locations and facilities, due to their particularly sensitive nature,
is normally prohibited or restricted. One cannot therefore exclude the
possibility of a State having the right to refuse a challenge inspection in
exceptional cases when its supreme interests are jeopardized. The existence
of such areas and sensitive points have by the way been recognized in the
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(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)
document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe. In this context we consider that the view
expressed by Ambassador Dolgu, Head of the delegation of Romania, was quite
justified, namely that it would be advisable to use the provisions of that
document at the negotiations on the convention on the prohibition of chemical
weapons.
The participants in the negotiations have different views on solutions to
the issue of challenge inspections at the present time. Some propose that the
Executive Council be involved. Others, while in favour of providing access to
a number of sensitive locations and facilities automatically, immediately upon
request, make exemptions for private premises. Moreover the procedure for
implementing challenge inspections envisaged under these proposals while
securing the interest of the major Powers and members of military alliances,
gives a small number of States certain rights of which practically all the
other parties to the convention are deprived of. There is also a proposal to
the effect that in the event of a challenge, the challenged State should have
the right to propose alternative measures which should satisfy the challenging
State.
In view of these various proposals and approaches, movement towards
agreement apparently might be initiated by defining a number of cases where
refusal of an inspection on the requested scare would not be allowed: for
example, in the event of suspected use of chemical weapons, or inspection of
locations and facilities declared under the convention. It appears this idea
en-joys wide support at the negotations, and understandably so, for we are
dealing with the cases and facilities which are most directly relevant to a
convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and consequently there
should be no reason for refusing an inspection.
As for other cases and other locations and facilities, in elaborating
agreement on challenge inspections the idea of using alternative measures, up
to viewing the facility from without and collecting chemical samples near the
facility, might be helpful. Such a differentiation would, in our view, ensure
progress towards agreement on this issue which, while unresolved, hampers
agreement on other issues of the convention.
Of course, there remains the difficult problem of what should be done if
the alternative measures still do not satisfy the challenging State.
We share the hope expressed by the head of the Swedish delegation,
Ambassador Theorin, that the "general narrowing of positions on verification
that has been demonstrated lately should help to facilitate agreement on this
issue" -- i.e. international challenge inspection. The Soviet delegation
declares itself ready to seek actively for mutually acceptable solutions on
the basis of any positive ideas and suggestions which are on the negotiating
table.
We have been asked by a number of delegations to explain what is meant by
permanent international verification which the Soviet Union proposes applying
to chemical-weapon destruction facilities, specialized facilities for the
production of category I chemicals for permitted purposes and to a certain
number of facilities producing key precursors. I would like to explain our
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(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)
understanding of permanent verification. In our view, such verification can
be implemented either through the permanent presence of international
inspectors at facilities or through visits to facilities by international
inspectors in combination with permanent use of control and measuring
instruments at facilities, including remote monitoring. As for the order and
modalities for the use of such instruments, helpful solutions in our view
might be prompted by the experience in the implementation of
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Identification of "important"
(in terms of verification) points at the facilities, sealing of certain units,
installation of photo and video equipment, measuring devices in agreed
sections of the technological process, maintenance of international
verification instruments by international inspectors, etc.
As for systematic international inspection, we propose that their
frequency and timing be determined by the Consultative Committee on the basis
of the risk posed to the convention by a given chemical or facility. In
working out the details of systematic international inspections, we could also
draw on the experience and practices of the IAEA, in particular with regard to
providing the different types of systematic inspections, (routine and
special), the frequency and time-frame of inspections, and the right of the
IAEA to determine the facilities to be inspected at a given time. We believe
that the experience and practices of the IAEA might also prompt us to the
right solutions on other questions of verifying compliance with the chemical
weapons convention. They might be drawn upon in working out an agreement on
the activities of the inspectorate too, that is the appointment of inspectors,
their privileges, inspection procedures, etc.
On the basis of the provisions included in the convention, it would be
advisable to elaborate subsequently, along the lines of the IAEA, a model
agreement between a State Party and an appropriate body of the Convention
which would govern the practical aspects of implementing international
verification at facilities (the verification procedure, specific measures for
the closure of facilities, etc.)
When the convention is in effect, specific measures of verification with
regard to chemical-weapon production facilities and chemical-weapon
destruction facilities would be agreed upon by a State Party and the
Consultative Committee and included in the relevant plans for the elimination
of stocks and facilities.
The emerging prospect of the conclusion of a convention puts on the
negotiating agenda the question of interaction of States under the new
conditions where chemical weapons have been banned. The Soviet Union is
strongly in favour of implementing wide international co-operation on an equal
and mutually beneficial basis in the developments of peaceful chemical
industry as an alternative to the development, production and stockpiling of
chemical weapons. One cannot but agree with the view that without provisions
to this effect a future convention would be weakened. A convention on the
prohibition of chemical weapons can, in our opinion, become an example of
practical implementation of the agreed principles of "disarmament for
development".
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(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)
The negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons have gained
momentum and it is our hope that the proposals we have presented today will
contribute towards speedy agreement on the convention. However, we cannot
remain impassive in the face of certain statements which are in fact aimed at
creating difficulties in the negotiations.
The British magazine, Jane's Defence Weekly, recently published an
article on chemical-weapon issues by K. Adelman, Director of the United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency -- incidentally, this article has been
reprinted in our newspaper, Pravda. In that article, Mr. Adelman writes: "To
have a chance of achieving that (a chemical-weapons ban), we need to ensure
that our negotiators' hands are not empty. Congress, therefore, should fund
the Administration's request for binary chemical weapons production". In our
view this logic is strange, to say the least. It reminds me of a satirical
story by the well-known Czech writer, Janislav Hasgek, about the Conference on
Disarmament at the time of the League of Nations. That Conference literally
blew up as a result of careless handling of a new explosive, "Washingtonite",
by a representative of the military business who stood waiting at the entrance
to the conference room with samples of his product to offer the participants
of the Conference.
It is simply regrettable that the negotiating portfolio of the
United States delegation is still being replenished not with compromise
proposals but with new types of chemical weapons, which can only poison the
atmosphere at the negotiations.
The Soviet delegation has today expressed certain views on ways of
reaching agreement at the next stage of negotiations. We intend to continue
to work actively for the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition of
chemical weapons this year. The positive effects of the conclusion of such
convention would be of great significance, and not only in the military field.
Its conclusion would demonstrate that it is practically possible to find
solutions to the complex problems of disarmament through the joint efforts of
States, and would contribute to creating a more positive political climate.
This is the aim of the new Soviet proposals, and we expect similar steps on
the outstanding issues from other participants in the negotiations.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I now give the
floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala.
Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, the friendship between our
two countries extending over so many centuries has resulted in a uniaue
relationship as equal sovereign States despite vast disparities in size,
population and power. In the field of disarmament we have respected your
principled approach and your many initiatives including the declaration of
non-first use of nuclear weapons, the unilateral reduction of your army by
1 million, your decision not to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere and
your consistent policy that disarmament is the concern of all nations
irrespective of size and might, as mentioned in your distinguished Foreign
Minister's message to our Conference on 3 February. As an outstanding
representative of your country we are confident that you will conduct our work
in the first month of the 1987 session so as to create the necessary impetus
to carry us forward in our task of negotiating for disarmament.
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(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)
We would like to take this opportunity of thanking
Ambassador Alan Beesley of Canada for having presided so competently
over our work in August 1986 and in the inter-sessional period.
My delegation extends its sincere condolences to the delegation of the
United States of America and to the family of the late
Ambassador Donald Lowitz. We have lost a friend and a colleage whose
outstanding personal qualities will long be remembered. As we begin a new
session in our Conference my delegation would like to acknowledge the
contribution made to our forum by Ambassador Sutowardoyo of Indonesia,
Ambassador Franceschi of Italy, Ambassador Issraelyan of the USSR and
Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia, who have left us. At the same time we welcome
Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa of Brazil, Ambassador Morel
of France, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Yamada of Japan,
Ambassador Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Nazarkine of USSR and Ambassador Kosin
of Yugoslavia. My delegation was especially touched by the poignant statement
last week of Ambassador Yamada speaking as a survivor of the Hiroshima
holocaust. The words on that monument in Hiroshima "Let it never happen
again" should indeed be in our minds at all times during our important work in
this Conference to ensure their realization in our time. Nuclear deterrence
theory based on the continuity of adversarial relationships and the
credibility of the threat that it will happen again has only led to greater
arsenals of nuclear weapons with an explosive power of over 1 million
Hiroshima bombs, and greater insecurity.
Despite its being the International year of Peace, the events of the last
year did not fulfil the deeply-held aspirations of the people of the world in
terms of concrete agreements on disarmament. We recognize, however, that a
significant improvement in the international climate for disarmament
negotiations has continued since 1985. Reykjavik was a missed opportunity
where this improvement could have culminated in a radical change for the
better. To the extent that the participants at Reykjavik are ready to carry
forward its lessons will depend the real historical significance of that
weekend's discussions. The reports we have had so far are not encouraging.
The leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation who held
a Summit Meeting in Bangalore on 16 and 17 November 1986, stated their view on
Reykjavik in the following terms:
"The Heads of State and Government noted with deep disappointment
that the promise held out by the Reykjavik Summit could not be realized.
They, however, noted with satisfaction that the proposals made at the
Summit were still on the table. They expressed the earnest hope that the
negotiations would be resumed without delay so that a decisive step could
be taken towards realizing the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear
weapons altogether."
For Sri Lanka as a founder-member of the Non-aligned Movement and one of
its former Chairmen, the Harare Summit of non-aligned leaders represented an
important event in the International Year of Peace. The Declaration issued at
Harare contained the main principles and policies of 101 non-aligned countries
in the field of disarmament and international security. Basic to these is the
non-aligned concept of global security which the Harare Declaration expressed
in the following words:
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(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)
"Historically, States have considered that they could achieve
security through the possession of arms. The advent of nuclear weapons,
has however, radically changed this situation. Nuclear weapons are more
than weapons of war; they are instruments of mass annihilation. The
accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, constitutes a
threat to the continued survival of mankind. It has therefore become
imperative that States abandon the dangerous goal of unilateral security
through armament and embrace the objective of common security through
disarmament."
Many speakers in our current session have noted the achievements
registered in the First Committee of the forty-first session of the
United Nations General Assembly. The distinguished Ambassador of Mexico has
set out in detail the resolutions adopted in respect of some of the more
important issues including the priority nuclear subjects. My delegation was
also encouraged by the atmosphere that prevailed and the voting patterns which
implied a broader area of agreement on the substantive disarmament issues. We
now face a crucial test as we attempt to transfer those resolutions into the
negotiating context of our Conference. Convergence in the deliberative
United Nations bodies devoted to disarmament cannot cohere with divergence in
this sole negotiating body. The hopes that have been expressed for positive
developments in our 1987 session are therefore justified and the Sri Lanka
delegation will strive together with others to ensure their realization. A
related development which we welcome is the entry into force of the Treaty of
Rarotonga and the signature of the relevant Protocols by two of the
five nuclear Powers.
With 1987, the Year of Peace has yielded to the Year of Shelter for the
Homeless designated as such by the United Nations on a proposal made in 1980
by Prime Minister Premadasa of Sri Lanka. This focus on a core issue of
development as an investment in mankind is also a reminder to all of us of the
relationship between disarmament and development. The global expenditure of
almost a trillion dollars a year on armaments, both nuclear and conventional,
is by all empirical standards inconsistent with stable and balanced social and
economic development and contributes to distortions and imbalances in the
world economy. The International Conference on the Relationship between
Disarmament and Development rescheduled for this year and to be held in
New York can, with universal participation and intensive preparation, result
in an agreed programme of disarmament measures releasing resources for
development purposes.
Another forthcoming event which impinges on the work of our Conference is
the convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament in 1988 and its preparatory process beginning this year. The
approach of the third special session devoted to disarmament must necessarily
lend a sense of urgency to our work. We have within our grasp the completion
of a convention on chemical weapons and the Comprehensive Programme on
Disarmament before the third special session. In addition we can and must
show progress in the nuclear issues and especially on item 1 of our agenda,
Nuclear-Test Ban.
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(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)
We have entered the ninth year of our existence as the single
multilateral negotiating body. The agenda before us is dictated by the needs
of our common security and not by the national interest of individual nations
alone. Our failure to act on this agenda is a common failure but the
responsibility for that failure cannot be shared knowing as we do the relative
capacity of the members of this body to contribute to disarmament. We have
begun this year with the re-establishment of two Ad Hoc Committees which have
begun functioning without delay and the setting up of two further ad hoc
committees which we hope will commence work soon. There are two agenda items
in which my delegation has a particular interest in seeing some forward
movement while emphasizing the need to make progress on all agenda items.
We have in this Conference remained far too long in a stalemated position
on item 1 -- Nuclear-Test Ban. The need for the Conference to work on this
important agenda item is self-evident. Self-evident too is the impact of
external developments. The rejection of the offer of converting a unilateral
moratorium on nuclear testing into a bilateral moratorium; the dilatory
linkage being established between bilateral negotiations for a reduction in
the yields and the numbers of nuclear tests with bilateral negotiations for
reductions in nuclear weapons; the Six-Nation Mexico Declaration of
7 August 1986, with its practical proposals on the verification of a test
ban; and the overlap in content and similarity of voting patterns on
General Assembly resolutions 41/46 A, which Sri Lanka co-sponsored, and 41/47,
on which we voted affirmatively, are some of these developments. The impact
of some of them is clearly negative and while we cannot ignore their reality
we can seek to build on the positive developments for our work here.
The distinguished Ambassador for Mexico has indicated a possible way to
further our work by setting up an ad hoc committee with a mandate acceptable
to all. The distinguished Ambassador of Japan also made an important
contribution by noting that the gap we have to bridge is indeed not so wide as
to daunt us in our diplomatic efforts. Our purpose in wanting to see an
ad hoc committee set up on item 1 is not a window-dressing effort to make the
Conference appear to be working towards a nuclear-test ban so as to placate
international public opinion, mollify domestic lobbies or stall other moves to
achieve a comprehensive test ban. We want to see real work begin on practical
steps or interim steps including on an international seismic monitoring
network with the active participation of all delegations. But the steps must
lead to the objective clearly set out in both General Assembly
resolutions 41/46 A and 41/47 -- a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty. We
recognize and indeed respect the differences that exist among us for the
moment about the pace at which we should progress towards a Comprehensive
Test-Ban Treaty. The objective however remains a common one and our
differences should not be an impediment towards practical work in an ad hoc
committee in this Conference. Statements made here on verification clearly
indicate that there is a common approach. Work in an ad hoc committee can
demonstrate the reality of this. We shall soon be observing the first death
anniversary of the late Olof Palme who campaigned so long and so hard for an
end to nuclear testing. The Palme Commission pamphlet on a comprehensive test
ban published recently in pursuance of his wishes and dedicated to his memory
concluded: "Together with measures to reduce significantly the size of
existing nuclear 'arsenals and to limit the characteristics of new nuclear
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(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)
weapon systems, a comprehensive test ban could constrain nuclear capabilities
and help to create a new political atmosphere in which the danger of nuclear
war would be greatly reduced".
Over recent years there has been a steady swell of support for the
non-aligned resolution in the General Assembly initiated by Egypt and
Sri Lanka on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which has emerged
as the only resolution on this crucial issue. Last year, resolution 41/53 was
adopted by a record vote of 154 for, with one sole abstention, and no votes
against the resolution. Once again it seems to be a situation where there is
a common objective shared by us all -- the prevention of an arms race in outer
space -- which, as the province of all mankind, cannot be an arena for the
threat or use of force and must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
While the resolution acknowledges the primary role of the Conference on
Disarmament in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as
appropriate, on this issue differences exist on what steps are necessary now
for this body to achieve these objectives. Since 1985 we have had an Ad Hoc
Committee mandated with the deliberately circumscribed task of exploring
relevant issues. Last year my delegation was encouraged by the efforts of
some delegations to advance the work of the Ad Hoc Committee by attempting to
agree on definitions of important concepts and terms relevant to this agenda
item. We regret that the participation in this important aspect of work was
limited. We would like to see the Ad Hoc Committee re-established with the
minimum delay possible and as an earnest of its sincerity the Group of 21 has
made a very modest proposal for a mandate which we trust will be accepted. No
one can be so wedded to the status quo as to object to the addition that has
been proposed, bearing in mind paragraph 80 of the Final Document as
reiterated in General Assembly resolution 41/53. The message of the
distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations to this Conference
enjoined us "to create conditions for negotiating agreements on this vital
matter". That is our modest goal for this session.
We hear, meanwhile, disturbing calls for an early deployment of
space-based ballistic missile defence systems which were until recently
described to us as research programmes. They will, if heeded, inevitably
involve non-compliance with existing treaties which even the most elastic
interpretation will not conceal. Whether ballistic missile defence systems
are being researched and developed in the full glare of media attention or in
clandestine, they represent generically a dangerous new phase in the arms
race. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that our discussions here are taking
place while irreversible steps are being planned to place weapons in space. A
balanced and even-handed non-aligned attempt in pursuance of the Harare
Declaration to ban such obviously offensive weapons in space as dedicated
anti-satellite weapons met with the strongest opposition from those who have
crafted the most elaborate arguments to justify defensive systems. As the
Harare Declaration noted "Measures aimed at developing, testing or deploying
weapons and weapons systems in outer space could, through a constant chain of
action and reaction, lead to an escalation of the arms race in both
'offensive' and 'defensive' weapons thus making the outbreak of nuclear
conflict more likely". There is an obvious inconsistency in seeking a world
free of ballistic missiles and proceeding to erect shields against them which
the overwhelming body of scientific opinion assesses as being vulnerable and
therefore only functional as part of a first-strike capability. The
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(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)
deployment of weapons in space must be prevented in our common interest. The
attractions of hi-tech warfare and an interlocking programme of lucrative
research contracts should not divert us from the dangers of an arms race in
space and the need to prevent it going beyond the research stage. This task
cannot be left exclusively to bilateral negotiations. It also requires the
establishment of a group of scientific experts within this Conference so that
multilateral expertise can be pooled on the technical issues relevant to
preventing an arms race in outer space. My delegation therefore supports the
proposal made by the Swedish delegation and calls for an early agreement on
the mandate and composition of such a group.
The discussions at Reykjavik gave us all a glimpse of a nuclear-free
world as a realistic possibility seriously contemplated by the leaders of the
two nations accounting for 95 per cent of nuclear weapons in the world.
Non-aligned countries like Sri Lanka would like to encourage these nations to
pursue this goal in their bilateral negotiations. We are disturbed however by
those who seek to obstruct this, arguing the need for nuclear weapons on the
basis of an alleged inferiority in conventional arms. The goal of nuclear
disarmament must be pursued if the spirit of Reykjavik is to inform the
bilateral discussions taking place and lead to agreements in all disarmament
forums including the nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva, as well as the
MBFR and CSCE. That goal is a priority issue in this multilateral negotiating
body.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Sri Lanka for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President
himself and the country that the President represents. I now give the floor
to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Ambassador StUlpnagel.
Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President,
speaking for the first time in this year's session of the Conference on
Disarmament, it is a particular pleasure for me to congratulate you to the
assumption of your office. At this point in time we can already note how
brilliantly you discharge your duties, doing it with diplomatic skill,
friendliness and resolution.
In this family of nations which constitute the Conference on Disarmament,
we all feel deep sorrow for the loss of an eminent colleague who had been with
us for two years. With Don Lowitz my delegation has lost a friend, the
Conference has a lost a warm hearted, politically engaged and professional
dynamic personality. We are grateful to have known him.
We have new colleagues among us. I welcome Ambassadors Pierre Morel of
France, Aldo Pugliese of Italy, Chusei Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Hacene of
Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa of Brazil and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. My
delegation looks forward to working closely with all of them.
Any observer with sufficient interest in our proceedings would, from a
most perfunctory study of statements during the first two weeks of our work
this year, certainly recognize the importance and prominence of emphasis that
item 1 of our agenda, nuclear test ban, has been given in many interventions.
Some of the speeches did not fail to paint a very sombre picture of the
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(Mr. von STaPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany)
situation the Conference finds itself in with regard to the work on a CTB;
neither was there a lack of pre-emptive accusations, which were visibly aimed
at one group.
I cannot share the speculative pessimism of some of our colleagues;
quite the contrary: an impartial and detached analysis both of the work the
Conference achieved last year on the subject and of the developments that took
place since it adjourned at the end of August lead me to believe that the
circumstances are most propitious for the establishment of an ad hoc commitee
and for positive and meaningful results to be achieved by it.
The controversy concerning the formulation of those parts in last year's
report of the Conference on item no. 1 tends still to obscure the view of what
has already been achieved in terms of a considerable narrowing of differenc(?s
in an important field of the CTB discussion, i.e. the question of
verification. In our view the Conference has reached a remarkable momentum
towards general acceptance of an effective international monitoring and
verification system. This promising development, as WP see it, is due to the
efforts of many delegations who have contributed important elements to a new
and more refined view of test-ban safeguards. Needless to say, the conceptual
accomplishments that have enlarged the common ground on which to build could
only be achieved on the basis of the purposeful contribution by the
Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts over nb- last 10 years, and especially by its
last progress report, CD/721, which has open remarkable new perspectives
towards the realization of an inPrnational seismic monitoring system by
detailing plans to integrate the exchange of level II (waveform) dat:i th
next international seismic data exchange experiment.
We consider hallmarks SOMP of the contributions of indivi-aual
during last year's session of the Conference. There is, for one, tht-
Working Paper CD/712, representing an admirabl and knowledgeable comni-?
of present insights into the rv,quirements of a global seismic netoor'c;
calling for the definition and development of prototype monitorina stz3t,
this paper further develops a proposal my delegation had alre7,6
Working Papers CD/612 and CD/24.
Norway's contribution, in this Working Paper CD/714, was particularly
significant in that it explores the interaction of regional small-apertur
seismic arrays with a global network incorporating a number of such arrayc.
The practical experiences with the Norwegian regional seismic arrny system
NORESS provide an Indispensable input for the operationality and tn.
continuous improvement of an effective global system.
The most unambiguous demand for an early instal'ation of a
seismic monitoring network along the lines of the working papers of irv
delegation I already mentioned is contained in the Autralian Wonn Paer.
CD/717, which clearly ocints out the adnnntace no ,ne harYestd by :wift
enactment of the proposals scantaled in it: in's- e:it. a
global seismic monitoring network bed initially on the PT:ist
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(Mr. von STULPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany)
In keeping with the advances of seismic technology, experience could be
gained with long-term operations and the system could be perfected in such a
way that, on the very entry into force of a CTBT, the comprehensive monitoring
devices could at once become a truly safeguarding system.
Among other valuable contributions of individual delegations one has
certainly to count Working Paper CD/724 by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, in which it formalized a change of position concerning the
inclusion of the level II data exchange in further discussions.
This brief review of some of the proceedings of our Conference during its
1986 session amply substantiates my initial claim that substantial progress
towards common concepts, common methodology, has been achieved during last
year's session in spite of some attempts to the contrary. In the view of my
delegation the time has come to discuss inter alia,those common concepts
within an ad hoc committee on a CTB, to be established at the earliest
possible juncture. The work of the Committee should help us to reach
practical and universally acceptable solutions in our quest for a
comprehensive, fully verifiable test ban; it is our firm belief that this
should be possible on the basis of the working programme proposed in CD/621
and within the confines of a mandate as contained, for instance, in CD/521.
Certainly, if an ad hoc committee were instituted, its discussions would
not be exhausted in merely technical deliberations; a comprehensive and fully
verifiable test ban would, if agreed upon, be of eminent importance for the
security policies of States world wide. It is exactly for this reason that
the topic of a CTB cannot be discussed by the Conference without paying due
attention to its general implications in the nuclear age. The Federal
Government believes that the goal of agreement on a reliably verifiable
comprehensive nuclear test ban at the earliest possible juncture can be
realized gradually. This should be achieved by reducing allowed testing to
agreed and defined intervals of time and by consecutively refraining from
testing altogether in the framework of agreed reductions of nuclear weapons.
While my delegation wishes for timely results from the bilateral talks
which the United States of America and the Soviet Union are holding here at
Geneva about questions relevant to test limitation in all its aspects and
which are scheduled to enter into a new round in the middle of March, my
Government has never hesitated to express its view that there are more than
bilateral aspects to the problem of a CTBT. The community of States can
indeed contribute substantially to the solution of those problems which still
stand in the way of an agreement.
We do not agree, though, with some delegations which content themselves
with dwelling lengthily on their finding that the verification problems still
facing us can be solved -- and indeed some went as far as to imply that they
were already solved. In our view attention should be drawn to the numerous
prerequisites listed in the Swedish Working Paper CD/712 to ensure the
incorporation of state-of-the-art technology into a global monitoring network
that does not yet exist and has only once been tested in a most elementary
form. A great number of stations that participated in the 1984 GSETT, though
already representing a high level of technological achievement in themselves,
would not match the definitions given in the last chapter of CD/712 for the
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(Mr. von STULPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany)
prototype of a CD monitoring station. Although individual seismographic
stations, even if they fell short of the aforementioned demands concerning
their equipment, might work effectively, the task of operating in a reliable
manner an interlinked system of as much as 50 to 100 seismic stations based in
different countries and run by many nations, as well as the task of
communicating the data derived from these stations to and from international
data centres -- possibly in real time -- has not yet been satisfactorily
resolved, as the report of the GSE on the technical test run in 1984 has
demonstrated. Furthermore, CD/712 proposes as an additional measure for the
analysis of doubtful seismic events to combine the findings of the
international seismic monitoring network with data derived from satellite
inspection. The realization of this proposal would indeed greatly enhance
verification capabilities and most probably resolve most of the outstanding
verification problems; but no multilaterally accessible satellite system for
vatification purposes exists as of today or oftomorrow. And we do not know
that even ti most ardent NTB proponent has volunteered with a corresponding
effer. 're conclusion we draw from this is that we should do everything
z)OFSiblP to improve the global seismic monitoring system until the possibility
depicted in the Swedish Working Paper may come true.
My Government has noted with great pleasure that the six Heads of State
or Government, of the New Dehli initiative, at the meeting in Mexico on
7 August 1986, have expressed their readiness to actively participate ir
surmounting the outstandinc verification problems of a future CTBT. Ne waule
welcome it if, besides Swesden, also other States participating in the
initiative would see fit to senn their experts to the GSE, especially wit'e
regard to the new test run of the global monitoring system envisaged for
My Geeernment has repeatedly declared that it considers a CTP as or
rne main 7r)als of its sarmament and arms control policy. And jf w tLin
tree we still se=, some diffieulties in tne feld of eerification, we do eer
ant to nivr. room to any doubt that we will activeleo pursue a course aier at
clearinn rceay these obstacles, -,Jaich in any case we de not find insicmener2rs
As a step towards substantiating its OW7 commitment to this global
system, the Federal Government decided to intensify its cceoperatve on::
in tne field of fast and re2iable data exchanae and storage of acquire
2eismic data. It therefore finances t.ee continuous operation of a seiemic
data anlysis centre installed at the Federal Institute for Geosciences and
Nararal Resources in Hannover. The Institute, by way of direct
ocput4,r-toecomputer links with other countries, is in a position to stere 3;"1]
ro exchange all relevant seismic data includ;ng level II (waveform, data.
r/ concentrated concentrated our research in the field of designing the hardware and
software necessary to acquire, analyse and transmit seismic data including
waveform data on direct computer-to-computer links. Our seismic data centres,
specifically and from ':he outset, are designed for open access and remote ,ata
treatroent via telecommunication links so as to freely share our specific
knowledge in this field with interested seismic scientists. We expl:cinly
request all members of ?ce Conference to make Use of this hitherto singular
ea:rviee, two demonstrations of which will be (liven to interested heads of
delegations and to the experts of the GSE on 5 and 6 March 1987 here in
Geneva. The data centre described above in our view constitutes an important
step forward on the way to the creation and reliable operation of an
international seismic monitoring network.
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(Mr. von STULPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany)
Mr. President, let me now turn shortly to other subjects on our agenda.
In our view the negotiations on a world-wide ban of chemical weapons command
high priority. In document CD/734 we have the outlines of a treaty which, in
important parts, is already well developed. The Conference on Disarmament has
before it the task of solving the questions still open, especially in the
field of verification, as rapidly as possible.
Concerning the verification of non-production, it is in our view
important that the selection of substances which are to be forbidden or
controlled should satisfy the criteria of possible use, or better misuse, for
military purposes. It would not be a sensible contribution to the solution of
that problem if we included in that selection substances which are militarily
irrelevant.
As to challenge inspection, we still see in CD/715 the model which could
finally satisfy all interests. We appeal to our partners in this negotiation
to co-operate in the search of a solution because it is this co-operation
which is the true expression of credibility of negotiating partners.
Readiness to adopt CD/715, as expressed in principle by formerly hesitant
delegations, is welcome as long as the conceptual approach of this proposal is
not diluted. We will, in this context, screen carefully what the Soviet
delegation has said this morning, which lends itself to the interpretation
that the Soviet delegation now accepts the principle of mandatory or
obligatory challenge inspections; but as I say, we will have to look at the
text very closely and see what the other conditions which go along with it
will mean. A procedural arrangement for example prior to an
on-challenge-inspection that would put into question the inspection itself, or
in any case delay it, is not acceptable to us. We are convinced that an
effective verification of a chemical-weapon ban is attainable if the controls
on non-production and challenge inspections are adequately formed. What has
to be secured is that the Convention can reliably prevent that militarily
significant amounts of chemical weapons or their precursors from being
produced or stocked secretly. The methods and volume of the controls must be
realistic, credible and effective. These are the essentials and we think that
within the near future we could make decisive progress in this field. We are
ready to co-operate.
My delegation welcomes the long-established Finnish initiative to provide
advice for the necessary monitoring equipment and technical means for
verification purposes. I understand that the recent special workshop on
automatic monitoring in terms of detection of alleged used, verification of
destruction and non-production in Helsinki is another step towards the common
goal of effective verification. My Government looks forward to the
communication of the results of this workshop.
We noted with interest the reference which the Romanian delegation made
in our CW negotiations to the Document of the Stockholm Conference which was
taken up today. Indeed, the most important aspect of the Stockholm Conference
is the agreement on on-site inspections without refusal. Thereby, obligatory
on-site inspection has been recognized as an essential element of effective
verification for any arms control and disarmament agreement. We think this is
an essential breakthrough to which we attach great importance in light of the
whole arms control process. But then, Stockholm is not part of the true arms
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(Mr. von STI.JLPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany)
control process. It is a measure of confidence-building measures, and not
what we are doing here in the realm of chemical weapons, disarmament
measures. As my delegation pointed out in our Plenary Statement of 5 February
of this year already challenge inspections should cover all possible
installations and all locations -- they all must be "challenge inspection
objects", and there we differ from what we have heard this morning.
My delegation hopes that it will be possible to agree on a mandate for
our discussions about space and the possible arms race in space. We think it
useful to screen all aspects even more profoundly than we did last year.
Concerning radiological weapons, we think that after the reinstitution of
our Ad Hoc Committee what is needed now is informal consultations, to enable
us to find out how our work in both tracks, A and B, could possibly proceed.
If it proves that the forced merger of the two tracks renders us unable to
speak at all about those aspects of the problem which might otherwise be
solvable, then we should find a way to address the unitarian approach. The
public in all our countries justifiably awaits answers from the Conference on
Disarmament on this issue.
In iccordance with the unanimously adopted resolution 41/421 of the
First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly all delegations should
now endeavour to contribute in a realistic way to the finalization of the
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, if possible in the given time-frame.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of
Germany for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President.
I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic,
Ambassador Rose.
Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, I have already
had an opportunity to congratulate you, on behalf of my delegation, on your
assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Allow me to
extend a warm welcome to the newly arrived Ambassadors of Algeria, Brazil,
France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. I wish them
all the best in their office as Heads of their countries' delegations to the
Conference on Disarmament. On behalf of my delegation, I should like to
express our deepest sympathy to the United States delegation on the unexpected
passing away of its chief delegate, Ambassador Donald Lowitz.
A comparison of the initial situation at this session with that of last
year reveals new elements propitious to our work. At the same time, we are
compelled to note that the arms race has not slowed down and that arsenals
have not become smaller. The entire international situation remains
exceedingly complex and tense. In order for it to be markedly improved, much
greater efforts are needed. With this aim in mind, socialist countries
proposed at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly that all
nations should jointly commence work on a comprehensive system of peace and
international security. The system should embrace the most important areas of
Government-to-Government relations and their interaction and bring about a
world in which peoples can look to the future without having to worry about
their existence and without the tremendous burden of armaments on their
shoulders.
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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
The main thrust of this great project is to free mankind, even during
this century, from nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, as
suggested by the Soviet Union at the outset of the Year of Peace. This
initiative goes hand-in-hand with the Budapest Appeal, which calls for a
dramatic cut in conventional forces and armaments in Europe.
In this context, we attach great importance to the decisions taken by the
non-aligned movement and the signatories of the Delhi Declaration, which aim
in the same direction.
Behind all these endeavours, there is the recognition that a joint
political effort will be required and that national interests must honestly
and reciprocally be respected if the security of peoples and countries is to
be guaranteed in the nuclear and space age. As far as we are concerned, this
is what the call for a fresh approach to international relations is all about.
We know full well how far some circles are from this mode of thinking.
Yet in the final analysis, they will have to meet this historic challenge,
since there is no other alternative in the face of the threatened annihilation
of the human race. In yesterday's address to the International Forum for A
Nuclear-Free World, General Secretary Gorbachev put it in this way: "The
question is like this: either the political mentality is geared to the
requirements of the times, or civilization and life itself on Earth may
perish".
Naturally, the socialist countries' initiatives do not only seek to
brighten the horizons for future development. They must also be considered as
offers of practical measures to be tackled right now.
Seen in this light, the Reykjavik meeting was an especially outstanding
event. It is among the first things to be mentioned whenever reference is
made to new elements. The emerging possibility of radical disarmament
measures is an encouraging sign and fosters determination to labour still more
committedly for the cessation of the insane arms race. However, irritation on
the part of certain quarters has not escaped our attention either. Those
concerned regard Reyjavik as an accident and long to return to the
status quo ante. What we, in turn, urge countries to do is to build on the
results achieved in Reyjavik and translate them into concrete agreements. In
particular, the aim must be to reduce strategic weapons by 50 per cent within
the next five years, to eliminate medium-range weapons in Europe and to
strengthen the ABM regime. The German Democratic Republic has declared on
this score that the countermeasures taken on its territory could be reversed
once medium-range missiles are removed.
The results attained in Stockholm and at the Conference that reviewed the
Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons are unanimously judged as
an indication of broader readiness for constructive dialogue. May these
examples, showing that problems can be resolved if reason and goodwill
prevail, have a favourable impact on our forum. The same is to be hoped for
the relevant resolutions adopted at the forty-first session of the
United Nations General Assembly.
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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
We are watching with keen interest and with particular satisfaction the
growing efforts aimed at curbing the arms race regionally. One such instance
is the ratification of the treaty on the nuclear-free zone in the
South Pacific. Inspired by the same principal objective, the German
Democratic Republic has proposed regional arms limitation measures in Europe,
notably a nuclear-weapon-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons in
central Europe. As for the reduction of forces and armaments in Europe, it is
our hope that the current talks between the members of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization and NATO may very soon lead to successful negotiations by the
parties concerned.
We would end up with a one-sided picture, if we left out of consideration
the developments running in the very opposite direction. They are alarming
indeed. The deviation from the Salt II Agreement, the mounting intensity of
attacks on the ABM Treaty and the refusal to give a positive response to the
Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests are a clear indication of
the intention to continue and fuel the arms race in all fields and to extend
it to outer space.
The bilateral negotiations and talks between the USSR and the
United States appear to be making no progress on matters of substance, either
on nuclear and space arms or on the cessation of nuclear weapons testing.
These are, in brief, the conflicting circumstances under which the
Conference has begun its 1987 term. We believe whatever positive element
there is should be used to bring differing positions closer together and to
seek progress with even greater tenacity in all the fields of interest to the
Conference. This is precisely what the Deputy Foreign Ministers of socialist
countries were guided by when they met in Berlin a few weeks ago to deliberate
issues of relevance to the Conference on Disarmament. In this context, I wish
to point out that the delegation of the German Democratic Republic considers
as priority items a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests, the prohibition
of chemical weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
Certainly, we are also aware of the importance of the other subjects on the
agenda, including the call for a comprehensive disarmament programme to be
submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its resumed
forty-first session.
Of special urgency now is that a fresh start be made on the drafting of a
treaty that provides for the complete cessation of all nuclear weapons
testing. Both the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly and the
statements we have heard so far during the plenary debate give evidence of
broad readiness to move ahead. No doubt, the fastest way to arrive at a
treaty would be through regular negotiations. For this reason, my delegation
would prefer an appropriate mandate for a committee. In order to help prepare
the ground for an accord, it would be equally ready, however, to take part in
goal-oriented discussions about problems to be resolved. Without going into
details, I would like to point out some of the aspects which, in our
judgement, will have a major bearing on the practical approach to be chosen.
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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
Firstly, the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests will remain an
international task of utmost urgency. Achieving it would impact very
favourably on the entire disarmament process, and appropriate disarmament
forums should be used to pursue this goal. This Conference, however, seems to
us particularly capable of working out a universal treaty.
Secondly, we believe in the possibility of intermediate measures in the
event that a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests is recognized and
formulated as an explicit commitment.
This idea is not new to socialist countries. Just take the
Threshold Treaties of 1974 and 1976, the Soviet programme of 15 January 1986
and the proposals put forward by the USSR in Reyjavik. Clearly, a moratorium
by the Soviet Union and the United States, to which the USSR has not slammed
the door after all, would be particularly effective. It will be of crucial
importance in this regard that any partial step be geared to a comprehensive,
legally binding ban.
Thirdly, it appears indispensable to us to discuss all the elements of a
future treaty in their complexity. Any selective approach is liable to leave
out of consideration the interrelated nature of the subjects involved and
would thus not yield the desired result.
Fourthly, it will be necessary to rid the verification issue of all
political encumbrances and to resolve it in a constructive manner, in line
with the requirements of the treaty. Whatever it may take to do that is
there. We need parallelism beween the Committee's activities and the Group of
Scientific Experts, which should expeditiously prepare the level-2 data
experiment to be carried out in 1988.
My delegation takes the view that a committee should be set up as quickly
as possible. We second the proposal that two working groups should be
created -- one on matters of contents and scope of the treaty, and the other
on compliance and verification.
If we manage to establish a committee in which business-like discussions
are conducted, we must make clear their pertinence to future negotiations and
that we expect all the sides concerned to strive for real results. There must
not be repetition of some of the practices in which the 1983 working groups
indulged.
Considerable headway has been made in drawing up a convention on the
prohibition of chemical weapons, not least thanks to the laudable efforts of
the Committee's former chairmen, Ambassadors Turbanski and Cromartie. The
goal of finalizing the convention this year -- something that presents itself
as the logical consequence of this development -- is very exacting but
realistic. We fully concur with Ambassador Ek4us, Chairman of the Committee
on Chemical Weapons, that there is a positive chance right now for eliminating
chemical weapons from the globe once and for all. It must not be passed up.
A new round in the chemical arms race would all of a sudden move to a distant
future the attainment of results which we are so close to now. In fact, this
is what bad experience has taught us.
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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
Given strong commitment to accommodation and dedicated work, we could
well rise to the occasion. The far-reaching proposals which the Soviet
delegation has just tabled are of special significance in this context and we
welcome them as yet another exemplary contribution to our work. Solving the
remaining issues of substance would speed up the negotiating process. This is
particularly true of challenge inspection, the locations of stocks and their
verification, and matters relating to the non-production of chemical weapons
in civil industry. Results are possible on the basis of existing proposals.
Once this and other blanks in the text of the convention are filled, it
will be a lot easier to work out details. We are convinced of the possibility
of an understanding on what is needed now and what could be completed at a
later stage.
We support the Chairman's desire to streamline operations of the
committee so that it is able to perform its current duties. Apart from the
efforts undertaken at the Conference proper, everything should be done to
maintain and improve the atmosphere needed for constructive work. The USSR
has suggested an agreement under which chemical weapons would be neither
produced nor deployed. Such a step would give a fresh impetus to the present
negotiations.
My delegation is gratified to note the interests evoked by the seminar on
the prohibition of chemical weapons to be organized by the German Democratic
Republic's National Pugwash Group next month. The event will focus on the
verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. The Government of the
German Democratic Republic is doing its utmost to make that seminar a success.
During the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly,
154 countries reiterated their opposition to an arms race in outer space and
called for relevant agreements. The Conference on Disarmament has the duty to
answer this call. Reason and realism are utterly incompatible with the
strange logic that wants to eliminate weapons on Earth and, at the same time,
put most modern means of destruction in space. Hence the world-wide
resistance to the Star Wars plans. Time is pressing, as the champions of SDI
are doing everything to get weapons deployed in outer space and to create
faits accomplis. Attacks on the ABM Treaty are increasing in number. It is
thus no longer sufficient for the Conference simply to continue last year's
exchange of views. Rather, it must start direct work on practical measures
designed to head off the spread of the arms race to outer space and ensure
that space is used peacefully, for the good of all mankind. My delegation
advocates the early establishment of a committee with a relevant mandate.
In view of the fact that bilateral and multilateral negotiations
complement and stimulate each other, the following projects could, in our
opinion, be envisaged: prohibition of the use of force in outer space, as
well as from space against the Earth and vice versa; protection of satellites
and prohibition of anti-satellite weapons; and verification measures.
In conclusion, let me give you, Comrade President, the assurance that the
delegation of the German Democratic Republic is prepared and willing to do its
very best in order that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament may conclude this
year's sessions with tangible results.
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
the German Democratic Republic for his statement. I now give the floor to the
representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart.
Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Thank you,
Mr. President. Since this is the first time I am taking the floor allow me to
congratulate you sincerely on your assumption of the post of the President of
the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February. I wish you success
in fulfilling the important functions incumbent upon you, and I can assure you
of our aspiration to give you every help in this task. Allow me also to
express our gratitude to the distinguished representative of Canada,
Ambassador Beesley, for his able and competent leadership of the work of the
Conference last August and during the inter-sessional period. I am taking
advantage of this opportunity to associate myself with the words of welcome to
our new colleagues, the heads of the delegations of France, Romania, Japan,
Algeria, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Italy and the Soviet Union, and we wish them all
every success. We ask the delegation of the United States of America to
accept the deep condolences of the Mongolian delegation on the untimely death
of Ambassador Lowitz and to pass on to his family and friends our sincere
sympathy.
We are satisfied to note that the Conference has succeeded, as it did
last year, in adopting the agenda and programme of work and also a decision on
the creation of certain subsidiary bodies right at the start of the session.
It is to be hoped that the coming weeks will be just as productive from the
point of view of dealing with organizational questions and questions of
substance.
Since the beginning of the activities of the multilateral negotiating
body on disarmament, today known as the Conference on Disarmament, practically
a quarter of a century has passed. Possibly this date does not have any
particular meaning for the activities of the Conference on Disarmament but,
nonetheless, it is worth mentioning, not only as a reason for reviewing the
results already achieved, but rather and mainly as an encouragement for
further efforts which must be made in negotiations on disarmament. In this
respect we must admit that, with regard to the main aims of disarmament, We
have still been unable to justify the hopes of the peoples of the world and,
particularly in recent years, solutions to many vitally important and pressing
problems facing this negotiating body have been bogged down without
justification. It is high time, as stated in the appeal of the United Nations
General Assembly resolution 41/86 M, adopting the report of the Conference on
Disarmament, "to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of
disarmament on its agenda, in particular those relating to
nuclear disarmament". Appeals to the Conference to fulfil its mandate in
holding negotiations in the field of disarmament are contained in many other
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly too. To ignore these
resolutions reflecting the demands of the world's community is inadmissible,
and we are of the view that this year it is necessary to take decisive action
to speed up the work of the Conference, to achieve solutions, based on new
political thinking, which would direct its efforts towards the elaboration of
concrete agreements on problems which are ripe for such agreement.
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(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)
The Reykjavik meeting of the heads of the world's two leading Powers and
the virtual agreements reached there, thanks to the constructive efforts by
the Soviet Union in its position on the most important questions of limiting
and eliminating nuclear arsenals in a short period, have confirmed the truth
that there are no issues in world affairs on which it is impossible to achieve
mutually acceptable agreement if there is common sense, political realism and
a feeling of responsibility for the peaceful future of mankind. This meeting
opened up a qualitatively new stage in the fight for nuclear disarmament and
has given it powerful impetus. Now the main thing we have to do is to go
forward in strengthening and developing the new situation that has come about
following the meeting in Iceland so that the spirit of Reykjavik is fully
reflected in disarmament negotiations in various forums.
The continuation of the arms race is showing itself more and more to be a
dead-end leading only to a destabilization of the situation, a pointless waste
of resources, and an increased military danger for everybody, including its
proponents. In order to stop and reverse around, practical measures are
urgent. One such measure, and one of the most important and most urgent in
our conviction, is the prohibition of nuclear tests. This question, as it
certainly deserves, has been right from the beginning of the session in the
centre of the attention of the Conference. In this connection we would like
here and now to express the hope that the new efforts being made will make it
possible finally to get this question out of its deadlock and create a
subsidiary body with a proper mandate intended to start practical work on an
agreement on a nuclear-test ban. In an atmosphere of growing general concern
about nuclear explosions, it is unacceptable that the Conference on
Disarmament should fail to deal seriously with this problem.
A few days ago we witnessed two nuclear tests carried out by the
United States. Thus, the United States has taken the step that brings about
the ending of the unprecedented USSR moratorium on all nuclear explosions.
That moratorium has quite clearly confirmed that it is possible to take
measures that can set up a firm barrier against the nuclear arms race. The
Soviet moratorium made a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and
was a sign of new political thinking and responsibility. The moratorium has
in a sense overturned the old thesis that both the super-Powers were equally
responsible for the arms race.
Speaking at the plenary meeting of the Conference on 5 February, the head
of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Nazarkine, stated that as a result of
events in Nevada, the Soviet Union no longer feels bound by its unilateral
moratorium on all nuclear explosions and will, in due course, begin carrying
out its own programme of nuclear tests. As you know, the Soviet Government
has repeatedly stated, including in its statement on 18 February last year,
that the Soviet Union will be obliged to renew its nuclear test after the very
first nuclear explosion by the United States in 1987. Mongolia understands
this position on the part of the Soviet Union, a position dictated exclusively
by the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies. In this
connection one cannot but stress the obvious fact that the gap between the
number of nuclear explosions carried out by the United States and the USSR has
increased in the favour of the United States by 26 since the
Soviet moratorium. Moreover, it is no secret that the continuation of nuclear
tests in the United States of America is not aimed at keeping the nuclear
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(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)
arsenal in a state of readiness for war or at carrying out the doctrine of
"deterrence", but rather primarily at developing completely new forms and
types of nuclear weapons, at creating the third-generation nuclear weapons.
Mongolia is happy to note the readiness of the Soviet Union, on a basis of
mutuality, to stop carrying out its nuclear test programme at any time, and
expresses the hope that the leadership of the United States will see the need
to respond positively to the Soviet Union's goodwill.
Questions of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war continue
for us to be extremely important and have high priority. A resolution adopted
at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly on these
issues once again emphasized the urgent need for the Conference to begin
multilateral negotiations on them. The programme put forward by the
Soviet Union more than a year ago for the stage-by-stage complete elimination
of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, with an agreement on the prohibition of
the development, testing and use of space strike weapons, is just as relevant
today and could be the basis for consideration of nuclear disarmament issues
by the Conference on Disarmament. One of the most important measures intended
to prevent nuclear war, as we see it, remains the adoption by all nuclear
States of an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It
should be emphasized in this connection that the United Nations
General Assembly in its resolution 41/86 B asked the Conference on Disarmament
to examine the question of the elaboration of an international instrument of a
legally binding character which would contain a formulation of such an
obligation.
Mongolia is happy to note that the Soviet Union and your country,
Mr. President, the People's Republic of China, have assumed the obligation not
to be the first to use nuclear weapons. We can only welcome the fact too that
both these Powers recently signed Protocols II and III of the Rarotonga Treaty
on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, which deserves
general approval. We think that the aim of this Treaty is in keeping with our
proposal for the creation of a mechanism for excluding the use of force among
States of Asia and the Pacific. If these examples were-to be followed by the
other nuclear States, it would really be a concrete contribution to the
strengthening of confidence among States and a reduction of the threat of
nuclear war. Confidence needs to be strengthened by deeds and not by words.
One cannot demand confidence from others if one reserves for oneself the
freedom to continue nuclear tests and to torpedo the most important agreements.
The Reykjavik meeting has confirmed that unless the threat of the arms
race spreading to space is removed, it is impossible to agree on a reduction
and elimination of strategic nuclear weapons. Thus, the meeting has once
again cast light upon the key significance of the solution to this problem for
preserving and strengthening peace and stability on Earth.
Today, the need to set up a firm barrier against the proliferation of the
arms race into space is stronger than it ever has been. The proponents of the
Strategic Defence Initiative are setting about speeding up the deployment of
the individual elements in space and are trying in this way to shift to a
broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. In General Assembly resolution 41/53
the international community once again unambiguously expressed itself in
favour of preventing the arms race in space and the holding of negotiations on
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(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)
the conclusion of an agreement or agreements on this question. It is
essential now to start negotiations urgently on specific aspects of this
problem, bearing in mind the final aim of the non-admissibility of arms in
space. The proposal concerning the elaboration of an international agreement
on ensuring immunity for artificial Earth satellites and the prohibition of
the development, testing or use of anti-satellite systems, and the elimination
of existing systems of that kind, seems in our opinion to be extremely
realistic and fully in accordance with the general aspiration to keep space
free from weaponry and to use it for peaceful and creative purposes.
We must as soon as possible re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on
Outer Space this year, and avoid creating a situation like the one which arose
in the past, where the whole of the first part of the session was wasted on
agreeing on the mandate and the programme of work of the Committee.
We are inspired by the general aim to complete this year the elaboration
of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The course of the
negotiations warrants our iudgement that this optimism is not built on sand.
The inter-sessional consultations last year and the session of the Ad Hoc
Committee in January this year have been very productive from the point of
view of dealing with several complicated technical questions. Taking this
into consideration, and taking into account the recommendation of the
consensus resolution 41/58 D of the United Nations General Assembly, the
Ad Hoc Committee could work without interruption to achieve the conclusion of
the convention.
And now, in order to turn the possible into the real, and hopes into
practical deeds, what is needed, as was very accurately and rightly stated by
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Prez de Cu4llar, in his
message to the Conference, are political compromises. An example of this kind
of political compromise, of a constructive search for mutually acceptable
solutions, is the new and important proposals by the Soviet Union, described
by Ambassador Nazarkine in his statement today, to deal with various important
questions of the future convention concerning the prohibition of chemical
weapons. These proposals, in our opinion, will no doubt encourage further
progress at the negotiations to find a way to deal with the outstanding
issues. They go a long way to taking account of the positions and the
interests of the various partners and reflect the responsible approach of the
Soviet Union in expressing new political thinking with regard to the cause of
peace and disarmament. We hope that other participants in the negotiations
will show the same readiness for compromise, so that, as far as possible, in
the very near future the drafting of the convention will be completed.
In our opinion, the Ad Hoc Committee can achieve success in the
outstanding issues of principle such as non-production of chemical weapons in
commercial industry, procedures for the destruction of the CW production base
and the question of challenge inspection, if it avoids wasting valuable time
in discussing technical details of a secondary nature. After the questions of
principle have been resolved, such technical details could be relatively
easily settled.
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(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)
We, like other delegations, highly appreciate the contribution made by
Ambassador Turbanski and Ambassador Cromartie in achieving the successes which
have been obtained thus far, and we are convinced that under the guidance of
the new Chairman, Ambassador Ekeus, the Ad Hoc Committee will achieve further
decisive progress.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Mongolia for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President.
I now come to the last speaker on my list for today, the representative of
Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargi.
Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt): Mr. President, allow me first to express to you
our happiness to see you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament at the
start of its 1987 session. I would like also to voice my appreciation for the
way you are directing its work. This comes as no surprise from an able
diplomat like yourself, and from a State like China, which you represent, and
because of the special iesponsibility it carries as one of the Great Powers
and because of its unique status within the Conference. I am confident that
this status will enable you to present many initiatives to allay the
difficulties slowing the pace of the work of the Conference.
Permit me also to avail myself of this opportunity to express our
gratitude to Ambassador Alan Beesley, the representative of Canada, for his
efforts during August 1986, and throughout the inter-sessional period.
I am saddened today by the absence from our midst of
Ambassador Donald Lowitz, the representative of the United States of America,
whose untimely death is a loss for his country, the Conference and his friends
who worked with him and came to be closely acquainted with his noble
qualities. I kindly ask the United States delegation to convey my heartfelt
condolences to his widow and to the other members of his family.
It gives me pleasure to welcome the new representatives who joined the
Conference, Ambassadors Youri Nazarkine of the Soviet Union, Aldo Pugliese of
Italy, Rubens Antonio Barbosa of Brazil, Jorge Morelli of Peru, Kamel Hacene
of Algeria, Gheorge Dolgu of Romania, Pierre Morel of France, Chusei Yamada of
Japan and Marko Kosin of Yugoslavia. I am confident that each one of them
will bring his own positive contribution to the work of the Conference.
Normally, a new session of the Conference on Disarmament is opened
against a background of optimism, of looking forward with hope to the
possibility of achieving progress in the work of the Conference. But how can
this be the case today when we see the start of this session coinciding with
the continuation and escalation of both the nuclear and the conventional arms
race; when we see the persistence of the trend to extend it from land, sea
and air into outer space and a continuation of the attempts to achieve
military superiority and nuclear deterrence. All this goes on without regard
to the existing arms limitation and disarmament treaties, whether they be
bilateral or multilateral; without feeling bound by the pledges already made
in the Geneva Joint Statement of January 1985, or those made at the Geneva
Summit November 1985, where it was pledged to prevent an arms race in outer
space and to terminate it on Earth, not to seek military superiority, and
acknowledged that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. All
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(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)
this is happening without any consideration to the security of the great
majority of States or their interests, a great majority of States that find
themselves drawn forcibly into untold dangers and threatened with annihilation.
The situation we face today must give rise to pessimism and generate a
feeling of frustration. There is simply no other way out of this sad state of
affairs but to comply with existing treaties on arms limitation and
disarmament, both in letter and spirit. We have to strengthen such treaties
through the conclusion of yet more treaties. This necessitates generating
momentum in the bilateral negotiations in response to the high hopes pinned on
them. The spirit of Reykjavik must be maintained. This also requires
enabling the Conference on Disarmament to break out of the state of paralysis
it has reached, by making it possible for the Conference to undertake the
tasks entrusted to it instead of persisting to raise doubts about the scope of
its mandate or continuing to obstruct its work. Bilateral and multilateral
negotiations are not alternatives to one another but rather complement and
sustain each otheD. Such efforts must be guided by the world conscience and
the international will as reflected in the resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly. They must respond to the appeals contained in the
declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement and the six countries representing
the five continents.
Like the majority of States we are of the view that a nuclear-test ban is
a necessary first step if we are really serious in our attempt to prevent the
vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and to achieve
nuclear disarmament, thus protecting the world from the scourge of a nuclear
war. Hence our increasing concern about the insistence of some nuclear-weapon
States to persevere in their nuclear tests usina, as a pretext, the arguments
of maintaining their capacity of nuclear deterrence, to ensure the worthiness
of their nuclear weapon stocks, and their doubts about the effectiveness of
verification procedures under the technology presently available. All these
arguments are not valid. They are merely used to justify the continuation of
nuclear tests. They were refuted by many previous speakers in this same
room. It is regrettable that some of these States are parties to, even
depositaries of, both the treaties on the partial ban of nuclear testing and
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These States have pledged to work
towards a comprehensive test ban, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and
nuclear disarmament. They were expected to lead the way towards a
consolidated non-proliferation regime and thus encourage the States not
parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede to
it. But the same States, by their present conduct, can lose their credibility
as an ideal to be followed. In fact they are encouraging the States not
parties to remain outside the Treaty, and worse, to develop further their own
nuclear capabilities. And this is another cause for our concern, particularly
when we know that among such States some are situated in the Middle East, and
the racist regime in South Africa. By remaining outside the NPT and
developing their nuclear capabilities they threaten to engulf the two regions
in a nuclear conflict. This would have grave consequences not only for the
two regions, but for the world at large.
In this context, we welcome every step which would help to achieve the
objective of a nuclear-test ban. We object to every action that diverts us
from this goal. Once more we welcome the decision by the Soviet Union to
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(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)
impose a unilateral moratorium on its nuclear tests as of 6 August 1985. We
welcome their decision to renew this moratorium repeatedly. We regret that
the other nuclear States, particularly the United States, did not respond in
kind, and all the more so in view of the fact that nobody raised doubts about
the sincerity of the Soviet Union in honouring its decision. We understand
the Soviet Union's decision not to be bound by the unilateral moratorium any
longer. We still deem it necessary for the nuclear States to declare a
moratorium on their nuclear tests, thus creating the required climate to
negotiate a nuclear-test-ban treaty.
We also welcome the decision by the United States Administration to
transmit to the Congress, for ratification, the two draft treaties on
threshold and peaceful nuclear explosions. This came after a long wait. But
we hope that they will be ratified at the earliest possible opportunity. We
feel satisfied at the news that President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev touched upon the issue of a nuclear-test ban during their last
meeting in Reykjavik, considering the possibility of an agreement on the
reduction of the number and yield of nuclear tests and appropriate
verification procedures.
But while welcoming all these steps our objective will remain that of
concluding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Conference on
Disarmament will remain the optimum framework to conclude such a treaty,
giving it the universality we all hope for. That is why we regret the failure
of the Conference on Disarmament, during its last three sessions, to
re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban, in spite of the many
attempts made to reach a compromise. We hope that the Conference will succeed
in its present session in re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee and in ending
the deadlock on this issue. Undoubtedly General Assembly resolution 41/46 A
provides a good basis for such an action. It contains many concessions that
were described to us in the past stages of the work of the Conference as
conducive to a softening in the position of the objecting States. The
resolution also reflects the extent of flexibility of the States that
sponsored and voted in favour of it. This is a positive development that
should not be underestimated and should meet with a positive response.
Egypt was one of the first States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of
1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.
Egypt was at the forefront of the States that signed the convention on the
prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological
weapons and on their destruction, although the circumstances prevailing in our
region prevented us from speeding up its ratification. From this background
and in the framework of the continuity of Egyptian policy, we fully support
the current efforts to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of the
development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their
destruction.
Egypt will not hesitate to exert every effort to achieve this objective.
We look forward to a treaty that fully and effectively bans the development,
production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction; a
treaty that does not, however, impede the peaceful chemical activities. We
aspire to a treaty which includes effective verification provisions without
such procedures that would exceed the actual requirements of the treaty, or be
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(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)
used as an indirect means to threaten the national security of the States
parties. We believe that acceding to the treaty will depend to a large extent
on the provisions it contains providing for international co-operation to
develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries. In this context we welcome
the decision by the Ad Hoc Committee to consider this aspect of the treaty
during its current session. Lastly, I would like to mention the fact that
concluding a treaty which is acceptable to all parties and to which all would
accede is one of the prerequisites for its acquiring universality.
Allow me on this occasion to express my thanks to Ambassador Cromartie,
the representative of the United Kingdom, for his efforts during his
chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in the previous session. May I also
congratulate Ambassador Ekeus, the representative of Sweden, on his assumption
of the Chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in the present session. We all
know the role played, and being played, by the delegation of Sweden,
particularly by Ambassador Ekeus personally, in the ongoing negotiations to
conclude a treaty banning chemical weapons. We wish him all success in his
task. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will conclude the draft treaty in
time to present it to the United Nations General Assembly at its
forty-second session in accordance with its resolution 41/58 B.
The progress we have achieved in the realms of science and technology is
an indisputable fact. What is more, it is an ongoing phenomenon, day after
day. Space technology available today represents the new link in the chain of
evolution and advancement with both its useful and harmful facets affecting
humanity. It has useful aspects, because each addition to the technological
discoveries and inventions represents a new victory, increasing the welfare of
the human being by what it provides to fulfil his aspirations to prosperity
and the raising of his living standards. It has also harmful facets, by what
is achieved by its military facet, the destructive power in the service of the
selfish tendencies of the States able to exploit this technology militarly to
impose their hegemony and to introduce it in the arms race, thus escalating
the race to extremely dangerous heights, where security and serenity are
neutralized, even for the States that do not take part in the race.
This explains why the prevention of an arms race in outer space is
imposing itself as a priority item on the agenda of all international forums
and meetings dealing with arms limitations and disarmament. This is
particularly true since the United States declared its Strategic Defence
Initiative. Today there is quasi international consensus that the extension
of the arms race to outer space and the implementation of the SDI are a
serious escalation of the arms race that will have grave consequences in all
fields, political, military and economic.
If we spoke a few years ago about the possible availability of the
necessary technology for the development and production of space weapon
systems, and if we had tried then to imagine the dangers that would attend
such a development, it therefore becomes a source of deep concern when we hear
today that it has proved possible to achieve such progress in acquiring the
necessary technology for the production of such weapon systems. We are
worried to hear those who call for hastening the production and deployment of
the said systems, in such a way that the danger becomes an actual reality,
where it was but a mere possibility in the past.
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(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)
What complicates the issue even more is the seeking of some States to
participate in the SDI. If the avowed objective of their action is to extract
purely commercial profits, we are sure that the participation of other States
in this programme will provide them with advanced technology which will help,
sooner or later, to proliferate space weapons and will contribute, directly or
indirectly, to improving the performance level of a conventional weapon
system. The matter becomes more serious when, among such States, we find Some
that are situated in areas where tension prevails already, particularly when
previous efforts to bind such States to one or more of the treaties on arms
limitations and disarmament have already failed.
How we wish that the mastering of space technology and the new horizons
it conquered will remain confined to serving humanity and increasing its
welfare! How we wish that outer space, as a common heritage of humanity, may
be explored and exploited exclusively for peaceful purposes!
If in the past we called for the possibility to conclude an agreement or
agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, this call
becomes more urgent in the light of the current developments. Undoubtedly,
the prevention of an arms race in outer space is easier at present, before the
space Powers multiply and militarize outer space in such a way as to impede
the efforts in the field of arms limitations and disarmament, if it does not
destroy the whole fabric. Here, we are at a loss as to how to perceive the
fact that the declared objective of the bilateral negotiations between the
two super-Powers is to prevent an arms race in outer space, while at the same
time the United States is developing, with the purpose of their deployment,
space weapon systems about which negotiations are going on for their
prohibition and the destruction of existing systems.
Here again, if there are priorities to be set, in the light of the
present developments, we deem it necessary to take action to achieve: first,
the halting of the development of anti-satellite weapons and the dismantling
of the existing systems; second, the prohibition of the introduction of new
weapons systems into outer space; and third, ensuring that the existing
treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the
1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems are fully
honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of recent
technological advances.
In the face of the present situation with all its ramifications, we
cannot but express our dissatisfaction with the attempts to raise obstacles to
prevent the Conference on Disarmament being entrusted with carrying out the
required negotiations to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate,
to prevent an arms race in outer space, particularly bearing in mind that the
record of the bilateral negotiations gives no cause for optimism, since they
have failed to achieve any progress until the present. What is more, this
failure in the item on outer space resulted in impeding the possibilities of
agreement in other areas. General Assembly resolution 41/53 reaffirms the
primary role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a multilateral
agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in
outer space in all its aspects. Notwithstanding the important work done by
the Ad Hoc Committee during the last two sessions, there must be a more
specific link between the Committee's work, in any particular stage, and the
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(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)
final objective unanimously endorsed by the international community, namely to
conclude an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in
outer space. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will speedily overcome the
procedural difficulties concerning the agreement on an appropriate mandate and
a programme of work that ensures that its work will take the right direction
towards the final objective of its activities.
It was not by coincidence that the issue of the prohibition of attacks on
nuclear facilities, within the framework of the item on the prohibition of
radiological weapons, received such attention by the great majority of States
members in the Conference. This is an expression by these States of the
interests of the greater part of the world community. This fact has been
reflected by many United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the last of
which is resolution 41/59 I, and by resolutions of other international
groupings. This concern arises from the desire of many States to build
nuclear reactors in order to benefit from nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes. At the same time, the same States are keen that such an action on
their part will not make them hostages to the dangers of nuclear radiation
resulting from any attack on their facilities.
The Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor was a living
example of what nuclear facilities could be subjected to. The Chernobyl
accident was another case in point of the dangerous effects of nuclear
radiation on environment and population. We thought that the two incidents
were ample evidence to validate our view about the importance and the need for
the Conference on Disarmament to deal with the issue of prohibition of attack
on nuclear facilities, particularly since many other international forums have
transmitted the subject to the Conference for consideration. That is why we
are concerned about the persistence of some members in voicing doubts about
the competence of the Conference to consider this issue. We regret to have to
note a clear regression in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee during its past
session. If we are keen about the consideration of this issue by the
Conference, at the same time we do not underestimate the difficulties and
varying security considerations of the member States, nor the necessity of
reaching solutions that are satisfactory and acceptable to all. We are of the
view that the right way is through further negotiations. We have to explore
new approaches and proposals to deal with this issue. But the way does not
lie in some members deliberately raising obstacles to the work of the
Ad Hoc Committee, even going so far as preventing its re-establishment.
The importance we attach to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear
facilities should not be interpreted as an attempt to diminish the importance
of the issue of prohibition of radiological weapons. We believe that if it is
unacceptable to some to concentrate on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear
facilities, then, and regardless of the fact that we do believe that
prohibition of an actual threat has priority over the prohibition of a
potential threat, let us at least consider both issues simultaneously.
Needless to say, my referring to a limited number of the items on the
agenda of our Conference in my statement, and my having specified Egypt's
position regarding them, does not in any way diminish the importance we attach
to the other items. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive
Programme of Disarmament, under its able Chairman, Ambassador Garcia Robles,
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(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)
the representative of Mexico, will succeed in preparing the draft before the
end of the first part of the present session so as to present it to the
forty-first session of the General Assembly. We are confident that this is
possible provided there is the political will and if the positions of the
different States are adequately flexible, particularly concerning the nuclear
paragraphs of the programme, the stages of implementation and the time-frame.
We agree with the view of the members who called for the necessity that
the item on negative security assurances be given the importance it deserves
by the Conference. We believe that the provision of such guarantees in a
legally binding international document, with no conditions attached, is a
legitimate and just demand on the part of the non-nuclear States. We are
confident that the Ad Hoc Committee, if reactivated, will be able to reach the
appropriate formula to satisfy this demand.
We also think that the establishment of ad hoc committees, with
appropriate mandates, is the best framework to consider both the items on the
cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of
nuclear war including all related matters, in accordance with the relevant
resolutions of the General Assembly.
We do not deny that the international climate and the relations between
the two super-Powers in general, and the stages reached in their bilateral
negotiations in particular, have their impact, whether positive or negative,
on our Conference. But regardless of our apprehension of the effect of these
factors, we deem it necessary for the Conference to succeed in generating its
own momentum for its work. This must be done in such a way that the
Conference is able to carry out the tasks specified to it by the Final
Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament. It is our view that the holding of the third special session in
1988 is an opportunity for the Conference to confirm its credibility by
presenting to that session specific draft treaties on arms limitations and
disarmament, treaties that would provide the peoples of the world with peace
and security through which they can achieve progress and enjoy prosperity.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Egypt for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President and
for the country that the President represents. That concludes my list of
speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I now give
the floor to the representative of Mexico.
Mr. GARCfA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The distinguished
representatives will have received today the document that has been circulated
under number CD/739. This contains a letter signed by four permanent
representatives, those of Argentina, India, Sweden and Mexico, containing a
request that the Conference publish and distribute as a document of the
Conference the joint statement that the leaders of six countries, the authors
of the Initiative for Peace and Disarmament, issued on the eve of the
New Year. In this joint statement, there is one paragraph -- that is,
paragraph 6 -- which refers specifically to the question of a moratorium that
might serve as a first step towards achieving a treaty putting an end to
nuclear tests. I felt that since that subject is specifically on the agenda
of this Conference it was relevant for me to read out the part that seemed
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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
most relevant. It reads as follows: "There is no justification for nuclear
testing by any country. We appeal once again to the United States to
reconsider its policy on nuclear testing so that a bilateral moratorium can be
established. Our offer to help ensure adequate verification of such a
moratorium remains valid. We are ready to start implementing it at any
moment."
The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement.
Does any other member wish to take the floor? And I see none. You will
recall that as an exception to the agreement reached at our last plenary
meeting, the Conference will hold its next plenary meeting on Thursday,
19 February, at 10.30 a.m. On that occasion we might need to have a brief
informal meeting once the list of speakers is exhausted, to consider a request
from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference. As there is
no other business to consider, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting.
The plenary meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.
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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.390
19 February 1987
ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETIETH PLENARY MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m.
President:
GE.87-60223/7254E
Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China)
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I call to order the
390th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.
First of all, I wish to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, His Excellency Mr. Jean-Bernard
Raimond, who will be the first to address this plenary today. The Minister is
a distinguished career diplomat who has served his country in several
important diplomatic posts in Member States of this Conference. It may be
fitting to recall that His Excellency is no stranger to Geneva and the
Palais des Nations, as he was a member of the French Delegation to the
Conference of Experts on the Prevention of Surprise Attack, held here in
1958. I am sure that all members join me in expressing our appreciation to
him for finding the time to come here to convey the views of his Government on
the issues of disarmament, in spite of a very heavy schedule. His very
presence here is a clear indication of the importance the Government of France
attaches to matters concerning disarmament. In conformity with its programme
of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda items 1,
"Nuclear-Test Ban" and 2, "Cessation of the Nuclear-Arms Race and Nuclear
Disarmament". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however,
any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the
Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of
France and Czechoslovakia. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my
list, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, His Excellency .
Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond.
Mr. RAIMOND (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me
at the outset to tell you how happy I am to be taking the floor today before
the Conference on Disarmament. I would like to take this opportunity to
associate myself with the tribute paid by all delegations to the memory of the
representative of the United States to the Conference, Mr. Lowitz. I am happy
that as chance would have it, China is presiding over our work today. This
circumstance gives me the opportunity to greet the representative of a great
country which is the friend of France. Its foreign policy is based, like
ours, on independence of action. Its security policy, like that of France,
rests on exclusive control over its forces. China is, like my country, a
nuclear and space Power. I do not hesitate to say here that in this capacity
too she, for her part, is contributing to the balance of force, and therefore
to peace. Like France, China decided eight years ago to participate in the
new Committee on Disarmament which has since become the Conference.
The last address delivered by a member of the French Government before
your Conference dates back to 1979. At the time We were marking the
transformation of a sui generis institution organized around the
co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States into a multilateral
negotiating body. This change, and in particular the abolition of the
co-chairmanship, was something which in 1978 France had made the condition for
its participation in the new institution.
The question facing us at the time was whether there was room for
multilateral negotiations in parallel with the bilateral Soviet-American
negotiations. There were some who invoked the so-called law attributed to
George Kennan according to which the chances of negotiations achieving
anything are in inverse proportion to the number of participants involved, and
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(Mr. Raimond, France)
argued that any multilateral forum dealing with disarmament would be
inefficient or indeed useless. I would like to recall here that this is not
France's position.
The work being done by your Conference in the field of chemical weapons
is second to that of no other forum as regards the seriousness of its approach.
On the question of conventional weapons, last September's success at the
Stockholm Conference, in another framework, that of the CSCE, showed that
there is no need to be only two parties in order to complete and conclude the
first agreement between East and West for a decade. Certainly,
confidence-building measures are a limited sphere; however, nobody would
underestimate their implications for Europe, nor their significance for arms
control, inasmuch as they have endorsed the principle of on-site inspection.
The day before yesterday, in Vienna, there was a meeting in the French
Embassy -- the first in a series of informal consultations -- to find out
whether it is possible to build on the achievements of Stockholm in the field
of conventional disarmament at the same time as in that of confidence-building
measures. Here again my country insists that each participant in the CSCE
should speak on its own behalf and that negotiations should not turn into a
bloc-to-bloc confrontation.
France is in favour of disarmament agreements which are verifiable and
part of a progressive process. The maintenance of the right to security of
each State throughout this process is in our view its necessary corollary.
France will therefore never accept that its forces or its territory should be
affected by any negotiations to which France is not a party or in which she
has not spoken on her own behalf. This right which she claims for herself she
naturally recognizes for other countries.
At the opening of this new session of the Conference there is a
prevailing feeling that negotiations on arms control and disarmament are at a
turning point. The resumption of the Soviet-American dialogue in 1985 led,
four months ago, to the Reykjavik meeting. That meeting left many observers
bewildered.
As I had occasion to say in December, from the Reykjavik talks public
opinion noted, rightly or wrongly, that the United States could, if necessary,
change its strategy, give up its ballistic missiles in Europe and, more
particularly, bring about an evolution in its contribution towards deterrence
in which recourse to conventional means would play a greater part. It also
noted from this meeting that the USSR stated that it was prepared to rid
itself within 10 years of the strategic investment which it has been making
continuously for a quarter of a century. There is nothing intrinsically wrong
with conjuring up new worlds, which one would naturally hope would be better
ones. It can be intellectually stimulating to imagine the adoption of new
strategies for tomorrow or the day after.
In Reykjavik the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged proposals
and counter-proposals concerning remote, probably utopian, horizons; but we
should be careful not to endanger the foundations of our security today.
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(Mr. Raimond, France)
As many European leaders emphasized, in the disarmament field, we must
now concentrate on what is realistic, possible and desirable.
For us, specifically, this can be summarized in three points.
First, we hope that the objectives agreed upon by the Soviet Union and
the United States in Reykjavik can be achieved, that is, the reduction of
50 per cent of their strategic arsenals over five years. It goes without
saying that this would be a considerable result, without equivalent in the
history of arms control negotiations, and obviously we would be extremely
happy about it. In that case why, paradoxically, detract in advance from this
five-year objective by setting up against it much more doubtful 10-year
objectives?
Secondly, we should ensure the maintenance of the ABM Treaty for a
mutually agreed period, followed by a period in which, if appropriate, it
would be changed by negotiation, as was sought in Reykjavik.
At present, as everybody knows, a debate is underway on the problem of
interpreting the ABM Treaty in relation to the research programmes being
carried out in the United States as well as in the Soviet Union. This is not
a new argument, and should be carefully distinguished from the question of the
early deployment of defensive systems. That would go beyond what was
authorized in 1972, that is, the possibility of deploying a hundred
antiballistic interceptors around a single site, as had been done in Moscow.
My country's position with respect to the interpretation of the
ABM Treaty clauses starts from an obvious point: the ABM Treaty is
essentially bilateral and there has never been any question of considering its
extension to other countries. So, it is up to the two signatory countries to
determine for themselves what today is in keeping with the provisions laid
down in 1972, taking account of new technological developments; what goes
beyond the agreed provisions of the Treaty; and what modalities can or cannot
be used to make changes in the Treaty. Whatever solution may be found, I add
that it would have to be agreed upon bilaterally.
We are attached to maintaining the ABM Treaty, as our representative had
occasion to recall in 1984 before your Conference. We therefore hope to see
it respected by both parties, including with respect to research activities.
These are clearly permitted by the Treaty. To avoid any technological
surprises is an element of the Treaty's stability and thus of its durability.
Finally, a third objective should be the reduction of American and Soviet
intermediate-range missiles in Europe over the same period of five years. The
zero option was implicitly accepted in 1979 by our partners in the Alliance
and explicitly proposed by them in 1981. The political reasons for this are
well known. However, the situation in 1987 is different. In 1981 our
partners in the Alliance had proposed renouncing the deployment announced, but
not yet been carried out, in exchange for a reduction in the number of
missiles existing on the Soviet side. In 1987 there are intermediate-range
missiles on both sides, but not in the same quantities. Therefore, the
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(Mr. Raimond, France)
implementation tomorrow of such a formula, which in any case would have to be
accompanied by a very detailed timetable and verification measures, must not
lead to a situation of diminished security for Europe.
The implementation of a possible zero option agreement between the
United States and the USSR therefore supposes that the security of Europe
should be perserved. This means, firstly, that the possibility of getting
round the agreement (over or under it) must be avoided. I am thinking more
particularly of the question of shorter-range missiles, a matter of concern,
quite rightly, not only to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
but also to the governments of other European countries. And secondly, it
means that the consequences of the present conventional imbalances must not be
further aggravated. This last point is rather a statement of the obvious, but
we must still not lose sight of it: we do not recall that it was raised at
Reykjavik.
These prospects are of direct concern to Europe and its security.
Europe, as the President of the French Republic observed, "remains divided
between the security it has and the security it hopes for". In his memoirs of
Europe before the First World War, written at a time when a conventional war
was ravaging our continent for the second time, the Austrian writer,
Stephan Zweig, noted that "now that the great storm has long since shattered
it, we know that this world of security was only a dream. And yet our parents
inhabited it as a house of peace."
Today, Europe sees its security assured in a very real way by nuclear
deterrence. It cannot, therefore, consider any evolution in the opposite
direction, which would make conventional and chemical war once again possible
and no doubt probable one day, taking into account the assymetry in the forces
involved, as well as geography. There is, then, no purely conventional
deterrence which could ensure the security of our continent.
France is in favour of a return to a balance of conventional forces in
Europe, if possible at a lower level. We also hope that the Soviet-American
negotiations on strategic arms and intermediate-range missiles will reach a
successful conclusion.
None the less we consider that, as the Prime Minister, Mr. Jacques Chirac,
recalled, as long as we are confronted with the overarmament of the two
super-Powers at the same time as the imbalance in conventional forces in
Europe, our security will lie in nuclear deterrence. My country will
therefore never accept that its nuclear forces should be included, directly or
indirectly, in negotitions in which it does not intend to participate as long
as the conditions it has set have not been met. France, through the voice of
the President of the Republic, made known in September 1983 and June 1984 the
conditions which would enable it to make its contribution to an effective and
verifiable process of nuclear disarmament:
First, that the gap between the nuclear arsenals of the two Great Powers,
on the one hand, and that of France, on the other, shall have changed in
nature. Second, that the great imbalances existing in conventional arms shall
have been corrected and the elimination of the chemical threat become a
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(Mr. Raimond, France)
reality. And third, that no new defensive system leading to a destabilization
of the present foundations of deterrence and therefore of peace, shall have
been brought into use.
The problem of third forces in the process of nuclear disarmament should
be brought into proportion. The French strategic nuclear forces today
represent less than 2 per cent of the comparable potential of the
United States or the Soviet Union.
What then, finally, is the situation four months after the Reykjavik
meeting? I would say that today there is a possibility and even a hope of
managing to rebuild a disarmament and arms control policy on more realistic
bases. To swap the aspiration of a denuclearized world for that of a world
without ballistic weapons leads to a dead end.
The way, therefore, in which both Washington and Moscow return to a more
accurate assessment of what is really possible and desirable in negotiations
will determine what real progress can be made in the limitation of nuclear
arms. This is true not only for 1987 but also for coming years.
The reason why I have talked at length about the "post-Reykjavik"
prospects and nuclear disarmament negotiations is that I know how much
attention is being given to these issues by delegations at the Conference.
But the Conference equally has its own concerns and tasks, I mean nuclear
testing, chemical weapons and space.
We are aware of the importance attached by most members of this
Conference to a total nuclear-test ban. The later is in part the continuation
of a concern which, in the 1960s, was more a matter of the environment than of
disarmament. It also results from commitments made within the framework of
disarmament agreements in which France did not wish to participate: on the
one hand, the 1963 atmospheric test-ban Treaty, and on the other, what a
French expert described as a "disarmament agreement of the unarmed countries",
that is, the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
France does not consider today, any more than yesterday, that stopping
tests is a pre-condition for progress towards nuclear disarmament. It
maintains that, on the contrary, the stopping of tests could become
significant at the end of a long-term process resulting in real and effective
nuclear disarmament.
There is, therefore, an important difference with a number of countries
represented here concerning the desirable sequence of disarmament measures. I
think it is honest to recognize it, and that clarity in these matters is more
useful than ambiguity.
Over and above these considerations of principle, there is the fact that
France has not carried out one tenth of the nuclear explosions conducted by
the two Big Powers. It does not carry out tests over the 150 kilotonne
threshold, so often and so long discussed and today apparently so difficult to
verify accurately. Finally, it sees no reason to agree to the planned
obsolescence of its deterrent.
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(Mr. Raimond, France)
For all these reasons, we informed the Soviet Union that we had no
objection to the moratorium it proposed and introduced, nor, however, did we
see any advantage in it. We may note in any case that through
Marshall Akhromeev on 25 August last, the Soviet Union recognized that nuclear
tests did not have only negative effects. The Army Chief of Staff and Deputy
Minister of Defence admitted that a high percentage of them served to test the
reliability of existing arms. This observation has also been made by the
American side. Now, in a world in which the number of nuclear warheads were
reduced by half, the reliability of the existing weapons could only be yet
more important. This is a problem that cannot be indefinitely ignored.
The work of this Conference with a view to elaborating an international
convention on the prohibition of the manufacture of chemical weapons and the
elimination of stocks is certainly one of the most delicate tasks to which it
has addressed itself.
The effort made has enabled us to find some significant points of
convergence on the shape and a number of important elements of the future
convention. It remains true that as the work progresses the real difficulties
come to light. This stems from the natural course of negotiations in such a
complex field, but it also means that a number of choices have to be made.
First, do we want a convention which, like the one on biological weapons,
simply postulates that chemical weapons should be banned, without really doing
anything about the effectiveness of such a prohibition and its verification?
Or do we consider that these are weapons whose military effectiveness
unfortunately has less and less to be demonstrated and which therefore are
likely to become commonplace? Results achieved step by step, and limited not
geographically (because the ease with which such arms can be transported would
make such an approach utterly meaningless) but in terms of stockpiles, would
surely already be a considerable achievement.
Secondly, do we want verification measures to be aimed at putting
permanent pressure on any possible cheating, or are we prepared to settle for
imperfect verification because nobody will ever know whether clandestine
stocks have been reconstituted or hidden?
Third, what links should be established between the future convention and
the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 concerning the use of chemical
weapons?
Fourth, should we concentrate our efforts mainly on conventional chemical
weapons, those which could be described as "bottom of the range" and
accessible to most countries with industrial facilities? Or on the contrary,
do we mean to give priority to the most modern chemical warfare agents or even
prevent the appearances of future technologies in these areas? Is such an
ambition even realistic?
These discussions underly the work of your Conference. They explain
their complexity and therefore their inevitable slowness.
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(Mr. Raimond, France)
My country wishes to achieve results, even if they prove to be limited,
in an initial stage, for example, to the progressive destruction of stocks and
production facilities during a period to be determined.
This same stage-by-stage approach could be used with respect to the
solution to be found for the problem of the lists of supertoxic agents. We
know that it is difficult at this stage to identify the possibilities of
military use of some of them which are already being used in civilian
industry, for example in pharmaceutical products. It should be possible to
ask the Consultative Committee envisaged by the convention to determine the
regime during a later stage of the negotiations, or during the implementation
of the convention. The French delegation will put forward proposals along
these lines. Generally speaking, quite obviously, it will spare no effort to
ensure that concrete results are achieved, including during this session.
Nevertheless, it is in the light of these uncertainties in the
negotiations that France does not rule out the possibility of acquiring a
limited and purely deterrent capability in this area. In accordance with the
commitments assumed by France when signing the Geneva Protocol of 1925, this
would only be used for retaliation and not for a first attack. In any case,
the current negotiations, to which we continue to attach very high priority,
could not constitute a moratorium for France, nor for that matter for any
other country.
Everybody here knows that side by side with the discussions which this
Conference is to pursue concerning measures to contribute to the prevention of
the arms race in outer space, negotiations are going on on a bilateral basis
in this same city between the Soviet Union and the United States. Our
objective cannot be to give preference to one or other of these approaches, or
to cause them to hinder one another.
It remains true that in the mid-1980s the international community
included among its concerns the problems of the military use of space in the
same way as in the mid-1950s it recognized that the problems of the nuclear
age could not be a matter of indifference to it, even though the possession of
nuclear weapons was at the time limited to two countries. In 1978, when
proposing the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency,
and then in 1984, through the proposals it put before this Conference, France
emphasized that these problems could not be excluded from the multilateral
debate.
We naturally attach the greatest importance to the Outer Space Treaty
of 1967. It remains true, as your work has clearly shown, that the present
regime seems inadequate, particularly with respect to the immunity of
satellites of third parties. France will submit, within the framework of the
work of the Ad Hoc Committee, proposals which take account of the difficulty
of formulating a regime based solely on the definition of an anti-satellite
weapon.
In fact there is no single way of destroying satellites, and it would
therefore not be realistic to found an international regime on the prohibition
of ASAT systems, which could only be incomplete. What does seem to be a
matter of priority is to implement the fundamental principles of the present
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(Mr. Raimond, France)
space regime, that is, its utilization under conditions of equality,
non-discrimination among States, and non-appropriation of space. If such an
approach is adopted, a number of specific measures can be considered
concerning the registration and notification of space objects, as well as the
multilateral code of conduct applicable to space activities.
At the institutional level, the idea of entrusting responsibility for
seeing to the application of transparency measures and the code of conduct for
space activities to the International Satellite Monitoring Agency might be
considered.
All too often in the field of disarmament we have to admit, at the risk
of causing disappointment or being misunderstood, that nothing will ever be as
easy, completely satisfactory or rapid as we might hope. In the complicated
and changing world which we have irreversibly entered for more than half a
century, the threat has become more diverse. Paradoxically, the most modern
weapons are also those which will apparently be the least used. How then can
we be suprised when reason falters in the face of suspicion?
France wishes to contribute to disarmament, but like any other State it
considers that the negotiations should first serve the security of each and
every one. If, furthermore, disarmament can contribute to the enterprise of
development, France would naturally be the first to be delighted. It is from
this point of view that we consider that the United Nations meeting on the
relationship between disarmament and development, which it proposed in 1983
and which is to take place in New York this summer, is extremely important.
We all know how far arms control represents a necessary effort to ensure
foreseeability and stability in an international environment whose
technological evolution constantly challenges its structures.
The nightmare of seeing progress in arms overtaking negotiations, which
sums up the arms control dilemma, is nothing new. In the field of nuclear
weapons in particular, for almost 20 years the negotiators, like the young
Tancredo in "The Leopard", would like to agree "that everything should change
only if, afterwards, everything remains the same as before". It is
inevitable, in this context, that public opinion should be concerned more with
wars that are going to change, rather than the wars which are going on. And
yet we know very well that if it is weapons that kill, it is men that start
the conflicts. Modern arms are not the first cause of tensions; they are the
result of older antagonisms, of longstanding conflicts of interests, which
patient diplomacy must reconcile.
A disarmament and arms control policy that only deals with the
consequences and not the causes of tension and the absence of confidence among
nations cannot lead to lasting results, that is, to the security to which each
of our nations aspires. Nothing is more difficult, we know full well; and
therefore nothing is more worthy of our efforts.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank his Excellency the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of France for his statement and for his kind
words addressed to me and to my country. I now give the floor to the
representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.
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Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Comrade President, we welcome you
wholeheartedly to the chair of the Conference on Disarmament during this
opening month of our present session. Your great socialist country has
contributed a lot to the work of this Conference since it joined it in 1978.
Your wise presidency is another specific contribution of China to the
Conference on Disarmament at a time when we are all trying to invigorate its
work, to effectively meet the requirements addressed to this multilateral
negotiating body. My delegation pledges you full support in the remaining
part of your presidency. Let me also thank Ambassador Beesley of Canada for
the able guidance he offered to us in the concluding part of last year's
session. It is with pleasure that I welcome the new representatives to this
Conference -- Ambassador Nazarkine of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Pugliese of
Italy, Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Dolgu of Romania,
Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Yamada of Japan and Ambassador Kosin of
Yugoslavia.
Let me also express once again the deepest sympathy of my delegation to
the delegation of the United States and to the family of Ambassador Lowitz
with whom we had excellent working and social relations. At the same time I
would like to welcome in our midst the Deputy Head of the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Ambassador Hansen, as Acting Head of the
United States delegation.
(spoke in French)
We listened most attentively to the statement of the Foreign Minister of
France, Mr. Raimond. His presence here at our session is evidence that his
country considers the work of the Conference to be highly important. We were
also able to note France's keen interest in the problems of international
security during the recent visit to Paris of our Foreign Minister,
Bohuslav ChYoupek. That visit was considered most useful by the authorities
in Prague, as it contributed not only to Franco-Czech relations but also to
highlighting the need for greater European co-operation as launched 12 years
ago in Helsinki.
(continued in English)
Throughout the history of mankind, nations and groups of nations have
always had to fight for their security. Peace, when it came here and there,
was usually at the price of a hard and bloody struggle. This is true not only
of distant but also of quite recent history of Europe, and it is not yet past
history in many regions of the world today. In the process, means of war
improved constantly until personal arms were replaced by automatic machines
for annihilation and the present weapons of mass destruction. Peace and
security cannot be won by these weapons, since their destructive nature
prevents them from being used rationally, even from a purely military and
technical viewpoint. Peace and security today have to be built otherwise.
It is one of the far-reaching political conclusions of our times that
international peace and security have to be put on a wider and more stable
basis than in the past. This basis cannot be established other than by all
States which want to build their relations with neighbours and other countries
not on force but through peaceful co-operation in conditions of firm
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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)
international security. That is what the sponsors of the United Nations
General Assembly resolution 41/92 on the establishment of a comprehensive
system of international peace and security had in mind in advancing their
initiative.
The cessation of the nuclear-arms race and measures of real disarmament
will have to constitute the backbone of such a comprehensive system.
Nuclear disarmament is of highest priority in this regard. The treatment
nuclear weapons deserve was very accurately described by Mikhail Gorbachev
when he spoke on Monday to the participants in the International Forum for a
Nuclear-Free World and for the Survival of Humanity in Moscow. I quote from
his statement: "We rejected any right for the leaders of a country, be it the
USSR, the United States or any other, to pass a death sentence on mankind. We
are not judges, and the billions of people are not criminals to be punished.
So the nuclear guillotine must be broken."
We followed with great attention the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik
last October. Even if some political "experts" subsequently described the
meeting as a failure, we did not share that view. On the contrary, we
witnessed, for the first time, a direct attempt to break the "nuclear
guillotine". Even if that was not possible on that occasion, and I will not
discuss the reasons for it, the meeting in that calm, northern island has left
a permanent mark and the nuclear arsenals will never again seem as untouchable
as they still seemed to be in the recent past.
Our Conference is a highly representative body, with all nuclear
countries taking part in its work. It should therefore, also contribute to
the solving of a number of issues related to nuclear disarmament which are
very clearly inscribed on its agenda. We reject the notion that the
Conference should address only some of its agenda items while others should be
left to bilateral or some other limited fora. This applies especially to the
first three items, which deserve our permanent attention.
Whether some like it or not, the NTB has been not only at the top of our
agenda but also at the centre of international attention for quite some time.
One of the two major nuclear Powers gave us, during the previous almost
19 months, convincing proof of its readiness to stop nuclear testing. The
Soviet Union did all in its power to continue its moratorium, and if it was
interrupted that was done by the United States, by carrying out its nuclear
explosion on 3 February.
In our understanding, its willingness to refrain from nuclear testing
shows not only that the Soviet Union is ready to achieve a nuclear-test ban
but also that it is prepared effectively to address nuclear disarmament in all
its aspects. Such a concrete step as the unilateral moratorium on nuclear
testing is much more convincing proof of good political will than loud
peaceful rhetoric and declarations of good intentions.
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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)
We fully associate ourselves with those who call for the establishment of
a working body for the NTB. There is a lot to be done in this area, including
on verification. In our opinion, active and purpose-oriented work of such an
organ could clearly demonstrate the following.
First, the achievement of the NTB is an urgent measure which could
substantially contribute to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and create
an atmosphere conducive to successful negotiations on measures of nuclear
disarmament.
Second, the overwhelming majority of States are in favour of the
cessation of nuclear testing and realize that the universal test ban would
correspond to their vital security interests.
Third, there are all necessary ingredients for-an effective NTB to be
negotiated, including its verification machinery.
Fourth, there is a need to consider, in a businesslike manner and in one
forum, numerous proposals concerning the scope and nature of the NTB, possible
partial measures, various approaches towards verification, including
individual offers of States or groups of States, so as to combine them into
one system, ensuring, in the most effective way, full compliance with the test
ban.
Fifth, the Ad Hoc Committee on the NTB could also constitute a necessary
bridge between the useful work of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts and the
actual state of efforts aimed at the achievement of the NTB. That link would
be useful, inter alia, for putting the results of the planned test of level II
seismic data transmission next year into a proper perspective.
Fruitful work by the NTB Ad Hoc Committee can also give us the necessary
specific criteria for consideration of the utility of establishing a permanent
international system for the exchange of seismic data.
Thus, we see a number of valid arguments in favour of the establishment
of an Ad Hoc Committee on the NTB. My delegation would be ready to
participate in its proceedings actively and to display the necessary
flexibility so that the Conference can, finally, undertake some specific steps
towards the nuclear-test ban.
It is our hope that the Ad Hoc Committee for the prevention of an arms
race in outer space is going to be re-established shortly. The Conference
should not close its eyes to the danger of outer space being completely
militarized. The Committee's mandate should reflect the objective necessity
to establish quite clearly, and in a more conclusive form, the impact of the
present legal regime for outer space and to define what additional measures
are needed. At the same time we do not consider that a mandate, thus
conceived, should prevent us from an exchange of views on specific proposals
which already have been, or might be proposed in the coming months. In this
respect we were attracted by the statement of the First Deputy Foreign
Minister of the USSR, Yuli Vorontsov, containing, inter alia, the proposal to
establish an international inspectorate to verify that arms are not being
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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)
placed on objects launched into outer space. This is a new, far-reaching and
radical measure which could, in our opinion, represent a solid barrier against
the direct militarization of outer space.
There is no need to stress further the urgency of measures to prevent an
arms race in outer space since it is sufficiently displayed in the course of
the present debate in the United States on the deployment of a first phase of
the SDI. It seems that supporters of this allegedly defensive programme are
becoming somewhat impatient. They see important changes in the world and
finally realize that even the nuclear threat, on which they calculated heavily
in their "mission to save the world", as they say might not be here
indefinitely. For this reason it is necessary to launch the practical
implementation of the SDI, to invest huge financial resources as soon as
possible, to make the SDI irreversible. If they succeed, they will assure
huge profits for the American military-industrial complex for many years to
come. But what is more important, the SDI will become a limitless laboratory
for the transition from "dirty" and indiscriminate nuclear weapons to equally
efficient, but more "handy" and "practical" weapons based on directed energy.
Space is considered wide enough to absorb the effects of nuclear explosions,
which are difficult to control on Earth. Certainly, the chosen objects on
Earth will be spared the long agony of nuclear destruction. Instead, they
will be blown away in a clean, fast and "civilized" manner.
Anyone who is sufficiently acquainted with the provisions of the
ABM Treaty and its spirit cannot take seriously any talk of its "broad
interpretation". The only real meaning of such an interpretation is that the
ABM Treaty is an obstacle to the SDI and will have to be forgotten. And that
will be the first real step opening the way to complete militarization of
outer space.
Our delegation welcomes the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical
Weapons has promptly been re-established under the able guidance of
Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden. 'This early commencement, as well as a new,
purpose-oriented approach, gives us a guarantee that the Conference will try
to use its potential fully and that everything will be done so that the
CW convention is finalized already this year. Nothing can prevent us from
solving the remaining political and technical aspects of the prohibition of
chemical weapons providing there is the political will to do so. Just
two days ago the Conference witnessed another good example of the required
constructive approach when the Head of the USSR delegation,
Ambassador Nazarkine, spoke on the problem of location of chemical weapons
stocks, on the question of destruction versus diversion, and some aspects of
verification on challenge. We consider that all the proposals advanced reveal
genuine interest in speeding up our work on the CW convention and should be
approached seriously. Any hasty conclusions, especially if they are rather
beside the point, are somewhat out of place. We would like to hope that the
suggestions made by Ambassador Nazarkine will be discussed thoroughly on an
appropriate working level.
We follow attentively the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the problem of
non-production of chemical weapons and on challenge verification. During the
brief sessions in autumn of last year and in January we noticed that
divergencies in the positions of various countries were being gradually
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(Mr. Veivoda, Czechoslovakia)
reduced. It is a delicate process which should be further pursued in a calm,
businesslike manner. We are confident that by the end of this year's session
the remaining differences will have been narrowed down sufficiently in order
to permit us to formulate what, for the purposes of the convention, could be
considered as essentially common positions also on articles VI and IX.
The CW convention is, unfortunately, not yet definitely agreed upon. But
it is clear that its basic outline has already evolved and one may already
have quite an accurate idea of the basic provisions of its individual
articles. Verification will be extensive, covering a large number of
activities right from the entry into force of the convention, through the
destruction of CW stocks and facilities for their production, as well as with
a view to permanent assurance that the convention is fully complied with in
the future. Such a wide verification system is a sort of acknowledgement that
the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons is an ambitious and
difficult task. We consider that it would be fully in compliance with this
ambition to try to cover the whole road which substances have to travel before
they become chemical weapons. Everyone would apparently agree that the first
step to create a toxic substance is a synthesis. The only places where this
may happen are laboratories. Let us recall that such first category
substances as tabun, sarin or soman were also the results of laboratory
research. We therefore support the idea that this first step in the creation
of chemical weapons should be recognized and dealt with by the convention.
It would be futile to try to control regularly all existing laboratories, but
it would be a grave mistake to ignore that new supertoxic lethal chemicals of
category I may permanently be synthesized in the laboratories, whether
deliberately or by coincidence. The number of relevant laboratories is
relatively limited in each country and their declaration, with a possibility
of inspection on challenge, should not represent an extraordinarily heavy
burden. Smooth application of such procedures could create the necessary
confidence and would represent a kind of introduction to the effective
verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the civilian chemical
industry.
The comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been on our agenda since
the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in
1978. During the period of almost 10 years a lot of provisions for the
Programme have been agreed upon. There are now just a couple of items that
remain open but they, somehow, seem beyond our reach.
The Ad Hoc Committee on the CPD has already resumed its work under the
continued, dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico. We
are confident that he will do all in his power to finalize the draft Programme
soon, in accordance with the decision of the United Nations General Assembly
and we will offer him our most active co-operation. But the key to the CPD is
in the hands of those who fail to display a minimum of flexibility with
respect to a number of priority items, among which the NTB is an outstanding
issue.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the
President and to the country that the President represents.
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(The President)
That completes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish
to take the floor? That does not appear to be the case.
I now intend to suspend briefly the plenary meeting and to convene, as
announced last Tuesday, an informal meeting of the Conference to deal with a
request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference. Once
we have considered that request, we shall resume the plenary meeting in order
to formalize any decision reached at the informal meeting, as well as to adopt
the timetable for the activities of the Conference during the coming week.
The plenary meeting is suspended.
The meeting was suspended at 11.35 a.m. and resumed at 11.36 a.m.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 390th plenary of the
Conference on Disarmament is resumed.
I wish to put before the Conference for decision document CD/WP.267,
dealing with a request from Senegal to participate in the work of the
Conference. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference
adopts the draft decision.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The secretariat has circulated
today, at my request, an informal paper containing a timetable of meetings to
be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week.
The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the
Ad Hoc Committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and subject to change,
if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference
adopts the timetable.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I should like now to make an
announcement: The Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will
hold open-ended consultations on the next session of the Commission in
Conference Room III on Friday, 27 February, at 3 p.m. Those consultations
will be held with full services. As there is no other business to consider, I
intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 24 February, at 10 a.m.
The meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.
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CD/PV.391
24 February 1987
ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 24 February 1987, at 10 a.m.
President:
GE.87-60236/7280E
Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China)
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the
391st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.
Consistent with its programme of work, the Conference will continue today
its consideration of agenda items 1 and 2 entitled "Nuclear Test Ban" and
"Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament" respectively.
In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member
wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.
Today, I have on my list of speakers the representatives of Yugoslavia,
the United States of America, Kenya and Nigeria.
I now give the floor to the first of those speakers, Ambassador Kosin of
Yugoslavia.
Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): Thank you Mr. President. May I first of all
join other delegations in congratulating you, the representative of the
People's Republic of China, a country with which Yugoslavia maintains close
and friendly relations, on your assumption of the Presidency for the month of
February. I wish you success in the discharge of this important function.
The excellent way in which you have guided the Conference so far has enabled
substantial work to be achieved at the outset of the 1987 session. Knowing
your competence and experience I am sure that the Conference will continue to
benefit from your able guidance. I would also like to take this opportunity
of thanking you, Mr. President, for the kind words addressed to my
predecessor, Ambassador Vidas, and for your warm welcome to me. I am grateful
to my distinguished colleagues too for welcoming me here in the Conference on
various occasions. I would like to express as well, on behalf of my
delegation, appreciation to the outgoing President, Ambassador Beesley of
Canada, who so skilfully steered the Conference during the month of August and
in the period preceding the 1987 session. I wish to take this opportunity
too, to express through the good offices of his Personal Representative,
Ambassador Miljan Komatina, our gratitude to the United Nations
Secretary-General Mr. Perez de Cuellar for his message to this Conference. We
found it particularly encouraging to hear in his message that the tasks before
the Conference "are indeed difficult but in no way insurmountable, given the
universal desire for a more secure world in which our scarce human and
material resources could be utilized for the fullest economic and social
development of all societies".
I avail myself of this opportunity to express once again our most
profound condolences on the untimely death of the distinguished representative
of the United States, Ambassador Donald Lowitz, and to ask the
United States delegation to convey our deep sympathies to the United States
Government and to the bereaved family.
The past year has offered a few reassuring elements through
intensification of dialogue, far-reaching initiatives and proposals, and the
growing awareness of the need for reaching agreements and understandings.
On the other hand, 1986 showed that the arms race, instead of being
restrained, had intensified, thus rendering the overall process of
negotiations and agreement-reaching more complex. This clearly demonstrates
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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)
that the political ground for accord is insufficiently broad, and still
fragile. Therefore, the Conference should strive not only to overcome the
oasic differences in positions on disarmament but also to win the race against
time, for every opportunity missed renders our task more difficult and complex.
We have thus begun our deliberations at the 1987 session with mixed
feelings. While the dialogue at the multilateral, regional and bilateral
levels has been broadened and intensified, no new agreements have emerged and
the existence of some of them has even been called into question.
The year 1986 was also marked by numerous messages testifying to the fact
that the international community is not reconciled to the prevailing situation
of stagnation and is willing to reverse it through political dialogue and
meaningful negotiations on disarmament. That was the main characteristic of
1986 as the International Year of Peace.
The non-aligned countries, since their first Summit Conference in
Belgrade a quarter of a century ago, have always considered disarmament a
politically comprehensive and priority issue of peace and security. Such an
approach dominated their meetings held in the course of last year, in
particular the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government, held in
Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1986. The more than 100 Heads of State or
Government of non-aligned countries assembled there have -- in their
Political Declaration -- spelt out their views about the issues on the agenda
of our Conference.
They emphasized the extreme urgency of adopting measures for the
prevention of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament, and in that context,
they called for the conclusion of an international agreement banning the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending the achievement of nuclear
disarmament.
They pointed to the pressing need to negotiate and conclude a
comprehensive multilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty prohibiting all
nuclear-weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time.
They called on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations
urgently to conclude an agreement or agreements to prevent the extension of
the arms race in all its aspects into outer space.
They also called upon the Conference on Disarmament to make all efforts
to adopt the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during the first part of
its 1987 session, and to submit it to the General Assembly.
They called for negotiations to proceed without delay for an
early conclusion of a binding international instrument to assure the
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
They urged all States to abstain from any action that could impede an
early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.
The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries emphasized also
that, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament, measures for the
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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)
limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons
should be pursued resolutely within the framework of progress towards general
and complete disarmament.
The general thrust of the Eighth Non-Aligned Summit Conference was
reflected in the general debate at the forty-first session of the
United Nations General Assembly.
The debate itself was constructive and led to the adoption of more
consensus resolutions than before, especially those that leave room for a
fresh approach on our part.
Of special relevance to us here is the fact that the General Assembly at
its forty-first session adopted more than 20 resolutions relating to specific
responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament.
The meeting between United States President Ronald Reagan and
Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik, in
early October 1986, showed that there is no alternative to dialogue, that it
is changing in nature and that the views of the two major Powers converge in
some areas that bear on their special responsibilities in the nuclear age.
What is encouraging, to us, is the fact that the Reykjavik proposals are still
on the negotiating table. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that the
Reykjavik Summit failed to respond to the needs of the international
community, which had expected some specific agreements and a higher degree of
understanding, so necessary at this critical juncture for international
relations. Therefore, the world community appeals to both Powers to speed up
their moves towards agreement.
The successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has resulted in the
adoption of important confidence-building measures as well as those for the
verification of military activities. The Stockholm Conference demonstrated in
practice the active role played by all States, irrespective of their Size,
population or military might, and their legitimate interests in contributing
towards resolving the problems related to confidence-building, and towards
halting and reversing the arms race.
The success of the Stockholm Conference, which began its deliberations in
extremely unfavourable international circumstances, is an undeniable proof of
the importance and vitality of multilateral negotiations.
As a non-aligned European country, Yugoslavia has undertaken to translate
its long-term policy choices at the global level into a coherent concept at
the regional level, too. Along these lines it actively participates in
various initiatives, together with other non-aligned and neutral countries of
Europe.
Within this framework, and in pursuance of good-neighbourly co-operation,
Yugoslavia advocates the transformation of the Balkans into a zone of peace
and co-operation, free from weapons of mass destruction.
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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)
The necessity of multilateral negotiations was also confirmed by such
tragic events as the Chernobyl accident and the Challenger explosion. State
and continental boundaries have proved to be incapable of averting the dangers
hanging over mankind, the dangers which the most sophisticated technologies,
if uncontrolled, increase rather than prevent. It has become clear that
international co-operation in most advanced and sophisticated technologies is
a necessity. It is encouraging in this regard that the International Atomic
Energy Agency, in a relatively short period of time, managed to adopt two
international conventions to that effect.
In planning our activities this year we should. take account of the fact
that the international involvement and the agreement-oriented approach have
generated a more favourable climate for the work of our Conference, and for
addressing the issues on its agenda substantively.
We expect that the work of the Conference -- which last year proceeded in
a very business-like atmosphere on constructive and concrete approaches to
individual agenda items, and on substantive and accelerated negotiations as
regards the chemical-weapons ban -- will in 1987 become more intensive and
meaningful. Yugoslavia, for its part, and in accordance with its views and
positions of principle, will make every effort to have the Conference attain
these goals.
Given the prevailing situation in international relations, the Conference
on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum in the field of
disarmament, is gaining in importance on the global level. For multilateral
negotiations, in our view, constitute the corner-stone of multilateral
dialogue, in which the Conference on Disarmament has a major role to play.
Multilateral and bilateral negotiations complement each other. This does
not mean that multilateral negotiations should wait for the completion of
bilateral negotiations; multilateral negotiations are irreplaceable in
addressing all disarmament problems.
The agenda of our Conference includes all key disarmament issues. Among
them, the most pressing ones are those that require urgent solutions,
including, of course, those issues the solution of which is most directly
linked to the Conference on Disarmament.
Within the framework of nuclear disarmament issues, we devote special
attention to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban (CTB). The argument that the
objective of a CTB is a long-term one is unacceptable to us. It is not
accidental that this question has been the focus of interest of the entire
international community for a quarter of a century already, with virtually
unanimous calls for a test ban. Hence, a CTB would both have practical and
symbolic value. It represents, in effect, the most important individual step
towards curbing the nuclear-arms race and arresting the development of new
generations of deadlier and deadlier nuclear weapons.
There is no need to repeat that the nuclear-weapon States themselves have
undertaken the obligations under existing international agreements, including
some signed but unratified treaties between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Of no less significance in this connection is the fact that
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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)
practical behaviour has proved that even the on-site inspections of nuclear
testing grounds are acceptable.. We hope therefore that the United States
will join the Soviet Union which has already expressed its readiness for a
bilateral moratorium on nuclear tests.
Thus, there exist, in our opinion, all the necessary political, technical
and procedural pre-conditions for our Conference to undertake substantive work
aimed at negotiations on this subject. It goes without saying that the
practical approaches will differ. That of my delegation is a flexible one
and takes account of the ultimate objective of reaching a comprehensive
nuclear-test-ban treaty.
Such a treaty would, at the same time, be the test of the worthiness of
the jointly declared objective in the United States-Soviet negotiations of
eliminating all nuclear arms on Earth. This and the common view of
both Powers that nuclear war must never be fought, as well as the stand of the
non-aligned movement that the use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against
humanity, is, in our opinion, the basis upon which it is possible to negotiate
more effective arrangements and instruments for the prevention of nuclear war
and for nuclear disarmament.
However, in making references to nuclear weapons and recognizing its
priority, we should not lose sight of conventional weapons, which continue to
absorb most of the resources spent on arms, and which take a heavy toll of
human life in so-called local wars. Moreover, the development of conventional
weapons systems makes these weapons increasingly dangerous and almost as
destructive as nuclear weapons. This seriously threatens to lower the
threshold of eventual use of nuclear weapons. It requires, as stated in the
Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament, that parallel efforts be made to reduce the armed forces and
conventional weapons, and to narrow the scope -- through regional and
international agreements -- for this dimension of the arms race. The
complexity of the strategic equation and the actual situation in the world
command a comprehensive approach to the totality of disarmament issues.
Yugoslavia has always opposed the extension of the arms race to other
areas, in particular to outer space. Outer space is the area where
international co-operation could be to the benefit of all mankind. Extension
of the arms race into outer space would have a destabilizing effect on
international security and co-operation, and would undermine the efforts aimed
at disarmament. It would also consume vast material resources and the
potential needed to meet the basic subsistence and development requirements of
the majority of mankind.
Outer space is obviously a global problem. It concerns all countries,
whether from the political, security, economic, technological or any other
point of view. That is why multilateral negotiations are so indispensable in
this area.
Consequently, the Conference should tackle this problem in a substantive
way, without, of course, diminishing the importance of bilateral negotiations
between the United States and the USSR.
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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)
The work on the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention in the
course of the 1986 session of the Conference provides, in many respects, an
example of how we should proceed on other agenda items. The outgoing Chairman
of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie of the
United Kingdom, and the Chairmen of the Working Groups deserve the credit for
the results presented in the report adopted by the Conference. But despite
these significant steps, progress is still very slow on a number of major
issues and some key problems remain outstanding. We expect, therefore,
that the incoming Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekilus of
Sweden -- whose ability and competence are well known -- together with all the
delegations will make a constructive effort to speed up the negotiations. In
my view, the conditions for this do exist, even concerning the most sensitive
issues, such as verification. We consider that the proposals presented so far
offer a solid basis for negotiated solutions.
We must be aware that expectations are especially high in this field:
all the more so, as six decades have elapsed since the chemical-weapons ban
was introduced for the sake of humanity and human dignity, and we can no
longer make excuses for further delays.
Greater involvement on the part of all of us is an imperative today.
In addition, we should pledge outselves to adopting the
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during the first part of the
1987 session. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive
Programme of Disarmament, the distinguished representative of Mexico,
Ambassador Garcia Robles, will surely do his utmost to succeed in this
endeavour. The numerous initiatives and proposals put forward in 1986 and the
results already achieved, as well as consistency in the publicly proclaimed
objectives of the members of the Conference, provide a reasonable basis on
which to build this Programme. At the same time, that would be a concrete
contribution to the third special session of the United Nations
General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
The arms race has a negative impact on all spheres of human life, in
particular the economic one. It wastes enormous resources, the total annual
level of which is equivalent to the overall debt of developing countries.
This terrible waste of resources is taking place against the background of a
crisis in the world economy which particularly affects the developing
countries. Therefore, we attach particular importance to the forthcoming
Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development as a way to
reverse the arms race and create conditions conducive to sustained development
of the world economy as a whole, and to the more rapid development of
developing countries, in particular. We should not harbour illusions that a
stable world can be built on inequities and injustices, and that the bare
necessities of hundreds of millions of human beings, lacking even the basic
conditions for existence, can be ignored.
The third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on
disarmament will be held next year. It is hoped that it will further develop
the views and recommendations put forward at the previous sessions, and take
steps to implement them. This will open up new avenues for co-operation in
curbing the arms race, as well as for disarmament negotiations.
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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)
Therefore, we all at the Conference are expected to contribute to the
successful outcome of the forthcoming international gatherings. No Government
can stand by and escape responsibility for failing to contribute. It is
our duty to do all we can to live up to the letter and spirit of the
United Nations Charter, which clearly does not advocate a world based on
balance of terror or fear of destruction, nor can that be accepted as an
alternative. Our Conference, as the single multilateral negotiating body in
the field of disarmament, must be given new impetus and substance. But in
order to achieve this, it will be necessary to take concrete steps towards
prompt and complete fulfilment of the tasks facing it. We cannot hide behind
the rules of procedure and use them to cover up our failures. The rules of
procedure are relevant only if they ensure progress towards substantive work.
The Conference should devise ways to assure continuity in dealing with
all issues on its agenda in a substantive manner. A phased approach to a
chemical-weapons ban discussed during the course of the 1986 session is an
obvious example of the evolution of our activities. Practical approaches to
substantial issues should thus, in our view, be given priority over procedural
discussions on the mandates of the subsidiary bodies of the Conference,
i.e. the ad hoc committees. The negotiating mandates of these bodies stem
from the mandate of the Conference itself and cannot be questioned. Briefly,
the methods of work should be improved in order to enable successful
deliberations at the Conference as a whole. In doing so, the Conference
should always keep in mind its principal objective: the reaching of a
disarmament agreement. The debate on the negotiating mandates should, as
appropriate, be replaced by efforts to intensify the work of the Conference by
elaborating concrete programmes of work for the conclusion of agreements or
for their drafting. That would help bridge the differences and ensure the
convergence of views, enhancing the role of our Conference in international
dialogue.
In conclusion, I would like to express the hope that all of us engaged
in the work of the Conference will help to attain our aims and objectives in
disarmament, and make every effort so that the results of the Conference could
meet the legitimate interests of the whole international community, and that a
world free from weapons of mass destruction, or with fewer of them, a world of
peace and co-operation, may become a reality.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the
President and to the country that the President represents. I now give the
floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of the United States
of America, Ambassador Hansen.
Mr. HANSEN (United States of America): Mr. President, allow me, through
you, to express the gratitude of the United States delegation for the many
continuing expressions of condolence occasioned by the sad and untimely death
of Ambassador Don Lowitz. They are a source of comfort and support to us.
Ambassador Lowitz was my colleague and my friend. I shall miss him.
Pending the appointment of a permanent replacement for Ambassador Lowitz
I have been requested to serve as the acting United States representative to
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(Mr. Hansen, United States)
the Conference on Disarmament. I accept this responsibility with a
recognition of the debt my delegation owes to Donald Lowitz, and conscious of
the importance of the work of the Conference.
On 5 February, the Director of the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Ambassador Kenneth Adelman, addressed the Conference,
conveying a message from President Reagan. In addition to reaffirming our
commitment to negotiations on a complete and verifiable ban on chemical
weapons, the President stated that the United States is committed to working
with the members of this Conference in achieving responsible solutions to the
problems of reducing the world's arms. Mr. Adelman discussed the importance
of real openness to the success of these efforts.
Three basic themes are contained in the President's message and in
the remarks of Mr. Adelman: first, the significance of furthering the
negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban; second, finding responsible solutions
to the problems of reducing the world's arms; and third, the importance of
real openness in achieving progress.
Today, I would like to note that the work of the Chemical Weapons
Committee is off to a good start under the able chairmanship of
Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden. It is important as well to express appreciation
to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom for his efforts in guiding the
work of the Committee during the 1986 session. Ambassador Cromartie also gave
impetus to an extended period of inter-sessional work last fall as well as
during the January meetings of the Committee. His endeavours and achievements
were substantial; we commend him and his delegation.
My delegation has taken note of the important statement made at the
17 February plenary meeting by the distinguished representative of the
Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkine. We judge it to be an important
contribution to the work of the Conference, and will return to issues related
to the banning of chemical weapons in a future intervention.
I would like to begin my discussion of the first three items on the
agenda of this Conference with some observations concerning the framework of
the agenda and the objectives pursued by the Conference. Since 1945 not one
human being has been killed by a nuclear device used for military purposes.
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in November 1985
here in Geneva that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
Certainly, all other States possessing nuclear arms share that conclusion.
Military strategists in both East and West agree that a nuclear war must never
be fought.
Europe has been free of major war since 1945. There has not even been a
military skirmish between East and West, even though there have been periods
of crisis or near-crisis and regrettable military action in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia. Forty-one years have elapsed without a major war on the
territory of Europe. Yet, twice in the first half of this century, American
soldiers crossed the Atlantic to fight and die in wars on European soil.
Today, the prospect of even one major war in Europe in the second half of this
century is unthinkable.
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(Mr. Hansen, United States)
Whatever the perceptions of States represented here, whatever conclusions
each reaches on the basis of its own analysis, whatever its political ideology
or objectives, none can disprove the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in
preventing war and preserving peace in Europe.
And deterrence is not a Western phenomenon. It is not the invention of
undisciplined strategists. Rather it is a fact of life and a key element in
the military doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. True, great
contempt is sometimes expressed by Soviet commentators for the word
deterrence, but the concept is deeply embedded within the Soviet military
thinking, and some Eastern spokesmen have even spoken publicly in defence of
nuclear deterrence. Those who criticize deterrence do so without a full
appreciation of its character or of the contribution it has made to East-West
stability.
While none of the States possessing nuclear weapons is engaged in
military conflicts with each other, some States which are participants in this
Conference are currently engaged in one kind or war or another. Human beings
are being killed -- most with conventional weapons, some with chemicals.
Would not this forum risk becoming the theatre of the absurd if it were
to devote much time to addressing the prevention of nuclear war, something
ITuite unlikely -- and which in any case is being addressed by those most
..:irectly involved and responsible -- while ignoring the fighting and killing
which is actually taking place in so-called conventional conflicts?
Where on the programme of work for 1987 is there provision for this
-,nference to undertake arms control and disarmament efforts which might
pntribute to the ending of the destruction, pain and suffering now taking
.iace in diverse parts of the world because conventional weapons are being
ised?
In his address to the Conference on Disarmament on 19 February, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of France alluded to the lack of confidence among
States as the real source of international security problems. He also spoke
of the significance of the Stockholm Accords and the fact that they were
achieved in a multilateral negotiation. In Stockholm, 35 States agreed to
exchange in November of each year an annual calendar of their planned military
exercises, which involve at least 13,000 troops, for the coming year.
Observers from all other participating States are to be invited to each
military exercise involving more than 17,000 troops. Furthermore, each State
accepted that other States have the right to conduct an on-site inspection
whenever there are doubts about a State's compliance with agreed provisions.
The major objective of these and other provisions of the Stockholm
document is to build confidence among States as a method to prevent war, not
only nuclear war, but war.
Mr. President, allow me briefly to cite some additional efforts being
undertaken which are relevant to the Conference agenda. On 20 December, the
United States and the Soviet Union activated a third direct communications
system, a so-called "hotline" circuit. This provides the capability to
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(Mr. Hansen, United States)
transmit facsimile documents between Washington and Moscow and completes the
implementation of the 1984 agreement between the United States and the
Soviet Union to supplement the previously existing system.
On 20 January negotiations took place here in Geneva between Soviet and
American representatives on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction
.centres in Washington and Moscow.
These two developments -- improvements to the hotline and negotiations on
the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres -- are part of the overall
approach taken by my Government to reduce the risk of war.
Having argued that nuclear weapons have played an important part in
preventing the occurrence of a major war in Europe for more than four decades,
I mean in no way to detract from the final essentiality that the international
community, over time, find other means to guard its security. One cannot
but be moved by the living witness that Ambassador Chusei Yamada, the
distinguished representative of Japan, has given to the hell that the use of
nuclear weapons represents. The United States delegation will do its part to
fulfil the inscription, "let it never happen again", on the monument of which
Ambassador Yamada spoke.
The items I have referred to above, as well as the meeting in Reykiavik
last October between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, have
significant implications for the first three items on the agenda of this
Conference for 1987.
As regards the reductions of nuclear weapons, Director Adelman noted in
this Council Chamber, on 5 February, that the bilateral negotiations between
the United States and the Soviet Union are focusing, really for the first
time, on radical reductions of nuclear weapons. These intricate and delicate
negotiations have significance for the future stability and security of much
of the world. Each side must weigh carefully the potential effects of an
agreement on its own security as well as that of its allies and friends.
For its part, the United States remains cautiously optimistic that
responsible, realistic and significant agreements on reductions are possible
which will build upon the discussions held at Reykjavik.
Frankness and honesty are often the best ingredients of diplomatic
intercourse. I wish to employ both in addressing the first item on the
agenda, that of a nuclear-test ban.
The United States sees a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing as a
long-term objective which must be viewed in the context of a time when the
United States and its allies do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to
ensure international security and stability. This condition does not exist
now and will not exist during 1987. This condition cannot come into being
without deep reductions in nuclear arms, substantially improved verification
capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures and greater balance in
conventional forces.
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(Mr. Hansen, United States)
Nevertheless, my Government has begun a process which should proceed in
an orderly, step-by-step fashion. The first priority is improved verification
of the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. The
kinds of questions both parties to these Treaties have raised concerning the
other's compliance indicate that an agreement on improved verification is
clearly warranted. Once agreement is reached on direct measurement to ensure
that the yield limits of these Treaties are being respected, the United States
intends to ratify them. Immediately thereafter, we are prepared to enter into
negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel programme -- in
association with a programme to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear
weapons -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.
This policy is being implemented. President Reagan has informed the
United States Senate of his willingness to ratify the Treaties once
verification improvements have been agreed; the Senate is now taking
appropriate action.
Also in accordance with this policy, Soviet and United States experts
have been meeting here in Geneva to agree on the agenda for bilateral
negotiations on nuclear testing issues. The last round of these meetings is
now in a working recess; experts are preparing to meet again on 16 March.
The United States is prepared to engage in this process with utmost
seriousness and solemnity. However, this process must build on a series of
key understandings reached between the States most intimately involved.
This Conference can neither replace nor duplicate the delicate work which
is just getting under way bilaterally. Nevertheless, this Conference can
usefully consider and work on a number of nuclear testing issues, including
compliance and verification issues essential to any future accord. The
Conference on Disarmament can make contributions on these and other test-ban
issues of particular importance. Bearing in mind the ultimate obiective of
banning nuclear tests, the delegation of the United States is prepared
therefore to resume work on nuclear-test-ban issues in a committee with an
appropriate non-negotiating mandate as proposed by members of the Western
group.
The United States welcomes the plans of the Group of Scientific Experts
to carry out further experiments aimed at the application of advanced
techniques to the collection and exchange of seismic data useful for
monitoring against possible underground nuclear explosions. This work should
significantly increase the contribution that a global network of seisometers
could make to the monitoring and verification of an eventual agreement on
nuclear testing. We particularly welcome the fact that the Soviet Union has
withdrawn its opposition to work on the exchange of so-called level II, or
full waveform, seismic data. And we look forward to the demonstration
relating to seismic monitoring which is to be given by authorities of
the Federal Republic of Germany.
In subsequent interventions, my delegation intends to contribute to work
on other items on the agenda for 1987. In closing today, however, I would
like to summarize the approach of my Government to agenda items 1, 2 and 3.
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(Mr. Hansen, United States)
The United States seeks significant progress in the bilateral nuclear and
space talks. We are working for the implementation of steps which lower the
risk of accidental or inadvertent conflict, which could employ either nuclear
or conventional means. We are convinced that the steps we have taken and are
taking to prevent war are responsible acts of government in areas which are in
our competence. The United States seeks to engage in a process which will
result in practical and realistic steps in the area of nuclear testing. My
delegation does not concur in the need to alter an adequate mandate text that
would enable practical work to begin now. Such action has the almost
inevitable result of delaying or preventing agreement on establishing the
relevant committee, thereby thwarting the work of the Conference.
Finally, Mr. President, let me congratulate you on the significant
progress made already during only the opening month of this year's session of
the Conference. It must not be by chance alone that three Ad Hoc Committees
have been constituted thus far during your Presidency. With a commitment by
all members to progress rooted in advancing the security interests of all
nations, this Conference should witnes substantial progress in its work during
1987.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I'thank the representative of
the United States of America for his statement and I now give the floor to the
representative of Kenya, Ambassador Afande.
Mr. AFANDE (Kenya): Mr. President, allow me, at the outset, and on
behalf of my delegation, to express my warm congratulations to you on your
assumption of the important post of President of the Conference on Disarmament
for the first month of the 1987 session. We are confident that with your
experience and expertise in disarmament negotiations the Conference will be
able to progress in its work. Mr. President, you represent a great country
with which Kenya enjoys very friendly relations. My delegation therefore
declares its commitment to co-operate with you in your difficult task.
My delegation would also like to register our gratitude to
Ambassador Beesley, the distinguished representative of Canada, who presided
over the work of this Conference for the month of August 1986, and during the
recess period until the opening session of the Conference in 1987. We commend
him for the qualified manner in which he skilfully guided the work of the
Conference and his commitment to disarmament affairs.
The absence of Ambassador Donald Lowitz following his untimely death is a
great loss not only to his family and country but also to this Conference. He
was a dear friend and colleague whose charm and contribution in the Conference
on Disarmament will long be remembered. My delegation sends its heartfelt
condolences to his widow, Mrs. Shana Lowitz, his family and the United States
delegation.
I would also like to welcome our new distinguished colleagues who are
participating for the first time in the Conference on Disarmament, namely
Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa of Brazil, Ambassador Morel
of France, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy,
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(Mr. Afandc., Kenya)
Ambassador Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Nazarkine of the USSR and
Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. I also welcome the acting United States
representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Hansen.
The year 1986 proclaimed as the International Year of Peace by the
United Nations General Assembly, sadly witnessed the continuation of regional
conflicts in various parts of the world. It was expected that the various
adversaries in these regional conflicts would observe the year as such and
give peace a chance in resolving their divergent conflicts. But sadly this
was not the case. If anything, the intensity of some of these conflicts
increased with regrettable vigour. However, the year was climaxed with a
serious search for peace between the two super-Powers, the United States
and the USSR, when President Ronald Reagan, and General Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev, met in Reykjavik in October last year. There is no
consensus on the final results on the achievements of the Summit Meeting,
which regrettably indicates that it was not a success. It appears that the
two super-Powers .are far from entering into any binding agreements on
disarmament questions. It is clear that both super-Powers are concerned about
safeguarding their own security from the threat of attack with offensive
nuclear weapons, especially inter-continental ballistic missiles, launched by
either side against the other. It is indeed proper for the two super-Powers
to negotiate and make proposals as well as raise objections in efforts geared
towards enhancing their mutual security and in a wider sense the security of
the whole world.
We have remained steadfastly convinced that bilateral arms limitation and
disarmament negotiations should be complementary to multilateral negotiations
in arms limitation and disarmament, especially in the Conference on
:Disarmament, which is the single multilateral negotiating forum.
The bilateral disarmament negotiations between the two super-Powers have
cesumed in Geneva on an emphatic note with both the United States and the USSR
Governments demonstrating a willingness to negotiate earnestly with a view to
achieving success in these negotiations. We hope that both the delegations
from the United States and the USSR will strive towards harmonizing their
different approaches to the various complex issues in this renewed round of
bilateral negotiations. The other nations of the world are anxiously waiting
for success in these bilateral talks and such anxiety arises from the
justified rationale that international peace and security is the concern of
all countries small and big alike.
Turning to issues that are directly relevant to the Conference on
Disarmament, my delegation notes that the agenda for the 1987 session of
this Conference remains the same as that of the 1986 session which, to my
delegation, is an indication of the continuity of the work of the Conference
and also of the desire by all member States of the Conference to tirelessly
work towards furthering the negotiations aimed at reaching concrete and
tangible results in solving the difficult problems in arms limitation and
disarmament negotiations.
The agenda item on a nuclear-test ban is highest on the agenda and still
creates grave concerns not only with my delegation but also with many other
delegations represented in this Conference. Nuclear-weapon States especially
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(Mr. Afande, Kenya)
the two super-Powers, the United States and the USSR, have conducted numerous
nuclear tests in the years gone by with only brief non-binding respites in
such tests. We have taken note of the circumstances which have made the USSR
declare the termination of its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests after
the test conducted by the United States on 3 February this year. We regret
that the efforts to achieve a bilateral moratorium were unsuccessful. It is
in this context that my delegation welcomes unilateral declarations suspending
such tests by any nuclear-weapon State but is of the view that the ultimate
requirement on this crucial matter should be a concerted effort by all
nuclear-weapon States to for ever prohibit nuclear tests.
It is factual to state that these tests are conducted to determine the
reliability and effectiveness of such petrifying weapons as well as to develop
new categories of weapons. We are convinced that the Conference on
Disarmament has a moral obligation to carry out negotiations on this very
important item and my delegation appeals to all groups represented in this
Conference to support the establishment of an ad hoc committee in order to
facilitate meaningful negotiations on elaborating a treaty banning all nuclear
tests.
My delegation remains convinced that all problems related to the
prohibition of nuclear tests, be they on verification or on other concerns,
can be comprehensively discussed in such a subsidiary body established by the
Conference. The draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban
proposed by the Group of 21 in document CD/520/Rev.2 of 21 March 1986, offers
a realistic basis for establishing a mandate on negotiations on this item.
This should be complemented by resolution 41/46 A adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly at its forty-first session entitled "Cessation
of all Nuclear Test Explosions".
In discussing the item on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the Conference
on Disarmament should not forget the continued appeals made by the Heads of
State or Government of Argentina, India, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania
on the urgency to halt nuclear-weapon testing prior to the formulation of a
comprehensive test-ban treaty. In the Mexico Declaration, adopted by the
leaders of these six countries on 7 August 1986, it is stated that "they
remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing
to an end all nuclear tests", and in addition, "Both the qualitative and the
quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race, and both
would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing". The
Joint Statement made by the six leaders on the eve of the New Year -- 1987 --
underlines the views which are also held by my delegation that there is no
justification for nuclear testing by any country.
My delegation is concerned over the reports that South Africa is
developing facilities, on Marion Island in the Antarctic, capable of testing
nuclear weapons. South Africa's nuclear weapon capability is threatening the
African countries in general, and the front-line States in particular, with
nuclear annihilation should African States persist with efforts to achieve
freedom and justice for the black majority in South Africa. It goes against
the proposal made in Cairo in 1964 by the Heads of State of the Organization
of African Unity calling for the denuclearization of Africa.
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(Mr. Afande, Kenya)
My Government has urged countries that have aided South Africa in
developing a nuclear weapons capability to halt all such activities in the
interests of international peace and security and also to enable the
implementation of the call for the denuclearization of Africa. All Member
States of the United Nations Organization should adhere to United Nations
General Assembly resolutions 41/55 A and B adopted during the
forty-first session of the General Assembly in 1986 entitled "Implementation
of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa" and the "Nuclear
Capability of South Africa" respectively.
Delegations in the Conference on Disarmament have informally and formally
expressed positive projections that the Conference will be able to finalize a
draft chemical weapons convention in its 1987 session and be in a position to
present it to the forty-second session of this year's United Nations
General Assembly. This optimism can only be manifested if all delegations
work towards resolving the outstanding issues hampering the drafting of a
chemical weapons convention.
The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will
indeed hasten the consultations in this very important area. The keen
interest of my delegation in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical
Weapons stems from the conviction that chemical weapons, some of which do not
require a sophisticated technological base to produce, and can, indeed, be
produced by any country, should for ever be banned from the arsenals of States
possessing these horrifying weapons.
My delegation would like to sincerely thank Ambassador Cromartie, the
distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, for steering the work of
the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as its Chairman for the 1986 session
in a most commendable and satisfying manner. We also take this opportunity to
congratulate Ambassador Eketus, the distinguished representative of Sweden, on
his being appointed as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical
Weapons for the duration of the 1987 session of the Conference on
Disarmament. We have great confidence in his experience and we trust that
under his direction the Ad Hoc Committee will be in a position to continue and
initiate new approaches to resolve all outstanding problems hampering the
conclusion of a draft chemical weapons convention by the end of the 1987
session of the Conference.
My delegation recalls quite clearly that after the Summit Meeting between
the two super-Powers in Geneva, in 1985, a Joint Statement issued by
the United States and the USSR truthfully declared that a nuclear war cannot
be won and must never be fought. We were reassured by this statement as it
indicated that it was not to the interest of the super-Powers to engage in a
nuclear war. But we would be even more reassured if this joint declaration
could be enhanced by immediate and concrete measures to halt and reverse the
nuclear-arms race not only in bilateral negotiations between the two
super-Powers but also in the Conference on Disarmament.
The prevention of nuclear war is indeed a vital task and no energies
should be spared in launching negotiations to realize this objective. We
appeal to all delegations to work together towards establishing an appropriate
body to consider this very important matter.
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(Mr. Afande, Kenya)
My delegation supports all efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-free
zones. In this regard, we commend all the States Parties to the Treaty of
Rarotonga which has declared a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, stretching
from the Equator in the North to the Antarctic in the South and from the
West Coast of Latin America to the West Coast of Australia.
In calling for the prohibition of nuclear war including all related
matters, non-nuclear-weapon States have, rightfully, proposed that the
nuclear-weapon States should categorically assure them against the use of or
threat of use of nuclear weapons or any one of them. It would be morally
unjustified for any nuclear-weapon State to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State.
The complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons would provide
this basic assurance required by non-nuclear-weapon States, as the effects of
nuclear weapons once unleashed would not distinguish between nuclear-weapon
States or non-nuclear-weapon States.
The realm of outer space, which has been referred to as the common
heritage of mankind and should be confined exclusively for peaceful purposes
to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all nations, has
proved vitally useful in the sense that civil space satellites have proved
crucial in communications, navigation, weather-forecasting and remote-sensing,
among other vital uses. Regrettably, this realm has become militarized and
the super-Power arms race has been extended into outer space.
It is in the general interest of all mankind that space should not be
used to further any aggressive military interests of any State especially
those of the two super-Powers and their allies. To do so would threaten the
security of the whole world from space as well as efforts to terminate
the arms race on Earth. We are hopeful that the re-establishment of
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for the
1987 session of the Conference will be able to address the problems related to
this agenda item.
We also believe that the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Radiological Weapons for the 1987 session will provide a necessary forum for
further progress in efforts aimed at reaching agreement on a convention
prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological
weapons.
The Conference on Disarmament is expected to submit to the United Nations
General Assembly a complete draft of the Comprehensive Programme of
Disarmament before the close of its forty-first session, and we hope that all
delegations will extend to Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, the distinguished
representative of Mexico, who is Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the necessary co-operation in efforts
towards realizing this required objective. On its part, my delegation, will
extend its necessary co-operation to ensure progress in the work of this
Ad Hoc Committee.
I cannot conclude my statement without mentioning the forthcoming
Conference on the question of the relationship between disarmament and
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(Mr. Afande, Kenya)
development, to be held in New York in August this year. Although the
Conference is of particular importance to developing countries, my delegation
considers that all countries, developed and developing, are affected in one
way or another by the nuclear and conventional arms race.
Military expenditures are increasing with the progression of time and thF?
nuclear-weapon States and their allies account for a large proportion of this
expenditure, on the one hand. On the other hand, developing countries also
contribute a substantial proportion to the continued rise in military
expenditures, which is a saddening fact as such resources could be usefully
invested in improving the lagging social and economic sectors of these
countries.
Many resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly have
often expressed the concern of this world body for reducing and restraining
military expenditures and for creating increased possibilities for
re-allocating released resources towards socio-economic development,
particularly for the benefit of developing countries. Kenya, as a developing
country attaches great importance to the forthcoming Conference and appeals to
some developed countries which have expressed doubt on the effectiveness of
the Conference to attend it and contribute to the achievement of its desired
objectives.
Finally, the Conference on Disarmament has in its agenda indicated the
major issues in disarmament which need to be addressed and negotiated upon in
order to create a safer, freer and peaceful world. It cannot be denied that
the non-aligned and neutral States in this Conference have made all efforts
within their capability to bring about effective measures in the field of
disarmament negotiations. These efforts, which are on record, have been aimed
at initiating new approaches to all the questions before the Conference on
Disarmament. Sadly, most of these efforts have not achieved any great Success
within the Conference. The non-aligned and neutral States, in formulating new
approaches and initiatives on disarmament questions, have always done so with
the objective of fulfilling the dictates not only of the Charter of the
United Nations but also of the Final Document adopted after the first special
session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament held in 1978, which in
essence advocate complete and effective disarmament measures.
We note that the third special session of the General Assembly, wholly
devoted to the question of disarmament, is scheduled to take place in 1988.
This will be 10 years after the first special session of the General Assembly
devoted entirely to the same question. As at present position, the Conference
on Disarmament will not have made any major achievements in negotiations
manifesting in any disarmament treaty. Certainly, the expectations of the
other participating member States in the third special session will be
dampened when this fact is brought to their attention. We have one year to
show to the world that the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament can
produce tangible results. My delegation hopes that the Conference on
Disarmament will adequately respond to this challenge by action and not by
mere words.
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President
as well as to the country that the President represents. I now give the floor
to the last speaker on my list for today, the representative of Nigeria,
Ambassador Tonwe.
Mr. TONWE (Nigeria): I thank you Mr. President. I would also like to
congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on
Disarmament for the crucial month of February 1987. The skilful manner in
which you have conducted the affairs of the Conference during the last few
weeks has produced the positive results we have obtained so early in the
session. I wish to assure you and the delegation of your great country that
you can count on the continued support of the Nigerian delegation. May I also
congratulate Ambassador Alan Beesley of Canada for the efficient way he
presided over our deliberations in the month of August and during the
inter-sessional months.
I cangot continue this statement without first paying tribute to a
distinguished colleague and friend, Ambassador Donald Lowitz of the
United States, whom the cold hand of death so prematurely took away from us
at the beginning of the session. Ambassador Donald Lowitz was an affable
diplomat who defended the interests of 'his great country convincingly, and, at
the same time, demonstrated his respect for the interests of other nations,
as they were conveyed by their representatives. Indeed, by his words,
comportment and friendship, he made one feel that the arms race, which we are
gathered here to try to stop, was a phenomenon that was out of character, even
for the rival Powers. The loss of Ambassador Lowitz is tragic and I would
like to convey through you, Mr. President, the heartfelt condolences of the
Nigerian delegation to the United States delegation, to Shana Lowitz and to
the entire family of the deceased.
Permit me, Mr. President, to welcome the representatives of member States
who have recently been appointed by their respective Governments to lead their
delegation to the Conference.
The statements made this morning by the distinguished representatives of
Yugoslavia, the United States and Kenya, have given us a lot of food for
thought -- some of it quite appetizing, other parts quite provocative. I am
convinced that we would all like to reflect seriously on the propositions we
have heard. I would not like here to go into details. I would only like to
say that some of the things we have heard incite some reservations.
We cannot today look at the topography of the disarmament field without
being struck by a number of features and dates which have far-reaching
consequences for our deliberations and negotiations at this Conference:
November 1985, Reykjavik, 1993, 3 February 1987, etc.
November 1985 and Reykjavik recall summits of hope, which, unfortunately,
rapidly fizzled away. Nineteen-ninety-three and 3 February 1987 are dates
which must remind us of national idiosyncracies and a determination we cannot
ignore.
The ideological schism, the ambitions, strategies, fears and divergences
which paralyse summits, or fuel the arms race in rival States or alliances,
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(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)
impose a tremendous responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva -- the unique multilateral negotiating forum. Consequently, instead of
despair when we hear what we do not want to hear, the Conference will have to
draw on its reserve of optimism, perseverance and creativeness.
The Nigerian delegation recognizes the indispensability of bilateral
talks on disarmament, but it does also believe that these talks do not in any
way reduce the tremendous value of the role of the unique multilateral forum.
We further recognize that disarmament has to be carried out by those who have
amassed arms, especially the super-Powers; but we are also convinced that the
enterprise is extremely important for the survival of all nations, big or
small. It is, therefore, the duty of the Conference on Disarmament to see to
it that the course of negotiations reflects the conscience of humanity. The
Conference on Disarmament, having been duly mandated to act in the field, must
not lose the right to take initiatives, nor relent in its endeavour to be kept
fully informed about the substance of bilateral or regional disarmament
negotiations.
The Conference on Disarmament has been around long enough to know that
relations between the super-Powers are often bedevilled by various subjective
factors which exacerbate their fears and rivalry. As the Washington-based
"World Priorities" put it:
"Distrust between the two (super-Powers) has been fanned by exaggerated
fantasies on both sides (and) mutual antagonism has created (in that
context) a symbiosis which is as effective in driving the arms race as
any co-operative agreement could be.".
We do not need to have read the Prince to know that the said symbiosis is not
entirely new. Competition is an important ingredient of any living organism,
rivalry is the hallmark of Great Powers. If Great Powers had no rivals, they
would invent them and if they were not opposed, they would develop into
tyrants and oppress the people. The Nigerian delegation welcomes a healthy
competition among the Powers, but would never support those who nourish
inordinate ambitions.
One such ambition, in our time, is the desire of States to establish a
permanent military superiority, political and economic hegemony over the rest
of the world, for all time. History is replete with cases of the rise and
fall of Powers and Empires. The process, and the circumstances, of ascendancy
and decline might differ in each case, but the basic human qualities and
shortcomings which bring them about have, all through the ages, remained much
the same. As a philosopher explained it, "those who do not study the past
will repeat its errors, and those who do will find other ways to err".
We must not surrender to the basic instincts of man, in the crucial field
of disarmament. We must not find other ways to err. If we did, it would be
because we have denied ourselves the creative genius of man. Those who have
done so much to conquer their physical environment can no doubt do something
to design solutions, albeit dynamic, to their socio-political problems.
Time is not irrelevant. In the 1920s, disarmament negotiations collapsed
ostensibly because the Powers could not agree on the relative weight to be
attributed to the different weapons. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear
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(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)
weapons became the principal obstacle. Our planet is today threatened by the
massive build-up of nuclear-weapon arsenals, and the overwhelming majority of
mankind wishes to see this weapon banished for ever. But time is running
out: When the super-Powers, two today, three, four tomorrow, have acquired
"Star Wars" capabilities, only the strategy of massive retaliation would be
perceived by other nuclear-weapon States to provide a minimum deterrence.
Consequently, if this Conference still wishes to give priority to nuclear
disarmament in the future, now is the time to concentrate its efforts on
stopping the dangerous attempt to transfer the arms race to outer space. If
we cannot acquire the moral force to dissuade the protagonists of Star Wars
from militarizing outer space, we will have lost the battle for nuclear
disarmament on Earth.
The Nigerian delegation sincerely hopes that the prevention of the arms
race in outer space will henceforth be placed in the foreground of our
preoccupations at this Conference. My delegation would like to see a
subsidiary body established without further delay, with a mandate that is
meaningful and flexible and would lead progressively to an agreemeni.
As a corollary of steps to be taken to halt the imminent militarization
of outer space, the Conference must tackle the problem of eliminating the
factor which generates mutual distrust and insecurity, which, in turn, fuels
the desire to acquire some invulnerable weapon up there in outer space. The
Nigerian delegation continues to believe that the first step in this direction
is a nuclear-weapon-test ban. This should be followed by a freeze of all
nuclear-weapon arsenals. Thereafter, negotiations to reduce and eliminate
nuclear weapons can seriously begin.
The argument that tests do not prevent an acceptable, and therefore
verifiable, agreement on nuclear-weapon cutbacks is not at all convincing. It
is now common knowledge that testing permits nuclear-weapon States to refine
and modernize their arsenals and thus aggravate the crisis of confidence.
This cannot be said to support the aim of our negotiations. The argument
about detection difficulties no longer holds. Scientists on both sides have
confirmed that they can detect, by national means, nuclear explosions with
yields of even less than 1 kiloton. In this connection, we welcome the
indications that seismologists of the super-Powers have been exchanging data
and visits. This should be intensified, as it would create the understanding
and trust needed to produce and hold an agreement.
To further improve the psychological and political environment for
nuclear disarmament negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States should be prepared
to give a legally binding undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against States which do not possess such weapons. We make this
proposal because we realize that some nuclear-weapon States will probably
reject out of hand our previous suggestion that all States should renounce the
use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The Nigerian delegation still
cannot understand, having regard to the disastrous consequences of a nuclear
war, nuclear winter and all that, that our proposal was rejected by some
Powers, which, none the less, implore the Conference to give priority to
negotiating a ban on chemical weapons. And yet nuclear weapons are a greater
threat to human survival than are chemical weapons; and there is no choice to
be made between death by physical annihilation and death by asphyxiation.
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(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)
Several arguments have been advanced for holding back on giving the type
of undertaking we envisage, or for imposing conditions. The Nigerian
delegation appreciates that there are certain problems that have to be
resolved. For example, what proviso would apply to States which are members
of military alliances equipped with nuclear weapons; or States which have
nuclear weapons on their.territory; or States which have no nuclear weapons
but may exercise some discretion as to the use of those stationed on their
territory. All these are questions which deserve special attention and would
require special treaty provisions. The Nigerian delegation has no doubt that
such provisions, which meet the legitimate concerns of all States, can be
designed by the Conference.
In this connection, the Nigerian delegation is highly encouraged by the
prompt decision of the Conference to set up an Ad Hoc Committee on the
so-called negative security assurances.
We sincerely hope that the Committee will soon be able to commence
concrete work on the text of a legal instrument that is generally acceptable.
Having said that, the Nigerian delegation would like to say how pleased
we are to note the amount of progress that has been made in the last year on
the convention to ban chemical weapons. We would like to congratulate
Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom for the significant work
done in this respect under his chairmanship. We are glad that
Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden, our dedicated colleague, has been elected to,
hopefully, conclude the good work that has been done in this field so far.
The prospect of a chemical weapons convention in the near future is, for
my delegation, a source of confidence in the future of our disarmament
negotiations. If it materializes, the convention would, in itself, be
historic: it would be the first major disarmament agreement. Above all, it
would demonstrate, once again, on a multilaterally significant issue, that the
major Powers can co-operate intensively in diverse areas, if their national
interests, or their perceptions of international problems, converge. It would
further confirm our belief that given the political will, the Conference on
Disarmament could make rapid progress in other areas.
My delegation would like to reiterate the views we have expressed in the
past that the final text of the chemical weapons convention should ensure that
the destruction of all stockpiles and facilities would be done in such a
manner that the present chemical-weapon Powers would not in any way be in a
position to exploit their position during the transition period. Furthermore,
it would have to guarantee in no uncertain terms, to the non-chemical-weapon
Powers, the right to unfettered development of their budding chemical
industries for peaceful purposes.
The Nigerian delegation is glad to note that the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Compretiensive Programme of Disarmament, under the distinguished chairmanship
of Ambassador Garcia Robles, has been relaunched. Given the energy and
dedication of the Chairman, and the concern of all delegations to meet
the deadline quite rightly set by the General Assembly, we believe that
substantial progress can be made towards agreeing on a comprehensive programmP.
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(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)
The work of the Conference this year is particularly crucial for the
future of disarmament negotiations. Next year, the third special session on
disarmament should be held. The Conference on Disarmament will then have to
give an account of itself. Unless it can show evidence that its structure,
procedures and results deserve an unqualified extension of its mandate, the
Conference might have to face some unpleasant surprises.
The Conference on Disarmament has a mandate from the United Nations. The
same body has determined in various resolutions which areas should be given
priority. It is wrong for certain States to seek to impose other priorities
on the Conference, in disregard of the resolutions of the overwhelming
majority of the international community. We must, therefore, at this
Conference, give priority to nuclear disarmament and for that purpose put the
non-militarization of outer space first. That is the best way to move ahead.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Nigeria for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President
and to the country that the President represents.
This concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish
to take the floor? I see none. As there is no other business, I intend now
to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on
Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 26 February, at 10 a.m. The plenary
meeting stands adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.
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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
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ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 26 February 1987, at 10 a.m.
President:
GE. 87-60254/7417E
Mr Fan Guoxiang (China)
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the
392nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.
According to its programme of work, the Conference will today continue
its consideration of agenda item 1, "Nuclear Test Ban" and item 2 "Cessation
of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament".
Following rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member who
wishes to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.
On my list of speakers for today, I have the representatives of India,
Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
I now give the floor to the first speaker, the representative of India,
Ambassador Teja.
Mx. TEJA (India): Mr. President, permit me to take this opportunity to
extend to you the felicitations of my delegation on your assumption of the
Presidency for this crucial month of February, the opening period of the
spring session of the Conference on Disarmament. The manner in which the work
of the Conference has got off to a smooth start bears eloquent testimony to
your diplomatic skills and capabilities. I should like to assure you of my
delegation's full co?operation in the discharge of your responsibilities. I
would also like to avail myself of this occasion to convey our gratitude to
Ambassador Beesley of Canada for having presided over the Conference in a most
competent and exemplary manner during the important month of August and in the
intersessional period.
My delegation wishes to extend its sincere condolences to the delegation
of the United States of America and to the family of the late
Ambassador Donald Lowitz. In his untimely demise, we have lost a colleague
whose professional skills and high personal qualities will be long remembered
by all of us.
I would like to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to our new
colleagues who have joined the Conference on Disarmament: Ambassador Hacene
of Algeria, Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy,
Ambassador Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia and
Ambassador Nazarkine of the Soviet Union. Since I am substantively
participating in the Conference for the first time, I greatly look forward to
working closely with all of them and of course with other colleagues.
The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament -- SSOD?III -- to be held next year, provides us with an
appropriate moment to make an honest appraisal of our collective effort in
this area and to take stock, briefly, of the successes and failures of the
Conference on Disarmament during the last nine years. A careful analysis
reveals that the achievements could have been more substantial but the fault
surely does not lie in the charter of the Committee but rather in the lack of
political will which, in turn, had a cumulative effect on the functioning of
this sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament. The
priorities established by the Final Document have unfortunately been distorted
and almost reversed. There have been no meaningful negotiations on such
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(Mr. Teja, India)
critically important items of our agenda as Cessation of the nuclear arms race
and nuclear disarmament, Prevention of nuclear war, Nuclear test ban and
Prevention of an arms race in outer space. No subsidiary bodies have been set
up on halting the nuclear arms race or prevention of nuclear war. On a
nuclear-test-ban treaty, which has long been considered as the crucial first
step in ending the nuclear arms race, it was not possible to agree on an
adequate negotiating mandate for an ad hoc committee. On the Prevention of an
arms race in outer space, the Ad Hoc Committee has found itself hampered in
its work, again because of the absence of a negotiating mandate. We draw
attention to these flaws not to detract from the achievements of the
Conference but to highlight the lamentable fact that lack of political will
cannot but lead to a loss of urgency and hence momentum. One must therefore
hope that in the year just before the SSOD-III, the Conference will focus on
re-establishing the priorities in disarmament to enable itself to undertake
negotiations on the critical items, as we -- all of us around this
table -- had originally intended in 1978.
The present session of the Conference on Disarmament takes place against
the backdrop of Reykjavik. When we reflect that the United Nations had
declared 1986 as the International Year of Peace, we cannot but conclude that
Reykjavik meeting became a lost opportunity. None the less, we would like to
be optimistic and consider it a positive development, in the sense that it
indicated that a nuclear-free world can become a reality if the necessary
political will can be mustered. Equally importantly, Reykjavik demonstrated
that it is possible to overcome mutual fear and suspicions which have fuelled
the arms race. It was not, of course, an isolated or sudden event. An
earlier summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in
November 1985 had led to their important joint conclusion that a nuclear war
cannot be won and therefore must never be fought. The two leaders accepted
that their countries would not engage in conventional or nuclear war or seek
to achieve military superiority. It is to be hoped that after Reykjavik it
will now be possible at the ongoing bilateral consultations taking place here
in Geneva to make substantial progress towards translating these joint
conclusions into legally binding instruments.
While we welcome any progress in bilateral talks, this need not imply
that the Conference on Disarmament can or should have no meaningful role. It
has been unambiguously mandated to undertake negotiations on the fundamental
aspects of nuclear disarmament. In the face of the universal concern about
the danger of a nuclear war and its consequences for mankind, a multilateral
approach is both logical and democratic. It would be a positive step if this
Conference could establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate on item 2 of our
agenda. The Final Document of SSOD-I has already provided us with the
framework of the stages involved, commencing from cessation of improvements or
development of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and leading to
reductions in the existing stockpiles with a view to their ultimate
elimination.
The cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is closely
linked to another item on our agenda: the prevention of nuclear war. We
believe that nuclear weapons are not merely weapons of war but weapons of mass
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annihilation. The use of these weapons cannot be countenanced on any grounds
whatsoever, least of all on abstractions based on esoteric doctrines of
security. It is a cause for concern that so far it has not been possible to
establish an ad hoc committee to consider appropriate and practical measures
for the prevention of nuclear war. The Harare Declaration of the
8th Non-Alighed Summit reiterates that "the use of nuclear weapons besides
being a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, would also be a crime
against humanity". This is in recognition of the fact that the prevention of
nuclear war is not only a moral imperative but linked to the survival of the
human race. The Summit accordingly urged the nuclear-weapon States to agree,
pending the achievement of the nuclear disarmament, to the conclusion of an
international treaty on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons. It would contribute to the success of negotiations on item 3, if the
Conference on Disarmament can undertake substantive work to develop a
convention to forswear the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on lines
similar to General Assembly resolution 41/60 F which has been adopted by
overwhelming majority year after year since 1982. The Annex to this
resolution provides for a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of
nuclear weapons which is based on the principles enshrined in the Charter of
the United Nations. A legally binding commitment banning the use of nuclear
weapons is therefore a logical step in the right direction.
Twenty-seven years ago, Jawaharlal Nehru proposed a standstill for the
suspension of nuclear-weapon testing, until an agreement on the control and
prohibition of nuclear weapons could be achieved. India, therefore, attaches
particular importance to the nuclear-test ban. We believe that a
comprehensive treaty on the complete prohibition of tests of all types of
nuclear weapons in all environments by all States is a prerequisite to halting
the arms race. It is self-evident that unless we all agree to putting an end
to nuclear-weapons tests, we shall not be able to achieve our goal of nuclear
disarmament and the dangers of nuclear war will increase. It is this
conviction which motivated the leaders of the Five-Continent Peace Initiative
to call for an end to all nuclear testing, first in the Delhi Declaration and
more recently in the Mexico Declaration. The 8th Non-Aligned Summit also
addressed itself to this important issue in an unambiguous manner. The Harare
Declaration states that a comprehensive test ban is a matter of the highest
priority for the non-aligned countries. It emphasizes the "pressing need to
negotiate and conclude a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test ban treaty
prohibiting all nuclear weapons tests by all States in all environments for
all time". The alternative before us is this: a negotiated comprehensive
test-ban treaty to de-escalate the nuclear-arms race and reduce the risk of
nuclear war or a situation of non-negotiation in which continued
nuclear-weapon testing accelerates the arms race and increases the danger of
nuclear war. Our choice is clear!
How can we achieve this objective? By merely talking about it or by
making concrete efforts to reach agreements? The Conference on Disarmament is
a negotiating body on disarmament, not a deliberative organ which task has
been entrusted to the Disarmament Commission by the General Assembly. It is
important to recall this distinction because any attempt to confuse the tasks
of the deliberative and negotiating organs of the United Nations will only
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(Mr. Teja, India)
impede our work and will not be conducive to achieving constructive results.
The Conference on Disarmament cannot therefore content itself by setting up a
subsidiary body which has no authority to negotiate but only discuss.
The approach to item 1 of our agenda has therefore to be one of
negotiations, not that of non-negotiations. The Final Document of the first
special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which was
adopted by consensus nine years ago, has clearly stated that the cessation of
nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective
nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. The same
Declaration had also referred to the need to conclude urgently the
negotiations which were then in progress on a "treaty prohibiting
nuclear-weapon tests". This effort was unfortunately abandoned soon after the
adoption of the consensus document. It cannot remain in that limbo and must
be rescued from its position of obscurity.
Basing ourselves on the deeply held and publicly stated position of
non-aligned nations to which I have referred a little while ago, the Group
of 21 in the Conference on Disarmament adopted by consensus an approach which
is contained in document CD/520/Rev.2. This document clearly states our
desire to establish an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban "to initiate the
multilateral negotiations of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear
weapon tests". This position remains on the table. The position of the
Western Group, as far as I am aware, is contained in document CD/521.
We have recently heard arguments, some of them quite eloquent, that
despite the serious differences in approach, the Conference should consider
the setting up of an ad hoc committee without undertaking negotiations. It
has been suggested that what is important is not the mandate but "practical"
work and that certain shifts in the voting pattern on certain resolutions in
the General Assembly are indicative of the growing convergence between the
opposing views. With due respect and the best of goodwill, we find it
difficult to agree with this proposition or with the suggestion that the basic
issues of negotiations should be set aside. One delegation has
authoritatively stated that on some nuclear-testing issues, it is prepared to
resume work in a committee with "an appropriate non-negotiating mandate".
Some delegations have raised the question of whether a negotiating mandate is
absolutely necessary at the present time. Still others feel that the ad hoc
committee could profitably concentrate on such issues as verification and
compliance, a subject which has been under discussion by the Ad Hoc Group of
Scientific Experts for the last 10 years. We are not convinced that piecemeal
approaches with frequently shifting preferences can provide the answer to this
problem.
Since 1979, the year after the Final Document of SSOD-I was adopted,
there have been 364 or 365 nuclear tests, as has been recorded by the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The moratorium on nuclear
testing which was being unilaterally observed by one of the super-Powers has
been abandoned for reasons which are well known to the Committee. Nearly
25 years after the call given by the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty that as a
provisional measure all nuclear test explosions should be halted, the tests
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(Mr.
Teja, India)
have unfortunately continued. Under such circumstances, when
confronted with an indefinite prospect of more nuclear tests,
more nuclear tests, should this Conference be asked to set up
committee to do less than what many of us have advocated over
tests are conducted not merely to update the existing nuclear
develop new weapon systems, when testing is justified not only on the
perceived inadequacy of verification and compliance but on the more basic
ground of national security, when the priority attached by some to a
nuclear-test ban has been virtually reversed so that a test-ban treaty would
come towards the end rather than in the earlier stages of the disarmament
process, should the role of the Conference on Disarmament -- the sole
multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament -- be confined to an airy
discussion of the issues, without any authority to engage in meaningful
negotiations on the vital issues of the day.
we are
and I repeat,
an ad hoc
the years? When
arsenals but to
The answer to these questions is clear in so far as we are concerned.
The setting up of an ad hoc committee under item 1 without the mandate to
initiate multilateral negotiations of a treaty for the prohibition of all
nuclear-weapon tests will defeat the very objective which we all wish to
achieve. It may create an illusion of movement without any real movement and
arouse false hopes that the Conference had broken new ground when nothing of
that sort may in fact have happened. It would be tantamount to legitimizing
nuclear-weapon tests and by implication the nuclear-arms race for an
indefinite period. My delegation would be reluctant to take on such an
onerous responsibility. We would therefore once again urge in all sincerity
that the question of a negotiating mandate should be addressed with due
deliberation and with more effort to persuade those who have not been in
favour of it. This way, we would at least know the future direction in which
we are moving even though the road may sometimes be hard and difficult. To do
otherwise would mean obscuring our vision and getting lost among the footpaths
of side issues without reaching the principal destination.
I would now like to turn to item 5 of our agenda -- Prevention of an arms
race in outer space -- which has all too obvious a relationship with the
nuclear issues. The Six-Nation Initiative has placed particular emphasis on
this question. The Delhi Declaration calls for the prohibition of the
development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons
The Harare Declaration calls on the Conference on Disarmament to commence
negotiations urgently to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate,
to prevent the extension of the arms race in all its aspects into outer space
and thus enhance the prospects of co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer
space.
The Ad Hoc Committee, which has been obliged to function so far within a
limited mandate, has reached certain conclusions which are reflected in last
year's report contained in CD/726. This document concludes that the Ad Hoc
Committee has examined and identified the need to reinforce the legal regime
applicable to outer space; that the Ad Hoc Committee has examined and
identified the need for strict compliance with existing agreements; and that
the Ad Hoc Committee recognized the interest of mankind in the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes.
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(Mr. Teja, India)
What is therefore needed now is to undertake negotiations to reinforce
the regimes by developing new agreements or agreement. The issue assumes
greater urgency in view of the reports about the possibility of early
deployment of the first phase of the ballistic missile defence foreseen in the
Strategic Defence Initiative. The Conference was not in existence when
nuclear weapons began to be developed. It would however be tragic if our
Conference merely engages itself in discussion while development and
deployment of space weapons takes the arms race into yet another dimension
undermining the existing network of arms control agreements. This cannot but
aggravate the threat of a nuclear war. The Conference must therefore address
itself to the issue without further delay.
My delegation is pleased to note the high priority attached to
item 4 -- Chemical Weapons -- by the members of the Conference, especially the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Encouraging trends were noticed during 1986 and a fair amount of progress was
achieved in refining the language of the draft convention. For this, I would
like to express our sincere gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee,
the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, and also the Chairmen
of three Working Groups. We share the optimism expressed by some delegates
about the possible conclusion of the Convention by the end of 1987 and are
prepared to co-operate fully with the new Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee,
the distinguished representative of Sweden, to achieve this goal.
It is already possible to visualize the final form of the CW Convention
and it would be no exaggeration to state that it will be the most complex
disarmament instrument that we have negotiated to date. Presently, the
negotiations are at a delicate stage. It is therefore necessary that we
organize our work in a manner that would enable us to deal most effectively
with the pending issues. I would suggest that we occupy ourselves with the
issues of principles while leaving the experts to iron out the technical and
procedural questions. In this connection our delegation has attempted in the
following paragraphs to indicate some of the priorities.
The definition of a chemical weapon is a fundamental issue and a
complicated one. The present definition based on toxicity has helped the
Ad Hoc Committee in its deliberations but it is now widely felt, especially
taking into account the consideration of non-prohibited activities, that this
definition needs to be refined by incorporating other elements based on
characteristics of chemical weapons and, therefore, the danger that they might
pose to the Convention. Another area which is related to this issue is the
classification of chemical products into different categories and the
rationale for doing so. In this exercise, our delegation feels, we must not
lose sight of the fact that the Convention is aimed at banning chemical
weapons and not inhibiting the growth of chemical industry for peaceful
purposes. Accordingly, the importance of Article XI of the Convention cannot
be overlooked. It is our strong conviction that provisions for implementing
international co-operation for economic and technological development of
peaceful chemical industry will only serve to strengthen the Convention and
its fundamental objectives.
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(Mr. Teja, India)
The issues relating to organizational aspects and the structure of the
authority which will be responsible for the implementation of this Convention
also deserve urgent and thorough consideration. Given the unique nature of
this instrument, it is necessary to design new solutions to meet the
requirements of the Convention.
Finally, while still on chemical weapons, another significant aspect is
that of the challenge inspection regime. It is heartening to note that there
is now a convergence on the basic concepts underlying this measure and we hope
that it will soon be possible to convert it into an agreement on the details
of this exercise. An early resolution of this issue will go a long way in
strengthening our determination to conclude the Convention by the end of 1987.
In accordance with the decision of the General Assembly, the Conference
is expected to present a comprehensive programme of disarmament before the end
of the forty-first session. It is expected that the successful elaboration of
this programme, which was to have been initially completed in 1982 for
SSOD-II, will help reaffirm the priorities clearly established in the Final
Document of SSOD-I. Some nuclear-weapon States have in the past refused to
agree to specific measures as well as to a time-frame for these stages. It
will be our effort to ensure that the Ad Hoc Committee on Comprehensive
Programme of Disarmament under the able guidance of Ambassador Garcia Robles
will be able to fulfil its mandate in accordance with the final objective of
general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
My delegation is pleased to note that it has been possible to set up
during the first month itself, Ad Hoc Committees on items 6 and 7 -- dealing
respectively with effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and new
types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons including
radiological weapons. We hope that these Committees can begin their work soon.
Before concluding, I should like to briefly touch upon the work which is
to be carried out in the forthcoming Conference on Disarmament and Development
later this year. The Conference will provide all members with a historic
opportunity to come to substantial agreement on this important issue. The
Conference should avoid controversy and focus instead on the universally
important subject in a positive manner. My delegation hopes that the
successful conclusion of this Conference will provide a useful and significant
impetus to our efforts in achieving the goal of general and complete
disarmament.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
India for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the President.
I now give the floor to my next speaker, the representative of Poland,
Ambassador Turbanski.
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Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Comrade President, it has been repeatedly
stressed in this room that the Conference on Disarmament is a sole or a unique
multilateral negotiating body of 40 States of all regions of the world,
different political systems, large, medium and small, non-nuclear and nuclear,
members of political and military alliances and non-aligned. This, no doubt,
creates strong potential for producing concrete, effective results. The fact
is, however, that this potential is still not fully awakened to become a
leading force in working out real, effective measures for decreasing step by
step the world's military arsenals, especially of weapons of mass destruction,
until their final elimination.
With a feeling of disappointment one has to admit that, though some
progress has been made by the Conference on Disarmament every year, especially
on chemical weapons prohibition, unfortunately so far no results have been
achieved which could be translated into real disarmament measures.
It is true that the work of this body depends to a large degree upon the
state of the world political situation. I share the feeling which seems to
prevail that though still far from being satisfactory, the overall political
climate is now more propitious for substantial results to be achieved by the
Conference than it was some years ago.
The past year was proclaimed the International Year of Peace. Although
there was not peace everywhere in the world this was a year of great
significance for the future, for better prospects of lasting peace, based on
far-reaching disarmament rather than the arms race.
It was the year of the great Soviet initiative to free the world of
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction before the turn of the century.
This was not a programme addressed to a specific forum or nation. It was a
programme addressed to all nations, to all disarmament forums. It was quite
natural that also here, at the Conference on Disarmament, it occasioned not
only significant interest, as it deserved, but also stirred up useful
discussion and exchange of views. This programme still remains, as we call it
in conference language, on the negotiating table, as was the case also during
the Reykjavik Summit Meeting. That Meeting now belongs to history. It has
heralded new hopes of a nuclear-free world. The positive results were,
however, far less than they could have been. The far-reaching, bold Soviet
proposals for reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons were
again not matched by a similar willingness of the other major Power to
promptly do away with nuclear weapons and prevent an arms race in outer space.
The bilateral USSR-United States talks here in Geneva continue. We
strongly believe that they will be carried on successfully and will bring
concrete, positive results.
Nineteen eighty-six -- the International Year of Peace -- was also a year
of silence at the Soviet nuclear-test sites. This silence could have
continued permanently if the United States had not chosen to carry on with its
programme of nuclear testing. No matter whether it was a coincidence or
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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
wilful and careful planning, the first American nuclear test this year -- on
3 February, the opening date of the Conference's session -- was a challenge to
world public opinion and a sign of disregard for the efforts of this
Conference.
The Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe resulted in the adoption of a document which is
widely considered a convincing demonstration of a very concrete contribution
to the strengthening of international stability and security. In many
respects it could serve as a good example that intensive efforts and the
spirit of compromise can lead to substantial results, that progress is
possible even in a complicated international situation.
In making this short overview of the main developments in the area of
international security and disarmament in the past year I would like also to
mention the important proposal of the socialist countries at the
forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly on the
establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security.
Such a system is indispensable in a modern world, as we approach the
twenty-first century.
This is meant to be not only a system of peace and security but a system
of collective thinking and mutual responsibility for the future of mankind, a
system embracing not only political and military aspects but also economic,
humanitarian, social and other important areas of international relations.
Important political initiatives and proposals came from the non-aligned
countries. I have especially in mind the Harare Declaration and the
declarations of the leaders of the six States.
At their Budapest summit meeting, the Warsaw Treaty member States put
forward the idea of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments
in Europe.
And last but not least, my country came forward with an important
initiative at the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting to complete the mandate of the
European Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament so as to enable it to consider and to undertake steps toward
reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.
These two last initiatives, though regional in scope, have broader,
extraregional significance from the point of view of international security,
confidence and stability.
I have recalled only some examples of developments of the last year.
They do not mean, however, that tensions in the international situation ceased
to exist, that the arms race has stopped, or that the danger of nuclear
holocaust has disappeared. Not at all.
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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
Though some of us do not like any time limits to be put before the
Conference, it is worthwhile reiterating that in 1988 the third
special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament
will be convened.
I fully agree with Ambassador J. Dhanapala of Sri Lanka that "the
approach of SSOD-III must necessarily lend a sense of urgency to our work".
It would be a political setback for the Conference, for all of us to come to
the SSOD-III without substantial results.
The agenda of the Conference on Disarmament has consisted of the same
items for years. The same also applies to priorities. The only difference is
that they are becoming more and more urgent every year. The whole complex of
nuclear issues -- nuclear-test ban, cessation of the nuclear-arms race and
nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war, though enjoying the highest
priority among the vast majority of Conference members, has not yet received
actual priority treatment by the Conference.
It remains the firm belief of Poland that the solution of these issues is
of fundamental importance for the security of all States and of all mankind.
Poland has consistently considered the nuclear-test ban as a very
important step towards the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, as a measure
facilitating nuclear disarmament, and substantially contributing to
international security and mutual confidence. The utmost urgency of the
prohibition of nuclear testing was strongly emphasized during the
forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, which adopted four
resolutions on this subject.
Poland was among the vast majority of countries who voted for the
adoption of all these resolutions. We hope that States members of the
Conference on Disarmament which were not ready to join any of these
resolutions will rethink their position so as to enable the Conference to
start effective and business-like work on this item.
We respect the security concerns of every country, but there is, in the
nuclear age, only one security for all of us. That is why it was dispiriting
to hear again that France, a country whose participation in the building of
European and world security is so important, continues to be of the opinion
that the cessation of nuclear testing does not constitute "a pre-condition for
progress towards nuclear disarmament".
Most of the speakers in the first month of the 1987 session have
emphasized a nuclear-test ban as a matter of the highest priority and urgency,
with substantial implications for the security of all States. Now, this first
month is over but the Conference is still unable to move toward establishing
an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. Interpretations of this fact could
differ, but there is only one sad reality -- no substantial work is being done
by the Conference on a nuclear-test ban.
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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
This deplorable situation must be changed. We should again join our
efforts and more courageously search for a compromise formula of a mandate for
the committee. We should not forget, however, that the mandate, though
important, is not an aim in itself.
The Group of Scientific Experts which over the years of its activity, and
especially by the last progress report, has demonstrated its significant
contribution to the issue of nuclear-test ban verification is a positive
exception in the overall picture of the Conference's inability to deal
effectively with the prohibition of nuclear testing.
The Group of Scientific Experts will meet again next week to begin its
work on preparation of international experiment on the exchange and processing
of levels I and II seismic data.
Some useful experience was gained by experts who participated in the
Canadian Workshop in October 1986, in which a Polish expert also took part.
May I, Mr. President, use this opportunity to express our thanks to the
Canadian authorities for their organization of this useful meeting.
The importance of exchange of wave-form (level II) data and its
significance for verification of the future nuclear-test ban treaty is obvious
to everybody.
But for the work of the Group to be fully effective and goal-oriented, it
has to be supplemented by concrete proceedings in the ad hoc committee. We
believe that when the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts meets again in the
summer part of the session, the ad hoc committee will have long been at work.
My delegation is for a prompt establishment of the ad hoc committee
within the framework of which business-like work on the scope, compliance and
verification of a treaty on a nuclear-test ban could be undertaken. Even
those who regard "a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing as a long-term
objective" would agree that neither of these issues could be effectively
solved as a separate, autonomous issue, without due regard for their
interrelationship. That is why we are in favour of work on all elements of a
future treaty, as a complex. We also agree with those delegations who
consider that working groups within the committee might be needed.
We think that different approaches should be considered so as to enable
the committee to make full use of the abundant material at the disposal of the
Conference. More detailed views on possible items to be discussed within the
ad hoc committee are offered in the document submitted by a Group of Socialist
Countries on 13 June 1986 (CD/701). The task before us looms large; the
sooner it is undertaken and accomplished the better for our ultimate goal --
the nuclear-test ban treaty.
The informal meetings held during last year's session on the cessation of
the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament were in our opinion constructive
and useful. This year we should move toward the next step -- more structured
and goal-oriented work preferably in a more formalized form. Poland still
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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
considers that the most desirable solution would be to establish a
corresponding ad hoc committee, but we are also open to other constructive
proposals.
Prevention of nuclear war is a problem of global dimensions. It deserves
indeed to be dealt with more seriously by this multilateral body. Here again
we are in favour of the establishment of an appropriate ad hoc committee, but
if this is not possible my delegation would be ready to actively participate
in a structured discussion of the issue at informal plenary meetings or in any
other form leading toward practical work.
In this context I cannot but comment on the statement made at the plenary
meeting two days ago: "Would not this forum risk becoming the theatre of the
absurd if it were to devote much time to addressing the prevention of nuclear
war, something quite unlikely".
I think it could be useful to refer in this context to some opinions of
scientists, including American ones, on the growing danger of accidental
nuclear war, which in their view is not "something quite unlikely".
Let me quote three examples from last year:
First, the Conference on the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War held in
Vancouver, Canada, in May 1986, concluded that the danger of accidental
nuclear war was substantial and increasing,
Second, three prominent American scientists in an article published last
year in Journal of Peace and Research (vol. 23, No. 1, 1986) concluded that
recent developments in strategic weaponry had led to increasing fears that the
danger of nuclear war by accident was growing,
Third, a similar conclusion was reached by the Pugwash Workshop on
nuclear forces and accidental nuclear war held in December 1986.
These are not only theoretical calculations
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail
addressing the participants of the International
reminded them that:
"There are dozens -- I repeat dozens -
moments when the possibility of using such
countries was seriously considered" -- and
to stress once again how close mankind has
point-of-no-return".
. The General Secretary of
Gorbachev, recently
Forum for Nuclear Free World,
- of recorded and acknowledged
weapons against other
he continued "I am saying this
come to the
The greatest danger facing the world today is nuclear war. In fact, it
would be a real "the theatre of absurd" if this forum called the Conference on
Disarmament did not deal with this question.
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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)
It is true that nuclear and other issues, being on our agenda, are also
the subject of Soviet-American bilateral talks. Poland attaches the utmost
importance to those negotiations. We strongly believe, however, that this
Conference cannot be just an observer of those negotiations. It would be
contrary to its mandate, to the decisions of the United Nations, and to the
expectations of the world community.
The concrete work of the Conference on Disarmament on the items connected
with nuclear weapons should not be impeded by anybody or by any reason. The
problem of nuclear weapons is not the problem of the security of only some
States. It is not even the problem of the security of all of us. It is the
problem of the survival of our civilization. And even if in this train in
which we all travel together there are some more important passengers, there
are also fellow-travellers who have the interest, right and duty to say in
what direction the train should go.
Before I finish I would like to make a short remark on another item of
special interest to my delegation, chemical weapons. It has been so far the
most advanced piece of work done by the Conference. We are very glad to see
the evident progress already achieved during this session.
The recent proposals of the Soviet Union are of great significance to our
work. They open new avenues for making headway, clearly demonstrating the
constructiveness of the Soviet approach and decisiveness to bring our work to
a prompt and successful end. However, a similar approach is urgently needed
on the part of others too, and we would like to see it coming.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Poland for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkine.
Mr. NAzARKINE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): Comrade President, as has been repeatedly stated by the Soviet
side, our unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing cannot last indefinitely if
the United States does not join in it. The statement issued by the Soviet
Government of 18 December last year said quite explicitly that the
Soviet Union would resume nuclear testing after the first United States
nuclear explosion of 1987. You are well aware of the developments which
occurred early this month -- I am referring to the United States nuclear
explosion on 3 February, followed by yet another explosion. I wish to remind
you that on the occasion of the explosion on 3 February our side stated that
"The Soviet Union no longer considers itself bound by its unilateral
moratorium on all nuclear testing and will begin at an appropriate time the
implementation of its programme of nuclear testing".
Today at 08.00 hours Moscow time the Soviet Union carried out an
underground nuclear explosion of up to 20 kilotons at the test site near
Semipalatinsk.
This explosion was carried out to test research results in the field of
nuclear explosion physics.
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(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)
It must be clear that the resumption of testing is not our choice, but
has been forced upon us. We are well aware that the real reason for the
refusal of the United States side to join the Soviet moratorium or to agree on
a nuclear-test ban is that the United States is openly counting on achieving
military superiority over the Soviet Union and the socialist countries by
developing new types and classes of weapons. The nuclear testing carried out
by the United States involves not only development of new nuclear warheads,
but also the creation under the SDI programme of space-based strike weapons --
X-ray nuclear-driven lasers. Work is under way on a totally new weapon
capable of destroying targets both in space and on Earth. The SDI programme,
therefore, is the major obstacle not only to reducing the nuclear arsenals but
also to ceasing nuclear testing.
We emphasize that we regard a total nuclear-weapon-test ban as a priority
measure -- I stress, a priority rather than a long-term measure -- aimed
towards the limitation of nuclear arms and their subsequent elimination. We
propose finding without delay a solution to this question. I wish to remind
you that the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
M.S. Gorbachev, stated in his reply to the leaders of Argentina, India,
Mexico, Greece, Sweden and Tanzania in connection with their Declaration
of 1986, that "Even if we are compelled to resume nuclear testing, we would
work as consistently as we do for a resumption of full-scale negotiations on
the subject, which we are prepared to conduct in any form and in any forum,
but, naturally, with the participation of the United States".
We believe that the Conference on Disarmament, which under its mandate is
a body for multilateral disarmament negotiations, is one such forum. We wish
to emphasize yet again that the States blocking the initiation of negotiations
on the subject assume a serious global responsibility. It is necessary to
begin without delay practical work on a nuclear-test ban in the Conference on
Disarmament, and to establish an ad hoc committee for this purpose.
We also support proposals to take practical steps towards extending the
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water to underground nuclear testing.
The Ad Hoc Group of Seismological Experts will shortly resume its work in
the framework of the Conference. The Soviet experts are already in Geneva and
are ready to participate constructively in the Group's work with a view to
developing a system of international seismic level II data exchange and
preparing the international experiment.
There is no need for me to remind you of our proposals on verifying
compliance with a complete nuclear-test ban agreement. Seeking to use every
opportunity to intensify efforts in this field, the Soviet Union has already
expressed its willingness to make use of the proposals by the six leaders to
this effect. The verification problem can no longer be used as an excuse for
avoiding agreement.
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(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)
We wish to reaffirm that if the United States halts its nuclear testing,
the Soviet Union will be prepared to halt on a reciprocal basis the
implementation of its own programme of nuclear testing any day or month.
The Soviet Union remains a staunch supporter of a complete halt to all
nuclear testing as a crucial, top-priority measure for achieving the main
objective of curbing the race in nuclear arms and, subsequently, completely
eliminating them. As before, the Soviet Union will actively work to achieve
this goal.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. That concludes my
list of speakers for today. Is there any member who would like to take the
floor?
Mr. HANSEN (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President. I
listened with great care to all of the statements which have been made this
morning and my delegation will indeed give careful consideration to the views
which have been expressed. Of particular interest were the remarks made by
the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Narzakine. I
would like to make one or two brief comments that I think are useful to us in
this forum, which many of you have said in the last two or three days is the
only multilateral disarmament conference.
I think that every nation, large or small, is, by its constitution,
charged with the responsibility to provide for the defence of its people.
That is certainly the case in my country. My country was not the first one to
venture into outer space with weapons. We have for many years studied and
analysed the questions of defence. We have for many years relied upon a
concept with which many of you have voiced disagreement: the concept of
mutually assured destruction. The President of the United States, as a man of
vision, sought to find a different approach and therefore, as you all know,
has instigated a programme of research which is commonly known as the
Strategic Defence Initiative.
Now, I started by mentioning a State's right and indeed obligation to
provide for its own defence. We question no other country's right to the same
but we demand our own right and of course we consult with friends and allies;
of course, we take into consideration factors relating to balance, stability
and the effect upon peace and security in our world. But the fact remains
that the United States does not now have any defence against ballistic
missiles. That fact often surprises people: that a country as large as mine
would not have a defence against strategic missiles which represent in today's
world the most blatant threat to the security of our country. Now we have
begun a programme of research which has, in our view, shown that stragegic
defence is possible. We are negotiating with the Soviet Union bilaterally, as
you all know, in attempts to try to deal with this problem which has arisen
from the standpoint not only of our own security but from the standpoint of
international stability. We hope those negotiations bring results.
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(Mr. Hansen, United States)
Now let me tell you that within the area of nuclear testing, when you
speak of X-ray lasers, less than 10 per cent of those tests deal in any way
with X-ray lasers. The principal objection which is given to you and to the
international media about the United States Strategic Defence Initiative seems
to be based upon the premise that the SDI will provide the United States with
some sort of space strike capability. In that regard, I should like to quote
from a publication resulting from the work and analysis, not of American
scientists, but of Soviet scientists, among them Mr. Velikhov, who is
generally recognized to be the man in the Soviet Union charged with this
particular responsibility. I now quote:
"As regards the possibilities of destroying ground-based targets by
lasers from space, there are even more uncertainties. Space-based laser
weapons, although sufficiently powerful to destroy ICBMs in flight, would
obviously be impotent against a wide variety of hard ground targets, such
as missile silos, strategic command centres, aircraft under hard covers,
and so forth. ... Space-based laser weapons would be extremely sensitive
to the weather conditions over prospective targets. ... These
considerations all strongly suggest that even under favourable weather
conditions, laser systems of a space-based ballistic missile defence seem
to have limited applicability against ground hard targets."
I do not wish to engage in long debates with anyone, and certainly not in
those which have a polemic character, but I do want to make sure that this
body understands that we are not seeking a "space strike capability", and the
best way for me to let you know that, is the fact that scientists agree that
lasers have little potential for such an activity.
Mr. NAZARKINE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): I am not going to take up much time. I would simply like to say
that in one of our forthcoming statements in the course of this session of the
Conference on Disarmament we were precisely intending to refer to the issue
which was just now mentioned by the distinguished representative of the
United States, Ambassador Hansen, namely the possibilities of the Strategic
Defence Initiative from the standpoint of offensive or strike potential.
Hence I am not going to refer to this issue today but I shall revert to it in
one of my statements.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. Does any other
member wish to take the floor? I now give the floor to the representative of
Brazil.
Mr. SALLES (Brazil): I just wish to call the attention of the Conference
to document CD/733/Add.1 which has recently been circulated. This is an
addendum to document CD/733 which, as you recall, contained a letter from the
Secretary-General of the United Nations to you, Mr. President, conveying the
text of many resolutions dealing with disarmament as well as information
concerning other resolutions relating to disarmament matters. The
document CD/733/Add.1 gives notice of the inclusion in the information that
the Secretary-General has transmitted to you of resolution 41/11 on the
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(Mr. Salles, Brazil)
Declaration of a Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic. I
mention this because my delegation feels that this inclusion was necessary, as
the document did not contain it. As you will recall, this resolution which
was co-sponsored by Brazil and many other delegations from Latin America and
Africa, had an overwhelming vote of approval of 124 votes against just 1 and
8 abstentions. We feel that the Declaration of a Zone of Peace and
Co-operation of the South Atlantic is an initiative representing a very
important contribution to the objectives we are here to promote and implement.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Brazil for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I
see none. The President has learnt that now we have some other business to
deal with. However, since some delegations need to conduct some
consultations, I suggest that we suspend the meeting for half an hour. If
this can be agreed upon, we can resume here in half an hour. I would also
like to inform you, at the request of its Co-ordinator, that the Group of 21
will meet in room C.108 immediately. The meeting is suspended.
The meeting was suspended at 12 noon and resumed at 12.40 p.m.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 392nd plenary meeting of
the Conference on Disarmament is now resumed. We shall now deal with other
matters.
The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a Working Paper
(CD/WP.268) containing a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee under item 5 of
the agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". The draft
mandate is identical to the mandate adopted by the Conference last year in
document CD/694.
I have conducted informal consultations with members from different
groups, and in putting this Working Paper CD/WP.268 before the Conference for
decision, I wish to state that, as is known to all members of the Conference
and as reflected in the 1986 report of the Conference to the General Assembly
of the United Nations (CD/732), consideration of proposals for measures aimed
at the prevention of an arms race in outer space is covered by the mandate
contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268.
If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the
draft decision contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation
would have preferred a clearer and more categorical text, but it is well aware
that in this case time is of the essence and it would be wrong for your
strenuous efforts, Mr. President, not to receive their due reward through the
adoption of a decision on this basis. My delegation will therefore agree to
our adopting this mandate, with a clear interpretation on the part of my
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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)
delegation, which we have been told is the interpretation that all groups and
all delegations give to this text. Thus my delegation will accept this text,
and I shall continue in English for greater accuracy:
(spoke in English)
"with the understanding that the mandate we are going to approve covers
measures proposed with the aim of preventing an arms race in outer space".
(continued in Spanish)
As you, Mr. President, and all the other distinguished members of the
Conference will have, noticed, the words I have used are taken from the
penultimate paragraph of the document distributed to us as Rev.1, and from the
words you have just spoken. Mention is made in that paragraph of
"consideration of proposals for measures", etc. Thus my delegation's
interpretation is the one I have just given, which will appear in the record
of this meeting.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Mexico for his statement, and I thank him for his co-operative spirit. I now
give the floor to the representative of Australia.
Mr. ROWE (Australia): Mr. President, I would like to express my
appreciation for the untiring efforts you have made which have led to the
decision that we are about to take, to adopt the mandate for the
re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in
Outer Space. We attach great significance to the early resumption of work in
this Committee on this very important subject, and we are very pleased that it
has been possible to arrive at consensus in the Conference to allow that to
happen. We, of course, fully support the resumption of that work on the basis
of the mandate which, in fact, was in operation last year because we believe
that there is a lot of very useful work which needs to be done before that
mandate could be considered to be exhausted, and we certainly look forward to
actively contributing to the work under that mandate. We also welcome the
statement which you have read out and we certainly accept the terminology of
that statement. We fully endorse the way in which that statement is phrased
because we feel that that is a very accurate reflection of the state of
affairs and of the understandings that certainly we hold about the matters
referred to in that statement. I would like to express once again our
appreciation for your efforts and our support for the re-establishment of the
Ad Hoc Committee under the mandate which is proposed and, of course, taking
full account of the Presidential statement which you have read out.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Australia for his statement, and also for the spirit of understanding he has
displayed. I now give the floor to the representative of Venezuela.
Ms. GONZALEZ (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): First of all,
Mr. President, I wish to express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you occupy
the Presidency of the Conference of Disarmament for this month. I should also
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(Ms. Gonzalez, Venezuela)
like to express our appreciation for the efforts you have made to forge a
consensus on the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an
Arms Race in Outer Space. Finally, I wish to say that my delegation
associates itself with the interpretation given by Ambassador Garcia Robles of
Mexico, which fully reflects its own position.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Venezuela for her statement, and also for the spirit of co-operation she has
expressed. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia.
Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of
all I too wish to thank you for the efforts you have made to enable the
Conference to take the decision on the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee on
the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I should also like to say that
since the beginning of this session of the Conference the socialist countries
have shown their keen interest for the Conference to take this decision as
rapidly as possible. They have always shown themselves to be very flexible
and most co-operative with respect to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, in
order to forge ahead with the Conference's work and not waste precious time, a
very important factor as the distinguished representative of Mexico pointed
out. The socialist countries join in the consensus that is emerging on the
mandate and the Presidential statement on the subject.
I wish to say that the socialist countries are ready and prepared to make
an active contribution, as in the past, to the work of this subsidiary body on
this important and high-priority item of the Conference's agenda, namely, the
prevention of an arms race in outer space.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Mongolia for his statement, and for the spirit of co-operation he has
displayed. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru,
Ambassador Morelli Pando.
Mr. MORELLI PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): On behalf of the
Group of 21, I wish to express our deep appreciation and gratitude for the
efforts you have made for the prompt re-establishment of the highly important
Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of
Peru for his statement and for the spirit of co-operation he has expressed.
If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft
decision contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): A copy of the statement that I
have just made has been distributed to all members.
I have also requested the secretariat to circulate an informal paper
containing a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its
subsidiary bodies during the week 2-6 March. The timetable has been prepared
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(The President)
in consultation with the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. As usual, it is
merely indicative and may be changed, if so required. If there is no
objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the informal paper.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): Allow me now to make my
concluding statement as President of the Conference for the month of February.
In approaching the end of my term of Presidency, I wish to make a few
remarks regarding the work done in the Conference on Disarmament during the
month of February.
Our first order of business for the annual session was to organize our
work in order to begin our consideration of substantive matters without
delay. The Conference was able to adopt its agenda for the 1987 session and
the programme of work for the first part of the session at the very first
plenary meeting. This was a welcome development, which was made possible
thanks to the understanding and co-operation of all members of the
Conference. This positive political atmosphere at the opening of the
Conference also made it possible for us to agree, in accordance with the rules
of procedure, to invite a number of non-members to participate in substantive
questions relating to the work of the Conference.
The Conference had also to consider organizational arrangements for the
substantive items on the agenda. We were able to re-establish at the
2nd plenary meeting during the first week after the opening of the session the
Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, appoint an able Chairman,
Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden, for that subsidiary body and continue the
negotiating process on that agenda item. During the second week we have also
been able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on item 6, entitled "Effective
international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and on item 7 "Radiological Weapons".
Today, after intensive consultations during the past week, we have also been
able to reach agreement on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, under agenda item 5. Consultations
are proceeding for the appointment of their Chairmen. The Ad Hoc Committee on
the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has also resumed its work under the
Chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, who has been leading that
Committee with his well-known diplomatic competence. The Conference is also
engaged in intensive consultations with a view to starting, as soon as
possible, substantive work on other items on the agenda. Those consultations
show an approximation of positions on organizational arrangements for some of
those items. It will be up to my successor to continue those consultations
and hopefully to succeed in consolidating agreement on those organizational
questions.
However, there is a Chinese proverb which says that a long journey has to
start with the first step. In this connection, it should be pointed out that
the progress achieved by the Conference during the month of February is merely
the beginning of our substantive work for this y5ar. We shall spare no effort
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(The President)
to reconcile the differences among delegations and various groups, so that the
Conference may discharge its functions as the sole multilateral negotiating
body of the international community in the field of disarmament. A spirit of
co-operation and compromise among delegations is required in the process of
negotiations and consultations and I am sure that all members of the
Conference will continue to show it in the coming months.
From the statements made so far it can be seen clearly that delegations
continue to attach great importance to the Conference on Disarmament as the
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. On this basis, we shall redouble
our efforts in seeking common ground on various subjects on the agenda so that
the Conference will be able to reach agreements on certain items at an early
date, as the entire international community expects us to do.
May I express my appreciation to all members for their assistance during
my Presidency, and at the same time extend to my successor,
Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba, my best wishes for success during his
Presidency. He can count on my full co-operation in the discharge of the
duties of the office.
Finally, I would like to express my sincerest thanks to all members of
the secretariat of the Conference for their assistance extended to me during
this month, particularly the Secretary-General of the Conference,
Ambassador Komatina, and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference,
Ambassador Berasategui. I wish also to extend my gratitude to all the staff
of Conference Services, the interpreters and translators, for their hard work.
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will meet next
Tuesday, 3 March 1987. The plenary meeting is adjourned.
The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.
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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.393
3 March 1987
ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 3 March 1987, at 10 a.m.
President:
GE. $7-60350/7627E
Mr. Lechuga Hevia (Cuba)
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The PRESIDENT (Translated from Spanish): I call to order the 393rd
plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the outset, allow me to
make a brief opening statement.
It is, of course, our desire that the Conference on Disarmament may set
up the committees that remain to be established and thus make a significant
step forward along the path to disarmament. We are now in a new year, with a
very special set of circumstances: viable proposals have been put forward
which would appreciably reduce the nuclear arsenals of both sides, and the
possibility has been demonstrated of checking the mad adventure of the arms
race.
The Conference on Disarmament has been given a primary role in this major
undertaking of achieving firm and stable peace. It is the only multilateral
negotiating body, and in it there are represented all the nuclear Powers and
representatives of countries of different sizes and from differing
geographical regions of all the continents and political and economic systems
of the world spectrum. It therefore brings together the optimum conditions
required to carry out such an important task. If it does not achieve its
objectives, that is because the spirit of confrontation and narrow mindedness
will have prevailed over the responsbility placed upon this body by the
international community.
Over the years efforts have been made to guide the work entrusted to the
Conference along the paths of effective negotiations, but further efforts are
now needed in the prevailing circumstances. There are crucial agenda items
which have been the subject of exhaustive debate and analysis and which are
still virtually deadlocked. Others have been given superficial consideration,
with no real advances being made. This position is a sort of stalemate and
stagnation, and it must be overcome, as has been said repeatedly here by
almost everyone who has taken the floor.
The prevailing circumstances of international relations are complex and
dangerous, and daring measures must be adopted to ease and end the existing
tensions. Good faith is also required, to undertake responsible negotiations
that will meet the needs and aspirations of all peoples, since peace is
indivisible. There can be no peace for some and not for others. Hence, we
have to bury the old ideas that have no place in the world of today. We have
to put an end to the illusions of military superiority, which must be replaced
by peaceful relations of equitable co-operation.
To our mind, the waste of material, scientific, human and technological
resources for the manufacture of means of destruction cannot be dissociated
from the growing needs of the vast majority of mankind that calls for the use
of those riches to ease and satisfy their needs in the field of food, health
care and culture. These are needs which it is daily more difficult to meet,
fundamental requirements that cause death and disease and accentuate the
backwardness of millions of people who will never enjoy the benefits of the
scientific and technological advances that are today the privilege of small
strata of the world's population, unless steps are taken to bring about a
radical change in the situation. We would venture to say that it is a truism
that there can be no peace without development, and no development without
peace.
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(The President)
Therefore the alternative to general crisis is disarmament, with
everything this involves in terms of confidence and a climate of peace. This
is a key year for this essential task. To promote peace, to establish it as
the normal standard of co-existence, is the goal this Conference can serve.
Thanks to the diplomatic skill of my predecessor,
Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, a number of important organizational issues were
solved during the month of February. We quickly adopted our agenda for the
annual session and the programme of work for the first part of the session.
Two Ad Hoc Committees are working actively and three others have been
established. The only matter pending, for them to start their activities, is
the appointment of their Chairmen. I invite members to consider this matter
as soon as possible in their group consultations, so that we may be in a
position to take prompt action on this question. There are also some other
organizational arrangements which require our active consideration, such as
those relating to agenda items 1, nuclear-test ban, 2, cessation of the
nuclear-arms race agd nuclear disarmament, and 3, prevention of nuclear war,
including all related matters.
We also need to look at various ideas relating to the question of new
types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, that is,
the first part of agenda item 7. There is also the question of the improved
and effective functioning of the Conference, which we started to consider last
year in informal consultations, and which, as we all agreed at the start of
the session, we should take up again in 1987. I intend to consult members on
all these questions. We know that on some of those issues disagreements still
persist, while for others we should be able to find compromises which,
although not entirely satisfactory for everyone, might help us to advance our
work. I am sure that I can count on the assistance and co-operation of all
the members of the Conference in trying to move on from organizational to
substantive discussions on these questions.
I am ready, in my capacity as President, to offer any assistance which
might be necessary or to take initiatives whenever there are realistic
prospects of success. That concludes my opening statement.
In accordance with its programme of work the Conference begins today its
consideration of item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In
accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing
so to do may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have
on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the German Democratic
Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I now give the floor to
the first of the speakers, the representative of the German Democratic
Republic, Ambassador Rose.
Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, on behalf of
the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, I should like to
congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on
Disarmament for the month of March. It gives me great satisfaction to see
that the high office of President of the Conference is now being performed by
the distinguished representative of Cuba, a country with which the German
Democratic Republic has for many years been linked by fraternal relations.
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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
What is more, I have always appreciated, Comrade President, our close and
inspiring personal co-operation in the field of disarmament.
Knowing your outstanding qualities as an experienced diplomat, I am
confident that the proceedings of the Conference will be steered by skilful
hands.
At the same time, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the
outgoing President, the distinguished representative of the People's Republic
of China, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, for the untiring and effective efforts he
made to enable the Conference to quickly engage in practical and meaningful
work.
We have learned with profound sorrow of the sudden death of Norway's
Foreign Minister, His Excellency Knut Frydenlund. With his passing away, the
Norwegian people has lost a statesman of great international repute. I would
like to ask the Norwegian Observer delegation to convey our heartfelt
condolences to its Government.
In my intervention today, I wish to introduce a Working Paper on item 1,
entitled Nuclear-Test Ban, submitted by a group of socialist'countries. The
document will be distributed with the symbol CD/743 in the next few days.
Before coming to that, however, I should like to take this opportunity,
with your kind permission, Comrade President, to draw the attention of the
Conference to a statement jointly issued on I March 1987 by the Politbureau of
the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Council of
State and the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic. The
statement is in support of the latest ground-breaking initiative of the
Soviet Union, which calls for the prompt conclusion of a separate accord on
the complete elimination of nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe within the
next five years. Allow me to quote the following passages:
"Inspired by a sense of responsibility and readiness for compromise,
the Soviet Union has responded to wishes and suggestions by leading
Western politicians. There are no more excuses possible now. Words must
be followed by deeds, for Reykjavik already saw a virtually finished
agreement on that subject. It is now feasible, without great difficulty
or delay, to arrive at a finalized accord on medium-range missiles. Such
a bold initial step would bring within reach the vision of a
nuclear-weapon-free Europe and of reducing the stockpiles of nuclear arms
altogether. Like the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic
believes it to be extremely important not to relent in the quest for
agreement on a substantial reduction and the subsequent elimination of
strategic armaments and, in this context, to prohibit any deployment of
weapons in outer space.
"The Party and Government leadership of the German Democratic
Republic puts on record its agreement with the Soviet position that,
immediately after the signing of such an accord, the short-range
intermediate missiles deployed to counter the stationing of Pershing-2
and cruise missiles in western Europe will be removed from the territory
of the German Democratic Republic."
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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)
In this connection, I wish to let you know that Mr. Erich Honecker,
Chairman of the German Democratic Republic's Council of State, has sent a
message to Mr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, in
which he has pointed out the historic chance this new Soviet initiative offers
along the road to a world without nuclear weapons.
Also, I wish to emphasize again that, besides the removal of medium-range
and short-range intermediate nuclear weapons, the threat posed by the other
theatre nuclear forces in Europe could be lessened quickly and effectively, if
a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe were created, as proposed by
Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.
I should now like to revert to the introduction of CD/743.
In view of the urgency of the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests as an
initial step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, socialist
countries deem it necessary for the Conference on Disarmament to considerably
intensify work on item 1 of its agenda.
Working Paper CD/743 serves this very purpose. It contains a statement
of basic positions and proceeds from the recognition that achievement of an
NTH treaty is a question of political decision-making, since there are no
technical obstacles to an early conclusion of such an accord. It is
deplorable indeed that the historic chance offered by the unilateral Soviet
moratorium on all nuclear explosions has not been seized.
This has forced the USSR to resume testing, the reasons for which have
been well understood by delegations to the Conference. The Soviet Union has,
however, repeatedly declared its readiness to return to the moratorium on
nuclear testing, if the other side halts its nuclear explosions as well. That
position was reaffirmed last Thursday by Ambassador Nazarkin, a fact which is
to be welcomed. Therefore, socialist countries appeal once again to the
United States to reconsider its policy on nuclear testing.
Working Paper CD/743 takes account of the circumstance that the
Conference on Disarmament has before it all the basic materials which may
facilitate substantive work on item 1, e.g., the 1980 report of the trilateral
negotiations, draft treaties on an NTB submitted by two delegations in the
early 1980s, as well as other proposals and working papers. It calls for the
establishment of an ad hoc committee, which should carry out its tasks in two
working groups dealing with contents and scope of the treaty and with
compliance and verification, respectively.
The Working Paper exhorts the Conference promptly to proceed to
negotiations on every aspect of the matter. In order for substantive work to
be commenced, all member States are called upon to display the flexibility
needed to achieve a reasonable compromise on the mandate for an ad hoc
committee.
On the basis of the fundamental positions outlined in CD/743, the group
on whose behalf I am speaking is prepared to present detailed views and
suggestions on the issues relating to an NTBT.
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of
the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose, for his statement and for the
kind words addressed to my country and to myself. I now give the floor to the
representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.
Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translated from
Russian): Comrade President, I am very pleased indeed to congratulate you,
the representative of fraternal Cuba and an eminent diplomat, on the occasion
of your accession to the post of the President of the Conference on
Disarmament for the month of March. I am confident that the work of the
Conference on Disarmament, in which the delegation of the Republic of Cuba
plays a significant role, will under your guidance be marked by advances on
the issues on its agenda. May I assure you of the readiness of the delegation
of the Soviet Union to co-operate with you in the discharge of your
responsible duties. I am very gratified to note that relations between our
two countries are built on a solid foundation of friendship tested over dozens
of years of understanding and co-operation between the fraternal peoples of
Cuba and the Soviet Union. I should also like to thank the distinguished
representative of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Fan Guoxiang, for
the great efforts he exerted as President of the Conference in the month of
February.
At the request of the Soviet delegation, a statement by
Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the CPSU
Central Committee, dated 28 February 1987, has been distributed as an official
document of the Conference on Disarmament of 28 February of this year
(CD/742). In that statement, Mikhail Gorbachev announced, on behalf of the
Soviet leadership, the Soviet Union's proposal to separate the problem of
medium-range missiles in Europe from the package of other issues and to
conclude without delay a separate agreement on it. For such a step there is
not merely a basis but an agreement that is actually ready. It was agreed in
Reykjavik that the Soviet Union and the United States would eliminate all
their medium-range missiles in Europe within the next five years. Within the
same period, the number of Soviet missiles of this class in the Asian part of
our territory would be cut down to 100 warheads on the understanding that the
United States could leave the same number of medium-range-missile warheads in
its national territory.
Once the agreement on eliminating Soviet and American medium-range
missiles in Europe is signed, the Soviet Union will withdraw from the German
Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, by agreement with the Governments of
those countries, the extended-range theatre missiles which had been stationed
there in response to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in
western Europe. As for other theatre missiles, the Soviet Union is prepared
immediately to begin talks with a view to reducing and eliminating them
altogether.
The Soviet Union has tabled these proposals at the Geneva talks with the
United States.
As pointed out by General Secretary Gorbachev, we have been assured more
than once that if the Soviet Union singled out the question of medium-range
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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
missiles from the Reykjavik package, agreement on their elimination in Europe
would pose no difficulty. A good opportunity is now being offered of proving
that in practice.
General Secretary Gorbachev's statement of 28 February 1987 demonstrates
the Soviet Union's willingness to find a solution to the problem of nuclear
disarmament. This question also has an important place on the agenda of the
Conference on Disarmament. In today's statement the Soviet delegation wishes
to outline its approach to certain aspects of this problem (agenda item 2) and
also to present a number of views on items 3 and 5 of the agenda. These items
are closely interrelated, for in the final analysis they concern ways of
attaining humanity's survival in the nuclear and space era.
I believe we are, at least, all in agreement that a nuclear war cannot be
won and must never be fought. After all, a provision to this effect was
recorded in the joint Soviet-American Statement on the results of the Geneva
Summit in November 1985.
At the same time there are substantial differences of opinion on the
course to be pursued in order to prevent nuclear war, and these differences
are widely reflected in the discussions at the Conference on Disarmament.
Naturally, these differences are also reflected in practical actions, which is
something that is particularly worrying. ?
Before turning to these various views and approaches, I wish to make a
preliminary clarification. Western representatives are inclined to emphasize
that what should be discussed is prevention of any war, and not prevention of
nuclear war. Naturally, we too are against any war: all the more so since a
conventional war can easily develop, in the present conditions, into a nuclear
war. At the same time we lay special emphasis on the fact that it is
precisely nuclear war that should be prevented in the first place, for its
consequences would be fatal for all humanity. I believe that on this question
our differences are only in emphasis, though undoubtedly the underlying causes
are more substantial. It is our view that attempts to equate nuclear war with
conventional war stem from the concept of power politics, which permits the
use of war and military force as a political instrument. I will not venture
to define where this concept stems from -- inertia of thinking, sincere
misconception or a desire to mislead. This concept of a policy of force
mechanically applies the views of the pre-nuclear age to the present
conditions of the nuclear and space era, which can be fatal to humanity for it
poses the risk of war, conventional as well as nuclear. The
position-of-strength policy would not be what it is if it did not permit the
use of force, above all nuclear force.
By contrast, we believe that it must be recognized that today, more
weapons mean less, rather than more, security; and this is the truth. Today,
a global nuclear war cannot be a continuation of rational policy, for it would
put an end to all life, and therefore to all policies. The Chernobyl tragedy
which occurred in my country last year has shown to the entire world the fatal
effects and enormous force of the atom when it has gone out of control; and
after all, this accident is nothing compared to the possible consequences of
the explosion of even the smallest nuclear bomb by today's standards.
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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
The position-of-strength policy, which allows for the possibility of
using nuclear weapons, is also being underpinned in the West by a "theoretical
basis" in the form of the concept of deterrence, according to which it is
necessary for the United States and other Western nuclear Powers to build up
nuclear arms in order to prevent the so-called "spread of communism". I am
not going now to elaborate on the fallacy of the very idea of such deterrence,
for there has been and there is no threat. The ulterior motive of the policy
of deterrence is really quite different.
A large number of United States documents, and, in particular, memoranda
of the United States National Security Council which were declassified some
years ago, have revealed that the United States pursued the objective of
compelling the Soviet Union to change the basis of its foreign and domestic
policies, that is, to cease to exist as the Soviet Union, and of tearing away
parts of its territory. That was the minimum objective, whereas the maximum
objective was as follows: to seek the "total disintegration and elimination
of Soviet power" (National Security Council document NSC 20/1 of
18 August 1948). The declassified documents have revealed the United States
military plans of that time which, proceeding from the possibility of using
nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, were designed to pursue the above
objective. I am referring to the plans code-named "Half-moon-Fleetwood-
Doublestar" (1948), "Trojan", "Offtackle" (1949) and many others.
President Dwight Eisenhower's documents, published recently, show that in
the 1950s again, the United States leadership, on more than one occasion,
considered using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. In particular, the
President mentions that at least twice he considered giving the green light to
nuclear bombing raids on the Soviet Union and on both occasions it took him a
long time to decide whether to reject the plan of action or to give it the
go-ahead. And when, in the early 1980s, the United States President,
Ronald Reagan, for the first time referred to the Soviet Union as an "evil
empire" it was a reflection of the self-same approach, of the same concept of
eradicating "evil" by force.
Future historians will probably be able to see United States political
documents and military plans of the 1980s, which will be declassified in due
course when the limitation period expires. That is only, of course, if we
succeed in preventing the implementation of the vicious ideas embodied in
those plans.
I am far from arguing that the United States leadership consciously wants
to unleash nuclear war against us. That would be madness, and this fact is
perfectly well realized by responsible leaders. However, in the political
circles of the United States and its allies, despite their leaders'
declarations of the inadmissibility of nuclear war, the conviction that
nuclear weapons are necessary continues to prevail.
In his statement at the Conference on 24 February last, the United States
representative, Ambassador Hansen, said that deterrence "is not the invention
of undisciplined strategists" but a fact of life. Unfortunately, he is
right. However, this "fact of life" did not arise spontaneously. It stems
from a certain policy, as indeed does the arms race, but if the arms race is a
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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
"fact of life", does that mean that we have to reconcile ourselves with this
fact of life? That would mean voluntarily to condemn oneself and all humanity
to inevitable death. Of course, the destructive power of nuclear weapons
deters potential aggressors. That is precisely why we have such weapons.
This is probably what Ambassador Hansen meant when he referred, on
24 February, to the fact that the Soviet Union also relies on the deterrence
factor.
But here I would like to draw your attention to the following
differences. Firstly, on arms questions, we proceed from the criterion of
reasonable sufficiency, tailoring the nature and the level of this limit to
the positions and actions of the United States and its allies. The Western
countries use the "deterrent" nature of nuclear weapons as a basis for their
concept of deterrence, by which they seek to justify the build-up and
improvement of nuclear arms. As a result, deterrence in this Western sense is
conducive to a continued arms race and as nuclear weapons pile up, the
likelihood.that they will remain "obedient" grows smaller. The spread of
those weapons, the sophistication of related technical systems, increased
transportation, the constant risk of malfunction, human weakness or someone's
ill will -- all this put together constitutes a broad range of unpredictable
factors upon which humanity's survivaris dependent.
Secondly, even if we were to follow the concept of nuclear deterrence,
there is no denying that the nuclear safeguard is neither faultless nor
everlasting. At any moment it can become a death sentence for mankind. That
is why we propose eliminating nuclear weapons altogether. To that we receive
the reply that if nuclear weapons were eliminated, this would increase the
risk of conventional war, which, given modern conventional arms, can also
cause great casualties. Supporters of this view are undoubtedly right that
any war, and not only nuclear war, should be prevented, but we do not agree
that this can be achieved with the help of nuclear weapons. We should use
other means than a nuclear guillotine.
As a means to that end, we propose the establishment of a comprehensive
system of international security. This is our theoretical doctrine if you
wish -- our alternative to the concept of deterrence. On the basis of it, the
socialist countries have elaborated a concrete political platform. This
system is based on the principle that one cannot build one's own security at
the expense of the security of others. Its main areas, military, political,
economic and humanitarian, from an organic whole.
We seek to translate this platform into a practical course of action.
You are aware of our programme for eliminating nuclear weapons by the year
2000. This programme should be implemented in stages, and those stages are
interrelated and have clear-cut timeframes. Our Reykjavik initiatives, our
new proposal on medium-range missiles, our proposals presented at the
Conference on Disarmament, including those related to banning chemical
weapons, proposals on arms limitation and disarmament, put forward in other
forums, proceed from our concept of comprehensive security. We are by no
means proposing that disarmament be limited to the nuclear field alone. The
Soviet Union is in favour of disarmament measures in other areas as well,
including the area of conventional arms.
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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
We have signed the Delhi Declaration, which brings together our
philosophical and political approaches to building a nuclear-free and
non-violent world and the approaches of that great country, India, and the
thousands of millions of people represented by the non-aligned movement. We
support India's proposal to conclude an international convention prohibiting
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
We have proposed the concept of international economic security and have
presented new approaches to humanitarian problems of the third basket of the
Helsinki accord.
We are in favour of building policies on the basis of new political
thinking which, as General Secretary Gorbachev pointed out, "means an ability
to listen to the voice of the public, the European and world public, to
understand the concerns and interests of other peoples and not to separate
one's own security from the security of neighbours in our interconnected
world". That is what we propose instead of nuclear deterrence, which even in
its best version of reduced levels of nuclear arms, does not exclude the risk
of a nuclear holocaust and, in its worst version, leads to an accelerated
nuclear-arms race which greatly increases this risk.
I should point out that the fallacy of the concept of nuclear deterrence
was recognized by none other than the United States President, Ronald Reagan,
when arguing in favour of the Strategic Defence Initiative: he stated that
the new ABM system is designed to render nuclear weapons "obsolete and
ineffective". Of course, even if the SDI were to lead to the elimination of
nuclear weapons, that would only come with the elimination of everything else
on our planet, including human civilization. However, the mere fact of
President Reagan's recognizing the need to eliminate nuclear weapons is
important. But what will happen to nuclear deterrence in that case? The
intention is perhaps to replace the nuclear deterrent by space deterrence, but
then, where does the "exclusively defensive" nature of the SDI come in?
On this point I wish to elaborate a little bit further. In his statement
on 26 February, Ambassador Hansen argued that the SDI is designed for
defensive purposes only, and even quoted Soviet Academician E. Velikhov to
support this argument. I have to point out that selective quoting is in
itself a risky business because out of context it can present a distorted
picture.
In fact, objective scientific data indicate that an X-ray laser (referred
to at the 26 February meeting) is characterized by important absorption in all
substances, including air. Laser X-rays, therefore, are absorbed even in the
residual layers of the atmosphere about 150 km above the Earth.
In accordance with the declared goals, the X-ray lasers to be developed
under the SDI are designed to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles in
the active section of their flight path, that is, already in the upper layers
of the atmosphere. But cannot these same lasers be used against other space
targets? For example, against early-warning satellites with the aim of
blinding the other side in the event of a first nuclear strike against it?
Technically, it would seem to be even easier than to destroy intercontinental
ballistic missiles; but is that defence?
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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
On the other hand, objective scientific data quoted by
Academician Velikhov and many other experts, including United States experts
indicate that if a laser beam is powerful enough it can make a hole in the
atmosphere and consequently destroy a target on Earth. I can refer, for
example, to data provided by a United States expert Robert English, published
very recently in the International Herald Tribune, on 19 and
20 February 1987. Based on an analysis of the technical possibilities of
space laser weapons and of current thinking in the United States
Administration, the author comes to the conclusion that the SDI involves the
development of space weapons for destroying targets on Earth as well.
Finally, I have to point out that the division of arms into "offensive"
and "defensive" weapons is in itself very relative. Basically, only
absolutely passive means of defence can be regarded as purely defensive. If a
defence system contains active destructive elements it can always, with a
varying degree of effectiveness, be used as an offensive means. At the same
time, even passive means of defence increase the effectiveness of destructive
means. For example, how should we classify tanks, as offensive or defensive
weapons? On the one hand, they have fire-power enabling them to hit targets
and on the other hand, strong armour protecting their crew from destruction --
so what is a tank?
The answer is probably to be found not in the military and technical
characteristics of a given type of weapon but in the political philosophy of
those who possess it.
As for the balance of forces, it is determined by both offensive and
defensive arms and that is why it is absolutely incorrect to say that one type
of weapon is bad because it is offensive and another is good because it is
defensive. If, hypothetically speaking, each of the two sides possesses
one hundred offensive missiles, that is, a ratio 1:1, and then one of the
sides creates defensive means which can neutralize 50 per cent of the
offensive missiles of the other side, it is quite obvious that the balance of
offensive weapons will change to become a ratio of 1:2 in favour of the side
which has the so-called defensive means.
The SDI programme, whatever defensive labels it may be given, is designed
to alter the balance of forces to the advantage of the United States.
However, it is not just a question of changing the balance of forces.
The implementation of this programme would completely destabilize the military
and strategic situation in the world as a whole and create a situation where
the question of whether a war is "to be or not to be?" would be decided in a
matter of seconds; and the human will's part in this decision would be
reduced to a minimum: the decision would essentially be left to computers.
We make no secret of the fact that we regard the SDI as an attempt to
draw the Soviet Union into a qualitatively new arms race -- the laser-weapons
race. Through the SDI the United States is trying to find a way out of the
nuclear deadlock, to acquire these weapons which, while matching nuclear
weapons in effectiveness, unlike nuclear weapons would, if used, leave the
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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
attacker unharmed. These qualitatively new weapons would make it possible to
deliver extremely accurate "surgical" strikes on the most vital targets of the
other side. This, according to the plans of SDI supporters, would make it
possible, to dictate one's will to other countries while pointing the laser
beam at them, and also to avoid the unacceptable consequences of the use of
nuclear weapons -- nuclear winter, widespread radiation, adverse genetic and
other consequences. This will be a weapon for the rich, available only to the
select few. These seem to be the plans.
Lately, there have been attempts by the United States Administration to
adopt a so-called broad interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. These attempts
are nothing more than a desire to justify, with the help of legal casuistry,
the policy of circumventing and violating the above Treaty with a view to
speeding up SDI development, making it irreversible, leaving future
United States Administrations incapable of modifying their position on the SDI
for many years to come.
The Soviet Union has been and continues to be in favour of preserving the
ABM Treaty, strengthening the regime established by it, and abiding by the
generally-recognized traditional interpretation of all its provisions. At the
same time, without abandoning our fundamental position on preventing an arms
race in outer space, we are prepared to seek mutually acceptable agreements
with the United States, taking into account the commitment of the present
Administration to the SDI programme. Our proposal on strengthening the regime
of the ABM Treaty by way of a mutual undertaking not to withdraw from the
Treaty for 10 years along with strict compliance with all its provisions, goes
in this direction. We propose agreeing on the dividing line between
activities that are prohibited or permitted under the Treaty.
Today I have touched upon a number of important issues under discussion
in the Conference of Disarmament, proceeding from our philosophy of a secure
world, as we envisage it. In concluding, I wish to point out that, naturally,
the rebuilding of international security anew can only be based on
confidence. Of course, the path is not easy. I will not elaborate on the
reasons for the acute lack of confidence we are facing today. I believe that
it is best to look into the future, rather than to turn to or be bound by the
past. It is necessary to analyse the past, but we should not be its
prisoners. Confidence can be built on the basis of co-operation, getting to
know each other, finding solutions to common problems. We cannot accept the
argument that confidence comes first and only then everything else, including
disarmament. We are in favour of advancing towards the building and
strengthening of confidence through common endeavours; and each of us should
set about this task for himself.
That is what we are doing, and that is why we are doing so.
Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals on the medium-range missiles put forward on
28 February are the most recent confirmation of this line of action. But the
path to confidence, like the path to disarmament, is a two-way one, requiring
reciprocal steps.
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement, and for the kind
words addressed to my country and to the Chair. I have no more speakers on my
list for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I call on the
representative of the United States of America.
Mr. HANSEN (United States of America): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I, too,
would like to extend the congratulations of my delegation to yourself as you
occupy the chair of President of this Conference. my delegation will work
closely with you in a co-operative mode to further the work in which we all
have an interest. It is appropriate as well to extend once again our
appreciation to Ambassador Fan for the work which he accomplished during his
tenure as President of the Conference.
I do not have prepared remarks today, but I should like nevertheless to
make a few comments that I trust will be of use to all of our delegations in
the contemplations which we must make as part of the deliberative process of
the Conference.
May I begin by making two observations. First, the President of the
United States, Ronald Reagan, stated on 11 November 1981 that the objective in
all arms control and disarmament negotiations should be deep reductions,
significant reductions of military capabilities. That programme, chat
philosophy, is starting to be reflected in our bilateral negotiations with the
Soviet Union on nuclear issues. The second observation I would wish to make
is that the very idea of zero intermediate-range nuclear missiles originated
with my Government in concert with consultations with those countries in
Europe with whom we are joined in alliance. It was in fact an approach which
sought to prevent deployment of further systems, to bring about some greater
stability in the question of nuclear forces. It is proper to note as well
that at Reykjavik the agreement to reduce intermediate-range nuclear weapons
was at hand. It was not the United States which wrapped the package and tied
the bow. That this package is now being untied, we regard as a positive
development.
The United States has long believed that progress in one area of
negotiations regarding nuclear weapons should not be held hostage to progress
in other areas. We, and our allies, have consistently urged that we seek
early progress on reductions in offensive nuclear forces in both the strategic
negotiations and in those dealing with intermediate-range nuclear forces.
Thus, we do welcome this apparent Soviet willingness to move forward in the
INF negotiations for which we have been ready since the Geneva Summit of
November 1985. We note that the General Secretary has said that proposals are
to be placed on the table in Geneva. We have seen these proposals and we
welcome them. And it is, in fact, our view that we look to progress in the
negotiations themselves rather than in public statements.
We want to make progress a real possibility. We intend to make our
readiness for that progress concrete by tabling specific treaty language in
the very near future.
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(Mr. Hansen, United States)
I should not have taken the floor today at all if it were not for one
statement made by my distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union,
Ambassador Nazarkin. Much of what has been said has been said before in one
form or another and I should suspect that you may be somewhat bored with the
discourse between the United States and Soviet delegations which has often
taken place in this hall. I should like to refer to the statement by
Ambassador Nazarkin, which I find particularly unfortunate, on page 11 of the
English text. This statement indicates in one way or another, and I should
add probably most directly, that the United States has the desire to dictate
its will to other countries. This is patently false. It is counter to our
political system. It is counter to our political ideology. It is counter to
our basic understandings of democracy and government.
But the statement contains another fallacy. That fallacy relates to the
idea that one might even be able to achieve something by pointing a laser from
outer space at someone or something on Earth. Even the distinguished
representative of the Soviet Union pointed out in his intervention today that
the properties of lasers are such that their efficiency as a weapon is almost
exclusively limited to space. Therefore it becomes difficult to understand
how such a weapon, despite articles in the free press, could be used against
States to dictate one's will.
During the last plenary session I quoted from a Soviet study, not an
American study, not done'by political commentators but by scientists. I
quoted from this study to show the universality of understanding among
scientists. I should like to quote again:
"Kilovolt X-rays are strongly absorbed in all substances including air."
(Atmosphere, ladies and gentlemen, is generally composed of air.) "And so a
kilovolt X-ray beam is absorbed in upper atmosphere (higher than 100 km).
True, if the laser beam is sufficiently powerful, it might 'drill' through the
atmosphere. But this property of X-ray lasers is best exploited by firing not
downwards from space but upwards from an altitude of 80-90 km from under a
relatively thin atmospheric layer when the target is in space."
I do not regard this as a selective quotation. I regard this as a
statement of scientific fact which is relevant to issues under consideration.
I think that we all recognize that this Conference deals with issues which are
both scientific in their essence and political in their manifestation. We
must learn to deal with both of these manifestations, both of these elements,
in the most objective, dispassionate manner. If we do this, then we enhance
our opportunities to make progress.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished
representative of the United States of America for his statement and for what
he said about supporting the work of the President. Now, you will remember
that at the last plenary meeting the Conference adopted a decision
re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in
Outer Space. A number of non-members have already requested to participate in
the work of that Ad Hoc Committee. Requests have been received from Norway,
Finland, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Austria, Denmark, Greece,
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(The President)
Spain and Senegal. As no objection has been raised to those requests for
participation which were communicated to all members earlier during the
session, I suggest that we hold an informal meeting next Thursday, after the
list of speakers had been exhausted, in order to consider those requests. We
will afterwards resume the plenary meeting and formalize the relevant draft
decisions. If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference
agrees to hold the aforementioned informal meeting on Thursday.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Are there any further
speakers? The distinguished representative of the Soviet union has the floor.
Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): First of all I should like to express my satisfaction at the
positive assessment of our recent proposal on medium-range missiles that has
just been voiced by the distinguished representative of the United States,
Ambassador Hansen. Secondly, I should like to make a number of comments on
his reaction to my statement today. First of all, as far as his reaction to
the part of my statement referring to plans to turn the SDI into a weapon
which could enable its possessor to dictate to others. At the beginning of my
statement I referred to a whole series of documents of the United States which
were declassified and which prompted me to draw the conclusion I did draw.
Indeed, the fact remains a fact that the military plans which were developed
and which did exist in the United States, and which then subsequently became
public when they were declassified, were based on intentions to carry out a
nuclear strike against our country; this is an objective fact,
unfortunately. Consequently, of course, I cannot accept the harsh words which
Ambassador Hansen used regarding this assumption of mine, as the general
policy based on the concept of so-called nuclear deterrence has not changed.
At this time today we sense and observe a businesslike approach to political
problems.
As for Ambassador Hansen's reaction to my comments regarding the SDI, I
do not see any contradiction here, quite frankly, between the fact that he
today referred to the statement of scientific experts of 26 February and what
I myself said; but he just cited a part of the full picture. I should like
just to reaffirm this once again. X-ray lasers are absorbed in various
substances, including the atmosphere of the air. So, to be sure, an X-ray
laser is more effective when used against targets which are not separated from
the laser beam source by air, and particularly if they are on the Earth. But
in my statement I referred to the possibility of using lasers against
satellites and to this I can add the possibility of using laser weapons
against aircraft in the upper layers of the atmosphere. Finally, I did cite
considerations with respect to the general balance of forces, which is
determined by offensive and defensive weapons. I think that after
Ambassador Hansen has studied our statement today more carefully we will have
the chance to exchange views on this issue in a more thoroughgoing manner.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of
the Soviet Union for his statement. Are there any further speakers? Before
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(The President)
adjourning, I should like to express my condolences to the distinguished
representative of Norway on the passing away of the distinguished Minister of
Foreign Affairs of that country.
The next plenary meeting will be held on Thursday, 5 March, at 10 a.m.
The meeting is adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.
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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.394
5 March 1987
ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva.
on Thursday, 5 March 1987, at 10 a.m.
President:
GE. 87-50370/6029e
Mr. Lechuga Hevia
(Cuba)
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the
394th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In accordance with
its programme of work, the Conference today continues the consideration of
agenda item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In accordance with
rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may
raise any other matter related to the work of that Conference.
Once we have heard all the speakers on my list for today, I intend to
suspend the plenary meeting in order to consider the requests by non-member
States to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee re-established under
agenda item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Immediately after
the informal meeting, we shall resume the plenary meeting to formalize any
agreements we have reached informally.
On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Italy, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia and Australia. I now give
the floor to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Pugliese.
Mr. PUGLIESE (Italy): Mr. President, please allow me at the outset to
associate myself with the warm congratulations and good wishes that have been
extended to you on your taking over the high office of President of the
Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. We are all confident that
under your guidance the Conference shall be able to successfully move into the
substantive phase of our deliberations. I wish, at the same time, to
associate myself with all the delegations in expressing all our appreciation
to Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of China who had the difficult task of presiding
over this Conference during the month of February, a time of particular
significance for the work of the entire session. Thanks to his intelligent
and constructive action and to the dynamism with which he carried out his
duties, considerable progress has already been made. We all owe to
Ambassador Fan Guoxiang the achieving of the very impressive outcome of
re-establishing in the very first month of our work a total of five
ad hoc committees on some priority items of our agenda. May T also take this
opportunity, being myself a newcomer, to welcome other colleagues who have
recently joined us, and thanking my other distinguished colleagues for the
warm welcome they have extended to me. I wish to assure you all of the full
co-operation of the Italian delegation. It is also my desire on this occasion
to remember Ambassador Donald Lowitz whom I had the chance to meet only too
briefly. Nevertheless, I could fully appreciate his human and professional
qualities. I wish to reiterate, through you, Mr. President, the sincere
condolences of the Italian delegation to his family and to the United States
delegation.
The practice of prefacing statements in the general debate of the
Conference with comments on the international political situation and on the
state of the East-West dialogue, particularly in the field of disarmament,
reflects the awareness that our work is certainly not taking place in a
vacuum, but instead is influenced by various intertwined developments.
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(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)
On the one hand, it is the view of my Government that we have ground for
feeling encouraged by the latest developments in the US-USSR nuclear and space
talks and that, in particular, the Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan
and General Secretary Gorbachev allowed significant progress to be made and
opened new possibilities of great interest. We hope that difficulties in the
way of concrete agreements will soon be overcome and that this will grant a
radical reduction of nuclear arsenals, in line with the expectations of all
peoples of the world.
In this framework, we are of course aware of the interconnections
existing between various aspects of the strategic equation. But we also
recognize the enormous difficulties involved in trying to deal with, and agree
on, solutions for all such aspects at the same time. This is why the
Italian Government is in favour of a pragmatic approach that should make it
possible to keep separate questions that are not homogeneous, and to conclude
concrete agreements for the reduction of arsenals in a context of stability,
whenever that may be possible.
On the other hand, the sinister echo of gunfire continues to be heard in
many regions of the world and that reminds us, all too sharply, that the world
situation is fraught with great uncertainty and that the arms race is the
practical expression of feelings of insecurity and distrust.
Men and women throughout the world long for peace. But well-turned
speeches and proclamations of good intentions are useless if in practice they
are contradicted by recourse to force and the open flouting of international
law.
The Italian Government has always endeavoured -- and intends to spare no
effort -- to ensure the elimination of all obstacles and all threats to peace.
Peace in a context of security is a fundamental cornerstone of our
foreign policy, and we are committed to working towards this goal by a
continuous process of consistent and responsible decisions and conduct. This
is the purpose of our loyal participation in the Atlantic Alliance, a
defensive community which has provided a significant contribution to the
maintenance of peace and security in the world in recent years. The same
peaceful approach underlies our membership to the European Community, an
association of free peoples sharing a common heritage of traditions and
culture.
Italy believes that the achievement of general and complete disarmament
under effective international control, in a framework of stability,
transparency of intentions and capabilities and of general respect for the
principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, is the basic condition for
a true and positive peace. That must be and remain our final goal and we must
make every effort to gradually achieve it, if we really want to prepare a
better future for mankind. Intermediate goals with a view to that final
result might be represented by the establishment of a balance of forces, both
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(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)
in the nuclear and conventional field, at lower and lower, indeed at the
lowest possible, levels of armaments to ensure the maintenance of defence
capabilities and stability.
We acknowledge that security perceptions and requirements differ in the
various regions of the world, they differ indeed from country to country. We
respect all approaches to security issues by all countries since we believe
that only through the preservation of security it is possible to undertake
collective steps toward effective disarmament. At the same time we feel
entitled to respect for our own policy which, while looking upon deterrence as
an essential element to our national security, does pursue security and
equilibrium at the lowest levels of all types of armaments.
For many years the question of the ban on nuclear testing in all
environments has been one of the main issues on the agenda of the Conference
on Disarmament. It is therefore regrettable that this forum has been unable
to find a way out of the procedural "imbroglio" which has prevented it, for
more than two years now, from continuing practical work on this matter.
My Government remains firmly committed to the pursuit of a verifiable
comprehensive test ban.
As this delegation has often reiterated, the Italian Government is in
favour of a CTBT and attaches great importance and significance to the
accomplishment of progress towards such an objective. Naturally we do not
ignore that the problem of a comprehensive test ban cannot be discussed
separately from other issues concerning disarmament and strategic stability.
Therefore it is our view that positive results would best be achieved through
a step-by-step approach, and that a solution would be easier if substantial
and balanced reductions in number and quality of offensive weapons could be
agreed upon and implemented.
Another important aspect of this problem is verification. In fact, Italy
believes that a test-ban treaty would be unacceptable unless it contained
adequate provisions for verification to ensure compliance by all parties.
This issue is really a key one, because clandestine nuclear testing might have
far-reaching consequences for the general framework of international security
and stability. In our opinion, verification problems can be gradually solved
also through improved technology, and allow for the implementation of a
step-by-step approach to a CTB. In this context a first significant step
would certainly be represented by the ratification of the TTB Treaty of 1974
and of the PNE Treaty of 1976. The Italian Government has been encouraged by
the talks held between the United States and the USSR in Geneva on the
possibility of limitations on tests and considers this to be of good omen also
for the work of this Conference on this specific issue.
My delegation remains convinced of the value of further concrete work
towards a comprehensive test ban at this Conference. Several substantive
Working Papers on behalf of a group of Western States members of the
Conference have been tabled on various aspects of a CTB and have not yet been
discussed. thoroughly.
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(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)
My delegation is therefore eager to resume our practical work on all the
substantive aspects of a CTB and in particular on such key issues as scope,
verification and compliance, in line with our commitment to make any possible
effort towards the goal of bringing about a cessation of all nuclear tests.
We have pointed out many times our willingness to begin work immediately on a
concrete examination of essential issues that would be involved in a
comprehensive test-ban treaty. The draft mandate contained in document CD/521
is a proposal by which we continue to stand. In our firm view, that mandate,
if adopted, would lead immediately to the creation of a subsidiary body in
which a substantive examination of central issues relevant to the formulation
of a CTBT could be undertaken with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the
subject. We have further exemplified our position on this item in a detailed
way by presenting a suggested programme of work for an ad hoc committee under
item 1, which is included in document CD/621.
My Government recognizes also that these issues are complex and difficult
to solve and that they should be thoroughly examined in a constructive way,
i.e., by sitting down together, in a properly mandated ad hoc committee, and
working together to try to resolve them.
The negotiation of a global ban on the development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, which seems to
us one of the most important and urgent disarmament goals, has achieved
encouraging progress during the 1986 session. Steps forward have been made
regarding a more efficient compilation of Articles III, IV and V; a great
amount of work was also accomplished by Working Group A with regard to
Article VI, in connection with the criteria and the listing of the various
categories of chemicals. As for Article IX, we wish to express our
appreciation and thanks to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom and to
Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia: the four points on which Ambassador Cromartie
detected a convergence of views constitute, in the opinion of the
Italian delegation, a sound basis for a solution of the key issue of
on-challenge verification.
Indeed, while not minimizing the importance of other outstanding items, I
believe that, after all, the success of our work depends largely on our
capability to reach an agreement on a convention banning chemical weapons and
that consequently we should aim at conclusive results during this year. The
main difficulties lying ahead in this context are still connected with the
problem of verification which, indeed, is not simply a technical one. It is a
problem having an obvious political dimension; admittedly, verification can
also have a confidence-building effect.
By envisaging a verification system for a convention banning all chemical
weapons and prescribing their removal from the military arsenals we believe
that the Italian delegation is aware that "intrusive" and stringent forms of
verification may sometimes be seen by some as restraining national sovereign
discretion to a certain extent, or as being prejudicial to the protection of
national industrial and commercial secrets. However, we are convinced that
such concerns should be overcome through a careful assessment and a better
knowledge of the implications of different types of verification, in a spirit
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(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)
of mutual co-operation and goodwill. Moreover, we believe that the
elimination of such a hideous category of weapons and the confidence that an
eventual ban is being loyally complied with, are priority goals for all
countries and, especially, for those, such as Italy, which have long renounced
the chemical military option.
It is vital to ensure that prohibited chemicals are neither manufactured
in previous production facilities, nor in new ones; that States should not
manufacture "single purpose" chemical warfare agents or their precursors and
that "dual-purpose" agents or precursors should not be diverted to warfare
purposes.
We are convinced that an effective verification system should include
systematic inspections and "on-challenge" inspections of a stringent nature.
On this question, there are two Western Working Papers on the table: CD/500
by the delegation of the United States and CD/715 by the delegation of the
United Kingdom. My Government considers it essential that a verification of
compliance should represent a basic obligation. On the other hand States
signing the Convention have also the right to demonstrate their compliance
with it, when they are faced with a challenge. In this respect the Italian
delegation considers that the recent proposals made by the USSR delegation on
17 February last, while still requiring some expansion of their scope,
represent an interesting contribution and may hold promise of constructive
negotiations.
My delegation shares with others the awareness of the importance and
urgency attached to agenda item 5, concerning the prevention of an arms race
in outer space. Indeed, my Government addresses this issue with the highest
interest and sense of priority. Therefore we wish first of all to express our
deepest satisfaction for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee almost
at the very beginning of this session of the Conference.
My Government believes that an arms race in outer space should be
prevented, that in the context of a general and complete disarmament outer
space should be devoted to preaceful activities, and that the exploration and
use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific development.
In this respect the two major space and nuclear Powers share the greatest
responsibility in the search for effective and verifiable agreements on the
prevention of an arms race in outer space. I believe that there is a general
awareness that a competitive drive towards the deployment of armaments in
outer space would be a costly and undesirable endeavour.
Current trends in the bilateral talks here in Geneva allow us to hope for
a constructive approach in spite of the complexities of the issues involved.
In this context we believe that it will be most important for the major space
Powers to agree on a common approach in dealing with these problems, including
those connected with the offence-defence relationship.
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(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)
It is of the utmost importance to make sure that space research and
activities are consistent with the principles and purposes of the
United Nations Charter and that they are aimed at solely defensive purposes.
This Conference can play an important and useful role in the issue of the
prevention of an arms race in outer space which has an essential interest for
all States. During the last session, the Ad Hoc Committee, despite a
regrettable delay in getting down to substantive work, was able to clarify
some important aspects concerning the existing legal regime in relation to
arms control in outer space, to consider some relevant issues, and to examine
some of the activities which are currently being carried out in outer space.
We hope that this work will be continued, with renewed energy this year and
that further progress in the examination of the complex and various issues
connected with this item will be achieved.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the events of the past
months have shown to be full of promise for our work in this Conference. We
want to foster our efforts in order to build on what has so far been
accomplished. For this purpose we shall try to take advantage of all
available avenues constantly bearing in mind the essential requirements of
international security and stability.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of
Italy for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now
call on the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Ambassador Nazarkin.
Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from
Russian): On 4 March the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons completed, as
you know, the consideration of a cluster of issues relating to chemical weapon
stockpiles. This offers an opportunity to take stock of the first results of
this year's negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons.
On the whole we are satisfied with the intensive start made in the
negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee under the Chairmanship of
Ambassador Ekeus. It is our hope that in future this momentum will be
maintained in the negotiations.
In its statement in the plenary of the Conference on 17 February, the
Soviet delegation, wishing from the outset to give a fresh impetus to the
negotiations, outlined a number of proposals with a view to reaching a speedy
agreement on the question assigned to the first cluster for discussion. These
proposals contained comprehensive provisions for declarations to be made by
each State party to a future convention specifying detailed information on
locations of chemical weapon stocks (storage facilities) at the time the
convention enters into force; for closure of storage facilities and
prevention of movement of stocks; and for effective verification of the
closed storage facilities on the basis of systematic international inspections
along with permanent use of instruments. The positive significance of these
proposals has just been noted by the distinguished representative of Italy,
Ambassador Pugliese.
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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
Until recently, the fact that the question of declarations of storage
facilities remained unresolved gave rise to a pessimistic view of the
prospects for a speedy conclusion of the convention. In presenting its
proposals the Soviet Union proceeded from the interest of finding without
delay a solution to this question. We are satisfied that these proposals of
ours have made it possible to take a major step forward at the negotiations
and we hope that progress on the question of declaration and international
verification of chemical stockpile locations will have a positive effect on
the work on other subjects and on the whole process of the subsequent
negotiations.
Wishing to maintain the momentum in our work, the Soviet delegation is
making a proposal for a resolution to the question of a time-frame for
elimination of chemical weapons, in view of the situation which has emerged at
the negotiations. As you know, the Soviet Union's earlier proposal, motivated
by the desire to see the process of chemical weapon destruction initiated as
quickly as possible, was that this destruction should begin not later than six
months after the convention enters into force. That proposal met with
objections, in particular from the United States, which stated that it was not
ready to proceed to the elimination of chemical weapons shortly after the
convention entered into force. In view of this fact, we are prepared not to
insist on our proposal which, of course, remains valid, and we do not object
to beginning the destruction of chemical weapons not later than after one
year. We are also prepared, taking into account that the convention would
provide for permanent international verification of chemical weapon
destruction facilities and the full responsibility of States for the way those
facilities operate, not to insist that such facilities should in all cases be
State-owned. We expect that these additional proposals will make it possible
to find appropriate solutions.
As the documents of the Ad Hoc Committee indicate, a number of provisions
of article 4 ("chemical weapons") and Annex 4 have not been finalized yet.
There are naturally various reasons for that -- objective difficulties and
complicated technical issues which have yet to be resolved -- but we cannot
ignore the obstacles which might very well not have been there had all
delegations adopted a constructive approach.
This applies above all to the question of destruction of chemical
weapons. On 17 February the Soviet Union proposed that all chemical weapons
should be destroyed. In presenting that proposal we took into account the
difficulties referred to by the United States delegation which had for a long
time been opposed to the very concept of diversion of chemical weapons for
permitted purposes. Wishing to meet the concerns of our partners in the
negotiations we withdrew our requirement that a State should have the right to
decide on the ways of eliminating chemical weapon stockpiles, although I
should point out that our arguments that diversion might be economically
justified remain valid. It appeared that since we accepted the United States
position agreement was at hand. However, the United States delegation has
again blocked agreement and, quite contrary to its previous position, has
suddenly begun to insist on diversion of chemical weapon stocks. This fact is
of course regrettable. The Soviet delegation reaffirms its willingness to
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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
seek a solution to the question of the elimination of chemical weapons. That
requires now, above all, that the United States delegation should present
concrete proposals on the types and quantities of chemical weapons the
United States would like to divert.
One of the most difficult of the outstanding questions is the problem of
the order of elimination of chemical weapon stocks. Discussions on the
question have shown above all the technical difficulties involved in working
out a so-called equivalent unit for comparing various categories of
chemicals. In view of this fact and of possible differences in the
composition of chemical weapon stockpiles we would like to propose that the
following order of elimination of chemical weapon stockpiles be discussed.
Firstly, the whole elimination period shall be divided into nine one-year
periods. Secondly, within each one-year period a State party shall eliminate
one-ninth of its chemical-weapon stockpiles in each of the existing
categories. Thirdly, a State party may carry out the elimination of chemical
weapons at a faster pace than under the agreed order of elimination.
We would be interested to hear the views of other delegations on these
questions. The Soviet delegation is prepared, in the course of further ,
negotations, to seek mutually acceptable solutions on the question of the
order of elimination of chemical weapons. It is our hope that by the end of
the spring session of the Conference the full text of Article 4 and Annex 4
will be finalized.
The Soviet Union is in favour of achieving, as a matter of principle, the
prompt and complete elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base
for their production. The Soviet side has made repeated statements to this
effect on a number of occasions, including at the highest level. In this
context we should like once again to draw your attention to the statement of
General Secretary Gorbachev of 15 January 1986, in which it was stated
inter alia that "We are prepared to ensure a timely declaration of the
location of enterprises producing chemical weapons and the cessation of their
production, and we are ready to start developing procedures for destroying the
relevant industrial base and to proceed, soon after the Convention enters into
force, to the elimination of the stockpiles of chemical weapons".
This statement makes it clear beyond any doubt that in pursuing chemical
disarmament we do not seek unilateral disarmament of the other side. In case
such a convention is concluded chemical weapons and the production base for
their manufacture are to be destroyed by all States possessing such weapons,
including both the Soviet Union and the United States.
The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is now proceeding to the
consideration of the cluster of questions relating to non-production of
chemical weapons in the commercial (civil) industry. This, if anything, is
the most difficult aspect of the convention. In November 1986 the
Soviet Union made a series of proposals on the subject which, as is widely
recognized, have considerably advanced the negotiations. Today we would like
to present some new ideas on this question.
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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
Important work lies ahead in order to finalize the lists for various
categories of chemicals which would be subjected to different regimes of
limitation and verification. We expect category I, along with super-toxic
lethal chemicals possessing a set of properties characteristic of chemical
warfare agents and key components of binary chemical weapons, to cover
incapacities as well.
The viability of a future convention will be ensured only when it is able
to keep pace with the times and the achievements of applied and fundamental
chemistry and to prevent the development of chemical weapons. This purpose
could be served among other things by basic guidelines for revision of the
lists of chemicals which would be initially included in the convention. We
propose that such a revision be carried out both on a periodical (annual)
basis and at the request of any State party as new chemicals appear, as the
production technology for such chemicals develops, and on the basis of the
declarations by States of their chemical weapon stockpiles.
One of the possible loop-holes for breaching the convention might be
through the commercial production of super-toxic lethal chemicals. Nobody
denies the risk to the convention posed by the high level of toxicity of these
chemicals, for toxicity is the determining property of a chemical warfare
agent. Consequently there should be a general interest in removing this
risk.
As you know, at one time the Soviet Union proposed applying most
stringent prohibition measures to the production of super-toxic lethal
chemicals. This position, however, met with objections from a number of
parties to the negotiations, based on commercial consideration, who argued in
favour of preserving the procedure and methods of production of these
chemicals in the commercial industry existing in their countries. Back in
1985, at the initiative of Western delegations, provisions were developed for
a division of super-toxic lethal chemicals into two categories: super-toxic
lethal chemicals used in chemical weapons and super-toxic lethal chemicals
which cannot be used in chemical weapons. At the time this agreement which
provided for international on-site verification of the production of these
chemicals was welcomed by Western countries as a major success in the
negotiations.
In preparing its proposals which were presented in November 1986 the
Soviet Union took into account the position of Western countries and agreed to
divide super-toxic lethal chemicals into two categories and spelled out
specific ideas on a regime for permitted production of such chemicals. The
way to work the finalization of the relevant provisions of the convention now
seemed open. However, the issue of permitted production of super-toxic lethal
chemicals began to slide: one would not wish to believe that in the place of
progress towards agreement there might be backward movement on the question
which appeared to be ripe for a final solution.
With a view to contributing to the success of the work on the question of
non-production of chemical weapons in the commercial industry and in
particular facilitating progress towards agreement on regimes for the
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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
production of super-toxic lethal chemicals which do not possess a set of
properties characteristic of chemical warfare agents, that is category 2
chemicals, we are presenting an additional proposal on the threshold for
annual capacity above which facilities for the production of such chemicals
are to be declared and subjected to systematic verification. The annual
volume of production of each such chemical included into the list for this
category would be set at 10 kilograms according to our proposal. The
frequency and timing of systematic international inspection would be
determined by the Consultative Committee taking into account the risk to the
convention posed by a given chemical or facility.
The question of challenge on-site inspection undoubtedly deserves the
special attention of the parties to the negotiations. The fact that there is
no agreement on this essential element of the verification mechanism of a
future convention hampers agreement on quite a number of other issues relating
to a comprehensive and total chemical-weapons ban.
The Soviet Union, in the course of negotiations, has presented some ideas
which, taking into account the position of other States, are aimed at bringing
closer the positions of the parties to the negotiations. Progress towards a
mutually acceptable agreement has also been facilitated by the proposals of
the United Kingdom, Pakistan and the paper of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc
Working Group, Ambassador Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia. The result has been
that it has been possible for the first time to register some areas of
convergence on the question of challenge inspections which are outlined in the
report of the Ad Hoc Committee, document CD/734. In particular, there is
general agreement that the procedure for processing a challenge should ensure
that inspections be carried out in the shortest time-frame.
It would be fair to say as well that the parties to the negotiations
recognize that the locations and facilities to be subject to challenge
inspections differ, and that that difference is based not on ownership of such
locations and facilities but on their objective relevance to the scope of the
convention. No one disagrees that in certain cases no refusal of an
inspection to the full extent requested would be permitted -- for example, in
the event of suspected use of chemical weapons and inspections of locations
and facilities declared under the convention. At the same time, it cannot be
ignored that there might be exceptional cases when the conduct of an
inspection could jeopardize the supreme interests of a State party. In those
cases, carefully considered means are required which, on the one hand, would
ensure the integrity of the convention and confidence in compliance with it,
and on the other hand would take into account the legitimate interests
(political defence, economic, etc.) of a State party. It is our view that in
this respect a good balance was struck in the British paper. We believe we
should make maximum use as a basis for agreement of the idea of using
alternative measures in cases where a State deems access of inspectors to the
location unfeasible, an idea contained in that paper.
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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)
The Soviet delegation is in favour of an active search for mutually
acceptable solutions on challenge inspections, and intends actively to
participate in this process. We call on all parties to take the same course
of reasonable compromise.
The current spring part of the Conference's session is to a large extent
decisive for negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. The Soviet
delegation will continue to work actively and consistently for overall
progress in the negotiations, to seek mutually acceptable solutions and a
speedy conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I now call on the
representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.
Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Comrade President, my delegation is deeply
satisfied in welcoming you, the distinguished representative of revolutionary,
socialist Cuba, to the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The ties
of friendship and close co-operation between our two countries will
undoubtedly be extended to your Presidency, and you can count on the fullest
support' and assistance of my delegation in your effort to complete the
establishment of a number of working bodies of the Conference and to start
their practical work. We again congratulate your predecessor,
Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of China, who presided with success over our work in
the opening month of this session.
My delegation joins those who expressed condolences to the delegation of
Norway in connection with the passing away of the Norwegian Foreign Minister,
Knut Frydenlund. Let me also express my personal sympathy to the delegation
of Hungary in view of the untimely demise of the ambassador to Switzerland,
Ambassador Komives. He was the first representative of his country in the
Conference on Disarmament, actually at the time of the ENDC, and fulfilled his
task here twice. We knew him as a dedicated representative of his country and
an excellent colleague.
The agenda of this Conference contains a number of items related to
nuclear disarmament as well as to the prevention of an arms race in outer
space. It is thus only natural that participants in the Conference follow
with keen interest the current bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space
weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States. Developments at these
negotiations have always found a certain echo in this room, especially if
these developments were encouraging.
An important milestone in this regard was the Soviet-American meeting in
Reykjavik in October of last year. A number of delegations, including my own,
have already given their assessment of the results of that meeting. For us
the basic criterion was that all positive elements which were achieved in
Reykjavik should be maintained and developed further, instead of being
reversed and forgotten.
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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)
On 28 February the Soviet Union advanced proposals which built on the
achievements of Reykjavik and at the same time create favourable conditions
for further agreements to be achieved. The statement of the General Secretary
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, contains a
proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe and to conclude the
relevant agreement separately from other issues. This proposal is based on
the agreement reached in Reykjavik that the USSR and the United States
eliminate all their medium-range missiles in Europe within the next
five years. The remaining missiles of this class would be limited to
100 warheads on both sides. In the case of the Soviet Union these will be
deployed in the Asian part of the territory, while the United States will have
all its respective missiles deployed on its national territory.
The immediate impact of such an agreement and its implementation would be
a substantial reduction of the danger of military confrontation in Europe and
adjacent regions which Czechoslovakia, a country in the centre of Europe,
welcomes most heartily. When NATO started the implementation of its 1979
decision on the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe
the Government of Czechoslovakia, mindful of a qualitatively new, direct
threat to its security, concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on the
stationing of longer-range theatre missiles on Czechoslovak territory. It was
stressed then and repeated, that this measure was in reply to the NATO
deployment and that if Pershing-2 and cruise missiles were removed :rom
Europe, there would be no need for the longer-range theatre missiles to be
maintained on Czechoslovak territory. It was a position of principle and in
the statement of General Secretary Gorbachev it is clearly said that as soon
as the agreement on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range
missiles in Europe is signed, the Soviet Union will withdraw from the German
Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, on the basis of agreement with the
Governments of those countries, longer-range theatre missiles. In other
words, once the threat which caused the stationing of these weapons is
removed, there will be no need to keep them on the territory of the German
Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia any longer.
The recent Soviet proposal has met with considerable interest and highly
positive reactions from many countries. It is thus justified to hope that it
could lead to some concrete, tangible results in the near future. Apart from
improving the political climate in Europe, the elimination of medium-range
missiles from that continent would represent an important sign of political
will and readiness to engage in the process of nuclear disarmament and would
give us realistic hope that the key problems of nuclear disarmament on the
agenda of our Conference would finally be addressed in a constructive,
business-like manner.
One of the essential prerequisites for the radical and definite solution
of the problem of nuclear disarmament -- the complete elimination of nuclear
arsenals -- is the willingness of States, especially those owning nuclear
weapons, to address the problems of war and peace, of security of States in
its complexity. And this complexity today is much deeper and wider than it
was still some years ago. During the Second World War old, so to speak
classical, concepts of military thinking still could be applied, when the
issues of individual battles were decided mainly by one side's capability to
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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)
mobilize in certain regions at a certain time a prevailing quantity of armed
forces and military hardware and by using them skilfully. But with the
appearance of nuclear weapons this concept gradually became obsolete since
huge nuclear stockpiles and their fast means of delivery will quickly
transform any limited conflict into a world conflagration. In the final
analysis, the Earth as a whole has become one military theatre and could be
easily turned into a battlefield without any limitations. Rather, there would
be one limitation -- all military operations would be carried on on the Earth
or in the air, with all weapon systems being launched from the Earth or from
the air.
But from the beginning of the 1980s we have witnessed an effort to remove
even this last limitation. Any attempt to bring the arms race into outer
space, to deploy weapons there, irrespective of whether we fix on them a
defensive or offensive label, would represent a qualitatively new threat
against the Earth.
During our last two plenary meetings an exchange of views developed with
respect to directed-energy weapons and their possible use in space and from
space against the Earth. Ambassador Hansen of the United States tried to
explain that, for example, laser weapons could only be used beyond atmosphere,
against ballistic missiles during their trajectory through space.
Ambassador Nazarkin then drew our attention to the fact that lasers could
already now be used in outer space also for offence against other objects,
e.g. early-warning satellites, and that with sufficient concentration of
energy they could also penetrate, to some extent, through the atmosphere and
attack aircraft, for example, in its upper layers. Even Ambassador Hansen
then agreed that lasers could drill through atmosphere, even if he preferred
the upward drill. In connection with this exchange my delegation would like
to stress just one more aspect. What was discussed were more or less existing
or near possibilities of lasers. But what is going to happen 20 to 30 years
from now, once weapons have been permanently installed in outer space? We are
confident that the present arguments about how lasers cannot penetrate through
the atmosphere will seem, to future analysts, rather obsolete, if not
ridiculous. And we should not forget that directed-energy weapons represent
only one form of possible weapons to be installed in outer space. Already now
various other types are mentioned, and it might be safely presumed that
several decades from now, if human civilization survives, a whole panoply of
strike space weapons could be developed. And it is now for us a high-priority
task to stop the penetration of weapons into outer space, and to make it
impossible to develop new and highly destructive space weapons.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of
Czechoslovakia for his statement and the kind words addressed to my country
and to myself. Ambassador Vejvoda has just made reference to the sad demise
of Ambassador Imre Komives of Hungary, who was during two different sessions
the representative of his country in this negotiating body, Chairman of the
then Committee on Disarmament and also of the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Radiological Weapons. He served with distinction the multilateral disarmament
negotiating body and was an outstanding representative of his country,
Hungary. He was also the friend of many of us here. I personally remember
him with great respect as we were companions during my first tour of duty in
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(The President)
Geneva. May I, on behalf of the Conference, transmit our deep condolences to
the delegation of Hungary and to the family of Ambassador Komives. I now call
on the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.
Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, I welcome you to the Chair of
this Conference for the month of March and heartily express the willingness of
my delegation to co-operate with you fully as you preside over this important
Conference.
Last month we made splendid progress and for this we are deeply indebted
to your predecessor, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of the People's Republic of China.
In the statement I made on the opening day of the Conference I said that
Australia had great hopes for the Conference in 1987. I also said that one of
the reasons for our optimism was that the opening month of the Conference
would be in Ambassador Fan's hands. Our optimism has already been justified
and the reasons for it were more than fulfilled, and we thank Ambassador Fan
for this.
The wisest and most experienced amongst us, Ambassador Garcia Robles of
Mexico, pointed out on an informal occasion last week that if one looks at our
agenda and sets to one side the final item, that of the drafting of our
report, one is left with eight other substantive items. In his remarks he
noted that if agreement were reached on the establishment of an ad hoc
committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and other
arrangements for specific handling of two other items were agreed to, then
there would remain only one item on which enabling action was required, and
then we would be at work on all items.
Last week the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space was established, and today,
I understand, we will appoint the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee,
Ambassador Aldo Pugliese of Italy.
I think it is also true that the specific arrangements for items 2 and 3
of our agenda are in train.
So, as is usual, Ambassador Garcia Robles' analysis of the situation is
correct. Putting it simply, we are under way for 1987 and the deck has been
cleared for agreement on getting work started under that last item, in fact
the first item of our agenda -- nuclear test ban. And this item is the
subject of my statement today.
This truly gratifying set of developments rests, I believe, on the active
influence within our Conference during these opening weeks of a word, a
concept, which has been on everyone's lips -- convergence. On the very first
day of our Conference, on 3 February, this concept, this phenomenon and its
desirability, was referred to frequently. Since then we have seen it applied
in action with excellent results. I believe it can serve us well now with
regard to item 1 of our agenda, an item to which every delegation in this room
attaches undoubted priority importance.
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(Mr. Butler, Australia)
To demonstrate this point I would like briefly to remind the Conference
of some of the statements that have already been made on item 1. I hasten to
say, as all will appreciate, that making a choice between various statements
is always a difficult business. So I want this to be clear.
The only motive I have had in making the following choices is to give
fair evidence of the existence of convergence with respect to item 1 of our
agenda.
On 3 February, in the first statement made at this year's session of the
Conference, Ambassador Garcia Robles said this:
"The need this year, (is) to establish without further delay an ad hoc
committee with the objective of ... carrying out the multilateral
negotiations of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear test
explosions."
On the same day the Chairperson of the Swedish delegation, Ambassador Maj
Britt Theorin, said:
said:
"It is time for the convergence in the General Assembly to be translated
by us into a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban ... it
is time for the Conference on Disarmament to start practical work on its
first agenda item. All relevant matters should be addressed: scope and
content, as well as compliance and verification."
On 26 February, the leader of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Nazarkin
"It is necessary to begin without delay practical work on nuclear test
ban in the Conference on Disarmament and to establish an ad hoc committee
for this purpose."
A statement of very great significance was made by the leader of the
United States delegation, Ambassador Hansen, on 24 February. He said:
"This Conference can neither replace nor duplicate the delicate work
which is just getting under way bilaterally. Nevertheless, this
Conference can usefully consider and work on a number of nuclear testing
issues, including compliance and verification issues essential to any
future accord. The Conference on Disarmament can make contributions on
these and other test ban issues of particular importance."
These statements demonstrate convergence that is clear, but it would be
misleading to gloss over differences of view that have also been expressed.
For example, on 26 February the leader of the delegation of India,
Ambassador Teja, expressed reservations about the establishment of an ad hoc
committee unless it had a negotiating mandate, and was directed specifically
to nuclear-weapon tests.
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(Mr. Butler, Australia)
Ambassador Teja said that unless this approach were taken we might
"create the illusion of movement without any real movement and arouse false
hopes that the Conference on Disarmament had broken new ground when nothing of
that sort may in fact have happened".
He said that if his approach were accepted "we would at least know the
future direction in which we are moving even though the road may be sometimes
hard and difficult. To do otherwise would mean obscuring our vision and
getting lost among the footpaths of side-issues, without reaching the
principal destination".
This concept of the "principal destination" is of course the central one,
and it is here that I believe we also are witnessing convergence.
For example, I return to Ambassador Hansen's statement, which designated
specifically that "the ultimate objective is that of banning nuclear tests".
By the way, not nuclear-weapon tests, nuclear tests, all tests. He went on:
"The United States seeks to engage in a process which will result in practical
and realistic steps in the area of nuclear testing".
Be went on to state the United States view of what it sees to be certain
key relationships, such As between cuts in nuclear weapons, improved
verification capabilities and what the United States calls (and oe---.r6 may not
agree) the long-term objective of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty.
With all respect to my Indian friend and colleague, I cannot agree that
to start practical work now would in any way sidetrack us from the real issue,
what he himself has called the principal destination -- how could it? He says
his Government is committed to that destination, although possibly qualified
by the Indian use of the term weapons testing. Nevertheless that principal
destination is one to which he says, and all of us around this table say, we
are committed.
We all know, as the Indian Ambassador has pointed out, that the way ahead
is difficult and that there are areas of disagreement but to say as he does,
that because of these difficulties we should not even start our work, is a
logic my delegation cannot support.
Our concern is that while bilateral discussions continue between the
major nuclear-weapon States both on nuclear-weapon reductions and on the issue
of reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear testing, this vital body, our
Conference, should deny itself the role and influence it can and must have on
these issues: we should not deny ourselves that role.
Both super-Powers in their recent statements on this subject have allowed
and admitted that role and that influence to this Conference. They have both
endorsed it.
We all often stress the urgency and importance of this Conference playing
its proper role especially on the nuclear-testing issue. we can do it.
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(Mr. Butler, Australia)
Convergence is at hand. The gaps between us are in fact small, as I hope
the citations I have made have indicated, we should act now.
This practical, sober and realistic approach, if I may be allowed to say
so, was probably put most clearly, indeed I thought it was put brilliantly, by
the leader of the Japanese delegation, Ambassador Yamada, in his statement of
10 February.
He emphasized the existence of common purpose and perception on the
nuclear-testing issue which had been revealed at the last General Assembly and
is now evident in this Conference.
He said: "There is common perception of the subject matter of the work.
There is recognition of the importance of verification and willingness to
participate in its implementation. Now is the chance to resume substantial
work on a CTB".
With regard to the mandate language having reviewed the existing drafts
and relevant recent resolutions of the General Assembly, he noted "that there
can be much in common" between the words "with a view to the negotiation of a
treaty" on the one hand and the words "with the objective of carrying out the
multilateral negotiation of a treaty".
Above all, he said these words and they are words with which my
delegation heartily agrees:
"It must be possible for us to proceed in a spirit of co-operation to
establish an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate to commence
substantial work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the beginning of
this session. Indeed, it would be our collective responsibility to do
so."
In conclusion, one of my Government's abiding concerns is the question of
where would we be, in the pursuit of this vital objective of an end to all
nuclear testing, if we failed again this year to have this Conference play its
proper role? Why should we sit and let time pass when other relevant
negotiations are taking place, when we have a role to play in assisting
negotiations? What would we say to ourselves if the time came, next year or
the year after, when the States possessing nuclear weapons or conducting
nuclear tests said "We are ready, we have got a treaty, where are the means of
verification, how can we put this into action, what has the Conference on
Disarmament done?"; and the answer is, "We have sat on our hands, we have not
done the work, we were waiting". Our Australian concern is that we do this
work now so that when the treaty required to bring about an end to all nuclear
testing by all States in all environments for all time is ready and open for
signature and implementation, we are there with the technical means, the means
of verification, to bring that treaty into action, and not have to say "we sat
on our hands for five years, give us another three or four years while we work
out what you need to make that treaty come into force." That work can be done
now. With the current convergences we should be able to agree, as
Ambassador Yamada has said, to an appropriate mandate to start that work now.
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(Mr. Butler, Australia)
Technical aspects of it are under way, in the view of the scientific
experts -- they are meeting now. We have proposed in Working Paper CD/717
that this Conference should decide to establish a global seismological
network: the elements, the bones, the fabric of it are already there, but we
have proposed putting it into place now, so that when the treaty is ready
either through this Conference, through bilateral negotiation, or a
combination of both, that network will be in operation and thus the treaty
will be in operation on the earliest possible day. We are not alone -- others
have made proposals, some similar, some complementary. The materials we
require are at hand. Convergence is with us and I appeal to this Conference
to bring to a conclusion, without further delay, a decision on the
establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1 of our agenda.
Spanish): I thank the representative of
the kind words addressed to the
on my list for today. Does any other
I give the floor to the representative of
The PRESIDENT (translated from
Australia for his statement and for
President. I have no more speakers
delegation wish to take the floor?
Hungary, Ambassador Meiszter.
Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Mr. President, allow me to thank you and those
who expressed words of sympathy and condolence on the occasion of the untimely
demise of my compatriot, the late Ambassador Imre Komives, who served with
devotion the same cause we are striving for. My delegation will convey their
words to the Hungarian Government and to the grieving family of
Ambassador Imre Komives.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As announced at the beginning
of this plenary meeting, I shall now suspend the meeting and convene in five
minutes' time an informal meeting of the Conference in order to consider the
various requests from non-member States to participate in the work of the
Ad Hoc Committee established under agenda item 5. I also wish to announce
that the consultations on the appointment of the Chairman of that Ad Hoc
Committee have come to a successful conclusion, and when we resume the plenary
we can formalize the appointment of its Chairman.
The plenary meeting was suspended at 11.25 a.m. and resumed at 11.45 a.m.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 394th plenary meeting of
the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.
As a consequence of the results of the informal meeting we have just
held, the Conference will proceed to consider the requests from non-member
States to participate in the Committee established under agenda item 5,
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In accordance with the practice
established by my predecessor during the month of February, I suggest that we
consider the requests together, as there have been no objections to Working
Papers CD/WP.269 to 279, containing the draft decisions on the participation
of Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Portgual, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Austria, Denmark,
Greece, Spain and Senegal. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the
Conference adopts the draft decisions.
It was so decided.
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now wish to refer to the
question of the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The consensus we have reached is
to appoint Ambassador Aldo Pugliese of Italy as Chairman of the Ad Hoc
Committee. I shall therefore take it that the Conference agrees to that
appointment.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should like to congratulate
Ambassadore Pugliese, on behalf of all members of the Conference as well as
myself, on the appointment on which we have just decided. Naturally, I wish
him every success in his important duties, which I am sure he will carry out
efficiently, given his well-known diplomatic ability. I give the floor to
Ambassador Pugliese.
Mr. PUGLIESE (Italy): Mr. President, I would simply like to thank you
and, through you, to express my gratitude to all the distinguished members of
the Conference on Disarmament for the confidence they have placed in the
Italian delegation by agreeing that I should serve as Chairman of the Ad Hoc
Committee that will be dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer
space.
?
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The secretariat has today
circulated at my request a timetable of meetings for the Conference and its
subsidiary bodies for next week. As usual, the timetable has been prepared in
consultation with the Chairmen of the various Ad Hoc Committees; it is
tentative and may be altered if necessary. In this connection, the Chairman
of the Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 5, Ambassador Pugliese, will begin
consultations on the most suitable date for the subsidiary body to begin its
work. Once he has completed his consultations, the timetable will be revised
and circulated once again if the Committee is to meet next week. If there is
no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now intend to adjourn the
plenary meeting if no other member wishes to take the floor. The next
plenary meeting on the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday,
10 March, at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.
The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.
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10 March 1987
ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 March 1987, at 10 a.m.
President: Mr. Lechuga Hevia
GE. 87-60384/7611E
616.
(Cuba)
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the
395th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.
First of all, I should like to extend, on behalf of the Conference, a
warm welcome to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs,
Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who is present here today at this plenary meeting. I
also wish to convey to him the best wishes of all members of the Conference
for success in the performance of his duties. In his message to us
immediately after he assumed his important duties as Under-Secretary-General
in the Department of Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Akashi recalled the great
importance which the Secretary-General attaches to the significant role played
by the Conference on Disarmament, and expressed his personal concern that the
Conference's needs should be entirely satisfied by the Department of
Disarmament Affairs. I am sure that all members will appreciate Mr. Akashi's
comments, which reflect his commitment to the important duties he is now
discharging.
In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today continues
the consideration of agenda item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in
Outer Space. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of Procedure, however,
any member wishing to do so may raise any other matter related to the work of
the Conference.
I note the presence in the public gallery today of the participants in
the Conference of Women with the United Nations for Disarmament,
Understanding, Co-operation and Action, currently being held in the
Palais des Nations. This Conference coincides, significantly, with
International Women's Day and so I should like to convey our congratulations
to all the women who, from different positions, participate in the affocts
aimed at disarmament and arms limitation. I therefore welcome today the women
in the public gallery of the Conference on Disarmament. Furtherwre, today is
an exceptional day: I must announce that we have no speakers. I think this
is the first time in two years that there ha,7e been no speakers in zni
Conference. However, in accordance with the practice of the Conference 1
would like to ask if any delegation wishes to take the floor. I see none, and
therefore we shall adjourn the meeting. The nest plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 12 March, at 10 a.m. The
meeting is adjourned.
The meeting rose at 10.25 a.m.
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12 March 1987
ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 March 1987, at 10 a.m.
President:
GE.87-60398/7657E
Mr. Lechuga Hevia
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the
396th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.
In accordance with its programme of work the Conference today continues
the consideration of agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer
space". In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however,
members may raise any other matter related to the work of the Conference.
I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of
the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik, to whom I give the floor.
Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): Thank you, Mr. President. Allow me to
congratulate you on your presidency in the month of March. Your nation has in
its coat of arms the rising sun, as a symbol of hope, a key that opens doors
to find solutions and a palm tree with fruit, as the symbol of the
fruitbearer, from which we all hope to reap. All of this, I hope augurs well
for our work this month under your able and experienced chairmanship.
I wish to thank Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of the People's Republic of China
for the very able way in which he guided the Conference in February. The
Chinese philosopher K'ang Yu Wei once remarked: "Going froth the level plain
to the mountain peak, we must pass by the foothill slopes before we can
ascend". Ambassador Fan has in fact guided us in passing the foothill slopes.
We will remember Ambassador Don Lowitz as an eminent colleague and a good
friend. Responding to Mrs. Lowitz' letter to the members of this Conference,
I can assure her that it was for us really a joy and a privilege to have known
him.
Allow me to welcome the newly appointed Under-Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi. / also welcome the Ambassadors who
arrived since I last spoke in July: Ambassadors Morelli Pando of Peru, Teja
of India, Hacene of Algeria, Morel of France, Dolgu of Romania, Yamada of
Japan, Pugliese of Italy, Kosin of Yugoslavia, Nazarkin of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and Hansen of the United States. We are grateful for the
contributions made by their predecessors, whom we wish well.
First, I wish to make a brief remark on the overall setting in which we
have resumed this year's spring session. The Reykjavik Summit has placed
East-West relations in a new perspective. It was undoubtedly a milestone on
the road towards arms control and disarmament. There was, and fortunately
still is, a prospect for arms-control agreements of potentially major
significance.
We are satisfied to note that the United States and the Soviet Union are
building further on the foundations that were laid at Reykjavik. We are
encouraged that recently an important stumbling block on the road to further
progress has been removed, as the Soviet Union has accepted the delinkage of
outer space issues from the negotiations on intermediate-range ballistic
missiles.
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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)
We are confident that movement in the bilateral talks will also favour
the climate in which this Conference will work. I am thinking not only of the
most important issue which the Conference considers, the establishment of a
chemical-weapons convention, but also of the complementary role the Conference
can play on issues related to those that are the subject of negotiations
between the two major nuclear and space Powers.
In July last year I addressed some substantial issues with regard to a
nuclear-test ban. Needless to say, the Netherlands Government is, as it has
always has been, in favour of a CTB and has considered its realization an
important goal to be achieved. Regrettably, progress on the road towards a
CTB has been slow. But we see it as a positive sign that currently talks are
being held by Soviet and United States experts on the subject of nuclear
tests, in particular on the verification of the TTBT and PNE Treaties. We
look forward to the ratification of these Treaties as a step on the road to a
comprehensive ban. We also welcome the discussions being conducted by
United States and Soviet experts on the idea of interim steps with respect to
nuclear tests, to which I shall return in a moment.
We are encouraged by the increasing awareness, as demonstrated in the
international debate on the test-ban issue, that an effective test-ban
agreement requires a stringent verification regime and -- and this is very
important -- that such a regime should be technically feasible. At their
Ixtapi meeting, the countries of the Five Continents Initiative, the
New Delhi Six, rightly recognized in their statement that verification is an
important issue and accordingly forwarded useful proposals to enhance
verification capabilities. Verification no longer seems an issue that, as
such, divides us, although, of course, a great deal of work still has to be
done.
It is encouraging that the Soviet delegation has accepted so-called
level II data exchange and is ready to participate in a practical test
envisaged for 1988 on the basis of such data during a test run. We also took
note of Soviet declarations to the effect that the USSR is open to the most
strict forms of verification, such as on-site inspection and the use of all
possibilities of seismology. We regret that such on-site inspection was not
permitted during the recent Soviet test on 26 February and, as I said earlier,
that the Soviet Union did not accept the invitation of the United States
Government to observe and monitor a test at the Nevada site.
With a view to bringing about the cessation of nuclear testing, we wish
to reiterate our hope that the two major nuclear Powers will continue to
explore the possibilities of reducing tests, both quantitatively and
qualitatively, in relation to the reduction of arsenals. Fewer nuclear
weapons, few nuclear tests; and depending on the scope of the arms control
agreement, no tests for certain types of nuclear weapons. In this context, we
recall the statement of Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic on
17 February, in which he said that the concept of interim steps has always
been part of the socialist approach to a CTB.
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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)
If, as we hope, such steps lead the major nuclear Powers on the road
towards a CTB, it would be a great pity that the Conference should remain an
impotent observer. As long as we cannot negotiate on the treaty itself, we in
the Conference should do everything feasible that will bring us nearer to the
goal. That includes work that can be undertaken under the mandate proposed by
a group of Western countries (CD/521). It seems of little interest to us
whether that work will be granted the title of "negotiations". It is not on
the basis of such labelling that major nations can be forced to negotiate on a
final treaty banning all testing. In fact, we hope that such practical work
will also bridge differences that separate those who consider a CTB an
immediate objective and others who, for the time being, consider it from a
different perspective.
Let us, on the basis of CD/521, finally resume the substantive work on
scope, verification and compliance related to a comprehensive test ban. For
too long we have been waiting for a thorough discussion of the many
interesting papers that have been submitted, such as the ones presented by the
Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Norway and Australia. As
Ambassador Turbanski of Poland underlined in his intervention on 26 February,
it is unfortunate that more than a month has passed and that we are unable to
do substantial work on the subject. We wish to echo the Polish Ambassador's
reminder that the mandate, though important, is not an aim in itself.
Let me also say something on the objective as such of a CTB. We believe
that we must, with respect to the objective of a CTB, be realistic. A CTB
remains in our view an important tool to slow down the nuclear-arms race. It
would also have great political significance, and as such set an example to
nations that possess -- or are on the verge of acquiring -- a nuclear
explosive capability. However even in a world in which a CTB would reign,
this would unfortunately not put a definite end to the nuclear-arms race. A
CTB can never be a substitute for deep cuts in nuclear arsenals.
We fail to understand those who argue that a comprehensive test ban is
even a prerequisite to halting the arms race. Some have said here in this
room that, unless we all agree to putting an end to nuclear-weapon tests, we
shall not be able to achieve our goal of nuclear disarmament; that without a
CTB the dangers of nuclear war will even increase. We on our side are more
optimistic about the perspectives of the bilateral nuclear talks going on
elsewhere in Geneva.
In short, for my Government, which attaches very high priority to the
question of the test ban, the reduction and the ultimate abolition of nuclear
arsenals, is of even greater importance.
The cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament are, of
course, major issues. The Conference should certainly address these issues.
But can we consider those themes completely separate from the question of
conventional arms control? Various resolutions accepted at last year's
General Assembly, in particular resolutions 41/59 C and 41/59 G, point out, in
fact, the importance to be attached to conventional arms control and
disarmament.
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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)
We agree with Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia, when on 24 February, he
underlined the importance of conventional weapons that continue to absorb most
of the resources spent on arms and take a heavy toll of human life in
so-called local wars. The development of conventional weapons systems is
indeed making those weapons increasingly dangerous and very destructive.
The Atlantic Alliance agreed in Halifax on the objective of the
establishment of a comprehensive, verifiable and stable balance of
conventional forces at lower levels in the whole of Europe. The Warsaw Pact
expressed its interest in conventional arms reductions as well. The
elimination of conventional disparities in Europe will certainly be conducive
to future nuclear disarmament.
My Government hopes that a systematic exchange of views in the Conference
on Disarmament on the cessation of a nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament
will be continued. But as Ambassador Hansen of the United States rightly
asked: "Where on the programme of work for 1987 is there provision for this
Conference to undertake arms control and disarmament efforts which might
contribute to the ending of the destruction, pain and suffering now taking
place in diverse parts of the world because conventional weapons are being
used?". We all know there are countries that are vocal when it concerns
nuclear weapons -- which they do not possess -- but that are often tacit on
conventional weapons -- which they do possess. We fully respect the deeply
felt concern of those delegations about the threat of nuclear war. However,
we do think that a more balanced approach, reflecting also the anxiety about
actual and often very indiscriminate killings by conventional weapons, would
be a more proper response to our common aspirations. A more balanced approach
is also required if we take into account the urgent need for scarce resources,
in particular in developing countries, whose plight is a matter of great
concern to my Government, as it is to the international community as a whole.
My Government considers the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons
within certain areas through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones to
be of great importance. Such zones are conducive to stability and security in
the respective area. They also tend to set an example for countries in other
areas, although we acknowledge that the establishment of such zones is less
complicated in areas where up to now nuclear weapons have not been introduced.
My Government feels that certain conditions should be fulfilled to make
such regional endeavours successful, also in the longer run. The agreements
reached should be the fruit of initiatives from within the region, which
itself should be clearly defined. Preferably all countries in the region must
be prepared to join and the agreement should be supported by an adequate
verification regime. The agreement should include guarantees from the nuclear
Powers. Generally speaking, it is, of course, of great importance that all
participating countries pay attention to the effective functioning of the
nuclear-free zone. It is in this spirit that my Government appreciates the
establishment of the Treaty of Rarotonga on a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone,
on which the distinguished Ambassador of Australia, Richard Butler, gave us
interesting information in his speech on 3 February 1987.
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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)
Since the beginning of the space age, technology has made progress with
gigantic steps and space has become an aspect of our daily life. The
Soviet Union, the United States, China, India, Japan and the countries working
together in the European Space Agency have placed satellites in orbit and
other countries will certainly follow suit.
Almost from the start there has also been a steady increase in military
activities in space. In the 1970s the borderlines between civil and military
use of space became vaguer. Now, up to approximately 75 per cent of the
satellites launched have only or mainly military purposes.
For one and a half years, the Conference on Disarmament has, in an
Ad Hoc Committee, examined problems in relation to a possible arms race in
outer space. We have gradually come to grips with the immense complexities of
the issues involved. We believe that the discussions on the subject in the
Ad Hoc Committee were serious and profound and that the Committee should this
year go on in the same spirit. We should, in our view, concentrate more than
before on relevant new developments as far as the military use of outer space
is concerned. We feel that, building on those discussions, it would be
possible for this Committee to come forward with some specific recommendations
for stability-enhancing measures.
Of particular concern to my Government is the protection of satellites
that on account of, for instance, their contribution to greater transparency,
crisis management and early warning against nuclear attacks, perform a
stabilizing role. The search for a satisfactory regime in this field is a
very complex task. One of the complicating factors is, of course, that not
all satellites concerned play only such a stabilizing role. An approach
complementary to the bilateral negotiations with regard to the protection of
high-orbit satellites seems to us of particular importance.
The analytic discussions on the legal regime have been interesting.
However, what is lacking is consensus on what is and what is not covered by
existing international law. We realize it will be very difficult to agree on
a paper in which common ground would be defined. But it seems to be of great
importance that a serious effort should be made. It would be a good idea if
at some moment legal experts from capitals be invited to assist us in our
discussions.
Other useful work can be done in the Committee. Confidence-building
measures constitute an area to be further explored. We favour a strengthening
of the United Nations registration agreement of 1975. The exchange of more
detailed information on all space activities and even prior notification on
the launching of space objects are themes the Committee may wish to address.
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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)
In accordance with decision A/41/421 adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly, we hope work on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
under the highly esteemed chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles will be
finalized during this session. We trust the approach of all concerned will be
realistic, so as to ensure that the comprehensive programme can indeed be
established at the next General Assembly.
From the beginning, the Netherlands has supported the Swedish proposal
made in June 1980 to broaden the scope of the draft treaty on radiological
weapons by including the issue of attacks on nuclear facilities. However, as
we all know, for various reasons, a number of delegations were not in favour
of accepting such a two-track approach and were not prepared to bring the two
issues under one international legal instrument. We regret this, but it seems
realistic to recognize that from the outset the two-track approach has been
controversial.
The question we ought to discuss in the Ad Hoc Committee is whether it
would not. be possible to find a compromise by now concentrating on an
agreement on track A (radiological weapons proper), parallel to an explicit
understanding that track B (the attacks on nuclear facilities) will be the
subject of further negotiations here ?this body. Let me emphasize that such
a phased approach should in no way be considered as an expression of doubt on
the competence of bilis body as the negotiating forum on track B. On the
contrary, as we have stated before, we consider the Conference to be the
competent body where attacks on both installations for peaceful use and
installations for military purposes can be treated adequately. The IAEA,
which is responsible for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, is not
the appropriate forum for this topic.
We believe the future legal instrument dealing with these attacks ought
to be based on the concept of indiscriminate warfare through mass
destruction. We should aim at the prevention of mass destructive
indiscriminate effects and if we do so, the distinction between military and
civil facilities is not relevant.
My delegation is aware of the objections some have raised against the
approach I have just sketched. The issue of the competence of the Conference
as well as the assessment of the urgency of the issue of attacks have been
stumbling blocks that prevented us from making more progress. But we believe
that those differences can be addressed in such a way that no vital security
or other interests are liable to be affected. In our opinion the time has
come for Governments to deal with the issue and break the impasse. Neither
questions of competence, nor the attitude of benign neglect, may be reasons to
stumble on as we did before.
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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)
Finally, a few words on chemical weapons. Negotiations on chemical
weapons are beginning to take a decisive turn. Due to the patient and
painstaking efforts of last year's Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee,
Ambassador Cromartie, and his staff, we can now work on the basis of a
so-called "rolling text", which provides us, in spite of the multitude of
square brackets -- and perhaps also because of those brackets -- with an
excellent starting point from which the negotiations can proceed. We are
grateful to Ian Cromartie for the dedication and insight with which he and his
colleagues have guided the work. We congratulate Ambassador Ekeus on his
appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for this year. We know the
chairmanship to be in good hands.
Many colleagues have said we should make use of the momentum in the
negotiations. In fact, our goal should be to reach agreement before the end
of the year. As I myself said in July last year, my delegation indeed hopes
that before the end of the year we can break the back of the problems. Recent
moves made by the Soviet delegation are indeed encouraging. We hope this sets
the trend for further progress.
However, we also wish to voice a note of caution. A variety of important
and sensitive issues must still .be addressed. A reat number of practical
issues have to be dealt with at some moment before an agreement be signed. It
would not-be wise to leave major loopholes in the convention that aould later
lead to misinterpretation and arouse suspicion on implementation, if not worse.
Three major areas of disagreement have plagued this Conference for many
years. They concern challenge inspection, the question how to verify that the
civil chemical industry is not misused for the production of chemical weapons
and the issue of how to declare and monitor existing chemical weapons
stockpiles. Although in particular on the first of those issues, challenge
inspection, we still have a long way to go, it is reassuring to note that on
each of these issues progress has been made in recent months.
Let me first take the subject on which, in our view, the most significant
steps have been made, the declaration and monitoring of stocks. It has now
become clear that the Soviet Union is prepared under the convention to make a
declaration containing detailed information on locations of chemical-weapon
stocks shortly after the entry into force of the convention. We welcome this,
because we infer from it that a system of successive declarations, phased out
over the entire period of destruction is no longer deemed necessary.
We were also happy to note that destruction, rather than diversion, of
CW stocks for peaceful purposes is now the objective, even if the issue of a
possible diversion of stocks on a very limited scale is not finally settled
yet. A lot of substantive work still remains to be done on the issue of
stocks -- I mention only the sensitive issue of the order in which stocks must
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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)
be destroyed -- but we feel that a good basis is now available for further
consultations and negotiations on remaining issues. This work is, as I
understand, well under way under the able guidance of the item co-ordinator
for Cluster I, Mr. Nieuwenhuys.
In the area of verification of non-production of chemical weapons, the
second major issue I just mentioned, the work of the Conference drew great
benefit from informal consultations in the inter-sessional period at the end
of last year, and from the deliberations at the session in January. In that
relatively brief period discussion of hitherto "untouchable" issues appeared
to be possible. We hope that the spirit prevailing in that period will
continue to inspire us in these weeks when the Committee is dealing with
article VI of the convention.
My delegation welcomes Soviet concurrence with the notion of risk in
determining the stringency of verification of non-production. In our view,
the risk factor -- essentially the risk that a civil chemical plant will in
fact violate the convention -- is important in determining the intensity with
which the plant in question should be subject to a monitoring regime. The
idea of defining a threshold for annual production, to which
Ambassador Nazarkin referred in his statement on 5 March, has been under
discussion for some time. Such a quantitative criterion would indeed provide
us with one of the factors to determine the risk involved.
In the coming weeks we shall have to get down to the level of practical
implementation: what factors are relevant to determine the risks various
chemical substances and types of production pose and consequently which
inspection regime will be applied for each of them? We are encouraged by the
constructive suggestions the item co-ordinator for Cluster III, Mr. Macedo,
has recently made on this point.
Useful work on the classification of substances has already been done by
the former Chairman of Working Group A, Mr. Richard Rowe. Under his guidance
three categories of substances were elaborated under article VI, together with
a first outline of a regime for each category. While generally appreciative
of the progress achieved so far, my delegation realizes that a number of
important issues related to monitoring of production of chemicals have hardly
been addressed. The still virtually unexplored and very complex area of
commercially produced super-toxic lethal chemicals and the risk they may pose
to the convention is only an illustration of the many important problems
awaiting a judicious solution.
As for on-site challenge inspections, the third outstanding and perhaps
most important issue of disagreement, my delegation appreciates that in his
latest interventions, Ambassador Nazarkin has made observations that seem to
narrow down some of the differences. We acknowledge that the Soviet
delegation has identified two important areas where requests for challenge
inspections cannot be refused and that it has broadly supported the British
approach for alternative solutions in exceptional circumstances.
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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)
However, we are still faced with the essential problem of how to act in
case stocks or facilities have not been registered and challenge inspections
are refused. Especially in countries with a large territory and with
traditionally less open systems of communication, this can present a major
problem, if no adequate verification regime is established.
Since this problem goes to the heart of the convention, I think it may be
useful to explain what we see as the crux of challenge inspections.
When the convention enters into force the envisaged system of routine
inspection will in general give adequate assurances that existing stockpiles
of chemical weapons are destroyed and no new stockpiles are built. However,
doubts may arise, in particular about places and facilities that are not
declared. The root of the problem may in such cases be misunderstanding,
perhaps of a technical nature, and it is obvious that a challenge inspection
can most effectively dissipate any misgivings.
But the doubts expressed may also be based on suspicion that a State
Party is in fact deliberately not properly implementing the convention. Cases
such as clandestine stockpiling and production of chemical weapons should
indeed also be covered by the convention.
It is of crucial importance that in cases of such malevolent practices no
legal, procedural or other obstacle can be put in the way of a justified
request for challenge inspection. For the effective functioning of the
convention, confidence in its implementation is essential. Confidence can
only be instilled if intrusive on-site inspection is, in those cases of
supposed malpractices, guaranteed.
The United States delegation has, now three years ago, in its proposal
under article X (CD/500) rightly pointed out the way in which we should find a
solution. We feel the British approach, as presented in CD/715, building on
the United States proposal, to be a realistic one. The British Working Paper
advanced the idea that in exceptional circumstances, in particular for
national security reasons, alternative measures may be proposed by the
challenged State, but those should be to the satisfaction of the challenging
State. If the latter State is not satisfied and if the challenged State
cannot in time advance other alternative measures, contracting parties will
face a situation in which the challenged State may be declared as violating
the convention.
It is clear that all parties have an interest that such a crisis will
never break out. It could in fact undermine the overall functioning of the
treaty as such. It is therefore of the greatest importance that in the coming
months we seek a solution which minimizes the risk that such a crisis
situation will in fact lead to the breaking down of the convention. But the
rule should remain that the complaining party has the right to international
challenge inspection on the spot.
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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)
Some delegations have suggested that we could make good use of the
example of the confidence-building measures (CBMs) that were agreed upon in
Stockholm in September 1986, in the framework of the European Disarmament
Conference. We agree with those delegations in so far as we should be
inspired by the constructive spirit which led to results at the Stockholm
Conference. But we believe the parallel cannot be drawn any further because,
as Ambassador Von Stillpnagel rightly said, the negotiations in Stockholm
served a different purpose.
In Stockholm the objective was to build confidence. Here our more
radical objective is the complete abolition of all chemical weapons. We
cannot confine ourselves to a system that gives "some" confidence. What we
need is a system of verification that gives full confidence.
Full confidence will also require full confidence in the organization we
shall establish and in the rules of decision-making we shall draft. I refer
in this context to the Netherlands Working Paper CD/445 of March 1984, on the
size and structure of a chemical disarmament inspectorate. But there is far
more to it. As Ambassador Cromartie said in his final statement as Chairman
of the Ad Hoc Committee on 3 February, provisions under article IX, but also
under article VIII, of the convention would be required to underpin confidence
in the convention. Provisions on a strong organization and on strong rules of
decision-making should provide the necessary confidence in the draft
convention as a whole, to enable it to be concluded.
A lot of important work is still waiting for us. Differences must be
bridged, resistance overcome. Let us assist the President of the Ad Hoc
Committee in setting priorities by first focusing on the major issues. I call
upon all delegations to contribute to a common effort to bring the convention
on chemical weapons to an early conclusion.
Mr. President, a famous countryman of yours, the Cuban poet Jose Marti,
said on building a nation a century ago what we today can say about building a
chemical weapons convention. Like a nation, a chemical weapons convention "is
not a complex of wheels (of fortune), nor a wild horse race, but a stride
upward concerted by real men".
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of
the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the
President, and of course for his reference to my country's coat of arms as an
allegorical expression of good omen for our work, as it were. I have no more
speakers on my list. Does any other representative wish to take the floor? I
see none.
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(The President)
I have requested the secretariat to circulate today a timetable of
meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. As usual,
the timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc
Committees; it is purely indicative and may be modified if necessary. In
this connection, I wish to inform the Conference that the Ad Hoc Committee on
the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space will meet tomorrow afternoon at
4.30 p.m. in this room. Subsequent meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee will be
decided on in the light of the results of the consultations currently taking
place, and therefore the timetable does not contain a specific reference to
the Ad Hoc Committee's next meeting. If I hear no objection, I shall take it
that the Conference adopts the timetable.
It was so decided.
The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The next plenary meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 17 March, at 10 a.m. The
meeting is adjourned.
The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.
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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
CD/PV.397
17 March 1987
ENGLISH
FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva:
on Tuesday, 17 March 1987, at 10 a.m.
President:
GE.87-60416/614n
Mr. Lechuga Hevia (Cuba)
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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the
397th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In accordance with
its programme of work, the Conference today begins the consideration of
agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".
However, in conformity with rule 3 of the rules of procedure, any member
wishing to do so may raise any other matter related to the work of the
Conference. .
I should like to recall that Saturday, 14 March, three days ago, marked
the twenty-fifth anniversary of uninterrupted multilateral negotiations on
disarmament and arms limitation. On 14 March 1962, the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament began its work, at the level of foreign ministers.
Since then, a number of major agreements have been concluded in the
negotiating body. Despite all the hopes that could be placed in a negotiating
process that would set mankind on the path towards the objective of general
and complete disarmament under effective international control, the arms race
has continued unchecked. New systems of nuclear weapons have been developed,
and the arsenals of such weapons have attained such dimensions that in the
event of a nuclear conflict the annihilation of mankind would be inevitable.
It is no accident, then, that today we are beginning the consideration
precisely of agenda item 3.
Conventional forces have acquired a destructive capability previously
unknown, and military expenditures have reached astronomical heights which
were unthinkable 25 years ago. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the
world would be an even more dangerous place to live in had it not been for the
conclusion of the agreements negotiated in this Council chamber during the
period in question. In any event, despite those agreements and all the
efforts made in negotiations, no one can say that today we are nearer our
objective than in 1962. But precisely because of the universal nature of the
danger facing us and the variety of threats to which we are subjected, in the
present circumstances there can be no giving way to despair or frustration.
The sheer scale of the risk posed by the arms race and of the task facing us
mean that there is no valid alternative to the existence of a single
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, as stated in the Final Document of
the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and
therefore it is to be hoped that this anniversary will lead us to pursue
actively our search for agreements on effective disarmament measures.
I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Norway,
Bulgaria, Spain, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
In accordance with the decision adopted by the Conference at its
387th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the personal adviser to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Dr. Bakkevig. In doing so I should
like to recall that the Conference had been expecting the visit of
His Excellency The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sadly passed away a few
days ago. I have already had occasion to convey to the representative of
Norway the sincere condolences of the Conference on this sad loss. I now give
the floor to Dr. Bakkevig.
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Mr. BAKKEVIG (Norway): Mr. President, first of all let me express my
satisfaction at the honour and privilege of addressing the Conference on
Disarmament. May I also extend to you, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia, the
distinguished representative of Cuba, my congratulations on your assumption of
the Presidency of the Conference for the month of March. I thank you also for
the kind welcome you extended to me. Allow me also, through you,
Mr. President, to express the gratitude of the Norwegian Government for the
expressions of condolences in this Conference occasioned by the sudden death
of the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Knut Frydenlund, who was
scheduled to address the Conference. May I also express my profound
condolences and sympathy over the sudden death of Ambassador Donald Lowitz of
the United States. Ambassador Lowitz took part in the CD Workshop on
Seismological Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban in Oslo in
June 1985, and had plans to visit our country again in May of this year.
It is the profound belief of my Government that the nations of the world
cannot, in the era of nuclear weapons, obtain real security at the expense of
each other. They must explore the areas of mutual interest and, on the basis
of such common ground as may be found, create alternatives to a situation
dominated by distrust and arms build-up. Collective security must be based on
confidence-building measures, arms-control agreements and co-operation across
the international divides of security arrangments.
Recently there have been hopeful signals of new momentum in the nuclear
as well as in the conventional field of arms control. We are pleased to
observe that developments in a positive direction are taking place. Thus the
Stockholm Conference last year succeeded in reaching an agreement on security
and confidence-building measures in Europe. If properly implemented these
measures will in our view serve to enhance security on this continent.
Furthermore, new negotiations are now about to start in Vienna with a
view to eliminating existing disparities and establishing conventional
stability at lower levels of forces.
The Reykjavik meeting last autumn between President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev signalled willingness to deal with the important
problems of arms control in a constructive manner. We welcome the latest
developments concerning the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations on
intermediate-range nuclear missiles. An agreement to eliminate these weapons
from Europe will have the full support of the Norwegian Government. We do
hope that the initiatives taken by the United States and the Soviet Union will
lead to the early signing of an agreement. The parties must, of course, take
appropriate steps to secure adequate verification and agree on parallel
limitations of short-range intermediate-range nuclear missiles in order to
prevent a possible circumvention of an INF agreement.
It is our hope that recent developments in the East/West context will
have a positive impact on the disarmament efforts on the multilateral level as
well.
A global, comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons is urgently
needed. Norway has taken active part in the negotiations in the Conference on
Disarmament on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production
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(Mr. Bakkevig, Norway)
stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Under the
able chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, the Ad Hoc
Committee on Chemical Weapons made significant progress on important questions
in 1986.
Difficult problems still remain to be resolved, particularly in the field
of verification. However, the momentum in the negotiations has been
sustained, and we are pleased to note the progress achieved so far during the
1987 session.
We feel assured that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical
Weapons in 1987, Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden, will spare no efforts in trying
to find early and satisfactory solutions to the outstanding problems. In
particular, it is necessary to work out details for verification regimes,
including routine and on-site inspection on challenge of all facilities and
sites where violations could occur. No doubt, solving these questions
represents a difficult and complex task. We noted in this regard the
statement of Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union at the plenary meeting on
5 March, when he said that "chemical weapons and the production base for their
manufacture are to be destroyed by all States possessing such weapons,
including both the Soviet Union and the United States".
The Norwegian Government attaches importance as well to the bilateral
consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union on an effective
and verifiable global convention on chemical weapons. These consultations
have already contributed positively to the negotiating process within the
framework of the Conference on Disarmament.
A basic and still unresolved question is the elaboration of modalities
for handling requests for on-site inspection on challenge. Norway is of the
opinion that the provisions concerning routine on-site inspections should be
supplemented by a stringent system for on-site inspections to verify
allegations of non-compliance. This would provide the ultimate source of
confidence in the convention. Such a system has to satisfy certain criteria,
of which the following three are the most essential: firstly, the challenged
State must be under the obligation to demonstrate to other States, and
especially the challenging State, that it complies with the provisions of the
convention. Secondly, an inspection would have to be undertaken immediately
after the issue of a challenge. Thirdly, the investigation should be detailed
and comprehensive.
Whereas Norway takes part in all aspects of the negotiations on a
chemical-weapons ban in the Conference on Disarmament, we have put special
emphasis on the question of verification of alleged use of these weapons. In
1981 the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a comprehensive
research programme concerning verificatio