SOVIET BLOC, NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED AND NATO COUNTRY STATEMENTS AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) 3 FEBRUARY - 30 APRIL 1987 VOLUME II

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
500
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 26, 2012
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 1, 1987
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4.pdf31.07 MB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Directorate of Intelligence ?SPorpt? Soviet Bloc, Neutral/Nonaligned and NATO Country Statements at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) 3 February 30 April 1987 Volume II Reference Aid -sr IR 87-10010 June 1987 Copy 30 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 25X1 Directorate of Intelligence Secret Soviet Bloc, Neutral/Nonaligned and NATO Country Statements at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) 3 Februar 3 April 1987 Volume II Reference Aid Secret IR 87-101)10 June 1987 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 ? r? _ SECRET STATE GENEVA TEL 001784 87 SECRET GENEVA 01784 EXDIS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR BODY TAGS: FARM, UNGA, COG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS; FEBRUARY 17, 1987, AMBASSADOR HANSEN'S STATEMENT. 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-003. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE PREPARED STATEMENT DELIVERED BY U.S. ACTING CD REPRESENTATIVE LYNN HANSEN AT THE FEBRUARY 17 PLENARY MEETING OF THE FIFTH ROUND OF U.S.-SOVIET INTENSIFIED CW BAN DISCUSSIONS. THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED IS BEING REPORTED BY SEPTEL. 3. BEGIN TEXT. MR. AMBASSADOR: -- YESTERDAY, THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS BEGAN MOUND V OF THE ACCELERATED BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE BEING HELD PURSUANT TO THE COMMITMENT TO ACCELERATE WORK ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN MADE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AT THEIR NOVEMBER 1985 SUMMIT MEETING. -- IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO RECALL THE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT WAS READ TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON FEBRUARY 5 BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, KENNETH ADELMAN. THIS MESSAGE IS A CLEAR AND AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY. ALLOW ME TO QUOTE: -" ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TASKS FACING YOU IS THE WORKING OUT OF A COMPREHENSIVE, EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THIS TASK IS MADE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT BY THE FACT THAT CAPABILITIES FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE ARE INCREASING AND THAT, CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE BEING USED IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD. YOU HAVE A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY. FOR AS YOU CONSIDER THE PROVISIONS OF A CONVENTION, YOU MUST MAKE SURE THAT A GLOBAL BAN WILL, IN FACT, ELIMINATE THE CAPABILITY FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO BE USED AGAINST FUTURE GENERATIONS. AN EFFECTIVE CONVENTION WILL REQUIRE AN UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE OF OPENNESS ON THE PART OF ALL STATES. SECRET 302 r.nnv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET - - I REAFFIRM THE COMMITMENT MADE BY THE UNITED STATES IN 1984 WHEN WE TABLED OUR DRAFT CONVENTION BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS WORLDWIDE. THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO WORK FOR THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THESE TERRIBLE WEAPONS AND FOR THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THEY NEVER AGAIN ENTER THE ARSENALS OF THE WORLD'S ARMIES." -- THIS IS, OF COURSE, THE FIRST ROUND IN WHICH I HAVE PARTICIPATED. I REGRET VERY MUCH THAT IT IS THE TRAGIC DEATH OF AMBASSADOR LOWITZ THAT HAS LED TO MY BEING HERE. I CONSIDER MY POSITION AS HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO BE A PRIVILEGE, AS WELL AS A VERY WEIGHTY AND CHALLENGING RESPONSIBILITY. -- THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS A NEW LEADER AS WELL. AMBASSADOR NAZARKINE, MY COLLEAGUES AND I WELCOME YOU AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU AND YOUR STAFF. -- AT THIS POINT, I WOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES' DELEGATION. -- MR. AMBASSADOR, BEFORE DISCUSSING SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS IN DETAIL, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION HAS NOTED WITH INTEREST THE IMPORTANT SOVIET STATEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT THIS MORNING. I WILL TOUCH ON IT ONLY BRIEFLY IN THIS STATEMENT BECAUSE THERE HAS NOT YET BEEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE IT THE VERY CAREFUL STUDY IT DESERVES. WE WILL STUDY IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND RESPOND IN A PROMPT AND SERIOUS MANNER. -- I WOULD NOW LIKE TO PRESENT VIEWS OF MY DELEGATION ON THE ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH DURING THIS ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS. THESE ISSUES ARE: ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES, DECLARATION OF THE LOCATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES AND ASSOCIATED VERIFICATION MEASURES, CHALLENGE INSPECTION, AND BILATERAL MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION. WE CAN ALSO ACCEPT THE SOVIET SUGGESTION TO DISCUSS NON-PRODUCTION. I WILL DISCUSS EACH ISSUE BRIEFLY IN TURN. -- THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES HAS BEEN THE FOCAL POINT OF THE PREVIOUS FOUR ROUNDS. AS A RESULT OF THESE INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS, THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES HAVE MOVED CLOSER TOGETHER. HOWEVER, THE INFORMAL DISCUSSION PAPER JOINTLY DEVELOPED BY THE TWO SIDES CLEARLY SHOWS THAT A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT POINTS NEED TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE A MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION IS IN HAND. FOR EXAMPLE, AGREEMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN REACHED: (1) ON WHETHER TO SPECIFY THAT CONVERSION OF SPECIALIZED SECRET 303 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDPco_ni Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET BUILDINGS WILL BE AN EXCEPTION; (2) ON THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES THAT MAY NOT BE CONDUCTED IN CONVERTED BUILDINGS; AND (3) ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION IN CONVERTED BUILDINGS. -- U.S. EXPERTS BELIEVE THAT, IN MOST CASES, IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL TO CONVERT A SPECIALIZED BUILDING THAT HAD BEEN USED FOR PRODUCTION OF SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS. COMMENTS BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION SUPPORTED THIS TECHNICAL JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET POSITION, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, CONTINUED TO BE THAT CONVERSION OF SPECIALIZED BUILDINGS SHOULD BE PERMITTED IN ALL CASES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT CONVERSION SHOULD BE ALLOWED ONLY AS AN EXCEPTION. -- RETENTION OF THE MAJORITY OF SPECIALIZED BUILDINGS, EVEN IF THEY WERE MODIFIED TO MEET PREVAILING COMMERCIAL STANDARDS, WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO RESUME CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION THAN IF THE BUILDINGS WERE DESTROYED. I HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL BRING ITS FORMAL POSITION INTO LINE WITH THE LIMITED PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR CONVERSION BY AGREEING THA, AS A GENERAL RULE, SPECIALIZED BUILDINGS WOULD BE DESTROYED AND THAT CONVERSION WOULD BE PERMITTED ONLY AS AN EXCEPTION. -- OBVIOUSLY, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF VERIFICATION REQUIRED AT A CONVERTED BUILDING HAS A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO WHAT THE CONVERTED BUILDING IS USED FOR. IN THE U.S. VIEW, USING SUCH A BUILDING FOR HANDLING SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS OR CORROSIVE CHEMICALS WOULD GIVE RISE TO SERIOUS CONCERNS. A MUCH SIMPLER AND MORE DESIRABLE APPROACH WOULD BE TO REQUIRE THAT A CONVERTED SPECIALIZED BUILDING MAY NOT BE USED FOR HANDLING SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS OR CORROSIVE CHEMICALS AND TO PLACE CORRESPONDING CONSTRAINTS ON THE TYPES OF EQUIPMENT THAT COULD BE PRESENT. -- DURING ROUND IV, THE SOVIET SIDE ASKED FOR U.S. VIEWS ON HOW A CONVERTED FACILITY SHOULD BE MONITORED. IN THE U.S. VIEW, A CONVERTED FACILITY MUST BE SUBJECT TO MONITORING INDEFINITELY IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE. A FACILITY CONVERTED TO A USE NOT INVOLVING CHEMICAL PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING WOULD NEED TO BE MONITORED BY SYSTEMATIC ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, AT A FREQUENCY TO BE DETERMINED. A FACILITY CONVERTED TO PERMITTED CHEMICAL PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING WOULD NEED TO BE MONITORED BY DATA REPORTING AND SYSTEMATIC ON-SITE VERIFICATION, WHICH MAY INCLUDE ON-SITE INSTRUMENTS IN ADDITION TO INSPECTIONS. THE FREQUENCY OF INSPECTION, AS WELL AS THE USE OF INSTRUMENTS, IS TO BE DETERMINED. STUDIES ARE UNDERWAY IN WASHINGTON TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR SUCH DETERMINATIONS. SECRET 304 ConrF - Caniti7Pd Cony Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET -- IN CONTRAST TO THE PRODUCTION FACILITIES ISSUE, THE ISSUE OF EARLY DECLARATION OF STOCKPILE LOCATIONS, WHICH INCLUDES ASSOCIATED VERIFICATION MEASURES, HAS HARDLY BEEN DEALT WITH IN THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EARLY DECLARATION OF STOCKPILE LOCATIONS AND TO THE ASSOCIATED ON-SITE VERIFICATION MEASURES. WITHOUT THESE PROVISIONS, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN THE STOCKPILE DECLARATION. -- MR. AMBASSADOR, IN YOUR PLENARY STATEMENT IN THE CD THIS MORNING, YOU PRESENTED SOVIET VIEWS ON THE STOCKPILE ISSUE WHICH SEEM TO CONTAIN MAJOR CHANGES IN THE SOVIET POSITION. OBVIOUSLY, WE WILL STUDY THIS CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT VERY CAREFULLY. I HOPE THAT DISCUSSIONS DURING THIS ROUND WILL SHOW THAT THERE ARE NO LONGER ANY IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES ON THIS IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, NUMEROUS DETAILED PROVISIONS YET TO BE DEVELOPED IN THIS AREA, AS WELL, THAT ARE ESSENTIAL FOR AN EFFECTIVE REGIME. -- A THIRD ISSUE IN THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IS CHALLENGE INSPECTION. THIS IS, OF COURSE, A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE. IT MAY WELL BE THE MOST IMPORTANT, BECAUSE AN EFFECTIVE CHALLENGE PROVISION IS ESSENTIAL FOR DEALING WITH THE POTENTIALLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS OF UNDECLARED STOCKPILES AND UNDECLARED PRODUCTION FACILITIES. -- THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED INTENSIVELY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ROUND IV. THE DISCUSSION WAS USEFUL, ALTHOUGH THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES REMAINED FAR APART. THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUED TO INSIST ON A MECHANISM TO SCREEN CHALLENGE INSPECTION REQUESTS AND ON A RIGHT OF REFUSAL AS WELL. THE U.S. SIDE, FOR REASONS WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED EXHAUSTIVELY, BELIEVES THAT SUCH FEATURES WOULD MAKE A CHALLENGE INSPECTION REGIME INEFFECTIVE. -- THE SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT IN THE CD THIS MORNING ALSO DEALT WITH THE ISSUE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION. IT APPEARS TO CONTAIN SOME INTERESTING NEW ELEMENTS, ALTHOUGH IT ALSO APPEARS THAT MAJOR DIFFERENCES CONTINUE TO EXIST. AS SOON AS WE HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY THE SOVIET STATEMENT, THE TWO SIDES COULD ALSO EXPLORE THE CHALLENGE ISSUE BILATERALLY IN GREATER DETAIL. -- NEVERTHELESS, I WOULD LIKE TODAY TO PRESENT BRIEFLY U.S. VIEWS ON POSSIBLE MISUSE OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION. -- THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ARGUED THAT A SCREENING MECHANISM AND A RIGHT OF REFUSAL ARE NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH SECRET 305 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-ni isRpnnni rv-vv-, A A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET POSSIBLE MISUSE OF THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION. THE UNITED STATES CERTAINLY RECOGNIZES THE RISK OF MISUSE. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE REMEDIES PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE POSE A SERIOUS RISK OF MISUSE AS WELL. A RIGHT OF REFUSAL, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD EASILY BE USED TO BLOCK LEGITIMATE REQUESTS FOR INSPECTIONS. ADOPTING THE APPROACH ADVOCATED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD ONLY SUBSTITUTE ONE PROBLEM FOR ANOTHER. -- BOTH SIDES ACKNOWLEDGE, I BELIEVE, THE POWERFUL DETERRENT INHERENT IN THE POSSIBILITY OF RECIPROCAL CHALLENGE INSPECTION REQUESTS. A PARTY WILL BE VERY CAREFUL IN MAKING A REQUEST IF IT KNOWS THAT IT MAY PROVOKE A REQUEST IN RETURN. HOWEVER, CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED THAT IF A STATE HAS LITTLE TO LOSE, IT WILL NOT BE DETERRED FROM MISUSING THE CHALLENGE PROVISION. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH WAS DESIGNED WITH THIS RISK IN MIND. CHALLENGE REQUESTS WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, NOT BE MADE FREQUENTLY. REQUESTS FROM STATES NOT ON THE FACT- FINDING PANEL WOULD BE SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY A MEMBER OF THE PANEL. INSPECTIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED UNDER PROCEDURES AGREED IN ADVANCE AND DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE INTRUSION INTO MATTERS NOT RELEVANT TO RESOLVING THE CONCERN THAT PROMPTED THE INSPECTION REQUEST. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THE REACTION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THESE SAFEGUARDS. WE ARE CERTAINLY PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY SOVIET SUGGESTIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF PREVENTING ABUSE OF THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION SO LONG AS SUCH ALTERNATIVE MEANS PRESERVE THE SAME HIGH STANDARD OF EFFECTIVENESS. -- MR. AMBASSADOR, THE UNITED STATES ALSO ATTACHES CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO ITS 1984 PROPOSALS FOR BILATERAL EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION OF DATA BEFORE SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION. WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE APPARENT RELUCTTNCE OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO PROVIDE IN CONFIDENCE THE KINDS OF INFORMATION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY MADE PUBLIC IN THE CD ON JULY 10, 1986. IT SEEMS STRANGE, AS WELL AS TROUBLING TO US, THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT EVEN ADMITTED OFFICIALLY THAT IT POSSESSES THE KIND OF WEAPONS THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS. -- THE U.S. DELEGATION CONTINUES TO SEEK OPENNESS ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM. WE ARE STILL AWAITING A CONSTRUCTIVE AND DETAILED SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE 1984 PROPOSALS I MENTIONED. I HOPE THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE WILL COME DURING THIS ROUND. THE LACK OF A RESPONSE CAN ONLY PROLONG THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. -- DURING THIS ROUND, THE TWO SIDES ALSO NEED TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO CONVERT THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE SECRET 306 rnnv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET ON BILATERAL INSPECTION REPRESENTATIVES INTO DETAILED MEASURES. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE CAN AGREE THAT THESE REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE OBSERVERS RATHER THAN MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM. IN ROUND III, THE SOVIET SIDE SEEMED TO FAVOR THE OBSERVER APPROACH, BUT, IN ROUND IV, IT SEEMED TO BACK AWAY FROM THIS APPROACH. -- BEFORE CONCLUDING, I WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH BRIEFLY ON THE SUBJECT OF NON-PRODUCTION, WHICH WAS RAISED BY SOVIET EXPERTS AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE ROUND. THE U.S. SIDE IS, OF COURSE, LOOKING FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE CLARIFICATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS IT REQUESTED DURING ROUND IV. SINCE THEN, AN ADDITIONAL POINT HAS ARISEN THAT NEEDS CLARIFICATION. AS THE SOVIET SIDE IS AWARE, THE U.S. POSITION IS THAT INSPECTIONS OF APPLICABLE COMMERCIAL FACILITIES SHOULD BE UNPREDICTABLE IN THEIR TIMING. OUR STRONG IMPRESSION FROM THE INTERSESSIONAL DISCUSSIONS IS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SUPPORTS THIS APPROACH AS WELL. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IN PREVENTING POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING IF THE SOVIET POSITIONS WERE CLEARLY STATED. -- MR. AMBASSADOR, THESE ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES THAT EXIST AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE ARE OTHER ISSUES WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED IN DUE COURSE. BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL NOW TO FOCUS ON THOSE PROVISIONS WHICH ARE KEY TO AN EFFECTIVE BAN AND ARE MAJOR OBSTACLES IN THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. IN FULFILLING THE COMMITMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO PRESENT ITS VIEWS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THE VIEWS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND TO A JOINT EFFORT TO SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. END TEXT. 4. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK ADMIN END OF MESSAGE SECRET SECRET 307 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDID97-ni1RRpnnnit Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET STATE GENEVA TEL 001803 87 SECRET GENEVA 01803 EXDIS SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, FEB 16, 1987 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-004. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY -- -- FIRST MEETING OF ROUND V WAS HELD AT EXPERTS LEVEL ON FEBRUARY 16. -- TOPICS DISCUSSED WERE: (1) SCHEDULE FOR ROUND V BILATS; (2) AGENDA AND ORDER OF TOPICS; (3) AN INVENTORY OF UNRESOLVED OPICS. U.S. DEL REBUFFED SOVIET DEL SUGGESTION THAT RECENT SWEDISH NON-PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. END SUMMARY. 3. URPOSE AND SCOPE -- -- THIS INITIAL MEETING OF THE ROUND V BILATS WAS LIMITED TO DISCUSSIONS OF AGENDA, SCHEDULE, LISTING OF UNRESOLVED TOPICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS RELEVANT TO FURTHER MEETINGS. SOVIET DEL PROVIDED A LIST OF TEN DELEGATES HEADED BY AMB. YOURI K. NAZARKINE. NEW NAMES ON DEL LIST ARE ANDREY E. GRANOVSKY (MFA) AND VITALI M. GANJA (MOD). THE SIDES AGREED TO START FORMAL DISCUSSIONS AT A FEBRUARY 1 PLENARY MEETING. 4. SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS FOR ROUND V -- -- SOVIET DEL PROPOSED A HIGHLY STRUCTURED SCHEDULE OF 14 MORE MEETINGS WITH FIVE MEETINGS PER WEEK FOR THREE WEEKS. THEY PROPOSED A SEQUENCE OF TWO EXPERTS MEETINGS ON A SPECIFIC TOPIC FOLLOWED BY AN AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL MEETING AT WHICH EXPERTS MIGHT BE PRESENT. THE FORMAL SESSION WOULD OPEN (FEB 17) A D CLOSE (MAR 6) WITH PLENARY MEETINGS. -- U.S. DEL PRESENTED A SCHEDULE OF EIGHT MEETINGS COMPOSED OF THREE PLENARY MEETINGS AND FIVE EXPERTS MEETINGS BETWEEN FEB 17 AND MAR 5. U.S. DEL CRITICIZED SOVIET SCHEDULE AS NOT ALLOWING SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE PREPARATIONS BETWEEN MEETINGS NEEDED TO MAKE DISCUSSIONS PRODUCTIVE. SECRET 398 - cnniti7pri r.npv Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET -- AGREEMENT ON THE SCHEDULE WAS DEFERRED UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF AMB. HANSEN ON FEB 17. 5. AGENDA AND ORDER OF TOPICS FOR ROUND V BILATS -- SOVIET DEL PROPOSED FOUR TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION: (1) CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES; (2) BILATERAL MEASURES; (3) CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS; AND (4) OTHER QUESTIONS (TO INCLUDE NON-PRODUCTION). -- U.S. DEL INSISTED, AND SOVIETS AGREED, THAT DECLARATION AND VERIFICATION OF STOCKPILE LOCATIONS BE ADDED. -- AGREEMENT ON SEQUENCE OF TOPICS WAS DEFERRED UNTIL THE FEB 17 ARRIVAL OF AMB. HANSEN. 6. INVENTORY OF UNRESOLVED TOPICS -- -- U.S. AND SOVIET DELS VERBALLY INVENTORIED UNRESOLVED TOPICS. U.S. INVENTORY WAS BASED ON JANUARY 14 PAPER "CW: PRINCIPAL OUTSTANDING TREATY ISSUES (U)" (CIRCULATED IN WASHINGTON TO CW IG MEMBERS). -- SOVIET DEL ACCEPTED A L U.S. TOPICS AND ADDED A FEW. -- IN DISCUSSING THE TOPIC OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION AS AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE, SOVIET DEL PROPOSED THAT SWEDISH PON-PAPER "SOME PRINCIPLES AND ELEMENTS TO GUIDE A SYSTEM OF AD HOC ON-SITE INSPECTION IN A CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS" BECOME THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS. U.S. DEL RESPONDED THAT SINCE THE DOCUMENT WAS STILL CHANGING AND NOT PUT IN FINAL FORM BY AMB. EKEUS, IT WAS NOT USEFUL TO DISCUSS IT BILATERALLY (SWEDISH PAPER DATAFAXED TO WASHINGTON FEB 12). &7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK ADMIN END OF MESSAGE SECRET SECRET 309 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-011RRPnnni nn rw-v-v-I4 A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 STATE GENEVA SECRET GENEVA 01871 EXDIS SECRET TEL 001871 87 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR BODY TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS; FEBRUARY 17, 1987, AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN'S STATEMENT 1. THIS IS CW BILAT -005. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE PREPARED STATEMENT DELIVERED BY USSR CD REPRESENTATIVE YURI NAZARKIN AT THE FEBRUARY 17 PLENARY MEETING OF THE FIFTH ROUND OF U.S.-SOVIET INTENSIFIED CW BAN DISCUSSIONS. THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED IS BEING REPORTED BY SEPTEL. 3. BEGIN TEXT: MR. AMBASSADOR, -- THE FIFTH ROUND OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STARTS TODAY. IT WILL BE TAKING PLACE IN A QUALITATIVELY NEW SITUATION GENERATED IN THE MULTILATERAL TALKS ON THE CONVENTION ON A COMPREHENSIVE AND COMPLETE BAN OF THESE WEAPONS. -- IN THE COURSE OF THE PRECEDING ROUNDS OF BILATERAL TALKS, EXTENSIVE WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES. SOME RESULTS OF THIS WORK HAVE ALREADY BECOME THE PROPERTY OF THE MULTILATERAL TALKS, CONTRIBUTING TO AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF PROVISIONS OF THE FUTURE CONVENTION. WE HOPE THAT FOLLOWING THE CURRENT ROUND, THE USSR AND THE U.S. WILL BE ABLE TO AUGMENT THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACTIVIZATION OF THE TALKS ON THE CONVENTION. -- DURING THE PERIOD THAT ELAPSED SINCE THE LAST ROUND OF SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS, THE SOVIET UNION CARRIED OUT AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN BOTH THE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL TALKS OF ITS POSITIONS ON UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND THE APPROACHES OF OTHER STATES TO THEM. WE HAVE, OF COURSE, PAID PROPER ATTENTION TO THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND TO THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. -- TODAY, AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, THE USSR DELEGATION PRESENTED SOME _ SECRET 310 A nThrmed for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 - c7r*- ? 0;0000.... Departi?lent of StaFI PAGE 11 OF 12 GENEVA 01172 DO OF N 2113432 032 $503113 PAGE III GENEVA 11372 II OF I14 2113432 032 ? I,* ? TO DESTROY ALL CN STOVES, RATNEAar ?. 1'1110 TO DIVERT OVAL-mint( CNEMICALS FOP- _________?? . ---? -COMICIAL INDUSTRIAL USE. ? C.s= AGREEMENT THAT CONVERSION OF CV PRODUCTION.. ClUllOINGS WOULD BE PERMITTED ONLY AS AN EXCEPTION. ? ? 1.1 _ 7-::-?? INFO ACOA-Ill /11.1 Al CAR _ . ACT ION SS-Il ? ?????????? ? 4r. INFO LOG-11 COPY-01 ADS-11 SS0-111 /111 V 0 2112422 FEB 17 X iN MISSION GENEVA ? 10 SECSTATE VaSNDC IMMEDIATE Sill INTO DOC WASNOC JCS Nance SECDEF VASNOC AIC MASS? BONN AMEMBASSY LONDON ARERIASSY MOSCOW ? ANEMASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY VIENNA E? 00E1 mut Ritmo HUH SS ION USNA10 SECRET GENEVA 11172 ? E7DIS ACOA FOR MA; 00C FOR OP/ISA; JCS FOR 33/0 SUM FOR 050/ISP; VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE ? E. O. 12356: OEM: OAOR TAGS; Pall, NW., COG, UR, US sus.tEct, CONFERENCE ON DISARMANENT -0.1. USSR.- ? E$4 BILATERAL DENICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, PLENARY MEETING, ;: 7 X..?FEIRUARY. 17, 15117 REFS: Al GENEVA 111714 IlLAT-11131 II STATE 144171 ????????? ! , -,111TFU ? ts GC, MA/ PA, VI , SP, D/GAC D/ I1 S/ART A7CS JO.'-'41G1EENENT TO POT INCAPACIIANTS IN 'CATEGORY" CHEMICALS TO BE SAANC01. ?-?????? "ALSO; THEY WILL NOT INSIST ON INCLUSION OF CATEGORY I Of IRRITANTS CS, CM AS LONG AS A SPECIAL ? REGIME IS DEVISED FOR THEM. MA/ I SP WC S. X 1. TN1S IS Cu BILAT-116., ISECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY AT FEBRUARY 17 OPENING PLENARY MEETING OF - FIFTH BILATERAL CV ROUND, SOVIET DEL HEAD NAIARKINE REVIEWED SEVERAL AREAS OF SOVIET MOVEMENT IN CV NEGOTIATIONS AND CALLED ION U.S. TO CHANGE ITS 1314 POSITION AND OVIONSTRATE FLEXIBILITY BY MAKING CONCESSIONS. O.S. DEL MEAD NANSEN REVIEWED U.S. POSITIONS IN KEY AREAS MIMI REWIRE BILATENAL DISCUSSION. NE CHASTIZED THE SOVIETS FON TIEI1 ATTEMPT TO GET TII: th:. TO MAKE CONCESSION: IN ITS 1334 PROPOSAL. C0/311 DID NOT REPRESENT A nuINALIST PROPOSAL; RATHER IT WAS AND IS SEEN AS A WAY OF ENSURING THAT U.S.. ? SECURITY INTERESTS WERE PROTECTED. ENO SUMMARY. S. SOVIET STATEMENT ? ? SOVIET DEL HEAD L0BASSADOR NAEARKINE1 DEL I VERED & PREPARED STATEMENT (SEPTEL) IN WICK NE REITERATED THE SOVIET 'PROPOSALS' MADE IN THE CD PLENARY EARLIER IN THE DAY (TEXT OF SOVIET CD STATEMENT DATAFAXED TO ACDAI AND NOTED ADDITIONAL POINTS OF FLEXIBILITY. NE OFFERED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS U.S. DEL HAD ON THEN. IN PARTICULAR, NAZARKINE CITED TIE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN THE SOVIET POSITION TO MEET U.S. CONCERNS: A. EARLY DECLARATION OF LOCATIONS OF CV STOCKS AND SUBSEQUENT VERIFICATION. ALERT COPY sow I ET READINESS TO ADD MORE CHEMICALS to CHTErmeT F. F. NA1ARKINE HOPED INA1 WORK ON THE JOINT PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES COULD BE COMPLETED, AS WELL AT ONE ON INC ISSUE OF PAVING A RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS WEN INSPECTIONS OCCUR ON EACN?OTHERS TERRITORY. ADDITIONALLY, HE HOPED THAT THE BILATERAL T.01131111 AT INC ARRANGEMENTS PAPER COULD BE FINISHED DURING THIS ROUND. 1.. HE SAID THAT TIE USSR WOULD NOT OBJECT .1.`?., ? TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL THAT THE DEFINITION OF A CV PRODUCTION FACILITY INCLUDE ANY FACILITY FOR PRODUCTION or SINGLE-PURPOSE CHEMICALS 4.? THAT ME NOT IN THE SUPER-TOXIC LEINA). CATEGORY. R. HE NOTED THAT THE USSR IS PREPARED TO EXCHANGE IDEAS ON ALL ISSUES UNDER NEGOTIATION INCLUDING CHALLENGE INSPECTION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE TWO DEES SHOULD - EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE RECENT SWEDISH CHALLENGE. INSPECTION NON-PAPER ' HE CONCLUDED By NOTING THAI THE SOVIET UNION- PAD PRESENTED A 'WNW OF COMPROMISE PROPOSALS ' aND THAT THEY EXPECTED THE SAME FROr. THE U.S. - a 4. U.S. STATEMENT -- k. IN HIS STATEMENT CRET a.), U.S. DEL HEAD IsaisASSADOR HANSEN) ovoTED THE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN INC WAS READ BY AT.DA DIRECTOR AOELMAN ik THE FEBRUARY L CD PLENARY. THIS MESSAGE REAFFIRMED THE U.S. 1311 COmmlImENT FOR A WORLD-WIDE CD IAN AND FOR VERIFICATION PROVISIONS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD NEVER AGAIN RE STOCKPILED. 11. OMEN SET FORTH THE FOLLOWING AS THE ISSUES THAT THE U.S. WISHED TO ADDRESS: II) ELIMINATION OF CV PRODUCTION FAOILITIES, 12) DECLARATION OF THE LOCATIONS OF CV STOCKPILES ANO ASSOCIATED VERIFICATION MEASURES, (3) CHALLENGE INSECT tow, AND 141 BILATERAL MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE - PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION. C. DRAWING ow GUIDANCE 1REF II HANSEN STATED THAT, VITN RESPECT To THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE WERE I CV FACILITY WAS PERMITTED TO BE CONVERTED TO CIVIL USE, THE CONVERTED FACILITY MUST BE SUBJECTED 10 MONITORING INDEFINITELY. A FACILITY CONVERTED TO USE NOT INVOLVING CHEMICAL PRODUCTION WOULD NEED TO BE MONITORED SECRET 313A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-ni1RRPnnni nni rv-v-v-14 ? _I"! ? ? ? A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 ^ .4 , ?? PAGE 12 14 12 GENEVA 11172 SI Of SA 2117432 ^ Iv SYSTEMATIC ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, AT A FREQUENCY TO 1E DETERMINED. IN A001TioN, A FACILITY CONVERTED TO PERMITTED CHEMICAL PRODUCTioN vOMO ALSO BE SUBJECT TO THE ABOVE rum IT MUST HE MONITORED NV DATA REPORTING AND RAISE 1Y ON-SITE INSTRUMENTS. ? Department-of State D. NANSEN ACKNOWLEDGED INC RECENT STATED SOVIET SHIFT IN POSITION ON CV STOCKPILE DECLARATIONS AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE INC U.S. ATTACHES TO EARLY DECLARATION or STOCKPILE MATIONS AND TO ASSOCIATED VERIFICATION MEASURES. ,E. ON THE CNAILENGE INSPECTION, MANSEN STATED THAT SOVIET INSISTANCE ON A MECHANISM TO SCREEN 1(go(sYS AND ON A RIGHT Or REFUSAL WOULD MAKE A CHALLEHGE INSPECTION REGIME INEFrECTIVE. NE SAID THAT THE U.S. WA: PREPARED TO CONSIDER SOVIET SUGGESTIONS roe ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF PREVENTING ABUSE Of THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION AS LONG AS SUCH ALTERNATIVES PRESERVED INE sAmE NIGH STANDARD OF EFFECTIVENESS. NAHUM SAID THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS THE SWEDISH Nom-PAPER AS THE SOVIETS SUGGESTED. a I. NANSEN SAID TIE U.S. DELEGATION CONTINUED TO SEEK OPENNESS ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM. LACK or RESPONSE TO U.S. PROPOSALS FOR ADVANCE BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE WOULD ONLY PROLONG THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A CU BAR. S. PLENARY DISCUSSION -- A. NAZARKINE EMPHASIZED TNAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD PRESENTED nal PROPOSALS AND IDEAS TO MEET U.Z. CONCERNS, RUT ON TIE OTHER NAND, IN ITS STA7EMENT, THE U.S. SIDE NAD CONFIRMED ITS 1384 POSI7104 AND REPEATED U.S. CRITIC!SM Or s0vir7 PssiTioNc. NE URGED THE I.E. Sim TO SNOW FLEXIBILITY TO SEEK A SOLUTION TC THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THUS MAKE MUTUAL CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT. INCOMING 1132 SS091.1 PAGE II GENEVA 111172 SO OF S4 2119435 1632 FOR TIE U.S. TO HE NONE FLEXIBLE AND PROVIDE coNcEssIoNs. I. NAIARKiNE REVIEWED THE CHANGING [NARA:TER OF THE CV NEGOTIATIONS SINCE 1976. NE STATED THAT IT APPEAREC TO NMI NOV THAT THE NEGOTIATION: NAD ENTERED A NEW STAGE IN WHICH THE POSITION: ARE UNDERSTOOD AND NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MULTILATERAL . ARENA ARE MOVING WELL. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD CHANGE. NE RECOMMENDED THAT DURING THE CURRENT ROUND, UNION NE TERMED A THREE-WEEK 'MARATHON, THE TWO - DELEGATIONS :Homo ADDRESS ONE ISSUE AFTER ANOTHER, RELYING ON DISMISSION RATHER THAN ON PREPARED STATEMENTS. C. NAZARKINE AGAIN PUSHED FOR DISCUSSION OF ME SWEDISH NON-PAPER ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND NOTED TRE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS WILLING TO REFER THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE TO MOSCOW. D. FINALLY, NAZARKINE ALSO PUSHED FOR JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF A PAPER ON THE RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS DURING INSPECTIONS ON EAU OTHERS SOIL. ? E. NANSEN FORCEFULLY COUNTERED THE SOVIET CALL ALERT COPY -- NE NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD STOPPED CW PRODUCTION IN ISIS. TIE SOVIETS HAD NOT STOPPED PRODUCTION, BUT SAS PRODUCED THE voRLD'S. e.AARGEST STOCKPILE. HE REMAINED THAT THE SOVIETS GNAT STARTED TO SNOV INTEREST IN MOVING FORWARD ON A CV BAN LAST YEAR. ? ^ NANSEN STATED THAT THE U.S. 1914 POSITION 1C31/311114 WAS NOT A "NAXIMALIST POSITION, BUT ONE WORKED OUT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY TO ENSURE TIE ELIMINNTION Of cu. THE IDEAS AND CONCEPT: IN C0/91/1 WERE NOT PUT ON A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT BASIS RUT, HE REMINDED, TNEY REFLECT CONDITIONS UNION ARE SEEN AS VITAL TO PROTECT U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS. ? NANSEN CONTINUED BY STATING THAT THE U.S. WAS IN GENEVA TO WORK OUT A BASIC CONVENTION THAT WOULD MAKE CV A THING OF THE Pat AND WAS NOT IN A'TURKISN RUG BAZAAR TO IARTER PRICE. .. NE NOTED TIE DISTRUST BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND STATED THAT MISTRUST GROWS WHEN THE SOVIETS WILL NOT EVEN ACKNOWLEDGE CV P055655 ION. F. IN RESPONDING TO NAZARKINE"S SUGGESTION FOR A "NARATNON.LIKE" APPROACH DURING THIS BILATERAL ROUND, NANSEN SAID THAT INTENSITY IS NOT A MATTER Or TM, roc WE HAD ALREADY BEEN NEGOTIATING FOR OVER TEN YEARS. INTENSITY. RESULTS FRON ADDRESSING THE SUBSTANCE SERIOUSLY. NANSEN RECOMMENDED THAT THIS WORK PROCEED ON THE BASIS or THREE EXPERTS MEETINGS PER WEEK WITH ADDITIONAL MEETINGS OF AMBASSADORS AS REQUIRED. THIS WOULD ALLOW FOR PREPARATION, EVALUATION AND CONSULTATION WITH WASHINGTON. G. NAZARKINE ACCEPTED HANSEN'S PROPOSAL. AGREEMENT WAS ALSO REACHED ON AGENDA Topics FOR ROUND V: III CU PRODUCTION FACILITIES; CD BILATERAL MEASURES; 01 CW STOCKPILE DECLARATIONS AND VERIFICATION; MI CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS; AND CO CV NON.PRODUCTION, 6. CDPIMENt: LACK OF SOVIET REFERENCE TO ' 1614 U.S. PROPOSALS FOR BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND FOR NTN-RELATED PROVISIONS WAS NOTABLE. END GWENT. . -2, MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK SECRET 3138 SS0,161 in Part - Sanitized Com Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET STATE GENEVA TEL 001967 87 SECRET GENEVA 01967 EXDIS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR BODY TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, SOVIET DRAFT TEXT ON RECIPROCAL PARTICIPATION OF USSR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS 1. THIS IS CW BILAT -007. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE SOVIET TEXT FOR RECIPROCAL PARTICIPATION OF SOVIET AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ON EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY. THIS TEXT WAS PROVIDED TO THE U.S. DEL DURING A CW EXPERTS BILAT MEETING ON FEBRUARY 20, 1987. THIS PAPER WILL BE FURTHER DISCUSSED DURING AN EXPERTS MEETING SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 27. DISCUSSIONS OF FEB 20 ARE REPORTED SEPTEL. 3. BEGIN TEXT: (TITLE) RECIPROCAL PARTICIPATION OF USSR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES, IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ON THE RESPECTIVE U.S. AND USSR TERRITORIES STIPULATED BY THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (INFORMAL WORKING DOCUMENT) -- GUIDED BY THEIR DESIRE TO ENHANCE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND STRENGTHEN ASSURANCE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AIMS AND PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE USSR AND THE U.S. AGREE TO ASSURE PARTICIPATION OF USSR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES, ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY, IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ON THE RESPECTIVE U.S. AND USSR TERRITORIES WHICH WILL BE SPECIFIED BY THE CONVENTION. THE SIDES SHALL PROCEED FROM THE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS IN ARTICLE IX OF THE CONVENTION. -- THE EXISTENCE OF THIS UNDERSTANDING AND ITS USE SHOULD NOT AFFECT THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. AS THOSE OF STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION. -- EACH SIDE MAY UTILIZE THIS UNDERSTANDING WITH RESPECT TO ANY INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE SECRET 314 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168Rnnn1nn1nnnn1_A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET INSPECTIONS -- BOTH ROUTINE AND CHALLENGE -- ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE WITH THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION. -- THE SIDES WILL ASSIGN THEIR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS AND WILL EXCHANGE LISTS OF SUCH REPRESENTATIVES NOT LATER THAN DAYS AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION. THE LISTS ARE SUBJECT TO UPDATING AS NEEDED. THE SIDES SHALL UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO ASSIST THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING. -- THE SIDES WILL UTILIZE THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM TO ASSIST IN THE CONSIDERATION OF ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE RECIPROCAL PARTICIPATION OF USSR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ON THE RESPECTIVE USSR AND U.S. TERRITORIES. -- THE SIDE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION IS TO TAKE PLACE SHALL, WITHOUT DELAY, INFORM THE OTHER SIDE OF IT. HAVING RECEIVED SUCH INFORMATION, THE OTHER SIDE MAY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS RIGHT TO REQUEST THE PARTICIPATION OF ITS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THIS INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION. IN THIS CASE, THE SIDE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE INSPECTION IS TO TAKE PLACE WILL SATISFY THE REQUEST. -- THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES SHALL ACCOMPANY THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM IN THE CAPACITY OF AN OBSERVER AND SHALL ENJOY THE SAME PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES AS THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM. HE WILL, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE THE POSSIBILITY TO CARRY OUT HIS ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE ASSIGNMENTS FACING THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM, PARTICIPATE IN ALL ENDEAVORS CARRIED OUT BY THE INSPECTION TEAM. HE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT OF THE INSPECTION TO THE RECEIVING SIDE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM'S EXECUTION OF ITS ACTIVITIES, WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THIS TEAM AND THE RECEIVING SIDE, AND WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN WRITING THE TEAM'S REPORTS TO THE BODIES OF THE CONVENTION. -- THE SIDE WHICH SENT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SHALL COMMUNICATE TO THE OTHER SIDE, USING THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM, THE BASIC CONCLUSIONS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON SECRET 315 n-r+ - c.niti7pri nnnv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET THE RESULTS OF HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN DAYS AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE INSPECTION. END TEXT. 4. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK ADMIN END OF MESSAGE SECRET SECRET 316 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R0001001 nnnni-et Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 STATE GENEVA SECRET GENEVA 01968 EXDIS SECRET TEL 001968 87 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR BODY TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, EXPERTS MEETING, FEBRUARY 19, 1987 REF: STATE 44071 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-008 . (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- FEBRUARY 19 EXPERTS LEVEL MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF JOINT U.S.-SOVIET PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. SOVIET SIDE APPEARED EAGER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THIS PAPER. THEY QUICKLY AGREED TO ACCEPT U.S. POSITION THAT SPECIALIZED CW BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT MAY BE CONVERTED ONLY AS AN EXCEPTION, BUT SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO STUDY OTHER CHANGES WHICH DEL PROPOSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDANCE (REFTEL). PAPER WILL BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AT FEBRUARY 23 MEETING. END SUMMARY. 3. AT FEBRUARY 19 MEETING U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS REVIEWED JOINT U.S.-SOVIET PAPER ON DEFINITION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY AND ASSOCIATED ELIMINATION AND VERIFICATION MEASURES. SOVIET SIDE EMPHASIZED THAT IT WISHED TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM "PRAGMATICALLY," TAKING ACCOUNT OF U.S. VIEWS. SOVIET SIDE QUICKLY ACCEPTED EARLIER U.S. PROPOSAL THAT CONVERSION OF EQUIPMENT AND BUILDINGS BE ALLOWED ONLY AS AN EXCEPTION, REFLECTING CHANGE IN POSITION ANNOUNCED AT FEBRUARY 18 CD PLENARY. HOWEVER, THEY SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO STUDY LANGUAGE CHANGES PROPOSED BY U.S. SIDE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ROUND V GUIDANCE (REFTEL). 4. SOVIETS ASKED WHETHER U.S. STILL OPPOSES SOVIET POSITION THAT CONVERTED SITES BE USED ONLY FOR NON-MILITARY PEACEFUL PURPOSES. IN THEIR VIEW, WHILE INSPECTION OF SUCH FACILITIES WOULD BE ONE SAFEGUARD AGAINST RECONVERSION, LIMITING THE ACTIVITY IN THE CONVERTED FACILITY TO NON-MILITARY PURPOSES SECRET 317 flni-laccifiPri in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET WOULD BE STILL ANOTHER. U.S. REPS POINTED OUT THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD IMPOSE SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS ON CONVERSION OF U.S. FACILITIES, WHICH ARE MOSTLY ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. PER GUIDANCE, DEL SAID ISSUE WAS CURRENTLY UNDER STUDY IN WASHINGTON. 5. WITH REGARD TO EQUIPMENT FOR PRODUCING CHEMICAL MUNITION PARTS, SOVIETS ASKED FOR EXPLANATION OF U.S. PROPOSAL FOR DESTRUCTION OF NON-STANDARD EQUIPMENT. SOVIET SIDE REQUESTED THAT U.S. DEL PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DESTROYED. SINCE MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT USED FOR PRODUCING CW MUNITIONS IS COMMON TO CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS PRODUCTION, THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT A SPECIAL DESTRUCTION PROVISION MIGHT INVITE A CHALLENGE INSPECTION THAT COULD CREATE MORE DOUBTS THAN IT WOULD SOLVE. U.S. REPS SAID PROVISION WAS NEEDED TO PREVENT RETENTION OF SPECIAL FORMS AND DIES THAT WERE USED ONLY FOR CW PRODUCTION. 6. DELS AGREED ADDITIONAL WORK IS REQUIRED BY EXPERTS TO SOLVE REMAINING DIFFERENCES. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF THE JOINT PAPER DURING EXPERTS MEETING ON FEBRUARY 23. SOVIETS APPEAR TO WANT A FINAL AGREED PAPER BY THE END OF THIS ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS. 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK ADMIN END OF MESSAGE SECRET SECRET 318 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168Rnnn1nn1nnnn1_A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 STATE GENEVA SECRET GENEVA 02221 EXDIS SECRET TEL 002221 87 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR BODY TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, EXPERTS MEETING, FEBRUARY 20, 1987 REFS: (A) GENEVA 1976 (CW BILAT-000) - (B) 86 STATE 339047 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-009. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY -- -- AT MEETING OF EXPERTS ON FEBRUARY 20, SOVIET DEL PROVIDED AND EXPLAINED A PAPER WHICH FLESHED OUT THE PREVIOUSLY AGREED PRINCIPLE THAT EACH SIDE WOULD PARTICIPATE IN INSPECTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE. THE SOVIETS ALSO PROPOSED THAT PERMANENT POSITIONS FOR THE U.S. AND USSR ON THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE BE THE SUBJECT OF A CONFIDENTIAL "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT." U.S. DEL PRESSED SOVIETS ON U.S. 1984 PROPOSAL FOR EARLY, PRIVATE BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA. FOR THE FIRST TIME SOVIETS ENTERED INTO EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, BUT DID NOT MOVE AT ALL TOWARD U.S. POSITION. END SUMMARY. 3. TOPICS -- -- THE THIRD EXPERTS MEETING OF ROUND V BILATS, HELD FEBRUARY 20, WAS DEVOTED TO A DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS, SPECIFICALLY, U.S./USSR OBSERVERS FOR INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE AND EARLY, PRIVATE BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE. 4. U.S./USSR OBSERVERS FOR INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS -- -- SOVIET DEL PRESENTED A PAPER ON "RECIPROCAL PARTICIPATION OF USSR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES, IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ON THE RESPECTIVE U.S. AND USSR TERRITORIES STIPULATED BY THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS" (REF A). THE PAPER, WHILE GENERALLY IN LINE WITH U.S. VIEWS (REF B), CONTAINS UNACCEPTABLE REFERENCE TO INSPECTIONS ON "USSR TERRITORIES" RATHER THAN BROAD FORMULA NECESSARY TO COVER ALL SOVIET BASES SECRET 319 17:0,r1. - Canifi7Pri r.onv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET REGARDLESS OF LOCATION. THE PAPER PROVIDES FOR THE EXCHANGE OF LISTS OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PERTAINING TO FORTHCOMING INSPECTIONS, "OBSERVER" STATUS FOR U.S./USSR REPRESENTATIVES, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES AND THE COMMUNICATION OF COMMENTS TO THE INSPECTED STATE. -- U.S. DEL WELCOMED SOVIET PAPER AND SAID IT WOULD RESPOND AFTER GIVING PAPER CAREFUL STUDY. -- U.S. DEL QUESTIONED SOVIETS AS TO THE REPORTING CHAIN OF U.S./USSR OBSERVERS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAMS. SOVIETS ENVISION OBSERVER REPORTS GOING BACK TO THE OBSERVER'S GOVERNMENT. OBSERVER'S GOVERNMENT WOULD THEN FORWARD ITS COMMENTS TO INSPECTED STATE. 5. CONFIDENTIAL AGREEMENT ON STAFFING INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE -- - SOV DEL PROPOSED A "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT" WHEREBY U.S. AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS WOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT AN AMERICAN HEADED THE SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE RESPONSIBLE FOR INSPECTIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT A SOVIET HEADED THE SECTION RESPONSIBLE FOR INSPECTIONS IN THE U.S. SOVIET RATIONALE FOR THIS WAS INCREASED CONFIDENCE IN EACH SIDE'S KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITIES/EVENTS IN THE OTHER COUNTRY. THEY CITED AS PRECEDENT UN POSITIONS WHICH ARE TRADITIONALLY HELD BY THE SAME COUNTRY. THEY SAID THERE MAY ALSO BE A SIMILAR IAEA ARRANGEMENT. THE SOVIETS EMPHASIZED THIS WAS A CONFIDENTIAL PROPOSAL. U.S. DEL QUESTIONED SOVIETS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR MULTILATERAL ACCUSATIONS OF U.S./USSR MONOPOLY OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE. SOVIET DEL POINTED OUT THAT THE INSPECTION TEAMS IN THE U.S. OR USSR WOULD CONTAIN INSPECTORS FROM A VARIETY OF COUNTRIES. U.S. DEL AGREED TO REFER THE MATTER TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSIDERATION. 6. EARLY, PRIVATE, BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE -- -- U.S. DEL PRESSED SOVIETS HARD AND AT LENGTH ON THE NEED FOR PRIVATE BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF CONVENTION. -- SOVIET DEL RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHES TO THIS MEASURE, BUT THEY REMAINED UNCONVINCED OF ITS NECESSITY PRIOR TO SIGNATURE. HOWEVER, RATHER THAN REJECTING THE CONCEPT OUT SECRET 320 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP97-n1iRApnnni Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET OF HAND AS IN THE PAST, SOVIETS TOOK A "PERSUADE ME" ATTITUDE WHEN DISCUSSING THE TOPIC. THEY RAISED HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE CONVENTION MIGHT NOT BE SIGNED OR RATIFIED EVEN AFTER THE EARLY EXCHANGE. THEY ALSO ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE ACCURACY OF THE DATA PROVIDED WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER SIDE. FINALLY, THEY CITED EXAMPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH DATA EXCHANGE HAD NOT LED TO AN AGREEMENT (MBFR) OR TO U.S. RATIFICATION (SALT II, TTBT AND PNET. -- U.S. DEL COUNTERED THAT EARLY DATA EXCHANGE WAS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE WHICH COULD HELP GIVE BOTH SIDES CONFIDENCE THEY NEED TO HAVE BEFORE SIGNING THE CONVENTION. THE DATA EXCHANGE WOULD PROCEED IN TWO STAGES, FROM GENERAL TO SPECIFIC, ALLOWING BOTH SIDES TO ASSESS ITS VALIDITY AND WORK OUT PROBLEMS BEFORE A CONVENTION WAS SIGNED. THIS WOULD ALSO ALLOW AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE SOME OF THE PROPOSED VERIFICATION MEASURES. U.S. DEL POINTED OUT EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGES AND REJECTED INSINUATION THAT THE U.S. MIGHT TRY TO TAKE SOVIET DATA WITH NO INTENTION OF SIGNING OR RATIFYING THE CONVENTION. -- U.S. DEL POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. HAD PUBLICLY PROVIDED IN JULY 1986 THE KIND OF DATA BEING DISCUSSED, AND NOW ASKED THE SOVIETS TO PROVIDE COMPARABLE DATA PRIVATELY. SOVIET DEL COUNTERED THAT THERE WERE "CERTAIN DISCREPANCIES" BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET DATA REGARDING U.S. SITES. THEY PROMISED ELABORATION IN TWO TO THREE WEEKS FROM A BOOK RECENTLY PUBLISHED IN MOSCOW. -- SOVIET DEL ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. INTENDED THE DATA EXCHANGE TO INCLUDE ALL U.S. BASES INCLUDING THOSE IN EUROPE. U.S. DEL SAID YES. 7. COMMENT: THIS MEETING REPRESENTS FIRST TIME SOVIETS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO HAVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON U.S. DATA EXCHANGE PROPOSAL, WHICH THEY HAVE VIRTUALLY IGNORED SINCE IT WAS PRESENTED TWO-AND-A-HALF YEARS AGO. THEY CAST THEMSELVES, HOWEVER, IN A SKEPTICAL LISTENING AND QUESTIONING MODE AND WERE UNWILLING TO MOVE TOWARD U.S. POSITION, TO MAKE COUNTER PROPOSALS OR DISCUSS DETAILS. SOVIETS MERELY HINTED THAT MAYBE SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT LATER. U.S. RESPONDED THAT PUTTING OFF ISSUE WOULD SIMPLY PROLONG MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. END COMMENT. SECRET 321 nnnv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET 8. THE NEXT EXPERTS MEETING WAS SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 23 TO DISCUSS THE DECLARATION OF STOCKPILE LOCATIONS. 9. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK ADMIN END OF MESSAGE SECRET SECRET 322 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R0001001nnnni_zt Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 ? r? _ SECRET STATE GENEVA TEL 002222 87 SECRET GENEVA 02222 EXDIS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR BODY TAGS: FARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, FEBRUARY 23, 1987 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-010. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY-- -- THE FOURTH EXPERTS MEETING OF U.S./SOVIET BILATERALS FOCUSSED ON (1) DECLARATION AND INTERIM MONITORING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES AND (2) JOINT PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. SOVIETS HAD NO PROBLEM WITH U.S. APPROACH TO CW STOCKPILE MONITORING REQUIREMENTS REFLECTED IN CD/516. THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR AND AGREED TO THE USE OF ON-SITE SENSORS, REMOTE MONITORING OF THESE SENSORS, AND ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION THROUGH ON-SITE INSPECTORS. CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF DRAFT JOINT DISCUSSION PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES RESULTED IN SOVIET AGREE- MENT WITH U.S. POSITION ON SEVERAL PREVIOUSLY DISAGREED POINTS. SEVERAL MAJOR POINTS REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED, HOWEVER. END SUMMARY. 3. AT MEETING OF EXPERTS ON FEBRUARY 23, TWO TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED: MONITORING DECLARED CW STOCKPILE LOCATIONS AND CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. 4. MONITORING DECLARED CW STOCKPILE LOCATIONS -- A. IN RESPONSE TO U.S. QUESTION, SOVIET REP (BERDENNIKOV) STATED THAT PHRASE "PERMANENT USE OF INSTRUMENTS", AS USED IN NAZARKIN'S FEB 17 PLENARY SPEECH IN SECTION ON STOCKPILE MONITORING, COULD INCLUDE REMOTE MONITORING OF THOSE INSTRUMENTS, JUST AS IN THE CASE OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING. THE SOVIET SIDE COULD AGREE TO THE USE OF MONITORING DEVICES, TO ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, OR TO A COMBINATION OF BOTH IF NECESSARY, FOR VERIFICATION. B. SOVIET REP SAID THAT CW STOCKPILE SITES WOULD CONTINUE TO BE OPEN TO MANDATORY CHALLENGE ON-SITE INSPECTION AFTER THE CW STOCKS HAD BEEN REMOVED. C. U.S. REP PRESSED FOR SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. CD WORKING PAPER, "THE DECLARATION AND INTERIM SECRET 323 r.nnv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET MONITORING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES" (CD/516; JUL 13, 1984). DOCUMENT ILLUSTRATES U.S. POSITION THAT USE OF A COMBINATION OF REMOTELY-MONITORED ON-SITE SENSORS AND SYSTEMATIC ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ARE ESSENTIAL FOR STOCKPILE MONITORING. SOVIET REP SAID THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT REMOTE MONITORING OF ON-SITE DEVICES AND THE OTHER VERIFICATION METHODS SUGGESTED IN THE PAPER. -- U.S. DELOFF (LOVELACE) ALSO HIGHLIGHTED FACT THAT PERIODIC STOCKPILE SAFETY CHECKS MUST CONTINUE. STOCKS CANNOT BE SIMPLY SEALED UP UNTIL THEY ARE FINALLY REMOVED FOR DESTRUCTION. THESE SAFETY REQUIRE- MENTS RESULT IN A DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT WHICH WILL REQUIRE A COMPLEX MONITORING SYSTEM AND CONTINUING INFORMATION FLOW TO THE MONITORING BODY. PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY ARISES BETWEEN TIME OF FIRST INSPECTION AND TIME MONITORING SYSTEM IS FULLY OPERATIONAL. -- SOVIET REP AGREED WITH U.S. COMMENTS AND STATED THAT THERE MAY BE A HIGH REQUIREMENT FOR ROUTINE ON- SITE INSPECTIONS, POSSIBLY EVEN CONTINUOUS PRESENCE OF INSPECTORS DURING SOME PERIODS, SUCH AS THE PERIOD PRIOR TO INSTALLATION OF SENSORS. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT WHATEVER IS REQUIRED TO ENSURE AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME. D. THE SOVIET SIDE SAID IT BELIEVED A DIFFERENT DETAILED PLAN FOR MONITORING WILL BE DEVELOPED FOR EACH DECLARED SITE BASED ON THE MODEL AGREEMENTS CONCEPT. THE DETAILED PLANS SHOULD NOT BE INCORPORATED INTO THE BODY OF THE CONVENTION. HOWEVER, THE CW CONVENTION SHOULD INCLUDE A SUMMARY STATEMENT OF WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. 5. CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) PRODUCTION FACILITIES-- A. DELEGATIONS CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF THE JOINT CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER DEVELOPED DURING PREVIOUS TWO ROUNDS. B. THE TWO SIDES DISCUSSED AT LENGTH HOW TO FORMULATE THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "CW PRODUCTION FACILITY." SOVIET REP EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT A STATE COULD EVADE DECLARATION REQUIREMENTS BY ARGUING THAT PRODUCTION OF A NERVE AGENT HAD NOT BEEN "FOR CW PURPOSES." US REP, WHILE SHARING CONCERN ABOUT LOOPHOLES, SOUGHT TO AVOID INCLUDING FACILITIES THAT HAD ONLY MADE SMALL QUANTITIES OF AGENTS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL, PROTECTIVE OR RESEARCH PURPOSES. SOVIETS ACCEPTED U.S. POINT. TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO BASIC DIFFERENCES AND THAT TOPIC SHOULD BE TAKEN UP AGAIN AT A LATER SECRET 324 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET MEETING. C. SOVIETS ACCEPTED CONCEPT OF "MAIN PRODUCTION TRAIN" PROPOSED BY U.S. DEL PER ROUND IV GUIDANCE PAPER (86 STATE 343781). THEY ALSO ACCEPTED VIRTUALLY ALL AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY U.S. DEL PER ROUND V GUIDANCE (STATE 44071, PARA 38). D. IN TWO CASES, SOVIETS SOUGHT TIGHTER RESTRICTIONS THAN THOSE PROPOSED BY U.S. DEL PURSUANT TO INSTRUC- TIONS. THEY SOUGHT TO NARROW OPTION FOR REUSE OF SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT AND TO TIGHTEN UP U.S. REFERENCE TO "PREVAILING COMMERCIAL INDUSTRY STANDARDS FOR FACILITIES NOT PRODUCING SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL OR CORROSIVE CHEMICALS." (COMMENT: U.S. HAD CRAFTED ITS ORIGINAL LANGUAGE ON REUSE OF EQUIPMENT TO PROTECT U.S. CHEMICAL COMPANIES FROM DESTRUCTION OF THEIR FACILITIES IF THEY HAD PROVIDED PINACOYL ALCOHOL FOR BINARY PROGRAM. OBVIOUSLY, THIS ARGUMENT CANNOT BE USED WITH SOVIETS, SINCE U.S. INTEREST IN NERVE AGENT SOMAN IS CLASSIFIED. PROPOSAL RELATING TO INDUSTRY STANDARDS SEEMS TO BE A "NON-SEQUITUR" WITHOUT PRACTICAL EFFECT. END COMMENT.) E. SOVIET SIDE SAID THAT THEY WOULD NO LONGER INSIST THAT REUSE OF CONVERTED CW PRODUCTION BUILDINGS BE RESTRICTED TO NON-MILITARY PURPOSES. THEY COULD ACCEPT USE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY COULD NOW ACCEPT EITHER APPROACH AND IT WAS UP TO THE U.S. TO INDICATE WHICH APPROACH IT PREFERRED. PER INSTRUCTIONS, U.S. REP SAID THE ISSUE WAS BEING STUDIED IN WASHINGTON. F. IN ORDER TO MEET U.S. CONCERNS, THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED U.S. SUGGESTION THAT THE WORD "BUILDING" SHOULD INCLUDE UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES. G. AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED ON HOW EXCESS PRODUCTION CAPACITY FOR DUAL-PURPOSE KEY PRECURSORS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED. SOVIET SIDE ARGUED THAT U.S. LANGUAGE (DRAWN FROM ROUND IV GUIDANCE) WOULD CREATE A LOOPHOLE SINCE IT COVERED ONLY CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT A STATE DECLARED HAD MADE KEY PRECURSOR CHEMICALS FOR CW USE IN THE PAST. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SOME WESTERN CHEMICAL PLANTS THAT HAD FURNISHED KEY PRECURSORS FOR THE IRAQI CW PROGRAM, SUCH AS THOSE MENTIONED IN A RECENT BBC DOCUMENTARY, WOULD NOT BE COVERED. U.S. REP NOTED THAT SOVIET APPROACH ALSO COVERED PLANTS THAT HAD NEVER PROVIDED KEY PRECURSORS FOR CW PRODUCTION AND SAID THAT BROADER ISSUE OF EXCESS CAPACITY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN CONNECTION WITH CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING REGIME. H. SOVIET DEL ALSO RAISED THE BASIC QUESTION OF SECRET 325 nnrnved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET WHETHER MILITARY MUNITIONS HARDWARE FACTORIES SHOULD FALL WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF A CW PRODUCTION FACILITY. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE PRODUCTION OF METAL PARTS FOR CW WOULD NORMALLY BE AN AUXILLARY PART OF THE PLANTS PRODUCTION PROCESS. FOCUS SHOULD REMAIN ON DESTRUCTION OF THE SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT USED FOR CW HARDWARE PRODUCTION. THE CONVENTION SHOULD NOT IMPACT ON NON-CW RELATED ACTIVITIES OF FACILITIES. I. SOVIET DEL SUGGESTED THAT UNRESOLVED SECTIONS (KEY PRECURSORS, MUNITIONS HARDWARE) BE DROPPED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON THE CURRENT PAPER SO IT COULD BE INTRODUCED IN CD. WORK COULD CONTINUE ON OMITTED SECTIONS. U.S. REP REPLIED THAT THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED NOW RATHER THAN LATER. DISCUSSION WILL CONTINUE ON PAPER DURING A FUTURE EXPERTS MEETING. 6. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO DISCUSS THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE AT THE WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, CW EXPERTS MEETING. 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK ADMIN END OF MESSAGE SECRET SECRET 326 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 ? Cs.1,6,_RnDon Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 STATE GENEVA SECRET GENEVA 02377 EXDIS SECRET TEL 002377 87 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR BODY TAGS: FARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, EXPERTS MEETING, FEBRUARY 25, 1987. REFS: (A) STATE 42809 - (B) GENEVA 2145 - (C) STATE 51601 1. THIS IS CW BILAT -011. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) -2. SUMMARY -- -- AT FEBRUARY 25 MEETING ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION, U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS ADDRESSED: (1) RELEVENT FACILITIES AND ACCESS QUESTION, (2) POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO UNRESTRICTED ACCESS, (3).SAFEGUARDS AGAINST MISUSE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION, AND (4) SOVIET VIEWS ON U.S. PROPOSAL FOR MANDATORY (ARTICLE X) AND NON-MANDATORY (ARTICLE XI) CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN U.S. DRAFT TREATY (CD/500). U.S. DEL EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE U.S. ATTACHES TO TREATY PROVISION FOR MANDATORY, SHORT-NOTICE CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF ALL RELEVANT FACILITIES TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS PROPOSED BY POSSIBLE CLANDESTINE CW STOCKS AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES. -- SOVIETS SAID THEY ALSO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND COULD ACCEPT EITHER UK OR SWEDISH CHALLENGE INSPECTION VARIANTS AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. SOVIETS SAID THEY WILL ACCEPT MANDATORY ONSITE INSPECTION FOR ALL DECLARED LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES, INCLUDING THOSE NOT SUBJECT TO ROUTINE INSPECTION.IN OTHER CASES, ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS UP TO AND INCLUDING PARTIAL ACCESS COULD BE AGREED UPON. SOVIETS SAID THEY APPRECIATE UNDECLARED STOCKS POSE DIFFICULT PROBLEM AND WISH TO SOLVE PROBLEM IN WAY WHICH MEETS THE CONCERNS OF BOTH THE CHALLENGER AND THE CHALLENGED STATE. SOVIETS ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT U.S. "TWO-TIERED" APPROACH--I.E., ARTICLE X AND XI AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SITES--PROVIDE BASIS FOR DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT. THEY SUGGESTED U.S. DELETE ARTICLE XI. SECRET 327 rhnv Anuroved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET -- DISCUSSION WAS DETAILED AND WIDERANGING, WITH SOVIETS SEEKING TO CONVEY ATTITUDE OF FLEXIBILITY. POSITIONS REMAIN FAR APART. HOWEVER, IN SOME RESPECTS SOVIET POSITION NOW SEEMS AT LEAST SLIGHTLY STRICTER THAN THAT IN UK PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY. 3. FEBRUARY 25 EXPERTS MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION. DRAWING ON GUIDANCE (REF A), U.S. DEL EXPLAINED U.S. POSITION AND PRESSED SOVIETS TO CLARIFY THEIR POSITION. -- SOVIETS SAID THEY ALSO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND COULD ACCEPT EITHER UK OR SWEDISH CHALLENGE INSPECTION VARIENTS AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. SOVIETS SAID THEY WILL ACCEPT MANDATORY ONSITE INSPECTION FOR ALL DECLARED LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES. IN OTHER CASES. ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS UP TO AND INCLUDING PARTIAL ACCESS COULD BE AGREED UPON. SOVIETS SAID THEY APPRECIATE UNDECLARED STOCKS POSE DIFFICULT PROBLEM AND WISH TO SOLVE PROBLEM IN WAY WHICH MEETS THE CONCERNS OF BOTH THE CHALLENGER AND THE CHALLENGED STATE. SOVIETS ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT U.S. "TWO-TIERED" APPROACH--I.E., ARTICLE X AND XI AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SITES--PROVIDE BASIS FOR DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT. THEY SUGGESTED U.S. DELETE ARTICLE XI. 4. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS -- -- U.S. REP (MIKULAK) OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THE IMPORTANCE U.S. ATTRIBUTES TO A PROVISION FOR MANDATORY, SHORT-NOTICE CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF ALL RELEVANT FACILITIES AS BOTH A DETERRENT AND A WAY TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE WHEN CONCERNS ARISE. HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO ADDRESS EFFECTIVELY THE PROBLEMS POSED BY POSSIBLE UNDECLARED CW STOCKPILES AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES. -- SOVIET REP (BERDENNIKOV) REPLIED THAT SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERS CHALLENGE INSPECTION ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND DIFFICULT ISSUES IN THE CW BAN NEGOTIATIONS. CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS A NECESSARY PART OF A CW BAN AND THE USSR FAVORS AN EFFECTIVE CHALLENGE INSPECTION SYSTEM WHICH WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF ALL PARTIES. IN 1986, THE USSR HAD TAKEN A MAJOR STEP BY AGREEING TO USE UK CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND WAS INTERESTED IN U.S. DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON THIS PROPOSAL AS WELL AS SECRET 32s1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA_Rnpao r" - - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET ON THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL (REF B). HE SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WAS OPEN-MINDED; IT COULD ACCEPT EITHER PROPOSAL AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND WAS ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THE DIFFICULTIES THE U.S. HAS WITH THE UK PROPOSAL. HE NOTED U.S. OPPOSITION TO PROPOSALS THAT PROVIDE FOR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REVIEW OF REQUESTS AND STRESSED THAT THE UK PROPOSAL, WHICH THE USSR CAN ACCEPT AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, HAS NO SUCH FILTER. (COMMENT: THIS REMARK TENDS TO CONFIRM PRIVATE INDICATION TO DELOFF THAT SOVIETS ARE BACKING AWAY FROM THE CHANGES THEY PROPOSED TO THE EK PROPOSAL, SUCH AS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REVIEW OF REQUESTS. END COMMENT.) -- U.S. DEL REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION OF EITHER THE UK OR SWEDISH PROPOSALS. INSTEAD, U.S. SIDE NOTED (1) NEED TO MEET REQUIREMENTS OF U.S. PROPOSAL, WHICH PROVIDES FOR SHORT-NOTICE, MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF ANY SUSPECTED SITE; (2) U.S. CONCERNS THAT ANY RIGHT OF REFUSAL WILL ENABLE A STATE INTERESTED IN VIOLATING THE TREATY TO ESTABLISH SANCTUARIES AND MISUSE THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL; AND (3) GREAT DIFFICULTIES U.S. SIDE WOULD HAVE WITH CONCEPT OF SUBMITTING CHALLENGE INSPECTION REQUESTS TO ANY VOTING PROCEDURE. 5. RELEVANT FACILITIES AND ACCESS QUESTION -- -- THE SOVIET SIDE SAID THAT IT WOULD ACCEPT MANDATORY CHALLENGE ON-SITE INSPECTION WITH NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL FOR ALL LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES DECLARED UNDER THE TREATY, EVEN THOSE NOT SUBJECT TO ROUTINE INSPECTION. - BERDENNIKOV SAID THE USSR WAS PREPARED TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO ANY SITE CONNECTED WITH CW. IN THIS RESPECT, THE USSR WANTED "ABSOLUTE TRANSPARENCY" BUT WAS CONCERNED THAT THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION NOT BE MISUSED. THE SOVIET SIDE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE EFFORTS BY A PARTY TO SEEK UNWARRANTED ACCESS TO NON-CW-RELATED SITES TO OBTAIN STATE SECRETS. THE PROBLEM WAS WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE BETWEEN WHAT IS RELEVANT AND WHAT IS NOT. PLANTS WITH A CW PRODUCTION CAPABILITY SHOULD BE COVERED. IN OTHER CASES, ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE AGREED UPON. THE NATURE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS -- BEGINNING WITH PROVISION OF DATA AND GOING UP TO PARTIAL ACCESS -- WOULD DEPEND ON THE SPECIFIC CASE. -- U.S. SIDE COUNTERED THAT THE ISSUE WAS SECRET 329 im,,,Inecifiari in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET WHERE SUSPICIONS AS TO CLANDESTINE PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING MIGHT BE MOST LIKELY TO ARISE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE UNITS WHICH MIGHT EMPLOY CW MIGHT NOT BE CHEMICAL TROOPS. THESE UNITS AND THEIR STORAGE SITES WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TARGETS FOR MANDATORY CHALLENGE. VIOLATIONS ARE MORE LIKELY TO OCCUR AT SECURED SENSITIVE MILITARY SITES THAN AT SITES TO WHICH ACCESS IS NOT RESTRICTED. SINCE STOCKS CAN BE MOVED QUICKLY, ANY DELAY WOULD FAVOR A VIOLATOR. U.S. SIDE SAW NO REASON WHY ANY MILITARY FACILITY MIGHT NOT BE RELEVANT TO A CW CONVENTION. IF SOME SITES WERE EXCLUDED FROM CHALLENGE, THE CONVENTION COULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE. ^ BERDENNIKOV REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE REALIZES THAT THE PROBLEM OF UNDECLARED STOCKPILES IS A VERY DIFFICULT ONE. IT HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF THE MOST RECENT UK-SOVIET CW DISCUSSIONS (REF C). THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ASKED THE BRITISH HOW THEIR CONCEPT OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES WOULD DEAL WITH CASES OF SUSPECTED CW STOCKS AND WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ALTERNATIVES TO INSPECTING THE SITE WHERE THE WEAPONS ARE. THE BRITISH HAD LITTLE TO SAY BUT HAD SAID THAT PARTIAL ACCESS MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT. THE SOVIET SIDE FAVORS CARRYING OUT CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME AND IS INTERESTED IN RESOLVING THE PROBLEM IN A WAY WHICH MEETS THE CONCERNS OF BOTH THE CHALLENGER AND THE CHALLENGED STATE. (NOTE: AT RECEPTION SAME EVENING SOVIET DELOFF SMIDOVICH VOLUNTEERED SEPARATELY TO TWO U.S. DELOFFS THAT HE FOUND PERSUASIVE THE U.S. ARGUMENTS THAT ON-SITE ACCESS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO RESOLVE CONCERNS ABOUT CLANDESTINE STOCKS.) -- U.S. SIDE POINTED TO THE INCONSISTENCY IN THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR VERY STRICT VERIFICATION OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO PERMIT CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN OTHER AREAS. - BERDENNIKOV RESPONDED THAT THE TWO SITUATIONS WERE NOT COMPARABLE. THE SOVIET UNION FAVORS MANDATORY CHALLENGE OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY SITES WITH A POTENTIAL FOR CW PRODUCTION. HOWEVER, ADDED SOVIET CHEMICAL INDUSTRY REP, THERE ARE ALSO SENSITIVE NON-CW-RELATED PARTS OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY. HE CITED EXAMPLES CONNECTED WITH MILITARY OR SPACE-RELATED PROGRAMS. -- U.S. SIDE REPLIED THAT U.S. IS PREPARED SECRET 330 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-011Aspnnninni nnnni A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET TO SUBMIT SUCH A SITE TO MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION; U.S. EXCLUDES NO/NO SITES. 6. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES -- -- U.S. SIDE PROBED THE SOVIETS ON ALTERNATIVE MEASURES AND HOW THEY ENVISAGE THEM WORKING. DEL MADE CLEAR U.S. DOES NOT RULE OUT ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. HOWEVER, THE MEASURES WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR QUICKLY AND IF AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED ON SUCH MEASURES, THEN AN INSPECTION MUST OCCUR. -- THE SOVIETS SAID THAT THE INSPECTION SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE SHORTEST TIME AND THAT ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE USED TO NULIFY THE OBJECTIVE OF THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION. PROCEDURES COULD BE ELABORATED TO FACILITATE THE ARRIVAL OF THE INSPECTION TEAM AT THE SITE IN QUESTION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, THE CHALLENGER COULD NOT SIMPLY HAVE CARTE BLANCHE ACCESS. -- SOVIET SIDE SAID IT DID NOT PRECLUDE ANY ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. THEY CITED AS EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: (1) AN AIR SURVEY, (2) ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRIAL WASTE WATER, AND (3) PARTIAL ACCESS.- 7. MISUSE ISSUE -- -- U.S. SIDE ASKED WHETHER SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED PRIMARILY ABOUT POSSIBLE U.S.- SOVIET BILATERAL ACTIONS. IN SUCH CASES, U.S. REPS NOTED THE ABILITY OF A STATE TO RETALIATE WOULD DETER IMPROPER REQUESTS. IF, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT STATES "WITH NOTHING TO LOSE," THE FACT-FINDING PANEL WOULD SCREEN OUT SUCH REQUESTS. - BERDENNIKOV REPLIED THAT IN TIMES OF STRAINED RELATIONS, ONE SIDE MIGHT FIND IT POLITICALLY USEFUL TO MISUSE THE CONVENTION. THE USSR CONSIDERS THAT THE NNA WILL NOT ACCEPT THE FACT-FINDING PANEL. 8. DISCRIMINATION ISSUE -- -- THE SOVIETS ASKED ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. ARTICLE X AND ARTICLE XI AND ABOUT ACCESS TO PRIVATE DWELLINGS AND TERRITORY UNDER THE U.S. PROPOSAL. BERDENNIKOV SECRET 33 in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET SAID THAT "THE BIGGEST PROBLEM" ARTICLE X POSES FOR THE SOVIET SIDE IS THAT IT IS BASED ON A DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT- OWNED OR CONTROLLED SITES, ON THE ONE HAND, AND PRIVATE SITES, ON THE OTHER. BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET SYSTEMS, THIS COULD RESULT IN A DISCRIMINATORY SYSTEM. THE FACT THAT THE UK AND SWEDISH PROPOSALS DO NOT MAKE A DISTINCTION OF THIS SORT MAKES THEM MORE ATTRACTIVE THAN ARTICLE X TO THE SOVIET SIDE. SOVIET DEL ASKED WHAT PURPOSE ARTICLE XI SERVES AND WHETHER IT WAS REALLY NECESSARY SINCE U.S. WAS ARGUING EVERYTHING COULD BE COVERED BY ARTICLE X. BERDENNIKOV CALLED THE U.S. APPROACH "TWO- TIERED." THE USSR, ON THE OTHER HAND, THINKS THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SITES AND THAT THE SAME CHALLENGE INSPECTION REGIMES AND ONE SET OF PROCEDURES SHOULD APPLY TO ALL RELEVANT LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES. -- U.S. SIDE EXPLAINED THAT ARTICLE X WAS DEVELOPED TO REACH ANY ACTIVITY OR LOCATION WHICH COULD BE SUSPECTED OF A CW TREATY VIOLATION IRRESPECTIVE OF OWNERSHIP. THE U.S. PROPOSAL IS NOT INTENDED TO BE DISCRIMINATORY. HOWEVER, IF THE SOVIET SIDE HAS SUGGESTIONS FOR ELIMINATING PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATORY ASPECTS, THE U.S. SIDE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR THEM. - BERDENNIKOV SUGGESTED THAT ELIMINATING ARTICLE XI AND DEALING WITH THE "PRIVATE DWELLING" PROBLEM BY MEANS OF A FOOTNOTE MIGHT BE ONE SOLUTION. HE ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. SIDE WAS PREPARED TO SAY PRIVATE DWELLINGS DO NOT INCLUDE PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND AND WHETHER THE U.S. COULD ASSURE UNDELAYED ACCESS TO DWELLINGS. -- U.S. NOTED THAT ARTICLE XI PROVIDED A WAY FOR STATES NOT ON THE FACT-FINDING PANEL TO MAKE NON-MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION REQUESTS. RESPONDING TO SOVIET DOUBTS THAT THE NNA MOULD ACCEPT VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE U.S. APPROACH, U.S. SIDE SAID THAT IN OUR VIEW THE U.S. PROPOSALS CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED. THE NNA IS RELUCTANT TO GET EMBROILED IN ANY U.S.-SOVIET DISAGREEMENT. HOWEVER, IF MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON CAN REACH AGREEMENT, THEN THE NNA WILL ACCEPT BOTH ARTICLE X AND XI. AS FOR DWELLINGS, THE TERM "PRIVATE" IS NOT A USEFUL ONE. SOME HOMES IN THE U.S. ARE PUBLICLY- OWNED, AND THE U.S. PROPOSAL CONCERNS HOMES OR RESIDENCES IRRESPECTIVE OF OWNERSHIP. THE U.S. DOES SECRET 332 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-011RRPnnni nn rv-v-v-14 A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET NOT ANTICIPATE DELAYS IN OBTAINING ACCESS AND CAN ASSURE THE SOVIET SIDE THAT IT WILL COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION. -- U.S. SIDE THEN ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD ACCEPT ARTICLE X IF ARTICLE XI WERE REMOVED. BERDENNIKOV REPLIED THAT THE U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD THEN BE QUITE DIFFERENT AND THAT IF THE TWO SIDES COULD ALSO WORK OUT ALTERNATIVE MEASURES THEN THE SIDES WOULD BE "ON THE RIGHT TRACK." ALSO, IF THE U.S. COULD CONVINCE THE SOVIETS OF THE FEASIBILITY OF THE FACT-FINDING PANEL, THAT COULD BE DISCUSSED AS WELL. 9. COMMENT -- -- DISCUSSION WAS MOST LIVELY, DETAILED AND WIDE-RANGING TO DATE ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. SOVIETS WENT TO SOME EFFORT TO CONVEY ATTITUDE OF FLEXIBILITY. THEIR APPROACH REMAINS COMPLETELY UNSATISFACTORY IN KEY RESPECTS, HOWEVER. WHILE POSITIONS REMAIN FAR APART, SOVIETS NO LONGER SEEM TO BE TRYING TO WATER DOWN THE UK PROPOSAL. IN SOME RESPECTS, FOR EXAMPLE, WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN SOME CASES, SOVIET POSITION IS AT LEAST MODESTLY STRICTER THAN THE UK PROPOSAL. END COMMENT. 10. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. RUSHING ADMIN END OF MESSAGE SECRET SECRET 333 narinccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 STATE GENEVA SECRET GENEVA 02371 EXDIS SECRET TEL 002371 87 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR BODY TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) DISCUSSIONS, AMB. NAZARKIN VIEWS ON CW AND OTHER ISSUES 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-012 . (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY-- -- ACTING U.S. REP TO THE CD HANSEN AND SOVIET REP NAZARKIN MET ON 25 AND 26 FEBRUARY 1987 IN ONE-ON-ONE SESSIONS WHERE PRINCIPAL TOPIC WAS THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION. NAZARKIN REPEATEDLY SAID THAT CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS THE KEY TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND CITED SOVIET FLEXIBILITY TO REACH AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH HE CITED A REQUIREMENT FOR A RIGHT OF REFUSAL TO PREVENT ABUSE. IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER A BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA BEFORE FINALIZATION OF AN AGREEMENT, NAZARKIN SAID. NAZARKIN SHOWED INTEREST IN THE U.S. INVITATION TO VISIT THE CW DESTRUCTION FACILITY AT TOOELE, UTAH AND INQUIRED BRIEFLY ABOUT THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY PROCESS AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS MODERNIZATION. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THE NEXT BILATERAL ROUND BEGIN IN APRIL. ON NON-CHEMICAL ISSUES, NAZARKIN EXPRESSED PESSIMISM ABOUT POSSIBILITIES FOR AGREEMENT IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING EXPERTS MEETING DUE TO RESUME IN MARCH. HE ALSO NOTED THE PRESENCE OF CSCE EXPERT GEN. MIKHAYLOV IN KARPOV'S ARMS CONTROL DEPARTMENT IN THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY. END SUMMARY. - ? 3. IN FEBRUARY 25 AND 26 MEETINGS WITH AMBASSADOR HANSEN, SOVIET CD REP NAZARKIN CHARACTERIZED CHALLENGE INSPECTION AS THE KEY ISSUE IN THE CW NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET UNION HAD LOOKED MOST FAVORABLY ON THE UK PROPOSAL, IT BEING THE ONLY COMPROMISE ON THE HORIZON, BUT REALIZED IT DID NOT HAVE WIDESPREAD SUPPORT AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED. NEVERTHELESS, NAZARKIN EXPLAINED, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE MAKING ADDITIONAL ROVES TOWARD THE UK PROPOSAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THEY ARE NOW STUDYING THE LATEST SWEDISH IDEAS AND ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THEM. THE MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THE U.S. APPROACH, AS EMBODIED IN ARTICLE X, IS THE POSSIBILITY OF FRIVOLOUS INSPECTIONS AND ABUSE. NAZARKIN OFFERED SECRET 334 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-011ARPnnni nn nt-Int-14 A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET THAT THE SOVIET SIDE ACCEPTED THAT THERE ARE BUILT-IN DETERRENTS TO EITHER SOVIET OR U.S. ABUSE, BUT SUCH DETERRENTS WOULD NOT APPLY TO SOME OTHER SIGNATORIES OF A MULTI-NATIONAL AGREEMENT. HE ARGUED THAT A STATE MUST BE ALLOWED TO REFUSE AN INSPECTION ON THE GROUNDS OF SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST AND ATTEMPTED TO PORTRAY THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT AS ESTABLISHING SUCH A PRECEDENT. HANSEN REJECTED THE RELEVANCE OF THE STOCKHOLM PROVISIONS TO ANY ARMS REDUCTION REGIME. NAZARKIN REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD FLEXIBILITY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. -- REFERRING TO THE PACE WITH WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE APPEARS TO BE MOVING TOWARD U.S. POSITIONS IN THE CW NEGOTIATIONS, NAZARKIN SAID HIS WAS RESULT OF A CONSCIOUS POLITICAL DECISION TO SEEK A CW CONVENTION. THE MILITARY HAD GRUMSLED, BUT THEY HAD BEEN INFORMED AND THE POLITICAL DECISION WOULD DOMINATE. NAZARKIN CLAIMED HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET SIDE HAD FAILED TO ACCEPT THE USG INVITATION LAST FALL TO ATTEND A DEMONSTRATION AT THE U.S. ARMY CW DESTRUCTION FACILITY AT TOOELE, UTAH. BUT HE ALSO STATED THE SOVIETS DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE REASON FOR THE DEMONSTRATION IN THE FIRST PLACE. HANSEN REITERATED THE INVITATION WITHOUT REFERENCE TO SPECIFIC TIMES OR TERMS. (COMMENT: NAZARKIN RETURNED TO THIS ISSUE DURING THE SECOND CONVERSATION, DEMONSTRATING AN INTEREST IN A POSSIBLE ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION. END COMMENT.) NAZARKIN THEN SUGGESTED THE NEXT ROUND BEGIN IN APRIL. HANSEN REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT WOULD NOT ALLOW ENOUGH TIME FOR PREPARATION AND THAT THE U.S. WAS THINKING OF EARLY IN THE SUMMER CD SESSION. NAZARKIN SAID THERE IS NOT YET ANY POSSIBILITY FOR A BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA BEFORE AN AGREEMENT IS FINALIZED. HE POINTED THE FINGER AT THE MILITARY, STATING THAT THE POLITICAL SIDE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE NEED FOR A BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE. THE DELEGATION, HE SAID, WAS TRYING TO "FIND SOMETHING" TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE OR THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. MOSCOW WAS NOT CONVINCED OF U.S. WILLINGNESS TO COMPLETE THE CONVENTION AND FEARED THEY WOULD BE GIVING AWAY MILITARY SECRETS FOR NOTHING. -- THE CAPABILITY OF THE WESTERN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY TO MANUFACTURE TOXIC CHEMICALS AND LETHAL AGENTS CONTINUES TO BE OF SIGNIFICANT CONCERN, ACCORDING TO NAZARKIN. THE ANSWER TO SOVIET CONCERNS IN THIS AREA, HE NOTED, WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION. SECRET 335 ?-? 17),r+ - Caniti7Pri r.npv Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET NAZARKIN CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH STATES, LIKE IRAQ, WHICH WOULD BE NON-SIGNATORIES TO A POSSIBLE CW CONVENTION. BUT, HE OPINED, POLITICAL PRESSURE WOULD FORCE SUCH STATES TO COMPLY. NAZARKIN ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS OF ALLOCATING MONEY TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS MODERNIZATION. HANSEN NOTED THAT THERE ARE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATSEVERY YEAR ON NEARLY EVERY SUBJECT WHEN MONIES ARE APPROPRIATED AND ALLOCATED, BUT THAT BINARY PRODUCTION WAS NOW ASSURED BY DECISIONS ALREADY MADE. 4. PESSIMISM PERMEATED NAZARKIN'S VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITY FOR SUCCESS AT THE BILATERAL NUCLEAR TESTING EXPERTS MEETINGS TO RESUME IN MARCH. HE RETURNED TO THIS SUBJECT AT LEAST THREE TIMES, INDICATING HE DID NOT BELIEVE AN AGREEMENT ON AGENDA WOULD BE POSSIBLE. HE CITED U.S. PRECONDITIONS, I.E., AGREEMENT TO DIRECT MEASUREMENT BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER ISSUES COULD TAKE PLACE. NAZARKIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SOVIETS USE A METHOD SIMILAR TO CORRTEX WHICH HE REFERRED BY ITS ACRONYM MIZ (PRONOUNCED MEEZ). -- HE NOTED THAT THE DIRECTIVE TO NRDC TO TURN OFF ITS MONITORING DEVICES CONSTITUTED DE-FACTO NOTIFICATION OF 26 FEBRUARY SOVIET TEST AND CITED THE NAMING OF LOCATION, THRESHOLD AND PURPOSE AS EVIDENCE OF "NEW SOVIET THINKING". 5. LT GENERAL KONSTANTIN MIKHAYLOV (SOVIET MILITARY NEGOTIATOR AT THE BELGRADE AND MADRID CSCE MEETINGS) WHO WORKED FOR COL GEN CHERVOV IN THE ARMS CONTROL SECTION OF THE GENERAL STAFF HAS RETIRED FROM THE SOVIET ARMY AND IS KARPOV'S DEPUTY IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S ARMS CONTROL DEPARTMENT. (COMMENT: POLISH AMB. TURBANSKI TOLD HANSEN THAT THE POLES ARE NOW ORGANIZING A CLONE OF KARPOV'S DEPARTMENT WHICH, IT IS EXPECTED, WILL BE HEADED BY POLISH CDE AMBASSADOR KONARSKY. END COMMENT.) 6. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.RUSHING ADMIN END OF MESSAGE SECRET SECRET 336 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP97-ni1RRpnnn1 tv-14 f-Innrs Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 STATE GENEVA SECRET GENEVA 02418 EXDIS SECRET TEL 002418 87 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR BODY TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) DISCUSSIONS, EXPERTS MEETING, FEBRUARY 27, 1987 1. THIS IS CW BILAT -013. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY -- -- FEBRUARY 27 EXPERTS MEETING FOCUSSED ON CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING, BILATERAL OBSERVER ARRANGEMENTS AND ELIMINATION OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. -- TWO SIDES ALMOST FINISHED TEXT OF JOINT PAPER ON OBSERVER ISSUE AND AGREED ON FURTHER ASPECTS OF JOINT PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. END SUMMARY. 3. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING ("NON-PRODUCTION")-- -- U.S. REP ASKED FOR SOVIET RESPONSE TO U.S. DEL QUESTIONS FROM PREVIOUS ROUND CONCERNING AMB. ISSRAELYAN'S STATEMENT ON 5 NOV 86 DEALING WITH NON-PRODUCTION. -- SOVIET REP NOTED THAT SOME QUESTIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN ANSWERED IN AMB. NAZARKIN'S STATEMENTS. HE THEN PROVIDED RESPONSES TO U.S. QUESTIONS ON SOVIET CONCEPT OF "MULTIPURPOSE TECHNOLOGY" AND ON REGIME FOR COMMON INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS USEFUL FOR CW. -- WITH REGARD TO MULTIPURPOSE TECHNOLOGY, SOVIET AIM IS TO PREVENT FACILITIES THAT PRODUCE COMMERCIAL SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS (STLC) FROM BEING DIVERTED TO PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS. -- SOVIET REP CITED LIST OF EQUIPMENT IN 1986 AUSTRALIAN WORKING PAPER (CD/698) AS POSSIBLE BASIS FOR DISCUSSING CHARACTERISTICS OF "CONVERTIBLE" FACILITIES. (COMMENT: LIST WAS ORIGINALLY DRAFTED BY U.S. AS POSSIBLE "WARNING LIST" TO AID CW NON- PROLIFERATION EFFORTS. END COMMENT.) -- WITH REGARD TO COMMON INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS, SOVIET VIEW WAS THAT DECLARATION OF THE LOCATION OF THE FACILITY AND EXCHANGE OF DATA WOULD BE SECRET 337 in Part - Sanitized CODV Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET SUFFICIENT FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES. HOWEVER, SOVIET DEL WAS READY TO DISCUSS ROUTINE ON-SITE VERIFICATION INSOFAR AS OTHER DELS WANTED TO. -- U.S. REP OBTAINED CONFIRMATION THAT SOVIET POSITION IS THAT ANY DECLARED FACILITY WOULD BE SUBJECT TO MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION, EVEN IF IT IS NOT SUBJECT TO ROUTINE INSPECTION. -- U.S. REP PRESSED FOR EXAMPLES OF STLC COMMERCIAL CHEMICALS MADE ON A SIGNIFICANT SCALE. SOVIET REPS RESPONDED WITH TWO EXAMPLES: CARBAMATES -- TOXIC CHEMICALS NOT MADE ON A LARGE SCALE, AND SUBSTANCES WITH AN ETHYL-PHOSPHORUS BOND (KEY PRECURSORS). WHILE REFUSING TO DISCUSS SPECIFICS, THEY INDICATED THAT LATTER TYPE OF COMPOUND IS PRODUCED IN THE USSR, AS WELL AS IN THE WEST. -- U.S. REP ALSO PRESSED SOVIETS TO JUSTIFY THEIR PROPOSAL FOR SEPARATE CATEGORIES FOR STLC COMMERCIAL CHEMICALS AND FOR KEY PRECURSORS, SINCE THE REGIMES PROPOSED SEEMED TO BE THE SAME. SOVIETS RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE REGIMES PROPOSED, BUT THAT IT COULD BE COMPLICATED TO PRODUCE A MIXED LIST. -- U.S. DELOFFS THEN PRESSED FOR INFORMATION ON THE KINDS OF INSTRUMENTS TO BE USED TO MONITOR COMMERCIAL FACILITIES. SOVIET REPLIED THAT THE SAME KINDS OF INSTRUMENTS USED FOR MONITORING STORAGE AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES COULD BE USED. THEY CITED CONTINUOUS GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY AND MASS SPECTROMETRY AUGMENTED BY SAMPLING, AS EXAMPLES. PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED. SOME DATA, BUT NOT ALL, WOULD HAVE TO BE TRANSMITTED OFF-SITE. (KUZMIN NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT AS A STUDENT HE AND OTHER STUDENTS HAD FOOLED THEIR PROFESSORS WITH FALSIFIED GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY DATA.) -- U.S. DELOFF QUESTIONED WHETHER THE ANALYSIS OF DATA SHOULD BE GENERAL OR COMPOUND SPECIFIC, AND POINTED OUT THAT SPECIFIC INFORMATION PRESENTS A HIGHER CHANCE OF TECHNICAL LOSS. SOVIETS RESPONDED THAT A COMBINATION WOULD BE BEST. PART OF THE SAMPLES COULD BE ALALYZED ON SITE, PART ELSEWHERE SO NO ONE COULD ARGUE INSTRUMENT DEFECTS. -- U.S. DELOFF SUGGESTED THAT BOTH TRE INSPECTED FACILITY AND THE INSPECTORS SHOULD HAVE THE SAME EQUIPMENT IDENTICALLY CALIBRATED. SOVIETS SECRET 338 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-ni 1RPRnnninn1t-inn,14 A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET AGREED. -- U.S. DELOFF RAISED THE QUESTION OF TRAINING INSPECTORS, CITING IAEA PROBLEMS. SOVIETS RESPONDED THIS WAS A PROBLEM TO WORK OUT IN THE FUTURE. U.S. DEL SUGGESTED STANDARDIZED INSPECTION PROCEDURES TO AID INEXPERIENCED INSPECTORS. SOVIETS AGREED IT WAS A POSSIBILITY, BUT POINTED OUT AGAIN THAT NOT ALL PROBLEMS COULD BE FORESEEN, SO SOME DETAILS MUST WAIT FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATION. -- U.S. REP ASKED FOR SOVIET VIEWS ON THE LISTS OF CHEMICALS. SOVIETS SAID THAT A DEFINITION OF THE TERM "KEY COMPONENTS" WOULD FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON LISTS. U.S. REP SAID THAT TERM "KEY COMPONENTS" RELATED TO A SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEM AND WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THE BROADER U.S. APPROACH (I.E., IT IS NOT IMPORTANT WHERE THE REACTION OCCURS BUT THAT THE PRODUCT CAN BE RAPIDLY APPLIED ON THE BATTLEFIELD) IS A BETTER APPROACH. HE PRESSED SOVIETS TO EXPLAIN WHY U.S. APPROACH WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET REQUEST FOR U.S. TO SUGGEST A COMPROMISE, U.S. REP PROPOSED A NEW, NEUTRAL TERM "SPECIAL KEY PRECURSOR." SOVIETS SAID THEY WOULD DECIDE LATER BUT THOUGHT IT MIGHT LEAD TO POSSIBLE SOLUTION. 4. BILATERAL INSPECTION PAPER -- -- U.S. REP EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. REWRITE OF THE SOVIET PAPER USED SIMPLER LANGUAGE AND REARRANGED THE PIECES, BUT THAT VIRTUALLY ALL ELEMENTS HAD BEEN RETAINED. HOWEVER, U.S. HAD MODIFIED SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR REPORTING TO THE OTHER SIDE AFTER THE INSPECTION, AND HAD INCLUDED MATERIAL ON THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS. SOVIETS SAID MOST OF U.S. TEXT WAS ACCEPTABLE BUT THAT THEY WERE STUDYING (I.E., SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS) U.S. IDEAS ON THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS. (NOTE: U.S. DEL HES PROPOSED THAT AT LEAST T 0 U.S. OR SOVIET OBSERVERS ECCOMPANY THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM ON EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY. END NOTE.) THE DISCUSSION ON REPORTING AFTER THE INSP C IK CENTERED ON THE SOVIET POSITION THAT PROBLEMS SHOULD BE RAISED IMMEDIATELY AND DISPOSED OF AS OPPOSED TO THE U.S. POSITION THAT SOME PROBLEMS MIGHT NOT BE IMMEDIATELY APPARENT AND MIGHT SURFACE ONLY AFTER A NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO DEVELOP NEW LANGUAGE. 5. CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES -- -- SOVIETS RESPONDED TO U.S. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE JOINT PRODUCTION FACILITIE SECRET 339 flni-laccifiPri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET APER BY ACCEPTING HANGES AT THE EXPERTS EEVEL. THESE CHANGES INCLUDED THE FULL U.S. POSITION IN MONITORING CONVERTED FACILITIES. 6. NEXT MEETING -- -- AGREED TOPICS FOR NEXT EXPERTS MEETING (MAR 2) ARE BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE, BILATERAL OBSERVERS, AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES. 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. RUSHING ADMIN END OF MESSAGE SECRET SECRET 340 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100ionnn1-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 qwrpw, SECRET GENEVA 02588 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD); U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, EXPERTS MEETING, MARCH 2, 1987 REF: GENEVA 02221 (CW BILAT -009) 1. THIS IS CW BILAT -014. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY -- - -- AT MARCH 2 EXPERTS MEETING DELS RESOLVED REMAINING DIFFERENCES ON JOINT PAPER ON U.S.! SOVIET OBSERVERS FOR INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS. DESPITE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, SEVERAL BRACKETED POINTS REMAIN IN JOINT PAPER ON ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. END SUMMARY. 3. JOINT PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES -- - -- DISCUSSION CONTINUED ON REMAINING POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THIS PAPER. A. ELIMINATION OF EQUIPMENT -- -- THE SOVIET SIDE SOUGHT TO ENSURE THAT EQUIPMENT USED TO PRODUCE BINARY PRECURSORS DF AND QL WOULD BE DESTROYED. U.S. REP DRAFTED LANGUAGE TO SPECIFY THAT EQUIPMENT THAT HAD BEEN USED FOR PRODUCTION OF A SUPER- TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICAL OR A SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICAL WITH AN ALKYL-PHOSPHORUS BOND MUST BE DESTROYED AND COULD NOT BE RETAINED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES. SOVIET SIDE AGREED TO PROPOSED U.S. LANGUAGE. B. CONVERSION OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES -- - -- SOVIET REP REEMPHASIZED THAT SOVIET SIDE COULD ACCEPT CONVERSION OF BUILDINGS TO PERMITTED MILITARY USES. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOVIETS ALSO COULD AGREE THAT BUILDINGS COULD NOT BE USED FOR ANY MILITARY ACTIVITIES AT SUCH FACILITIES. IT WAS UP TO THE U.S. SIDE TO DECIDE WHAT IT WANTED. U.S. REP STATED THAT THIS WAS BEING LOOKED AT IN WASHINGTON AND U.S. DEL COULD NOT PROVIDE AN ANSWER AT THIS TIME. C. EXCESS PRODUCTION -- -- IN DISCUSSION ON ISSUE OF EXCESS PRODUCTION 341 SECRET 25X1 Dar!. - aniti7ed Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET CAPACITY FOR KEY PRECURSORS, THE SOVIET SIDE SAID THAT THE U.S. APPROACH TO THS DECLARATION AND MONITORING OF FACILITIES WHICH PRODUCE KEY PRECURSORS FOR CW PURPOSES WAS DISCRIMINATORY. THEY SAID THAT UNDER THE U.S. APPROACH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PROVE THAT WESTERN COMMERCIAL FACILITIES HAD PRODUCED KEY PRECURSORS FOR CW PRODUCTION AND ANY EXCESS CAPACITY WOULD ESCAPE EFFECTIVE CONTROL. SOVIET REP (SMIDOVICH) PROPOSED A TWO-TRACK DECLARATION PROCEDURE FOR CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT PRODUCE THESE KEY PRECURSORS: (1) THE DECLARATIONS FOR FACILITIES WHICH HAVE PRODUCED KEY PRECURSORS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD GO BACK TO JANUARY 1, 1946, (2) IN THE CASE OF OTHER FACILITIES WHICH PRODUCE THE KEY PRECURSORS FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES, ONLY CURRENT PRODUCTION WOULD BE DECLARED. -- U.S. REP REPLIED THAT EXCESS CAPACITY IS MOST LIKELY TO EXIST AT FACILITIES THAT FORMERLY MADE KEY PRECURSORS FOR CW PURPOSES. AFTER THE CONVENTION COMES INTO FORCE, THIS PRODUCTION CAPACITY IS LIKELY TO BE IDLE. THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOCUSSES ON THIS PROBLEM. -- SOVIET SIDE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REVIEW ALL THE DATA DECLARED ON KEY PRECURSOR PRODUCTION AND CAPACITY AND DETERMINE WHAT EXCESS PRODUCTION CAPACITY MUST BE ELIMINATED. U.S. SIDE QUESTIONED THIS APPROACH. TO AVOID THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL'S PASSING JUDGMENT ON A STATE'S INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY, QUESTIONS OF EXCESS CAPACITY SHOULD BE RAISED AND WORKED OUT BILATERALLY. IF A PARTICULAR PROBLEM IS NOT RESOLVED, THEN A STATE COULD TAKE THE QUESTION TO THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FOR REVIEW. -- SOVIET REP (BERDENNIKOV) ALSO SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING POSSIBILITIES FOR ELIMINATING EXCESS KEY PRECURSOR CAPACITY: (1) CONVERSION TO PRODUCTION OF OTHER CHEMICALS USED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES, (2) PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONVENTION, AND (3) IF CONVERSION IS NOT POSSIBLE OR NOT DESIRED, DESTRUCTION OF THE EXCESS CAPACITY. HE AGREED THAT ELIMINATION WOULD BE VERIFIED BY PROCEDURES USED TO VERIFY ELIMINATION OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. -- FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF NEED TO DEAL WITH MARKET FLUCTUATIONS AND COMPETITION, THE SIDES NOTED THAT JUDGMENT ABOUT EXCESS CAPACITY SHOULD BE BASED ON NATIONAL 342 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP97-ni1RRPnnn1 nr-11 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET PRODUCTION AND THAT MORE DISCUSSION IS REQUIRED ON THIS ISSUE. (COMMENT: AT END OF DISCUSSION SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT LANGUAGE ON ISSUE PROPOSED BY U.S. DEL FOR PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER ON THE CONDITION THAT U.S. ACCEPT ANALOGOUS LANGUAGE FOR ARTICLE VI (CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING. HOWEVER, U.S. DEL RESISTED TRADEOFF AND ISSUE REMAINS UNRESOLVED. END COMMENT.) -- ON FACILITIES PRODUCING CHEMICAL MUNITIONS HARDWARE AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR CW EMPLOYMENT, THE SIDES AGREED: (1) IF THE FACILITY ONLY PRODUCED PARTS FOR CW, THEN IT MUST BE DECLARED AND ELIMINATED,AND (2) IF THE FACILITY PRODUCED PARTS FOR OTHER MUNITIONS AS WELL, THE SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT (DIES, MOLDS, ETC.) MUST BE REMOVED AND THEIR DESTRUCTION VERIFIED. -- PAPER AS IT NOW STANDS REFLECTS SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF ALL POINTS OF U.S. POSITION. 4. JOINT PAPER ON U.S./SOVIET OBSERVERS FOR INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS -- - -- SOVIETS SAID THEY COULD ACCEPT U.S. PROPOSAL THAT AT LEAST TWO OBSERVERS FROM ONE SIDE WOULD ACCOMPANY THE INTERNATIONAL TEAM PERFORMING AN INSPECTION ON THE OTHER SIDE. -- SOVIETS AGREED THAT RESULTS OF OBSERVER'S REPORTS SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE OTHER SIDE PROMPTLY. U.S. REP NOTED THAT IT MAY ONLY BE AFTER A NUMBER OF SUCH INSPECTIONS THAT AN UNFAVORABLE TREND OR SITUATION IS REALIZED. THE SIDES EVENTUALLY AGREED THAT PROBLEMS NOTED BY OBSERVERS SHOULD BE COMMUNICATED PROMPTLY AND NOT LATER THAN 90 DAYS FOLLOWING THE INSPECTION. IN ADDITION IT WOULD BE SPECIFIED THAT PROBLEMS NOTED AFTER A SERIES OF INSPECTIONS WOULD BE REVIEWED DURING THE ANNUAL BILATERAL MEETINGS. - BERDENNIKOV ASKED WHETHER U.S. SIDE HAD ANY REACTION TO SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN PARTS OF THE INSPECTORATE RESPONSIBLE FOR INSPECTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE (REFTEL). U.S. REP REPLIED THAT DEL DID NOT EXPECT GUIDANCE DURING THE CURRENT ROUND. 343 SECRET 25X1 narinccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SFCRET 5. MAIN TOPIC AT MARCH 3 CW EXPERTS MEETING WAS ADVANCE DATA EXCHANGE. CRITERIA AND CONTENT OF SCHEDULE 1 (PROHIBITED) CHEMICALS ALSO WERE DISCUSSED. (SEPTEL). 6. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 344 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SWAP'? SECRET GENEVA 02618 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, EXPERTS MEETING MARCH 3, 1987 REF: GENEVA 2221 1. THIS IS CW BILAT -015 . (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY -- -- MAIN TOPIC OF MARCH 3 EXPERTS MEETING WAS EARLY DATA EXCHANGE. US DEL EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF 1984 U.S. PROPOSALS AND PRESSED SOVIETS TO RESPOND SERIOUSLY. SOVIETS REPLIED THAT THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT POLITICAL COMMITMENT OF U.S. AND "OTHERS" (I.E., FRANCE) TO CONCLUDING A CONVENTION, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF EMPHASIS U.S. IS PUTTING ON MOVING FORWARD WITH ITS BINARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. NONETHELESS, SOVIET DEL WAS NOT CLOSING THE DOOR TO POSSIBILITY OF EARLY DATA EXCHANGE. SOVIET SIDE EMPHASIZED THAT SOMETHING COULD WELL BE WORKED OUT IF U.S. GAVE CLEAR SIGNAL OF ITS COMMITMENT TO GO AHEAD WITH A CW BAN. -- BOTH SIDES ALSO REVIEWED PROGRESS DURING THE ROUND AND AGREED TO SEEK A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO DIFFERENCES OVER GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULE 1 (PROHIBITED) CHEMICALS AND CONTENT OF THIS LIST. IN ADDITION, SOVIET MILREP SUGGESTED TO U.S. MILREP THAT MILREPS HAVE MILITARY DISCUSSIONS DURING NEXT ROUND. END SUMMARY. 3. BILATERAL EXCHANGE -- - -- AT MARCH 3 EXPERTS MEETING, U.S. DEL PRESSED SOVIETS ON NEED FOR MOVEMENT ON U.S. 1984 PROPOSAL FOR BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF A CONVENTION. DEL STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE TO U.S. AS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE, FACT THAT ISSUE HAD HARDLY BEEN DISCUSSED PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 20 MEETING (REFTEL), AND NEED FOR BALANCE BETWEEN PROGRESS ON MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES. -- SOVIET REP (BERDENNIKOV) REPLIED THAT SOVIET SIDE WAS NOT CLOSING DOOR TO EARLY DATA EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, IT WANTED TO SEE WHAT PROGRESS IS MADE ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SPECIFICALLY CITED NEED TO WORK OUT CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES. THAT 345 SECRET 25X1 rIFd in Darf - Aniti7ed CODV Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET ISSUE, HE SAID, WAS FAR MORE COMPLICATED. DATA EXCHANGE, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD DEPEND ON A POLITICAL DECISION BY THE SIDES TO ACHIEVE A CONVENTION. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE USSR DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE U.S. WAS CONTINUING ITS BINARY PROGRAM. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS DOUBTS AS TO THE COMMITMENT OF THE U.S. AND "OTHERS" TO A BAN AND IS CONCERNED NOT TO DIVULGE MILITARY SECRETS NEEDLESSLY. (NOTE: BERDENNIKOV MADE CLEAR TO U.S. REP AFTER THE MEETING THAT THE "OTHERS" THE USSR HAS IN MIND IS FRANCE.) HOWEVER, ONCE THE POLITICAL COMMITMENT IS ESTABLISHED, THEN THE DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE COULD BE WORKED OUT. THEN THE QUESTION OF STAGES WOULD NOT BE IMPORTANT -- ASIDE FROM, PERHAPS, ON A DECLARATION OF POSSESSION OF CW. BERDENNIKOV THEN ASKED HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE U.S. ATTACHED TO A SOVIET DECLARATION OF POSSESSION. -- U.S. REP RECOMMENDED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE PAY ATTENTION TO WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN SAYS. HE NOTED THAT IN HIS FEBRUARY 5 STATEMENT TO THE CD, THE PRESIDENT HAD REAFFIRMED THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO A COMPREHENSIVE CW BAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE U.S. SIDE IS TROUBLED BY THE FACT THAT THE USSR DOES NOT EVEN ADMIT THAT IT HAS CW, EVEN THOUGH SUCH AN ADMISSION WOULD NOT AFFECT SOVIET SECURITY IN ANY WAY. NATURALLY, THS U.S. WOULD ATTACH MORE IMPORTANCE TO A DECLARATION ON POSSESSION OF CW IF IT WERE PART OF A PROCESS, RATHER THAN AN ISOLATED EVENT. THE U.S. HAD PROVIDED GREAT AMOUNTS OF DATA ON ITS CW STOCKPILE AND DID NOT FEEL ITS SECURITY WAS THEREBY DIMINISHED. AS FOR WHY THE U.S. IS GOING AHEAD WITH THE BINARY PROGRAM, IT WOULD BE MOST UNWISE FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT FOR THE U.S. TO PUT ALL ITS EGGS IN THE TREATY BASKET. U.S. REP THEN ASKED WHETHER SOVIET SIDE WAS LINKING MOVEMENT ON DATA EXCHANGE TO CHALLENGE ISSUE. BERDENNIKOV SAID THAT THE USSR TOOK THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS AT FACE VALUE. HOWEVER, THE USSR ALSO NEEDED PRACTICAL SIGNS OF MOVEMENT ON THE U.S. SIDE. AT PRESENT, HE SAID, EVERYONE SEEMED TO BE SIMPLY WAITING FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO COME FORWARD WITH MORE AND MORE CONCESSIONS. THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT WANT TO SINGLE OUT ANY ISSUE. HOWEVER, CHALLENGE INSPECTION WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND 346 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168Rnnni nni nnnni A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SFCRFT DIFFICULT ISSUES. BERDENNIKOV THEN ASKED HOW THE U.S. ENVISAGED THE DATA EXCHANGE OCCURRING. NOTING THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IF THERE WERE TO BE AN UNDERSTANDING, HE ASKED ABOUT THE TIME PERIOD, WHETHER LOCATIONS AS WELL AS QUANTITIES WOULD BE INVOLVED, AND HOW CHALLENGE INSPECTION WOULD BE USED. -- U.S. REPS REPLIED THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF TIME PERIOD AND THAT CHALLENGE REQUESTS COULD WELL BE PART OF THE PROCESS. CHALLENGES WOULD NOT BE MADE JUST TO CHECK THE PROCEDURES BUT TO RESOLVE A SPECIFIC CONCERN. 4. SCHEDULE 1 LIST AND GUIDELINES -- -- U.S. REP ASKED SOVIET REP TO CLARIFY HIS EARLIER SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED TO FIND A SOLUTION TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SIDES OVER THE GUIDELINES (CRITERIA) FOR SCHEDULE 1 (PROHIBITED) CHEMICALS AND THE CHEMICALS ON THIS LIST. (NOTE: DIFFERENCES CENTERED ON DESCRIPTION OF KEY PRECURSORS FOR BINARY SYSTEMS -- WHICH U.S. INSISTS NOT BE SINGLED OUT FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT -- AND SOVIET REFUSAL TO AGREE TO INCLUDE IN THE LIST CERTAIN CHEMICALS OF CONCERN TO THE U.S., WHILE INSISTING THAT THE RIOT CONTROL AGENTS CS AND CR BE INCLUDED.) SOVIET REP INDICATED SOVIET SIDE WAS INTERESTED IN A "PACKAGE DEAL" WHEREBY IT WOULD AGREE TO INCLUDE IN THE LIST ALL CHEMICALS U.S. HAS PROPOSED AND TO DROP TERM "KEY COMPONENTS" IF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION COULD BE DEVISED TO MAKE SURE BINARIES ARE IMPLICITLY COVERED BY THE GUIDELINES. DELS DISCUSSED POSSIBLE FORMULATIONS AND AGREED SUBJECT WOULD BE TAKEN UP AGAIN IN MULTILATERAL CONTEXT. (COMMENT: U.S. REPS WERE CONVINCED THAT ISSUE COULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED ON THE SPOT TO U.S. SATISFACTION BUT HELD BACK IN ORDER TO SLOW PACE OF DISCUSSIONS. END COMMENT.) 5. REVIEW OF THE ROUND -- - -- U.S. REP SAID THAT FRANK EXCHANGE DURING THE ROUND WAS SIGN THAT THE REAL CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES WERE BEING LAID OUT. HOWEVER, THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN PROGRESS IN THE MULTI- LATERAL AND BILATERAL FORA HAD TO BE ADDRESSED, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE BILATERAL 347 SECRET 25X1 im,,ninecifiori in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE. -- SOVIET REP SAID THAT THE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET SIDE FELT THE IMBALANCE WAS IN THE OTHER DIRECTION. HE CITED THE SOVIET MOVEMENT ON THE STOCKPILE LOCATION ISSUE AND THE PROGRESS ON THE "KEY" PRODUCTION FACILITIES ISSUE. ONCE THE LATTER ISSUE WAS RESOLVED ALL ARTICLE VI (PERMITTED ACTIVITIES) ISSUES COULD BE RESOLVED MUCH MORE EASILY. THE SOVIET SIDE HOPED THE U.S. SIDE UNDERSTOOD THE SOVIET POSITION ON DATA EXCHANGE; THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, SOVIET REP CITED SOVIET UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO MOVE TOWARDS A CONVENTION. A CLEAR U.S. SIGNAL WOULD FACILITATE PROGRESS. HOPEFULLY, EVENTS WOULD SHOW THAT SOVIET CONCERNS IN THIS REGARD WERE NOT JUSTIFIED. 6. SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR MILITARY TALKS -- -- AT THE END OF THE MEETING, SOVIET MILITARY REP GANJA PROVIDED U.S. MILREP (GARDNER) A COPY OF MOST RECENT VERSION OF SOVIET UNCLASSIFIED PUBLICATION ON THE U.S. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, "FROM WHENCE THE THREAT?" RE REFERRED TO THE SECTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE MILITARY REPS ON THE TWO SIDES TO DISCUSS MILITARY ISSUES AT THE NEXT ROUND. U.S. MILREP SAID HE WOULD REFER THIS SUGGESTION TO WASHINGTON. 7. COMMENT -- - -- SOVIETS ARE LESS RELUCTANT THAN PREVIOUSLY TO DISCUSS DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE, ALTHOUGH POSITIONS REMAIN FAR APART. PARTICULARLY INTERESTING WAS INDICATION THAT DECLARATION OF POSSESSION OF CW IS NOT A SENSITIVE ISSUE. DEL SUSPECTS THAT SOVIETS MAY PLAN TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE CW AND THEN PRESS OTHER "CLOSET CW STATES" TO MATCH THEIR OPENNESS. -- LATE COMMENT: SOVIET AMB. NAZARKIN MADE VERY LOW KEY BUT UNMISTAKABLE ANNOUNCEMENT IN CD PLENARY MEETING ON MARCH 5 THAT THE USSR POSSESSES CW. END COMMENT. -- SOVIET "PACKAGE DEAL" ON SCHEDULE 1 WOULD ELIMINATE ALLUSIONS TO BINARIES. THEIR CONCERN TO ENSURE BINARIES ARE FULLY COVERED 348 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000inninnnni _A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SRT COINCIDES WITH U.S. POSITION THAT ALL CW BE CAPTURED BY THE CONVENTION. END COMMENT. BE CAPTURED BY THE CONVENTION. END COMMENT. 8. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 349 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET SECRET GENEVA 02622 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, U.S./USSR INFORMAL POINT PAPER ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-016. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. THIS IS AN INFORMAL POINT PAPER PREPARED AD REFERENDUM TO CAPITALS BY U.S. AND SOVIET CW BILATERAL DELEGATIONS. BRACKETED LANGUAGE IS INDICATED BY //. BEGIN TEXT: MARCH 2, 1987 CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES 1. POSSIBLE DEFINITION THE TERM "CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY": (A) INCLUDES ANY EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS ANY BUILDING HOUSING SUCH EQUIPMENT, THAT WAS DESIGNED, CONSTRUCTED OR USED SINCE JANUARY 1, 1946: (I) AS PART OF THE STAGE IN THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICALS ("FINAL TECHNOLOGICAL STAGE") WHERE THE MATERIAL FLOWS CONTAIN ANY SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICAL, OR ANY OTHER CHEMICAL THAT HAS NO USE FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES ABOVE . . . KILOGRAMS PER YEAR BUT CAN BE USED FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES; OR (II) FOR FILLING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. (B) DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY FACILITY WITH AN ANNUAL CAPACITY FOR SYNTHESIS OF CHEMICALS SPECIFIED IN SUBPARAGRAPH 1(A) (I) ABOVE THAT IS LESS THAN . . . KILOGRAMS. 2. POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR ELIMINATION, INCLUDING VERIFICATION (A) GENERAL -- CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES SHOULD BE ELIMINATED. -- ELIMINATION AND ITS VERIFICATION SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO AGREED GUIDELINES. -- THE DETAILED PLANS FOR ELIMINATION, AS WELL AS CORRESPONDING VERIFICATION MEASURES, SHOULD BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE STATE PARTY TO ENSURE THAT THE 350 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000inninnnni _A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET AGREED GUIDELINES ARE MET. -- THE ELIMINATION PROCESS SHOULD BE VERIFIED BY SYSTEMATIC INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTION. (B) ELIMINATION OF EQUIPMENT -- SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE PHYSICALLY DESTROYED. AS AN EXCEPTION, CERTAIN SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT MAY BE USED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES, PURSUANT TO AGREED CONDITIONS. -- SUCH AN EXCEPTION MAY ONLY BE REQUESTED FOR SPECIFIC PIECES OF EQUIPMENT IN THE MAIN PRODUCTION TRAIN: (A) AT A FACILITY THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN CONVERTED TO PERMITTED PURPOSES, OR (B) AT A FACILITY THAT PRODUCES CHEMICALS FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES, BUT WAS ALSO DESIGNED, CONSTRUCTED, OR USED TO PRODUCE A CHEMICAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES THAT IS NEITHER A SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICAL NOR A SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICAL WITH AN ALKYL-PHOSPHORUS BOND. ALL OTHER SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT AT THE FACILITY MUST BE DESTROYED. -- "SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT" IS: . THE MAIN PRODUCTION TRAIN, INCLUDING ANY REACTOR OR EQUIPMENT FOR PRODUCT SYNTHESIS, SEPARATION OR PURIFICATION AND ANY OTHER EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE PRODUCT, OR WOULD BE IF THE FACILITY WERE OPERATED. . ANY CHEMICAL WEAPON FILLING MACHINES. . ANY OTHER EQUIPMENT SPECIALLY DESIGNED, BUILT OR INSTALLED FOR THE OPERATION OF THE FACILITY AS A CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY, AS DISTINCT FROM A FACILITY CONSTRUCTED ACCORDING TO PREVAILING COMMERCIAL INDUSTRY STANDARDS FOR FACILITIES NOT PRODUCING SUPER- TOXIC LETHAL OR CORROSIVE CHEMICALS. (EXAMPLES INCLUDE EQUIPMENT MADE OF HIGH-NICKEL ALLOYS OR OTHER SPECIAL MATERIAL; SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR WASTE CONTROL, WASTE TREATMENT, AIR FILTERING, OR SOLVENT RECOVERY; SPECIAL CONTAINMENT ENCLOSURES AND SAFETY SHIELDS; NON-STANDARD LABORATORY EQUIPMENT USED TO ANALYZE TOXIC CHEMICALS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES; CUSTOM-DESIGNED PROCESS CONTROL PANELS; DEDICATED SPARES FOR SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT.) -- "STANDARD EQUIPMENT" COULD BE REUSED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES UNDER AGREED CONDITIONS. 351 SECRET 25X1 im,,,,Inecifiori in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET OTHERWISE IT MUST BE DESTROYED. -- "STANDARD EQUIPMENT" INCLUDES: . PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT WHICH IS GENERALLY USED IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE TYPES OF "SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT;" . FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT, GUARD AND SECURITY/ SAFETY SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT, MEDICAL FACILITIES, LABORATORY FACILITIES, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. (C) ELIMINATION OF BUILDINGS -- THE WORD "BUILDING" SHOULD INCLUDE UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES. -- SPECIALIZED BUILDINGS SHOULD BE PHYSICALLY DESTROYED. AS AN EXCEPTION, SUCH BUILDINGS MAY BE CONVERTED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES, PURSUANT TO AGREED CONDITIONS. -- "SPECIALIZED BUILDING" IS: . ANY BUILDING CONTAINING SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT IN A PRODUCTION/FILLING CONFIGURATION; . ANY BUILDING WHICH HAS DISTINCTIVE FEATURES WHICH DISTINGUISH IT FROM BUILDINGS NORMALLY USED FOR CHEMICAL PRODUCTION OR FILLING ACTIVITIES NOT BANNED BY THE CONVENTION. -- "STANDARD ("NON-SPECIALIZED") BUILDINGS" COULD BE REUSED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES UNDER AGREED CONDITIONS. OTHERWISE, THEY MUST BE DESTROYED. -- "STANDARD BUILDINGS" MEANS BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTED TO PREVAILING INDUSTRY STANDARDS FOR FACILITIES NOT PRODUCING SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL OR CORROSIVE CHEMICALS. (D) GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR REUSE OF EQUIPMENT OR BUILDINGS -- ALL PLANS FOR REUSE OF EQUIPMENT AND BUILDINGS, AS WELL AS CORRESPONDING VERIFICATION MEASURES, SHOULD BE AGREED BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE STATE PARTY. -- THE REUSE OF EQUIPMENT OR BUILDINGS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE FACILITY IN QUESTION IS NO MORE CAPABLE OF BEING RECONVERTED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION/FILLING THAN ANY 352 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-0116ARnnn1 nn nnnni A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SEC.RRT SIMILAR FACILITY USED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES. TO THE EXTENT THAT A BUILDING OR ANY PART OF THE REMAINING FACILITY HAS SPECIAL FEATURES (TO BE SPECIFIED) IN EXCESS OF THOSE NEEDED BY FACILITIES NOT PRODUCING SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS OR CORROSIVE CHEMICALS, E.G., SPECIAL AIR FILTERING AND SPECIAL CONTAINMENT MEASURES, THEY MUST BE REMOVED OR MODIFIED. IN INSTANCES WHERE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO CONVERT A BUILDING TO MEET THESE STANDARDS, THE BUILDING MUST BE DESTROYED. -- EQUIPMENT OR BUILDINGS SHOULD BE REUSED ONLY FOR //NON-MILITARY PEACEFUL// (NOTE: SOVIETS CAN ACCEPT WITH OR WITHOUT ERACKETED PHRASE. U.S. DEL HAS NO GUIDANCE.) PERMITTED PURPOSES. FURTHERMORE, EQUIPMENT OR BUILDINGS SHOULD NOT BE REUSED FOR PRODUCTION/FILLING OF CHEMICALS IN SCHEDULE 1, OTHER SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS, OR CORROSIVE CHEMICALS. TO ENSURE THIS, THE FACILITY WILL NOT CONTAIN ANY EQUIPMENT SPECIALLY NEEDED FOR HANDLING SUCH CHEMICALS, INCUDING LINED OR HIGH-NICKEL ALLY PIPING OR VESSELS FOR ANY LOW-PRESSURE CONTAINMENT AREAS. -- INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORS SHOULD MONITOR THE DISMANTLING OF EQUIPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS. -- ALL CONVERTED FACILITIES, INCLUDING FACILITIES CONVERTED BEFORE A STATE BECAME A PARTY, SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATORY ON-SITE INSPECTION AND THEN TO SUBSEQUENT MONITORING FOR THE LIFE OF THE FACILITY AS FOLLOWS: - (A) FACILITIES CONVERTED TO A USE NOT INVOLVING CHEMICAL PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING WILL BE MONITORED BY SYSTEMATIC ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AT A FREQUENCY TO BE DETERMINED. - (B) FACILITIES CONVERTED TO PERMITTED CHEMICAL PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING WILL BE MONITORED BY DATA REPORTING AND SYSTEMATIC ON-SITE VERIFICATION. (THE INCLUSION OF ON-SITE INSTRUMENTS IN ADDITION TO INSPECTIONS SHOULD BE EXPLORED.) FREQUENCY OF INSPECTION, AS WELL AS THE USE OF INSTRUMENTS, IS TO BE DETERMINED. -- PERMITTED ACTIVITIES MAY CONTINUE DURING CONVERSION. -- INFORMATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED IN THE DETAILED 353 SECRET nprlacsifiRd in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET PLANS FOR ELIMINATION ON, INTER ALIA, THE PRECISE LOCATION, IDENTITY AND PURPOSE OF REUSE OF EQUIPMENT AND ON THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH BUILDINGS ARE TO BE REUSED. -- EQUIPMENT AND BUILDINGS SHOULD BE REUSED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME (FOOTNOTE: A SPECIFIC PERIOD SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED); THEY SHOULD NOT BE "MOTHBALLED." AS AN EXCEPTION, SMALL STANDARD PARTS, SUCH AS VALVES, FITTINGS, ETC., MAY BE RETURNED TO STOCKPILES OF LIKE PARTS. -- INITIAL AND FOLLOW-UP ON-SITE INSPECTION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT AS REQUIRED TO ENSURE THAT THROUGH THE REUSE OF EQUIPMENT, THE RECEIVING FACILITY HAD NOT BEEN MADE SUITABLE FOR RAPID CONVERSION TO CW PRODUCTION. 3. RELATED MEASURES (A) FACILITIES FOR PRODUCTION OF KEY PRECURSORS 411. -- ANY FACILITY USED TO PRODUCE //FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES// (NOTE: SOVIETS HAVE BRACKETED) A KEY PRECURSOR FOR WHICH THE NEED FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES EXCEEDS . . . . KILOGRAMS PER YEAR SHOULD BE DECLARED AND MONITORED UNDER ARTICLE VI ("PERMITTED ACTIVITIES"). -- IT SHOULD BE DEMONSTRATED TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL THAT THERE IS A LEGITIMATE NEED FOR THE FACILITY AND THAT USAGE (PERCENT OF RATED CAPACITY) FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES IS CONSISTENT WITH PREVAILING INDUSTRY STANDARDS. -- IF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL DETERMINES THAT THE CAPACITY IS GREATER THAN THE PREVAILING INDUSTRY STANDARD WOULD JUSTIFY FOR DEMONSTRATED LEGITIMATE NEEDS, THE EXCESS CAPACITY SHOULD BE DESTROYED, OR CONVERTED TO OTHER PERMITTED PURPOSES. THE DESTRUCTION OR CONVERSION OF THE EXCESS CAPACITY, AND THE VERIFICATION OF THESE ACTIONS, SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE V THAT GOVERN ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. /AB) FACILITIES FOR PRODUCING CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT. -- FACILITIES USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PRODUCTION OF: (A) NON-CHEMICAL PARTS FOR CHEMICAL MUNITIONS 354 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000inninnnni _A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 gWrIN'T OR (B) SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT, SHOULD BE DECLARED AND ELIMINATED. THE ELIMINATION PROCESS AND ITS VERIFICATION SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE V THAT GOVERN ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL PRODUCTION/FILLING FACILITIES. -- ALL EQUIPMENT FOR PRODUCING NON-CHEMICAL PARTS FOR CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WHICH IS NOT STANDARD EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE DESTROYED. SUCH EQUIPMENT, WHICH MAY INCLUDE SPECIALLY DESIGNED MOLDS AND METAL-FORMING DIES, MAY BE BROUGHT TO A CENTRAL LOCATION FOR DESTRUCTION, WHICH SHOULD BE CONFIRMED BY ON-SITE INSPECTION AT THE DESTRUCTION SITE. -- ALL BUILDINGS AND STANDARD EQUIPMENT USED FOR PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE CONVERTED TO PERMITTED PURPOSES, WITH CONFIRMATION AS NECESSARY THROUGH CONSULTATION OR CHALLENGE INSPECTION. -- PERMITTED ACTIVITIES MAY CONTINUE WHILE DESTRUCTION OR CONVERSION PROCEEDS.// (NOTE: SOVIETS BRACKETED ENTIRE SECTION DEALING WITH MUNITIONS, PENDING AUTHORIZATION TO ACCEPT TEXT.) (C) FACILITIES FOR PRODUCING COMMON COMMERCIAL CHEMICALS. -- FACILITIES PRODUCING CHEMICALS IN SCHEDULE //3// //IV// SHOULD BE DECLARED AND MONITORED UNDER ARTICLE VI (PERMITTED ACTIVITIES). PLANTS PRODUCING OTHER COMMON COMMERCIAL CHEMICALS NEED NOT BE DECLARED OR MONITORED, EVEN IF THEY PRODUCED PRECURSOR CHEMICALS THAT WERE USED IN TURN FOR PRODUCING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. END TEXT. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 355 SECRET 25X1 in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 RWIRET SECRET GENEVA 02620 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, U.S.-USSR INFORMAL POINT PAPER ON BILATERAL REPRESENTATIVES AT ON SITE INSPECTIONS. 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-017. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. THIS IS AN INFORMAL POINT PAPER PREPARED BY U.S. AND SOVIET CV BILATERAL DELEGATIONS AD REFERENDUM TO CAPITALS. THERE ARE NO POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT. BEGIN TEXT: MARCH 2, 1987 PARTICIPATION OF US AND USSR REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ON THE OTHER SIDE'S TERRITORY GENERAL PROVISIONS -- TO ENHANCE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IN FULFILLMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE AND PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE U.S. AND THE USSR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES TO PARTICIPATE, ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY, IN INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO THE CONVENTION OF THE OTHER SIDE. -- THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNDERTAKING TO COOPERATE WITH OTHER PARTIES, CONTAINED IN ARTICLE IX OF THE CONVENTION. IT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE U.S. OR USSR AS PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION, NOR WOULD IT IMPEDE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS PURSUANT TO THE CONVENTION. -- EACH SIDE COULD UTILIZE THIS ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO ANY INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTION-- WHETHER ROUTINE OR CHALLENGE--OF THE OTHER SIDE. RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES -- THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ACCOMPANY THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM AS OBSERVERS AND SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO OBSERVE ALL OF ITS INSPECTION-RELATED ACTIVITIES. IN ADDITION, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, OR REQUESTS CONCERNING THE INSPECTION TO OFFICIALS OF THE SIDE BEING INSPECTED ("RECEIVING SIDE"). -- THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD NOT 356 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-o11ARPnnninninnnni A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET INTERFERE IN THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM'S EXECUTION OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, NOR INTERFERE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TEAM AND THE RECEIVING SIDE. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN PREPARATION OF THE TEAM'S REPORT TO THE RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL BODY UNDER THE CONVENTION. -- THE SIDES SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO ENABLE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS. -- THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ENJOY THE SANE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES AS THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM. GENERAL PROCEDURES -- THE SIDES SHOULD EXCHANGE LISTS OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES NOT LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE ON WHICH THE CONVENTION IS IN FORCE FOR BOTH SIDES. THEY SHOULD UPDATE THE LISTS AS NECESSARY. -- WHEN ONE SIDE ("RECEIVING SIDE") IS NOTIFIED THAT IT IS TO BE SUBJECT TO AN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION, IT WOULD INFORM THE OTHER SIDE ("OBSERVING SIDE") WITHOUT DELAY. THE OBSERVING SIDE SHOULD WITHOUT DELAY INFORM THE RECEIVING SIDE WHETHER IT WILL EXERCISE ITS RIGHT TO SEND ITS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION. -- THE SIDES SHOULD USE THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THEM TO CONSIDER QUESTIONS RELATED TO PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ARRANGEMENT FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES, AS WELL AS ANY CONCERN ARISING FROM OBSERVATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION. THE OBSERVING SIDE SHOULD COMMUNICATE TO THE RECEIVING SIDE ANY CONCERNS ARISING FROM OBSERVATION OF A PARTICULAR INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION PROMPTLY, BUT NOT LATER THAN 90 DAYS FROM THE END OF THE INSPECTION. DURING THE ANNUAL MEETINGS ENVISIONED IN THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, THE SIDES SHOULD JOINTLY EXAMINE THE OBSERVATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS FOR THE PREVIOUS YEAR AND ENDEAVOR TO RESOLVE ANY CONCERNS. IN ADDITION, PROBLEMS THAT BECOME APPARENT ONLY AFTER A SERIES OF INSPECTIONS SHOULD BE PROMPTLY COMMUNICATED 357 SECRET 25X1 Davi - Saniti7ed Cocw Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET 25X1 TO THE RECEIVING SIDE AND THEN DISCUSSED PROMPTLY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. -- DETAILED PROVISIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ARRANGEMENT FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED BILATERALLY AT THE SAME TIME THAT RELATED PROVISIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE RELATED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ARE BEING DEVELOPED. SUCH BILATERAL PROVISIONS SHOULD INCLUDE SPECIFIC TIME FRAMES FOR NOTIFICATIONS, SPECIFIC MEASURES TO FACILITATE ARRIVAL OF OBSERVERS, AND GUIDELINES FOR THE NUMBER OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES AT A SPECIFIC INSPECTION. (THE NUMBER SHOULD BE SMALL, BUT AT LEAST TWO REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE PERMITTED.) END TEXT. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 358 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168Ronninni nnnni _A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 grrurT SECRET GENEVA 02623 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, MARCH 5, 1987, AMBASSADOR HANSEN'S STATEMENT 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-018. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE PREPARED STATEMENT DELIVERED BY U.S. ACTING CD REPRESENTATIVE LYNN HANSEN AT THE LAST MEETING OF THE FIFTH ROUND OF U.S.-SOVIET INTENSIFIED CW BAN DISCUSSIONS. BEGIN TEXT. MR. AMBASSADOR, -- THIS MEETING MARKS THE END OF THE FIFTH ROUND OF ACCELERATED BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS PURSUANT TO THE NOVEMBER 1985 SUMMIT COMMITMENT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. FOR THAT REASON, I WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT A BRIEF, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, BOTH OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND OF BILATERAL WORK OF SPECIFIC ISSUES. -- THE BILATERAL COMMITMENT IN NOVEMBER 1985 CLEARLY HAS LED TO AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORK ON A COMPREHENSIVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. THIS IS VISIBLE BOTH IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AND IN THESE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. IN THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, THIS POSITIVE TREND BECAME APPARENT IN ROUND III AND DEVELOPED FURTHER IN ROUND IV. -- AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS ROUND, AND CONTINUING THROUGH THE ROUND, THERE HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET POSITION AND THE PACE HAS ACCELERATED FURTHER. WE CONSIDER THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET POSITION AS VERY IMPORTANT AND CONSTRUCTIVE ONES. WE WELCOME THEM. -- YOU APPRECIATE, I AM SURE, THAT THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, AND THEIR SPECIFIC IMPACT ON FUTURE WORK IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS, ARE BEING CAREFULLY AND INTENSIVELY ASSESSED IN WASHINGTON. -- WHILE THIS ASSESSMENT IS TAKING PLACE, U.S. REPRESENTATIVES WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY, STEADILY, AND DELIBERATELY. WE WILL CONTINUE TO FULFILL THE COMMITMENT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE IN GENEVA IN NOVEMBER 1985 AND THAT HE REAFFIRMED IN HIS MESSAGE TO THE CD ONE MONTH AGO. -- AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR OTHERS TO REALIZE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT BE RUSHED INTO AN INEFFECTIVE AGREEMENT. "GETTING IT RIGHT" IS 359 SECRET 25X1 in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. ONCE A CONVENTION IS AGREED, IT WILL BE IN FORCE FOR A LONG TIME. THEREFORE, MY DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT ISSUES BE EXAMINED THOROUGHLY AND THAT EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS BE FOUND. WE WILL INSIST THAT THE MANY DETAILS REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A CONVENTION BE WORKED OUT CAREFULLY. THIS WORK WILL TAKE MORE THAN A FEW WEEKS OR A FEW MONTHS. -- LET ME NOW TURN MORE SPECIFICALLY TO THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE OVER THE LAST THREE WEEKS. OVERALL, WE CONSIDER THAT THIS ROUND HAS BEEN MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN PREVIOUS ROUNDS. -- DURING THIS ROUND, THE TWO SIDES PREPARED A JOINT PAPER ELABORATING ON THE EARLIER AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS ON EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISHMENT. -- THE TWO SIDES ALSO RESOLVED MANY POINTS OF DIFFERENCE IN THE JOINT PAPER ON ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. ONLY A FEW BRACKETED POINTS NOW REMAIN. THIS IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISH- MENT. -- THESE PAPERS, WHICH WERE PREPARED AD REFERENDUM TO CAPITALS, WILL BE PROMPTLY REVIEWED IN WASHINGTON. IT IS, OF COURSE, POSSIBLE THAT CHANGES MAY BE SUGGESTED AS A RESULT OF THIS REVIEW. THE RESULTS OF THE REVIEW WILL BE COMMUNICATED PROMPTLY TO YOU. -- IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO INFORM THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAT MY AUTHORITIES HAVE REVIEWED THE JOINT PAPER ON BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS RESULTING FROM ROUND IV. THEY HAVE FOUND THE PAPER TO BE ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT MODIFICATION. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER MOSCOW ALSO FINDS THE PAPER TO BE ACCEPTABLE. MR. AMBASSADOR, -- IN THE U.S. VIEW, THE SUBJECTS OF EARLY DATA EXCHANGE AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION HAVE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE AT THIS STAGE OF WORK ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. DURING THIS ROUND, THE DISCUSSIONS OF THESE TWO TOPICS WERE SOMEWHAT MORE DETAILED AND USEFUL THAN IN PREVIOUS ROUNDS, ALTHOUGH NOT SATISFACTORY FROM THE U.S. VIEWPOINT. THE TWO SIDES STILL SEEM TO BE FAR APART ON BOTH OF THESE CRITICAL ISSUES. 360 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000inni nnnni _A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SPrIIFT -- THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION OF DETAILED DATA BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION BEFORE SIGNATURE OF A CONVENTION TO BE ESSENTIAL TO BUILDING THE CONFIDENCE NECESSARY FOR ENTERING INTO AN AGREEMENT TO GIVE UP ITS CHEMICAL DETERRENT. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT RULE OUT SUCH AN EARLY EXCHANGE, BUT SEEKS A GUARANTEE THAT THE CONVENTION WILL BE COMPLETED ONCE DATA IS PROVIDED. SUCH GUARANTEES ARE NOT POSSIBLE. CERTAINLY, A SATISFACTORY PROCESS OF EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION WOULD MAKE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION VERY PROBABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WITHOUT SATISFACTORY PROCESS OF DATA EXCHANGE AND CONFIRMATION, THE COMPLETION OF THE CONVENTION WOULD BE IN DOUBT. ??? -- IN OUR VIEW, THE BUILDING OF THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE MUST BE A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS, RATHER THAN A ONE-TIME ALL-OR-NOTHING AFFAIR. THAT IS WHY THE UNITED STATES PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF DATA IN TWO STAGES. FIRST, GENERAL DATA WOULD BE EXCHANGED, AND THEN MORE DETAILED DATA. CERTAINLY, "TWO" IS NOT A MAGIC NUMBER. OTHER STATES COULD BE CONSIDERED. AND THE EARLIER THE PROCESS BEGINS, THE BETTER. SOVIET FAILURE TO DEAL MORE DIRECTLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH OUR CONCERNS IN THIS REGARD CAN ONLY PROLONG THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THESE REASONS, WE BELIEVE THE DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE SHOULD BE A KEY ELEMENT IN FUTURE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. -- WHILE EMPHASIZING THE CRITICAL ROLE OF EARLY DATA EXCHANGE IN BUILDING CONFIDENCE, I DO NOT WANT TO MINIMIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF OTHER STEPS AS WELL. THE INCREASING SERIOUSNESS OF THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS CONTRIBUTES TO BUILDING CONFIDENCE. A FURTHER CONTRIBUTION COULD BE MADE, FOR EXAMPLE, THROUGH A JOINT VISIT OF U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TO THE U.S. STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION FACILITY AT TOOELE, UTAH. AS YOU KNOW, AN INVITATION HAS ALREADY BEEN EXTENDED TO THE SOVIET SIDE. THIS INVITATION REMAINS OPEN. WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL NOT IGNORE THIS OPPORTUNITY. WE ARE AWAITING YOUR RESPONSE. -- WITH REGARD TO THE CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE, THIS ALSO REMAINS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE WE WELCOME THE CHANGES MADE IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON FEBRUARY 17, IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT THE SOVIET APPROACH, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, WOULD STILL NOT PROVIDE THE NECESSARY HIGH LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTERNATIVE MEASURES SUCH AS OBSERVATION FROM A DISTANCE OR NEAR-SITE WATER SAMPLING CANNOT RESOLVE A QUESTION OF SUSPECTED CLANDESTINE STOCKPILES. THE ONLY WAY TO TELL WHETHER A MUNITIONS BUNKER CONTAINS CHEMICAL 361 SECRET nRciassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CPCRPT WEAPONS IS TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE BUNKER. THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF OPINION; IT IS A FACT. -- THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES THAT FUTURE DISCUSSIONS OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION FOCUS ON MEANS FOR PREVENTING ABUSE OF A MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION. WE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE, RATHER THAN CONTINUING TO INSIST ON A RIGHT OF REFUSAL IN MANY INSTANCES, WILL BE PREPARED TO JOIN THE U.S. SIDE IN EXAMINING OTHER POSSIBLE SAFEGUARDS IN THE INTERESTS OF FINDING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. -- TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF NON-PRODUCTION, I NOTE THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS, ALTHOUGH THIS ISSUE WAS NOT A CENTRAL ONE IN THIS ROUND. IDEAS RELATED TO SCHEDULE 1 WERE EXPLORED THAT SEEM HELPFUL, BUT REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. HOWEVER, I WOULD NOTE THAT THE U.S. SIDE IS STILL AWAITING A RESPONSE TO ITS FEBRUARY 17 REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF RANDOM, I.E., UNPREDICTABLE, TIMING OF INSPECTIONS AT DECLARED COMMERCIAL FACILITIES. -- MR. AMBASSADOR, I WILL BE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON SOON, ALONG WITH MOST OF MY COLLEAGUES. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL BE DISCUSSING DEVELOPMENTS DURING THIS ROUND WITH OUR AUTHORITIES, WHO HAVE A VERY DEEP INTEREST IN THESE DISCUSSIONS AND IN THE EFFECTIVE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RESUMING DISCUSSIONS AFTER THIS PERIOD FOR REVIEW AND FURTHER PREPARATION. END TEXT. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK END OF MESSAGE SECRET 362 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET UNCLAS GENEVA 02630 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS (ROUND V): PRESS STATEMENT: 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-019. (UNCLAS -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS RELEASED TO THE PRESS AT 1700 HOURS, MARCH 5, 1987 BY U.S. DEL. 3. BEGIN TEXT: FROM FEBRUARY 16 TO MARCH 5, DELEGATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS HELD BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE TALKS WERE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NOVEMBER 1985 AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV TO ACCELERATE EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE AN EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE GENERAL AND COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND TO INTENSIFY BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AT THE EXPERT LEVEL ON ALL ASPECTS OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION. THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY AMBASSADOR LYNN HANSEN, ACTING U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY AMBASSADOR YURI NAZARKIN, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT. END TEXT. 4. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED NNNN 363 SECRET narinccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 cATRFT SECRET GENEVA 02730 VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, MARCH 5, 1987. TEXT OF AMB. NAZARKIN'S PLENARY STATEMENT. 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-002 (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. BEGIN TEXT-- STATEMENT BY THE HEAD OF THE USSR DELEGATION YU. K. NAZARKIN AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS GENEVA, MARCH 5, 1987 MR. AMBASSADOR, -- USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN THE COURSE OF THE FIFTH ROUND OF SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ABOUT TO BE COMPLETED TODAY, AND, WE HOPE, THIS WORK WILL PERMIT US TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE TASK OF PREPARING THE CONVENTION. AS A RESULT OF NEW PROPOSALS ON THE DECLARATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES, BROUGHT FORTH BY THE SOVIET UNION ON FEBRUARY 17, 1987, THIS ISSUE, AS SHOWN BY OUR DISCUSSIONS, WAS PRACTICALLY RESOLVED. WE SPEAK OUT FOR THE USE OF MAXIMALLY EFFICIENT METHODS OF STOCKPILE VERIFICATION INCLUDING PERMANENT USE OF INSTRUMENTS. IT APPEARS TO US THAT, FOR MAKING THIS SITUATION MORE SPECIFIC, ONE COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PROVISIONS IN THE DOCUMENT CD/516 PRESENTED BY THE U.S. WE PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT THE QUESTION OF STOCKPILES WAS, IN PRINCIPLE, RESOLVED BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. DELEGATIONS. -- THE CENTRAL ISSUE ON WHICH NOTICEABLE PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED IN THE COURSE OF THIS ROUND IS THE ISSUE OF CHEMICAL WEAPON-PRODUCING FACILITIES. WE ARE PREPARED TO REPORT THE DOCUMENT DEVELOPED BY OUR DELEGATIONS TO OUR CAPITAL. WE PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT, IN ORDER TO FINISH WORKING OUT THE DEFINITION CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT, IT IS STILL NECESSARY TO AGREE ON THE THRESHOLDS WHICH ARE PROVIDED FOR IN ITEMS (A) (I) AND (B) OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL. ACCORDING TO OUR VIEW, THEY SHOULD BE LOW THRESHOLDS MEASURED IN KILOGRAMS AS IT IS INDICATED IN THE WORKING DOCUMENT. WE ARE AWAITING FURTHER, MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THIS MATTER FROM THE U.S. DELEGATION. AS FOR THE SECTION ON POSSIBLE ELIMINATION MEASURES, INCLUDING VERIFICATION, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS A MATTER OF FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, AND BUILDINGS WHICH ARE INCLUDED IN THE DEVELOPED DEFINITION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS-PRODUCING FACILITY. -- I WOULD LIKE TO ESPECIALLY DWELL ON SECTION III OF THE DEVELOPED DOCUMENT ENTITLED, "RELATED MEASURES". REGREATABLY, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE COMPLETE 364 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-0116RRnnn1nnl nnnni A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 WPRPT AGREEMENT ON THIS SECTION. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PHRASE, "FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES" UNDER ITEM (A) OF THIS SECTION WHICH SPEAKS OF KEY PRECURSORS, CREATES A LOOPHOLE FOR BRINGING OF A CONSIDERABLE PART OF INSTALLATIONS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF SUCH CHEMICALS OUT FROM UNDER THE REGIME OF THE CONVENTION UNDER THE PRETEXT THAT THEY ARE ALLEGEDLY BEING PRODUCED NOT FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES. IT WILL, IN ANY CASE, MOST LIKELY BE DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH WHICH KEY PRECURSORS WERE DIRECTED TOWARD CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND WHICH ONES TOWARD PERMITTED PURPOSES. THIS IS WHY WE ARE PROPOSING THAT THE CONVENTION ENCOMPASS ALL PRODUCTION OF KEY PRECURSORS, WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE ACTIVITY IN ANY CASE, INDEPENDENT OF THE FACT WHETHER THESE PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN THE PAST WERE OR WERE NOT USED FOR PURPOSES OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE CAPACITY THRESHOLD WHICH IS TO BE ESTABLISHED PROVIDES FOR, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROVISIONS ON EXCESSIVE CAPACITIES, A CRITERION WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE PRODUCTION OF KEY PRECURSORS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES FROM THE REST OF THE PRODUCTION OF KEY PRECURSORS. -- WE COUNT ON BEING ABLE TO RESOLVE IN THE NEAREST FUTURE THE ISSUE OF KEY PRECURSORS-PRODUCING FACILITIES. -- ANOTHER UNRESOLVED QUESTION IN SECTION III REMAINS THE ISSUE ON FACILITIES FOR THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE ARE THANKFUL TO THE U.S. DELEGATION FOR PROVIDING DETAILS ON THIS PROPOSAL IT MADE. THEY WILL BE REPORTED TO OUR CAPITAL SUBSEQUENT TO WHICH A DECISION WILL BE MADE ON THE USSR POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. AT THIS STAGE, WE DO NOT CONSIDER OURSELVES BOUND IN ANY WAY BY THE TEXT CONTAINED IN SECTION III, ITEM (B). -- IN THE COURSE OF EXCHANGING VIEWS, ON THE ISSUE OF NON-PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN COMMERCIAL INDUSTRY, WE PROVIDED ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WHICH WERE PROPOSED TO US BY THE AMERICAN SIDE AT THE PRECEDING ROUND. AS FAR AS WE UNDERSTAND, OUR REPLIES CONTRIBUTED TO THE CLARIFICATION OF THESE QUESTIONS. AS FOR THE OTHER QUESTIONS OF THE U.S., THE REPLIES, AS NOTED BY BOTH SIDES, WERE PROVIDED EARLIER IN THE COURSE OF MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT ROUND, WE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF CATEGORY I LISTS OF CHEMICALS TO WHICH, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE U.S. SIDE ASCRIBES A GREAT DEAL OF IMPORTANCE. WE HOPE THAT OUR PROPOSALS WILL SOON LEAD TO A MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. I WISH TO STRESS THAT THE DELEGATION OF THE SOVIET UNION 365 SECRET npriaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 BELIEVES THAT WE WENT MORE THAN HALF-WAY TO MEET THE U.S. POSITION IN THIS MATTER. WE THINK THE CONVENTION SHOULD PROVIDE FOR A RELIABLE PROHIBITION AND DESTRUCTION NOT ONLY OF UNITARY BUT ALSO OF BINARY AND MULTI-COMPONENT CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND, BY THE WAY, NOT ONLY OF ITS KNOWN EXAMPLES AND TYPES, BUT SHOULD ALSO BLOCK THE APPEARANCE OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS WITH THE USE OF STILL UNKNOWN CHEMICALS. WE HOPE THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION SHARES WITH US THE AIM OF COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF ANY CHEMICAL WEAPONS. -- I WOULD LIKE TO DWELL ESPECIALLY ON THE QUESTION WHICH, AS WE SEE IT, IS THE MAJOR ONE OUT OF ALL THE REMAINING UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS; THAT IS, ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. WE PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS SHOULD BECOME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MECHANISM GUARANTEEING COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION BY ALL PARTIES TO IT AND SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN EFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION OF THE VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION NO MATTER BY WHOM. WE ARE EMPHASIZING THIS IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS AS A PRE- VENTION OF VIOLATIONS. AS WE SEE IT, CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS AS SUCH, IN PRACTICE, SHOULD BE AN EXCEPTIONALLY RARE, AN EXTRAORDINARY PHENOMENON, YET THE POSSIBILITY TO CARRY THEM OUT SHOULD RENDER VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION A POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE MATTER. WE HOPE THAT THE U.S. SIDE SHARES THIS APPROACH OF OURS. -- AS WE SEE IT, A FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE ISSUE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION TOOK PLACE DURING THIS ROUND. THIS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER. I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THE FACT THAT WE MET THE U.S. POSITION HALF-WAY, AGREED WITH THE AUTOMATIC NATURE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS IN FULL IN CASES WHEN THERE IS SUSPICION THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE USED, OR WITH RESPECT TO DECLARED FACILITIES OR LOCATIONS ACCORDING TO THE CONVENTION. WE ARE ALSO FOR HAVING THE INSPECTION CONDUCTED IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE PERIODS, SO THAT THE STATE IN VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION WOULD NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO COVER UP ITS TRACKS. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE CONVENTION SHOULD NOT HAVE ANY FORBIDDEN ZONES FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS, OTHERWISE, IT IS PRECISELY IN THESE FORBIDDEN ZONES THAT VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION WILL TAKE PLACE, SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, CLANDESTINE CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES. -- AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT WE ARE NOT DEVELOPING AN AGREEMENT ON COMPLETE AND COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT, BUT RATHER, A CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF AN IMPORTANT WEAPON, YET STILL ONLY ONE TYPE OF WEAPONS, NAMELY, CHEMICAL WEAPONS. 366 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168Rnnni nni nnnni A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SFPRFT THEREFORE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES, INCLUDING MILITARY ACTIVITIES, NOT RELATED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS. MOREOVER, IF OTHER TYPES OF ARMS ARE NOT TOUCHED UPON BY THIS CONVENTION, IT MEANS THAT STATES MAY HAVE SECRETS RELATED TO THESE OTHER TYPES OF ARMS, THEIR DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING, AND THE LIKE. I COULD NOTE IN PARENTHESES THAT IN MANY INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS DEVELOPED WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE U.S., INCLUDING THE DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONVENTION, THE RIGHT OF STATES TO HAVE CLOSED LOCATIONS AND REGIONS IS ACKNOWLEDGED. THUS, THE TASK CONSISTS OF SETTING UP A SYSTEM OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS SO THAT ON ONE HAND, EFFECT IVENSSS WOULD BE ASSURED AND ON THE OTHER HAND, NO DAMAGE WOULD BE DONE TO THE SECURITY OF STATES IN AREAS IN NO WAY RELATED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS. -- AS WE SEE IT, A GOOD WAY TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE IS PROVIDED FOR BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DOCUMENT, CD/715. THE MAIN IDEA OF THIS PROPOSAL--THE POSSIBILITY TO PROPOSE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES WHICH WOULD SATISFY THE STATES MAKING THE REQUEST--IS VIEWED BY US AS THE KEY WHICH COULD FACILITATE THE FINDING OF MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE DECISION WHICH WOULD OBJECTIVELY CORRESPOND TO THE SCOPE OF PROHIBITION OF THE CONVENTION BEING DEVELOPED. -- AS FOR THE APPROACH CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT CD/500, PERTAINING TO THE U.S. DELEGATION, WE CANNOT AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN IT: - -- THE DISCRIMINATORY NATURE WITH RESPECT TO STATE PROPERTY; ^ -- THE LACK OF POSSIBILITY TO PROPOSE AND AGREE ON ALTERNATIVE MEASURES IN THOSE CASES WHEN FULL ACCESS TO ONE OR ANOTHER LOCATION OR FACILITY IS IMPOSSIBLE; - -- AUTOMATIC INSPECTIONS IN ALL CASES. -- ONE SHOULD MOREOVER TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF STATES PARTY TO THE CONVENTION WILL TURN OUT TO BE IN AN UNEQUAL POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE FIVE STATES-MEMBERS OF THE FACT-FINDING GROUP, WHICH WILL APPARENTLY BE UNACCETABLE. -- IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE SOONER THE U.S. SIDE INTRODUCES CORRECTIONS INTO ITS APPROACH, THE BETTER IT WILL BE FOR A SPEEDY CONCLUSION OF A CONVENTION. -- FINALLY, ONE SHOULD DWELL ON THE ISSUE OF BILATERAL MEASURES. WE SHARE THE VIEW THAT A HIGHER LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION OF CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT. A LOT HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED IN THIS RESPECT. OUR DELEGATIONS AGREED ON A DOCUMENT ON A BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM, AND WE CONFIRM THE FACT THAT WE AGREE TO SUCH A DOCUMENT. AS WE UNDER- 367 SECRET 25X1 nprdaccified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET STAND IT, THE U.S. SIDE IS DOING THE SAME. IN THE COURSE OF THIS ROUND, OUR EXPERTS DEVELOPED A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE PARTICIPATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OTHER SIDE IN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS ON USSR AND U.S. TERRITORIES. WE EXAMINED THIS DOCUMENT, ON THE DELEGATION LEVEL, AND CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEND IT TO OUR CAPITAL FOR CONSIDERATION, SHOULD THE AMERICAN SIDE BE PREPARED TO DO LIKEWISE. -- WE KNOW WHAT GREAT IMPORTANCE THE U.S. SIDE ASCRIBES TO THE QUESTION OF DATA EXCHANGE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AND HERE, TOO, WE MET THE U.S. WISH HALF-WAY: WE AGREED TO HAVING SUCH AN EXCHANGE TAKE PLACE AFTER THE SIGNING BUT PRIOR TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION. FINALLY, HAVING TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE U.S. VIEWPOINT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF HOW HAVING THE INFORMATION ON THE POSSESSION OR NON-POSSESSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WE MADE A STATEMENT AT TODAY'S PLENARY MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN WHICH IT IS DIRECTLY STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS THE U.S., ARE STATES POSSESSING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE HOPE THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION WILL ? APPRECIATE THIS STEP OF OURS AS A CONTRIBUTION TO CREATING AND STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE IN THE FIELD OF THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. -- THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE, TOGETHER WITH THE U.S., THE CONSIDERATION OF FURTHER STEPS TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE. WE FEEL THAT AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES WOULD BE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN UNDERSTANDING ON ONE OF THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF THE CONVENTION--ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. BUT IT, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, REQUIRES STRIVING FOR AN UNDERSTANDING NOT ONLY ON OUR PART, BUT FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF BOTH SIDES. END TEXT. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 368 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000inninnnni _A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 PAGE 61 SEP,R ET , FILE Department of State GENEVA 02732 81 OF 06 06138IZ ACTION OFFICE ACOA-I2 WLM INFO /082 Al INFO 656-6I INFO 556-61 I 11 GNI I NG 2701 J2039 6601672 PAGE 61 GENEVA 82732 01 OF 06 061901Z 2701 002151 6501672 0E/0359Z DELS HOD USEFUL, DETAILED CISCUSSIONS ON 10-81 /002 ?? OCT-81 /062 Al WLM OCT PASS ACDE CHALLENGE ANC DATA EXCHANGE ISSUES. IRONICALLY, SOVIET POSITION ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION IS NOV 05/83521 MORE STRINGENT THAN THE UN POSITION, SINCE SOVIETS SUPPORT MANDATORY INSPECTION IN TWO 06/19321 CASES. -- ALSO, AT BEGINNING OF ROUND SOVIETS 06/19231 ANNOUNCED IN THE CD THAT THEY CAN AGREE TO PROMPT DECLARATION OF CW STOCKPILE LOCATIONS WITH EXTENSIVE ON-SITE VERIFICATION. AT END OF ROUND THEY ACKNOWLEDGED IN ANOTHER CD STATEMENT THAT THE USSR POSSESSES CHEMICAL WEAPONS. 06/1906Z - -- SOVIETS CONTINUE TO CRITICIZE ARTICLE STRONGLY AND TO INSIST ON A RIGHT OF REFUSAL ACTION OFFICE EUR-02 INFO MR-01 550-81 SSS-01 SSI-02 SS-01 0-01 P-02 7-01 C-81 SARN-I1 INR-61 L-01 PA-81 OCT-01 PM-8I SP-01 SRT-0l SNP-01 ACDA-01 SSSC-01 SDEL-03 /027 Al WLM OCT PASS INRE ASCE CIAE DODE INFO AC011-81 X-81 /002 A4 GAN ACTION SS-06 INFO LOG-00 AOS-06 550-00 /000 W 132213 0619031 /38 0 8618582 MAR 17 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO SECSTATE WASNDC IMMEDIATE 6752 INFO DOE VASHDC JCS WASHDC SECDEF WASNOC AMEMIASSY BONN AMEMIASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY VIENNA USMISSION MATO USDEL NIFR VIENNA SECRETSECTION II OF 06 GENEVA 02732 EXDIS ACOA FOR MA; DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/001N; SECDEF FOR OSO/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PARM UNGA, COG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CIO: US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND V WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS REF: U0 VO IC/ MO 1E/ STATE 644871 (ROUND V GUIDANCE/ STATE 34378f-'1GUIDANCE ON PRODUCTION FACILITIES) STATE 33914/ (GUIDANCE ON BILATERAL OBSERvERSI GENEVA 86134 (ROUNO CW BILAT-868I GENEVA 2626 (LW BILAT-017) GENEVA 2622 ICW 0ILAT-016/ I. THIS IS CW BILAT-621. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY/OVERALL ASSESSMENT -- -- FIFTH BILATERAL ROUND, HELD IN GENEVA DURING THREE-WEEK PERIOD ENDING MARCH 5, WAS NOTABLE FOR SOVIET EXPRESSIONS OF WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT VIRTUALLY ANYTHING THE U.S. PROPOSED ON ISSUE OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND ON BILATERAL OBSERVER ARRANGEMENT. ON THE OTHER NAND, REY ISSUES OF MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE, ARE STILL FAR FROM RESOLUTION. () 36g A crrDCT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 IN MOST CASES. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NOW FRAGMENTARY SIGNS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT EVENTUALLY ACCEPT ARTICLE X, PARTICULARLY IN A BILATERAL CONTEXT, AFTER MOVING THROUGH SEVERAL INTERMEDIATE POSITIONS. -- TWO SIDES WORKED OUT AN INFORMAL POINT PAPER BASED ON U.S. PROPOSAL FOR SOVIET OBSERVERS AT INSPECTIONS OF U.S. SITES AND VICE VERSA. INFORMAL POINT PAPER ON ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES HAS ONLY A FEW UNRESOLVED POINTS. END SUMMARY. 3. DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES -- A. U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS MET TEN TIMES IN GENEVA BETWEEN 16 FEBRUARY AND 4 MARCH FOR FIFTH ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS PURSUANT TO THE 1985 SUMMIT AGREEMENT TO INTENSIFY BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. (THIS REPRESENTS THREE FEWER MEETINGS THAN IN PREVIOUS ROUND.) FIRST AND LAST MEETINGS WERE AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, THE OTHERS AT EXPERTS LEVEL. B. PRIMARY TOPICS WERE: CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CV) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 X 0 S PAGE 01 S;:.UET Department of State GENEVA 02732 02 OF 36 0619021 ACTION OFFICE ACDA-11 INFO SSS-01 /013 Al WLM ia. 2762 070359 :S01673 INFO SSS-01 10-111 /001. ,S/S--0 11 PAGE 01 GEMEVA a2732 02 Or 06 251902Z 1'32 Z:2359 ! 161 06/0359Z DID NOT ENGAGE IN POLEMICS ON BINARIES, NOR DID THEY iNTRODUCE EXTRANEOUS SUBJECTS. 06/03521 B. SOVIETS WERE nu:m LESS FORTHCOMING ON BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION 06/1933Z THAN OTHER VERIFICATION-RELATED AREAS. HOWEVER, THEY WERE LESS RETICENT THAN IN PREVIOUS ROUNDS, PARTICULARLY ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. BOTH ISSUES, HOWEVER, REMAIN FAR FROM RESOLUTION. ACTION OFFICE EUR-112 INFO MR-11 550-01 SSS-01 55I-02 SS-01 0-01 P-62 7-01 C-01 SARN-11 INR-11 L-01 PA-11 OCT-01 PM-01 SP-01 SART-01 ACOA-11 SSSC-01 50E1-03 SCSC-01 /028 Al WLM OCT PASS IMRE NSC( CIAE DODE ACDE INFO ,ICDA-It X-01 /002 Al GAK ACTION 55-01 INFO LOG-11 ADS-01 SS0-00 /080 W 132317. 0619041 /38 0 0618511 MAR 17 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO SECSTATE WASP= IMMEDIATE 6753 INFO DOC WASHDC JCS MASI= SECOEF WASNDC AMEMIASSY BONN AMEMRASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMIASSY PARIS AMEMSASSY VIENNA USMISSION USNATO USOEL MIFR VIENNA SECRETSECT1ON 02 OF 86 GENEVA 02732 EXDIS ACOA FOR MA; DOE FOR OP/ISA; JCS FOR .15/0DIN; SECDEF FOR 050/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE B. 0. 12356: CUL: TAGS: FIRM UNGA, CDG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR PRODUCTION FACILITIES, BILATERAL OBSERVER ARRANGEMENT, BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE, AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION. IN ADDITION, THE SIDES DISCUSSED ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING MON-PRODUCTIONPLANI-INTERIM MONITORING. C. DISCUSSION OF IlLATERAL OBSERVER ARRANGEMENTS RESULTED IN INFORMAL POINT PAPER USED ON U.S. APPROACH (TEXT REF F). 'INFORMAL POINT PAPER ON CV PRODUCTION FACILITIES THAT WAS JOINTLY DEVELOPED IN ROUND III AND IV WAS FURTHER ELABORATED, BUT NOT COMPLETED. (TEXT REF F). IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH PAPERS ARE TO It REVI(VED IN CAPITALS AND NAT THIS COULD RESULT IN SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES. 4. SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS -- A. ROUND V WAS NOTABLE FOR STATED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT VIRTUALLY ANYTHING THE U.S. PROPOSED ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND BILATERAL OBSERVER ISSUES. THIS REPRESENTS A FURTHER MANIFESTATION OF THE MORE BUSINESS-LIKE SOVIET APPROACH ALREADY APPARENT IN ROUNDS III AND IV. SOVIETS C. WHILE SOVIETS PRESSED TO REACH AGREEMENT 06/19061 ON CV PRODUCTION FACILITY ISSUE, IN THOSE AREAS WHERE U.S. HAD DETAILED MATERIAL TO PUT FORWARD, THEY WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS IT AND IN MOST 3688 CrrInT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-m1RRPnnni nr1 rIn CASES ACCEPTED THE U.S. PROPOSALS. S. ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES -- A.. CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES -- -- U.S. DEL PUT FORWARD CHANGES IN U.S. VIEWS AS INSTRUCTED REF A. THESE POINTS WERE ACCEPTED BY SOVIETS. IN ADDITION, MOST POINTS REMAINING UNRESOLVED FROM PREVIOUS ROUND WERE AGREED ON BASIS OF THE U.S. APPROACH REF B. -- IN ORDER TO HELP ENSURE AN ORDERLY, DELIBERATE PACE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, U.S. DEL DID NOT PRESS TO COMPLETE PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER. IN FACT, U.S. DEL SOUGHT TO ENSURE THAT AT LEAST A FEW POINTS REMAINED FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. DEL BARELY MANAGED THIS SINCE SOVIETS ACCEPTED VIRTUALLY ALL U.S. PROPOSALS. -- REMAINING ISSUES ARE RELATIVELY MINOR: G1 WHETHER OR NOT CONVERTED BUILDINGS CAN BE USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES MOVIETS CAN ACCEPT EITHER SOLUTION; U.S. DEL HAS NO INSTRUCTIONS), MI WHETHER SAME APPROACH TO ELIMINATION OF EXCESSIVE PRODUCTION Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Department of State PAGE 91 GENEVA 92732 03 OF 06 0619942 ACTION OFFICE *CDA-12 INFO 555-11 /093 Al WLM 270A 003269 5S01674 06/93592 INFO 555-91 10-11 /902. 00/93552 00/1935: ACTION OFFICE EUR-112 INFO 110-91 SSO-OI SSS-OI SSI-92 55-01 0-01 P-02 1-01 C-01 SARN-11 INR-11 L-111 PA-01 OCT-01 P11-01 SP-01 SAR1-01 SNP-91 ACOA-01 SSSC-91 SDEL-03 SCSC-11 /028 Al WLM OCT PASS INRE NSCE CIAE DODE ACDE INFO ACA-SI A-11 /OM A4 GAN VS-0 1:ICEING PAGE 01 GENEVA 02732 03 OF 06 0619041 2704 1017360 5.7.067J WITH =PLAINTS 4eour AN INSPECTION YEARS AFTER IT HAD TAKEN PLACE. U.S. DEL RESISTED SOVIET EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A STRICT TIME LIMIT AND SOUGHT SPECIFIC RECNNITION OF THE RIGHT TO RAISE CONCERNS BASED ON A PATTERN OF EVENTS SPREAD OVER TIME. FINAL TEXT ENCOURAGES PROMPT COMMUNICATION OF COMPLAINTS BUT REFLECTS U.S. CONCERN AS WELL. -- SOVIETS ALSO SUGGESTED "GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT' WHEREBY INSPECTORATE SECTION FOR THE USSR 00/:9072 WCULD BE HEADED BY AN AMERICAN AND THE AMERICAN SECTION BY A SOVIET. ACTION 55-08 Itao LOG-01 ADS-01 SSO-90 /000 W 132336 01:9042 '3/ 0 0618582 MAR 87 FM usmissom GENEVA TO SECSTATE MASI= IMMEDIATE 6754 INFO DOE WASHDC JCS WASHOC SECDEF WASHDC AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMOASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY VIENNA USMISSION USNATO USDEL MR VIENNA SECRETSECTION 93.0F 96 GENEVA 02732 EXOIS ACDA FOR MA; DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DDIN; SECDEF FOR 050/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PARR UNGA, COG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD). US-USSR CAPACITY THAT IS AGREED FOR ARTICLE V (PRODUCTION FACILITIES) SHOULD ALSO BE APPLIED TO CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FACILITIES UNDER ARTICLE VI W.S. - NO, SOVIETS - YES), ALSO SOVIET DEL BRACKETED"SONT1Y-NEGOTIATED TEXT ON MUNITIONS HARDWARE PRODUCTION, PENDING AUTHORITY FROM.MOSCOW TO ACCEPT IT. -- SOVIETS EXPRESSED SWAG INTEREST IN INTRODUCING AGREED MATERIAL INTO CD DISCUSSIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. U.S. SAID IT WAS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS THIS BEFORE PAPER HAD BEEN REVIEWED IN CAPITALS. B. BILATERAL OBSERVER ARRANGEMENT -- -- DRAFT JOINT PAPER BECAME POSSIBLE WHEN SOVIETS ACCEPTED U.S. PROPOSAL THAT SPECIAL U.S./SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES FUNCTION AS OBSERVERS RATHER THAN AS MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAM. DEL BELIEVES PAPER REFLECTS SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF ALL POINTS OF U.S. POSITION (REF C). -- PRINCIPAL SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT SURPRISE THEM C. BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE -- -- THIS TOPIC WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL FOR THE FIRST TIME AT TWO EXPERTS MEETINGS. -- U.S. DEL STRESSED THAT SATISFACTORY BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE IS A PRECONDITION FOR SIGNATURE OF THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION AND THAT SOVIET FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD AFFECT THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. - -- SOVIETS HINTED THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERING PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT THEY POSSESS CW. (SOVIETS DID OBLIQUELY ACKNOWLEDGE THIS IN MARCH 5 PLENARY STATEMENT.) THEY ALSO SAID THEY DID NOT RULE OUT PROVIDING DETAILED DATA BEFORE SIGNATURE, BUT STRESSED THAT THIS COULD BE DONE ONLY WHEN IT WAS CERTAIN THAT THE CONVENTION WOULD BE COMPLETED. THEY SAID THEY WANTED A CLEAR POLITICAL COMMITMENT NOT ONLY FROM THE U.S., BUT ALSO OTHERS (SUCH AS FRANCE). IN SUM, THE SOVIETS WINKED AND SMILED, BUT GAVE NO COMMITMENT. D. CHALLENGE INSPECTION -- 364C C. errnrr Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 ?????? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 X ci X 0 S l PAGE 11 sr.ET Department of State GENEVA 82732 24 OF 26 J615361 ACTION OFFICE ACOA-82 INFO 555-91 /On Al WLM 2715 022361 2201677 26/24282 INFO 555-Il 10-11 /Or,. AL..W?M .s/so I LI PAGE 21 GENEVA 02732 24 or 26 361906: 2715 02361 ::c:o BUT REITERATED SOVIET CONCEXN ABOUT PO2SI8LE ABUSE OF MANDATORY CHALLENGE. 26/83552 -- BASED ON SOVIET STATE".ENTS IN ROUND V, ONE 4OULD CONCLUDE THAT THEY ARE DEAD SET 06/19401 AGAINST A MANDATORY CHALLENGE PROVISION ALONG THE LINES OF U.S. ARTICLE X. HOWEVER, IT MAY BE USEFUL TO SPECULATE ON HOW FAR THE SOVIETS MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE WILLING TO MOVE. ACTION OFFICE E112-12 INFO KR-11 550-11 SSS-81 55I-22 55-81 0-91 P-02 1-81 C-01 SUN-Il INN-91 1-91 P6-21 OCT-01 P11-01 SP-81 SART-01 SNIP-11 ACDA-01 SSUI81 50(1-03 SCSC-01 /028 A1 WtM OCT PASS INRC IISCE CIAE DODE ACDE INFO ACDA-11 X-11 /202 64 CAN ACTION 55-91 INFO 106-111 ADS-111 SS0-00 /800 W 132454 2619072 /38 0 1618582 MAR 87 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO SECSTATE WASNOC IMMEDIATE 6755 INFO DOE WASNOC JCS WASNOC SECOEF WASNOC AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMIASSY MOSCOW AMEMOASSY PARIS AMEMIASSY VIENNA USNISSION USNATO USDEL IMER VIENNA SECRETSECTION 114.0f 96 GENEVA 02732 EXDIS ACOA FOR MA; DOE FOR DP/ISA; ICS FOR J5/00111: SECOEF FOR 050/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE E.O. 12366: DECL: TAGS: PUN UNGA, COG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ICD): us-ussa BOTN SIDES STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION ISSUE. IN VIEW OF INSTRUCTIONS MEF AI TO KEEP CHALLENGE ISSUE IRON DOMINATING DISCUSSIONS, U.S. DEL LINITED DISCUSSION OF.1SSUE7t0 A SINGLE MEETING. -- CURRENT SOVIET POSITION, AS LAID DOWN IN FEBRUARY 17 CD PLENARY STATEMENK ANO CLARIFIED IN BILATERAL DiSCUSSIONS, PROVIDES FOM MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS IN TWO CASES -- FOR ALLEGATIONS OF CW USE AND FOR ACTIVITIES AT ALL DECLARED FACILITIES. NET RESULT IS THAT SOVIET POSITION NOW GOES FUITNER TNAN THE JULY 1986 UK PROPOSAL. -- SOVIETS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN UK CONCEPT OF 'ALTERNATIVE MEASURES AND DISCUSSED SPECTRUM Of POSSIBILITIES, INCLUDING PARTIAL ACCESS. -- U.S. DEL PRESSED SOVIETS HARD ON NEED FOR MANDATORY CHALLENGE PROVISION TO DEAL WITH UNDECLARED STOCKS AND UNDECLARED PRODUCTION FACILITIES. SOVIET DELOFF LATER ACKNOWLEDGED PRIVATELY PERSUASIVENESS OF U.S. ARGUMENTS, 26/19892 -- SINCE SUMMER 1986 THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS THAT A MANDATORY CHALLENGE PROVISION WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE ON A BILATERAL BASIS THAN 3680 ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS. THE SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN A BILATERAL CONTEXT THE POSSIBILITY OF A RETALIATORY CHALLENGE WOULD PROVIDE A POWERFUL DETERRENT TO ABUSE. THEY CONTINUE TO EXPRESS CONCERN, HOWEVER, ABOUT ABUSE BY THIRD PARTIES WHO MAY HAVE LITTLE TO LOSE. THIS CONTINUING THEME SUGGESTS THAT EVENTUALLY THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE RECEPTIVE TO A BILATERAL OUTCOME ON THIS ISSUE. -- WHILE EVIDENCE IS QUITE FRAGMENTARY, THE CHANCES THE SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT A MULTILATERAL PROVISION FOR MANDATORY CHALLENGE BASED ON ARTICLE X MAY BE IMPROVING AND CERTAINLY SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED NEGLIGIBLE. THEIR CURRENT STRESS ON 'ALTERNATIVE MEASURES' MAY BE ONE IN A SERIES OF INTERMEDIATE POSITIONS. ANOTHER INTERMEDIATE SOVIET MOVE MIGHT BE TO CLAIM TO TAME ARTICLE X AS THE 'BASIS FOR DISCUSSION' AND THEN SUGGEST CHANGES TO WATER DOWN THE MANDATORY ASPECT. -- STRAWS IN THE WINO THAT INDICATE THAT POSSIBLE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF ARTICLE X EVENTUALLY ARE: - REPEATED COMMENTS BY SOVIET REPS THAT CrrIDET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-n1iRRPnnni nn nt-Int-14 A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 '; F.1] RET Department of State SiS kb0.17 1k( PAGE 11 GENEVA 82732 05 OF 06 2619082 2719 302362 SC1560 PACE 11 GENEVA 82732 05 OF 06 0519092 2719 020262 2?:0151 26/0082 NOT USE TERM "BINARY" AND i:OULC BE BROAD ACTION OFFICE Acu-02 ENOUGH TO COVER CHEMICALS NOT USED IN BINARIES. INFO SSS-01 /803 Al WLM THESE CHEMICALS WOULD BE REFERRED TO AS "SPECIAL 05/03512 KEY PRECURSORS." WHILE P;OPOSAL APPEARS INFO 555-81 10-01 /Oa Ac:EPTABLE, DEL HAS DELAYED ACCEPTANCE IN OROER 06/19552 TO MODERATE PACE OF DISCUSSIONS. ACTION OFFICE EUR-12 INFO MR-01 550-81 SSS-81 55I-02 53-01 0-01 P-02 T-81 C-81 -- AS INSTRUCTED, DEL PRESSED SOVIETS TO SARA-81 INR-81 L-01 PA-01 OCT-81 PM-01 SP-01 :ART-01 ELABORATE POSITION ON TIMING OF INSPECTIONS 50-11 ACDA-81 SSSC-11 SDEL-83 SCSC-01 /028 A1 KM TO MAKE CLEAR THEY ACCEPT U.S. V:EW THAT OCT PASS INRE NSCE CIAE DODE ACDE IN:PECTION TIMING BE RANDOM (UNPREDICTABLE/. 06/19102 THEY SAIO THEY AGREE BUT U.S. DEL WILL ZEEK INFO ACDA-01 X-01 /012 A4 CAN TO NAIL THIS DOWN IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS. ACTION SS-08 INFO LOG-01 ADS-81 SSQ-08 MOO W 132555 0615092 /38 -- DEL ALSO PRESSED FOR SOVIET VIEWS ON USE OF INSTRUMENTS. THEY APPEAR TO ACCEPT EXTENSIVE USE OF INSTRUMENTS. 0 0618582 MAR 17 F. MISCELLANEOUS -- Fm USMISSION GENEVA TO SECSTATE wASHDC IMMEDIATE 6756 -- NO REFERENCE AT ALL WAS MADE TO NATIONAL INFO DOE 'IASI= TECHNICAL MEANS INTMI BY EITHER SIDE. JCS WASHOC SECDEF WASHDC -- SOVIETS DID NOT RAISE ISSUE OF MULTINATIONAL AMEMBASSY BONN CORPORATIONS. AmEmBASSY LONDON _ AmEMBASSY MOSCOW -- DATE FOR NEXT ROUND IS TO RE SETTLED THROUGH AMEHBASSY PARIS DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. U.S. SUGGESTED MEETING AGAIN AMEMBASSY VIENNA EARLY IN SUMMER CD SESSION, OUT SOVIETS INDICATED USMISSION uSNATO INTEREST IN APRIL. USDEL MBFR VIENNA -- SOVIETS ATTEMPTED TO BUILD SENSE OF SECRETSECTION OS .OF 06 GENEVA 02732 MOMENTUM BY SUGGESTING A DETAILED PRESS RELEASE 1E ISSUED AT THE END OF THE ROUND EXDIS AND BY PROPOSING ?ELS MEET EVERY DAY. THEY DID NOT PRESS EITHER POINT WHEN U.S. AcDA FOR MA; DOE FOR DP/ISA; JCS FOR J5/DOIN; DEL REJECTED THEIR APPROACH. SECOEF FOR 050/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE 6. RECOMMENDATIONS/REQUESTS -. E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PARM UNGA, COG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR THEY HAVE A LOT MORE FLEXIBILITY ON CHALLENGE )( ISSUE. . SOVIET DELOFF'S ACKNOWLEDGEOMENT OF PERSUASIVENESS OF U.S. ARGUMENTS-ABOUT UNDECLARED STOCKS. - 'FAVORA1LE SOVIET POSTURE ON SWEDISH CHALLENGE PROPOSAL. . - -- PREDICTION BY RELIABLE AND WELL-INFORMED SENIOR CD SECRETARIAT OFFICIAL THAT AFTER SEVERAL INTERMEDIATE POSITIONS SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT THE U.S. PROPOSAL. E. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MONITORING -- -- SOVIETS OFFERED TO COMPLETE SCHEDULE 1 (BANNED CHEMICALS) LIST ALONG LINES PROPOSED BY U.S. IN EXCHANGE FOR AN AGREED GUIDELINE FOR SCHEDULE 1 THAT INCLUDES, INTER ALIA, A REFERENCE TO FORMATION OF AGENTS IN MUNITIONS AND DEVICES. LIST WOULD INCLUDE PINACOLYL ALCOHOL, COLOROSOMAN/CHLOROSARIN, SAXITOXIN, AND SULFUR MUSTARDS, BUT NOT RIOT CONTROL AGENTS CS AND CR. AGREED GUIDELINE WOULD 368 E A. DEL REOUESTS WASHINGTON REVIEW OF PAPERS ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND ON BILATERAL rrnrirT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 X SI I, 16 Department of State PAGE 01 GENEVA 02732 06 OF 06 2619102 2727 2C11363 :S01612 ACTION OFFICE ?COA-02 :NFO 555-01 /003 Al WLM we 06/04012 SYS-6 PAGE 01 GENEVA 02732 06 OF 06 0619102 2727 032363 52016 MINIMO DETERRENT UNTIL END OF THE TEN- YEAR DES:RUCTION PERIOD. 05/03562 E. DEL RECUESTS GUIDANCE ON THE SOVIET INFO 555-01 10-01 /002. SUGGESTION FOR A "SENTLEMAN'S taREEMENT: 35/19571 CONCERNING STAFFING OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACTION OFFICE EUR-12 INSPECTORATE (PARA 58 ABOVE). INFO MR-01 SSO-01 555-91 55I-02 55-01 D-01 P-02 1-91 C-91 SARN-91 INR-91 L-01 PA-01 OCT-01 PM-91 SP-91 SART-01 F. DEL NOTES INCREASING NEED IN THE OILATS 57-111 ICDA-Ii SSSC-01 50E1-93 SCSC-01 /021 Al ULM AND IN THE CD TO DISCUSS ACTUAL VERIFICATION OCT PASS (NRC NSCE CIAE DODE ACDE HARDWARE AND URGES INCREASED ATTENTION TO 06/19122 DEVELOPING U.S. IDEAS ON SUCH HARDWARE. INFO ACDA-01 6-01 /002 AN GAB ACTION 55-00 INFO LOG-00 ADS-09 SSO-09 /909 W 132709 0613112 /31 0 0611512 MAR 87 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 6757 INFO DOE WASHDC JCS WASNOC SECEIEF WASNDC AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMSASST PARIS AMEMIASSY VIENNA USMISSION MATO USDEL MIFR VIENNA SECRETSECTION 06 OF 96 GENEVA 02732 EXDIS ACDA FOR MA; DOC F04 DP/ISA; JCS FOR JS/DDIN; SECEIEF FOR OSO/ISP VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PARR UNGA, COG, UR, US SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR OBSERVER ARRANGEMENTS, COMPLETION OF WORK UNDERWAY ON CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES ISSUE, AND FURTHER GUIDANCE ON ISSUE OF MILITARY USE OF CONVERTED FACILITIES. B. DEL REQUESTS CLARIFICATION OF GUIDANCE CONCERNING AUGUST MI UNITED STATES PROPOSAL ON NON-CONCEALMENT MEASURES. ROUND V GUIDANCE APPEARS TO DEAL ONLY WITH RELATED'Ill.S. PROPOSAL ON MEASURES TO ENHANCE HIM MONITORING. (DEL ALSO NOTES THAT DRAFT INF TREATY INCLUDES NON-CONCEALMENT PROVISION.) . C. DEL RECOMMENDS THAT SOVIETS BE TOLD AT SENIOR LEVEL THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS PRIOR TO NEXT ROUND THAT THEY NEED TO RESPOND MORE SERIOUSLY TO U.S. PROPOSAL FOR EARLY DATA EXCHANGE IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO MOVE AHEAD. D. DEL RECOMMENDS THAT WASHINGTON PREPARE GUIDANCE ON THE SCHEDULE FOR STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION, SINCE THIS IS AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ISSUE THAT IS PREDOMINANTLY BILATERAL IN CHARACTER. GUIDANCE SHOULD ALLOW STATES WITH SMALL STOCKPILES (E.G., FRANCE AND POSSIBLY U.S.) TO MAINTAIN 369F 7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK erpncT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000inninnnni _A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SRCRFT SECRET GENEVA 02747 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD); U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, PLENARY MEETING, MARCH 5, 1987 REFS: (A) CW BILAT -020 (NAZARKIN SPEECH) (B) CW BILAT -018 (HANSEN SPEECH) (C) CW BILAT -013 (CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER) (D) CW BILAT -014 (BILATERAL OBSERVERS PAPER) 1. THIS IS CW BILAT -024. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY -- -- AT THE MARCH 5 CLOSING PLENARY OF ROUND V, CW BILATERALS, SOVIET AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN SPOKE AND CHARACTERIZED THE TALKS AS USEFUL. HE THEN REVIEWED BOTH THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE ROUND AND THE REMAINING AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT, STRESSING CHALLENGE INSPECTION. AMBASSADOR HANSEN SAID RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET POSITION ARE BEING CAREFULLY ASSESSED IN WASHINGTON AND STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT BE RUSHED INTO AN INEFFECTIVE AGREEMENT. HANSEN NOTED ADVANCES DURING THE ROUND, BUT EMPHASIZED NEED FOR SOVIETS TO DEAL MORE SERIOUSLY WITH U.S. PROPOSAL FOR EARLY DATA EXCHANGE. END SUMMARY. 3. SOVIET STATEMENT -- A. SOVIET AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN DELIVERED A PREPARED STATEMENT (REF A) IN WHICH HE LISTED THE "USEFUL WORK" ACCOMPLISHED DURING THIS ROUND. HE SAID THE CW STOCKPILE LOCATION ISSUE WAS RESOLVED IN PRINCIPLE AND SUGGESTED THE 1984 U.S. WORKING PAPER ON STOCKPILE MONITORING (CD/516) AS BASIS FOR VERIFICATION APPROACH. B. NAZARKIN SAID THAT THE CENTRAL ISSUE ON WHICH NOTICEABLE PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED WAS CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. THE SOVIET DEL WAS PREPARED TO SEND THE U.S.-USSR JOINT PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT (REF C) BACK TO MOSCOW FOR REVIEW. - NAZARKIN NOTED THE FOLLOWING UNRESOLVED POINTS IN THE CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES PAPER: - -- THRESHOLDS OF PRODUCTION OF STLC'S FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES. (HE SAID THEY SHOULD BE MEASURED IN KILOGRAMS); - -- THE PHRASE "FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES" IN THE SECTION ON KEY PRECURSOR 369 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SFCRFT PRODUCTION COULD CREATE A LOOPHOLE BY EXCLUDING A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF FACILITIES FROM THE REGIME THAT ALLEGEDLY ARE NOT PRODUCING CHEMICALS FOR CW PURPOSES; - -- SECTION WHICH DEALS WITH THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR USE IN CW; C. ON CATEGORY 1 CHEMICALS NAZARKIN NOTED SUGGESTIONS BY SOVIET SIDE WHICH HE HOPED WOULD SOON LEAD TO A SOLUTION; D. ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION NAZARKIN SAID THE SOVIETS AGREED TO "AUTOMATIC" CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN THE CASE OF CW USE OR WITH REGARD TO DECLARED CW FACILITIES. THEY ALSO AGREED ON THE NEED FOR TIMELINESS IN CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS. HOWEVER, THEY STILL SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL IN INSTANCES IF NECESSARY TO PROTECT MILITARY SECRETS NOT RELATED TO CW. NAZARKIN REFERRED TO THE STOCKHOLM DECLARATION IN WHICH THE PRINCIPLE OF CLOSED AREAS IS ACKNOWLEDGED. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE UK PAPER, CD/715, WITH ITS PROVISION FOR ALTERNATIVE MEASURES, MIGHT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. NAZARKIN THEN LISTED SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO U.S. CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL. HE CITED THE FOLLOWING: - -- DISCRIMINATION AGAINST STATE-OWNED PROPERTY; -- NO POSSIBILITY FOR ALTERNATIVES TO INSPECTION; - -- AUTOMATIC INSPECTION IN ALL CASES; - -- INEQUALITY OF MOST CONVENTION PARTICIPANTS WITH REGARD TO THE FACT-FINDING GROUP. E. NAZARKIN ANNOUNCED SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE PAPER ON THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM, DEVELOPED IN PREVIOUS ROUND. HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS REFERRING THE PAPER ON U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES ON INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION TEAMS TO MOSCOW (REF D). 4. U.S. STATEMENT -- 370 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SF.C.RFT A. AMB. HANSEN BEGAN (REF B) BY NOTING THAT SINCE THE BILATERAL COMMITMENT ON CW AT NOVEMBER 1985 SUMMIT, THERE HAS BEEN A CLEAR INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORK ON A CW BAN. FURTHERMORE, IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET POSITION HAVE FURTHER ACCELERATED THE PACE. THE IMPACT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS IS BEING ASSESSED IN WASHINGTON. -- U.S. DEL WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY, STEADILY, AND DELIBERATELY. HOWEVER, U.S. WILL NOT BE RUSHED INTO AN INEFFECTIVE AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO OUR SECURITY AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES. U.S. DEL WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON WORKING OUT THE DETAILS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT A CONVENTION. B. AMB. HANSEN THEN REVIEWED THE WORK OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF BILATERALS, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS "MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN PREVIOUS ROUNDS." TWO PAPERS (ON BILATERAL OBSERVERS AT INSPECTIONS AND ON ELIMINATION OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES) HAD BEEN PREPARED AD REFERENDUM TO CAPITALS (REF C,D). THE RESULTS OF THE U.S. REVIEW WILL BE COMMUNICATED PROMPTLY TO THE SOVIETS. THE U.S. HAS ALSO COMPLETED REVIEW OF THE JOINT PAPER ON BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND FINDS IT ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT MODIFICATION. C. THERE ARE SEVERAL OUTSTANDING CRITICAL ISSUES WHICH, ALTHOUGH DISCUSSED, REMAIN UNRESOLVED: - -- EARLY BILATERAL DATA EXCHANGE IS AN IMPORTANT MEASURE TO BUILD CONFIDENCE. IT MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE SIGNATURE OF A CONVENTION. THE EXCHANGE OF DATA IS NOT A GUARANTEE OF A COMPLETED CONVENTION, BUT IT IS NECESSARY. THIS TOPIC SHOULD REMAIN A KEY ELEMENT IN FUTURE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. A JOINT U.S.-SOVIET VISIT TO THE U.S. DESTRUCTION SITE AT TOOELE, UTAH WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL IN BUILDING CONFIDENCE. - -- CHALLENGE INSPECTION WITHOUT RIGHT OF REFUSAL IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE HIGH CONFIDENCE IN THE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH A CONVENTION. FUTURE DISCUSSIONS OF 371 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD FOCUS ON SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE OF A MANDATORY CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROVISION. D. ON THE ISSUE OF NON-PRODUCTION, CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS OCCURRED IN THIS ROUND, AND FURTHER STUDY OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON CATEGORY 1 MUST BE DONE. THE U.S. AWAITS CLARIFICATION OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON RANDOM, I.E., UNPREDICTABLE TIMING OF INSPECTIONS AT DECLARED COMMERCIAL FACILITIES. 5. PLENARY DISCUSSION -- A. AMB. NAZARKIN POSED THREE QUESTIONS: (1) WHAT WAS THE U.S. OBJECTIVE IN INVITING SOVIETS TO TOOELE? (2) WOULD THE U.S. ALLOW INSPECTORS INTO MUNITIONS BUNKERS CONTAINING MON-CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AS PART OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION? (3) WHY WAS U.S. ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON RANDOM INSPECTION OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY? THIS POINT HAD BEEN ADDRESSED IN THE FEBRUARY 17 SOVIET CD PLENARY STATEMENT. NAZARKIN NOTED THAT IN HIS FEBRUARY 17 SPEECH HE HAD REFERRED TO THE IAEA MODEL FOR SYSTEMATIC INSPECTION IN WHICH THE VERIFICATION AUTHORITY SELECTS THE FACILITIES AND THE TIMING OF SYSTEMATIC INSPECTIONS, THEREFORE ALLOWING FOR RANDOM INSPECTION. AMB. HANSEN SAID U.S. WOULD PERMIT INSPECTION OF BUNKERS. THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE LOSS OF SECRETS IN SUCH A SITUATION; HOWEVER, FURTHER WORK SHOULD BE DONE TO FIND WAYS TO MINIMIZE SUCH LOSS. -- WITH REGARD TO THE TOOELE VISIT, AMB. HANSEN SAID NON-ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION WOULD CREATE A SENSE OF SOVIET OPPOSITION TO OPENNESS AND CALL INTO QUESTION THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DECLARE FACILITIES AND HAVE OSI'S, WHICH ARE FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF A CONVENTION. ON THE TECHNICAL SIDE, THE U.S. WANTS TO DEMONSTRATE ITS DESTRUCTION METHODS AND ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO OBSERVE 372 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R00010010n001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SRT THE SECURITY AND SAFETY TECHNOLOGY WHICH MIGHT BE APPLICABLE TO THE CONVENTION. A VISIT TO TOOELE WOULD ALSO BEGIN TO DEAL WITH THE PROCEDURES FOR THE VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION. C. HANSEN SUGGESTED FURTHER EXPERTS' DISCUSSION ON RANDOM INSPECTION. HE STATED THAT THE U.S. WANTED TO PREVENT A SITUATION IN WHICH ILLEGAL CW MATERIALS COULD BE ROVED FROM ONE SITE TO ANOTHER TO PREVENT DISCOVERY BECAUSE THE TIMING OF INSPECTION OF A STATES' FACILITIES WOULD BE KNOWN IN ADVANCE. 5. NEXT ROUND -- - -- AT END OF THE SESSION SOVIETS ASKED WHAT U.S. HAD IN MIND FOR THE DATES OF THE NEXT ROUND. -- HANSEN SAID U.S. WOULD RESPOND FORMALLY LATER THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. RESUMING IN THE EARLY PART OF THE SUMMER CD SESSION WOULD PROVIDE TIME FOR REVIEW AND FURTHER PREPARATION. 6. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLACK END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 373 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 02968 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, ROUND V TELEGRAM LIST 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-023. (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT. 2. FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF REPORTING TELEGRAMS ON THE U.S.-USSR BILATERAL CW DISCUSSIONS HELD IN GENEVA DURING THREE-WEEK PERIOD ENDING MARCH 5, 1987. ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES: RMIKULAK, CW BILAT GENEVA DATE TIME NUMBER NUMBER GROUP BTUA ABBREVIATED SUBJECT/ TOPIC 003 01784 181724ZFEB87 HANSEN 2/17 STATEMENT 004 01803 1911172FEB87 2/16 EXPERTS MTG (GENERAL) 005 01871 201236zFEB87 NAZARKIN 2/17 STMT 006 01872 201242ZFEB87 2/17 PLENARY MEETING 007 01967 231048ZFEB87 DRAFT USSR TEXT (RECIPROCAL PARTICI- PATION OF OBSERVERS) 008 01968 231052ZFEB87 1/19 EXPERTS MTG (CW PRODUCTION FACILITIE 009 02221 261544ZFEB87 2/20 EXPERTS MTG (BILATERAL OBSERVERS 010 02222 261545ZFEB87 2/23 EXPERTS MTG (STOCKPILE DECLARA- TIONS/CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES) 011 02377 021309ZMAR87 2/25 EXPERTS MTG (CHALLENGE INSPECT 10 012 02371 021117ZMAR87 AMB. NAZARKIN VIEWS ON CW 013 02418 021730ZMAR87 014 02588 051407ZMAR87 CW BILAT NUMBER 015 GENEVA DATE TIME NUMBER GROUP 02618 051656ZMAR87 016 02622 051706ZMAR87 017 02620 051701ZMAR87 2/27 EXPERTS MTG (BILAT OBSERVERS/CHE INDUSTRY/CW PRODUCTI FACILITIES) 3/02 EXPERTS MTG (CW PRODUCTION FACILITIE BILAT OBSERVERS) ABBREVIATED SUBJECT/ TOPIC 3/3 EXPERTS MEETING (EARLY BILATERAL EXCHANGE) US/USSR INFORMAL POINT PAPER (CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES) US/USSR INFORMAL POINT PAPER (BILATERAL REP'S 374 SECRET Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRFT OSI) AT 018 02623 051712ZMAR87 3/5 PLENARY MEETING 019 02630 051759ZMAR87 3/5 PRESS STATEMENT ENDING ROUND V 020 02730 06186ZMAR87 3/15 PLENARY (AMB. NAZARKIN'S SPEECH) 021 02732 061858ZMAR7 WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS 022 02747 071112ZMAR87 3/5 PLENARY MEETING (N.B. THIS MESSAGE WAS INCORRECTLY NUMBERED 023 FLACK END OF MESSAGE ?11??? 375 SECRET 024. PLEASE CORRECT.) ROUND V TELEGRAM LIST CONFIDENTIAL NNNN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 SECRET SECRETGENEVA 04562 SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): US-USSR BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISCUSSIONS, DATE OF NEXT ROUND 1. THIS IS CW BILAT-024. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN, HEAD OF THE SOVIET CD DELEGATION, HAS PROPOSED TO ACTING U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HANSEN JUNE 15 AS THE STARTING DATE FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF US/SOVIET CW BILATERALS. REQUEST WASHINGTON PROVIDE APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE SOONEST. 3. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE END OF MESSAGE SECRET NNNN 376 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.385 3 February 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 3 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m. President. Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China) GE.87-60034/7000E 177 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 1987 session and the 385th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Today we are all saddened by the sudden loss of a colleague and friend who devoted all his energies to the work of the Conference. Ambassador Donald Lowitz will always be remembered by us as a man of integrity, competence and good will who not only represented his country with distinction, but also gained our friendship and respect. He was our President at the opening of the 1985 session, when he had just been appointed to lead his country's delegation, and he showed then those professional and personal qualities which we all came to admire so much. On behalf of the Conference on Disarmament and of the delegation of China, I extend to the delegation of the United States of America and to his family our deeply felt condolences and sympathy at such a tragic moment. Now may I suggest that we observe a minute's silence in memory of our esteemed colleague. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador Morelli Pando. Mr. MORELLI PARDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Speaking, on behalf of the Group of 21, I wish to say that we are deeply grieved by the death of Ambassador Donald Lowitz, the representative of the United States of America. Ambassador Lowitz passed away at a time when he was dedicated heart and soul to his high office and when it was expected that he would continue to serve for a long time as the representative of a country that carries considerable weight in world affairs. From his assumption of his post, together with the presidency of this body, at the beginning of the 1985 session, Ambassador Lowitz was held in high esteem by his colleagues for the way in which he performed his official duties, for his outstanding academic qualifications and for his personal qualities, which are now remembered with gratitude and respect. The Group of 21 wishes on this occasion to express its condolences to the delegation of the United States of America, and, through it, to the United States Government, as well as to the wife and other members of the family of Ambassador Lowitz. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose. Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): We were profoundly shocked and grieved to learn of the sudden and totally unexpected passing away of the Head of the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, His Excellency Ambassador Donald Lowitz. With this tragic event I would like to offer the heartfelt condolences of the Group of socialist countries. Together with the other delegations we mourn, in Ambassador Lowitz, a diplomat who served his country for several years in the Conference on Disarmament. We 17R Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 3 (Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic) have lost a colleague whose personal integrity, intellectual qualities and sincerity were valued by everyone. His abilities were particularly manifest two years ago when he chaired the Conference as a fair and even-handed President. May I ask the United States delegation to convey to the family of Ambassador Lowitz, as well as to his Government, my Group's deepest sympathy. Ambassador Lowitz will be long remembered as an outstanding person. We shall miss him here. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. Now I give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler. Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Thank you, Mr. President. I have the honour to make the following statement on behalf of the Western Group of States members of the Conference on Disarmament. Exactly two years ago, on 4 February 1985, Ambassador Donald Lowitz presented his letter of appointment by the President of the United States of America as United States Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. Just two days ago, this past weekend, Ambassador Lowitz died in Geneva. He was 57 years of age, he had shared 35 of those years with his wife, Shana, with whom he had children and then grandchildren. Ambassador Lowitz was at this Conference for a relatively short time but the mark he left here will endure for a very, very long time. As Don Lowitz often said himself, he was not a professional diplomat, in the sense that he had not spent all of his professional life in the conduct of foreign relations. Indeed, he often described himself as simply a lawyer from Chicago. Yet Donald Lowitz showed us all the craft, the skill of diplomacy at its highest. He was scrupulously honest. He never sought to mislead anyone. He listened hard to all points of view and, I suspect, especially to those with which he thought he might conceivably have difficulty. Thus, his scrupulous personal honesty was also translated into fairness to others. He joined argument and negotiation vigorously, seeking to leave no one in any doubt or lack of clarity about the position of the Government that he was so proud to represent, and which he represented completely faithfully. And, when compromise could be reached, he would show generosity of spirit and join in that compromise. The Western States members of this Conference mourn the loss of a valued colleague and friend. We know that the purposes of this Conference were greatly served by Donald Lowitz's presence at it. We feel great sympathy towards his wife, Shana, and the members of his family. Their loss is as grave as it was sudden and we collectively convey this expression of sympathy to the Lowitz family. We know, too, that the Government and people of the United States of America have lost an immensely skilled official and devoted public servant and we ask the Acting Head of the delegation of the United States of America to convey to the United States authorities our expression of sympathy for their loss of Ambassador Donald Lowitz. He combined qualities of personal integrity, patriotism and deep religious faith in a way that was rare and of inestimable value to all and we will all miss him. 379 narlaccifipn in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 4 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Australia for his statment. The representative of the United States of America, Mr. Barthelemey, has asked for the floor, and I now give him the floor. Mr. BARTHELEMEY (United States of America): The United States delegation acknowledges with gratitude the expressions of condolence that have just been offered by yourself, and by representatives of the Group of 21, the Group of socialist States and the Western Group on the sad occasion of the death of the leader of the United States delegation, Ambassador Donald Lowitz. We have also been moved by the generous words spoken to us by other colleagues here. The delegation will ensure that they are transmitted to Mrs. Lowitz and her family, as well as to Washington. Ambassador Lowitz's death was, of course, a great shock to us. He had just returned to Geneva from the United States eager to renew the pursuit of the diverse goals of this Conference, in particular the chemical weapons negotiations. Ambassador Lowitz was immensely proud to have been chosen by President Reagan to represent the American people in this unique negotiating Conference and in the United Nations, for he believed profoundly that nations must be steadfast in the defence of their freedom and security but must also summon the will and wisdom to reduce weaponry and the danger of war. In the two years that he served here, Donald Lowitz gained not only the respect, but also the affection of his delegation. The statements we have heard this morning are testimony to the esteem of his colleagues as well. It is a respect and affection that he earned by his integrity in representing the views of his Government; by his painstaking attention to all aspects of the issues and his quick grasp of their subtleties; by his willingness to listen carefully to the views of others; by his generosity of spirit and by his wit and good humour. We shall miss Don Lowitz very much. Mrs. Lowitz has graciously consented to the request of the United States delegation that I share with you a message to her from the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan. I would like to read that message: "February 2, 1987. Dear Mrs. Lowitz, I was saddened to learn of the death of your husband. Please accept my heartfelt condolences. Ambassador Lowitz will be remembered as a public servant of the highest distinction. As United States representative to the Conference on Disarmament and to the United Nations First Committee he pursued with imagination and energy the security of the United States. His negotiations toward a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons and other important United States arms control efforts promoted world peace and stability. In all of his efforts his deep humanity won him the affection and respect of his colleagues, both American and foreign. We shall all miss Ambassador Lowitz. Our best tribute to him will be to continue to pursue the goals to which he was dedicated and to pursue them in the same humane spirit he constantly exhibited. Signed, Ronald Reagan." 380 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 5 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. I thank everyone. We shall now continue with our proceedings. I am sure that all members join me in extending our thanks to Ambassador Alan Beesley, of Canada, for the brilliant manner in which he presided over the Conference during the month of August and the inter-sessional period. His rich diplomatic experience, tact and dedication to the work of the Conference were brought to bear in resolving a number of delicate questions facing the Conference at the time. On behalf of the Conference, allow me to extend a warm welcome to the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency Mr. Yuli Vorontsov, who will be addressing the Conference later today. I need hardly elaborate on Mr. Vorontsov's great knowledge in matters of disarmament, which makes him an eminent leader of the Soviet delegation in bilateral talks on nuclear and space arms. I am sure that members will be following his statement with particular interest. I would like also to bid farewell to our colleagues who have left the Conference during the inter-sessional period to follow other pursuits: the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sutowardoyo; the representative of Italy, Ambassador Franceschi; the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan; and the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas. Both Ambassador /ssraelyan and Ambassador Vidas chaired this Conference during their tenure as representatives of their countries. The very effective manner in which they discharged their duties was appreciated by all of us. We wish all the above representatives every success in their future endeavours. I should like to recall that Ambassador Issraelyan was one of the deans among the representatives to the Conference on Disarmament, which he joined upon its constitution in its present form. He is also a veteran. He served his country with distinction and won the respect of all his colleagues. As President of this Conference, I would also like, on behalf of you all, to extend a warm welcome to the new representatives who are joining us for the first time: Ambassador Hacene, of Algeria: Ambassador Barbosa, of Brazil: Ambassador Morel, of France; Ambassador Pugliese, of Italy; Ambassador Yamada, of Japan; Ambassador Dolgu, of Romania; Ambassador Nazarkine, of the USSR; and Ambassador Rosin, of Yugoslavia. We are sure all these new delegates and colleagues will support us in handling the difficult tasks confronting us in the coming weeks and I am sure that we are all looking forward to co-operating with them in our daily work. I wish also to note the presence among us of the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Erik Suy, who has very kindly provided effective servicing for the Conference during his tenure in office in Geneva. I understand that he will be leaving us soon and I extend to him all our best wishes for his future personal and professional life. May I also extend a 381 nna-Inecifiarl in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 6 (The President) cordial welcome to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Jan Martenson, who is present at our proceedings today. In doing so, I should like to note that he will soon be leaving this important function and assuming others which will keep him also in close contact with the Conference. He has served as Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs for more than seven years and during that period his department has serviced this Conference with devotion and effectiveness. I am sure we all thank him for that and wish him every success in his new post. Now, as President of the Conference, I have the honour to present to the Conference a message by the State Councillor and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, Wu Xuegian, which reads as follows: "On the occasion of the commencement of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in 1987, I wish to extend, on behalf of the Chinese Government, our warm congratulations and cordial greetings to the distinguished representatives from various countries. Nineteen eighty-six was designated as the International Year of Peace. Over the year, the people of the world expressed their earnest desire for world peace in various ways, demonstrating their determination to strengthen unity, safeguard peace and oppose war. The continuous expansion of the forces for peace has become an irresistible historical trend. However, the turbulent world situation shows that the danger of war is not yet past. Regional conflicts remain unsettled and the arms race continues unabated, posing a grave threat to world peace and security. The world's people strongly demand that the countries which bear a 'special responsibility' for putting an end to the arms race conduct serious negotiations in conformity with the trend of the times so as to reach an early agreement contributing to the maintenance of world peace without prejudice to the interests of other countries and that they fulfil in real earnest the obligations of 'taking the lead' in drastically reducing armaments. The preservation of world peace and security and the realization of genuine disarmament are the common aspirations of the people of all countries and also the main task of the Conference on Disarmament. China has always held that the question of disarmament concerns the security interests of all countries and that all countries, big or small, strong or weak, should have equal rights to join in the discussion and settlement of the question. The institution of the Conference on Disarmament has changed the situation in which only a few countries monopolized disarmament negotiations and it has provided the small and medium-sized countries with an important forum for participation in the settlement of disarmament questions. As the sole international body for multilateral disarmament negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament has over the past few years done a great deal of useful work in pushing forward the international disarmament process. The non-aligned and neutral countries have played an important role in this respect. However, for reasons known to all, the Conference on Disarmament has made little progress on most of the major issues, much to the dissatisfaction of the people. 382 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 7 (The President) China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It opposes the arms race and actively supports and advances proposals and propositions on disarmament which contribute to the maintenance of world peace and security. It has also taken serious major steps of practical significance concerning disarmament. This fully demonstrates the Chinese Government's sincerity in disarmament. Together with the people of other countries, the Chinese people will make unremitting efforts to build a world of lasting peace, prosperity and development, as well as equality and co-operation. The Chinese Government attaches great importance to the role of the Conference on Disarmament and has taken an active part in its work. China is ready to work with the other member States participating in the Conference for progress in the negotiations on various disarmament issues and to make contributions to the early realization of genuine disarmament. I wish the Conference on Disarmament fresh progress in 1987." This concludes the message by Minister Wu. I should like now to give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Miljan Komatina. In his capacity as personal representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, he will read out a message addressed to the Conference by the Secretary-General. Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The message of the Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament reads as follows: "Today, more than ever before, the tasks before the Conference on Disarmament engage the anxious interests of all, in East or West, North or South, who are cognizant of the deadly dangers created by an unrestrained arms race in this nuclear age. The whole community of nations will keenly watch the Conference's work and hope for auguries of success in the vast endeavour of lessening these dangers. The past year has witnessed some remarkable developments. The meeting between the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America at Reykjavik was a most significant event: it showed what possibilities are open, in dialogue at the highest leadership level, for taking radical initiatives on crucial disarmanent issues which have been bogged down in indecisive negotiations for years. The proposals and ideas that were discussed were indicative of the positive evolution in the intentions and positions of the two most powerful States. Nineteen eighty-six also recorded some progress in multilateral forums. The agreement in Stockholm, the two Conventions concluded in Vienna under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the successful conclusion of the Biological Weapons Review Conference and the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament in elaborating the chemical weapons ban are noteworthy examples of a constructive approach towards the issues of disarmament and international security. .101 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 8 (Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations) The deliberations on these issues during the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly also contributed to the promotion of international dialogue. Furthermore, activities during the International Year of Peace put a focus on the elemental issue of human survival. The year ended with a wide international consensus for the strengthening of the role and efficacy of the United Nations without which the international order would be even more precarious. These are all reassuring signs, but they have not yet changed the sombre realities facing us all. Concrete disarmament agreements still elude us and the gap between words and deeds has not narrowed. The same year that encouraged some hope also furnished vivid and alarming reminders of how even seemingly reliable technology can go wrong and of how war continues to take its high toll in human life and the assets of nations. The responsibility resting on your Conference in matters of vital importance for the future of mankind can hardly be exaggerated. The goal of curbing the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and moving towards substantial disarmament agreements leading to the final elimination of nuclear weapons needs to be vigorously pursued. Pending the realization of that goal, all practicable measures for the prevention of war, particularly nuclear war, need to be taken so as to bring about an immediate decrease in the risks stemming from the existence of today's enormous arsenals of weapons. A most important and urgent matter of disarmament is the complete cessation of nuclear weapon tests and no efforts can be spared in the elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. To that end, fresh and perhaps innovative proposals are needed which would lend a decisive impetus to your efforts and complement other endeavours in this field. Your negotiations on a global chemical weapons ban have now reached a crucial stage and assumed a growing sense of urgency in the light of present realities. Elements for early success in your negotiations are not wanting. What is needed is the manifestation of a genuine willingness to make the necessary political compromises which would facilitate the conclusion of a convention even this year. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the prevention of the arms race in outer space needs to be translated into a co-operative undertaking by your Conference to create conditions for negotiating agreements on this vital matter. This is now one of the essential areas in which concerted action can be taken for strengthening international peace and security. The tasks before your Conference as a unique representative negotiating forum are indeed difficult, but in no way unsurmountable, given the universal desire for a more secure world in which our scarce human and material resources could be utilized for the fullest, economic 384 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 9 (Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations) and social development of all societies. In discharging its responsibilities, the Conference would certainly benefit from more high-level political attention by all its members. I pledge my full support to the efforts of the Conference, which I consider essential not only for the completion of multilateral disarmament agreements, but also for the promotion of the general process of disarmament at all levels.". This concludes the message of the Secretary-General, but I have been asked by the Secretary-General to convey on his behalf to the delegation of the United States and to the family of Ambassador Lowitz the expression of his heartfelt condolences and deepest sympathy. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for his statement. Allow me to invite him to convey to Mr. Perez de Cuellar our thanks for his message and for the interest he shows in our work. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has also addressed a letter to us transmitting the resolutions and decisions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-first session. That letter has been circulated today by the secretariat as document CD/733. I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of Mexico, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Sweden, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and the representative of Australia. I now give the floor to the first speaker of the 1987 session, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Those of us who have had occasion to participate for some time in the work of this "single multilateral disarmament negotiating body" can, on the basis of our experience, say that the two months in which the task of guiding our deliberations presents the greatest difficulties are without doubt the first and last months of each session. For this reason we are gratified that you are presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February which is now starting and which marks the beginning of its 1987 session. The skill which you displayed during previous consultations and your valuable participation as representative of China in the First Committee during the recent session of the General Assembly are guarantees of the efficiency with which we are sure you will discharge the important duties that are now entrusted to you, and in connection with which you may count on the wholehearted co-operation of the delegation of Mexico. I should also like once again to extend to your predecessor, Ambassador Beesley, the distinguished representative of Canada, our warmest congratulations on the outstanding way in which he performed his duties from 1 August 1986. nna-Inecifiarl in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 10 (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico) My delegation also associates itself with the tribute paid by the Conference on Disarmament to the memory of Ambassador Donald Lowitz as well as with the fully justified and well-deserved words of farewell you addressed to those who have left or are about to leave the Conference and your words of welcome to those who, in one way or another, are just beginning to participate in our work. In embarking today on the ninth session of the Conference on Disarmament, it is most appropriate that we should bear in mind what the United Nations General Assembly stated emphatically at its last session, which happened to coincide with the so-called International Year of Peace, in its resolution 41/86 M, adopted on 4 December by the impressive majority of 133 votes in favour, on the item entitled "Report on the Conference on Disarmament". In this resolution which, for a number of reasons, should serve as a guide in our work this year,' the Assembly: Expressed its conviction that this Conference, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, "should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament". It reaffirmed that the establishment of ad hoc committees "offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament". It called upon the Conference on Disarmament "to further its mandate more earnestly through negotiations and to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament", and for that purpose established relevant committees with appropriate negotiating mandates. At that forty-first session, the General Assembly adopted over 60 resolutions which, in one way or another, cover all the disarmament items on the agenda of the Conference. Of these various resolutions, I shall confine my present statement to an examination of the resolution which is the most important among those relating to the first of these items, namely, the prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing; of the resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; of the main resolutions dealing with the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters as well as, finally, of the decision on the comprehensive programme of disarmament which, this year, is of particular importance in the light of the action taken by the Assembly in the sense that, noting the recommendation contained in the report submitted by the Conference, it decided that work on the elaboration of the programme be resumed at the beginning of the Conference's 1987 session "for the purpose of completing that task during the first part of that session and submitting a complete draft of the programme to the General Assembly at that time", namely, during its forty-first session which, as we know, was not done. 386 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 11 (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico) The first of the resolutions to which I have just referred, namely, resolution 41/46 A, was adopted on Wednesday, 3 December 1986, by 135 votes in favour, and is entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions". Although its text is more concise than in previous years, it contains all the essential and relevant elements. In its first preambular paragraph it is recalled that the item, which had been examined for more than 30 years and on which the General Assembly had adopted more than 50 resolutions, was a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which it had repeatedly assigned the highest priority. The resolution stresses that, on eight different occasions the General Assembly had condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it had stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing "will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war". Reference is also made to what was stated by the Secretary-General at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 12 December 1984, at which the highest administrative official of the United Nations emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons, and that the desired comprehensive test-ban treaty was undoubtedly "the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament". Another of the preambular paragraphs emphasizes that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undertook in article 1 of that Treaty to conclude a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear-test explosions, including all those explosions underground, and that such an undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in the Preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. In the next paragraph, the Assembly recalls that the same three nuclear-weapon States, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, in the report they submitted on 30 July 1980 to the Committee on Disarmament after four years of trilateral negotiations, stated, inter alia, that they were "mindful of the great value for all mankind that the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments will have" as well as "conscious of the important responsibility placed upon them to find solutions to the remaining problems", adding furthermore that they were "determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion". The preamble to the resolution I am referring to also contains a new element, since it refers to something that happened after the adoption of the 1985 resolution, namely, the so-called "Mexico Declaration" which was adopted at Ixtapa on 7 August 1986 and in which the leaders of the six countries associated under the five-continents peace and disarmament initiative affirmed 387 nna-Inecifiarl in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 12 (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico) that they "remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests", adding that "Both the qualitative and the quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race, and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing". In the operative part of its resolution, the Assembly began by reiterating once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, "against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States", reaffirming its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority and would constitute "a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race". The Assembly once more urged the three depositary Powers of the Treaty of Moscow and the Non-Proliferation Treaty "to abide strictly by their undertakings" to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons and to expedite negotiations to this end. It went on to appeal to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular to the threq depositary Powers already mentioned "to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1987 session of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions". The resolution ends with a recommendation to the Conference that this ad hoc committee should "comprise,- two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification", and with an appeal to the States depositaries of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 "to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria". As we all know, by virtue of the decision announced in July 1985, it will be one year and a half at the end of this week since the Soviet Union began to abide by a unilateral moratorium that took effect on 6 August of that year. It is for this reason that the Group of Six, consisting of the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the Prime Minister of Tanzania, issued a joint declaration at the end of last year in which, among other things, they stated: "There is no justification for nuclear testing by any country. We appeal once again to the United States to reconsider its policy on nuclear testing so that a bilateral moratorium can be established. Our offer to help ensure adequate verification of such a moratorium remains valid. We are ready to start implementing it at any moment." It will be recalled that the same Heads of State or Government who, in the Delhi Declaration of January 1985, had stated that "Two specific steps today require special attention: the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a comprehensive test ban treaty", reverted to this question in the following terms in a new Declaration, adopted in Ixtapa on 7 August 1986: 388 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 13 (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico) "We reiterate our demand that an arms race in outer space be prevented. Space belongs to humanity, and as participants in this common heritage of mankind, we object to the outer space of our Earth being misused for destructive purposes". Although, in addition to the resolution that was approved, three other draft resolutions were submitted in the First Committee on this item -- one sponsored by China, the second by a group of Western States and the third by a group of socialist States -- no decision was taken on them at the request of their respective sponsors. Then there was the draft resolution sponsored by many members of the so-called Group of 21 among whom, as in the previous year, the representatives of Sri Lanka and Egypt played a particularly important role in its elaboration and in the usual round of consultations; after the original text had been amended by its sponsors this draft resolution was adopted in plenary by the General Assembly on 3 December by a vote which can certainly be described as one of the most impressive of the session, namely, 154 votes in favour, none against and only 1 abstention -- that of the United States. That resolution, namely, resolution 41/53, like that of the previous year, is very long and as usual consists of a preamble and an operative part. In the preamble, the General Assembly, after recognizing the.common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, reaffirms the commitments assumed by the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular their undertaking not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. In the preamble the General Assembly also reaffirmed paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and "appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty". In the operative part of the resolution I am discussing, it is worthwhile highlighting the following two appeals: the first is contained in paragraph 4 and addressed to all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, "to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space" in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. The second appeal is contained in paragraph 9 and is addressed to the United States and the Soviet Union, which are urged to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work. 389 n.rincQifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 14 (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico) Finally -- just as I did a year ago -- I have intentionally kept until last the following three quotations from operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 8, since they all refer expressly to the Conference on Disarmament: In paragraph 5, the Assembly reiterated that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, "has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects". In paragraph 6 the Assembly expressly requested the Conference on. Disarmament "to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space". Lastly, in paragraph 8 of its resolution, it requested the Conference "to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1987 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects". As regards the item that has invariably been the second item on the agenda of this multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, namely, the one entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race.and nuclear disarmament", resolution 41/86 F whose title is the same as the item and which was adopted on 4 December by 130 votes in favour, recalls, in its preamble, the danger posed by nuclear weapons to mankind and to the survival of civilization and, after a number of other equally pertinent considerations, goes on in its operative part to; Affirm that the existence of bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms "in no way diminishes the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of the nucelar-arms race and nuclear disarmament". In the same operative part the resolution goes on to request the Conference on Disarmament "to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its 1987 session to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements" that would bring about a "substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to,their ultimate elimination". As regards the third item on our agenda, the main resolution adopted by the Assembly at its last session is, in my opinion, resolution 41/86 G entitled "Prevention of nuclear war" which, on 4 December, received 134 votes in favour in the plenary of the Assembly. This resolution, after stating that "it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war, which would inevitably be a nuclear war" and noting with "grave concern" that the Conference on Disarmament had once more been unable to start negotiations on the question 390 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 15 (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico) during its 1986 session, again requests this Conference "as a matter of the highest priority" to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject "at the beginning of its 1987 session". Coming to the last point in my brief review, namely, the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, I shall today simply recall what has been on the agenda of the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum since 1980 and what the Conference recommended in its last report to the Assembly -- which endorsed that recommendation in its decision adopted unanimously on the subject on 4 December -- namely, that the elaboration of the draft programme should be concluded "during the first part" -- namely, the part that is beginning today -- of this year's session with a view to submitting "a complete draft of the programme to the General Assembly" at its forty-first session which, as we know, has not yet been concluded. At some later date I shall discuss the background of this question in greater detail and also examine with the attention it deserves another of the more important items on our agenda, namely, the elimination of chemical weapons. In concluding this, my initial, statement, I should like to stress that what it suggests can be summarized as follows* The need, this year, to establish without further delay an ad hoc committee "with the objective of -- and I emphasize these four words which represent a significant concession by the sponsors of the draft which constituted the basis of resolution 41/46 A -- with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions". The need for the Conference "to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate ... with a view to undertaking negotiations" to prevent an arms race in outer space, in accordance with resolution 41/53 which, as I have already mentioned, was adopted by 154 votes in favour, none against and with only 1 abstention. The need to establish forthwith an ad hoc committee for the purpose described in resolution 41/86 P, which was adopted by 130 votes in favour, on the second item on the Conference's agenda concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The need to establish without delay a subsidiary body which, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 41/86 G, adopted by 134 votes in favour, would deal with what the Assembly had every reason to describe as "the most acute and urgent task of the present day", namely, the prevention of nuclear war. The need to concentrate efforts and display a real spirit of flexibility and mutual concession so that the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, on which we have been working since 1980, can be completed and submitted to the Assembly at its forty-first session, as we ourselves suggested last year and as the Assembly expressly requested in the decision it adopted unanimously on 4 December last. 391 narinQqifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 16 (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico) The points I have summarized above are all the more urgent if they are viewed in the light of two factors. The first is that the year we are embarking upon will mark the first decade of this multilateral disarmament negotiating forum and that, during the nine years of its existence, contrary to what happened with its predecessors, it has been unable to approve a single treaty or convention on the subject. The second factor concerns what the Assembly stated at its last session and which / took the liberty of quoting at the beginning of my statement, namely, that it is vital that the Conference should "further its mandate more earnestly through negotiations ... in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament". It must also be borne well in mind that, at their recent Reykjavik meeting, Secretary-General Gorbachev and President Reagan "came very close to reaching agreements which would have been historic in their sweep and significance ... could have paved the way for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons". The authors of this sensible view that I have just quoted are the six leaders who, since 1984, have been submitting concrete proposals concerning disarmament and peace. They include Miguel de la Madrid, the President of Mexico who, in his statement at the United Nations on 24 September, expressed the following opinion that I feel constitutes an appropriate epilogue to my own statement with which, in accordance with our time-honoured tradition, initiates for us today the 1987 discussions of the Conference: "In the Declarations that we have signed", said the President of Mexico, "first at New Delhi in 1985 and just last month in the Mexican city of Ixtapa, we have stated that it is incumbent upon all men and all peoples, and not just those Governments which possess the technical capacity to wreak total destruction, to make efforts to halt the arms race. ... Our statements, whose legitimacy flows from the fact that they express the wishes of all mankind, are but the first in a series of efforts that the international community will have to undertake, in the hope of eradicating nuclear weapons.". The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency the First Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Yuli Vorontsov. Mr. VORONTSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, thank you for the warm words of welcome addressed to me. It is pleasant to be here once again in the midst of large-scale disarmament. On behalf of the Soviet delegation, may I congratulate you on occupying the responsible post of President of the Conference on Disarmament and wish you success in the discharge of your 392 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R0001001nonn1-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 17 (Mr. Vorontsov, USSR) complicated duties. We express the hope that under your guidance the Conference will succeed in engaging in businesslike negotiations on a wide range of questions relating to arms limitation and disarmament. In your person, Comrade President, we also welcome the 'representative of the People's Republic of China, our great socialist neighbour whose Government has repeatedly stated its interest in solving questions of nuclear disarmament, of preventing an arms race in outer space, of banning nuclear-weapon tests and of prohibiting chemical weapons -- in other words, of virtually all those issues which take pride of place in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I also have pleasure in greeting the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, whom I met within these walls over 20 years ago. The tireless activity of the dean of the disarmament corps has earned wide recognition and has been marked by the award to him of the Nobel Peace Prize. All of us listened with great interest to his thoroughgoing statement concerning the tasks of the Conference on Disarmament. We should like to wish success to the distinguished representatives of Algeria, Brazil, Italy, Romania, France, Yugoslavia and Japan who have recently been appointed as heads of delegations, Ambassadors Hacene, Barboza, Pugliese, Dolgu, Rosin and Yamada. We should also like to thank Ambassador Beesley, who was in the Chair in August 1986 and represented the Conference on Disarmament with distinction during the intersessional period. May I, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, express my most profound condolences to the delegation of the United States of America with regard to the sudden demise of their Head, Ambassador Lowitz. I should like to ask for our condolences to be conveyed to Mrs. Lowitz and to her family. I should also like to introduce the new Head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Yuri Nazarkine, who is well known to many of you and who has the necessary experience in the field of disarmament negotiations, including at this Conference, and experience of work in preparing treaties and agreements. / should like to wish him and the Soviet delegation he heads successful and fruitful activity. This session of the Conference on Disarmament is opening at a difficult, a crucial time. To prevent the world from moving towards the abyss of the nuclear self-annihilation of mankind to which we are all being criminally and irresponsibly pushed by the high priests of the arms race, by those enamoured of fabulous profits on armaments, by the fanatical advocates of the military orientation of each and every scientific discovery, it is now more urgently necessary than ever before to have new political thinking, new conduct by States. It is necessary, in sum, to break the sequence of years of senseless accumulation of the most sophisticated weapons of death, necessary resolutely to engage in creating a just, non-violent world, necessary to direct our efforts towards ensuring the survival of mankind and releasing its priceless intellectual and vast material potential for the purposes of development. The Conference on Disarmament can make a concrete and invaluable contribution to this process. The Conference in essence embodies the idea of a world conference on disarmament. In its work there participate all the nuclear-weapon States, which have special responsibility for the elimination in - Saniti7ed Cony Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 18 (Mr. Vorontsov, USSR) of the nuclear threat. But not only they. In the efforts to ensure reliable security for all, the contribution of every State is weighty and important; this issue is the common responsibility of all the members of the world community. The Soviet Union fully realizes its share of responsibility. A year has elapsed since, on 15 January 1986, the Soviet Union took an initiative unprecedented in its scope and purposes by puttting forward a programme for the elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, before the end of this century. This programme has become the nucleus of the concept fixed by the twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of a comprehensive system of international security. As a result of a joint initiative by socialist countries in the United Nations, a wide-ranging, democratic international dialogue has begun on comprehensive security for all. The plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held a few days ago demonstrated the resolve of the Soviet people in their desire to implement the decisions of the twenty-seventh Congress of the Party. We are openly talking about the need to think and act in a new way, as the realities in our country and in the world as a whole require. The plenary meeting noted that, under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, all sound forces in Soviet society are resolutely in favour of profound, revolutionary transformations in all spheres of our lives, the galvanization of socialist development and the practical implementation of the great humanitarian ideals associated with the theory of socialism. We are now restructuring our national economic machinery in keeping with objective economic laws and freeing ourselves from the accumulation, as a result of the ignoring of scientific approaches to economic development, of serious defects in the operation of planning and management institutes and in management practice, style and methods. Priority is being given to the consistent introduction of self-management into the life of work collectives and to the creation of conditions that will enable every worker to feel himself truly the master of his enterprise. Elections are being introduced for senior managerial posts and the conditions for the operation of a competitive system for the selection and replacement of other supervisory staff are in the course of being defined. Simultaneously with this, methods are being introduced for managing economic activity by means of material and financial incentives rather than by directives. Of course, economic and scientific progress is not an end in itself. Its fruits will be enjoyed fully by all Soviet people. Moreover, our basic premise is that, by increasing our economic potential, we shall be able to assist to a greater and qualitatively better degree in the development of the world economy and to make a weightier contribution towards helping the developing countries. 394 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100nn1-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 19 (Mr. Vorontsov, USSR) Restructuring is already more than merely an idea for our further advances it is the reality in which the multi-million population of the Soviet Union. lives, thinks and works. Its implementation and the introduction of new, transformative ideas are inconceivable without genuine democracy, which is why the plenary session put the serious, thorough democratization of Soviet society on a pinnacle as the lever whereby our main force, the people, can be fully involved in the solution of the problems confronting us. We are convinced that democracy, openness, criticism and self-criticism are the guarantees for the sound development of Soviet society. Democracy and openness are inseparable from socialism, whose main principle is "everything on behalf of man, everything for the good of man". It is natural, therefore, that man, the means for the comprehensive development of his creative potential, and the satisfaction of his material and spiritual needs were at the centre of the plenary session's attention. "We want to turn our country into a model of a highly-developed State, into a society of the most advanced economy, the broadest democracy and the most humane and the highest moral standards, where the working man will feel himselea full and equal master". These words spoken at the plenary session by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, determine our thinking, our hopes and our practical actions. The Soviet people associate with the restucturing, the speeding up of development and the democratization their vital interests, the fate of the country and its international prestige. It is clear to every unprejudiced person that the attainment of our creative goals is possible only in conditions of peace and security. We do not conceal the fact that the implementation of our plans as defined by the Party Congress and the January plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, plans for the most significant restructuring and the acceleration of the development of our entire country, would be furthered by the reduction of international tension and the cessation of the squandering of efforts and resources on the arms race, which is senseless and deadly dangerous to all mankind. We are in favour of the creation of a climate of trust conducive to the organization of a wide-ranging international distribution of labour and to the mutual enriching of the cultural lives of peoples. We do not set concern for our own security against the interests of the security of other States and peoples. In the modern world -- a world that is interdependent, that is in many respects one and that is too fragile for military rivalry and wars -- political realism demands that the indivisibility of security be recognized. No country can achieve security for itself alone, by acting on its own or together with a narrow group of allies, by relying solely on military technology, whether on Earth or in space. In the Delhi declaration which was signed by the leaders of the Soviet Union and India and has enriched the world community with a concrete presentation of the principles of a non-violent world free from nuclear weapons, it is stressed, and I quote, "Instead of the 'balance of terror', there must be comprehensive international security ... East and West, North and South, regardless of social systems, ideologies, religions or races, must unite in a common devotion to disarmament and development". nnt-laccifiPri in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2512/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 20 (Mr. Vorontsov, USSR) Reykjavik has given us precise awareness of the fact that a nuclear-free world and the resolution of the crucial problems in the nuclear and outer space area is no Utopia but a real possibility. Although the hope that the meeting in Reykjavik would lead to early practical results has not been borne out, the negotitions in the capital of Iceland have taken the cause of nuclear disarmament to an unprecedentedly high frontier from which the outline of a nuclear-free, secure world is clearly visible. The Soviet Union is, through active and presistent practical actions at all the negotiations under way, reaffirming its desire to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. Here in Geneva, the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons are under way. We are not withdrawing a single one of the proposals aimed at the sharp reduction and subsequent elimination of all nuclear devices and the guaranteeing of a peaceful space that we put forward at Reykjavik. Moreover, we are crystallizing our proposals and manifesting in practice a readiness to find constructive outcomes by doing our utmost to impart dynamism to these negotiations. Hence, in the negotitations on nuclear space weapons, the Soviet side has put forward a proposal aimed at moving the discussions on at last from endless debate into the constructive channel of practical preparation of documents. Work on reaching agreement on the documents in question has already begun. We are counting on achieving success in this important task. People expect real results from us. We hope that they understand this in Washington too and that they will positively respond to our efforts there. However, one has the impression that in Washington they are for the present occupied with other business. Upon the conclusion of the current round of negotiations, we intend, in keeping with the United Nations recommendations, to inform the Conference on Disarmament of the results. We are convinced that openness is bound to be one of the most powerful factors of movement towards a nuclear-free world too. The results of Reykjavik have become the common heritage of all countries and peoples to whom it is of vital interest that nuclear weapons should be eliminated and that the arms race should not spread into outer space as well. The productive interaction of States both large and small is necessary as never before for the continued existence and progress of mankind. In these circumstances, it is especially intolerable that the great negotiating potential of the Conference on Disarmament is being far from fully used. The reason for this is well-known: some people would not like businesslike negotiations to be conducted here on disarmament issues or real agreements to be achieved. Joint efforts are needed to wrench the Conference out of the "procedural quagmire" and to embark upon a search for constructive decisions and forward-leading compromises. A priority measure on the way towards the curbing of the arms race and the subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons is, as the United Nations has recognized, the banning of nuclear-weapon tests. Hence, their attitude to the prohibition of nuclear explosions attests in the most eloquent fashion to States' attitude to the whole range of disarmament questions and is a test, a litmus test, of their good will and of the concordance of their words and deeds. 395 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 21 (Mr. Vorontsov, USSR) The most striking proof of our willingness to promote progress on the nuclear-test-ban que tion is our repeatedly extended unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. Today is the 547th day of silence on our nuclear test sites, silence that will continue until the first American test of this year. And even were we to be forced into resuming nuclear explosions -- and, as a well-known Soviet scientist has so eloquently put it, "the button for the Soviet test sites is on the desk in the White House" -- we would not cease even then our persistent efforts in favour of the commencement of full-scale negotiations on this problem, negotiations which we are prepared to conduct with a delegation of any composition and in any forum -- with, of course, the participation of the United States. One such forum is undoubtedly the Conference on Disarmament. It is incumbent on the Conference to begin, without a single day's postponement, the preparation of a treaty that would put an end to nuclear tests and, in particular, to resolve the issues pertaining to the structure and sphere of application of the treaty and to its observance and verification. And we urge you to move from discussions to actions. The time has come to create an ad hoc committee endowed with appropriate powers. It is time, finally, to get down to real business, to achieve tangible results. The Soviet side is prepared positively to consider all proposals furthering progress in this extremely important, this key area. We are convinced that the focus of the Conference's attention should be the programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, which both sets concrete goals and fixes clear deadlines for their achievement. The Conference could consider such concrete questions of nuclear disarmament as the cessation of the production of fissionable and fusionable nuclear materials for the purposes of developing and creating weapons, the order of elimination of nuclear aramaments, and fundamental approaches to the monitoring of multilateral nuclear disarmament measures. The solution to the question of nuclear disarmament is inseparably linked with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It would be unforgiveable if, after being wrested from the nuclear nightmare, mankind was thrust into a laser/space nightmare. The time has come for active negotiations and practical work, rather than abstract discussion, on finding effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. The view is about here and there that the "serious" negotiations on this problem should be conducted, not in the meeting hall of this Conference, but rather on a bilateral basis, in the Soviet and American missions. We think otherwise. We are convinced that, in the matter of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, there is not and cannot be any division of the negotiations into "serious" and "unserious". We are in favour of being guided by the most serious approach to any negotiations on this crucial problem that has now arisen before mankind. The Conference has good potential for businesslike and concrete discussion of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer spacn. This problem affects all States and is a case in which the Conference could not only become the generator of useful ideas, but also engage in concrete 397 im,,,Inecifiori in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 22 (Mr. Vorontsov, USSR) negotiations on certain aspects of this problem. For instance, in our view, the Conference could engage in the businesslike consideration of the question of the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. After all, from outer space it is possible to select as a "laser target" not only Soviet cities, but any town in any "disobedient" country. The Conference could also consider the possibility of creating a system of international verification guaranteeing unswerving compliance with an agreement of the kind in question and, in particular, study the idea of an international inspectorate. Such an inspectorate, for instance, would have the right of access for the purpose of carrying out on-site inspections to all facilities designed for the launching and deployment in outer space of space devices and to the corresponding launch vehicles. Bearing in mind as the ultimate goal the banning of the deployment of armaments in outer space, the Conference could begin the elaboration of partial, but important measures leading to this goal. In particular, the Conference could consider the possibility of drawing up an international agreement guaranteeing immunity for artificial Earth satellites which do not carry weapons of any sort on board. In this connection, it would also be desirable to study the possibilities of eliminating existing anti-satellite systems. For our part, we suggest banning weapon systems of the "space-to-space", "space-to-Earth" and "Earth-to-space" kinds. We should like to stress that the USSR, manifesting good will, continues to refrain from placing anti-satellite systems in outer space. An area in which the most urgent action is today required from the Conference is indisputably that of negotiations on the ptohibition of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union considers it essential that every effort be made to complete the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons this year. Such a possibility does really exist, whatever those whom it does not suit may say. To drag out this work now, when most of the questions of principle have been solved, would be truly criminal. I have a suggestion to make to the participants in the Conference: let chemical disarmament become the first example of peaceful, rather than military progress in international politics. The preparation of a convention on the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons would mean a significant increase in trust, including in the military sphere, and would give the lead for the solution of complicated problems of disarmament. It would be a striking confirmation of the viability of the multilateral approach to disarmament and would greatly increase the prestige of the Conference, which bears full responsibility vis-a-vis the international community for negotiations on chemical weapons. It is gratifying to note that progress achieved in many areas at the negotiations is the result of a series of Soviet proposals and steps made in the Conference on Disarmament last year, as well as of constructive initiatives by many other countries, including the United Kingdom, Sweden and Pakistan. 398 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 23 (Mr. Vorontsov, USSR) We are not closing our eyes to the difficulties. Nor do we consider that, having put forward our proposals, we can sleep on our laurels. I should like to inform the members of the Conference that our experts in Moscow are continuing their intensive work on the search for breakthrought on the questions outstanding. At the same time, the efforts of a mere one country, and even the efforts of a mere majority of countries, are not enough for the drawing up of the convention. We hope that the United States will truly join the search for compromises. Now at the negotiations the time has come when what is needed is the ability to rise above "author's pride" in one's own approaches and to put to the forefront the task of finding a common approach. There is no other way to success. This applies both to the United States and to all other countries, including the Soviet Union. And yet one further point. There remain in the negotiations few unagreed major questions that require a political solution. However, there are a lot of, as it were, minor technical issues, which as a whole make up a swamp that is difficult to cross. Let's not get bogged down in it, let's take a critical look at whether everything that is now being discussed at length in working groups and sub-groups is really necessary for an effective Convention. I should like to wish every success to the Ambassador of Sweden, Rolf Ek6us, as the future Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the organization of the final stage of the agreeing of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. May Mr. Ekeus go down in diplomatic history as the last leader of negotiations on this issue. In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that at this year's session progress will be made on the many procedural obstacles and the cause of real disarmament will move forward. And it is necessary to look purposefully ahead because, if we once again open the quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future, whereas what is at issue here is the future of mankind itself. May I wish all the participants in the Conference success in the discharge of the responsible tasks before them. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank His Excellency the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, whom I welcome again amongst us. Mt THEORIN (Sweden): It was with a deep sense of sadness and distress that the Swedish delegation learned about the death of Ambassador Donald Lowitz. In Ambassador Lowitz, the delegates to the Conference had a trusted and always reliable friend. He served his Government with distinction and skill. In the small community of delegates dedicated to the great task of disarmament, his intelligent, articulate and steadfast 399 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 24 (Ms Theorin, Sweden) representation of his Government's position and interest was looked upon with respect and admiration. We deeply regret that the Conference can no longer benefit from the lucid and penetrating intellect of Donald Lowitz. We will badly miss his strong sense of humour and his warm personality. The memory of Donald Lowitz is inscribed in the annals of the Conference on Disarmament. We mourn with the delegation of the United States and we ask the leader of that delegation, Mr. Barthelemy, to convey to Mrs. Shana Lowitz and the children of Donald Lowitz and to the Government of the United States our heartfelt condolences and deep sympathy. May I express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you, Ambassador Fan, in the Chair as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February. My delegation is looking forward to working with you. I assure you of the full support and co-operation of my delegation in your important task to launch our work effectively. I wish also to extend to your predecessor, Ambassador Beesley, of Canada, my sincere thanks for the skilful way in which he guided the Conference during the closing months of its previous session and up to the opening of this session. And finally, I would like to extend a heartfelt welcome to those other colleagues who have joined us since August. Ambassador Hacene, of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa, of Brazil, Ambassador Morel, of France, Ambassador Pugliese, of Italy, Ambassador Yamada, of Japan, Ambassador Dolgu, of Romania, Ambassador Nazarkine, of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Kosin, of Yugoslavia. I wish to pledge to our new colleagues the full co-operation of the delegation of Sweden. My delegation listened with the greatest attention to the important statement by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Yuli Vorontsov. The Conference on Disarmament today reassembles at an important moment. Will disarmament be given a chance? Or will yet another lost opportunity be added to the list that is far too long? The next weeks and months may well determine whether progress can be made building on what was achieved in Reykjavik. The next weeks and months will determine whether the possibility now to advance towards a nuclear test ban will be wasted in Nevada and Kazakhstan. The United States has announced its intention to carry out a new test this very week. The Soviet Union has made it clear that it will, if that occurs, follow suit and abandon its unilateral testing moratorium. It would indeed be deplorable if such fireworks should mark the opening of this session. It would amount to nothing less than an affront to international efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban. Many far-reaching disarmament proposals have lately been made, with a culmination at the dramatic Reykjavik meeting. But developments since have been slow. Though all proposals are said to remain on the table, we have seen no reports of outstanding differences being narrowed or even jointly defined. To stall negotiations is to gamble, not only with high stakes, but against the odds. 400 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 25 (Ms Theorin, Sweden) The concerns of the non-nuclear States are legitimate and must be met. The world expects major steps because major steps are needed. The world expects bilateral and multilateral negotiations to reap the fruits of a new international climate. The world expects the nuclear Powers to show boldness and determination at the negotiating table and restraint on testing grounds and in weapons laboratories. Not the other way round, as is today the case. For the multilateral negotiations, a constructive dialogue between the major nuclear Powers is essential. Equally important: results in multilateral negotiations improve international political relations in general. In Europe, the most over-armed of all continents, the Stockholm Conference achieved militarily and politically significant results. A breakthrough was made for the principle of on-site inspection of compliance with treaties on disarmament and confidence-building. Last September, a successful review Conference of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention was held in here in Geneva. Also at that Conference, progress was made regarding measures to strengthen and enhance the Convention. During the latest session of the General Assembly, the First Committee produced consensus resolutions on such traditionally controversial topics as verification and compliance. In addition to established priority issues in the nuclear field, increased and appropriate attention was paid to the conventional arms race. Several resolutions acknowledged progress made here in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons convention. On the main issue of a nuclear test ban, a development took place that should give the Conference a good opportunity finally to agree on a mandate to deal with all aspects of the matter. The latest statistics of nuclear explosions published by the Swedish Defence Research Institute, although still preliminary for 1986, show that unilateral measures in the field of disarmament make a difference. Mainly as a result of the Soviet Union's moratorium, the total number of explosions has decreased: from 55 in 1984 to 30 in 1985 and 21 in 1986. The Soviet Union carried out 27 explosions in 1984, 7 in 1985 and none in 1986. The United States carried out 17 tests in 1984, 15 in 1985 and 12 in 1986. France continues to test on more or less the same level as before: 8 explosions were registered during 1986. One British test was registered in 1986, while no Chinese test was registered. In 1986, the Conference on Disarmament was again unable to establish a committee with a view to negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty. However, while positions remained locked on the question of a mandate, one sensed a greater openness in the debate of the issue. And substantial progress was made by the Group of Scientific Experts, which agreed on an ambitious working plan for the future, including a second global data collection and analysis test in 1988. Later on, the Reykjavik meeting was close to producing an agreed formula on how to deal with the matter between two major nuclear Powers. Seemingly this involved an approach in stages, which we regret, since the time is more than ripe to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive treaty. In the view of some, I may add, this goal is put off to a distant future. It is even said 401 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 26 (Ms Theorin, Sweden) that it should be preceded by the elimination of nuclear weapons. One may wonder what is the purpose of a test ban once nuclear weapons are abolished. Nuclear weapons development is taking place now and to halt it a test ban is a necessity now. This is the case with regard to both the present and the possible future nuclear-weapon States. In the General Assembly, Sweden was pleased to note an improved political climate on the test ban issue. This improvement was translated into a certain convergence of views expressed in resolutions on the matter. The resolution on the urgent need for a comprehensive test ban treaty, introduced by Australia, attracted positive votes from an overwhelming majority of non-aligned States and for the first time from the group of socialist States, while this year the United States did not oppose it. The resolution on a cessation of all nuclear test explosions, introduced by Mexico, attracted a greater number of positive votes from the group of Western States than ever before. Sweden, as co-sponsor of both resolutions, appreciates the flexibility shown by various delegations. Diplomacy is to accommodate without losing sight of the goal. For my country, the voting pattern by which these resolutions were adopted was a significant development. It makes the call for practical work on a comprehensive test ban treaty in this Conference still more authoritative. It is time for the convergence in the General Assembly to be translated by us into a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. This Conference cannot abdicate its responsibility for what has been our professed goal for 25 years -- a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is time for the Conference on Disarmament to start practical work on its first agenda item. All relevant matters should be addressed: scope and content, as well as compliance and verification. The informal meetings held during last year's session of the Conference on Disarmament on the substance of the agenda item, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", were both constructive and worthwhile. Continued efforts should lead to more structured and formalized deliberations under this item. Although delegations from all groups have stated that they attach the utmost importance to the item "Prevention of nuclear war", unfortunately no agreement on how to deal with the issues involved has so far been reached. New efforts should be made to bring about progress on the matter. It is unfortunate that the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to make progress on the question of negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The obstacles reflect basic differences of opinion on this issue. The most fundamental element of an effective negative assurance is legally binding undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. These nom-nuclear-weapon States should not have to make any further commitments beyond that of staying nuclear-weapon free. This commitment should be formalized by adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by 402 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 27 (Ms Theorin, Sweden) participation in an established nuclear-weapon-free zone, or in other agreed ways, giving it international legal effect. The threat of an arms race in space has assumed an increasingly prominent place on the disarmament agenda. Possible future systems for defence against ballistic missiles have become a fundamental problem in bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Development and deployment of anti-satellite systems would be destabilizing and trigger an arms race in outer space. ASAT developments are a source of concern for the increasing number of countries having civilian space programmes. Sweden is gratified that discussions have taken place in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space during the past two years. That Committee's deliberations have, to a degree, been useful in sorting out issues in this field. The existing body of international law relating to an arms race in space is in many respects inadequate. We must negotiate additional measures, for example, a ban on space weapons, including development, testing and deployment of ASAT systems and their destruction. Existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral ones, must be strictly adhered to. The ABM Treaty is a case in point. The Ad Hoc Committee should continue its work during this year's session. Its considerations can be further broadened and deepened within the framework of its mandate. There are still a variety of legal aspects that should be further analysed. An overview of the technical aspect of space weapon development is called for. The setting up of an informal working group of technical experts could be considered. The international context of the negotiations on chemical weapons gives cause for serious concern. Chemical weapons have been used by Iraq in the war with Iran, disregarding rules of international law. In Europe, very large chemical weapons stockpiles exist and further development, production and deployment of such weapons is under way. Major military Powers have prepared themselves to carry out chemical warfare. The worldwide spread of chemical weapons is a clear possibility, in some cases even a definite probability. There is no alternative to the conclusion of a comprehensive convention banning all chemical weapons. After almost two decades of work and negotiation, it has been possible to address most of the elements which are necessary ingredients of a treaty. A structure and the early drafts of the treaty have been developed. We must not allow the steady pace of negotiations, and the smooth functioning of this multilateral negotiating body, to lull us into accepting slow progress and a long-term perspective. If that happens, weapons development will overtake us and ruin our efforts. In order to further the negotiations, all countries producing or considering the production of chemical weapons, unitary as well as binary, should refrain from it during the course of the negotiations. Disarmament can never be furthered through increased armaments. Against this background, any production of chemical weapons is regrettable. My Government attaches the utmost importance to this negotiation and will spare no effort to assure its urgent and successful conclusion. 403 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 28 (Ms Theorin, Sweden) A number of problems remain and must now be addressed vigorously. One is the regime for declaring and verifying existing stockpiles of chemical weapons. Another is the search for an effective, but not excessive system for international challenge inspections. The general narrowing of positions on verification that has been demonstrated lately should help to facilitate agreement on this issue. A third major problem is verification of future non-production of chemical weapons. Steps have been taken towards generally acceptable verification regimes applicable to different categories of chemicals. Such a verification system should, of course, not hamper legitimate activities of the chemical industry. Other important problems to be solved are questions related to the functioning of the Consultative Committee and its organs, including the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Committee Chairman during the past session, Ambassador Cromartie, of the United Kingdom, for his energetic and efficient performance of this function, characterized by his deep insight in the field. The continued work should be organized in a most effective way, corresponding to the requirements of this stage of the negotiating process. I rest assured that all members of the Conference will actively support efforts to speed up the negotiation to make possible an early conclusion of a convention. Last year's summer session of the Conference took place in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. Many delegations pointed out the dangers connected with all nuclear activities, civilian or military, and the geographical dimensions of the risks involved. In Vienna, two international Conventions have been elaborated with efficiency and speed. They aim at improving arrangements for countries to alert and assist each other in the case of a nuclear accident. The Conventions have already entered into force. The IAEA General Conference has also adopted resolutions calling on competent fora to deal with the prohibition of military attacks against nuclear installations. Sweden regrets proposals by some countries to elaborate a convention on this matter in the framework of the IAEA. The prohibition of attacks against nuclear installations is indeed a disarmament issue, in view of the mass destruction which such attacks would cause. And, while not opposing any bilateral or regional arrangement on this matter, we prefer a global approach. The forum is here, in the Conference on Disarmament. in 1984, Sweden put forward a draft treaty on radiological weapons. The proposal aims at prohibiting radiological weapons, as well as attacks on nuclear facilities, causing mass destruction through radiation. Mass destruction -- the very title of the agenda item -- is the link which justifies this approach. Instead of suggesting the moving of the item from one international body to the other, delegations should this year try to address the substantive outstanding dispute. Circumstances oblige me once again to draw the attention of the Conference to the somewhat perennial question of the expansion of its membership. It is far from reasonable that candidates are kept waiting year after year for a decision. I hope that a satisfactory solution of the matter will be arrived at during this session. 404 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 29 (Ms Theorin, Sweden) The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is scheduled to take place in 1988. Sweden will take an active part in that special session, as well as in the important preparatory work preceding it. The special session should reconfirm the conviction of the international community that there is no task more urgent for mankind than to achieve nuclear disarmament. Bearing in mind the priority of the nuclear issue, the scope could be broadened. For our part, we would be pleased if the special session also addressed such crucial questions as conventional disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the naval arms race and the need for confidence-building measures on a global level. Twenty-five years ago the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was established here in Geneva. Sweden joined it as one of eight members not belonging to any of the military alliances. The record of that Committee and that of its successors, the CCD and the CD, deserves close examination. The Geneva disarmament bodies have been instrumental in producing such agreements as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Bacteriological Weapons Convention, the Sea-Bed Treaty and the ENMOD Convention. It is a record that well stands comparison with what has been achieved in negotiations between the nuclear Powers. On several crucial disarmament issues, particularly when nuclear weapons are the subject, the functioning of these multilateral bodies has, however, been severely hampered. The comprehensive test ban is a case in point. This has not been due to lack of dedication, deftness or derring-do on the part of negotiators here in Geneva. It is because the conferences have been denied, by nuclear Powers, the leeway necessary to fulfil their role. They have even been denied the prerogative to negotiate on main items of their agenda. Today we have an excellent opportunity to reinforce confidence in the ability of the Conference on Disarmament to perform its task. We must proceed with and conclude a treaty outlawing chemical weapons. We must get negotiations going on a comprehensive test treaty. We must, on all items on our agenda, demonstrate the potential and viability of multilateral disarmament negotiations. Political and military decision-makers, all over the world, are preparing plans for war and for new rounds of the ever accelerating arms race. If peace and disarmament is to become a reality, it must also be planned for and vigorously pursued. As the saying has it, "They sow the wind, they will reap the storm". If we sow weapons, we will reap war. But if we sow seeds of disarmament, we will reap peace. The work has been going on for 25 years here in Geneva. Time is running short. We will not have 25 more years to try it out. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. We have exhausted the time available to us this morning though we still have two members listed on our list of speakers. Furthermore, we also have some organizational matters to consider. Accordingly, I will suspend the plenary meeting and resume it at 3.30 p.m. sharp in order to 405 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 30 (The President) continue our deliberations. As agreed by the Conference, after we have listened to the last speaker for today we shall hold an informal meeting to consider the provisional agenda and programme of work for the Conference. If we reach agreement at that informal meeting, we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to adopt any decision resulting from the informal meeting. Also, at the request of the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, I wish to inform the members of that Group that they will meet here at 3 p.m. for a brief consultation and will be provided with interpretation service. The plenary meeting of the Conference is suspended. The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and reconvened at 3.30 p.m. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare that the 385th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. First of all, I will give the floor to Ambassador Cromartie, of the United Kingdom, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to introduce the report of the Committee. Now I give the floor to him. Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I should like first to tell you of the profound shock with which I heard the news of the death of Ambassador Don Lowitz, whom we mourn both as a colleague and as a friend. He arrived in this Conference two years ago this week and we admired the courage and skill with which he stepped, at his first meeting, into the Chair which you now occupy to preside with success over the Conference for the month of February. Thereafter we were able to admire the ability and integrity with which he conducted his official function as leader of the United States delegation and we enjoyed friendship with him and with his family. He would have been sitting next to me today and it is with sorrow that I realize I shall see him no more. I should be grateful if the United States delegation would accept my deep condolences and convey them to his widow, Shana, whom we remember with affection and sympathy, and to their children. I should now like to speak as outgoing Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to present the report which was adopted by the Committee on 29 January and which is now before you as document CD/734. This report covers the work carried out during the intersessional period on the basis recommended in the Committee's last report, CD/727, of 21 August, and approved by the Conference on 28 August. The Conference requested that the Committee should resume its work under its existing mandate for a session of limited duration during the period 12-30 January 1987 on issues under Articles III, IV, V, VI and IX and the parts of Article II relevant to Articles V and VI: that consultations should be undertaken on those issues by the Chairman in the meantime in preparation for the resumed session: and that for that purpose open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee should be held between 24 November and 17 December 1986, including, where necessary, meetings with full services: and that the Committee should report to the Conference on Disarmament on its work during the intersessional period. It is this report that I am giving to you today. 406 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 31 (Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom) The substantive results of the work in question are before you in document CD/734. The open-ended consultations were very well attended and took place in an atmosphere that demonstrated the keen interest of delegations in this work. Mr. Rowe, of Australia, and Mr. Poptchev, of Bulgaria, continued their work as Chairmen of Working Group A and Working Group B respectively with great dedication and enthusiasm. The Ad Hoc Committee owes a great debt of gratitude to them for the way in which they pursued during the intersessional period the work they had undertaken in the 1986 session, the results of which are contained in the Committee's previous report, CD/727, of 21 August 1986. When the Committee met again in formal session, on 12 January, it decided that the progress achieved in informal consultations warranted an updating of the rolling text of the draft Convention to incorporate the addition of common ground identified during the intersessional period. This revised version is contained in appendix I to the document before you, CD/734, with the recommendation, in paragraph 9(a), that this appendix should be used for further negotiation and drafting of the Convention. Active work was still continuing until the last day. Two other papers of the Chairman of Working Group A were placed in appendix II so that they could be available for further work in the 1987 session. As Mr. Wisnoemoerti, of Indonesia, who was Chairman of Working Group C in 1986 and who clarified the issues under Articles VIII and IX, left at the end of the most recent session of the Conference, in August 1986, / undertook, in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee, extensive consultations with many delegations on the subject of article IX and its relation to the Convention as a whole. I am most grateful to those of you who spent the time to give me the benefit of your perceptions both from your national and regional points of view and from the points of view of any Groups to which your countries belong. As a result of those consultations, / came to the conclusion that it would not at this stage help the Conference's work to attempt multilateral consideration of the text of Article IX. I was, however, agreeably surprised by the extent of common ground which I found. I therefore recorded in the Committee's report that / had detected a convergence of views on four points: firstly, that confidence in the Convention should be built up and maintained by routine inspection of declared facilities; secondly, that provisions under Article IX were needed for any party to give voice to its suspicions that another party was not complying with its obligations and to have confidence that these suspicions would be promptly allayed by agreed procedures; thirdly, that such procedures should be regarded as a fundamental source of confidence in the Convention and recourse to them should be a rare event; fourthly, that once these procedures had been invoked, a very short time for resolution of the issue was essential both for reasons inherent in the nature of chemical weapons as well as for wider political reasons. These points do not, of course, form part of the rolling text, which contains provisionally agreed treaty language subject to reservations expressed by square brackets or footnotes. 407 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 32 (Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom) As you will see from our latest version of the text, appendix 1 of the report before you represents a considerable advance on what was contained in the appendix to our previous report, CD/727. In the light of the agreement at the very end of the previous session on a new text for Article IV, Working Group B, under the chairmanship of Mr. Poptchev, has developed an improved and more comprehensive structure for Articles III, iv and V of the Convention, which deal with initial declarations of chemical weapons and production facilities for their elimination. This represents an important step forward and I hope that it will provide a good foundation for further work on this subject, where there are important points remaining to be resolved, including the questions of declaration of location of stocks and of the definition of production facilities. In the absence of a resolution of this last point, it seemed premature to tackle the questions remaining to be resolved under Article II on definitions. In any case, Working Group A was very fully occupied with work which continued until the report before you went to press. The new text of Article V/ developed during our previous session has been further developed under the able and energetic guidance of Mr. Rowe to comprise three schedules of chemical substances of concern under a chemical weapons convention, with corresponding annexes on regimes to deal with them. The Article now provides, for the first time, for an undertaking for each State Party to declare data on the relevant chemical substances and facilities which produced them and to subject the chemicals and facilities covered in Annex II and Schedule 2 to monitoring by data reporting and routine systematic international on-site inspection. This undertaking represents an important step forward. Taken together with the provisions of Annexes 1 and 3 of Article VI, it will make an important contribution to the confidence required for the Convention to be concluded. This accords with the first of the four points of convergence that I mentioned earlier, namely that confidence in the Convention should be built up and maintained by routine inspection of declared facilities. During the transitional period in which stocks of chemical weapons and their production facilities are eliminated, further measures will be required, and remain to be elaborated, to give confidence that States Parties are complying with their obligations in this respect. As I told you earlier, I also detected a convergence of view that provisions under Article /X would be required to underpin confidence in the Convention we are negotiating. This crucial issue remains to be resolved. The execution of all these measures of verification will require the establishment of an effective organization under Article VIII of the treaty. This task may prove to be as complex as Article VI has proved this year. The development of Article V/ so far establishes that this organization will have a long-term, detailed routine task to perform. Further work on this Article in conjunction with Article VIII will be required to ensure that the provisions of the draft convention together provide the necessary confidence in the draft Convention as a whole to enable it to be concluded. 408 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 33 (Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdbm) Finally, I should like to express my warm thanks to all delegations for the way in which they have, during my year as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contributed positively and constructively to the common task of negotiating in this Conference, the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, a draft Convention to ban chemical weapons altogether. Our special joint thanks are due to the Chairmen of the three Working Groups, Mr. Rowe, of Australia, Mr. Poptchev, of Bulgaria and Mr. Wisnoemoerti, of Indonesia, for their tireless work and for the great contribution they have made to .the fruitful result of our year's work. I am sure that I speak for all members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in expressing our deep gratitude to the United Nations Secretariat for the support and help that they have given to the Committee in its work, especially to the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and his staff, who have made a great contribution to the Committee's work, and to all the interpreters and translators, who have enabled us to operate in all the languages of the Conference. I have now discharged the function with which the Conference entrusted me at the beginning of its last session. In doing so, I am delighted that, as a result of a decision of the Conference in August, roan hand over this task to Ambassador Ekeus, of Sweden. I know that the Chair of the Committee could not be in better hands. I offer my heartfelt best wishes for the forthcoming session and pledge to him as Chairman the co-operation and support of the delegation of the United Kingdom. As I have the floor, let me say as the representative of the United Kingdom, that I congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the office of President. I know that you will discharge it with all the wisdom traditional in your country. And let me say finally a word of thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Beesley, of Canada, for the great diplomatic skill with which he conducted the presidency in the month of August. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for his introduction to the report of the Committee contained in document CD/734 and I also thank him for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I wish to say to Ambassador Cromartie that we all admire his outstanding performance as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and also to thank him for his introduction to the fruitful results of one year's work. I would also like to say that, by his well-known diplomatic ability and his personal charm, he has been instrumental in securing substantial progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. During our informal consultations we agreed that, on 5 February, at our next plenary meeting, I will submit the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference for adoption. At the end of the morning session on 5 February, we will re-establish that Ad Hoc Committee and we will appoint Ambassador Ekeus, of Sweden, as Chairman. I now give the floor to the last speaker on my list, the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler. 409 neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 34 Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Australia has great hopes at this 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament. I believe, Mr. President, that there is a Chinese saying that says that "Even a journey of a thousand miles starts with its first steps"; our first steps this year are in your hands and this is one of the sources of our hope, or our optimism. /t gives great satisfaction to my delegation to see you in the vital opening month of our 1987 session presiding over the Conference on Disarmament as head of the delegation of China. China's depth of culture and historical experience is well known and is deeply felt by the Australian Government and people. We have admired the determination and the resolve of the Chinese people in pursuing the goals of modernization and have been struck by the strides that China has made in multilateral work on disarmament. This was most recently reflected in the significant initiatives China took at the latest session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Australia also appreciated the very important declaration by China that it would no longer conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere. We look to the historic wisdom of China and to your obvious personal abilities to get us started on the right path, on the right journey in 1987. My delegation will give you full support in your efforts this month and not least because of the strong and ever-growing relationship that exists between our two countries as neighbours in the Asia and Pacific region. I want to express, too, our thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Beesley, for the efforts he made in August, a difficult month for the Conference on every occasion. I would like, too, to pause briefly to express congratulations to him for his election in the meantime as a member of the International Law Commission. I also want to join others who this morning have welcomed new heads of delegations who have joined us here at the Conference table. I said that we have great hopes at this 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament. There are a number of reasons why we hold this view and I will mention a few of them briefly. First, last year at Reykjavik we saw the end of the first period of renewed vigour in United States/Soviet negotiations on major issues in arms control and disarmament. That period began in November 1985, at the Geneva summit meeting, and a year later, indeed a relatively short time later, there were exposed at Reykjavik the main elements of a truly significant agreement between the two major military Powers. Our understanding is that, while an agreement was not able to be sealed at Reykjavik, its elements remain substantially intact and work is proceeding on securing not only a far-reaching agreement, but an agreement which would be a beginning not an end, one which would lead naturally to even further measures of arms control and disarmament. This real possibility must and should have a positve influence on what we will seek to do and will be able to do in this Conference in 1987. It validates our confident expectations of momentum in this Conference this year. 410 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 35 (Mr. Butler, Australia) Second, there was the progress we made in our own work last year. Two or three years ago, times were hard in this Conference. Debates were sharp and positions often very divergent. But last year a degree of convergence started to emerge. In several areas of our work there was a sense that the Conference was on the move, that differences were being narrowed and that progress was being sought with new determination. Third, the same process of convergence and reconciliation of important differences was evident at the most recent session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. This was perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the resolutions adopted on nuclear testing and chemical weapons. Again, delegations set aside the narrow expression of differences of view and approach and strove instead to seek common ground. This spirit still exists. We detect a widespread willingness to continue this flow of events and to develop it. We have heard a good deal of criticism of the multilateral disarmament system and machinery during the past few years. There is no doubt that some of that criticism has been valid, but surely it is wise, at least on some occasions, to put these things into an historical perspective. It has always been the case, for example, certainly throughout this century, that there has been a multilateral conference on disarmament in Geneva and real disfunctionalities between what that conference could do and the realities of the military power held by certain States. Yet, in spite of that degree of disfunctionality, the various versions of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva have added incrementally to international law and practice in the field of arms control and disarmament. / think this was a point made this morning by Ms Theorin, the distinguished leader of the Swedish delegation. I think the point is this: if one looks at the corpus of such law and practice that has been agreed upon in Geneva this century, the value of historical perspective is revealed as in a flash. To put it simply the agreements and practices negotiated in Geneva have proven indispensable to the management of international relations and to attempts to maintain the peace in our difficult and increasingly complex age. I would like now to address briefly three items on our Conference agenda which have definite priority for my Government. The first of them is a nuclear-test ban treaty. Towards the end of our set- an last year, the gap between members of the Conference on this vital subject was closing. This process of convergence was further revealed at the General Assembly in the resolutions which were adopted on this subject, both in terms of the substance of the resolutions and in the voting patterns on them. There was also the resumption of discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on this subject. Signific:_c aevelopments took place too in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and in proposals for the establishment of an international seismic monitoring network for the verification of a test-ban treaty, one of which was made by my own Government. May I again at this moment urge the Conference to take a decision to establish that network, along the lines, for example, of our proposal. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 36 (Mr. Butler, Australia) On the central issue, that of a nuclear-test ban treaty, we see no reason why the last step cannot be taken very soon and an ad hoc committee of this Conference on a nuclear-test ban treaty established. We believe that this can be done and done quickly, and my delegation stands ready to participate in removing the last obstacles. This is not to say that other work external to this Conference, either in bilateral discussions or by particular groups of States, should not continue. However, the missing piece is at hand and that piece is the resumption of work in this Conference on bringing into existence a verifiable treaty, preventing all nuclear test explosions by all States in all environments for all time. I now turn to chemical weapons. We have stated repeatedly in this Conference that the Australian Government attaches high priority to the conclusion of a multilateral convention which would ban the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. We believe that such an objective is clearly in sight. There is a new spirit in the negotiations and this was evident throughout the 1986 session of the Chemical Weapons Committee. It was reflected in particular in the process which was recorded in the intersessional consultations during November, December and January. The advances made in the negotiations are reflected in the report containing the revised rolling text of the Convention which Ambassador Cromartie presented this afternoon. This momentum which was generated under the dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie must be sustained. In fact we must increase the tempo of our negotiations during 1987 so that the opportunity which clearly exists of concluding a convention this year may be realized. This requires two things: concentration upon resolution of the main outstanding issues, and tailoring of the working arrangements of the Committee in the most effective way. The Committee has concentrated its work during the past year on matters relating to Articles III, IV, v, VI and IX. While all these Articles will continue to require further attention, we consider it is now imperative to focus in a concentrated way on other specific issues. Four of these are of central importance: declaration and verification of chemical weapons stocks; chemical weapons production facilities; non-production of chemical weapons; and challenge inspection. There has already been a considerable amount of effort devoted to the discussion of these issues and to the formulation of appropriate provisions for inclusion in the Convention, but a solution to all aspects of these issues has remained elusive. They are difficult and complex, but it is not beyond our ability to solve them. Our ability to find solutions was demonstrated in the latter part of the 1986 session, which resulted in progress, good progress being made on Articles III, IV, V and VI. The subject of challenge inspection is recognized as one of the most important issues needing solution. A range of proposals has been put forward in relation to it, but we believe that an appropriate provision can be arrived 412 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 37 (Mr. Butler, Australia) at if the issue is taken up in a concentrated way. A solution to challenge inspection would give a significant impetus to the negotiations as a whole. Thus we think that the challenge inspection issue should be given prominence during the 1987 session. We have mentioned the desirability of focusing our work on specific issues in a concentrated way. This would require an adjustment to the way in which we have organized the Committee's work in the past. We are very pleased that the incoming Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Committee, Ambassador Elceus, is envisaging such an approach. We fully support the idea of focused consideration of clusters of issues, providing, of course, that there can be flexibility in relation to when particular issues might be taken up depending on the progress being made. It is through such an approach that we believe that the momentum that has been so much in evidence during 1986 will be sustained and that the objective to which we are all committed will be achieved. As further evidence of Australia's commitment to this objective, we would like to record that since the last plenary meeting of the 1986 session of the Conference the Australian Government has taken further action in support of its view that chemical warfare is abhorrent. On 26 November 1986, Australia withdrew its reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, although a valuable international agreement, is less than perfect. In view of the many reservations to the Protocol, it cannot be said categorically that it prohibits all use of chemical weapons. By withdrawing its own reservation and by its active pursuit of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention, Australia aims to strengthen the international norms against chemical warfare. Australia has also been concerned about the proliferation of chemical weapons. To ensure that Australia does not inadvertently contribute to the problems of chemical weapon use through chemicals exported from Australia being secretly diverted to the manufacture of chemical weapons, eight chemicals which could be misused in this way were placed under strict export controls by us in 1985. The Australian Government has recently decided that an additional 22 chemicals which could be used in making chemical weapons will be placed under Australian export controls, bringing to 30 the number of such chemicals for which export permits will be required. Although Australian Ministers decided in December 1986 that an additional 22 chemicals would be controlled, I have to make clear :hat the full implementation of this decision, this firm decision, i still in train. The Australian export control list will, we hope, serve as a model for all chemical exporting nations. The measures we have implemented to control the export of these chemicals is intended to reduce the risk of chemical warfare. But export controls, while a valuable measure, are not a substitute for a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. So we will continue to give our full support to the maintenance' - that important objective, an objective which is in sight and is one of our expectations for 1987. 413 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 38 (Mr. Butler, Australia) I turn now to outer space. On the question of a convention of an arms race in outer space, the position of the Australian Government is clear: such an arms race should never take place. We accept that it is the basic commitment of the major Powers involved to prevent an arms race in outer space. That is what they have said, and we accept it and we want to see that commitment honoured. We believe that the multilateral community, whose interest in this issue is beyond question, can make an important contribution towards achieving this goal. We believe that the work of this Conference has a central place in this effort and should be resumed this year without delay. It would be distressing in the extreme if the resumption of that work were to be delayed by mere procedural arguments. The task is urgent and the job at hand is large. We hope, Mr. President, that the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space will be well into its working stride before you leave the Chair of this Conference. At an earlier point in this statement I mentioned initiatives that have been taken by groups of States outside the strict confines of the Conference on Disarmament or the multilateral disarmament system. One such initiative which came to fruition in 1986 was the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga, the treaty establishing a South Pacific nuclear-free zone. On 8 August 1985, I informed the Conference of the decision taken on 6 August by the Heads of Government of the 13 member countries of the South Pacific Forum, at its meeting in Rarotonga in the Cook Islands, to endorse the draft. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and subsequently to open it for signature. The text of the Treaty and its draft Protocols was transmitted to the Conference on 16 August 1985 in document CD/633. Today I wish to inform the Conference that the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of Rarotonga, entered into force, with the deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, on 11 December 1986. Just one and a half years after it was opened for signature, the Treaty of Rarotonga is in operation. There is now a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone stretching from the Equator in the north to the Antarctic in the south and from the west coast of Latin America to the west coast of Australia. The States which have ratified the Treaty are: Fiji, the Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Niue, Western Samoa, Kiribati, New Zealand and Australia. The South Pacific has therefore become the second populated region, that is, after Latin America, to establish a nuclear-free zone, one which covers a truly significant portion of the surface of this Earth. As illustration of that significance, I have asked the secretariat now to distribute to the Conference a map of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The Treaty of Rarotonga provides that: no South Pacific country which becomes a Party to the Treaty will develop, manufacture, acquire or receive from others any nuclear explosive devices; there should be no testing of nuclear explosive devices in the South Pacific; there will be no stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territories of participating States; nuclear activities in the region, including the export of nuclear material, are to be conducted under strict safeguards to ensure exclusively peaceful, non-explosive use; South Pacific countries shall retain their unqualified sovereign rights to decide for themselves such questions as access to their 41 4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 39 (Mr. Butler, Australia) ports and airfields by vessels or aircraft of other countries; international law with regard to freedom of the sea will be fully respected; and finally, performance of obligations by Parties will be subject to strict verification. The Treaty also bans the dumping of radioactive waste at sea in the region and in this it compliments the SPREP Convention concluded in 1986 for the environmental protection of the South Pacific region. The Treaty of Rarotonga reflects deeply-felt and longstanding concern in the South Pacific region about nuclear testing, the ocean dumping of nuclear wastes and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It expresses the strong community of interests which members of the South Pacific Forum share in environmental and security matters and, in the words of the Treaty's Preamble, the determination of the Parties to ensure "that the bounty and beauty of the land and the sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their people and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace". There are three Protocols to the Treaty and they were opened for signature on 1 December 1986. The first of them invites France, the United States of America and the United Kingdom to apply key provisions of the Treaty to their South Pacific territories. The other two Protocols respectively invite the five nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Parties to the Treaty and not to test nuclear explosive devices within the Zone. It is our firm view that the Treaty of Rarotonga constitutes an important contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the region it covers and is a significant nuclear arms control agreement. Its significance in this respect would be further enhanced if those nuclear-weapon States which have been invited to sign the Protocols to the Treaty relevant to them did so as expeditiously as possible. One State, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, did so on 15 December of last year, and Australia welcomed this. A significant feature of the Treaty of Rarotonga is that the South Pacific Forum, which produced the Treaty, is an association of regional Governments which traditionally operates by consensus. Members of this Conference will be sensitive to the difficulties associated with the process of arriving at a consensus in producing arms control and disarmament agreements, and aware that, in coming to an agreement, the interests of all participants must be taken into account. The Treaty of Rarotonga is a document which is a product of just that process, a consensus document agreed to by a number of States, a number in fact numerically equivalent to a third of this Conference. I have said that this Treaty is an important arms control measure. No nuclear weapons are stationed on the territory of the South Pacific States. This Treaty provides a strong guarantee that this will remain the case. The Treaty also creates verification mechanisms with respect to this undertaking. Other areas where a similar undertaking has been institutionalized, with the overwhelming support of the international community, are Antarctica, Latin America, outer space and the sea bed. The Treaty of Rarotonga marks an important additional contribution towards 415 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 40 (Mr. Butler, Australia) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, a contribution with significant consequences both for the South Pacific region and for neighbouring regions. It is a major contribution towards preventing a sizeable part of the globe becoming yet another location in which the geographical spread of nuclear weapons could occur. The prohibition of the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of South Pacific countries is of particular importance in this regard. It extends beyond the obligations that these countries have entered into under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As I mentioned earlier, the text of the Treaty of Rarotonga was circulated to this Conference in 1985 in document CD/633. Since then, following consultations by a South Pacific Forum delegation of officials with all the prospective Protocol States, the Protocols have been adopted in final form by the South Pacific Forum, meeting at Suva in August 1986. The final text of the Protocols has been circulated today jointly by the delegations of Australia and New Zealand as an annex to document CD/633. That has been placed on the table of delegations today. The text of the Treaty proper, including all the annexes, with the exception of the amended Protocols circulated today, remains identical to what is contained in CD/633. I referred earlier to the history of multilateral disarmament efforts in Geneva. One thing that is clear about these efforts is that, in spite of occasional very difficult periods, they have never remained static. We believe the multilateral disarmament machinery is today undergoing a process of change. The reason for this is that States value the machinery and they want to see it made more effective. In New York, where this subject has been increasingly vigorously discussed, we have made clear that we welcome attempts being made to review and upgrade our machinery. We believe that this should include a reshaping of the agenda of multilateral negotiations to enable us to respond very directly to the central realities of armaments and their impact on the maintenance of peace and security. The multilateral disarmament process would be better served if this Conference, for example, could focus its attention on a number of priority agenda items. There is a strong case for streamlining the current agenda by setting aside items that are less urgent or relatively unsuited to consideration by the Conference at the present time. We particularly hope that we can conclude our work on a comprehensive programme of disarmament and, in conformity with the resolution of the General Assembly at its forty-first session, submit our conclusions to the General Assembly before the end of that session. Australia believes in this Conference and in its role of ensuring that disarmament plays its proper part in the maintenance of peace and security. May I add that, in my firm view, this Conference is a better place for having had my friend, Donald Lowitz, sit at its table. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Conference and to the country that I represent. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Mexico. 416 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 41 Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Forgive me for having made so bold as to ask for the floor again after my lengthy statement this morning, but it will, I think, be understood that, as the representative of a country, Mexico, whose capital serves as the headquarters of the body set up under the first treaty to have established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an inhabited area, I should not wish to let pass the occasion on which Ambassador Butler has informed us of the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga without extending to him, and asking him to convey to all the members of the new zone, the congratulations of the delegation of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament. I believe that the first special session of the General Assembly was very right when it said in its Final Document -- and I quote the words of paragraphs 60 and 61 -- that "the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure" and that, as it added in paragraph 61, "the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons". For that reason, I reiterate my congratulations to Ambassador Butler and to the State or States he represents. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none. I now give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, for a statement concerning the services allocated to the Conference. Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): As you know, the United Nations continues to face a financial emergency necessitating reductions and the reprogramming of a number of its activities. As was the case during the second part of the 1986 session, the Conference needs to consider how to implement the target reduction of 30 per cent in services allocated to it. Intensive consultations were held at Headquarters, as well as in Geneva, in order to ensure the best prevailing conditions for the work of the Conference and for its servicing. The outcome of these consultations was that, in order that the work of the Conference would be the least impaired while bringing about the required rate of saving, it was better, on the basis of the experience of the second part of the 1986 session, to concentrate on reducing the number of weekly meetings rather than imposing a 30 per cent reduction in the duration of the annual session. As was the case for the second part of the 1986 session, those savings would mean in practice the allocation to the Conference of 10 meetings per week, with full servicing and 15 meetings per week also with full servicing, during the sessions of the Seismic Group. Therefore, the Conference will be afforded two daily meetings with full servicing throughout the whole of the 1987 session, plus one additional daily meeting when the Seismic Group is in session. Furthermore, should the Conference establish a higher number of committees than in 1986, it should be envisaged to hold their meetings consecutively with other committees or working groups. This practice was put into effect in the past and prevented the wastage of allocated resources in 417 npriacsified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 42 (Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations) the event that the time allocated for each meeting had not been fully utilized. May I recall that predecessors of the CD developed a system of punctuality, whereby all meetings would start no later than five minutes after their scheduled time of commencement. Of course, the substantive secretariat will always be available to service informal consultations in case members wish to intensify their activities beyond the allocation of meetings with full services. As in the case of the 1986 session, it will not be possible to hold meetings in the evenings or during weekends with full servicing. May I also recall the measures accepted by the Conference at the informal meeting held on 22 April 1986 concerning documentation. In order to implement these decisions and to bring about savings in the cost of documentation, we hope that documents will be presented in good time, since there is no overtime for the technical staff of Conference Services and therefore it will not be possible to meet last-minute deadlines. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference for his statement. During the informal consultations that we held before the opening of the session, I noted that there was general agreement among members on the services to be provided by us, as outlined by the Secretary-General. This being the case, we shall proceed accordingly. In conformity with Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure, the Secretariat has circulated working paper CD/WP.251, entitled "Provisional agenda for the 1987 session and programme of work on the Conference on Disarmament". intend now to suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider that working paper. The plenary meeting is suspended. The meeting was suspended at 4.35 p.m. and reconvened at 4.45 p.m. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 385th plenary meeting on Disarmament is resumed. I put before the Conference for decision the agenda for the 1987 session and the programme of work for the first part of the session, as contained in working paper CD/WP.251, dated 30 January 1987. In doing so, / wish to make the following statement on behalf of the Conference: "The Conference will also intensify its consultations on the item dealing with the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, bearing in mind that the Conference recommended in its last report to the General Assembly, and the Assembly supported this recommendation in the decision it adopted on this matter, that the elaboration of the programme should be completed during the first part of the 1987 session for submission to the General Assembly before the closure of the latter's forty-first session.". If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the working paper. 1/ It was so decided. 418 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.385 43 (The President) I should like to express my appreciation to the members for their assistance in adopting quickly our agenda for 1987 and the programme of work for the first part of the session. As agreed during our informal consultations, I intend to put before the Conference for adoption at the opening of our next plenary meeting, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/734, which was introduced today by its Chairman, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom. Also on that occasion, we shall re-establish, at the end of the morning meeting, that Ad Hoc Committee and appoint Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden as its Chairman. As you know, there is no need to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which can start its work immediately. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 5 February at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned. The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m. Note I/ Later issued as document CD/735. 41g Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.386 5 February 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH MEETING Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 5 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m. President: GE. 87-60143/71].7E ? Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China) 420 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 386th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the outset, I wish to extend, on behalf of the Conference, a warm welcome to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States of America, the Honourable Kenneth L. Adelman, who is to address the Conference today as first speaker. Mr. Adelman is well-known to us, as he has visited the Conference before. We also know of the important responsibilities which have been entrusted to him and, for that reason, I am sure that members will follow his statement with special interest. I should also like to welcome warmly the Deputy Foreign Minister of Cuba, His Excellency Mr. Ratil Roa Kouri, who will also speak today at the Conference. Mr. Roa Kouri is an experienced diplomat, who has served as Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations and, in that capacity, has been actively involved in disarmament matters. His statement will also be of particular interest to us. As announced at our last plenary meeting, I intend now to put before the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 12-30 January 1987, as contained in document CD/734. You will recall that the report was introduced by Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom at the same plenary meeting.. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad Hoc Committee. It was so decided. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Cuba, Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. I now give the floor to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States of America, the Honourable Kenneth L. Adelman. Mr. ADELMAN (United States of America): Mr. President, before I make my statement today, I want to take this opportunity, on behalf of the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, to extend our congratulations and best wishes to you as you guide the work of this Conference in the opening month of its 1987 session. On two occasions during the past three years I have had the privilege to lead an arms control delegation to your country, China, for discussions of arms control issues; it is a pleasure to be speaking under your presidency today. The United States delegation also extends its congratulations to Ambassador Beesley of Canada, who so ably guided the work of the Conference in August and through the inter-sessional period. The United States delegation joins in the welcome that has been extended to the new heads of the delegations of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 421 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 3 (Mr. Adelman, United States of America) Two years ago, when I first addressed this Conference on Disarmament, I was sitting on the podium with Donald Lowitz at my side; he was serving as President for that month. Since then, you have had the good fortune to know Don as I've known him for all my adult life: as a warm and wonderful person, who served his country whenever called upon -- and I asked him to do so more than two years ago now -- and who believed in this Conference and its goals and who believed in all of you. You saw this side of Don. I had seen him as a marvellous husband to Shana -- herself such a perfect embodiment of what's fresh and caring about America -- and as a fabulous father to Amy, Teddy and Josh and a loving grandfather to David. How they will all miss him. How we will all miss him. I understand that you have already heard from President Reagan on his tribute to Don. Let us, as the President said, pursue the goals Don pursued and, by so doing, give a living monument to his work here. I would now like to convey to you the President's greetings at the opening of this session; the President's words: "As the Conference on Disarmament resumes its work in 1987, I would like to extend my wishes for a productive session. Although the opening of the Conference has been darkened by the sad and untimely loss of our Ambassador, Donald Lowitz, I am certain we can join together in making progress in this forum as a fitting testimonial to his memory. Your work constitutes an important and integral part of efforts undertaken by the international community to make our world a more peaceful place. The issues with which you deal are complementary to those being addressed bilaterlly between the United States and the Soviet Union. The promise of Reykjavik, which has given us the vision of a world with significantly reduced levels of nuclear weapons, has become an indicator of what is possible. It inevitably draws attention to the issues on your agenda and should encourage you in your efforts to increase international stability and co-operation. One of the most important tasks facing you is the working out of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. This task is made even more difficult by the fact that capabilities for chemical warfare are increasing and that, contrary to international agreement, chemical weapons are being used in various parts of the world. You have a heavy responsibility. For, as you consider the provisions of a convention, you must make sure that a global ban will, in fact, eliminate the capability for chemical weapons to be used against future generations. An effective convention will require an unprecedented degree of openness on the part of all States. I reaffirm the commitment made by the United States in 1984 when we tabled our draft convention banning chemical weapons worldwide. The United States delegation will make every effort to work for the total elimination of these terrible weapons and for the verification provisions necessary to ensure that they never again enter the arsenals of the world's armies. 422 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 4 (Mr. Adelman, United States of America) Your efforts in this and in other fields are to be commended. We are committed to working with you in the Herculean task of bringing stability to a still insecure world and in achieving responsible solutions to the problem of reducing the world's arms." In the two years since I last spoke to this forum, the world has witnessed some dramatic developments in arms control. I would like to single out especially the remarkable meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik last October, in which I had the privilege of participating. From the United States perspective, Reykjavik marked an historic turning-point in our arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union. Why is that? Because for the first time, we engaged the Soviet Union in serious negotiations -- not just public initiatives, but serious, hands-on negotiations during those dramatic two days -- on the subject of deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms. This was the goal that President Reagan has been striving for ever since he entered office, ever since he first proposed the "zero-zero" option for intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and deep strategic arms reductions (START) in 1981 and 1982. At that time, you may remember, there were many people in our own country and elsewhere who argued that such ambitious arms reduction proposals had no real place in the arms control dialogue. Many, if not most, claimed that these deep-cuts proposals were too far-reaching and could never be the basis for productive negotiations with the Soviet Union: the Soviet Union would just never entertain such deep cuts as we envisioned. But, when the Soviet Union walked out of the arms talks at the end of 1983 -- a walk-out that was totally unjustifiable, I might add, due to the INF situation -- many of these same critics reiterated their arguments, believing that events had vindicated their views. But President Reagan persisted. And his persistence has paid off in a real shift in the arms control agenda. Now at last -- at long last, if you ask me -- the two sides are talking in nuclear arms control about agreements that, if signed -- and if fully complied with, which is another thing altogether -- would effect real and deep reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals, particularly those systems that are most destabilizing, that are most threatening in the world. No more are we looking at arrangements like the SALT accords of the 1970s, which permitted vast growth in the arsenals of both sides -- a fourfold increase in the number of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons since SALT I was signed in 1972 and an increase in our own arsenal in response to that fourfold increase on the Soviet side. Thanks to President Reagan's persistence, the agenda in nuclear arms control is now, I believe, irreversibly, deep offensive weapons cuts. There is another development to which I would call your attention, a development that has occurred outside the field of arms control proper, but which, if it were to come to pass, could have potentially broad ramifications for arms control and surely for the deliberations of this forum, for the future of the Conference on Disarmament. That is the increasing discussion of 423 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 5 (Mr. Adelman, United States of America) "openness", or glasnost, in the Soviet Union itself. Indeed, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov addressed it here two days ago and we talked about it last night during our long evening together. It is not clear where this focus might lead, it is not clear what glasnost, is to mean and how it is to unfold, or if the openness that the Soviet Union talks about now will be genuine openness by the standards of a truly open society. We can speak conditionally and we can express hope, a deep hope) we can say that, if this interest in openness on the part of the Soviet Union were indeed to prove real, if it were indeed to prove enduring, we could very much find ourselves standing on the threshold of a new era for the cause of arms control and disarmament. For openness and arms control go together, hand in hand, they go together on at least two levels. First, there is a clear connection between openness and international trust, between peace and the open society. Andrei Sakharov, that great world hero and a Soviet hero, has spoken of "the indissoluble bond between international security and trust on the one hand, and respect .for human rights and an open society on the other". Societies that respect the rights of their citizens, that respect freedom of speech, that respect freedom of religion, that respect freedom of the press, that respect freedom of assembly, these kinds of societies that defend the rights of individuals to criticize their leaders, to vote for their leaders in office and out of office -- such societies also keep their international treaty commitments. Such societies can be expected to behave in a fashion that promotes world peace. Such societies do not crave new territory. Such societies do not menace their neighbours. Looking at the history of the United States, it is impossible to find any time in our history when we went to war, engaged in war, against another open society, another democratic society. In fact, I don't believe that history shows one example of two free countries ever going to war with one another, because free peoples just don't choose to go to war. Conversely, as President Reagan said not long ago, "a Government that breaks faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign Powers". Second, there is a direct, practical link between openness and progress in arms control. That link lies in the problem of verification, in which I know this Conference is so interested and on which you have heard so much over the years. Verification has always defined the outer frontier of what we can achieve in arms control. We can control effectively only what we can verify effectively. But verification is often directly limited in turn by the degree of openness permitted by the States that subscribe to an arms control agreement. In an open society like the United States, relevant information on defence programmes is readily available. That is why, when dealing with open, democratic societies, one does not have to rely exclusively on what we call "national technical means" or elaborate verification mechanisms to verify arms agreements. Often in the past I have been asked about the Soviet ability to verify our arms control agreements and I say basically that all the 424 npriaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 6 (Mr. Adelman, United States of America) Soviet Union needs to verify our compliance with arms control is a subscription to various open publications in the United States -- The New York Times, The Washington Post, Aviation Week, and publications like that -- because, if there were ever a case where the United States violated an arms control agreement, it would be readily available in the open press. That is one reason why the United States has called for greater openness in all nations. Since 1982, when I worked with many of you here in this room there in the First Committee at the United Nations, the United States has consistently pressed for resolutions on disarmament and openness in the United Nations General Assembly and I am sure Jan Martenson will remember that, in 1982, we introduced a resolution on disarmament and openness and it was adopted by the General Assembly as I remember, by consensus. This resolution explicitly stated the connection between advancing disarmament and advancing openness and free discussion and free dissemination of information in all nations. It encouraged all nations to advance the cause of openness as a way of advancing the cause of disarmament as a way of advancing the cause of arms control. And basically this is my message to you today: the path to more ambitious arms control, in all areas, lies through the gateway of greater openness. To quote Dr. Sakharov, once again, the issue here "is not simply a moral one, but also a paramount, practical ingredient of international trust and security". The world is still very far from achieving this kind of openness, which is one reason why arms control remains a very painstaking, very difficult, very timely business. Take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on defence spending. You all know just as well as I do how slow and careful we must be in terms of arms control and how frustrating is a lot of the pace of the arms control talks, because all of us in this room grapple with the issue on a daily basis. But take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on defence spending, something that the United Nations has also been discussing for a good number of years. In 1985, according to our best estimates, the United States and the Soviet Union each devoted around $250 billion to defence. Figures on United States defence spending are, of course, widely available in open sources. They are broken down by category. They are extensively discussed. They are scrutinized in the United States Congress -- probably scrutinized a little too much, if you ask me -- but they are scrutinized in the United States Congress and elsewhere in our society. Figures for Soviet defence spending, on the other hand, must be derived from careful analysis. Why? Because published Soviet figures bear absolutely no relationship to the reality of the Soviet defence effort. In 1985, for example, the Soviet Union claims to have spent 20.3 billion roubles on defence. Assuming the official exchange rate of approximately $1.50 per rouble, that comes to less than $35 billion. Now, 425 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 7 (Mr. Adelman, United States of America) that is a ridiculously small sum -- some 15 per cent of what they really spend -- for the declared defence budget of a State regarded as a military super-Power. It bears no relationship at all to the $250 billion figure I mentioned a moment ago, which suggests what it would cost the United States to mount an effort equivalent to the present Soviet defence effort. There is no way in the world that the Soviet Union could be mounting its current defence effort on a declared budget of 20.3 billion roubles. It is spending many, many, many times that, and we all know that. Or again, take the public statements of the two sides on the issue of strategic defences. The United States Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), of which you have heard some, I am sure, in this room, is an openly declared programme. Its budget is published and voted on by the United States Congress. Its activities are reported to the Congress, where it is widely discussed and debated. The President of the United States often discusses the programme in his speeches. In fact I have personally found it hard to stop him from discussing the subject of SDI at any time, in his speeches or otherwise. Yet to this day, even as we negotiate on defence and space issues with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union continues to deny that it has the equivalent of an SDI programme of its own. We know this denial to be false. I believe everybody in. this room knows the denial to be false. We know that the Soviet Union began investigating several advanced strategic defence technologies before we did, years before. We know it is extensively engaged in exploration and development of these technologies. We know, for example, that the Soviet Union has an extensive laser research programme which involves about 10,000 scientists and expenditure of resources worth approximately $1 billion a year just on that kind of laser research programme. And we know it is researching a host of other technologies, advanced technologies, as well. Can it surprise anyone that our progress in arms control if often slow and halting when there is such a lack of openness and honesty between Governments about even such an elementary fact as this one? There is, in short, almost no area of arms control in which greater openness would not lead to greater openness on the way to greater progress. In some of these areas, lack of openness is among the most crucial barriers to a meaningful agreement. Thus, my message to you today can be summed up as this: unless the Soviet Union moves to the openness it now talks about, accomplishments in arms control are just going to be limited, if not thwarted altogether. That movement towards greater openness is necessary for progress on an issue like the one this Conference has before it. Of the tasks before you, my Government, as you know, considers the negotiations on achieving a comprehensive and effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons to have the highest priority. International negotiators have been striving to remove the chemical weapons threat since the late nineteenth century. Here it is 198/. Nearly a century has passed since the Hague Conference prohibited use of chemical projectiles, in 1899. 426 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 8 (Mr. Adelman, United States of America) Yet the world finds that the problem of chemical weapons remains; indeed, as the world edges toward the twenty-first century, the chemical weapons danger continues to grow. Shockingly, we have witnessed use of chemical weapons by some nations in this decade and even during the past year. It is high time that chemical weapons use was rendered a thing of the past. It is high time that these barbaric weapons were banished from the face of the earth. But it is obvious that, if these weapons are to be banned, a thorough and effective mechanism of verification is necessary. My country will just not accept, and no free nations should accept, a ban on chemical weapons without sound machinery of verification. A chemical weapons ban without confidence of compliance will be no more effective than the Hague Conference's 1899 prohibition on use of artillery containing poison gas, which did nothing to prevent extensive use of chemical weapons in the First World War. The use of chemical weapons, as I remember, produced some 1 million casualties. It will be no better than so many of the misguided disarmament measures of the 1920s and 1930s, which, the great Americal commentator, Walter Lippmann, said, were "tragically successful in disarming the nations that believed in disarmament" while permitting aggressor nations to maintain and expand their own arsenals. Until an effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban is in place, the American people will insist, and rightly's?, that the United States maintain adequate chemical forces to deter use of these heinous weapons by an aggressor. While the establishment of procedures for the effective verification of arms control agreements is often extremely demanding both technologically and politically, in the case of chemical weapons, the challenges are especially great. The toxic chemicals which are or could be used as agents of warfare are in general not very different from a variety of substances having legitimate civilian use. Clearly, the chemical process equipment used in their production can be found in the legitimate manufacture of pesticides or corrosives. Chemical agents can be stored in bulk, facilitating transportation as well as concealment. Chemical munitions have no particular characteristics which distinguish them from other types of munitions. They are too small and easily transported and concealed. Thus, as I mentioned before, the issue of openness goes to the heart of achieving a chemical weapons ban. Article III of the rolling text of the draft Convention on chemical weapons (CD/734) requires each State Party to declare whether it possesses chemical weapons. And yet today the United States is the only country in this room, the United States is the only country in the world, that publicly admits to having chemical weapons and has made public its stockpile locations. That, to me, is astonishing -- especially when so many countries are pressing the urgency of a chemical weapons ban. Some are even criticizing the United States for holding up progress and for developing chemical weapons. 427 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100ionnn1-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 9 (Mr. Adelman, United States of America) The production of chemical weapons is not illegal. The use of chemical weapons is illegal. Since it signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the United States has never used chemical wweapons; others have -- others, who do not even publicly admit to possessing chemical weapons, they heave used them; others, with representatives in this very room, they have used chemical weapons. The world expects better than this. The United States openly declares its possession and development of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union, along with other nations, does not. The world expects better than this. The United States has presented publicly an extraordinary amount of information concerning its binary weapons programme. The details are known to everyone. The Soviet Union has told us nothing about its chemical weapons programme. The world expects better than this. The United States has invited all members of this Conference to examine procedures for the destruction of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has yet to accept this invitation, which is still outstanding. The world expects better than this. The United States will devote some $500 million under the fiscal 1987 defence budget to the elimination of its current chemical munitions stocks. The Soviet Union, apparently, has no similar chemical weapons elimination or demilitarization programme. The world expects better than this. The United States has maintained a unilateral moratorium on the development of chemical weapons for 17 years. The Soviet Union has never stopped producing chemical weapons and it continues today to expand its facilities and to expand its capabilities. The world expects better than this. It is because of this sad state of affairs, because of this glaring lack of openness in the realm of chemical weapons, that we are more than ever convinced that confidence in compliance is essential to a chemical weapons ban. We are more than ever convinced that nothing less than an inspection regime institutionalizing the right of short-notice access upon demand to any location or facility suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons will effectively deter non-compliance -- that is, of course, the challenge-inspection provision of Article X of the United States draft convention, CD/500. But every article of the convention must be designed to contribute to this overall objective of confidence in compliance. And, to be effective, each provision must be clearly and unambiguously defined, written, and understood. It will do little good to have broad agreement on the basic provisions concerning permitted and prohibited activities if inspection procedures are inadequate or if they are imprecise. 428 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 10 (Mr. Adelman, United States of America) At present, it is a point of consensus among all our Governments that each State Party will provide international access to its destruction sites, its production facilities to be eliminated, and its facilities for producing permitted chemicals. But the working out of precise procedures for all these tasks had only just been begun by Ambassador Lowitz and his fine delegation. And the vital question of how to ensure confidence in compliance with regard to undeclared sites still remains at issue. But, again and again, wherever we turn in this negotiation, we run up against the same problem: it is precisely the absence of openness, the absence of glasnost, that is standing in the way, blocking further progress. In the draft Convention, I count no less than 13 different types of declarations that each State Party must be expected to make about its stockpiles and about their destruction, about its chemical weapons production facilities and about their elimination, and about its chemical industry. Article IV is a key element in this series of declarations -- calling for the declaration of all stockpiles. Everyone agrees that each State Party should declare the amount and composition of its stockpile. Everyone agrees with the basic objective that the complete stockpile should be destroyed. And yet the Soviet Union continues to reject two particular "openness" provisions; each is necessary if we are to have confidence that this objective is fulfilled. One is the early and complete declaration of the stockpile locations and on-site verification to ensure that the declaration reflects reality. The second is on-site monitoring of the stocks until destruction to ensure that some weapons are not clandestinely diverted to undeclared sites before destruction. And it is obvious that we face the serious risk that a State will not declare all its stockpile locations or the entire amount of its stockpile. The consequences of lack of openness in this realm are unfortunate, and they are not lost on world opinion. I think the 1983 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) identified the problem -- and identified the solution -- as well as anyone did: -Faced with a high degree of uncertainty about Soviet CW intentions, Western defence authorities have no prudent option but to assume that they pose a threat. If it decided to do so, the Soviet Government could probably find a way for reducing the ambiguities attaching to its CW stance in Western (and non-aligned country) eyes without at the same time jeopardizing Soviet security to the point of net detriment. Yet even though the need for such mistrust-reducing measures is so evidently growing, it seems that Moscow has not chosen to act in such a manner, a failure which is becoming more and more conspicuous and damaging". And that is from the Stockholm Institute (SIPRI). Clearly, there is a gap between the way certain States conduct business today and the way they promise they will behave under a convention banning chemical weapons. And it is simply not possible for a nation to yield 429 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 11 (Mr. Adelman, United States of America) national control over its own defence to an international agreement -- as we will be asked to do when we have a convention ready for signature -- on the basis of a mere promise of a new and better pattern of behaviour by other States like the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union says it is interested in real openness. Good. But will its deed& in this forum match its words? We hope so. We hope to see signs of real glasnost, here in the CD, in the coming weeks and months, otherwise I fear our work will be even slower and more difficult. I believe that a turn by the Soviet Union to real glasnost would transform our discussion and sweep away a host of difficulties that have been blocking your progress here. I believe it could remove the barriers that some have attempted to erect to the inspection procedures absolutely essential to make a chemical weapons ban worth the paper it is printed on. Genuine openness, real glasnost, were it to emerge in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet Union's dealings with the rest of the world -- nothing could be more welcome to the United States of America. Nothing could do more to make possible progress in the relationship between our two Governments. Nothing would so improve the prospects, not only for real advances in arms control, but for the entire cause of world peace. Nothing would be a better tribute to your dedicated and important work. Nothing could be a better monument to Donald Lowitz's work and to his life. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair personally and to the country the Chair represents. I wish also to thank him for conveying the message of the President of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkine. Mr. NAZARKINE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, I endorse your greetings in connection with the presence at today's meeting of the distinguished Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, Comrade Raul Rao, and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Adelman. Allow me also to thank you and those distinguished delegates who expressed words of welcome to me on my appointment as representative of the Soviet Union to the Conference on Disarmament. It is also a pleasure for me to transmit to my predecessor, Ambassador Issraelyan, the warm wishes expressed by yourself and by distinguished representatives. The opening day of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament, 3 February this year, was "celebrated" by an event that constituted an open challenge to the entire world community which is seeking to remove the threat of nuclear war and to strengthen the foundations of peace. On the day when there were heard in this room the statements of Alfonso Garcia Robles, the distinguished representative of Mexico and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, and other distinguished representatives in favour of the cessation of nuclear 430 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 12 testing, the United States carried out explosions at the test site in Nevada, maliciously timed to coincide with the Conference on Disarmament. (Mr. Nazarkine, USSR) another in the series of nuclear an explosion as it were deliberately, opening of the current session of the One cannot but agree with the opinion voiced by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Maj Britt Theorin, literally a few hours before the receipt of the news of the explosion, that such fireworks to mark the opening of this session "would amount to nothing less than an affront to international efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban". This affront shows Washington's real attitude towards the opinion of the world community, which has called upon the United States time and again to reconsider its negative stance on nuclear testing and to join the Soviet moratorium. By conducting another nuclear explosion, the United States has demonstrated flagrant disregard for the calls of the non-aligned movement, for the constructive proposals by the leaders of the "Delhi Six", for the views of parliaments and for the apirations of all people on Earth demanding the cessation and banning of all nuclear tests. The United States Administration carried out a nuclear explosion -- and I wish particularly to emphasize this -- in a situation in which the Soviet Union had been strictly observing for a year and a half and had extended five times the moratorium on all nuclear explosions that it had declared in August 1985. It is deplorable that the present United States Administration has not responded positively to the call from the USSR to join its peace initiative and has carried out another nuclear explosion, the twenty-fifth since the Soviet Union declared its unilateral moratorium. Thus, the United States has ignored the numerous decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, including the resolutions of the forty-first session calling for the cessation of nuclear testing once and for all. For example, resolution 41/46A, as you know, explicitly calls upon the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain to bring to a halt, without delay, all nuclear test explosions. It also indicates the ways to achieve such a halt: "either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria, which should include appropriate means of verification", that is, exactly what the Soviet side has done in practice. By carrying out the first nuclear explosion of 1987 in Nevada, the United States has also put an end to the silence at Soviet test sites. As the Soviet Government has repeatedly warned, the Soviet Union will be compelled to resume nuclear testing after the first nuclear explosion by the United States in 1987. In connection with what happened in Nevada on 3 February, the Soviet Union no longer considers itself bound by its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions and will resume at the appropriate time the execution of its own programme of nuclear testing. We will not let the United States achieve military advantages. At the same time, the Soviet delegation is authorized to declare that the Soviet Union will be prepared, on the basis of reciprocity, to stop the implementation of its test programme if the United States halts its nuclear testing. 431 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 13 (Mr. Nazarkine, USSR) The purpose of American nuclear tests is well known. It is to test fundamentally new types and classes of nuclear arms intended above all for the implementation of the notorious "Star Wars" programme. The United States stubbornly refuses to cease nuclear testing for it cherishes an unrealizable dream: to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, primarily through the development of third-generation nuclear weapons, including fundamentally new means of laser-beam warfare. Even today we do not think that the door leading to a solution to the question of halting nuclear testing has been definitively slammed shut. It is not our intention to cease our persistent efforts in favour of the commencement of negotiations on a nuclear-test ban, negotiations which we are prepared to conduct in any framework and in any forum -- with, of course, the participation of the United States. As you may recall, in his statement at the plenary meeting on 3 February, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Yuli Vorontsov, pointed out that the Conference on Disarmament is undoubtedly one such forum. The Soviet Union is in favour of the participants in the Conference engaging without delay -- I repeat, without delay -- in the elaboration of a treaty on a complete and general nuclear-test ban by the members of the Conference. We are in favour of establishing an ad hoc committee on this subject in the framework of the Conference and of endowing it with appropriate powers. In short, we are in favour of moving at last from words to practical work. There are no reasons, except false and fictitious ones, preventing agreement on a nuclear-test ban. There was a time when the United States argued that it would be impossible to verify such an agreement, but now, thanks to Soviet initiatives, these so-called arguments have been dispelled once and for all. The Soviet Union is willing -- and this has repeatedly been affirmed at the highest level -- to see any measures of verification in this field. It has been clearly stated by the Soviet side that such verification could be implemented both by national technical means and on the basis of international procedures, including on-site inspections. When the United States was no longer in a position to use the verification issue for delaying a solution to the question of the cessation of nuclear testing, it advanced new arguments. It now argues that nuclear tests can only be ceased in the event of complete nuclear disarmament and that, so long as nuclear arsenals exist, there is need for nuclear testing. However, to put the question in that way is to do nothing more than to deny the existence of the problem of a nuclear-test ban as an issue in its own right in the field of disarmament. After all, since 1954, when this question first appeared on the agenda of international disarmament negotiations, it has been understood that the cessation of nuclear testing is a significant measure in the limiting of the nuclear arms race and a step towards nuclear disarmament, and that its implementation will in fact put an end to qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, lead to their elimination and promote the conclusion of radical agreements on the reduction and elimination of these weapons. The new 432 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 14 (Mr. Nazarkine, USSR) American logic puts the cart before the horse. After all, nobody would take it into their head to argue that nuclear tests will be needed even when all nuclear arsenals have been destroyed. That line of argument, too, is nothing more than yet another unsuccessful attempt to justify the unjustifiable, that is, the unwillingness of the United States Administration to start curbing the nuclear arms race. Kr. Adelman, who has, unfortunately, already left the room, today put forward the usual collection of well-worn conjectures against the Soviet Union, the aim of which is to cover up the United States Administration's unwillingness to move towards arms-reduction and disarmament measures. But there is a reliable sign, a litmus test of States' attitude to disarmament and that is their attitude to the cessation of nuclear tests. We are in favour of such a ban. The United States, and this they confirmed on 3 February, is against it. In this way, they have shown their true attitude to the problem of disarmament. It is significant that Mr. Adelman did not feel it possible even to mention the question of a nuclear-test ban, which, as you know, is item number 1 on our agenda. As to the specific questions which are the subject of negotiations and which Mr. Adelman touched upon in his statement in a polemical tone, we prefer, not polemics, but businesslike negotiations. We have been and will continue showing our attitude to these questions at the negotiating table, in the form of constructive proposals and not by declarations. Unfortunately, the United States prefers declarations, polemics. Behind this lies their aspiration to continue and strengthen the arms race. Once again we appeal to the United States to stop and heed the voice of dozens upon dozens of States, the voice of hundreds of millions of people on our planet. At stake is the survival of mankind, the salvation of human civilization. The Soviet delegation has explicit instructions from its Government to do everything necessary to reach a solution on the question of the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests as a priority measure towards the attainment of the principal objective of containing the nuclear arms race and subsequently eliminating nuclear arms. I would like to express the hope that we shall be supported in this undertaking by all members of the Conference who hold dear the cause of preserving peace on Earth. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I would now inform the Conference of a change in the order of the list of speakers, the speakers next in line having agreed to a request put forward by the Co-ordinator for the Group of 21, who would like to make a statement at present. For this reason, I now give the floor to the Co-ordinator for the Group of 21, Ambassador Morelli-Pando. 433 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 15 Mr. MORELLI-PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): I have requested the floor at this time with the permission of distinguished delegates, who had requested their inclusion on the list of speakers, the distinguished delegates of Cuba, the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, in order to make, as you have just explained, the following statement on behalf of the Group of 21 (continued in English): "The Group of 21 expresses its deepest regret and disappointment at the announcement of the new nuclear-weapon test by one of the super-Powers on 3 February, the opening day of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament. The international community has been discussing for 30 years the question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The General Assembly in that period of time has adopted more than 50 resolutions on this matter, to which the United Nations has assigned the highest priority. As stated in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This action ignores the insistent appeals made recently by the international community for the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. In Harare last year, the Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries state in their Political Declaration, inter alia, that 'the continuance of the nuclear-weapon testing fuels the nuclear arms race and increases the danger of nuclear war'. In January 1985, in New Delhi, the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, India, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania called for an immediate halt to nuclear-weapon testing preparatory to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The same appeal was reiterated by the Group of Six in the Mexico Declaration and in the Joint Declaration of December 1986, in which it was stated that 'There is no justification for nuclear testing by any country. We appeal once again to the United States to reconsider its policy on nuclear testing so that a bilateral moratorium can be established'. Thus, this new nuclear-weapon test also frustrates the hopes of the international community for a joint moratorium. In light of the above, and bearing in mind that the aforesaid super-Power's decision not only greatly increases the risk involved in its bilateral nuclear-arms race with the other super-Power, but also affects the interest of the international community as a whole, in which the neutral and non-aligned countries play a significant role, the Group of 21: reaffirms its call for the multilateral negotiation of an agreement on the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, and demands that this objective be fulfilled in the Conference on Disarmament.". 434 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 16 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, the Ambassador of Peru, for his statement. The next speaker on my list is the representtive of Cuba, His Excellency the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Raul Roa Kouri. I now give the him the floor. Mr. RAUL ROA KOURI (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): First of all, I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation for the work done in the past few months by the distinguished Ambassador of Canada in fulfillment of his duties as President and to welcome the distinguished representative of the People's Republic of China, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, to whom has fallen the difficult task of presiding over this Conference during the month of February, a time of particular significance since it is the occasion for establishing the guidelines for our work for the entire session. Knowing your diplomatic skill, we are sure, Sir, that under your presidency the deliberations of this disarmament negotiating body will gain momentum. It goes without saying that the Cuban delegation, which represents a country struggling for peace, will contribute to that effort to the full extent of its abilities. The delegation of Cuba wishes also to extend its condolences to the delegation of the United States of America on the demise of Ambassador Donald Lowitz. In beginning the work of the new session, the Conference must redouble its efforts to reach the objectives that were at the origin of forum. The danger of a conflagration persists and, rather than diminishing, is growing daily. The intensification of the arms race, the enormous quantity of weapons already accumulated, the advances of technology in the perfecting of means of destruction, particularly in the nuclear sphere, constitute the greatest threat there has ever been to the survival of mankind. It is for that reason that all peoples urgently demand the adoption of measures to prevent nuclear war and promote disarmament. The declaration adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Movement meeting at Harare is a genuine expression of that demand for peace. The hundred or so countries that comprise the Movement proclaimed themselves in favour of the banning of the use of nuclear weapons, the freezing of their development, production, stockpiling and deployment and the cessation of all new production of fissionable material for military purposes. This stand in favour of disarmament and peace, which has been restated throughout the 25 years of the Movement's existence, was renewed on this occasion, with the greatest priority being given to the issues of nuclear armament. At their meeting in Zimbabwe, the Heads of State or Government therefore generally welcomed the broad programme for nuclear disarmament according to a schedule and with fixed deadlines submitted by the Soviet Union, whose objectives and priorities are aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. Being convinced likewise of the enormous 435 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168ROOninninnnni _A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 17 (Mr. Raul Roa Kouri, Cuba) importance of the suspension of nuclear-weapon tests for the halting of the arms race, our countries also expressed themselves on the need to establish a moratorium on all tests. Accordingly, they not only took note of the initiatives of the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and of the first President of the United Republic of Tanzania, but also expressed their satisfaction at the unilateral moratorium declared by the Soviet Union in August 1985 and extended several times and appealed to the United States to join the Soviet Union in that action, while urging the Soviet Union to maintain its moratorium. It is appropriate, in this context, to draw attention to the latest statement made by the Soviet Government extending the moratorium on testing so long as the United States did not stage ahy further nuclear tests -- which, it has been announced, it unfortunately did some hours ago, thus going against the interests of peace and disregarding the clamour of international public opinion. This and no other has been the United States Government's portentous greeting to the present session of this Conference on Disarmament. The resumption of nuclear testing is a serious matter that will poison both the environment and the international political climate still further and will complicate negotiations between the two great nuclear Powers while raising new obstacles to the work of this Conference. But this challenge to the international community is not the only thing contributing to the heightening of tension. We would also mention the decision of the United States Government to cease respecting the SALT II Agreement by adding to its arsenal, without dismantling another aircraft as the Agreement provides to remain within the established limit, its 131st heavy bomber capable of transporting long-range cruise missiles. In the present situation, that is a new factor of disturbance that increases distrust, particularly as the decision was premeditated and a further expression of the militaristic policy that it is desired to continue developing. Another question that deserves our attention and that was also examined by the summit Conference of the non-aligned is the extension of the arms race into outer space. The Heads of State or Government meeting at Harare expressed their deep concern at the preparations under way to extend the arms race into outer space and vigorously reaffirmed the principle that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes to the benefit of all countries, whatever their level of economic or scientific development, and be open to all States. Consequently, they urged this Conference urgently to begin negotiations with a view to arriving at agreements to prevent the extension of the arms race, in all its aspects into outer space and to promote the possibility of co-operation in the sphere of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, while emphasizing the imperative need to halt the development of anti-satellite weapons, to dismantle existing arsenals, to prohibit the introduction of new weapons systems and to ensure that the treaties in force preserve outer space for peaceful purposes. 436 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 18 (Mr. Raul Roa Kouri. Cuba) In taking stock of what happened last year in the sphere of disarmament, special mention must be made of the meeting that took place at Reykjavik on 11 and 12 October between the highest-ranking leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States, a meeting which came very close to achieving significant progress in arms reduction that, if they could continue going forward along those lines in bilateral or multilateral negotiations, would obviously have great importance for all mankind. The persistence of one of the parties, the United States, in continuing to develop what is termed the Strategic Defence Initiative to its ultimate consequences has prevented the realization of the agreements that had in principle been reached. That negative policy has earned the opprobrium of public opinion, which contrasts it with the willingness of the other party to give up nuclear weapons, to agree on a plan for their total elimination within a fixed time-frame, to propose guarantees for all as regards verification and, finally, to adopt effective measures to ensure the peaceful use and prevent the militarization of outer space before it is too late and the situation becomes irreversible. The Conference on Disarmament has a great responsibility in the efforts being exerted to eliminate the dangers of war by altering the course of that negative policy for world peace. It is, therefore, imperative to get the Conference out of the deadlock it now finds itself and to attempt by every means to attain a convergence of views that will make possible progress in the negotiations on all the items on the agenda. If the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons are crowned with success this year, there is no doubt that a great step will have been taken. Still fresh in our memory are the scourges affecting the Vietnamese people as a result of the criminal use of defoliant chemicals by the United States army. We must not lose sight of the fact that whatever arrangement that may be made as regards disarmament measures will have a beneficial influence on the budgets of the immense majority of international community by releasing, for their devotion to disarmament, the resources that are today being criminally squandered upon arms production and that this would alleviate in great measure the present economic crisis, by which all are affected in one way or another. Furthermore, the Conference is, in our view, duty-bound to pay attention to the resolutions of the General Assembly. It is inadmissible that, year after year, the agreements reached in the Assembly, which reflect the attitudes and aspirations of the immense majority of the international community, should be cast aside. The Conference cannot operate in a vacuum. It must link its work with what is being demanded by that public opinion that is, in turn, an echo of the aspirations of peoples and of their need to live in a climate of peace and trust in order fully to develop their capabilities. This negotiating body has a key role to play in the sphere of disarmament and a major responsibility of contributing by its efforts to rendering international relations more healthy. Given the fait accompli of a resumption of nuclear testing by the United States which is, objectively, the serious event with which we are confronted today, we believe it is timely for the Conference to pay urgent heed to the opinion of the Assembly, which gives the greatest priority to this matter, since as the resolution that gained overwhelming support during the 437 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 19 (Mr. Ratil Roa Kouri, Cuba) Assembly's forty-first session puts it, the permanent prohibition of all explosions would constitute "a contribution of the greatest importance for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race". In conformity with the provisions of that resolution, our Conference should create an ad hoc committee to draft 1. treaty on the banning of nuclear tests. My delegation trusts that the Conference will not fail to do this. We hope that, in this 1987 session, the Conference on Disarmament will shoulder its great responsibilities and take steps seriously and definitively to resolve the grave problems before it. Cuba, of course, will lend its resolute support to that end. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Deputy Foreign Minister of Cuba for his statement and the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Wilfried Bolewski. Mr. BOLEWSKI (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, it gives great satisfaction to my delegation to see you, as the representative of the People's Republic of China, presiding over the Conference on Disarmament during this opening month. My delegation would like to stress the usefulness of our inter-sessional consultations and regular sessions in November, December and January which have provided us.with a number of clarifications and useful discussions. There has been continuous general recognition of the urgent need for a ban on chemical weapons and speakers have expressed their desire for further constructive deliberations. My Government has emphasized on many occasions that it attributes the highest priority to the negotiations of a worldwide ban on CW. In this context, permit me also to quote from the North Atlantic Council Communiqu?f 12 December 1986: "At the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, we seek a convention which meets our objective, the general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all existing stockpiles". The North Atlantic Council further states: "If the Soviet Union is prepared to take a constructive attitude on all aspects of an effective verification regime, such an agreement is within reach. We appeal to the USSR to join us in overcoming the outstanding obstacles". At this point, my delegation would like to reaffirm the position of my Government on the need for effective verification. Our wish is that agreement be reached as soon as possible on a system of verification which effectively prevents the production of chemical weapons. It must be impossible for any contracting party to evade the inspections required for the attainment of this goal. Of decisive importance is verification expecially in areas where there is a danger of chemical weapons production. The inspections must therefore be tailored to the very purpose of the convention prohibiting chemical weapons. 438 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 20 (Mr. Bolewski. Federal Republic of Germany) Our object is and remains, for example, to control super-toxic lethal chemicals which are suitable for CW, not dangerous substances of the chemical industry in general. But even if a total control of the chemical industry were feasible or acceptable -- not only of the commercial industry, but of any chemical industry -- this would not render superfluous challenge inspections, because even such a total control would not mean that there could not be undeclared or unknown facilities and stocks which might present a risk. That is why my delegation insists on the necessity for any challenge inspection not to be limited to declared facilities, but to cover all possible installations and all locations. This, then, in turn will be a factor reacting upon the regular controls. The pre-condition to make challenge inspection a really satisfying operation is the acceptance of such a demand for control as a rule. But there are other elements on which consensus does not seem to be achieved yet. This concerns, for example, a further pre-condition, namely that the demand of a challenging State should prevail and not be made dependent upon a plebisciterian machinery of any sort. In our view, majority results or minority failures are hardly apt procedures, even if they are called democratic, to solve international security problems -- and this is what we are dealing with here. If a State perceives an imminent danger to its security, then that State -- no State -- will want to rely on a multilateral process to accept or discard its perception. In addition to that, we might run the risk of establishing the right of veto for one or even more groups in the international supervising body, depending upon the qualifications chosen for representation in that body. A right of veto or a blockimg minority would be a completely new element in an international convention, the central logic of which is to guarantee all States equal rights to security and equal duties to contribute towards its realization. As for on-challenge inspections, we continue to regard the British proposal as the basis of a solution that answers the need for stringent verification while taking account of the legitimate interests of the participating countries in terms of protection. My delegaqtion stands ready to help in any way to ensure that decisive steps towards a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons are taken in 1987. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. I also thank him for his kind words addressed to the President and to the country which the President represents. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Stanislav Turbanski. Mr. TURBANKSI (Poland): Permit me to begin by expressing to the delegation of the United States, my delegation's and my own profound condolences on the sudden, unexpected and untimely death of Ambassador Donald Lowitz, whose funeral will take place today in Chicago. It is still difficult to believe that he will no longer be with us. His exceptional personal qualities which so many representatives have pointed out in this hall and his contribution to the work of the CD will be long remembered by us. 439 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 21 (Mr. Turbanski, Poland) Comrade President, as it is for the first time that I take the floor under your presidency, allow me to congratulate you wholeheartedly on assuming this important and, especially at the beginning of the session, undoubtedly difficult function. My delegation is very pleased to see you, Ambassador representative of the People's Republic of China, a great socialist State wit. which my country, Poland, enjoys traditionally friendly relations in all spheres, presiding over the first month of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament. We are convinced that your diplomatic skill and personal qualities will make this month to be remembered as an example of good work and efficiency. We wish you a successful presidency and pledge full co-operation and support in your efforts. May I also take this opportunity to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Beesley of Canada, who presided in the last month of the 1986 session of the Conference and in the inter-sessional period. It is also a pleasure for me to welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassadors and heads of delegation of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the USSR and Yugoslavia, and to wish them a most successful stay in Geneva. And last, but not least, I welcome the presence at our today's meeting of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Cuba, Comrade Raul Roa Kouri, and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Kenneth Adelman. I have listened with interest to their statements, so different in their tune and the messages they contained. Speaking as co-ordinator of the Group of socialist States for item 4, chemical weapons, I wish to express our satisfaction over the Conference's adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, together with the substantial annexes reflecting, as they do, the state of affairs in our work on a CW convention. The results achieved are a convincing demonstration of the usefulness and fruitfulness of the work during the inter-sessional period, i.e. of both the informal consultations and the resumed session of the Ad Hoc Committee. In this connection, I would like to express our thanks to Ambassador Cromartie, of the United Kingdom for his skillful chairing over the Committee's work, his personal devotion and contribution to the achieved results. May I also extend our gratitude to Mr. Rowe, of Australia, and Mr. Poptchev, of Bulgaria, who, also during the January session, chaired Working Groups A and B respectively, as well as to Mr. Bensmail and other staff of the Secretariat and technical services. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on which we shall decide later today already in the first week of the session has, in our view, more than just procedural meaning. It points to the willingness of the Conference's members to restart without any unnecessary delay further work on a convention banning chemical weapons. We believe that is also an indication of the feeling that 1987 should bring us to the completion of this task. Indeed, an early finalization of the draft Convention is within our reach, and 1987 is most propitious for concluding the negotiations. 440 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 22 (Mr. Turbanski, Poland) This no doubt optimistic event at the outset is a good omen for our further work. We are deeply convinced that similar efficiency will be a guiding principle in the Ad Hoc Committee's work throughout the session of 1987. On the part of the socialist States, I assure you, no effort will be spared in the search for mutually acceptable solutions, as was stressed recently at the Berlin meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of socialist States. We do have our own position, but we also do realize that at the outcome of these negotiations there has to be only one common position based on a compromise. We expect that the same approach will be taken by others and we appeal to all delegations to contribute their share to the compromise solutions which are sought for. In this connection, let me draw your attention to the statement of the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade Yuli Vorontsov, who said: "What is now required at the negotiations, is to be able to shed 'parental feelings' toward the apptoaches one proposes and to concentrate on finding a common approach.". The rolling working text of the future Convention represents quite an extensive area of agreements, including most of the fundamental issues. The time has come to make necessary political decisions which would open the way to a successful solution of some of the outstanding issues. There is no need to repeat what we all know, i.e. what the areas of agreement are, or to point out issues where political solutions are needed. It seems, however, that both last year's session and the inter-sessionsal period have demonstrated clearly the growing significance of the overall problem of verification, both verification of non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry and challenge verification. We are of the opinion that verification measures should be in the centre of our work. The verification system should provide confidence for all States parties that the provisions of the convention are observed. We should be careful to close all loopholes which may either open the way to re-emergence of chemical weapons or become a constant source of misunderstandings. The socialist countries will continue their activity and flexibility in search for possible solutions to these important issues, as well as to all other still unresolved questions. We call on all States participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemial Weapons to join in a common effort toward an early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It would contribute to the strengthening of international security and confidence and would enhance the credibility of this body. 441 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R0001001 own 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 23 (Mr. Turbanski, Poland) Our Group is very pleased that at this very decisive stage of our negotiations the work of the Ad Hoc Committee will be chaired by Ambassador Ekeus, of Sweden, whose contribution to the progress achieved so far is considerable. We support Ambassador Ekeus' intention of giving a strong boost to the Committee's work. We are certain that both the method and the programme of work he is to put forward will serve this goal. His personal experience as previous Chairman of the Committee, and as long-time co-ordinator in the Group of 21 is a good guarantee that the 1987 session will close with a result which would enable the Conference to finalize its work on agenda item 4. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. Now I give the floor to the Co-ordinator of a group of socialist countries, Ambassador Rose, of the German Democratic Republic. Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): I have asked for the floor in order to make a statement on behalf of a group of socialist countries, but, before coming to that, I would like cordially to congratulate you, Comrade President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We are pleased to see in the Chair a very experienced and outstanding representative of socialist China, a country with which the German Democratic Republic enjoys friendly relations. These ties received fresh impetus through last year's visit to China by Erich Honecker, Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic. I wish to assure you, Mr. President, of my delegation's unqualified support in the discharge of your responsible duties. Also, I should like to thank Ambassador Beesley, of Canada, once more for the job well done as Conference President at the end of last year's session. My delegation is pleased to see in our midst the Deputy Foreign Minister of Cuba, Mr. Rail Roa, and I listened with great interest and attention to his important speech. Now I will read the joint statement of a group of socialist countries: "We deplore and condemn the nuclear-weapon test which the United States conducted on 3 February 1987, the very day the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament opened and 547 days after the Soviet Union's testing sites fell silent. With this move, militarist circles have tried in their specific way to counteract the efforts of States and peoples to ward off the danger of nuclear disaster and have shown their indiferrence to the demands of the international community, as expressed in numerous United Nations resolutions, in the declarations of the 'Delhi Six' and in strong appeals launched by peace forces all over the world. 442 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 24 (Mr. Rose. German Democratic Republic) The USSR has stated that it cannot put up ad infinitum with the disadvantages resulting for its security and that of its allies from extending its unilateral moratorium to almost one and a half years and that it would have to resume nuclear testing after the first United States nuclear explosion in 1987. Thus, the Soviet Union has made it clear that the button for touching off nuclear-weaspon tests at Semipalatinsk is located right in Washington. Regrettably, this has fallen on deaf ears. Even so, we still possess the means to agree on immediate measures to end all nuclear-weapon testing. The lasting impact of the unilateral moratorium will reside in the fact that the feasibility of such a step has been demonstrated to everyone. Fatalism and resignation are out of place. They would only aid the plans to carry the nuclear-arms race into outer space through a third generation of nuclear weapons and to destroy targets on Earth from outer space. With this in mind, we appeal to all those willing to avert the nuclear threat from mankind to start working, without any further delay, on dependable agreements aimed at halting all nuclear-weapon tests. The Conference on Disarmament is certainly the proper forum for that. It should at once set up a committee to begin drafting a nuclear-test ban treaty, including provisions for strict international verification. We are prepared to consider seriously all proposals to this effect, from whatever side they may come.". The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none. Then we take up the following items. As agreed at our last plenary meeting, I shall now proceed to put before the Conference for adoption the draft decision on the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the appointment of its Chairman, as contained in document CD/WP.252 which has just been circulated. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision. 1/ It was so decided. May I, on behalf of the Conference, extend to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekeus, our warm congratulations on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I am sure that all members join me in wishing him a successful tenure in that important office, which he has already held with the utmost competence and person commitment, advancing substantially the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, I would like to thank you and, through you, the members of the Conference for the confidence the Conference has placed in me and, through its decision, in my delegation. On this occasion, I would only state one thing and that is that results can only be achieved if all members of the Conference work together in the same direction and that progress can only be achieved through joint efforts. 443 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.386 25 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Ambassador of Sweden, Ambassador Ekeus, for his statement. I should like now to refer to other questions. The secretariat has circulated all requests received from non-members concerning their participation in the work of the Conference. They are as follows: Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Viet Nam, Austria, Denmark and Greece. I have requested the secretariat to prepare the relevant draft decisions, which I intend to put before the Conference at our next plenary meeting, on Tuesday, 10 February. As usual, we shall first have a brief informal meeting to consider those requests and later, at a resumed plenary, we will formalize the agreements reached at the informal meeting. We shall also take up then the question of the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committees under item 6 on the agenda, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States sgainst the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and item 7, "Radiological Weapons". I have requested the secretariat to circulate today an informal paper containing a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. You will notice there that the Ad Hoc Committees on Chemical Weapons and on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will start their work immediately. Of course, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if neCessary. On that understanding, and if there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable. It was so decided. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 10 February, at 10.30 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned. The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m. Note 1/ Later issed as CD/736. 444 n.rincQifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.387 10 February 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 10 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m. President: GE. 87-60162/7121E Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China) 445 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 387th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will listen to statements in plenary meetings and consider the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda and other organizational questions. In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. As agreed at our last plenary meeting, I intend to convene an informal meeting, immediately after we listen to those members listed to speak today, in order to consider the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committees on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and on "Radiological weapons". We shall also then examine requests by non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Argentina, Japan, Bulgaria and Peru. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cimpora. Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Mr. president. At the outset I wish to say that the Argentine delegation places the greatest confidence in your ability to exercise the very responsible duties of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in the first month of its annual session. Under its rules of procedure the Conference on Disarmament each year is obliged to engage in a process of setting up .subsidiary bodies and establishing mandates for them that requires, from the person occupying the Presidency, great diplomatic ability, which fortunately for us you possess in a most noteworthy degree, so as to give the Conference the initial impetus that will set in motion he negotiations on disarmament and these are its very raison d'etre. We therefore have no doubt that at the end of your term as President you will have made to the Conference on Disarmament a positive contribution, for which in advance we extend our heartiest congratulations and offer you our closest co-operation. Through you, Sir, I should also like to extend to Ambassador Beesley of Canada the appreciation of the Argentine delegation for the diplomatic tact and keen political insight with which, as President, he carried to fruition the work of the Conference on Disarmament in August of last year. It is a sad duty indeed to extend to the delegation of the United States of America the most heartfelt condolences of the Argentine delegation on the untimely demise of Ambassador Lowitz, a man esteemed by us all for his moral and political qualities in the service of his country. My delegation extends a warm welcome to the new members of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Kemal Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Rubens Barbosa of Brazil, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, Ambassador Aldo Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Chusei Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Gheorghe Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Marko Kosin of Yugoslavia, and Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin of the Soviet Union. Mr. President, we can never dwell sufficiently upon the first session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament where agreement was reached on an international strategy to take decisive action on the problems before us in this field. In particular, it was then agreed to establish a strategy for 446 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-o11ARPnnni nni nnnni A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 3 (Mr. Campora, Argentina) nuclear disarmament and the growing risks of nuclear war, and machinery was set up in the disarmament field by the establishment of a deliberative body, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and a negotiating body, the Conference on Disarmament. The Final Document adopted by consensus on that occasion provided the appropriate framework for initiating the disarmament process. What had to be done from that moment on was to translate into practical terms the provisions of the Final Document and continue along the avenue that was to lead us to the conclusion of binding and effective international disarmament agreements. Regrettably, in the intervening four years between the first and second special sessions no tangible result was reached. In addition, if we had to take stock of the second special session of the General Assembly itself, the salient feature would be the inability to agree on a single measure, however modest, to limit the risks of nuclear war. And yet on that occasion it was very clear that mankind's primary concern was the threat of nuclear annihilation. As we begin, this month, the ninth session of the Conference on Disarmament, we should ask ourselves what has been achieved to date. Looking back we can reach one unquestionable conclusion, which is that the initiatives undertaken do not offer any solution to the priority problems of disarmament nor to the increasingly urgent requirements generated by the nuclear and space arms races. It is clear also that for the two military alliances the quest for military pre-eminence that goes hand in hand with the accumulation of weapons has been more important than the search for international security through the disarmament process. The situation faced by the sole multilateral negotiating body on Disarmament derives chiefly from the fact that certain Powers and their allies take the view that negotiations on disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, should be confined exclusively to a bilateral framework. This is only one symptom of a totalitarian attitude that seems to be based on the utterly unacceptable idea that the force of nuclear weapons grants them the omnipotent and exclusive right to decide how, when, where and to what extent this question is to be negotiated. It should be emphasized once again in this forum that no country is prepared to surrender its right to participate in a negotiating process that affects its very survival. It would seem that in setting aside the urgent priority questions in this field of disarmament that have been defined and agreed in the Final Document, the Conference on Disarmament has gradually been losing sight of the gravity and urgency of the situation it faces. Were this tendency to continue, there is a danger that the credibility of the multilateral process could be completely lost. This state of affairs, certainly not created by the Group of 21, indicates the need to endow the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum with a new resolve and a new sense of urgency in its work. This requires, among other things, that we should be carefully selective in our efforts and concentrate our attention upon those items which, by their effects, have the greatest importance and priority. 447 narinccifipri in Part - Sanitized CoPv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 4 (Mr. Cgmpora, Argentina) On the eve of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference still has a chance to give its work the impetus that will yield the concrete results which the international community has been demanding. It would suffice, as a first step, for us to fulfil the mandate entrusted to us in paragraph 120 of the Final Document and to leave to the appropriate body the deliberative work which, important though it may be, is stripped of any great efficiency in a forum such as this. At the same time we should establish a preliminary method that will ensure appropriate complementarity between bilateral and multilateral disarmament endeavours. The situation we face today, as has repeatedly been said by other distinguished colleagues in this Chamber, is extremely critical for the multilateral negotiating body if it does not begin negotiations on the chief items upon its agenda. Questions such as the negotiation of a treaty that will prohibit nuclear-weapon tests, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, measures to prevent nuclear war, the necessity to avoid an arms race in outer space and the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament cannot be delayed any further. Nor can we accept that progress on these items should depend upon something so haphazard as the relations between the two principal nuclear-weapon States and their allies. The Conference on Disarmament should not confine its work to the negotiation of questions which, in our judgement, lack the necessary priority, as is the case, among other things, of what are generally referred to as radiological weapons. We recognize that the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests will not in and of itself bring about the reduction of existing nuclear-weapon arsenals, nor will it imply a limitation of the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout all regions, particularly in the seas and oceans. However, we do believe that this measure would contribute to halting the qualitative development of these weapons and would make it possible simultaneously to tackle the question of the cessation of their production and deployment throughout the world. The commencement of those negotiations would serve to strengthen confidence, thus tending to reduce risks of nuclear weapons, and would contribute also to the adoption of additional measures preventing the outbreak of nuclear war and permit the appropriate functioning of multilateral crisis management centres which, in our opinion, it is urgent to establish. Similarly, the various aspects and problems involved in the broad subject of outer space should be the object of our consideration. If this Conference does not respond with the necessary firmness and determination in dealing with this question, both from the standpoint of the interests of the space Powers and from the standpoint of the non-aligned countries, developments in this sphere will continue to accelerate until they lead to another ruinous arms race that will increase the risks of nuclear war. This rationale, which compels us to take a consistent approach to disarmament, leads me back to my point of departure, namely the Final Document. This is so because the strategy set forth in that Magna Carta of disarmament, has as its ultimate aim general and complete disarmament, and it therefore requests, in paragraph 109, that the then Committee on Disarmament should "undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of 4 4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R0001nninnnni_A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 5 (Mr. Cgmpora, Argentina) disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated". It clearly emerges from this that there is an essential prerequisite of agreeing on calendars for the fulfilment of the Programme and for each stage of its implementation. Along this same line of thinking, as regards nuclear and space weapons, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament cannot mean or imply any backward movement, however small, with respect to the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, in particular as regards paragraph 51. For my country, disarmament is not just one subject among many; rather it is one which is given the most serious attention at the highest level of Government. The active presence of the President of Argentina in the context of the initiative of the Group of 6 and his participation in the eighth Summic of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement serve to illustrate the degree of our concern and our resolve to take up this challenge with the urgency and earnestness that it requires. Let me conclude my statement today by repeating some of the ideas expressed by President Alfonsin in his message to the Conference on Disarmament in 1985. President Alfonsin said: "The aim of my Government is to give expression to its policy through deeds which confirm our intentions rather than through words alone. This applies to our conduct both in internal affairs and in the field of foreign policy. In simple terms, we propose to preach by example rather than with words. "Our actions in government contribute to peace and international co-operation because we neither believe nor accept that the threat or use of force should be an instrument of policy. This attitude does not imply the renunciation of principles or any lessening of our determination to protect legitimate national interests. Above all, our position is the expression of a stubborn faith in the capacity of man to settle disputes by peaceful means, through dialogue and negotiation, because nothing is lost from peace while everything can be forfeited as a result of war and violence." The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President personally. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada. Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Mr. President, I would like to express my sincere congratulations to you on your assumption of the Presidency in this important opening month of the Conference; under your pre-eminent leadership we will no doubt embark on a fruitful undertaking. May I also express my gratitude to 449 ;, Dmrl? - aniti7Rd Coov Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 6 (Mr. Yamada, Japan) you, Mr. President, and other representatives, for the kind words of welcome extended to me. It is a sad duty for me to offer my heartfelt condolences to Mrs. Shana Lowitz and the United States delegation on the untimely demise of Ambassador Donald Lowitz. May his soul rest in peace, for we will carry on his work for the cause of peace. At the beginning of the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament for 1987, I wish first of all to state that this is a year of critical importance in determining the future of disarmament negotiations, and those of us who are engaged in disarmament tasks have a joint responsibility to the international community to make further intensive efforts. The adoption last year by the General Assembly of resolution 41/60 G, calling for the convening of the third special session on disarmament in 1988, sets a date towards which we must carry forward our substantial work. It is with this perception that I wish to enunciate the views of my delegation on the arms control negotiations between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, and on the major agenda items of our Conference, especially those of a nuclear-test ban and chemical weapons. With regard to the United States-Soviet arms control negotiations, we wish to witness that in year 1987 they will succeed in giving effect to the progress thus far achieved. Speaking at the University of Belgrade, Yugoslavia, on 15 January, my Prime Minister, Mr. Nakasone, renewed his calls on the two Powers to work for early agreement at the nuclear and space talks, keeping in mind the following five points. First. the United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be such as to enhance the sense of strategic stability between the East and the West, and to contribute to the strengthening of the peace and security of the world. Second, in the negotiations for reductions of nuclear weapons, "globalism" should be fully adhered to, and, in the case of the long-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF), they should ultimately be completely removed from Europe and Asia alike. Third, in the negotiations, whatever is practicable should be undertaken and realized steadily on a step-by-step basis. In order to realistically move the negotiations even a step forward, it may have to be considered to separate the INF negotiations from others and to reach early agreement thereupon. Fourth, the security of the world should be safeguarded with consideration for the overall balance of all systems of weaponry. We must pay attention to the international efforts now being exerted in this direction for arms control and disarmament, including chemical and other conventional weapons. Fifth, East-West dialogue should be expanded and deepened. 450 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168Rnnninninnnni A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 7 (Mr. Yamada, Japan) The United States-Soviet exchanges following the Reykjavik meeting do not, I regret to say, warrant optimism. We hope, however, that during the seventh round of the nuclear and space talks now taking place here in Geneva, the negotiators of the two Powers will continue to search for common ground for agreement in a business-like atmosphere. I now wish to take up the work of the Conference which is entrusted with the task of multilateral disarmament negotiations by the international community. The fact that this Conference, since its establishment by the first special session on disarmament to this day, has produced no disarmament convention, should be a source of serious concern to us. I am not overly pessimistic, but I would rather like to focus our attention on the Conference's potentiality. The five nuclear-weapon States and States representing the various economic and social systems as well as regions of the world are gathered here to work seriously for disarmament. The Conference has at its disposal many interesting ideas put forward by various States, as well as accumulated expert knowledge and experience in the field of disarmament. It is my belief that if we skillfully draw upon the potentiality of the Conference with our wisdom and determination, there is a real possibility for the Conference to move substantially forward this year. Allow me to begin with the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests. As is well known, Japan has consistently considered the realization of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban as being the priority item in the field of disarmament, and strongly wishes to see a resumption of substantial work by the Conference on the issue. We believe that the following circumstances hold out prospects for recommencement in 1987 of this long-suspended work. First, there now seems to be a genuine desire on the part of a number of member States that substantial work be resumed. In the General Assembly last year, a great majority of non-aligned countries and socialist States, in contrast to their previous abstentions, voted in favour of the resolution 41/47 which Japan co-sponsored, calling for various actions to be taken in order that a CTB treaty may be concluded at an early date. We are encouraged by the wide support shown for the resolution, in particular, the call on the Conference on Disarmament, in its operative paragraph 2(a), to "commence practical work on a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of the 1987 session." Secondly, there is now a widening common perception as to the subject matter of the work. Resolution 41/46 A lists "contents and scope" of a treaty and "compliance and verification" as the subject matter of the work which, in comparison to the similar resolution of the previous year, shows a more realistic approach, an approach which we view favourably. Thirdly, all groups now seem to share a more or less common perception of the importance of verification in developing a CTB regime. 451 r.nnv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 8 (Mr. Yamada, Japan) A comprehensive nuclear-test ban has serious implications for the security concerns of all States. Verification measures to ensure compliance are therefore essential. It is from such a perspective that my Government has, in a number of ways, contributed to the work on verification, including, in particular, the proposal in June 1984 for a step-by-step approach, whereby those nuclear tests which are at present verifiable would be prohibited, and as progress is made in verification technologies, the scope of prohibition would be expanded, finally arriving at a comprehensive prohibition. It is also well known that other Western States such as Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom have made concrete proposals which stress the need for adequate verification measures. We welcome the fact that the socialist States, at the 1986 session of th Conference, began to attach importance to verification measures with regard ee a CTB. As Mr. Petrovsky, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, state,3 in his intervention on 24 June, "the Soviet Union favours the strictest possible verification of the ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site Inspection and making use of all achievements in seismology". He went on to state that the Soviet Union does not favour any loopholes in the regime for ar on-site inspection and that "Should any ambiguous situation arise when, for example, an exchange of seismic data would make it difficult to determine whether or not there had been a nuclear explosion or an underground tremor dse to some other reason, that would in fact be just the case when an on-site inspection would be required". 7 do hope that such positive statement h7 try.1 socialist States with regard tc the problem of verification, will he translated into concrete proposals in the course of substantial work r)n. The non-aligned and neutral States have also stressed the need for specific measures of verification with regard to a CTB, and have made cie their willingness to co-operate actively. For example, the "Doc,Iment iss at the Mexico Summit on Verification Measures" by the Leaders of the Six Nations, in August 1986 in Ixtapa, Mexico, recognizes the i7lpoftan,77 verification and expresses the preoaredness of the six counries to participate in on-site inspections at the nuclear-test sites cf the United States and the Soviet Union, and in monitoring of the territories of the two States outside of the test sites. As I have discussed, there exists now, in the Conference, a general expectation for the commencement of substantial work on a CTB. There is common perception of the subject matter of the work. There are rece,gnition the importance of verification and willingness to participate in its implementation. Now is the chance to resume substantial work on a CTB. Lastly, the Conference has, in the past three years, failed to esteblie an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1 because of the mandate issue. Whal great loss this has been to all members of the Conference! Given the common perception of the subject matter of the work, we may well wonder whether the so-called negotiating mandate is absolutely necessary at this present time. The draft mandate of a group of Western countries (CD/521) provides that the ad hoc committee is to resume its work "with a view to negotiation of a treaty", while the non-aligned sponsored resolution 41/46 A of the General Assembly lays down that the ad hoc committee is to be 452. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 9 (Mr. Yamada, Japan) established "with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty". We cannot but note that there could be much in common between the two. Since July 1986, talks have been under way between United States and Soviet experts on the entire scope of issues related to nuclear testing. They can also have a positive impact on the work in the Conference. It must be possible for us to proceed in a spirit of co-operation to establish an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate to commence substantial work on a CTB at the beginning of this session. Indeed, it would be our collective responsibility to do so. Mr. President, may I call upon you to make the best use of your eminent leadership for the establishment of the ad hoc committee. As far as my delegation is concerned, I pledge our full co-operation. The conclusion of a CTB treaty will necessitate the establishment of an international seismic monitoring network as an indispensable international mechanism to ensure compliance. In this connection, we highly value the Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test (GSETT) 1984, presented last year, concerning an exchange and analysis of Level I data, as well as the agreement by the experts to begin work directed towards the design of a modern international system based on the expeditious exchange of wave-form (Level II) and parameter (Level I) data and on the processing of such data at International Data Centres. We had, in April 1986, presented our ideas on an exchange of Level II data with like-minded countries, and, following up the results of the Canadian Workshop in October 1986 for data communication experts, we began an experimental exchange of Level II data in December 1986 with several interested countries. We will report on the results of this experiment to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts this year. May I take this opportunity to thank the Canadian Government for its sponsorship of this useful workshop. Useful ideas on the organization of an international seismic monitoring network indispensable for verifying compliance with a CTB treaty have been presented by Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Sweden and others. Discussions on this important question of organization would require much work. From this point of view also, I earnestly hope for an early establishment of an ad hoc committee on CTB. A comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, in the form of a convention widely acceptable the world over, is another item on which we hope to see further progress during the course of this year. The Ad hoc Committee, in 1986 and January 1987, has identified those substances to be controlled under a future convention and has begun the drafting of the regimes to which these substances would be subject, as well as streamlining the provisions concerning the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities. I would like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation of these results and to extend our sincere gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom, and the Chairmen of the Working Groups, Mr. Richard Rowe, Mr. Petar Poptchev and Mr. Noegroho Wisnoemoerti. Many countries called for r-N 453 rnnv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 10 (Mr. Yamada, Japan) the convention to be concluded in the course of this year, and my delegation for one is certainly prepared to do its share to enhance the work under the new Chairman, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden. Much time and effort have already been spent on the chemical weapons negotiations, and they are now at an advanced stage. They are very complicated and extensive in detail. As such, they do not lend themselves easily to immediate and simultaneous solutions. I should therefore like to propose that we concentrate our energies on those problems which will require agreements on principles: namely, articles of the convention and some of its annexes, leaving those other problems of a technical and procedural nature for extended consideration by experts. In the view of my delegation, the priority questions are as follows: First, the definition of chemical weapons is one of the basic issues of the convention. It is a most complicated and difficult problem. But the definition should, in principle, be understood to be "substances of particular relevance to chemical weapons" and related munitions. In drafting, the focus up to now has been placed on the prohibited substances under Article VI. Would that be sufficient? We should probably also take into consideration those substances as will be declared under Article IV. In this connection, my delegation thinks that the convention should not create impediments for the legitimate activities of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, and thus feels that due significance should be given to the general purpose criterion. It is therefore imperative that the concept of "permitted purposes" be given careful attention in drafting the definition. Second, with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons, the declaration of location of stocks, together with the declarations on the entirety of the stockpile and on its composition, should be made at an early point in time following the entry into force of the convention. These declarations should be verified by on-site inspection. In this connection, my Government welcomed the presentation in July 1986 by the United States delegation of a document in which detailed information on United States stockpiles and plans for their destruction were given. It was a courageous step helpful to the negotiations. If the other countries possessing chemical weapons were to follow suit, during the course of the negotiations, it would greatly contribute to the solution of the problems we now face, in particular, with regard to Articles IV and V. Third, in Article VI, which deals with the question of permitted activities, we should strive to develop common language on the verification measures to be applied to each of the categories of substances. There is much work to be done, also, on the issues of thresholds for the control of various chemical substances, the concept of militarily significant quantities, the mechanism for revising lists of chemicals, the cost factor, and so on. We feel however that these problems might be better assigned to the experts for their consideration and advice. It would be more productive 454 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 ???? CD/PV.387 11 (Mr. Yamada, Japan) for the Ad Hoc Committee to agree on the basic utility of these concepts in implementing Article VI, and then proceed to work out the body of Article VI and its annexes. With regard to the substances on which there is no agreement as to whether they should be included in a particular list or regime, we suggest that it would do no harm to put them aside temporarily by putting them on a preliminary list, returning to settle the question of the outstanding substances once the regimes to which they would be subject are more developed. Fourth, as regards the organizational questions in Article VIII, we feel it appropriate to maintain the present draft text for the time being. When the various substantive provisions on the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, regimes for permitted activities, challenge verification, and so forth are developed, there will be a need for a thorough review. The organs of the convention will need to be fully worked out and be in existence by the time of the entry into force of the convention. As they require extensive work, my delegation thinks that these, including the financial clauses, would be another set of problems which we could delegate for expert consideration at an appropriate time. Fifth, there seems to be common understanding on a challenge inspection regime under Article IX, that this inspection is to be of an exceptional nature to be conducted within a short time scale. However, when we get down to working out the details of its implementation, the divergences seem to be as wide as ever. In order to overcome this impasse, we must develop our thoughts as to whether we are pursuing a rectifying effect as regards possible contraventions of the convention or the restoration of confidence among the parties to the convention, whether our aim is to drive the offending party out of the convention regime, or whether bilateral solutions may possibly be contemplated. We should review existing proposals and engage in quiet and informal discussions to seek a solution to the problem. I have already said that the chemical weapons negotiations are at an advanced stage. We must organize ourselves to deal with this new stage in a most effective way. My delegation has advocated a work process where we concentrate on one item for a given week and move on to another, rather than deal with several questions in three separate working groups at the same time. I am pleased to note that the organization of work suggested by Ambassador Ekeus is along the lines of our thinking. We might meet as the Ad Hoc Committee for several days each month so as to assess the situation in the Working Groups, to consolidate areas where there has been progress and give directives where there has been little progress. Rather than spending day after day in various meetings, we need also to bear in mind the utility of "breathing spaces", so as to allow delegations to develop their thoughts and to consult with capitals. To this end, we may need to reduce the frequency of meetings within the framework of carefully formulated schedules. 455 nniiv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDp92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 12 (Mr. Yamada, Japan) To sum up, we should aim to built substantive agreements one by one at this advanced stage. Besides the CTB and chemical weapons, we are also expected to make substantial progress, during this spring session, on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The position of my delegation with regard to the various subjects on this item were stated in the Ad Hoc Committee. To recapitulate, we feel that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should by its nature be adopted by consensus, both here in the Conference and at the General Assembly; that the various measures it envisages and their means of implementation should be of a realistic character, accurately reflecting the present international situation; and that the review of the Comprehensive Programme should be an entirely different thing from the special sessions on disarmament which would have political significance in the light of the international situation prevailing at the time. My delegation stands ready to make its contribution, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, in furthering our work to develop the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. There are other agenda items such as outer space which are equally important, but I shall defer them to another opportunity. In beginning my statement, I stated my belief that this is an important year to work for disarmament, in view of the third special session scheduled for 1988. I also touched upon the potentiality of this Conference. We should not become overly pessimistic or blame others for lack of progress. Let us reaffirm our joint responsibility and focus our efforts on those areas where progress seems possible. And we can, through dialogue and co-operation, fulfil our joint responsibility to the international community and share in the fruits of such progress. Allow me to conclude my first intervention in the Conference with a personal note. In 1945 I was a boy of 14 years old attending a school in the beautiful city on the river Delta facing the inland sea. There was an old castle, temples, schools, inns, shops and houses. Almost in an instant they were all gone and people were suffering beyond description. There now stands a monument on which it is inscribed "Let it never happen again". I would like to pass on to all of you what a nuclear catastrophe really is, for I witnessed myself what it was like. I pledge to you, Sir, that I will work with you for a world where we can live together free from the fear of nuclear weapons. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov. Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Thank you, Comrade President. It is a great pleasure for me to see you in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament during the opening month of its 1987 session, representing a great country which bears special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. You are willing, I am sure, to perform your duties in a most efficient manner. Your high professional and diplomatic skills have already 456 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 13 (Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria) brought about some concrete results. In the spirit of the existing friendly relations between our two countries, you may rely, Comrade President, on the co-operation of the Bulgarian delegation. I wish to pay tribute to the successful work done by Ambassador Beesley of Canada who presided in August and during the intersessional period. It is a pleasure for me to welcome in our midst our new colleagues, Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa of Brazil, Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Nazarkin of the USSR, and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. My delegation looks forward to co-operating with them. On a sad note, I wish to extend our heartfelt condolences to the delegation of the United States of America in connection with the passing away of Ambassador Donald Lowitz. The year 1986 will remain memorable as "the International Year of Peace". The President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, sent a message on 29 January last to the .Secretary-General of the United Nations, which contains the assessment of my Government on a period that was difficult and complex, but rich in important international events. In his message, President Zhivkov informed the Secretary-General of the efforts that my country has been deploying for the implementation of the lofty'ideals of the International Year of Peace, including the establishment, in the Balkans, of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and a chemical-weapon-free zone. There is no doubt that the year 1986 will remain, in the annals of disarmament, intricately linked with the Statement of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of 15 January. In that Statement the Soviet Union put forward a large-scale programme to eliminate by the year 2000 all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and to build a world without nuclear weapons. This programme has been largely recognized as an example of new, dynamic political thinking, as an expression of determination to undertake radical steps called for by the nuclear-space age. In 1986 silence continued to reign at the Soviet nuclear-test sites. The Soviet unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions was an important gesture of political goodwill. It had no other aim than to create the most propitious conditions for solving one of the most urgent tasks of our time: the achievement of an agreement on a comprehensive ban of nuclear-weapon tests. An event of great political importance was the Summit Meeting in Reykjavik. It demonstrated once again the necessity of bold, non-traditional approaches to the solution of the most acute problems of today. What is more, it proved that it was possible to cut, in a not-so-distant future, through the Gordian knot of the nuclear-arms race; and to reduce and do away with the danger of nuclear catastrophe. In Reykjavik, the Soviet Union made sweeping proposals for a balanced reduction of nuclear arsenals, to be followed by their complete elimination. Regrettably, the United States was unable to negotiate its own half of the way. It remained prisoner to its illusions of reaching military superiority through the deployment of its Star Wars weapons. 457 r.nnv Aooroved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PSI. 387 14 (Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria) In his message to the United Nations Secretary-General, President Todor Zhivkov stated, inter alia: "We all have been deeply impressed by the Reykjavik Meeting between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan. This Meeting has given rise to great expectations in world public opinion and among the nations of the world. Notwithstanding the fact that the American side could not muster enough determination to accept the historic proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Reykjavik Meeting will, undoubtedly, remain as one of the most significant events during the International Year of Peace. We hope that sound reason will prevail and that the dialogue will continue on from where it was interrupted." The International Year of Peace was also remarkable for a number of important political initiatives: the Budapest proposal by the Warsaw Treaty Member States on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe; the Harare Declaration of Non-Aligned leaders; the "Six States" initiatives; and the proposals of the socialist countries in the United Nations for the setting up of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Xavier Perez de Cuellar, rightly pointed out in his message of 3 February to the Conference that the agreement in Stockholm, the two IAEA conventions concluded in Vienna, the results of the Biological Weapons Review Conference and the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament in its negotiations on the chemical weapons ban, "are noteworthy examples of a constructive approach towards the issues of disarmament and international security". The recent entry into force of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty was also an encouraging event. Speaking in terms of disarmament, may I emphasize that 1986 would have been a better year had the United States Administration joined the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Nineteen eighty-six would have been a better year if the United States of America had not rejected all proposals to start negotiations on a comprehensive treaty to ban all nuclear-weapon tests. Nineteen eighty-six would have been a better year if the United States of America had not continued its preparations for waging Star Wars. Nineteen eighty-six would have been a better year if the United States Administration had not decided to violate the SALT-2 Treaty. On 3 February 1987, the very day the Conference on Disarmament began its annual session, the United States Administration offered an affront to the international community by conducting its twenty-fifth test since the beginning of the Soviet moratorium. Thus, the United States Administration did everything possible to force the USSR to take a decision for resuming its nuclear testing. My delegation could not agree more with the phrase that Mr. Adelman considered it appropriate to repeat so many times in his statement here on 5 February last, namely that "The world expects better than this!". 458 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RnPa9_ni ?. . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 15 (Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria) The year 1986 confirmed that a new kind of political thinking is necessary, one that is in line with the new realities of our times. It is imperative to break with the century-old pattern of thinking and behaviour, resting on the acceptability and admissibility of war as a means of solving international disputes. For today, it is widely recognized that a nuclear war cannot be won and must newer be fought. The world situation must not be allowed to become such that peace and security no longer depend on the common sense or will of governments and peoples, that they become hostage of military and technological logic. This is the reason why we welcomed the Delhi Declaration, signed by the leaders of the USSR and India, in which it is stated that "the building of a world free of nuclear weapons and violence requires a revolutionary restructuring in the minds of men and bringing up nations in a spirit of peace, mutual respect and tolerance". The Bulgarian delegation cannot help repeating that, in its view, the establishment of ad hoc committees offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Conference. In this vein my delegation believes that it is high time for the Conference on Disarmament to undertake concrete and substantive work on the items related to nuclear disarmament. My delegation attaches highest priority to item 1 of our agenda: "Nuclear Test Ban". In our submission, the results of the forty-first regular session of the United Nations General Assembly have created favourable prerequisites to overcome the stalemate in our work. Any unbiased analysis of resolution 41/64 A and resulotion 41/47 cannot bflt lead to the conclusion that there is a convergence and reconciliation of differences in them. The Bulgarian delegation considers that on the basis of these resolutions a compromise solution can and must be found, that a consensus can and must be reached to set up an ad hoc committee with a mandate which would allow the Conference to proceed to substantive work. The existing convergence of views must be translated into an agreement, words must be matched by deeds. The Soviet Union and the United States bear a particular responsibility for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. In Reykjavik, the framework for agreements relating to the first stage of nuclear disarmament was clearly defined. It is quite natural that so many hopes are pinned, now, on the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva. This, however, does not mean and cannot mean that the Conference on Disarmament nught to sit idle on its agenda item 2. My delegation believes that the Conference has to proceed with an in-depth and structured discussion on all aspects of that issue, including the conditions for adherencP by all nuclear-weapon States to the efforts aimed at ending the nuclear-arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. In its resolution 41/86 G, the United Nations General Assembly requested the Conference to undertake negotiations "with a view to achieving agreements on appropriate and practical measures which could be negotiated and adopted individually for the prevention of nuclear war". It requested also the Conference to establish, for that purpose, an ad hoc committee on the subject. This resolution perfectly reflects the considered view of my delegation on item 3 of our agenda. At the same time it is appropriate to 459 n,r+ - c.niti7pri nnnv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 16 (Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria) note that my delegation's flexibility is well known, both officially and unofficially. We would like to reiterate our readiness to co-operate in order to break away with the deadlock on item 3. As to item 4, my delegation would like to express its satisfaction with the results achieved by the Conference at its 1986 session and during the inter-sessional period. Under the able guidance of Ambassador Cromartie of Great Britain, the Ad Hoc Committee succeeded in resolving a number of important issues related to the chemical weapons stocks, the chemical weapons production facilities and the activities not prohibited by the convention. It is gratifying to note that the progress achieved at informal consultations warranted an updating of the rolling text of the draft convention to incorporate the addition of common ground identified during the inter-sessional period. We share the view that momentum has been generated, and it must be sustained. In fact, it is necessary for the Conference to intensify its efforts by increasing the tempo of its negotiations. We believe that in 1987 our objective should be to finalize the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. While we do not tend to underestimate the remaining difficulties, we think that this objective is not beyond the reach of the Conference. There is no doubt in our mind that the Conference made a very wise decision in giving, at this crucial stage of the negotiations, the steering wheel of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons into the hands of Ambassador Rolf Ekeus. My delegation holds the view that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should resume its activities as soon as possible. There is no lack of valuable ideas and specific proposals in the Conference. We believe it is important now to focus the Committee's attention on the elaboration of significant measures conducive to guaranteeing the peaceful uses of outer space and preventing an arms race in it. This Conference should concentrate on the elaboration of an agreement or agreements, for instance on ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites. In this context, it is warranted to explore the possibility of elimination of existing anti-satellite systems. In other words, what my delegation would like to see on item 5 is deeds. With respect to item 8, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, by consensus, a decision for the Conference to conclude the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during the first part of its 1987 session, and to submit a complete draft of the Programme before the end of its forty-first regular session. Having co-sponsored this decision, my delegation would like to assure the distinguished Chairman of our Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Garcia Robles, that he can rely on our full support and co-operation in the work on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. 460 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 17 (Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria) The United Nations General Assembly has already taken a decision to convene its third special session devoted to disarmament. At the first plenary meeting of the Conference, the distinguished representative of Mexico rightly recalled that for nine years now the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to adopt even a single treaty, even a single convention. We are afraid that it might be a fatal blow to the credibility of this Conference, if it presents to the third special session devoted to disarmament a report along the lines of the reports it has been submitting to the regular sessions of the General Assembly during the past nine years. It is high time for the Conference to make a breakthrough. We must find a way out of the vicious circle with respect to nuclear disarmament and proceed to business-like negotiations on a nuclear-test ban. We must have no less an objective than to agree upon a convention which would ban the chemical weapons. We must adopt a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. To put it in a nutshell, we all must move forward at the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President, and to the country the President represents. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador Morelli Pando. Mr. MORELLI-PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, at the outset I wish to congratulate you and express my delegation's pleasure at the fact that a person of such great eminence should be presiding over this session, representing a country of such great world influence as China. It gives me particular pleasure to express my delegation's satisfaction at the work done by the distinguished representative of Canada as President of thiE Conference. I wish to extend to the delegation of the United States the condolences of my delegation at the premature and highly regrettable loss occasioned by the decease of Ambassador Lowitz for his country and for all of us who knew him. I extend a welcome to the distinguished delegates of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Year after year, ever since it received its mandate from the Final Document of 1978, this Conference has been going through a ritual of good intentions every February and a great chorus of frustration every August, and it is well known that, as in other disarmament forums, that ritual tends to follow the mercurial changes in relations between the major Powers, particularly the super-Powers. As we begin the 1987 session, the question arises this year, as in so many other years: is February going to be a season of good intentions? That question is especially relevant today in the light of the Reykjavik Summit. The meagre results of bilateral summits in recent years have become habitual, indeed predictable. This time it is understood that Reykjavik will go down in history as significantly different from previous summits, but it is not yet known whether that difference will in the final analysis have a positive sense and, if so, what its scope will be. 46 _ - D,r+ - Caniti7Pri r.013V ADDroved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 18 (Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru) Another question therefore arises, as to whether this Conference, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum, is going to receive the same information as was received by the General Assembly concerning what occurred at Reykjavik. If that is the case, if we are going to receive partial and mutually divergent reports about the achievements of the latest summit, then the proposal of the Group of 21 at our previous session that the Conference should be informed in February 1987 of the results of the bilateral negotiations that have taken place and any others that may be under way will not have been heeded. Obviously that proposal provided and continues to provide coherent, reliable and realistic foundations for multilateral negotiations which cannot be avoided and which we must not continue to postpone. Some statements in the plenary meeting last Thursday illustrate the difficulties faced by the Conference on Disarmament with respect to what I have said and with respect to other disturbing developments. And it was no coincidence that the Group of 21 at that same meeting expressed its view on the sensitive and urgent item of nuclear-weapon tests. That statement of the Group of 21 significantly took into account the resolutions of the General Assembly as well as the Non-Aligned Statement of Harare and the more recent statement of the six Heads of State or Government, and concluded, in conformity with those documents, by voicing an explicit and significant demand that the Conference on Disarmament should negotiate and conclude a treaty on this issue which is of the highest priority. As requested in General Assembly resolution 41/46 A, opportunely commented on and highlighted at our inaugural meeting by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, the creation of an ad hoc committee to address the question of a nuclear-weapon-test ban would be a major step forward and in the present circumstances would allow some hope of a convergence in the determination of the super-Powers to seriously negotiate a process which, in the final analysis, is a multilateral concern. Needless to say, other multilateral efforts should take place side by side with the Conference on Disarmament, in the context both of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 and of the Non-Proliferation Treaty whose preamble contains an undertaking to put an end to vertical proliferation, an issue profoundly and naturally linked, with horizontal non-proliferation. The delegation of Peru hereby reiterates its support for the principles and standards of that Treaty, whose continuity must be assured and whose acceptance should be extended so that the credibility of its fulfilment will be enhanced. Other types of convergent co-operation deserve attention. The six Heads of State or Government have offered their co-operation for the fulfilment and verification of general agreements in that area. Peru believes that other countries should rally to this suggestion, and therefore, within the bounds of its possibilities and bearing in mind the appropriate training of its experts in seismology we offer our co-operation as and when it may be required. In our plenary we have heard the views expressed by the distinguished representatives of Australia and Mexico with respect to the implementation of the Treaty of Rarotonga. As the representative of a country which is a full member of the Tlatelolco Treaty and the only country of the south-east Pacific area belonging to this forum I also wish to welcome the fact, that despite the nuclear threat hanging over mankind, it has proved possible, following in the wake of the Tlatelolco Treaty, to establish a second nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated geographical area. 462 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP97-n11RApnnn1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 19 (Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru) The link between the two treaties is clear and therefore if they are fully implemented this will mean, having in mind Ambassador Butler's fine turn of phrase, a zone of application extending from the west coast of Australia to the west coast of the corresponding part of Latin America and from the Equator down to the Antarctic, which in turn is governed by an appropriate international status. It is worth emphasizing a process that was begun by Latin America and is now being continued by the countries of the South West Pacific through the Treaty which has just entered into force and which fully marks the progress that was to be expected of non-nuclear-weapon countries 20 years after the adoption of the Tlatelolco Treaty. I refer to the definition of nuclear devices and their comprehensive prohibition, and in particular to the inclusion of a third protocol, relating to nuclear tests vis-?is the five Great Powers. Peru, whose legitimate interest coincides with that of other countries of the Permanent Commission of the South Pacific has a clear position on nuclear tests.in that area, specifically with a view to the preservation of vital marine resources. But Peru also believes that these problems cannot. be conceptually divorced from the highly qualitative competition in testing which has existed and may continue to exist between the super-Powers. Likewise we must bear in mind that what occurred, vis-A-vis the nuclear Powers, with the two additional protocols of the Tlatelolco Treaty may now begin to happen with the additional protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty: I refer to the highly qualified statements made by those Powers when they subscribe or ratify these additional instruments. The Tlatelolco Treaty expressly affirmed in its preamble that it did not constitute an end in itself. It could not, since to a great extent it depends for its refinement and full application upon the respect and support of the nuclear Powers. We may assume that this will also be the case as regards the Rarotonga Treaty. The delegation of Peru hopes that, in line with the possible advances in the prohibition of nuclear tests, we may also make progress on the items concerning the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the prevention of nuclear war, as the Group of 21 has tirelessly been proposing. We hope for a positive increase in the exchange of views which is already being reflected in our report to the General Assembly, with a view to reaching tangible results at this Conference. With respect to the established continuity of the ad hoc committees on items 4 and 8 of our agenda, my delegation wishes to state the following. With regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, we once again express our hope that the efforts currently under way to achieve a comprehensive and global treaty in this field may be completed this year, as has continually been requested by the competent international forums and also significantly and recently, by the Second Review Conference of the Treaty prohibiting biological weapons. Recognition should be given to the work done recently by the Ad Hoc Committee under the expert guidance of the distinguished representative of Great Britain, and now entrusted to the distinguished representative of Sweden, from whose guidance we may hope for very good results. 463 Dnr+ - gnniti7Pd Cony Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 20 (Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru) With respect to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, we again express our hope that under the prestigious leadership of Ambassador Garcia Robles it may fulfil its mandate to submit the draft programme, as desired and expected, to the forty-first session of the General Assembly. The delegation of Peru will adhere to the position formulated by the Group of 21 with regard to the re-establishment of the committees on items 5, 6 and 7 of the agenda. With respect to the first, item 5, prevention of an arms race in outer space, we are prepared to participate actively in discussing and considering this increasingly urgent priority item of the Conference on Disarmament, chiefly in the light of the concept of the peaceful uses of space and the possible analogies between such uses of outer space and the uses contemplated in the Convention on the Law of the Sea. The delegation of Peru firmly believes that this year the Ad Hoc Committee should be given a broader mandate than last yea's which was its first, and an appropriate programme of work. The prospects that lie before the Conference on Disarmament this year are uncertain because of the state of world affairs and because of the record of its own activities in recent years, with such scant results. But even though there are some auspicious signs, in this forum, will it be enough to achieve some additional partial results for us to be able to say that our annual work has been done? In my delegation's judgement, the time has come for some far-reaching thinking about the purposes of this Conference, thinking that will lead to conclusions worthy of being included in our report to the General Assembly. For example our work, as is natural, is governed by our agenda, but the latter does not take into account the interrelationship that exists between those items, as if they existed in their own airtight compartments. It does not seem acceptable that the obvious need to have ad hoc committees should rule out a comprehensive yearly deliberation. As I ventured to point out in August last year, we have systematically been excluding from our agenda certain items which the General Assembly entrusted to us. It is true that these items do not yet deserve the establishment of ad hoc committees, but nothing would prevent us from being truly comprehensive in our yearly deliberations, and not excluding those items that have so far been postponed. Along the same line of thinking, and bearing in mind the request made in this Conference that it should be informed about the bilateral negotiations, we should establish whether we are talking only about bilateral negotiations and only with respect to the items specifically included in the present agenda. My delegation believes that this Conference should also be informed about regional negotiations on the reduction of military forces and the implementation of confidence-building measures, that is, items which, like the question of conventional weapons, are specifically included among those entrusted to us by the General Assembly. 464 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 21 (Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru) The distinguished representative of Argentina has very rightly pointed out that this year the Conference on Disarmament should give due attention to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament scheduled for 1988. My delegation believes that this is exactly what is needed with a view to this very important event, as well as in relation to other related ones. We regret that in 1986 our Conference did not show interest in another item that has been postponed, the issue of disarmament and development, which should be dealt with this year at the conference referred to by several General Assembly resolutions. Mr. President, the delegation of Peru once again expresses its best wishes for your success in the important tasks entrusted to you in this initial period, in the belief that they will lead to tangible and auspicious progress in this eminent negotiating forum. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and I thank him for the kind words addressed to the President himself and to the country which the President represents. I now give the floor to Ambassador Butler, the Ambassador of Australia. Mr. BUTLER (Australia): At our first plenary meeting this year, on 3 February, I had the honour of joining with the representative of the delegation of New Zealand in circulating to the Conference the final text of ? the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, a Treaty which had then entered into force. May I say just quickly that I am very grateful to the distinguished Ambassador of Peru for the references that he has just made to the Treaty of Rarotonga and for the analysis of its importance which he shared with us. When we circulated those Protocols, we were able to announce that Protocols 2 and 3 had been signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I thought it would be interesting if I reported briefly to the Conference this morning that at 10 o'clock Suva time today, 10 February 1987, Protocols 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Rarotonga were signed by your country, Mr. President, by the People's Republic of China. The Protocols were signed by Ambassador Ji Chaozhu in Suva, that being the place where the Treaty of Rarotonga is deposited. May I take this opportunity, Mr. President, of saying to you personally that Australia, and I am sure I can speak for New Zealand in this context, very much welcomes the action that your Government has taken. Thank you. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none. As announced earlier and agreed at our last plenary meeting, I intend now to postpone the plenary meeting and convene, in five minutes' time, an informal meeting of the Conference to consider the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committees on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and on "Radiological weapons", as well as requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. The plenary meeting was suspended at 12.15 p.m. and resumed at 12.25 p.m. 465 r.nnv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 22 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 387th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. As a result of our discussions at the informal meeting, I wish first to put before the Conference for decision document CD/WP.253, dealing with the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". If I hear no objection, / shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision. 1/ It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): May I now turn to document CD/WP.245, relating to a draft decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision. 2/ It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I suggest now that we take up those requests contained in documents CD/WP.255 to 266, containing draft decisions on the participation of Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, Zimbabawe, Viet Nam, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Bangladesh. Since consensus was noted at the informal meeting on each of the requests received from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference, we agreed to take up at the resumed plenary all draft decisions together. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decisions. 3/ It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): As there is no other business to consider, / intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 12 February 1987 at 10.30 a.m. The meeting rose at at 12.50 p.m. 466 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDPg7_ni Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 23 Notes 1/ Later issued as CD/737. 2/ Later issued as CD/738. 3/ CD/WP.255: "In response to the request of Norway and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda." CD/wP.256: "In response to the request of Finland and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda." CD/WP.257: "In response to the request of New Zealand and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of New Zealand to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda." CD/WP.258: "In response to the request of Portugal and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Portugal to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda." CD/WP.259: "In response to the request of Turkey and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Turkey to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 7 and 8 of its agenda." CD/WP.260: "In response to the request of Zimbabwe and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Zimbabwe to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda." 467 - Qrifi7C1 nom/ Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.387 24 CD/WP.261: "In response to the request of Viet Nam and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Viet Nam to address during 1987 the plenary meetings of the Conference on item 8 of its agenda." CD/WP.262: "In response to the request of Austria and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Austria to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda." CD/WP.263: "In response to the request of Denmark and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Denmark to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda." CD/WP.264: "In response to the request of Greece and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Greece to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda." CD/WP.265: "In response to the request of Spain and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda." CD/WP.266: "In response to the request of Bangladesh and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of the rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Bangladesh to participate during 1987 at plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 6 and 8 of its agenda." 468 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RnPq7_ni Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.388 12 February 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 12 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m. President: GE. 87-6O187/5828e Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China) 469 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 388th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the outset, I should like to cordially welcome in our midst the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, His Excellency Dr. Klaus TOrnudd, who is addressing the Conference today as our first speaker. In doing so, I also wish to thank him for his interest in our work, as he has visited the Conference before. In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will listen to statements in plenary meetings and consider the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda and other organizational questions. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today, the representatives of Finland, Romania, New Zealand and Hungary. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, His Excellency Dr. Klaus Tornudd. ?4 Mr. TORNUDD (Finland): Mr. President, I wish to begin by expressing my thanks for the warm words of welcome you addressed to me. May I, for my part, congratulate you upon your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February. I am sure that your well-known experience and skill will guide the work of the Conference in the most efficacious way. May I also offer our heartfelt condolences to the United States delegation, and through it, to the family of Ambassador Donald Lowitz. The sudden passing away of Ambassador Lowitz, whom I had the honour to meet on several occasions, has deprived the United States of an educated public servant, and the Conference of an able negotiator. The Conference on Disarmament is resuming its work at a time of uncommon flux in international disarmament efforts. Much has happened since the Conference last assembled in this Chamber less than six months ago. The Reykjavic summit meeting showed that there is indeed a real possibility of radical reduction of nuclear weapons. After so many years of fruitless effort, bilaterally and by this Conference, Reykjavik is a harbinger of hope despite its immediate outcome. The Stockholm Conference showed that patient and painstaking multilateral negotiation of complex and militarily significant issues can pay off. The achievement of a new regime of confidence- and security-building measures in Europe has already inspired initiatives designed to move Europe towards lower levels of conventional forces and armaments on a regional scale. Finland welcomes the fact that, after Reykjavik, both the Soviet Union and the United States have reaffirmed their commitment to a continued search for agreement on the outstanding issues dividing them. Effective and 470 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-ni1 RR nnn nn innnn4 A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/Pv.388 3 (Mr. Tornudd, Finland) verifiable agreements on reducing nuclear weapons and preventing an arms race in outer space between the two Powers with the largest arsenals would truly enhance their security and that of everyone else. We note with satisfaction the extension of the United States-Soviet arms control dialogue to new areas. The formal negotiations that began last month on establishing nuclear risk reduction centres in Moscow and Washington deal with an aspect of the nuclear equation that is often overlooked in discussion of the ways and means to prevent nuclear war. In the final analysis, preventing nuclear war from arising by miscalculation or misunderstanding is no less important than preventing it from arising by calculation or design. In our view, efforts to reduce nuclear weapons and prevent their accidental or deliberate use would be greatly assisted by an equal effort to end their testing. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty would do much to retard and eventually end the development of ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would put pressure on those who might still harbour nuclear ambitions to desist from their folly, thus strengthening one of the key instruments of international security, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We regret the fact that the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing did not lead to the start of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, bilaterally or by this Conference. We continue to believe that a comprehensive test-ban treaty with adequate verification provisions is achievable right now. However, we also recognize that, even on this important question, the best should not be the enemy of the good. At the present juncture, step-by-step negotiations, firmly geared to the generally accepted goal of ending all nuclear tests in all environments for all time, would seem to offer the best available means out of the deadlock. We welcome the willingness of both sides to explore a gradual approach to this important issue. The Conference on Disarmament has already done a considerable amount of useful work on the subject of a test ban. That work needs to be continued bearing in mind the possibility of interim steps. One such step might well be the establishment by the Conference of an international seismic monitoring network based on existing facilities around the world, as recently recommended in General Assembly resolution 41/47. Clearly, confidence in a comprehensive test ban requires that it be verifiable. Mandated by this Conference, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has done valuable work in laying the necessary technical groundwork for reliable monitoring of seismic events for verification of a test ban. We welcome the steps toward developing an international data exchange system now underway. This work would be further assisted if all States conducting nuclear explosions were to provide the Secretary-General of the United Nations with information concerning these explosions as requested by General Assembly resolution 41/59 N. 477 Dmrl? - aniti7Rd CODV Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 4 (Mr. Tornudd, Finland) Finland participates actively in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts. With government funding, the University of Helsinki has for some years conducted a special seismological project for this purpose. In view of the new and demanding tasks the GSE set for itself at its last meeting, the Government of Finland has recently decided to allocate considerable additional resources to the project as of this year. Since 1980, Finland has co-operated with Zambia in establishing a seismic network there and training Zambian personnel to operate it. Zambia participated with success in the Level I data exchange experiment organized by the GSE in 1984. We look forward to Zambian participation in the even more complex Level II data exchange experiment scheduled for 1988. Since I last spoke from this rostrum one year ago, considerable progress has been achieved with regard to another priority item on the agenda of this Conference, the elaboration of a convention to ban chemical weapons. Although a number of critically important issues remain to be settled, the pace of progress over the past year gives rise to the hope that the remaining problems, too, can be solved in the not too distant future. We wish the new Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden, every success in his important task. Challenge inspection is undoubtedly the major unresolved issue at this point. We are glad to note that, as last year's Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, noted in his report to the Committee, a convergence of views now exists on at least four points. Enlarging this common ground to the point of consensus -- by working out the appropriate detailed procedures to everyone's satisfaction -- poses a challenge of its own. Perhaps differentiation by types of challenge inspection objects and accumulating experience from on-site inspections might help to solve this problem. We are heartened by the progress made in developing regimes for the verification of various categories of chemicals relevant to the convention. For the first time, there is now a provisional list of at least nine known chemical warfare agents which will be banned, except for small-scale production for research, medical or protective purposes. Important work has also been done in developing detailed verification measures for such production. We believe that in perfecting these measures care should be taken not to hamper basic research routinely undertaken in university laboratories or elsewhere. It is clear that effective verification of the chemical weapons convention requires, in addition to data reporting, both on-site inspections and the use of modern monitoring equipment. Monitoring equipment for verification purposes has been studied and tested by the Finnish chemical weapons verification project since 1972. As part of our continuing effort to help to provide the necessary technical means for assuring confidence in the convention, the Finnish project is hosting, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, a special workshop in Helsinki. The 472 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-Rnpcy,_ni ? - - - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 5 (Mr. Tornudd, Finland) workshop, convened at expert level, will address questions of automatic monitoring in terms of detection of alleged use, verification of destruction and verification of non-production. The results of the workshop will be communicated to all members of the Conference on Disarmament in written form as soon as they are available. We welcome the fact that the Conference on Disarmament will continue to deal with the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. Substantive, although rather preliminary, discussions have already been held in the past. Bearing in mind the fact that the extensive use of outer space for some military purposes, such as early warning and verification, clearly contributes to international security, continued discussion should, in our view, focus on preventing the weaponization of outer space. A ban on anti-satellite weapons should be a priority objective in this context. Multilateral efforts at this Conference would thereby complement, for the common good of all, the bilateral effort of those two who bear the primary responsibility for preventing an arms race in outer space. The Conference on Disarmament could also play an important role in furthering naval disarmament. This aspect of disarmament has for too long been overlooked. We are encouraged by the fact that the idea of bringing the burgeoning naval arms race under closer scrutiny, and eventually control, is gaining momentum. The United Nations Disarmament Commission will deal with this question again at its next annual session in May. As the single multilateral negotiating body for disarmament, this Conference could complement the work of the UNDC by taking up, in an appropriate manner, some aspects of this problem for more concrete action. Finland has recently drawn attention to the importance of naval confidence-building measures in her own region, Northern Europe, where the adjacent sea areas are the scene of growing military activity. Finally, as a representative of a non-member State I wish to take this opportunity to re-empbasize the continuing active interest of my country in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that our contributions have been useful and we look forward to all new opportunities to participate in disarmament efforts in the future as well. We remain ready to assume membership in the Conference on Disarmament. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu. Ambassador DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): Comrade President, it is with great pleasure that I associate myself with previous speakers in extending to you my warmest congratulations on your accession to the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in this month that begins our session, a month that is so important for the subsequent pursuit of our work. Our satisfaction is all the greater in that you are the representative of the 473 nni-laccifiPri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 6 (Ambassador Dolgu, Romania) People's Republic of China, a great socialist State with which the Socialist Republic of Romania has close and exemplary relations of friendship and co-operation in every field. We are confident that given your abilities in the conduct of our work, the Conference will have the most auspicious conditions for accomplishing its duties. Mr. President, through you I should also like to pay tribute to the outgoing President, Ambassador Alan Beesley of Canada, for the excellent work that he did and express to him my delegation's gratitude. I thank you, Comrade President, for your words of welcome for those of us who are taking our seats at the heads of our delegations for the first time here and through you I also thank the other colleagues who extended their welcome to me. It is a painful duty for me to convey my very sad condolences to the delegation of the United States on the untimely death of Ambassador Donald Lowitz. I wish to take this opportunity to share some thoughts reflecting the position of Romania, the view of President Nicolae Ceauiescu, on the problems of halting the arms race and of disarmament, problems which are included in the agenda of this forum. The effort and concern to participate in the solution of these problems are an essential component of my country's foreign policy. An essential component because the problem of halting the arms race and moving on to disarmament is, as we see it, in itself the fundamental problem of the contemporary world. Because of the events which marked it, last year was not the year of peace as our peoples had proclaimed through the United Nations. International relations continued to be characterized by particularly serious tensions, because all the negative processes and phenomena that feed these tensions persisted. But last year did not elapse without leaving some lessons behind. It led us to reconsider some of the basic ideas that have underpinned military and political thinking in the post-war period. It has become clear, for example, that a nuclear war cannot be waged without ending in the annihilation of civilization and of the very conditions for life on our planet. Last year also led us to a better understanding of the disastrous impact of the arms race on the state of health of the world economy. And again, last year, developments led us to realize ever more forcefully that in the suspicion-arms race spiral each of the two terms is both a cause and an effect and that the vicious circle they constitute can be broken, as the outcome of the Stockholm Conference showed, when all States display political will. All States, be they large and powerful and endowed with nuclear weapons or small or medium-sized and with limited military potential, all States, I say, have the right to be involved and to become involved in efforts to build a world without nuclear weapons. If we wish to survive, it is essential to give up the time-worn idea that nuclear arms strengthen defence capacity and thereby contribute to maintaining peace, and we must move on to the adoption and application of real nuclear disarmament measures. The most fruitful approach -- the one that we support -- is the comprehensive approach to disarmament problems: nuclear disarmament measures should be accompanied by a substantial reduction of 474 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDPg7_ni Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 7 (Ambassador Dolgu, Romania) conventional arms, troops and military expenditure. The latter, in Romania's view, should be reduced by at least 50 per cent by the year 2000. An initial step in that direction could be the implementation of the proposal contained in the Appeal and programme of the States members of the Warsaw Treaty for a 25 per cent reduction in arms, troops and expenditure by the end of the next decade. By simultaneously tackling nuclear and conventional disarmament in the framework of a comprehensive programme, this approach covers the complex realities of our world and the security perceptions of different States. As regards arms control and disarmament, there is no lack of ideas and proposals for action. What is lacking is action. More than ever, what is needed is to move from words to deeds. Having this in mind, and prompted by a desire to make at least a modest and symbolic contribution to this difficult transition, my country has set itself the task of unilaterally carrying out a 5 per cent reduction of its arms, troops and military expenditure. This measure was adopted by a popular referendum last November. It would have been desirable for such a reduction to take place on a multilateral basis, but given the enormous scale of destructive potentialities, such unilateral actions seem possible to undertake without hurting the security interests of the States concerned. Measures of this kind may contribute to building confidence and to establishing the right climate for halting the arms race and moving on to real disarmament measures. This decisive moment in the evolution of international life requires that all States step up their efforts and give new dynamism to the activities of organs and conferences in the field of disarmament and the activity of the entire system established for negotiations on disarmament. It goes without saying that by the military potential they possess the United States, the Soviet Union and the other nuclear Powers have a special responsibility in beginning and fostering the disarmament process. It is therefore natural to expect negotiations and meetings between the Soviet Union and the United States to lead to substantial and rapid results. But other States whose existence is also threatened and which are also directly affected by the political, economic and social consequences of the arms race cannot confine themselves to the role of spectators. With regard to the foremost problem of our day halting the arms race and moving on to disarmament, they should be able to express their views and they should be able to make their contribution. The Conference on Disarmament has a unique, leading role in the negotiating system on disarmament. It is the only multilateral negotiating organ of which all the nuclear-weapon States, as well as the principal States having considerable military potential, are members. Unfortunately we must observe, as other speakers before me have done, that in the period since its creation the results achieved by the Conference have been minimal. It is imperative that the potential of the Conference be more effectively used and that it apply itself to the drawing up of concrete agreements in the field of disarmament so that it can truly become a negotiating forum. In this regard we share the view that negotiating 475 Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 8 (Ambassador Dolgu, Romania) structures, i.e. ad hoc committees should be set up for each priority disarmament issue. Finally, what is of the essence is to begin a concrete dialogue on all the questions on the Conference's agenda. In view of the importance of disarmament problems in the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, in view of the great number of resolutions adopted on these issues, many of them touching directly upon the activity of this Conference, we feel that the Conference's work should be based to a greater extent on the relevant United Nations resolutions which are the embodiment of the will of the overwhelming majority of the States of the world. As regards the specific items on the Conference's agenda, the Romanian delegation wishes to make the following comments and proposals at this stage: As regards nuclear disarmament, these issues are at the forefront, quite rightly, of the Conference's agenda. As I have already stressed, due to its view of disarmament, Romania places nuclear disarmament at the forefront of its concerns. On the basis of this absolute priority, my country has always favoured effective negotiations aimed at ending the nuclear arms race and for the conclusion of agreements on the halting of production and development, on the reduction and finally on the elimination of nuclear weapons. In this spirit Romania welcomed and supported the proposals of the Soviet Union regarding the stage-by-stage elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. We feel that new efforts should be undertaken on the basis of the proposals submitted at the Soviet-American summit in. Reykjavik in order to achieve as soon as possible appropriate agreements for a halt to the arms race on Earth and in space. As a European country, Romania attaches special importance to the need to achieve this year an agreement, even one that is separate from the overall "package", for the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, with a view ultimately to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the European continent. Similarly, as a country situated in the Balkan region, Romania favours and is working for the transformation of that part of the continent into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons and of foreign military bases. At the same time we support the creation of such zones in the north and centre of Europe as well as in other continents. In that spirit we welcome the recent entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific. As regards the work of the Conference, we believe it is high time for us to cease dealing with nuclear questions in very general terms, and for these issues to become the specific subject of negotiations. Romania attaches a particular importance and high priority to the cessation of all nuclear testing which could and should constitute a first step in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Public opinion in my country learned with legitimate and deep concern of the new underground nuclear tests conducted by the United States and expressed its firm disapproval of this event. Romania, A A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RnPQ9_ni Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 9 (Ambassador Dolgu, Romania) which welcomed the Soviet Union's decision to institute a unilateral moratorium on its nuclear tests, considers it of the greatest importance that the United States should join in that measure. Such an act would be an important step towards creating the necessary conditions to move on to negotiations designed to conclude an agreement capable of ending nuclear tests. The establishment of such a moratorium by both parties as well as by the other nuclear Powers would constitute evidence of their willingness effectively to embark upon the path towards the cessation of the arms race and progress towards disarmament. In the present international circumstances, where there is a real risk of the annihilation of our civilization and of life itself on our planet it is more necessary than ever to refrain from any action which could increase tension and unleash a further arms build-up. The Romanian delegation firmly advocates that the problem of prohibition of nuclear testing should occupy a central place in the work of this session. We therefore favour the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this item. In view of the importance and gravity of this problem of nuclear tests, Romania proposes the convening of an international conference on a nuclear-test ban. Such a conference could be entrusted with debating all aspects involved in this problem, including the role of non-nuclear-weapon countries in the negotiation of an international nuclear-test-ban treaty and the application of a reliable and effective system of monitoring the provisions of such a treaty. The Conference on Disarmament could be the appropriate betting for the preparation of such a conference. As an interim step the Conference could also call for the establishment of a moratorium on all nuclear tests. Romania welcomes the idea of the creation of a network of seismic stations in different countries which, through the exchange of data and information, could contribute to monitoring the implementation of a future treaty banning all nuclear tests. We are prepared to participate in this with the technical means available to us. In the view of the Romanian delegation, the prevention of an arms race in outer space should also constitute a priority objective of negotiations in the Conference. Of considerable practical importance would be the prompt re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with dealing with all aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the beginning of negotiations on this issue. In our conception it is necessary that priority be given to the cessation of all actions militarizing space, the convening of an international conference and the conclusion of a general treaty on the use of space exclusively for peaceful purposes. Romania attaches great importance to the total prohibition and final elimination of chemical weapons, and thus to the preparation by the Conference of a draft convention. The results achieved to date by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the skilful guidance of Ambassador Cromartie to whom we wish to express the Romanian delegation's gratitude, represent remarkable steps towards the elaboration of the text of the convention. Several delegations that have already spoken have stressed the importance and urgency of developing a text of this convention as well as their willingness to exert the necessary efforts for resolving the problems or issues that remain 477 Cnnifi7ari r.npv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 10 (Ambassador Dolgu, Romania) pending: notably verification of non-production of chemical weapons by civilian industry, challenge inspection, declaration and verification of stocks of chemical weapons and other problems. In all these areas, verification remains the key problem. The agreed measures should be such as to inspire confidence that the provisions of the convention will be respected by all States parties. It is on that aspect in particular that we shall have to focus our attention during the process of searching for generally acceptable solutions. As regards the verification provisions, especially on-site inspection, we suggest using the formulas contained in the document oE the Stockholm Conference. In our view, the monitoring system agreed upon should not in any way affect the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, or the enhancement of the technical and scientific potential of each country. Like other delegations, we hope that under the skilful chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekeus, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will this year be able to carry to its conclusion the task entrusted to it. Romania favours the stepping up of negotiations aimed at the drafting of a convention prohibiting radiological weapons as part of the efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Such a convention could at the same time facilitate co-operation between States in the peaceful use of radiation and radiation sources while providing a suitable verification system with the participation of all States. We favour the achievement of an agreement containing a commitment by States not to resort to attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities likely to produce radiation and endanger the areas concerned. A subject that also deserves attention in our view is the need to ensure the safe operation of all peaceful nuclear facilities. Likewise, our delegation is in favour of the Conference addressing all aspects of the production of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and concrete measures for prohibiting them. I shall not dwell on the importance of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I have already stressed that in Romania's view true movement towards disarmament can emerge only from an integrated approach to all its aspects. I will therefore confine myself to expressing the hope that under the chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be able to fulfil its tasks during this year. The drafting of the text of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will constitute a concrete contribution by the Conference on Disarmament to preparations for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. To conclude I wish to quote some words recently pronounced by President Nicolae Ceaupscu. They seem to me particularly significant in this forum. 478 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDPg9_ni Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 11 (Ambassador Dolgu, Romania) "Present international circumstances are such that nothing can be more important today than moving on to concrete disarmament measures, to the adoption of measures capable of freeing mankind from the danger of a world war of annihilation. It is essential that we should do everything possible to halt the arms race, and above all the nuclear arms race, in order to ensure peace, the vital right of all peoples to existence, to freedom, to life and to peace." The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President and to the country that the Chair represents. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 387th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Mr. Graham. Mr. GRAHAM (New Zealand): Mr. President, my delegation extends its congratulations to you on your election to the Presidency of this important body. We hope that under your early guidance, the Conference will realize its potential this year in contributing to a saner and more stable security order. New Zealand has jointly submitted with Australia the final text of the Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The Protocols were finalized over the past year following consultations with each of the nuclear-weapon States. They were adopted in final form by the South Pacific Forum last August and opened for signature on 1 December. It is gratifying to see that, with Australia's ratification, the Treaty of Rarotonga has now entered into force. A majority of South Pacific Forum countries now constitute the Zone. The adherence of China and the Soviet Union to Protocols 2 and 3 is also welcomed. The Treaty and its Protocols meet the basic criteria for nuclear-free zones stipulated by the major nuclear Powers. New Zealand trusts that the sincerity with which the zone States have undertaken their obligations will be acknowledged by all nuclear Powers. We believe they will do so, and we look forward to their eventual adherence to the Protocols. The South Pacific region, which covers one sixth of the surface of the planet, is now nuclear-free in the accepted United Nations definition of the term. Together with the contiguous zones of Latin America to the east and the Antarctic to the south, a very sizeable part of the Earth's surface -- 40 per cent -- is free from the permanent deployment of nuclear weapons. The zones established by the Antarctic and Tlatelolco Treaties served as admirable precedents for our work, and we pay tribute to those who had the wisdom and foresight to conceive and negotiate those treaties. The South Pacific is relatively fro fr= strategic rivalry and confrontation. It is this situation which we seek to preserve as a strong and vital endowment to future generations. The Treaty is an arms control agreement not only of regional but also of global importance. The world has 479 - -1- Conr+ - Rrufi7d COM/ ADproved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 12 (Mr. Graham, New Zealand) changed dramatically in recent decades, and global security has become an interwoven tapestry of security commitments and relationships that form an indivisible whole. All countries of our world community, whether related in adversarial terms or not, are now mutually dependant upon one another for their common security and survival. In the South Pacific we have made a solemn security commitment by renouncing the possession and testing of nuclear weapons and their deployment in our territories. Nuclear weapons have no part to play in the security of the South Pacific. They offer no defence and their presence itself is destabilizing. We have made a common recognition that nuclear weapons provide an illusory protection, and that the survival and well being of our planet depends upon a lesser reliance on such weapons than that which prevails today. We in New Zealand seek an alternative to the system of nuclear deterrence at some future stage as the basis of international security. A global security system can only rest on something other than the threat of planetary degradation and our collective self-extinction. The risk of nuclear deterrence failing gives us all limited time in which to work. For our part, we will see to it that nuclear weapons stay out of New Zealand. We have declared that we do not wish to be defended by nuclear weapons. We see the Rarotonga Treaty as a small but significant step towards greater global security. It is New Zealand's hope that the Conference on Disarmament this year will reflect the same sense of urgency that galvanized our work in the South Pacific and that we shall see substantive progress during the session this year. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Meiszter. Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Mr. President, please allow me to express to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the responsible office of the President of the Conference on Disarmament. I am especially honoured to welcome in the Chair the representative of a State with which my country has increasingly good relations in all fields of social activity, the representative of a State which displays profound interest in an ongoing contribution to the cause of making disarmament efforts more efficient. I am confident that your patient guidance and diplomatic skills will help our Conference to break the vicious circle of feverish activities on one hand and fruitlessness on the other prevailing in this body during the past years. My words of appreciation go also to Ambassador Beesley of Canada who presided over our proceedings in an exemplary way during the closing month last year. The composition of this body has considerably changed since we closed our session last August. Some colleagues have left us to take up other responsibilities somewhere else, or departed under tragic circumstances like Ambassador Donald Lowitz, a man whose personal integrity, correctness and human warmth will leave a feeling of emptiness in us. May I express my profound condolences and sympathy over the sudden demise of our respected colleague, and request the delegation of the United States to transmit the 480 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RniDa9_ni Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 13 (Mr. Meiszter, Hungary) same to the Government of the United States, to Shana Lowitz and to her mourning family. I would like to join other representatives speaking before me and welcome our newly arrived colleagues, the representatives of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, offering to them friendship and co-operation as we had with their respective predecessors. I feel privileged to welcome again in our midst the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Klaus Tiirnudd of Finland, and to welcome as well Mr. Graham of New Zealand, and express my appreciation over their interest displayed and contribution made to the work of this Conference which will certainly be carefully studied by my delegation. Mr. President, at the beginning of this session I feel it appropriate to have a glance at the international situation. Our work is conducted under its conditions and is expected in its turn to produce a favourable feed-back effect on it. Approximately a year ago, when making my statement before this body on the same occasion, I characterized the international conditions prevailing at that time as "a shade clearer" than it had been in the preceding years. I attributed this to the fact that the results of the Summit Meeting in November 1985 between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan were significant and had some favourable influence on the general atmosphere of international relations. Now, a year later, one can see -- fornately -- the continuation of that promising tendency. Significant events have taken place in the international arena, which have contributed to improving the situation, even if not to the extent hoped or desirable. Elements of detente and confrontation continue to co-exist, and our task is consequently to decrease the confrontational element. An outstanding event of high-level diplomacy was the Reykjavik meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. The understanding in Reykjavik proved that courageous initiatives pursued with vigour and fresh thinking may produce results which had seemed unrealistic before. There are results from Reykjavik, even if not in the form of international written instruments. The understanding on the 50 per cent reduction of strategic nuclear arms and the accord reached on the elimination of United States and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and on a radical cut in missiles of this type in Asia are all elements of such importance that they can hardly be overestimated. The proposal of the Soviet side to consolidate the regime of the ABM Treaty and the initiation of full-scale talks on a total nuclear-test ban added special significance to the above-mentioned meeting. The greatest importance of the accords reached in Reykjavik is that they proved that nuclear disarmament is a real possibility. Mutually agreed elements of the Reykjavik accords are being followed up here in Geneva at the bilateral talks, hopefully with concrete results. Another instance of the favourable trend is the successful completion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The document concluded there carries a reaffirmation of the commitment by the participating States to refrain from any use of armed 481 ConrF - Ca niti7Pri Cony Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 14 (Mr. Meiszter, Hungary) forces inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, and contains far-reaching measures on confidence-building coupled with real provisions for verification, including inspections carried out on site. One can say even more. Despite its evident shortcomings we consider that the communique issued at the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council of 12 December 1986 carries a possibility of negotiating on the proposals put forward in the Budapest Declaration of June 1986. Let me remind the distinguished colleagues that the text of the Budapest declaration was submitted to the attention of this body last June by my delegation. These are but a few positive aspects of the present situation. They do not imply in any way that we forget that the controversial international situation is fraught with grave tensions. They only mean that the world is becoming increasingly aware of the fact that contradictions and problems cannot be solved by the policy of force, but rather through co-operative efforts and readiness for mutual accommodation. It means further that the awareness of the mutual interdependence of States has deepened to an extent never seen before. A number of problems have emerged -- partly as a consequence of the continuing arms race -- the solution of which is unimaginable in the framework of national policies alone. Problems and dangers threatening mankind have a global dimension, and consequently they lend themselves only to a treatment that is global in character. It is also becoming evident that security cannot be ensured by military means only. Even the most powerful States, those possessing the most destructive weapons, cannot feel secure if they represent a menace to any other State's national security. National security cannot be ensured unilaterally, it is more and more interrelated with international security. To put it shortly: security has become indivisible, it can only be universal and equal for all. That necessarily implies that the security of no State can be ensured to the detriment of that of others. Security policies should be pursued on the basis of co-operation, keeping in mind the security interests of others also. Another relevant and important recognition of our times is the broadening of the concept of security. Security is not just a question of military balance, but the elimination of imbalances in the world economy and joint solutions for the problems of mankind: economic co-operation, opportunities for contacts among peoples, respect for human rights and for the basic rules of civilized conduct of States in international relations. On the basis of such considerations, the delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic proposed in the name of its allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organization the idea of the "Establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security" at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. 482 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 15 (Mr. Meiszter, Hungary) The aim of launching this idea has been to initiate a process of collective thinking, to hear the views and ideas of our partners. We started with the understanding that such a system could only be the product of collective thinking. Proceeding on this basis we hopefully can arrive at collective actions on this crucial issue too. In our view, the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security calls for an ever deepening international co-operation in all fields of international relations. The immediate aim of such co-operation is to prevent the danger of nuclear catastrophe threatening the very existence of mankind, and to promote arms control and disarmament. It is indispensable in this context to establish an appropriate system for harmonizing different interests, to adjust the character, aim and level of military forces to the criterion of adequate security, and to effect a radical reduction in the accumulated arsenals of military hardware. This line of thinking leads me to the actual tasks of the Conference on Disarmament, which has a role to play in one of the vital aspects of the aim I mentioned a minute ago. The priorities in our work here are apparently agreed to by almost all: nuclear test ban, prohibition of chemical weapons, prevention of an arms race in outer space'. There is a growing international consensus that nuclear-weapon testing should be banned once and for all. My delegation is certainly of this view. Nuclear testing is the engine of the arms race in the so-called "conventional nuclear field" as well as in the development of the new "exotic types" of third-generation categories. With nuclear testing going on, any effort in the field of nuclear disarmament may well prove a futile exercise. The proceedings of the First Committee and the resolutions adopted there indicate a certain convergence of views which calls for an appropriate follow-up here in the Conference also. In our view it is imperative for the Conference to set up an ad hoc committee and to proceed to practical work without delay, with the aim of preparing a treaty that would effectively ban all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States everywhere and would contain provisions, acceptable to all, preventing the circumvention of this ban by means of nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. The negotiations should comprise all relevant aspects of the future treaty including scope and verification. The 18-month unilaterial moratorium by the USSR laid the groundwork for the successful achievement of the aim of a CTB. It is unfortunate and deplorable -- to say the least -- that the United States responded with a nuclear-weapon test to the calls of the international community on the very opening day of this Conference. The prohibition of chemical weapons figures high among the priorities of our agenda. It is a subject where the Conference could produce a tangible result this year, restoring its worn prestige. 4C3 rIfd in Darf - Aniti7ed CODV Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 16 (Mr. Meiszter, Hungary) Last year's work in the Ad Hoc Committee, and complemented by the two rounds of intersessional work, yielded a reliable basis which offers a real possibility for a breakthrough. In saying that, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom for the able guidance he rendered to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. Major issues related to verification in the field of CW stocks and their destruction, CW production facilities and the non-production of chemical weapons are generally agreed upon, and the main lines of methods of verification have been drawn up. On-challenge inspection has been generally accepted as part of the international verification system. Realistic guidelines have been spelled out for conducting such an inspection. Many delegations, including those most concerned, accepted the British proposal as a basis for work. In our view all the necessary prerequisites are at hand now to accomplish the work on the convention this year. What is needed is a firm determination, and a good deal of efficient diplomatic professional work. It is encouraging to know that Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden has already made the first steps to gear the work of the Ad Hoc Committee to a higher level of efficiency. The degree of priority of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space has greatly increased in the face of the events taking place in the development of new weapons systems designed for operation in outer space. The work done last year by the Ad Hoc Committee has produced fairly good results. The exchange of views proved that there is a need and room for developing further the international legal regime for keeping the arms race out of this area. The present system of international legal instruments is evidently not sufficient to prevent the technological arms race from moving into the outer space. It needs to be complemented. We are of the opinion that the Conference is an appropriate place to do this work, parallel with efforts made at other forums. The Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space should be re-established without wasting time on procedural aspects, and should start working with a view to concrete measures. It should concentrate on such particular issues as banning the use of force in outer space, space weapons, prohibiton of ASAT weapons systems and the protection of satellites. Dwelling only on the three priority issues before our Conference does not in any way mean that we disregard other subjects on our agenda. I will return to them later at the appropriate time as our work moves on. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President and to the country that the President represents. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none. Now we will proceed to other proceedings. 484 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP97-ni Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.388 17 (The President) Before we adjourn, I should like to turn to another subject. As you are aware, at its 9th plenary meeting on 8 February 1979, the then Committee on Disarmament decided to hold its plenary meetings on Tuesdays and Thursdays, beginning at 10.30 a.m. The Secretary-General of the Conference held consulatations with the co-ordinators of the various groups and reported to them on certain additional measures that could be taken to make maximum use of the resources allocated to the Conference. As a result of his consultations, a consensus has emerged on two questions which may lead to additional economies by the Conference. The first aspect requires a decision by the Conference in order to ensure that there is agreement in changing the times established by the 1979 decision. In this connection, I should like to propose that we begin the plenaries and other meetings of the Conference at 10.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m., so that we could use the maximum three hours which are normally allocated for meetings wth full services. In doing so, I wish to note that we will be receiving a high-level visitor on Thursday, 19 February, and that arrangements have already been made in connection with that visit. On that particular occasion, we shall start the plenary meeting at 10.30 a.m., in order to avoid any disruption in the programme of activities of such a distinguished visitor. With that exception, I believe that we could now agree that all meetings of the Conference, be they plenaries or meetings of subsidiary bodies, should start at 10.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m. It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The second aspect relates to the need to start punctually each plenary meeting. You will recall that, already at the Group consultations, I noted that in previous years it was the practice of the negotiating body to open its plenary meetings not later than five minutes after the scheduled time. I do hope that we can reach an understanding to the effect that this practice is adhered to. The Secretariat is circulating, at my request, an informal paper containing a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. On that understanding, if there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable. It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): Does any member wish to take the floor? I see none. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 17 February, at 10.00 a.m. The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m. 485 Dnrf - Caniti7Pd Cony Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.389 17 February 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 17 February 1987, at 10 a.m. President: GE. 87-60205/7218E Mr. Fan GUOXIANG (China) 4E 6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 389th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda items 1, entitled "Nuclear Test Ban" and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In conformity with Rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sri Lanka, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and Egypt. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkine. Mr. NAZARKINE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Comrade President. As you know, yesterday, 16 February, Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union addressed the participants in the International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World for the Survival of Humanity, in Moscow. The text of this statement has been distributed in a press release and any delegation that so wishes has the opportunity of reading it. Speaking on the reorganization of society which is under way in my country, Gorbachev emphasized that for the Soviet Union, in order to concentrate on the constructive endeavours to improve the situation in our country, peace is necessary. Our desire to make our country better will hurt no one, with the world only gaining from this. Reorganization, to stress its international aspect, is an invitation to any social system to compete with socialism peacefully for the benefit of general progress and world peace. But for such competition to take place and unfold in civilized forms worthy of mankind in the 21st century, we must have a new outlook and overcome mentalities, stereotypes and dogmas inherited from a past which is gone, never to return. We have come to the conclusion, said the Soviet leader, that in today's complex and contradictory world, new approaches and methods are required for solving international problems. These conclusions make us reconsider something which once seemed axiomatic, and fully realize that with the advent and improvement of nuclear arms the human race has lost its immortality. It can only be regained by destroying nuclear weapons. The nuclear Powers must go beyond their nuclear shadow and enter a nuclear-free world, thus ending the alienation of politics from the general human ethical norms. A nuclear tornado, said General Secretary Gorbachev, will sweep away both socialists and capitalists alike, the just and the unjust alike. Referring to the Soviet disarmament initiatives, the Soviet leader noted that none of our proposals attempts to leave out any of our weapons from the negotiations. Our principle is simple: all weapons must be limited and 42)1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-0116RRnnninnl nnnni A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 3 (Mr. Nazarkine, USSR) reduced, and those of wholesale annihilation eventually scrapped. He stressed, in particular, that the Soviet Union had expressed its readiness to have chemical weapons totally abolished. Comrade President, negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban have a long history, but only recently did the prospect of a successful conclusion already in the very near future become evident. This is an important result of constructive initiatives and efforts made by many countries including Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Sweden, Pakistan, Indonesia, Great Britain, Australia and other countries, and by the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee and its Working Groups. A breakthrough in the negotiations became apparent last year, when the Soviet Union, building upon the fundamental provisions of the statement of 15 January 1986, put forward several series of proposals which contributed to accelerating the negotiations and reaching agreement on quite a number of sections of the future convention. I believe there is every reason to regard the current session of negotiations as a decisive one. What we have now is not just the framework for a future convention but also solutions to most of the fundamental issues and, moreover, agreed texts of many provisions of a future convention. At the same time, a number of questions are yet to be resolved. Among them I would mention declaration and verification of chemical-weapon stocks and challenge inspections. Further work is required on provisions relating to non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry, the definition of a chemical-weapons production facility and elimination measures, the scope of the prohibition and various others. The "procedural" articles of the convention too, are not to be forgotten -- the procedure for the signing of the convention and its entry into force, its depositary, etc. We are therefore required to act most promptly and comprehensively so as to reach agreement on all outstanding issues and finalize the text of the convention and open it for signature. We agree with Ambassador Butler, the head of the Australian delegation, who said on 3 February 1987, referring to the objectives currently facing the participants of the negotiations, that "we must increase the tempo of our negotiations during 1987 so that the opportunity which clearly exists of concluding a convention this year may be realized". The only way to succeed is to seek mutually acceptable solutions and to negotiate, taking into account each other's legitimate concerns. The Soviet delegation commends the energetic efforts of Ambassador Ekeus, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, aimed at a successful conclusion of the negotiations. In the inter-sessional period of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet Union explored in depth all aspects of the state of affairs of the negotiations; its own position on the outstanding questions and the way other countries approach them. In doing so we looked above all for possible solutions to these questions and instructed our experts to act accordingly. 48C im,,,Inecifiori in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 4 (Mr. Nazarkine, USSR) In today's statement the USSR delegation wishes to present its proposals and ideas on the solution to a number of questions concerning the future convention with a view to facilitating more intensive negotiations and further progress therein. I have already referred to chemical-weapon stocks. They are the subject matter of Article 4, "chemical weapons", of the draft convention which is now under discussion and negotiation. Agreement has already been reached on a number of important provisions of that article, including those relating to declarations of volumes of stocks, their methods of destruction, and verification of operations of chemical-weapon destruction facilities. So far, however, it has not been possible to come to an agreement on the provisions in the convention relating to declarations of locations of chemical-weapons stocks and to international verification of such locations. Agreement has been hampered by a number of perfectly legitimate national security concerns expressed, for example, by the delegation of France and my delegation. We, for our part, have once again weighed up all the factors, viewed them in the context of the need for speedy progress at the negotiations and the concerns expressed by a number of countries, including the United States, which attach particular importance to finding a solution to this very question as rapidly as possible. As a result, we have come to the conclusion that with a view to finding a speedy solution to this question it would be advisable to agree to the proposal to provide, immediately after the convention enters into force, access to chemical weapons for the purposes of systematic international on-site verification of declarations of chemical-weapon stocks. In our view each State party to the convention should, not later than 30 days after its entry into force, make a declaration containing detailed information on the locations of chemical-weapon stocks (storage facilities) at the time of the convention's entry into force, both in its national territory and elsewhere under its jurisdiction or control. Such a declaration, inter alia, would specify the precise location of each storage facility, the quantity and composition of the chemical weapons in each location, methods of storage indicating the name of each chemical, munition types and calibres, etc. A State party should, within 30 days after the convention enters into force, take measures to ensure a closure of chemical-weapon storage facilities and prevent movement of stocks other than movement for their elimination. For the purposes of effective verification of closed chemical-weapon storage facilities, it is necessary to provide for systematic international verification with permanent use of instruments, including verification of the correctness of declarations, closure of storage facilities, installation by inspectors of devices for this purpose and periodic checks on such devices, presence of inspectors at the time when chemical weapons are moved out of the facility for elimination, sealing of the means of transport, etc. Upon complete removal of all chemical weapons from the facility, an international inspection team would draw up a statement certifying this fact. We expect that the proposals we have presented will enable us to agree promptly and without delay on the provisions relating to declarations of chemical weapons. 489 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168Rnnninninnnrm_A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 5 (Mr. Nazarkine, USSR) A number of other issues relating to Article 4, "chemical weapons", of the convention, are to be considered in the near future. We express our willingness to reach agreement on all outstanding issues in that article, including those related to the time-frame, order and methods of elimination. Bearing in mind that the proposal that a State party should have the right to divert chemical weapons has caused difficulties, we have carefully weighed up all the pros and cons of the proposal: we now proceed on the assumption that all chemical weapons are to be destroyed. The Soviet delegation hopes that our flexible approach will make it possible to find solutions to the above-mentioned issue and will help accelerate the negotiations. We also call upon other delegations to join in these efforts and to present concrete proposals for mutually acceptable solutions. In his statement yesterday, General Secretary Gorbachev, referring to problems of verification, said inter alia: "Now that we are coming to consider major measures for actual disarmament affecting the most sensitive area of national security, the Soviet Union will be pressing for the most stringent system of supervision and verification, including international verification. There must be complete certainty that the commitments are honoured by all." That is precisely why the Soviet Union gives priority to negotiating an agreement on effective international verification of compliance by all States parties with their obligations under the convention. Such verification should not only effectively ensure confidence in the destruction of chemical weapons and facilities for their production but also effectively preclude any rebirth of chemical weapons anywhere and in any country. The negotiations on verification machinery are based on a general understanding that the basis will be a system of "routine" international inspections. On the other hand, it has also been recognized that such international inspection should be complemented by on-site challenge inspections so that the whole verification mechanism of the Convention may be particularly reliable. Thus challenge inspections would serve above all the purpose of preventing breaches of the convention. Ultimately they would ensure the possibility of implementing international verification with regard to any activities relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. These principles should be taken fully into account in elaborating specific procedures for such challenge inspection. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the participants in the negotiations, despite agreement on a number of important aspects, still encounter great difficulty in finalizing agreements on challenge inspection. We believe that basically these difficulties have a perfectly objective and real basis: States may indeed have certain locations and facilities which are not relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Access to such locations and facilities, due to their particularly sensitive nature, is normally prohibited or restricted. One cannot therefore exclude the possibility of a State having the right to refuse a challenge inspection in exceptional cases when its supreme interests are jeopardized. The existence of such areas and sensitive points have by the way been recognized in the 490 nna-Inecifiarl in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 6 (Mr. Nazarkine, USSR) document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. In this context we consider that the view expressed by Ambassador Dolgu, Head of the delegation of Romania, was quite justified, namely that it would be advisable to use the provisions of that document at the negotiations on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The participants in the negotiations have different views on solutions to the issue of challenge inspections at the present time. Some propose that the Executive Council be involved. Others, while in favour of providing access to a number of sensitive locations and facilities automatically, immediately upon request, make exemptions for private premises. Moreover the procedure for implementing challenge inspections envisaged under these proposals while securing the interest of the major Powers and members of military alliances, gives a small number of States certain rights of which practically all the other parties to the convention are deprived of. There is also a proposal to the effect that in the event of a challenge, the challenged State should have the right to propose alternative measures which should satisfy the challenging State. In view of these various proposals and approaches, movement towards agreement apparently might be initiated by defining a number of cases where refusal of an inspection on the requested scare would not be allowed: for example, in the event of suspected use of chemical weapons, or inspection of locations and facilities declared under the convention. It appears this idea en-joys wide support at the negotations, and understandably so, for we are dealing with the cases and facilities which are most directly relevant to a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and consequently there should be no reason for refusing an inspection. As for other cases and other locations and facilities, in elaborating agreement on challenge inspections the idea of using alternative measures, up to viewing the facility from without and collecting chemical samples near the facility, might be helpful. Such a differentiation would, in our view, ensure progress towards agreement on this issue which, while unresolved, hampers agreement on other issues of the convention. Of course, there remains the difficult problem of what should be done if the alternative measures still do not satisfy the challenging State. We share the hope expressed by the head of the Swedish delegation, Ambassador Theorin, that the "general narrowing of positions on verification that has been demonstrated lately should help to facilitate agreement on this issue" -- i.e. international challenge inspection. The Soviet delegation declares itself ready to seek actively for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of any positive ideas and suggestions which are on the negotiating table. We have been asked by a number of delegations to explain what is meant by permanent international verification which the Soviet Union proposes applying to chemical-weapon destruction facilities, specialized facilities for the production of category I chemicals for permitted purposes and to a certain number of facilities producing key precursors. I would like to explain our 491 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000inninnnni _A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 7 (Mr. Nazarkine, USSR) understanding of permanent verification. In our view, such verification can be implemented either through the permanent presence of international inspectors at facilities or through visits to facilities by international inspectors in combination with permanent use of control and measuring instruments at facilities, including remote monitoring. As for the order and modalities for the use of such instruments, helpful solutions in our view might be prompted by the experience in the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Identification of "important" (in terms of verification) points at the facilities, sealing of certain units, installation of photo and video equipment, measuring devices in agreed sections of the technological process, maintenance of international verification instruments by international inspectors, etc. As for systematic international inspection, we propose that their frequency and timing be determined by the Consultative Committee on the basis of the risk posed to the convention by a given chemical or facility. In working out the details of systematic international inspections, we could also draw on the experience and practices of the IAEA, in particular with regard to providing the different types of systematic inspections, (routine and special), the frequency and time-frame of inspections, and the right of the IAEA to determine the facilities to be inspected at a given time. We believe that the experience and practices of the IAEA might also prompt us to the right solutions on other questions of verifying compliance with the chemical weapons convention. They might be drawn upon in working out an agreement on the activities of the inspectorate too, that is the appointment of inspectors, their privileges, inspection procedures, etc. On the basis of the provisions included in the convention, it would be advisable to elaborate subsequently, along the lines of the IAEA, a model agreement between a State Party and an appropriate body of the Convention which would govern the practical aspects of implementing international verification at facilities (the verification procedure, specific measures for the closure of facilities, etc.) When the convention is in effect, specific measures of verification with regard to chemical-weapon production facilities and chemical-weapon destruction facilities would be agreed upon by a State Party and the Consultative Committee and included in the relevant plans for the elimination of stocks and facilities. The emerging prospect of the conclusion of a convention puts on the negotiating agenda the question of interaction of States under the new conditions where chemical weapons have been banned. The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of implementing wide international co-operation on an equal and mutually beneficial basis in the developments of peaceful chemical industry as an alternative to the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. One cannot but agree with the view that without provisions to this effect a future convention would be weakened. A convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons can, in our opinion, become an example of practical implementation of the agreed principles of "disarmament for development". 492 - c.niti7a1 r.onv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 8 (Mr. Nazarkine, USSR) The negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons have gained momentum and it is our hope that the proposals we have presented today will contribute towards speedy agreement on the convention. However, we cannot remain impassive in the face of certain statements which are in fact aimed at creating difficulties in the negotiations. The British magazine, Jane's Defence Weekly, recently published an article on chemical-weapon issues by K. Adelman, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency -- incidentally, this article has been reprinted in our newspaper, Pravda. In that article, Mr. Adelman writes: "To have a chance of achieving that (a chemical-weapons ban), we need to ensure that our negotiators' hands are not empty. Congress, therefore, should fund the Administration's request for binary chemical weapons production". In our view this logic is strange, to say the least. It reminds me of a satirical story by the well-known Czech writer, Janislav Hasgek, about the Conference on Disarmament at the time of the League of Nations. That Conference literally blew up as a result of careless handling of a new explosive, "Washingtonite", by a representative of the military business who stood waiting at the entrance to the conference room with samples of his product to offer the participants of the Conference. It is simply regrettable that the negotiating portfolio of the United States delegation is still being replenished not with compromise proposals but with new types of chemical weapons, which can only poison the atmosphere at the negotiations. The Soviet delegation has today expressed certain views on ways of reaching agreement at the next stage of negotiations. We intend to continue to work actively for the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons this year. The positive effects of the conclusion of such convention would be of great significance, and not only in the military field. Its conclusion would demonstrate that it is practically possible to find solutions to the complex problems of disarmament through the joint efforts of States, and would contribute to creating a more positive political climate. This is the aim of the new Soviet proposals, and we expect similar steps on the outstanding issues from other participants in the negotiations. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala. Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, the friendship between our two countries extending over so many centuries has resulted in a uniaue relationship as equal sovereign States despite vast disparities in size, population and power. In the field of disarmament we have respected your principled approach and your many initiatives including the declaration of non-first use of nuclear weapons, the unilateral reduction of your army by 1 million, your decision not to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere and your consistent policy that disarmament is the concern of all nations irrespective of size and might, as mentioned in your distinguished Foreign Minister's message to our Conference on 3 February. As an outstanding representative of your country we are confident that you will conduct our work in the first month of the 1987 session so as to create the necessary impetus to carry us forward in our task of negotiating for disarmament. 493 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-ni 1RRRnnni nninnnn4 A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 9 (Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka) We would like to take this opportunity of thanking Ambassador Alan Beesley of Canada for having presided so competently over our work in August 1986 and in the inter-sessional period. My delegation extends its sincere condolences to the delegation of the United States of America and to the family of the late Ambassador Donald Lowitz. We have lost a friend and a colleage whose outstanding personal qualities will long be remembered. As we begin a new session in our Conference my delegation would like to acknowledge the contribution made to our forum by Ambassador Sutowardoyo of Indonesia, Ambassador Franceschi of Italy, Ambassador Issraelyan of the USSR and Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia, who have left us. At the same time we welcome Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa of Brazil, Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Nazarkine of USSR and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. My delegation was especially touched by the poignant statement last week of Ambassador Yamada speaking as a survivor of the Hiroshima holocaust. The words on that monument in Hiroshima "Let it never happen again" should indeed be in our minds at all times during our important work in this Conference to ensure their realization in our time. Nuclear deterrence theory based on the continuity of adversarial relationships and the credibility of the threat that it will happen again has only led to greater arsenals of nuclear weapons with an explosive power of over 1 million Hiroshima bombs, and greater insecurity. Despite its being the International year of Peace, the events of the last year did not fulfil the deeply-held aspirations of the people of the world in terms of concrete agreements on disarmament. We recognize, however, that a significant improvement in the international climate for disarmament negotiations has continued since 1985. Reykjavik was a missed opportunity where this improvement could have culminated in a radical change for the better. To the extent that the participants at Reykjavik are ready to carry forward its lessons will depend the real historical significance of that weekend's discussions. The reports we have had so far are not encouraging. The leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation who held a Summit Meeting in Bangalore on 16 and 17 November 1986, stated their view on Reykjavik in the following terms: "The Heads of State and Government noted with deep disappointment that the promise held out by the Reykjavik Summit could not be realized. They, however, noted with satisfaction that the proposals made at the Summit were still on the table. They expressed the earnest hope that the negotiations would be resumed without delay so that a decisive step could be taken towards realizing the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether." For Sri Lanka as a founder-member of the Non-aligned Movement and one of its former Chairmen, the Harare Summit of non-aligned leaders represented an important event in the International Year of Peace. The Declaration issued at Harare contained the main principles and policies of 101 non-aligned countries in the field of disarmament and international security. Basic to these is the non-aligned concept of global security which the Harare Declaration expressed in the following words: 494 npriacsified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 10 (Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka) "Historically, States have considered that they could achieve security through the possession of arms. The advent of nuclear weapons, has however, radically changed this situation. Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war; they are instruments of mass annihilation. The accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, constitutes a threat to the continued survival of mankind. It has therefore become imperative that States abandon the dangerous goal of unilateral security through armament and embrace the objective of common security through disarmament." Many speakers in our current session have noted the achievements registered in the First Committee of the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. The distinguished Ambassador of Mexico has set out in detail the resolutions adopted in respect of some of the more important issues including the priority nuclear subjects. My delegation was also encouraged by the atmosphere that prevailed and the voting patterns which implied a broader area of agreement on the substantive disarmament issues. We now face a crucial test as we attempt to transfer those resolutions into the negotiating context of our Conference. Convergence in the deliberative United Nations bodies devoted to disarmament cannot cohere with divergence in this sole negotiating body. The hopes that have been expressed for positive developments in our 1987 session are therefore justified and the Sri Lanka delegation will strive together with others to ensure their realization. A related development which we welcome is the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga and the signature of the relevant Protocols by two of the five nuclear Powers. With 1987, the Year of Peace has yielded to the Year of Shelter for the Homeless designated as such by the United Nations on a proposal made in 1980 by Prime Minister Premadasa of Sri Lanka. This focus on a core issue of development as an investment in mankind is also a reminder to all of us of the relationship between disarmament and development. The global expenditure of almost a trillion dollars a year on armaments, both nuclear and conventional, is by all empirical standards inconsistent with stable and balanced social and economic development and contributes to distortions and imbalances in the world economy. The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development rescheduled for this year and to be held in New York can, with universal participation and intensive preparation, result in an agreed programme of disarmament measures releasing resources for development purposes. Another forthcoming event which impinges on the work of our Conference is the convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1988 and its preparatory process beginning this year. The approach of the third special session devoted to disarmament must necessarily lend a sense of urgency to our work. We have within our grasp the completion of a convention on chemical weapons and the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament before the third special session. In addition we can and must show progress in the nuclear issues and especially on item 1 of our agenda, Nuclear-Test Ban. 495 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168Rnnni nni nnnni A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 11 (Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka) We have entered the ninth year of our existence as the single multilateral negotiating body. The agenda before us is dictated by the needs of our common security and not by the national interest of individual nations alone. Our failure to act on this agenda is a common failure but the responsibility for that failure cannot be shared knowing as we do the relative capacity of the members of this body to contribute to disarmament. We have begun this year with the re-establishment of two Ad Hoc Committees which have begun functioning without delay and the setting up of two further ad hoc committees which we hope will commence work soon. There are two agenda items in which my delegation has a particular interest in seeing some forward movement while emphasizing the need to make progress on all agenda items. We have in this Conference remained far too long in a stalemated position on item 1 -- Nuclear-Test Ban. The need for the Conference to work on this important agenda item is self-evident. Self-evident too is the impact of external developments. The rejection of the offer of converting a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing into a bilateral moratorium; the dilatory linkage being established between bilateral negotiations for a reduction in the yields and the numbers of nuclear tests with bilateral negotiations for reductions in nuclear weapons; the Six-Nation Mexico Declaration of 7 August 1986, with its practical proposals on the verification of a test ban; and the overlap in content and similarity of voting patterns on General Assembly resolutions 41/46 A, which Sri Lanka co-sponsored, and 41/47, on which we voted affirmatively, are some of these developments. The impact of some of them is clearly negative and while we cannot ignore their reality we can seek to build on the positive developments for our work here. The distinguished Ambassador for Mexico has indicated a possible way to further our work by setting up an ad hoc committee with a mandate acceptable to all. The distinguished Ambassador of Japan also made an important contribution by noting that the gap we have to bridge is indeed not so wide as to daunt us in our diplomatic efforts. Our purpose in wanting to see an ad hoc committee set up on item 1 is not a window-dressing effort to make the Conference appear to be working towards a nuclear-test ban so as to placate international public opinion, mollify domestic lobbies or stall other moves to achieve a comprehensive test ban. We want to see real work begin on practical steps or interim steps including on an international seismic monitoring network with the active participation of all delegations. But the steps must lead to the objective clearly set out in both General Assembly resolutions 41/46 A and 41/47 -- a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty. We recognize and indeed respect the differences that exist among us for the moment about the pace at which we should progress towards a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. The objective however remains a common one and our differences should not be an impediment towards practical work in an ad hoc committee in this Conference. Statements made here on verification clearly indicate that there is a common approach. Work in an ad hoc committee can demonstrate the reality of this. We shall soon be observing the first death anniversary of the late Olof Palme who campaigned so long and so hard for an end to nuclear testing. The Palme Commission pamphlet on a comprehensive test ban published recently in pursuance of his wishes and dedicated to his memory concluded: "Together with measures to reduce significantly the size of existing nuclear 'arsenals and to limit the characteristics of new nuclear 496 im,,,Inecifiori in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 12 (Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka) weapon systems, a comprehensive test ban could constrain nuclear capabilities and help to create a new political atmosphere in which the danger of nuclear war would be greatly reduced". Over recent years there has been a steady swell of support for the non-aligned resolution in the General Assembly initiated by Egypt and Sri Lanka on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which has emerged as the only resolution on this crucial issue. Last year, resolution 41/53 was adopted by a record vote of 154 for, with one sole abstention, and no votes against the resolution. Once again it seems to be a situation where there is a common objective shared by us all -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space -- which, as the province of all mankind, cannot be an arena for the threat or use of force and must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. While the resolution acknowledges the primary role of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on this issue differences exist on what steps are necessary now for this body to achieve these objectives. Since 1985 we have had an Ad Hoc Committee mandated with the deliberately circumscribed task of exploring relevant issues. Last year my delegation was encouraged by the efforts of some delegations to advance the work of the Ad Hoc Committee by attempting to agree on definitions of important concepts and terms relevant to this agenda item. We regret that the participation in this important aspect of work was limited. We would like to see the Ad Hoc Committee re-established with the minimum delay possible and as an earnest of its sincerity the Group of 21 has made a very modest proposal for a mandate which we trust will be accepted. No one can be so wedded to the status quo as to object to the addition that has been proposed, bearing in mind paragraph 80 of the Final Document as reiterated in General Assembly resolution 41/53. The message of the distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations to this Conference enjoined us "to create conditions for negotiating agreements on this vital matter". That is our modest goal for this session. We hear, meanwhile, disturbing calls for an early deployment of space-based ballistic missile defence systems which were until recently described to us as research programmes. They will, if heeded, inevitably involve non-compliance with existing treaties which even the most elastic interpretation will not conceal. Whether ballistic missile defence systems are being researched and developed in the full glare of media attention or in clandestine, they represent generically a dangerous new phase in the arms race. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that our discussions here are taking place while irreversible steps are being planned to place weapons in space. A balanced and even-handed non-aligned attempt in pursuance of the Harare Declaration to ban such obviously offensive weapons in space as dedicated anti-satellite weapons met with the strongest opposition from those who have crafted the most elaborate arguments to justify defensive systems. As the Harare Declaration noted "Measures aimed at developing, testing or deploying weapons and weapons systems in outer space could, through a constant chain of action and reaction, lead to an escalation of the arms race in both 'offensive' and 'defensive' weapons thus making the outbreak of nuclear conflict more likely". There is an obvious inconsistency in seeking a world free of ballistic missiles and proceeding to erect shields against them which the overwhelming body of scientific opinion assesses as being vulnerable and therefore only functional as part of a first-strike capability. The 497 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 13 (Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka) deployment of weapons in space must be prevented in our common interest. The attractions of hi-tech warfare and an interlocking programme of lucrative research contracts should not divert us from the dangers of an arms race in space and the need to prevent it going beyond the research stage. This task cannot be left exclusively to bilateral negotiations. It also requires the establishment of a group of scientific experts within this Conference so that multilateral expertise can be pooled on the technical issues relevant to preventing an arms race in outer space. My delegation therefore supports the proposal made by the Swedish delegation and calls for an early agreement on the mandate and composition of such a group. The discussions at Reykjavik gave us all a glimpse of a nuclear-free world as a realistic possibility seriously contemplated by the leaders of the two nations accounting for 95 per cent of nuclear weapons in the world. Non-aligned countries like Sri Lanka would like to encourage these nations to pursue this goal in their bilateral negotiations. We are disturbed however by those who seek to obstruct this, arguing the need for nuclear weapons on the basis of an alleged inferiority in conventional arms. The goal of nuclear disarmament must be pursued if the spirit of Reykjavik is to inform the bilateral discussions taking place and lead to agreements in all disarmament forums including the nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva, as well as the MBFR and CSCE. That goal is a priority issue in this multilateral negotiating body. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President himself and the country that the President represents. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador StUlpnagel. Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, speaking for the first time in this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament, it is a particular pleasure for me to congratulate you to the assumption of your office. At this point in time we can already note how brilliantly you discharge your duties, doing it with diplomatic skill, friendliness and resolution. In this family of nations which constitute the Conference on Disarmament, we all feel deep sorrow for the loss of an eminent colleague who had been with us for two years. With Don Lowitz my delegation has lost a friend, the Conference has a lost a warm hearted, politically engaged and professional dynamic personality. We are grateful to have known him. We have new colleagues among us. I welcome Ambassadors Pierre Morel of France, Aldo Pugliese of Italy, Chusei Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa of Brazil and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. My delegation looks forward to working closely with all of them. Any observer with sufficient interest in our proceedings would, from a most perfunctory study of statements during the first two weeks of our work this year, certainly recognize the importance and prominence of emphasis that item 1 of our agenda, nuclear test ban, has been given in many interventions. Some of the speeches did not fail to paint a very sombre picture of the 498 D,r+ - Caniti7Pri C;OnV ADDroved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 14 (Mr. von STaPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany) situation the Conference finds itself in with regard to the work on a CTB; neither was there a lack of pre-emptive accusations, which were visibly aimed at one group. I cannot share the speculative pessimism of some of our colleagues; quite the contrary: an impartial and detached analysis both of the work the Conference achieved last year on the subject and of the developments that took place since it adjourned at the end of August lead me to believe that the circumstances are most propitious for the establishment of an ad hoc commitee and for positive and meaningful results to be achieved by it. The controversy concerning the formulation of those parts in last year's report of the Conference on item no. 1 tends still to obscure the view of what has already been achieved in terms of a considerable narrowing of differenc(?s in an important field of the CTB discussion, i.e. the question of verification. In our view the Conference has reached a remarkable momentum towards general acceptance of an effective international monitoring and verification system. This promising development, as WP see it, is due to the efforts of many delegations who have contributed important elements to a new and more refined view of test-ban safeguards. Needless to say, the conceptual accomplishments that have enlarged the common ground on which to build could only be achieved on the basis of the purposeful contribution by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts over nb- last 10 years, and especially by its last progress report, CD/721, which has open remarkable new perspectives towards the realization of an inPrnational seismic monitoring system by detailing plans to integrate the exchange of level II (waveform) dat:i th next international seismic data exchange experiment. We consider hallmarks SOMP of the contributions of indivi-aual during last year's session of the Conference. There is, for one, tht- Working Paper CD/712, representing an admirabl and knowledgeable comni-? of present insights into the rv,quirements of a global seismic netoor'c; calling for the definition and development of prototype monitorina stz3t, this paper further develops a proposal my delegation had alre7,6 Working Papers CD/612 and CD/24. Norway's contribution, in this Working Paper CD/714, was particularly significant in that it explores the interaction of regional small-apertur seismic arrays with a global network incorporating a number of such arrayc. The practical experiences with the Norwegian regional seismic arrny system NORESS provide an Indispensable input for the operationality and tn. continuous improvement of an effective global system. The most unambiguous demand for an early instal'ation of a seismic monitoring network along the lines of the working papers of irv delegation I already mentioned is contained in the Autralian Wonn Paer. CD/717, which clearly ocints out the adnnntace no ,ne harYestd by :wift enactment of the proposals scantaled in it: in's- e:it. a global seismic monitoring network bed initially on the PT:ist 499 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 15 (Mr. von STULPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany) In keeping with the advances of seismic technology, experience could be gained with long-term operations and the system could be perfected in such a way that, on the very entry into force of a CTBT, the comprehensive monitoring devices could at once become a truly safeguarding system. Among other valuable contributions of individual delegations one has certainly to count Working Paper CD/724 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in which it formalized a change of position concerning the inclusion of the level II data exchange in further discussions. This brief review of some of the proceedings of our Conference during its 1986 session amply substantiates my initial claim that substantial progress towards common concepts, common methodology, has been achieved during last year's session in spite of some attempts to the contrary. In the view of my delegation the time has come to discuss inter alia,those common concepts within an ad hoc committee on a CTB, to be established at the earliest possible juncture. The work of the Committee should help us to reach practical and universally acceptable solutions in our quest for a comprehensive, fully verifiable test ban; it is our firm belief that this should be possible on the basis of the working programme proposed in CD/621 and within the confines of a mandate as contained, for instance, in CD/521. Certainly, if an ad hoc committee were instituted, its discussions would not be exhausted in merely technical deliberations; a comprehensive and fully verifiable test ban would, if agreed upon, be of eminent importance for the security policies of States world wide. It is exactly for this reason that the topic of a CTB cannot be discussed by the Conference without paying due attention to its general implications in the nuclear age. The Federal Government believes that the goal of agreement on a reliably verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban at the earliest possible juncture can be realized gradually. This should be achieved by reducing allowed testing to agreed and defined intervals of time and by consecutively refraining from testing altogether in the framework of agreed reductions of nuclear weapons. While my delegation wishes for timely results from the bilateral talks which the United States of America and the Soviet Union are holding here at Geneva about questions relevant to test limitation in all its aspects and which are scheduled to enter into a new round in the middle of March, my Government has never hesitated to express its view that there are more than bilateral aspects to the problem of a CTBT. The community of States can indeed contribute substantially to the solution of those problems which still stand in the way of an agreement. We do not agree, though, with some delegations which content themselves with dwelling lengthily on their finding that the verification problems still facing us can be solved -- and indeed some went as far as to imply that they were already solved. In our view attention should be drawn to the numerous prerequisites listed in the Swedish Working Paper CD/712 to ensure the incorporation of state-of-the-art technology into a global monitoring network that does not yet exist and has only once been tested in a most elementary form. A great number of stations that participated in the 1984 GSETT, though already representing a high level of technological achievement in themselves, would not match the definitions given in the last chapter of CD/712 for the 500 npriaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 16 (Mr. von STULPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany) prototype of a CD monitoring station. Although individual seismographic stations, even if they fell short of the aforementioned demands concerning their equipment, might work effectively, the task of operating in a reliable manner an interlinked system of as much as 50 to 100 seismic stations based in different countries and run by many nations, as well as the task of communicating the data derived from these stations to and from international data centres -- possibly in real time -- has not yet been satisfactorily resolved, as the report of the GSE on the technical test run in 1984 has demonstrated. Furthermore, CD/712 proposes as an additional measure for the analysis of doubtful seismic events to combine the findings of the international seismic monitoring network with data derived from satellite inspection. The realization of this proposal would indeed greatly enhance verification capabilities and most probably resolve most of the outstanding verification problems; but no multilaterally accessible satellite system for vatification purposes exists as of today or oftomorrow. And we do not know that even ti most ardent NTB proponent has volunteered with a corresponding effer. 're conclusion we draw from this is that we should do everything z)OFSiblP to improve the global seismic monitoring system until the possibility depicted in the Swedish Working Paper may come true. My Government has noted with great pleasure that the six Heads of State or Government, of the New Dehli initiative, at the meeting in Mexico on 7 August 1986, have expressed their readiness to actively participate ir surmounting the outstandinc verification problems of a future CTBT. Ne waule welcome it if, besides Swesden, also other States participating in the initiative would see fit to senn their experts to the GSE, especially wit'e regard to the new test run of the global monitoring system envisaged for My Geeernment has repeatedly declared that it considers a CTP as or rne main 7r)als of its sarmament and arms control policy. And jf w tLin tree we still se=, some diffieulties in tne feld of eerification, we do eer ant to nivr. room to any doubt that we will activeleo pursue a course aier at clearinn rceay these obstacles, -,Jaich in any case we de not find insicmener2rs As a step towards substantiating its OW7 commitment to this global system, the Federal Government decided to intensify its cceoperatve on:: in tne field of fast and re2iable data exchanae and storage of acquire 2eismic data. It therefore finances t.ee continuous operation of a seiemic data anlysis centre installed at the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Nararal Resources in Hannover. The Institute, by way of direct ocput4,r-toecomputer links with other countries, is in a position to stere 3;"1] ro exchange all relevant seismic data includ;ng level II (waveform, data. r/ concentrated concentrated our research in the field of designing the hardware and software necessary to acquire, analyse and transmit seismic data including waveform data on direct computer-to-computer links. Our seismic data centres, specifically and from ':he outset, are designed for open access and remote ,ata treatroent via telecommunication links so as to freely share our specific knowledge in this field with interested seismic scientists. We expl:cinly request all members of ?ce Conference to make Use of this hitherto singular ea:rviee, two demonstrations of which will be (liven to interested heads of delegations and to the experts of the GSE on 5 and 6 March 1987 here in Geneva. The data centre described above in our view constitutes an important step forward on the way to the creation and reliable operation of an international seismic monitoring network. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 17 (Mr. von STULPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany) Mr. President, let me now turn shortly to other subjects on our agenda. In our view the negotiations on a world-wide ban of chemical weapons command high priority. In document CD/734 we have the outlines of a treaty which, in important parts, is already well developed. The Conference on Disarmament has before it the task of solving the questions still open, especially in the field of verification, as rapidly as possible. Concerning the verification of non-production, it is in our view important that the selection of substances which are to be forbidden or controlled should satisfy the criteria of possible use, or better misuse, for military purposes. It would not be a sensible contribution to the solution of that problem if we included in that selection substances which are militarily irrelevant. As to challenge inspection, we still see in CD/715 the model which could finally satisfy all interests. We appeal to our partners in this negotiation to co-operate in the search of a solution because it is this co-operation which is the true expression of credibility of negotiating partners. Readiness to adopt CD/715, as expressed in principle by formerly hesitant delegations, is welcome as long as the conceptual approach of this proposal is not diluted. We will, in this context, screen carefully what the Soviet delegation has said this morning, which lends itself to the interpretation that the Soviet delegation now accepts the principle of mandatory or obligatory challenge inspections; but as I say, we will have to look at the text very closely and see what the other conditions which go along with it will mean. A procedural arrangement for example prior to an on-challenge-inspection that would put into question the inspection itself, or in any case delay it, is not acceptable to us. We are convinced that an effective verification of a chemical-weapon ban is attainable if the controls on non-production and challenge inspections are adequately formed. What has to be secured is that the Convention can reliably prevent that militarily significant amounts of chemical weapons or their precursors from being produced or stocked secretly. The methods and volume of the controls must be realistic, credible and effective. These are the essentials and we think that within the near future we could make decisive progress in this field. We are ready to co-operate. My delegation welcomes the long-established Finnish initiative to provide advice for the necessary monitoring equipment and technical means for verification purposes. I understand that the recent special workshop on automatic monitoring in terms of detection of alleged used, verification of destruction and non-production in Helsinki is another step towards the common goal of effective verification. My Government looks forward to the communication of the results of this workshop. We noted with interest the reference which the Romanian delegation made in our CW negotiations to the Document of the Stockholm Conference which was taken up today. Indeed, the most important aspect of the Stockholm Conference is the agreement on on-site inspections without refusal. Thereby, obligatory on-site inspection has been recognized as an essential element of effective verification for any arms control and disarmament agreement. We think this is an essential breakthrough to which we attach great importance in light of the whole arms control process. But then, Stockholm is not part of the true arms 502 npriaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 18 (Mr. von STI.JLPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany) control process. It is a measure of confidence-building measures, and not what we are doing here in the realm of chemical weapons, disarmament measures. As my delegation pointed out in our Plenary Statement of 5 February of this year already challenge inspections should cover all possible installations and all locations -- they all must be "challenge inspection objects", and there we differ from what we have heard this morning. My delegation hopes that it will be possible to agree on a mandate for our discussions about space and the possible arms race in space. We think it useful to screen all aspects even more profoundly than we did last year. Concerning radiological weapons, we think that after the reinstitution of our Ad Hoc Committee what is needed now is informal consultations, to enable us to find out how our work in both tracks, A and B, could possibly proceed. If it proves that the forced merger of the two tracks renders us unable to speak at all about those aspects of the problem which might otherwise be solvable, then we should find a way to address the unitarian approach. The public in all our countries justifiably awaits answers from the Conference on Disarmament on this issue. In iccordance with the unanimously adopted resolution 41/421 of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly all delegations should now endeavour to contribute in a realistic way to the finalization of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, if possible in the given time-frame. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose. Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, I have already had an opportunity to congratulate you, on behalf of my delegation, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Allow me to extend a warm welcome to the newly arrived Ambassadors of Algeria, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. I wish them all the best in their office as Heads of their countries' delegations to the Conference on Disarmament. On behalf of my delegation, I should like to express our deepest sympathy to the United States delegation on the unexpected passing away of its chief delegate, Ambassador Donald Lowitz. A comparison of the initial situation at this session with that of last year reveals new elements propitious to our work. At the same time, we are compelled to note that the arms race has not slowed down and that arsenals have not become smaller. The entire international situation remains exceedingly complex and tense. In order for it to be markedly improved, much greater efforts are needed. With this aim in mind, socialist countries proposed at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly that all nations should jointly commence work on a comprehensive system of peace and international security. The system should embrace the most important areas of Government-to-Government relations and their interaction and bring about a world in which peoples can look to the future without having to worry about their existence and without the tremendous burden of armaments on their shoulders. 503 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000inninnnni _A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 19 (Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic) The main thrust of this great project is to free mankind, even during this century, from nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, as suggested by the Soviet Union at the outset of the Year of Peace. This initiative goes hand-in-hand with the Budapest Appeal, which calls for a dramatic cut in conventional forces and armaments in Europe. In this context, we attach great importance to the decisions taken by the non-aligned movement and the signatories of the Delhi Declaration, which aim in the same direction. Behind all these endeavours, there is the recognition that a joint political effort will be required and that national interests must honestly and reciprocally be respected if the security of peoples and countries is to be guaranteed in the nuclear and space age. As far as we are concerned, this is what the call for a fresh approach to international relations is all about. We know full well how far some circles are from this mode of thinking. Yet in the final analysis, they will have to meet this historic challenge, since there is no other alternative in the face of the threatened annihilation of the human race. In yesterday's address to the International Forum for A Nuclear-Free World, General Secretary Gorbachev put it in this way: "The question is like this: either the political mentality is geared to the requirements of the times, or civilization and life itself on Earth may perish". Naturally, the socialist countries' initiatives do not only seek to brighten the horizons for future development. They must also be considered as offers of practical measures to be tackled right now. Seen in this light, the Reykjavik meeting was an especially outstanding event. It is among the first things to be mentioned whenever reference is made to new elements. The emerging possibility of radical disarmament measures is an encouraging sign and fosters determination to labour still more committedly for the cessation of the insane arms race. However, irritation on the part of certain quarters has not escaped our attention either. Those concerned regard Reyjavik as an accident and long to return to the status quo ante. What we, in turn, urge countries to do is to build on the results achieved in Reyjavik and translate them into concrete agreements. In particular, the aim must be to reduce strategic weapons by 50 per cent within the next five years, to eliminate medium-range weapons in Europe and to strengthen the ABM regime. The German Democratic Republic has declared on this score that the countermeasures taken on its territory could be reversed once medium-range missiles are removed. The results attained in Stockholm and at the Conference that reviewed the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons are unanimously judged as an indication of broader readiness for constructive dialogue. May these examples, showing that problems can be resolved if reason and goodwill prevail, have a favourable impact on our forum. The same is to be hoped for the relevant resolutions adopted at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. 504 npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 20 (Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic) We are watching with keen interest and with particular satisfaction the growing efforts aimed at curbing the arms race regionally. One such instance is the ratification of the treaty on the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Inspired by the same principal objective, the German Democratic Republic has proposed regional arms limitation measures in Europe, notably a nuclear-weapon-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons in central Europe. As for the reduction of forces and armaments in Europe, it is our hope that the current talks between the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO may very soon lead to successful negotiations by the parties concerned. We would end up with a one-sided picture, if we left out of consideration the developments running in the very opposite direction. They are alarming indeed. The deviation from the Salt II Agreement, the mounting intensity of attacks on the ABM Treaty and the refusal to give a positive response to the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests are a clear indication of the intention to continue and fuel the arms race in all fields and to extend it to outer space. The bilateral negotiations and talks between the USSR and the United States appear to be making no progress on matters of substance, either on nuclear and space arms or on the cessation of nuclear weapons testing. These are, in brief, the conflicting circumstances under which the Conference has begun its 1987 term. We believe whatever positive element there is should be used to bring differing positions closer together and to seek progress with even greater tenacity in all the fields of interest to the Conference. This is precisely what the Deputy Foreign Ministers of socialist countries were guided by when they met in Berlin a few weeks ago to deliberate issues of relevance to the Conference on Disarmament. In this context, I wish to point out that the delegation of the German Democratic Republic considers as priority items a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests, the prohibition of chemical weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Certainly, we are also aware of the importance of the other subjects on the agenda, including the call for a comprehensive disarmament programme to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its resumed forty-first session. Of special urgency now is that a fresh start be made on the drafting of a treaty that provides for the complete cessation of all nuclear weapons testing. Both the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly and the statements we have heard so far during the plenary debate give evidence of broad readiness to move ahead. No doubt, the fastest way to arrive at a treaty would be through regular negotiations. For this reason, my delegation would prefer an appropriate mandate for a committee. In order to help prepare the ground for an accord, it would be equally ready, however, to take part in goal-oriented discussions about problems to be resolved. Without going into details, I would like to point out some of the aspects which, in our judgement, will have a major bearing on the practical approach to be chosen. 505 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 21 (Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic) Firstly, the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests will remain an international task of utmost urgency. Achieving it would impact very favourably on the entire disarmament process, and appropriate disarmament forums should be used to pursue this goal. This Conference, however, seems to us particularly capable of working out a universal treaty. Secondly, we believe in the possibility of intermediate measures in the event that a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests is recognized and formulated as an explicit commitment. This idea is not new to socialist countries. Just take the Threshold Treaties of 1974 and 1976, the Soviet programme of 15 January 1986 and the proposals put forward by the USSR in Reyjavik. Clearly, a moratorium by the Soviet Union and the United States, to which the USSR has not slammed the door after all, would be particularly effective. It will be of crucial importance in this regard that any partial step be geared to a comprehensive, legally binding ban. Thirdly, it appears indispensable to us to discuss all the elements of a future treaty in their complexity. Any selective approach is liable to leave out of consideration the interrelated nature of the subjects involved and would thus not yield the desired result. Fourthly, it will be necessary to rid the verification issue of all political encumbrances and to resolve it in a constructive manner, in line with the requirements of the treaty. Whatever it may take to do that is there. We need parallelism beween the Committee's activities and the Group of Scientific Experts, which should expeditiously prepare the level-2 data experiment to be carried out in 1988. My delegation takes the view that a committee should be set up as quickly as possible. We second the proposal that two working groups should be created -- one on matters of contents and scope of the treaty, and the other on compliance and verification. If we manage to establish a committee in which business-like discussions are conducted, we must make clear their pertinence to future negotiations and that we expect all the sides concerned to strive for real results. There must not be repetition of some of the practices in which the 1983 working groups indulged. Considerable headway has been made in drawing up a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, not least thanks to the laudable efforts of the Committee's former chairmen, Ambassadors Turbanski and Cromartie. The goal of finalizing the convention this year -- something that presents itself as the logical consequence of this development -- is very exacting but realistic. We fully concur with Ambassador Ek4us, Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons, that there is a positive chance right now for eliminating chemical weapons from the globe once and for all. It must not be passed up. A new round in the chemical arms race would all of a sudden move to a distant future the attainment of results which we are so close to now. In fact, this is what bad experience has taught us. 506 npriaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 22 (Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic) Given strong commitment to accommodation and dedicated work, we could well rise to the occasion. The far-reaching proposals which the Soviet delegation has just tabled are of special significance in this context and we welcome them as yet another exemplary contribution to our work. Solving the remaining issues of substance would speed up the negotiating process. This is particularly true of challenge inspection, the locations of stocks and their verification, and matters relating to the non-production of chemical weapons in civil industry. Results are possible on the basis of existing proposals. Once this and other blanks in the text of the convention are filled, it will be a lot easier to work out details. We are convinced of the possibility of an understanding on what is needed now and what could be completed at a later stage. We support the Chairman's desire to streamline operations of the committee so that it is able to perform its current duties. Apart from the efforts undertaken at the Conference proper, everything should be done to maintain and improve the atmosphere needed for constructive work. The USSR has suggested an agreement under which chemical weapons would be neither produced nor deployed. Such a step would give a fresh impetus to the present negotiations. My delegation is gratified to note the interests evoked by the seminar on the prohibition of chemical weapons to be organized by the German Democratic Republic's National Pugwash Group next month. The event will focus on the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. The Government of the German Democratic Republic is doing its utmost to make that seminar a success. During the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, 154 countries reiterated their opposition to an arms race in outer space and called for relevant agreements. The Conference on Disarmament has the duty to answer this call. Reason and realism are utterly incompatible with the strange logic that wants to eliminate weapons on Earth and, at the same time, put most modern means of destruction in space. Hence the world-wide resistance to the Star Wars plans. Time is pressing, as the champions of SDI are doing everything to get weapons deployed in outer space and to create faits accomplis. Attacks on the ABM Treaty are increasing in number. It is thus no longer sufficient for the Conference simply to continue last year's exchange of views. Rather, it must start direct work on practical measures designed to head off the spread of the arms race to outer space and ensure that space is used peacefully, for the good of all mankind. My delegation advocates the early establishment of a committee with a relevant mandate. In view of the fact that bilateral and multilateral negotiations complement and stimulate each other, the following projects could, in our opinion, be envisaged: prohibition of the use of force in outer space, as well as from space against the Earth and vice versa; protection of satellites and prohibition of anti-satellite weapons; and verification measures. In conclusion, let me give you, Comrade President, the assurance that the delegation of the German Democratic Republic is prepared and willing to do its very best in order that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament may conclude this year's sessions with tangible results. 507 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001_4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 23 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart. Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. President. Since this is the first time I am taking the floor allow me to congratulate you sincerely on your assumption of the post of the President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February. I wish you success in fulfilling the important functions incumbent upon you, and I can assure you of our aspiration to give you every help in this task. Allow me also to express our gratitude to the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley, for his able and competent leadership of the work of the Conference last August and during the inter-sessional period. I am taking advantage of this opportunity to associate myself with the words of welcome to our new colleagues, the heads of the delegations of France, Romania, Japan, Algeria, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Italy and the Soviet Union, and we wish them all every success. We ask the delegation of the United States of America to accept the deep condolences of the Mongolian delegation on the untimely death of Ambassador Lowitz and to pass on to his family and friends our sincere sympathy. We are satisfied to note that the Conference has succeeded, as it did last year, in adopting the agenda and programme of work and also a decision on the creation of certain subsidiary bodies right at the start of the session. It is to be hoped that the coming weeks will be just as productive from the point of view of dealing with organizational questions and questions of substance. Since the beginning of the activities of the multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, today known as the Conference on Disarmament, practically a quarter of a century has passed. Possibly this date does not have any particular meaning for the activities of the Conference on Disarmament but, nonetheless, it is worth mentioning, not only as a reason for reviewing the results already achieved, but rather and mainly as an encouragement for further efforts which must be made in negotiations on disarmament. In this respect we must admit that, with regard to the main aims of disarmament, We have still been unable to justify the hopes of the peoples of the world and, particularly in recent years, solutions to many vitally important and pressing problems facing this negotiating body have been bogged down without justification. It is high time, as stated in the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/86 M, adopting the report of the Conference on Disarmament, "to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament". Appeals to the Conference to fulfil its mandate in holding negotiations in the field of disarmament are contained in many other resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly too. To ignore these resolutions reflecting the demands of the world's community is inadmissible, and we are of the view that this year it is necessary to take decisive action to speed up the work of the Conference, to achieve solutions, based on new political thinking, which would direct its efforts towards the elaboration of concrete agreements on problems which are ripe for such agreement. 50C npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 24 (Mr. Bayart, Mongolia) The Reykjavik meeting of the heads of the world's two leading Powers and the virtual agreements reached there, thanks to the constructive efforts by the Soviet Union in its position on the most important questions of limiting and eliminating nuclear arsenals in a short period, have confirmed the truth that there are no issues in world affairs on which it is impossible to achieve mutually acceptable agreement if there is common sense, political realism and a feeling of responsibility for the peaceful future of mankind. This meeting opened up a qualitatively new stage in the fight for nuclear disarmament and has given it powerful impetus. Now the main thing we have to do is to go forward in strengthening and developing the new situation that has come about following the meeting in Iceland so that the spirit of Reykjavik is fully reflected in disarmament negotiations in various forums. The continuation of the arms race is showing itself more and more to be a dead-end leading only to a destabilization of the situation, a pointless waste of resources, and an increased military danger for everybody, including its proponents. In order to stop and reverse around, practical measures are urgent. One such measure, and one of the most important and most urgent in our conviction, is the prohibition of nuclear tests. This question, as it certainly deserves, has been right from the beginning of the session in the centre of the attention of the Conference. In this connection we would like here and now to express the hope that the new efforts being made will make it possible finally to get this question out of its deadlock and create a subsidiary body with a proper mandate intended to start practical work on an agreement on a nuclear-test ban. In an atmosphere of growing general concern about nuclear explosions, it is unacceptable that the Conference on Disarmament should fail to deal seriously with this problem. A few days ago we witnessed two nuclear tests carried out by the United States. Thus, the United States has taken the step that brings about the ending of the unprecedented USSR moratorium on all nuclear explosions. That moratorium has quite clearly confirmed that it is possible to take measures that can set up a firm barrier against the nuclear arms race. The Soviet moratorium made a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and was a sign of new political thinking and responsibility. The moratorium has in a sense overturned the old thesis that both the super-Powers were equally responsible for the arms race. Speaking at the plenary meeting of the Conference on 5 February, the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Nazarkine, stated that as a result of events in Nevada, the Soviet Union no longer feels bound by its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions and will, in due course, begin carrying out its own programme of nuclear tests. As you know, the Soviet Government has repeatedly stated, including in its statement on 18 February last year, that the Soviet Union will be obliged to renew its nuclear test after the very first nuclear explosion by the United States in 1987. Mongolia understands this position on the part of the Soviet Union, a position dictated exclusively by the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies. In this connection one cannot but stress the obvious fact that the gap between the number of nuclear explosions carried out by the United States and the USSR has increased in the favour of the United States by 26 since the Soviet moratorium. Moreover, it is no secret that the continuation of nuclear tests in the United States of America is not aimed at keeping the nuclear 509 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 25 (Mr. Bayart, Mongolia) arsenal in a state of readiness for war or at carrying out the doctrine of "deterrence", but rather primarily at developing completely new forms and types of nuclear weapons, at creating the third-generation nuclear weapons. Mongolia is happy to note the readiness of the Soviet Union, on a basis of mutuality, to stop carrying out its nuclear test programme at any time, and expresses the hope that the leadership of the United States will see the need to respond positively to the Soviet Union's goodwill. Questions of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war continue for us to be extremely important and have high priority. A resolution adopted at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly on these issues once again emphasized the urgent need for the Conference to begin multilateral negotiations on them. The programme put forward by the Soviet Union more than a year ago for the stage-by-stage complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, with an agreement on the prohibition of the development, testing and use of space strike weapons, is just as relevant today and could be the basis for consideration of nuclear disarmament issues by the Conference on Disarmament. One of the most important measures intended to prevent nuclear war, as we see it, remains the adoption by all nuclear States of an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It should be emphasized in this connection that the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 41/86 B asked the Conference on Disarmament to examine the question of the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character which would contain a formulation of such an obligation. Mongolia is happy to note that the Soviet Union and your country, Mr. President, the People's Republic of China, have assumed the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. We can only welcome the fact too that both these Powers recently signed Protocols II and III of the Rarotonga Treaty on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, which deserves general approval. We think that the aim of this Treaty is in keeping with our proposal for the creation of a mechanism for excluding the use of force among States of Asia and the Pacific. If these examples were-to be followed by the other nuclear States, it would really be a concrete contribution to the strengthening of confidence among States and a reduction of the threat of nuclear war. Confidence needs to be strengthened by deeds and not by words. One cannot demand confidence from others if one reserves for oneself the freedom to continue nuclear tests and to torpedo the most important agreements. The Reykjavik meeting has confirmed that unless the threat of the arms race spreading to space is removed, it is impossible to agree on a reduction and elimination of strategic nuclear weapons. Thus, the meeting has once again cast light upon the key significance of the solution to this problem for preserving and strengthening peace and stability on Earth. Today, the need to set up a firm barrier against the proliferation of the arms race into space is stronger than it ever has been. The proponents of the Strategic Defence Initiative are setting about speeding up the deployment of the individual elements in space and are trying in this way to shift to a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. In General Assembly resolution 41/53 the international community once again unambiguously expressed itself in favour of preventing the arms race in space and the holding of negotiations on 510 . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 26 (Mr. Bayart, Mongolia) the conclusion of an agreement or agreements on this question. It is essential now to start negotiations urgently on specific aspects of this problem, bearing in mind the final aim of the non-admissibility of arms in space. The proposal concerning the elaboration of an international agreement on ensuring immunity for artificial Earth satellites and the prohibition of the development, testing or use of anti-satellite systems, and the elimination of existing systems of that kind, seems in our opinion to be extremely realistic and fully in accordance with the general aspiration to keep space free from weaponry and to use it for peaceful and creative purposes. We must as soon as possible re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space this year, and avoid creating a situation like the one which arose in the past, where the whole of the first part of the session was wasted on agreeing on the mandate and the programme of work of the Committee. We are inspired by the general aim to complete this year the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The course of the negotiations warrants our iudgement that this optimism is not built on sand. The inter-sessional consultations last year and the session of the Ad Hoc Committee in January this year have been very productive from the point of view of dealing with several complicated technical questions. Taking this into consideration, and taking into account the recommendation of the consensus resolution 41/58 D of the United Nations General Assembly, the Ad Hoc Committee could work without interruption to achieve the conclusion of the convention. And now, in order to turn the possible into the real, and hopes into practical deeds, what is needed, as was very accurately and rightly stated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Prez de Cu4llar, in his message to the Conference, are political compromises. An example of this kind of political compromise, of a constructive search for mutually acceptable solutions, is the new and important proposals by the Soviet Union, described by Ambassador Nazarkine in his statement today, to deal with various important questions of the future convention concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons. These proposals, in our opinion, will no doubt encourage further progress at the negotiations to find a way to deal with the outstanding issues. They go a long way to taking account of the positions and the interests of the various partners and reflect the responsible approach of the Soviet Union in expressing new political thinking with regard to the cause of peace and disarmament. We hope that other participants in the negotiations will show the same readiness for compromise, so that, as far as possible, in the very near future the drafting of the convention will be completed. In our opinion, the Ad Hoc Committee can achieve success in the outstanding issues of principle such as non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry, procedures for the destruction of the CW production base and the question of challenge inspection, if it avoids wasting valuable time in discussing technical details of a secondary nature. After the questions of principle have been resolved, such technical details could be relatively easily settled. 511 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 27 (Mr. Bayart, Mongolia) We, like other delegations, highly appreciate the contribution made by Ambassador Turbanski and Ambassador Cromartie in achieving the successes which have been obtained thus far, and we are convinced that under the guidance of the new Chairman, Ambassador Ekeus, the Ad Hoc Committee will achieve further decisive progress. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. I now come to the last speaker on my list for today, the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargi. Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt): Mr. President, allow me first to express to you our happiness to see you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament at the start of its 1987 session. I would like also to voice my appreciation for the way you are directing its work. This comes as no surprise from an able diplomat like yourself, and from a State like China, which you represent, and because of the special iesponsibility it carries as one of the Great Powers and because of its unique status within the Conference. I am confident that this status will enable you to present many initiatives to allay the difficulties slowing the pace of the work of the Conference. Permit me also to avail myself of this opportunity to express our gratitude to Ambassador Alan Beesley, the representative of Canada, for his efforts during August 1986, and throughout the inter-sessional period. I am saddened today by the absence from our midst of Ambassador Donald Lowitz, the representative of the United States of America, whose untimely death is a loss for his country, the Conference and his friends who worked with him and came to be closely acquainted with his noble qualities. I kindly ask the United States delegation to convey my heartfelt condolences to his widow and to the other members of his family. It gives me pleasure to welcome the new representatives who joined the Conference, Ambassadors Youri Nazarkine of the Soviet Union, Aldo Pugliese of Italy, Rubens Antonio Barbosa of Brazil, Jorge Morelli of Peru, Kamel Hacene of Algeria, Gheorge Dolgu of Romania, Pierre Morel of France, Chusei Yamada of Japan and Marko Kosin of Yugoslavia. I am confident that each one of them will bring his own positive contribution to the work of the Conference. Normally, a new session of the Conference on Disarmament is opened against a background of optimism, of looking forward with hope to the possibility of achieving progress in the work of the Conference. But how can this be the case today when we see the start of this session coinciding with the continuation and escalation of both the nuclear and the conventional arms race; when we see the persistence of the trend to extend it from land, sea and air into outer space and a continuation of the attempts to achieve military superiority and nuclear deterrence. All this goes on without regard to the existing arms limitation and disarmament treaties, whether they be bilateral or multilateral; without feeling bound by the pledges already made in the Geneva Joint Statement of January 1985, or those made at the Geneva Summit November 1985, where it was pledged to prevent an arms race in outer space and to terminate it on Earth, not to seek military superiority, and acknowledged that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. All 512 neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 28 (Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt) this is happening without any consideration to the security of the great majority of States or their interests, a great majority of States that find themselves drawn forcibly into untold dangers and threatened with annihilation. The situation we face today must give rise to pessimism and generate a feeling of frustration. There is simply no other way out of this sad state of affairs but to comply with existing treaties on arms limitation and disarmament, both in letter and spirit. We have to strengthen such treaties through the conclusion of yet more treaties. This necessitates generating momentum in the bilateral negotiations in response to the high hopes pinned on them. The spirit of Reykjavik must be maintained. This also requires enabling the Conference on Disarmament to break out of the state of paralysis it has reached, by making it possible for the Conference to undertake the tasks entrusted to it instead of persisting to raise doubts about the scope of its mandate or continuing to obstruct its work. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations are not alternatives to one another but rather complement and sustain each otheD. Such efforts must be guided by the world conscience and the international will as reflected in the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. They must respond to the appeals contained in the declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement and the six countries representing the five continents. Like the majority of States we are of the view that a nuclear-test ban is a necessary first step if we are really serious in our attempt to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament, thus protecting the world from the scourge of a nuclear war. Hence our increasing concern about the insistence of some nuclear-weapon States to persevere in their nuclear tests usina, as a pretext, the arguments of maintaining their capacity of nuclear deterrence, to ensure the worthiness of their nuclear weapon stocks, and their doubts about the effectiveness of verification procedures under the technology presently available. All these arguments are not valid. They are merely used to justify the continuation of nuclear tests. They were refuted by many previous speakers in this same room. It is regrettable that some of these States are parties to, even depositaries of, both the treaties on the partial ban of nuclear testing and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These States have pledged to work towards a comprehensive test ban, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. They were expected to lead the way towards a consolidated non-proliferation regime and thus encourage the States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede to it. But the same States, by their present conduct, can lose their credibility as an ideal to be followed. In fact they are encouraging the States not parties to remain outside the Treaty, and worse, to develop further their own nuclear capabilities. And this is another cause for our concern, particularly when we know that among such States some are situated in the Middle East, and the racist regime in South Africa. By remaining outside the NPT and developing their nuclear capabilities they threaten to engulf the two regions in a nuclear conflict. This would have grave consequences not only for the two regions, but for the world at large. In this context, we welcome every step which would help to achieve the objective of a nuclear-test ban. We object to every action that diverts us from this goal. Once more we welcome the decision by the Soviet Union to 513 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 29 (Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt) impose a unilateral moratorium on its nuclear tests as of 6 August 1985. We welcome their decision to renew this moratorium repeatedly. We regret that the other nuclear States, particularly the United States, did not respond in kind, and all the more so in view of the fact that nobody raised doubts about the sincerity of the Soviet Union in honouring its decision. We understand the Soviet Union's decision not to be bound by the unilateral moratorium any longer. We still deem it necessary for the nuclear States to declare a moratorium on their nuclear tests, thus creating the required climate to negotiate a nuclear-test-ban treaty. We also welcome the decision by the United States Administration to transmit to the Congress, for ratification, the two draft treaties on threshold and peaceful nuclear explosions. This came after a long wait. But we hope that they will be ratified at the earliest possible opportunity. We feel satisfied at the news that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev touched upon the issue of a nuclear-test ban during their last meeting in Reykjavik, considering the possibility of an agreement on the reduction of the number and yield of nuclear tests and appropriate verification procedures. But while welcoming all these steps our objective will remain that of concluding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Conference on Disarmament will remain the optimum framework to conclude such a treaty, giving it the universality we all hope for. That is why we regret the failure of the Conference on Disarmament, during its last three sessions, to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban, in spite of the many attempts made to reach a compromise. We hope that the Conference will succeed in its present session in re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee and in ending the deadlock on this issue. Undoubtedly General Assembly resolution 41/46 A provides a good basis for such an action. It contains many concessions that were described to us in the past stages of the work of the Conference as conducive to a softening in the position of the objecting States. The resolution also reflects the extent of flexibility of the States that sponsored and voted in favour of it. This is a positive development that should not be underestimated and should meet with a positive response. Egypt was one of the first States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Egypt was at the forefront of the States that signed the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and on their destruction, although the circumstances prevailing in our region prevented us from speeding up its ratification. From this background and in the framework of the continuity of Egyptian policy, we fully support the current efforts to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Egypt will not hesitate to exert every effort to achieve this objective. We look forward to a treaty that fully and effectively bans the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction; a treaty that does not, however, impede the peaceful chemical activities. We aspire to a treaty which includes effective verification provisions without such procedures that would exceed the actual requirements of the treaty, or be 514 narlaccifipn in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 30 (Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt) used as an indirect means to threaten the national security of the States parties. We believe that acceding to the treaty will depend to a large extent on the provisions it contains providing for international co-operation to develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries. In this context we welcome the decision by the Ad Hoc Committee to consider this aspect of the treaty during its current session. Lastly, I would like to mention the fact that concluding a treaty which is acceptable to all parties and to which all would accede is one of the prerequisites for its acquiring universality. Allow me on this occasion to express my thanks to Ambassador Cromartie, the representative of the United Kingdom, for his efforts during his chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in the previous session. May I also congratulate Ambassador Ekeus, the representative of Sweden, on his assumption of the Chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in the present session. We all know the role played, and being played, by the delegation of Sweden, particularly by Ambassador Ekeus personally, in the ongoing negotiations to conclude a treaty banning chemical weapons. We wish him all success in his task. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will conclude the draft treaty in time to present it to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-second session in accordance with its resolution 41/58 B. The progress we have achieved in the realms of science and technology is an indisputable fact. What is more, it is an ongoing phenomenon, day after day. Space technology available today represents the new link in the chain of evolution and advancement with both its useful and harmful facets affecting humanity. It has useful aspects, because each addition to the technological discoveries and inventions represents a new victory, increasing the welfare of the human being by what it provides to fulfil his aspirations to prosperity and the raising of his living standards. It has also harmful facets, by what is achieved by its military facet, the destructive power in the service of the selfish tendencies of the States able to exploit this technology militarly to impose their hegemony and to introduce it in the arms race, thus escalating the race to extremely dangerous heights, where security and serenity are neutralized, even for the States that do not take part in the race. This explains why the prevention of an arms race in outer space is imposing itself as a priority item on the agenda of all international forums and meetings dealing with arms limitations and disarmament. This is particularly true since the United States declared its Strategic Defence Initiative. Today there is quasi international consensus that the extension of the arms race to outer space and the implementation of the SDI are a serious escalation of the arms race that will have grave consequences in all fields, political, military and economic. If we spoke a few years ago about the possible availability of the necessary technology for the development and production of space weapon systems, and if we had tried then to imagine the dangers that would attend such a development, it therefore becomes a source of deep concern when we hear today that it has proved possible to achieve such progress in acquiring the necessary technology for the production of such weapon systems. We are worried to hear those who call for hastening the production and deployment of the said systems, in such a way that the danger becomes an actual reality, where it was but a mere possibility in the past. 515 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R0001001 onnni-et Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 31 (Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt) What complicates the issue even more is the seeking of some States to participate in the SDI. If the avowed objective of their action is to extract purely commercial profits, we are sure that the participation of other States in this programme will provide them with advanced technology which will help, sooner or later, to proliferate space weapons and will contribute, directly or indirectly, to improving the performance level of a conventional weapon system. The matter becomes more serious when, among such States, we find Some that are situated in areas where tension prevails already, particularly when previous efforts to bind such States to one or more of the treaties on arms limitations and disarmament have already failed. How we wish that the mastering of space technology and the new horizons it conquered will remain confined to serving humanity and increasing its welfare! How we wish that outer space, as a common heritage of humanity, may be explored and exploited exclusively for peaceful purposes! If in the past we called for the possibility to conclude an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, this call becomes more urgent in the light of the current developments. Undoubtedly, the prevention of an arms race in outer space is easier at present, before the space Powers multiply and militarize outer space in such a way as to impede the efforts in the field of arms limitations and disarmament, if it does not destroy the whole fabric. Here, we are at a loss as to how to perceive the fact that the declared objective of the bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers is to prevent an arms race in outer space, while at the same time the United States is developing, with the purpose of their deployment, space weapon systems about which negotiations are going on for their prohibition and the destruction of existing systems. Here again, if there are priorities to be set, in the light of the present developments, we deem it necessary to take action to achieve: first, the halting of the development of anti-satellite weapons and the dismantling of the existing systems; second, the prohibition of the introduction of new weapons systems into outer space; and third, ensuring that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems are fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of recent technological advances. In the face of the present situation with all its ramifications, we cannot but express our dissatisfaction with the attempts to raise obstacles to prevent the Conference on Disarmament being entrusted with carrying out the required negotiations to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space, particularly bearing in mind that the record of the bilateral negotiations gives no cause for optimism, since they have failed to achieve any progress until the present. What is more, this failure in the item on outer space resulted in impeding the possibilities of agreement in other areas. General Assembly resolution 41/53 reaffirms the primary role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Notwithstanding the important work done by the Ad Hoc Committee during the last two sessions, there must be a more specific link between the Committee's work, in any particular stage, and the 516 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 32 (Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt) final objective unanimously endorsed by the international community, namely to conclude an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will speedily overcome the procedural difficulties concerning the agreement on an appropriate mandate and a programme of work that ensures that its work will take the right direction towards the final objective of its activities. It was not by coincidence that the issue of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, within the framework of the item on the prohibition of radiological weapons, received such attention by the great majority of States members in the Conference. This is an expression by these States of the interests of the greater part of the world community. This fact has been reflected by many United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the last of which is resolution 41/59 I, and by resolutions of other international groupings. This concern arises from the desire of many States to build nuclear reactors in order to benefit from nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. At the same time, the same States are keen that such an action on their part will not make them hostages to the dangers of nuclear radiation resulting from any attack on their facilities. The Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor was a living example of what nuclear facilities could be subjected to. The Chernobyl accident was another case in point of the dangerous effects of nuclear radiation on environment and population. We thought that the two incidents were ample evidence to validate our view about the importance and the need for the Conference on Disarmament to deal with the issue of prohibition of attack on nuclear facilities, particularly since many other international forums have transmitted the subject to the Conference for consideration. That is why we are concerned about the persistence of some members in voicing doubts about the competence of the Conference to consider this issue. We regret to have to note a clear regression in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee during its past session. If we are keen about the consideration of this issue by the Conference, at the same time we do not underestimate the difficulties and varying security considerations of the member States, nor the necessity of reaching solutions that are satisfactory and acceptable to all. We are of the view that the right way is through further negotiations. We have to explore new approaches and proposals to deal with this issue. But the way does not lie in some members deliberately raising obstacles to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, even going so far as preventing its re-establishment. The importance we attach to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should not be interpreted as an attempt to diminish the importance of the issue of prohibition of radiological weapons. We believe that if it is unacceptable to some to concentrate on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, then, and regardless of the fact that we do believe that prohibition of an actual threat has priority over the prohibition of a potential threat, let us at least consider both issues simultaneously. Needless to say, my referring to a limited number of the items on the agenda of our Conference in my statement, and my having specified Egypt's position regarding them, does not in any way diminish the importance we attach to the other items. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under its able Chairman, Ambassador Garcia Robles, 517 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001_4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 33 (Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt) the representative of Mexico, will succeed in preparing the draft before the end of the first part of the present session so as to present it to the forty-first session of the General Assembly. We are confident that this is possible provided there is the political will and if the positions of the different States are adequately flexible, particularly concerning the nuclear paragraphs of the programme, the stages of implementation and the time-frame. We agree with the view of the members who called for the necessity that the item on negative security assurances be given the importance it deserves by the Conference. We believe that the provision of such guarantees in a legally binding international document, with no conditions attached, is a legitimate and just demand on the part of the non-nuclear States. We are confident that the Ad Hoc Committee, if reactivated, will be able to reach the appropriate formula to satisfy this demand. We also think that the establishment of ad hoc committees, with appropriate mandates, is the best framework to consider both the items on the cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. We do not deny that the international climate and the relations between the two super-Powers in general, and the stages reached in their bilateral negotiations in particular, have their impact, whether positive or negative, on our Conference. But regardless of our apprehension of the effect of these factors, we deem it necessary for the Conference to succeed in generating its own momentum for its work. This must be done in such a way that the Conference is able to carry out the tasks specified to it by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is our view that the holding of the third special session in 1988 is an opportunity for the Conference to confirm its credibility by presenting to that session specific draft treaties on arms limitations and disarmament, treaties that would provide the peoples of the world with peace and security through which they can achieve progress and enjoy prosperity. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President and for the country that the President represents. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico. Mr. GARCfA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The distinguished representatives will have received today the document that has been circulated under number CD/739. This contains a letter signed by four permanent representatives, those of Argentina, India, Sweden and Mexico, containing a request that the Conference publish and distribute as a document of the Conference the joint statement that the leaders of six countries, the authors of the Initiative for Peace and Disarmament, issued on the eve of the New Year. In this joint statement, there is one paragraph -- that is, paragraph 6 -- which refers specifically to the question of a moratorium that might serve as a first step towards achieving a treaty putting an end to nuclear tests. I felt that since that subject is specifically on the agenda of this Conference it was relevant for me to read out the part that seemed 518 neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.389 34 (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico) most relevant. It reads as follows: "There is no justification for nuclear testing by any country. We appeal once again to the United States to reconsider its policy on nuclear testing so that a bilateral moratorium can be established. Our offer to help ensure adequate verification of such a moratorium remains valid. We are ready to start implementing it at any moment." The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor? And I see none. You will recall that as an exception to the agreement reached at our last plenary meeting, the Conference will hold its next plenary meeting on Thursday, 19 February, at 10.30 a.m. On that occasion we might need to have a brief informal meeting once the list of speakers is exhausted, to consider a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference. As there is no other business to consider, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The plenary meeting stands adjourned. The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m. 519 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001_4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.390 19 February 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETIETH PLENARY MEETING Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 19 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m. President: GE.87-60223/7254E Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China) 520 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I call to order the 390th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. First of all, I wish to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, His Excellency Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond, who will be the first to address this plenary today. The Minister is a distinguished career diplomat who has served his country in several important diplomatic posts in Member States of this Conference. It may be fitting to recall that His Excellency is no stranger to Geneva and the Palais des Nations, as he was a member of the French Delegation to the Conference of Experts on the Prevention of Surprise Attack, held here in 1958. I am sure that all members join me in expressing our appreciation to him for finding the time to come here to convey the views of his Government on the issues of disarmament, in spite of a very heavy schedule. His very presence here is a clear indication of the importance the Government of France attaches to matters concerning disarmament. In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda items 1, "Nuclear-Test Ban" and 2, "Cessation of the Nuclear-Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of France and Czechoslovakia. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, His Excellency . Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond. Mr. RAIMOND (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to tell you how happy I am to be taking the floor today before the Conference on Disarmament. I would like to take this opportunity to associate myself with the tribute paid by all delegations to the memory of the representative of the United States to the Conference, Mr. Lowitz. I am happy that as chance would have it, China is presiding over our work today. This circumstance gives me the opportunity to greet the representative of a great country which is the friend of France. Its foreign policy is based, like ours, on independence of action. Its security policy, like that of France, rests on exclusive control over its forces. China is, like my country, a nuclear and space Power. I do not hesitate to say here that in this capacity too she, for her part, is contributing to the balance of force, and therefore to peace. Like France, China decided eight years ago to participate in the new Committee on Disarmament which has since become the Conference. The last address delivered by a member of the French Government before your Conference dates back to 1979. At the time We were marking the transformation of a sui generis institution organized around the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States into a multilateral negotiating body. This change, and in particular the abolition of the co-chairmanship, was something which in 1978 France had made the condition for its participation in the new institution. The question facing us at the time was whether there was room for multilateral negotiations in parallel with the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations. There were some who invoked the so-called law attributed to George Kennan according to which the chances of negotiations achieving anything are in inverse proportion to the number of participants involved, and 521 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 3 (Mr. Raimond, France) argued that any multilateral forum dealing with disarmament would be inefficient or indeed useless. I would like to recall here that this is not France's position. The work being done by your Conference in the field of chemical weapons is second to that of no other forum as regards the seriousness of its approach. On the question of conventional weapons, last September's success at the Stockholm Conference, in another framework, that of the CSCE, showed that there is no need to be only two parties in order to complete and conclude the first agreement between East and West for a decade. Certainly, confidence-building measures are a limited sphere; however, nobody would underestimate their implications for Europe, nor their significance for arms control, inasmuch as they have endorsed the principle of on-site inspection. The day before yesterday, in Vienna, there was a meeting in the French Embassy -- the first in a series of informal consultations -- to find out whether it is possible to build on the achievements of Stockholm in the field of conventional disarmament at the same time as in that of confidence-building measures. Here again my country insists that each participant in the CSCE should speak on its own behalf and that negotiations should not turn into a bloc-to-bloc confrontation. France is in favour of disarmament agreements which are verifiable and part of a progressive process. The maintenance of the right to security of each State throughout this process is in our view its necessary corollary. France will therefore never accept that its forces or its territory should be affected by any negotiations to which France is not a party or in which she has not spoken on her own behalf. This right which she claims for herself she naturally recognizes for other countries. At the opening of this new session of the Conference there is a prevailing feeling that negotiations on arms control and disarmament are at a turning point. The resumption of the Soviet-American dialogue in 1985 led, four months ago, to the Reykjavik meeting. That meeting left many observers bewildered. As I had occasion to say in December, from the Reykjavik talks public opinion noted, rightly or wrongly, that the United States could, if necessary, change its strategy, give up its ballistic missiles in Europe and, more particularly, bring about an evolution in its contribution towards deterrence in which recourse to conventional means would play a greater part. It also noted from this meeting that the USSR stated that it was prepared to rid itself within 10 years of the strategic investment which it has been making continuously for a quarter of a century. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with conjuring up new worlds, which one would naturally hope would be better ones. It can be intellectually stimulating to imagine the adoption of new strategies for tomorrow or the day after. In Reykjavik the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged proposals and counter-proposals concerning remote, probably utopian, horizons; but we should be careful not to endanger the foundations of our security today. 522 nna-Inecifiari in Part - sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 4 (Mr. Raimond, France) As many European leaders emphasized, in the disarmament field, we must now concentrate on what is realistic, possible and desirable. For us, specifically, this can be summarized in three points. First, we hope that the objectives agreed upon by the Soviet Union and the United States in Reykjavik can be achieved, that is, the reduction of 50 per cent of their strategic arsenals over five years. It goes without saying that this would be a considerable result, without equivalent in the history of arms control negotiations, and obviously we would be extremely happy about it. In that case why, paradoxically, detract in advance from this five-year objective by setting up against it much more doubtful 10-year objectives? Secondly, we should ensure the maintenance of the ABM Treaty for a mutually agreed period, followed by a period in which, if appropriate, it would be changed by negotiation, as was sought in Reykjavik. At present, as everybody knows, a debate is underway on the problem of interpreting the ABM Treaty in relation to the research programmes being carried out in the United States as well as in the Soviet Union. This is not a new argument, and should be carefully distinguished from the question of the early deployment of defensive systems. That would go beyond what was authorized in 1972, that is, the possibility of deploying a hundred antiballistic interceptors around a single site, as had been done in Moscow. My country's position with respect to the interpretation of the ABM Treaty clauses starts from an obvious point: the ABM Treaty is essentially bilateral and there has never been any question of considering its extension to other countries. So, it is up to the two signatory countries to determine for themselves what today is in keeping with the provisions laid down in 1972, taking account of new technological developments; what goes beyond the agreed provisions of the Treaty; and what modalities can or cannot be used to make changes in the Treaty. Whatever solution may be found, I add that it would have to be agreed upon bilaterally. We are attached to maintaining the ABM Treaty, as our representative had occasion to recall in 1984 before your Conference. We therefore hope to see it respected by both parties, including with respect to research activities. These are clearly permitted by the Treaty. To avoid any technological surprises is an element of the Treaty's stability and thus of its durability. Finally, a third objective should be the reduction of American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe over the same period of five years. The zero option was implicitly accepted in 1979 by our partners in the Alliance and explicitly proposed by them in 1981. The political reasons for this are well known. However, the situation in 1987 is different. In 1981 our partners in the Alliance had proposed renouncing the deployment announced, but not yet been carried out, in exchange for a reduction in the number of missiles existing on the Soviet side. In 1987 there are intermediate-range missiles on both sides, but not in the same quantities. Therefore, the 523 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R0001001nnnni_A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 5 (Mr. Raimond, France) implementation tomorrow of such a formula, which in any case would have to be accompanied by a very detailed timetable and verification measures, must not lead to a situation of diminished security for Europe. The implementation of a possible zero option agreement between the United States and the USSR therefore supposes that the security of Europe should be perserved. This means, firstly, that the possibility of getting round the agreement (over or under it) must be avoided. I am thinking more particularly of the question of shorter-range missiles, a matter of concern, quite rightly, not only to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany but also to the governments of other European countries. And secondly, it means that the consequences of the present conventional imbalances must not be further aggravated. This last point is rather a statement of the obvious, but we must still not lose sight of it: we do not recall that it was raised at Reykjavik. These prospects are of direct concern to Europe and its security. Europe, as the President of the French Republic observed, "remains divided between the security it has and the security it hopes for". In his memoirs of Europe before the First World War, written at a time when a conventional war was ravaging our continent for the second time, the Austrian writer, Stephan Zweig, noted that "now that the great storm has long since shattered it, we know that this world of security was only a dream. And yet our parents inhabited it as a house of peace." Today, Europe sees its security assured in a very real way by nuclear deterrence. It cannot, therefore, consider any evolution in the opposite direction, which would make conventional and chemical war once again possible and no doubt probable one day, taking into account the assymetry in the forces involved, as well as geography. There is, then, no purely conventional deterrence which could ensure the security of our continent. France is in favour of a return to a balance of conventional forces in Europe, if possible at a lower level. We also hope that the Soviet-American negotiations on strategic arms and intermediate-range missiles will reach a successful conclusion. None the less we consider that, as the Prime Minister, Mr. Jacques Chirac, recalled, as long as we are confronted with the overarmament of the two super-Powers at the same time as the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe, our security will lie in nuclear deterrence. My country will therefore never accept that its nuclear forces should be included, directly or indirectly, in negotitions in which it does not intend to participate as long as the conditions it has set have not been met. France, through the voice of the President of the Republic, made known in September 1983 and June 1984 the conditions which would enable it to make its contribution to an effective and verifiable process of nuclear disarmament: First, that the gap between the nuclear arsenals of the two Great Powers, on the one hand, and that of France, on the other, shall have changed in nature. Second, that the great imbalances existing in conventional arms shall have been corrected and the elimination of the chemical threat become a 524 neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 6 (Mr. Raimond, France) reality. And third, that no new defensive system leading to a destabilization of the present foundations of deterrence and therefore of peace, shall have been brought into use. The problem of third forces in the process of nuclear disarmament should be brought into proportion. The French strategic nuclear forces today represent less than 2 per cent of the comparable potential of the United States or the Soviet Union. What then, finally, is the situation four months after the Reykjavik meeting? I would say that today there is a possibility and even a hope of managing to rebuild a disarmament and arms control policy on more realistic bases. To swap the aspiration of a denuclearized world for that of a world without ballistic weapons leads to a dead end. The way, therefore, in which both Washington and Moscow return to a more accurate assessment of what is really possible and desirable in negotiations will determine what real progress can be made in the limitation of nuclear arms. This is true not only for 1987 but also for coming years. The reason why I have talked at length about the "post-Reykjavik" prospects and nuclear disarmament negotiations is that I know how much attention is being given to these issues by delegations at the Conference. But the Conference equally has its own concerns and tasks, I mean nuclear testing, chemical weapons and space. We are aware of the importance attached by most members of this Conference to a total nuclear-test ban. The later is in part the continuation of a concern which, in the 1960s, was more a matter of the environment than of disarmament. It also results from commitments made within the framework of disarmament agreements in which France did not wish to participate: on the one hand, the 1963 atmospheric test-ban Treaty, and on the other, what a French expert described as a "disarmament agreement of the unarmed countries", that is, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. France does not consider today, any more than yesterday, that stopping tests is a pre-condition for progress towards nuclear disarmament. It maintains that, on the contrary, the stopping of tests could become significant at the end of a long-term process resulting in real and effective nuclear disarmament. There is, therefore, an important difference with a number of countries represented here concerning the desirable sequence of disarmament measures. I think it is honest to recognize it, and that clarity in these matters is more useful than ambiguity. Over and above these considerations of principle, there is the fact that France has not carried out one tenth of the nuclear explosions conducted by the two Big Powers. It does not carry out tests over the 150 kilotonne threshold, so often and so long discussed and today apparently so difficult to verify accurately. Finally, it sees no reason to agree to the planned obsolescence of its deterrent. 525 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 7 (Mr. Raimond, France) For all these reasons, we informed the Soviet Union that we had no objection to the moratorium it proposed and introduced, nor, however, did we see any advantage in it. We may note in any case that through Marshall Akhromeev on 25 August last, the Soviet Union recognized that nuclear tests did not have only negative effects. The Army Chief of Staff and Deputy Minister of Defence admitted that a high percentage of them served to test the reliability of existing arms. This observation has also been made by the American side. Now, in a world in which the number of nuclear warheads were reduced by half, the reliability of the existing weapons could only be yet more important. This is a problem that cannot be indefinitely ignored. The work of this Conference with a view to elaborating an international convention on the prohibition of the manufacture of chemical weapons and the elimination of stocks is certainly one of the most delicate tasks to which it has addressed itself. The effort made has enabled us to find some significant points of convergence on the shape and a number of important elements of the future convention. It remains true that as the work progresses the real difficulties come to light. This stems from the natural course of negotiations in such a complex field, but it also means that a number of choices have to be made. First, do we want a convention which, like the one on biological weapons, simply postulates that chemical weapons should be banned, without really doing anything about the effectiveness of such a prohibition and its verification? Or do we consider that these are weapons whose military effectiveness unfortunately has less and less to be demonstrated and which therefore are likely to become commonplace? Results achieved step by step, and limited not geographically (because the ease with which such arms can be transported would make such an approach utterly meaningless) but in terms of stockpiles, would surely already be a considerable achievement. Secondly, do we want verification measures to be aimed at putting permanent pressure on any possible cheating, or are we prepared to settle for imperfect verification because nobody will ever know whether clandestine stocks have been reconstituted or hidden? Third, what links should be established between the future convention and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 concerning the use of chemical weapons? Fourth, should we concentrate our efforts mainly on conventional chemical weapons, those which could be described as "bottom of the range" and accessible to most countries with industrial facilities? Or on the contrary, do we mean to give priority to the most modern chemical warfare agents or even prevent the appearances of future technologies in these areas? Is such an ambition even realistic? These discussions underly the work of your Conference. They explain their complexity and therefore their inevitable slowness. 526 npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 8 (Mr. Raimond, France) My country wishes to achieve results, even if they prove to be limited, in an initial stage, for example, to the progressive destruction of stocks and production facilities during a period to be determined. This same stage-by-stage approach could be used with respect to the solution to be found for the problem of the lists of supertoxic agents. We know that it is difficult at this stage to identify the possibilities of military use of some of them which are already being used in civilian industry, for example in pharmaceutical products. It should be possible to ask the Consultative Committee envisaged by the convention to determine the regime during a later stage of the negotiations, or during the implementation of the convention. The French delegation will put forward proposals along these lines. Generally speaking, quite obviously, it will spare no effort to ensure that concrete results are achieved, including during this session. Nevertheless, it is in the light of these uncertainties in the negotiations that France does not rule out the possibility of acquiring a limited and purely deterrent capability in this area. In accordance with the commitments assumed by France when signing the Geneva Protocol of 1925, this would only be used for retaliation and not for a first attack. In any case, the current negotiations, to which we continue to attach very high priority, could not constitute a moratorium for France, nor for that matter for any other country. Everybody here knows that side by side with the discussions which this Conference is to pursue concerning measures to contribute to the prevention of the arms race in outer space, negotiations are going on on a bilateral basis in this same city between the Soviet Union and the United States. Our objective cannot be to give preference to one or other of these approaches, or to cause them to hinder one another. It remains true that in the mid-1980s the international community included among its concerns the problems of the military use of space in the same way as in the mid-1950s it recognized that the problems of the nuclear age could not be a matter of indifference to it, even though the possession of nuclear weapons was at the time limited to two countries. In 1978, when proposing the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, and then in 1984, through the proposals it put before this Conference, France emphasized that these problems could not be excluded from the multilateral debate. We naturally attach the greatest importance to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. It remains true, as your work has clearly shown, that the present regime seems inadequate, particularly with respect to the immunity of satellites of third parties. France will submit, within the framework of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, proposals which take account of the difficulty of formulating a regime based solely on the definition of an anti-satellite weapon. In fact there is no single way of destroying satellites, and it would therefore not be realistic to found an international regime on the prohibition of ASAT systems, which could only be incomplete. What does seem to be a matter of priority is to implement the fundamental principles of the present 527 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 9 (Mr. Raimond, France) space regime, that is, its utilization under conditions of equality, non-discrimination among States, and non-appropriation of space. If such an approach is adopted, a number of specific measures can be considered concerning the registration and notification of space objects, as well as the multilateral code of conduct applicable to space activities. At the institutional level, the idea of entrusting responsibility for seeing to the application of transparency measures and the code of conduct for space activities to the International Satellite Monitoring Agency might be considered. All too often in the field of disarmament we have to admit, at the risk of causing disappointment or being misunderstood, that nothing will ever be as easy, completely satisfactory or rapid as we might hope. In the complicated and changing world which we have irreversibly entered for more than half a century, the threat has become more diverse. Paradoxically, the most modern weapons are also those which will apparently be the least used. How then can we be suprised when reason falters in the face of suspicion? France wishes to contribute to disarmament, but like any other State it considers that the negotiations should first serve the security of each and every one. If, furthermore, disarmament can contribute to the enterprise of development, France would naturally be the first to be delighted. It is from this point of view that we consider that the United Nations meeting on the relationship between disarmament and development, which it proposed in 1983 and which is to take place in New York this summer, is extremely important. We all know how far arms control represents a necessary effort to ensure foreseeability and stability in an international environment whose technological evolution constantly challenges its structures. The nightmare of seeing progress in arms overtaking negotiations, which sums up the arms control dilemma, is nothing new. In the field of nuclear weapons in particular, for almost 20 years the negotiators, like the young Tancredo in "The Leopard", would like to agree "that everything should change only if, afterwards, everything remains the same as before". It is inevitable, in this context, that public opinion should be concerned more with wars that are going to change, rather than the wars which are going on. And yet we know very well that if it is weapons that kill, it is men that start the conflicts. Modern arms are not the first cause of tensions; they are the result of older antagonisms, of longstanding conflicts of interests, which patient diplomacy must reconcile. A disarmament and arms control policy that only deals with the consequences and not the causes of tension and the absence of confidence among nations cannot lead to lasting results, that is, to the security to which each of our nations aspires. Nothing is more difficult, we know full well; and therefore nothing is more worthy of our efforts. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me and to my country. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda. 528 npriacsified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 10 Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Comrade President, we welcome you wholeheartedly to the chair of the Conference on Disarmament during this opening month of our present session. Your great socialist country has contributed a lot to the work of this Conference since it joined it in 1978. Your wise presidency is another specific contribution of China to the Conference on Disarmament at a time when we are all trying to invigorate its work, to effectively meet the requirements addressed to this multilateral negotiating body. My delegation pledges you full support in the remaining part of your presidency. Let me also thank Ambassador Beesley of Canada for the able guidance he offered to us in the concluding part of last year's session. It is with pleasure that I welcome the new representatives to this Conference -- Ambassador Nazarkine of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Yamada of Japan and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. Let me also express once again the deepest sympathy of my delegation to the delegation of the United States and to the family of Ambassador Lowitz with whom we had excellent working and social relations. At the same time I would like to welcome in our midst the Deputy Head of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ambassador Hansen, as Acting Head of the United States delegation. (spoke in French) We listened most attentively to the statement of the Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Raimond. His presence here at our session is evidence that his country considers the work of the Conference to be highly important. We were also able to note France's keen interest in the problems of international security during the recent visit to Paris of our Foreign Minister, Bohuslav ChYoupek. That visit was considered most useful by the authorities in Prague, as it contributed not only to Franco-Czech relations but also to highlighting the need for greater European co-operation as launched 12 years ago in Helsinki. (continued in English) Throughout the history of mankind, nations and groups of nations have always had to fight for their security. Peace, when it came here and there, was usually at the price of a hard and bloody struggle. This is true not only of distant but also of quite recent history of Europe, and it is not yet past history in many regions of the world today. In the process, means of war improved constantly until personal arms were replaced by automatic machines for annihilation and the present weapons of mass destruction. Peace and security cannot be won by these weapons, since their destructive nature prevents them from being used rationally, even from a purely military and technical viewpoint. Peace and security today have to be built otherwise. It is one of the far-reaching political conclusions of our times that international peace and security have to be put on a wider and more stable basis than in the past. This basis cannot be established other than by all States which want to build their relations with neighbours and other countries not on force but through peaceful co-operation in conditions of firm 529 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 11 (Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia) international security. That is what the sponsors of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/92 on the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security had in mind in advancing their initiative. The cessation of the nuclear-arms race and measures of real disarmament will have to constitute the backbone of such a comprehensive system. Nuclear disarmament is of highest priority in this regard. The treatment nuclear weapons deserve was very accurately described by Mikhail Gorbachev when he spoke on Monday to the participants in the International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World and for the Survival of Humanity in Moscow. I quote from his statement: "We rejected any right for the leaders of a country, be it the USSR, the United States or any other, to pass a death sentence on mankind. We are not judges, and the billions of people are not criminals to be punished. So the nuclear guillotine must be broken." We followed with great attention the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik last October. Even if some political "experts" subsequently described the meeting as a failure, we did not share that view. On the contrary, we witnessed, for the first time, a direct attempt to break the "nuclear guillotine". Even if that was not possible on that occasion, and I will not discuss the reasons for it, the meeting in that calm, northern island has left a permanent mark and the nuclear arsenals will never again seem as untouchable as they still seemed to be in the recent past. Our Conference is a highly representative body, with all nuclear countries taking part in its work. It should therefore, also contribute to the solving of a number of issues related to nuclear disarmament which are very clearly inscribed on its agenda. We reject the notion that the Conference should address only some of its agenda items while others should be left to bilateral or some other limited fora. This applies especially to the first three items, which deserve our permanent attention. Whether some like it or not, the NTB has been not only at the top of our agenda but also at the centre of international attention for quite some time. One of the two major nuclear Powers gave us, during the previous almost 19 months, convincing proof of its readiness to stop nuclear testing. The Soviet Union did all in its power to continue its moratorium, and if it was interrupted that was done by the United States, by carrying out its nuclear explosion on 3 February. In our understanding, its willingness to refrain from nuclear testing shows not only that the Soviet Union is ready to achieve a nuclear-test ban but also that it is prepared effectively to address nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Such a concrete step as the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing is much more convincing proof of good political will than loud peaceful rhetoric and declarations of good intentions. 530 nna-Inecifiarl in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 12 (Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia) We fully associate ourselves with those who call for the establishment of a working body for the NTB. There is a lot to be done in this area, including on verification. In our opinion, active and purpose-oriented work of such an organ could clearly demonstrate the following. First, the achievement of the NTB is an urgent measure which could substantially contribute to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and create an atmosphere conducive to successful negotiations on measures of nuclear disarmament. Second, the overwhelming majority of States are in favour of the cessation of nuclear testing and realize that the universal test ban would correspond to their vital security interests. Third, there are all necessary ingredients for-an effective NTB to be negotiated, including its verification machinery. Fourth, there is a need to consider, in a businesslike manner and in one forum, numerous proposals concerning the scope and nature of the NTB, possible partial measures, various approaches towards verification, including individual offers of States or groups of States, so as to combine them into one system, ensuring, in the most effective way, full compliance with the test ban. Fifth, the Ad Hoc Committee on the NTB could also constitute a necessary bridge between the useful work of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts and the actual state of efforts aimed at the achievement of the NTB. That link would be useful, inter alia, for putting the results of the planned test of level II seismic data transmission next year into a proper perspective. Fruitful work by the NTB Ad Hoc Committee can also give us the necessary specific criteria for consideration of the utility of establishing a permanent international system for the exchange of seismic data. Thus, we see a number of valid arguments in favour of the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the NTB. My delegation would be ready to participate in its proceedings actively and to display the necessary flexibility so that the Conference can, finally, undertake some specific steps towards the nuclear-test ban. It is our hope that the Ad Hoc Committee for the prevention of an arms race in outer space is going to be re-established shortly. The Conference should not close its eyes to the danger of outer space being completely militarized. The Committee's mandate should reflect the objective necessity to establish quite clearly, and in a more conclusive form, the impact of the present legal regime for outer space and to define what additional measures are needed. At the same time we do not consider that a mandate, thus conceived, should prevent us from an exchange of views on specific proposals which already have been, or might be proposed in the coming months. In this respect we were attracted by the statement of the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Yuli Vorontsov, containing, inter alia, the proposal to establish an international inspectorate to verify that arms are not being 531 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001_4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 13 (Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia) placed on objects launched into outer space. This is a new, far-reaching and radical measure which could, in our opinion, represent a solid barrier against the direct militarization of outer space. There is no need to stress further the urgency of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space since it is sufficiently displayed in the course of the present debate in the United States on the deployment of a first phase of the SDI. It seems that supporters of this allegedly defensive programme are becoming somewhat impatient. They see important changes in the world and finally realize that even the nuclear threat, on which they calculated heavily in their "mission to save the world", as they say might not be here indefinitely. For this reason it is necessary to launch the practical implementation of the SDI, to invest huge financial resources as soon as possible, to make the SDI irreversible. If they succeed, they will assure huge profits for the American military-industrial complex for many years to come. But what is more important, the SDI will become a limitless laboratory for the transition from "dirty" and indiscriminate nuclear weapons to equally efficient, but more "handy" and "practical" weapons based on directed energy. Space is considered wide enough to absorb the effects of nuclear explosions, which are difficult to control on Earth. Certainly, the chosen objects on Earth will be spared the long agony of nuclear destruction. Instead, they will be blown away in a clean, fast and "civilized" manner. Anyone who is sufficiently acquainted with the provisions of the ABM Treaty and its spirit cannot take seriously any talk of its "broad interpretation". The only real meaning of such an interpretation is that the ABM Treaty is an obstacle to the SDI and will have to be forgotten. And that will be the first real step opening the way to complete militarization of outer space. Our delegation welcomes the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has promptly been re-established under the able guidance of Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden. 'This early commencement, as well as a new, purpose-oriented approach, gives us a guarantee that the Conference will try to use its potential fully and that everything will be done so that the CW convention is finalized already this year. Nothing can prevent us from solving the remaining political and technical aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons providing there is the political will to do so. Just two days ago the Conference witnessed another good example of the required constructive approach when the Head of the USSR delegation, Ambassador Nazarkine, spoke on the problem of location of chemical weapons stocks, on the question of destruction versus diversion, and some aspects of verification on challenge. We consider that all the proposals advanced reveal genuine interest in speeding up our work on the CW convention and should be approached seriously. Any hasty conclusions, especially if they are rather beside the point, are somewhat out of place. We would like to hope that the suggestions made by Ambassador Nazarkine will be discussed thoroughly on an appropriate working level. We follow attentively the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the problem of non-production of chemical weapons and on challenge verification. During the brief sessions in autumn of last year and in January we noticed that divergencies in the positions of various countries were being gradually 532 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 14 (Mr. Veivoda, Czechoslovakia) reduced. It is a delicate process which should be further pursued in a calm, businesslike manner. We are confident that by the end of this year's session the remaining differences will have been narrowed down sufficiently in order to permit us to formulate what, for the purposes of the convention, could be considered as essentially common positions also on articles VI and IX. The CW convention is, unfortunately, not yet definitely agreed upon. But it is clear that its basic outline has already evolved and one may already have quite an accurate idea of the basic provisions of its individual articles. Verification will be extensive, covering a large number of activities right from the entry into force of the convention, through the destruction of CW stocks and facilities for their production, as well as with a view to permanent assurance that the convention is fully complied with in the future. Such a wide verification system is a sort of acknowledgement that the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons is an ambitious and difficult task. We consider that it would be fully in compliance with this ambition to try to cover the whole road which substances have to travel before they become chemical weapons. Everyone would apparently agree that the first step to create a toxic substance is a synthesis. The only places where this may happen are laboratories. Let us recall that such first category substances as tabun, sarin or soman were also the results of laboratory research. We therefore support the idea that this first step in the creation of chemical weapons should be recognized and dealt with by the convention. It would be futile to try to control regularly all existing laboratories, but it would be a grave mistake to ignore that new supertoxic lethal chemicals of category I may permanently be synthesized in the laboratories, whether deliberately or by coincidence. The number of relevant laboratories is relatively limited in each country and their declaration, with a possibility of inspection on challenge, should not represent an extraordinarily heavy burden. Smooth application of such procedures could create the necessary confidence and would represent a kind of introduction to the effective verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the civilian chemical industry. The comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been on our agenda since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. During the period of almost 10 years a lot of provisions for the Programme have been agreed upon. There are now just a couple of items that remain open but they, somehow, seem beyond our reach. The Ad Hoc Committee on the CPD has already resumed its work under the continued, dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico. We are confident that he will do all in his power to finalize the draft Programme soon, in accordance with the decision of the United Nations General Assembly and we will offer him our most active co-operation. But the key to the CPD is in the hands of those who fail to display a minimum of flexibility with respect to a number of priority items, among which the NTB is an outstanding issue. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President and to the country that the President represents. 533 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.390 15 (The President) That completes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? That does not appear to be the case. I now intend to suspend briefly the plenary meeting and to convene, as announced last Tuesday, an informal meeting of the Conference to deal with a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference. Once we have considered that request, we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to formalize any decision reached at the informal meeting, as well as to adopt the timetable for the activities of the Conference during the coming week. The plenary meeting is suspended. The meeting was suspended at 11.35 a.m. and resumed at 11.36 a.m. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 390th plenary of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. I wish to put before the Conference for decision document CD/WP.267, dealing with a request from Senegal to participate in the work of the Conference. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision. It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable. It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I should like now to make an announcement: The Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will hold open-ended consultations on the next session of the Commission in Conference Room III on Friday, 27 February, at 3 p.m. Those consultations will be held with full services. As there is no other business to consider, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 24 February, at 10 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned. The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m. 534 neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.391 24 February 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 24 February 1987, at 10 a.m. President: GE.87-60236/7280E Mr. Fan Guoxiang (China) 535 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 391st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Consistent with its programme of work, the Conference will continue today its consideration of agenda items 1 and 2 entitled "Nuclear Test Ban" and "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament" respectively. In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. Today, I have on my list of speakers the representatives of Yugoslavia, the United States of America, Kenya and Nigeria. I now give the floor to the first of those speakers, Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): Thank you Mr. President. May I first of all join other delegations in congratulating you, the representative of the People's Republic of China, a country with which Yugoslavia maintains close and friendly relations, on your assumption of the Presidency for the month of February. I wish you success in the discharge of this important function. The excellent way in which you have guided the Conference so far has enabled substantial work to be achieved at the outset of the 1987 session. Knowing your competence and experience I am sure that the Conference will continue to benefit from your able guidance. I would also like to take this opportunity of thanking you, Mr. President, for the kind words addressed to my predecessor, Ambassador Vidas, and for your warm welcome to me. I am grateful to my distinguished colleagues too for welcoming me here in the Conference on various occasions. I would like to express as well, on behalf of my delegation, appreciation to the outgoing President, Ambassador Beesley of Canada, who so skilfully steered the Conference during the month of August and in the period preceding the 1987 session. I wish to take this opportunity too, to express through the good offices of his Personal Representative, Ambassador Miljan Komatina, our gratitude to the United Nations Secretary-General Mr. Perez de Cuellar for his message to this Conference. We found it particularly encouraging to hear in his message that the tasks before the Conference "are indeed difficult but in no way insurmountable, given the universal desire for a more secure world in which our scarce human and material resources could be utilized for the fullest economic and social development of all societies". I avail myself of this opportunity to express once again our most profound condolences on the untimely death of the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Donald Lowitz, and to ask the United States delegation to convey our deep sympathies to the United States Government and to the bereaved family. The past year has offered a few reassuring elements through intensification of dialogue, far-reaching initiatives and proposals, and the growing awareness of the need for reaching agreements and understandings. On the other hand, 1986 showed that the arms race, instead of being restrained, had intensified, thus rendering the overall process of negotiations and agreement-reaching more complex. This clearly demonstrates 536 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 3 (Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia) that the political ground for accord is insufficiently broad, and still fragile. Therefore, the Conference should strive not only to overcome the oasic differences in positions on disarmament but also to win the race against time, for every opportunity missed renders our task more difficult and complex. We have thus begun our deliberations at the 1987 session with mixed feelings. While the dialogue at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels has been broadened and intensified, no new agreements have emerged and the existence of some of them has even been called into question. The year 1986 was also marked by numerous messages testifying to the fact that the international community is not reconciled to the prevailing situation of stagnation and is willing to reverse it through political dialogue and meaningful negotiations on disarmament. That was the main characteristic of 1986 as the International Year of Peace. The non-aligned countries, since their first Summit Conference in Belgrade a quarter of a century ago, have always considered disarmament a politically comprehensive and priority issue of peace and security. Such an approach dominated their meetings held in the course of last year, in particular the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1986. The more than 100 Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries assembled there have -- in their Political Declaration -- spelt out their views about the issues on the agenda of our Conference. They emphasized the extreme urgency of adopting measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament, and in that context, they called for the conclusion of an international agreement banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. They pointed to the pressing need to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive multilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time. They called on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations urgently to conclude an agreement or agreements to prevent the extension of the arms race in all its aspects into outer space. They also called upon the Conference on Disarmament to make all efforts to adopt the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during the first part of its 1987 session, and to submit it to the General Assembly. They called for negotiations to proceed without delay for an early conclusion of a binding international instrument to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They urged all States to abstain from any action that could impede an early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries emphasized also that, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament, measures for the 537 in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 4 (Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia) limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be pursued resolutely within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. The general thrust of the Eighth Non-Aligned Summit Conference was reflected in the general debate at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. The debate itself was constructive and led to the adoption of more consensus resolutions than before, especially those that leave room for a fresh approach on our part. Of special relevance to us here is the fact that the General Assembly at its forty-first session adopted more than 20 resolutions relating to specific responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament. The meeting between United States President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik, in early October 1986, showed that there is no alternative to dialogue, that it is changing in nature and that the views of the two major Powers converge in some areas that bear on their special responsibilities in the nuclear age. What is encouraging, to us, is the fact that the Reykjavik proposals are still on the negotiating table. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that the Reykjavik Summit failed to respond to the needs of the international community, which had expected some specific agreements and a higher degree of understanding, so necessary at this critical juncture for international relations. Therefore, the world community appeals to both Powers to speed up their moves towards agreement. The successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has resulted in the adoption of important confidence-building measures as well as those for the verification of military activities. The Stockholm Conference demonstrated in practice the active role played by all States, irrespective of their Size, population or military might, and their legitimate interests in contributing towards resolving the problems related to confidence-building, and towards halting and reversing the arms race. The success of the Stockholm Conference, which began its deliberations in extremely unfavourable international circumstances, is an undeniable proof of the importance and vitality of multilateral negotiations. As a non-aligned European country, Yugoslavia has undertaken to translate its long-term policy choices at the global level into a coherent concept at the regional level, too. Along these lines it actively participates in various initiatives, together with other non-aligned and neutral countries of Europe. Within this framework, and in pursuance of good-neighbourly co-operation, Yugoslavia advocates the transformation of the Balkans into a zone of peace and co-operation, free from weapons of mass destruction. 538 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 5 (Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia) The necessity of multilateral negotiations was also confirmed by such tragic events as the Chernobyl accident and the Challenger explosion. State and continental boundaries have proved to be incapable of averting the dangers hanging over mankind, the dangers which the most sophisticated technologies, if uncontrolled, increase rather than prevent. It has become clear that international co-operation in most advanced and sophisticated technologies is a necessity. It is encouraging in this regard that the International Atomic Energy Agency, in a relatively short period of time, managed to adopt two international conventions to that effect. In planning our activities this year we should. take account of the fact that the international involvement and the agreement-oriented approach have generated a more favourable climate for the work of our Conference, and for addressing the issues on its agenda substantively. We expect that the work of the Conference -- which last year proceeded in a very business-like atmosphere on constructive and concrete approaches to individual agenda items, and on substantive and accelerated negotiations as regards the chemical-weapons ban -- will in 1987 become more intensive and meaningful. Yugoslavia, for its part, and in accordance with its views and positions of principle, will make every effort to have the Conference attain these goals. Given the prevailing situation in international relations, the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, is gaining in importance on the global level. For multilateral negotiations, in our view, constitute the corner-stone of multilateral dialogue, in which the Conference on Disarmament has a major role to play. Multilateral and bilateral negotiations complement each other. This does not mean that multilateral negotiations should wait for the completion of bilateral negotiations; multilateral negotiations are irreplaceable in addressing all disarmament problems. The agenda of our Conference includes all key disarmament issues. Among them, the most pressing ones are those that require urgent solutions, including, of course, those issues the solution of which is most directly linked to the Conference on Disarmament. Within the framework of nuclear disarmament issues, we devote special attention to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban (CTB). The argument that the objective of a CTB is a long-term one is unacceptable to us. It is not accidental that this question has been the focus of interest of the entire international community for a quarter of a century already, with virtually unanimous calls for a test ban. Hence, a CTB would both have practical and symbolic value. It represents, in effect, the most important individual step towards curbing the nuclear-arms race and arresting the development of new generations of deadlier and deadlier nuclear weapons. There is no need to repeat that the nuclear-weapon States themselves have undertaken the obligations under existing international agreements, including some signed but unratified treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union. Of no less significance in this connection is the fact that 539 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 6 (Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia) practical behaviour has proved that even the on-site inspections of nuclear testing grounds are acceptable.. We hope therefore that the United States will join the Soviet Union which has already expressed its readiness for a bilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. Thus, there exist, in our opinion, all the necessary political, technical and procedural pre-conditions for our Conference to undertake substantive work aimed at negotiations on this subject. It goes without saying that the practical approaches will differ. That of my delegation is a flexible one and takes account of the ultimate objective of reaching a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would, at the same time, be the test of the worthiness of the jointly declared objective in the United States-Soviet negotiations of eliminating all nuclear arms on Earth. This and the common view of both Powers that nuclear war must never be fought, as well as the stand of the non-aligned movement that the use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity, is, in our opinion, the basis upon which it is possible to negotiate more effective arrangements and instruments for the prevention of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament. However, in making references to nuclear weapons and recognizing its priority, we should not lose sight of conventional weapons, which continue to absorb most of the resources spent on arms, and which take a heavy toll of human life in so-called local wars. Moreover, the development of conventional weapons systems makes these weapons increasingly dangerous and almost as destructive as nuclear weapons. This seriously threatens to lower the threshold of eventual use of nuclear weapons. It requires, as stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that parallel efforts be made to reduce the armed forces and conventional weapons, and to narrow the scope -- through regional and international agreements -- for this dimension of the arms race. The complexity of the strategic equation and the actual situation in the world command a comprehensive approach to the totality of disarmament issues. Yugoslavia has always opposed the extension of the arms race to other areas, in particular to outer space. Outer space is the area where international co-operation could be to the benefit of all mankind. Extension of the arms race into outer space would have a destabilizing effect on international security and co-operation, and would undermine the efforts aimed at disarmament. It would also consume vast material resources and the potential needed to meet the basic subsistence and development requirements of the majority of mankind. Outer space is obviously a global problem. It concerns all countries, whether from the political, security, economic, technological or any other point of view. That is why multilateral negotiations are so indispensable in this area. Consequently, the Conference should tackle this problem in a substantive way, without, of course, diminishing the importance of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR. 540 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 7 (Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia) The work on the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention in the course of the 1986 session of the Conference provides, in many respects, an example of how we should proceed on other agenda items. The outgoing Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, and the Chairmen of the Working Groups deserve the credit for the results presented in the report adopted by the Conference. But despite these significant steps, progress is still very slow on a number of major issues and some key problems remain outstanding. We expect, therefore, that the incoming Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekilus of Sweden -- whose ability and competence are well known -- together with all the delegations will make a constructive effort to speed up the negotiations. In my view, the conditions for this do exist, even concerning the most sensitive issues, such as verification. We consider that the proposals presented so far offer a solid basis for negotiated solutions. We must be aware that expectations are especially high in this field: all the more so, as six decades have elapsed since the chemical-weapons ban was introduced for the sake of humanity and human dignity, and we can no longer make excuses for further delays. Greater involvement on the part of all of us is an imperative today. In addition, we should pledge outselves to adopting the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during the first part of the 1987 session. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, will surely do his utmost to succeed in this endeavour. The numerous initiatives and proposals put forward in 1986 and the results already achieved, as well as consistency in the publicly proclaimed objectives of the members of the Conference, provide a reasonable basis on which to build this Programme. At the same time, that would be a concrete contribution to the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The arms race has a negative impact on all spheres of human life, in particular the economic one. It wastes enormous resources, the total annual level of which is equivalent to the overall debt of developing countries. This terrible waste of resources is taking place against the background of a crisis in the world economy which particularly affects the developing countries. Therefore, we attach particular importance to the forthcoming Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development as a way to reverse the arms race and create conditions conducive to sustained development of the world economy as a whole, and to the more rapid development of developing countries, in particular. We should not harbour illusions that a stable world can be built on inequities and injustices, and that the bare necessities of hundreds of millions of human beings, lacking even the basic conditions for existence, can be ignored. The third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament will be held next year. It is hoped that it will further develop the views and recommendations put forward at the previous sessions, and take steps to implement them. This will open up new avenues for co-operation in curbing the arms race, as well as for disarmament negotiations. 541 nprdaccified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 8 (Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia) Therefore, we all at the Conference are expected to contribute to the successful outcome of the forthcoming international gatherings. No Government can stand by and escape responsibility for failing to contribute. It is our duty to do all we can to live up to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, which clearly does not advocate a world based on balance of terror or fear of destruction, nor can that be accepted as an alternative. Our Conference, as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, must be given new impetus and substance. But in order to achieve this, it will be necessary to take concrete steps towards prompt and complete fulfilment of the tasks facing it. We cannot hide behind the rules of procedure and use them to cover up our failures. The rules of procedure are relevant only if they ensure progress towards substantive work. The Conference should devise ways to assure continuity in dealing with all issues on its agenda in a substantive manner. A phased approach to a chemical-weapons ban discussed during the course of the 1986 session is an obvious example of the evolution of our activities. Practical approaches to substantial issues should thus, in our view, be given priority over procedural discussions on the mandates of the subsidiary bodies of the Conference, i.e. the ad hoc committees. The negotiating mandates of these bodies stem from the mandate of the Conference itself and cannot be questioned. Briefly, the methods of work should be improved in order to enable successful deliberations at the Conference as a whole. In doing so, the Conference should always keep in mind its principal objective: the reaching of a disarmament agreement. The debate on the negotiating mandates should, as appropriate, be replaced by efforts to intensify the work of the Conference by elaborating concrete programmes of work for the conclusion of agreements or for their drafting. That would help bridge the differences and ensure the convergence of views, enhancing the role of our Conference in international dialogue. In conclusion, I would like to express the hope that all of us engaged in the work of the Conference will help to attain our aims and objectives in disarmament, and make every effort so that the results of the Conference could meet the legitimate interests of the whole international community, and that a world free from weapons of mass destruction, or with fewer of them, a world of peace and co-operation, may become a reality. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the President and to the country that the President represents. I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Hansen. Mr. HANSEN (United States of America): Mr. President, allow me, through you, to express the gratitude of the United States delegation for the many continuing expressions of condolence occasioned by the sad and untimely death of Ambassador Don Lowitz. They are a source of comfort and support to us. Ambassador Lowitz was my colleague and my friend. I shall miss him. Pending the appointment of a permanent replacement for Ambassador Lowitz I have been requested to serve as the acting United States representative to 542 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 9 (Mr. Hansen, United States) the Conference on Disarmament. I accept this responsibility with a recognition of the debt my delegation owes to Donald Lowitz, and conscious of the importance of the work of the Conference. On 5 February, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ambassador Kenneth Adelman, addressed the Conference, conveying a message from President Reagan. In addition to reaffirming our commitment to negotiations on a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, the President stated that the United States is committed to working with the members of this Conference in achieving responsible solutions to the problems of reducing the world's arms. Mr. Adelman discussed the importance of real openness to the success of these efforts. Three basic themes are contained in the President's message and in the remarks of Mr. Adelman: first, the significance of furthering the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban; second, finding responsible solutions to the problems of reducing the world's arms; and third, the importance of real openness in achieving progress. Today, I would like to note that the work of the Chemical Weapons Committee is off to a good start under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden. It is important as well to express appreciation to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom for his efforts in guiding the work of the Committee during the 1986 session. Ambassador Cromartie also gave impetus to an extended period of inter-sessional work last fall as well as during the January meetings of the Committee. His endeavours and achievements were substantial; we commend him and his delegation. My delegation has taken note of the important statement made at the 17 February plenary meeting by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkine. We judge it to be an important contribution to the work of the Conference, and will return to issues related to the banning of chemical weapons in a future intervention. I would like to begin my discussion of the first three items on the agenda of this Conference with some observations concerning the framework of the agenda and the objectives pursued by the Conference. Since 1945 not one human being has been killed by a nuclear device used for military purposes. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in November 1985 here in Geneva that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Certainly, all other States possessing nuclear arms share that conclusion. Military strategists in both East and West agree that a nuclear war must never be fought. Europe has been free of major war since 1945. There has not even been a military skirmish between East and West, even though there have been periods of crisis or near-crisis and regrettable military action in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Forty-one years have elapsed without a major war on the territory of Europe. Yet, twice in the first half of this century, American soldiers crossed the Atlantic to fight and die in wars on European soil. Today, the prospect of even one major war in Europe in the second half of this century is unthinkable. 543 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 10 (Mr. Hansen, United States) Whatever the perceptions of States represented here, whatever conclusions each reaches on the basis of its own analysis, whatever its political ideology or objectives, none can disprove the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in preventing war and preserving peace in Europe. And deterrence is not a Western phenomenon. It is not the invention of undisciplined strategists. Rather it is a fact of life and a key element in the military doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. True, great contempt is sometimes expressed by Soviet commentators for the word deterrence, but the concept is deeply embedded within the Soviet military thinking, and some Eastern spokesmen have even spoken publicly in defence of nuclear deterrence. Those who criticize deterrence do so without a full appreciation of its character or of the contribution it has made to East-West stability. While none of the States possessing nuclear weapons is engaged in military conflicts with each other, some States which are participants in this Conference are currently engaged in one kind or war or another. Human beings are being killed -- most with conventional weapons, some with chemicals. Would not this forum risk becoming the theatre of the absurd if it were to devote much time to addressing the prevention of nuclear war, something ITuite unlikely -- and which in any case is being addressed by those most ..:irectly involved and responsible -- while ignoring the fighting and killing which is actually taking place in so-called conventional conflicts? Where on the programme of work for 1987 is there provision for this -,nference to undertake arms control and disarmament efforts which might pntribute to the ending of the destruction, pain and suffering now taking .iace in diverse parts of the world because conventional weapons are being ised? In his address to the Conference on Disarmament on 19 February, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France alluded to the lack of confidence among States as the real source of international security problems. He also spoke of the significance of the Stockholm Accords and the fact that they were achieved in a multilateral negotiation. In Stockholm, 35 States agreed to exchange in November of each year an annual calendar of their planned military exercises, which involve at least 13,000 troops, for the coming year. Observers from all other participating States are to be invited to each military exercise involving more than 17,000 troops. Furthermore, each State accepted that other States have the right to conduct an on-site inspection whenever there are doubts about a State's compliance with agreed provisions. The major objective of these and other provisions of the Stockholm document is to build confidence among States as a method to prevent war, not only nuclear war, but war. Mr. President, allow me briefly to cite some additional efforts being undertaken which are relevant to the Conference agenda. On 20 December, the United States and the Soviet Union activated a third direct communications system, a so-called "hotline" circuit. This provides the capability to 544 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 11 (Mr. Hansen, United States) transmit facsimile documents between Washington and Moscow and completes the implementation of the 1984 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to supplement the previously existing system. On 20 January negotiations took place here in Geneva between Soviet and American representatives on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction .centres in Washington and Moscow. These two developments -- improvements to the hotline and negotiations on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres -- are part of the overall approach taken by my Government to reduce the risk of war. Having argued that nuclear weapons have played an important part in preventing the occurrence of a major war in Europe for more than four decades, I mean in no way to detract from the final essentiality that the international community, over time, find other means to guard its security. One cannot but be moved by the living witness that Ambassador Chusei Yamada, the distinguished representative of Japan, has given to the hell that the use of nuclear weapons represents. The United States delegation will do its part to fulfil the inscription, "let it never happen again", on the monument of which Ambassador Yamada spoke. The items I have referred to above, as well as the meeting in Reykiavik last October between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, have significant implications for the first three items on the agenda of this Conference for 1987. As regards the reductions of nuclear weapons, Director Adelman noted in this Council Chamber, on 5 February, that the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are focusing, really for the first time, on radical reductions of nuclear weapons. These intricate and delicate negotiations have significance for the future stability and security of much of the world. Each side must weigh carefully the potential effects of an agreement on its own security as well as that of its allies and friends. For its part, the United States remains cautiously optimistic that responsible, realistic and significant agreements on reductions are possible which will build upon the discussions held at Reykjavik. Frankness and honesty are often the best ingredients of diplomatic intercourse. I wish to employ both in addressing the first item on the agenda, that of a nuclear-test ban. The United States sees a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing as a long-term objective which must be viewed in the context of a time when the United States and its allies do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability. This condition does not exist now and will not exist during 1987. This condition cannot come into being without deep reductions in nuclear arms, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures and greater balance in conventional forces. 545. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 12 (Mr. Hansen, United States) Nevertheless, my Government has begun a process which should proceed in an orderly, step-by-step fashion. The first priority is improved verification of the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. The kinds of questions both parties to these Treaties have raised concerning the other's compliance indicate that an agreement on improved verification is clearly warranted. Once agreement is reached on direct measurement to ensure that the yield limits of these Treaties are being respected, the United States intends to ratify them. Immediately thereafter, we are prepared to enter into negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel programme -- in association with a programme to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing. This policy is being implemented. President Reagan has informed the United States Senate of his willingness to ratify the Treaties once verification improvements have been agreed; the Senate is now taking appropriate action. Also in accordance with this policy, Soviet and United States experts have been meeting here in Geneva to agree on the agenda for bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing issues. The last round of these meetings is now in a working recess; experts are preparing to meet again on 16 March. The United States is prepared to engage in this process with utmost seriousness and solemnity. However, this process must build on a series of key understandings reached between the States most intimately involved. This Conference can neither replace nor duplicate the delicate work which is just getting under way bilaterally. Nevertheless, this Conference can usefully consider and work on a number of nuclear testing issues, including compliance and verification issues essential to any future accord. The Conference on Disarmament can make contributions on these and other test-ban issues of particular importance. Bearing in mind the ultimate obiective of banning nuclear tests, the delegation of the United States is prepared therefore to resume work on nuclear-test-ban issues in a committee with an appropriate non-negotiating mandate as proposed by members of the Western group. The United States welcomes the plans of the Group of Scientific Experts to carry out further experiments aimed at the application of advanced techniques to the collection and exchange of seismic data useful for monitoring against possible underground nuclear explosions. This work should significantly increase the contribution that a global network of seisometers could make to the monitoring and verification of an eventual agreement on nuclear testing. We particularly welcome the fact that the Soviet Union has withdrawn its opposition to work on the exchange of so-called level II, or full waveform, seismic data. And we look forward to the demonstration relating to seismic monitoring which is to be given by authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany. In subsequent interventions, my delegation intends to contribute to work on other items on the agenda for 1987. In closing today, however, I would like to summarize the approach of my Government to agenda items 1, 2 and 3. 546 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 13 (Mr. Hansen, United States) The United States seeks significant progress in the bilateral nuclear and space talks. We are working for the implementation of steps which lower the risk of accidental or inadvertent conflict, which could employ either nuclear or conventional means. We are convinced that the steps we have taken and are taking to prevent war are responsible acts of government in areas which are in our competence. The United States seeks to engage in a process which will result in practical and realistic steps in the area of nuclear testing. My delegation does not concur in the need to alter an adequate mandate text that would enable practical work to begin now. Such action has the almost inevitable result of delaying or preventing agreement on establishing the relevant committee, thereby thwarting the work of the Conference. Finally, Mr. President, let me congratulate you on the significant progress made already during only the opening month of this year's session of the Conference. It must not be by chance alone that three Ad Hoc Committees have been constituted thus far during your Presidency. With a commitment by all members to progress rooted in advancing the security interests of all nations, this Conference should witnes substantial progress in its work during 1987. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I'thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and I now give the floor to the representative of Kenya, Ambassador Afande. Mr. AFANDE (Kenya): Mr. President, allow me, at the outset, and on behalf of my delegation, to express my warm congratulations to you on your assumption of the important post of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the first month of the 1987 session. We are confident that with your experience and expertise in disarmament negotiations the Conference will be able to progress in its work. Mr. President, you represent a great country with which Kenya enjoys very friendly relations. My delegation therefore declares its commitment to co-operate with you in your difficult task. My delegation would also like to register our gratitude to Ambassador Beesley, the distinguished representative of Canada, who presided over the work of this Conference for the month of August 1986, and during the recess period until the opening session of the Conference in 1987. We commend him for the qualified manner in which he skilfully guided the work of the Conference and his commitment to disarmament affairs. The absence of Ambassador Donald Lowitz following his untimely death is a great loss not only to his family and country but also to this Conference. He was a dear friend and colleague whose charm and contribution in the Conference on Disarmament will long be remembered. My delegation sends its heartfelt condolences to his widow, Mrs. Shana Lowitz, his family and the United States delegation. I would also like to welcome our new distinguished colleagues who are participating for the first time in the Conference on Disarmament, namely Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Barbosa of Brazil, Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, 547 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 14 (Mr. Afandc., Kenya) Ambassador Dolgu of Romania, Ambassador Nazarkine of the USSR and Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia. I also welcome the acting United States representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Hansen. The year 1986 proclaimed as the International Year of Peace by the United Nations General Assembly, sadly witnessed the continuation of regional conflicts in various parts of the world. It was expected that the various adversaries in these regional conflicts would observe the year as such and give peace a chance in resolving their divergent conflicts. But sadly this was not the case. If anything, the intensity of some of these conflicts increased with regrettable vigour. However, the year was climaxed with a serious search for peace between the two super-Powers, the United States and the USSR, when President Ronald Reagan, and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, met in Reykjavik in October last year. There is no consensus on the final results on the achievements of the Summit Meeting, which regrettably indicates that it was not a success. It appears that the two super-Powers .are far from entering into any binding agreements on disarmament questions. It is clear that both super-Powers are concerned about safeguarding their own security from the threat of attack with offensive nuclear weapons, especially inter-continental ballistic missiles, launched by either side against the other. It is indeed proper for the two super-Powers to negotiate and make proposals as well as raise objections in efforts geared towards enhancing their mutual security and in a wider sense the security of the whole world. We have remained steadfastly convinced that bilateral arms limitation and disarmament negotiations should be complementary to multilateral negotiations in arms limitation and disarmament, especially in the Conference on :Disarmament, which is the single multilateral negotiating forum. The bilateral disarmament negotiations between the two super-Powers have cesumed in Geneva on an emphatic note with both the United States and the USSR Governments demonstrating a willingness to negotiate earnestly with a view to achieving success in these negotiations. We hope that both the delegations from the United States and the USSR will strive towards harmonizing their different approaches to the various complex issues in this renewed round of bilateral negotiations. The other nations of the world are anxiously waiting for success in these bilateral talks and such anxiety arises from the justified rationale that international peace and security is the concern of all countries small and big alike. Turning to issues that are directly relevant to the Conference on Disarmament, my delegation notes that the agenda for the 1987 session of this Conference remains the same as that of the 1986 session which, to my delegation, is an indication of the continuity of the work of the Conference and also of the desire by all member States of the Conference to tirelessly work towards furthering the negotiations aimed at reaching concrete and tangible results in solving the difficult problems in arms limitation and disarmament negotiations. The agenda item on a nuclear-test ban is highest on the agenda and still creates grave concerns not only with my delegation but also with many other delegations represented in this Conference. Nuclear-weapon States especially 546 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 15 (Mr. Afande, Kenya) the two super-Powers, the United States and the USSR, have conducted numerous nuclear tests in the years gone by with only brief non-binding respites in such tests. We have taken note of the circumstances which have made the USSR declare the termination of its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests after the test conducted by the United States on 3 February this year. We regret that the efforts to achieve a bilateral moratorium were unsuccessful. It is in this context that my delegation welcomes unilateral declarations suspending such tests by any nuclear-weapon State but is of the view that the ultimate requirement on this crucial matter should be a concerted effort by all nuclear-weapon States to for ever prohibit nuclear tests. It is factual to state that these tests are conducted to determine the reliability and effectiveness of such petrifying weapons as well as to develop new categories of weapons. We are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament has a moral obligation to carry out negotiations on this very important item and my delegation appeals to all groups represented in this Conference to support the establishment of an ad hoc committee in order to facilitate meaningful negotiations on elaborating a treaty banning all nuclear tests. My delegation remains convinced that all problems related to the prohibition of nuclear tests, be they on verification or on other concerns, can be comprehensively discussed in such a subsidiary body established by the Conference. The draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban proposed by the Group of 21 in document CD/520/Rev.2 of 21 March 1986, offers a realistic basis for establishing a mandate on negotiations on this item. This should be complemented by resolution 41/46 A adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-first session entitled "Cessation of all Nuclear Test Explosions". In discussing the item on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the Conference on Disarmament should not forget the continued appeals made by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, India, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania on the urgency to halt nuclear-weapon testing prior to the formulation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In the Mexico Declaration, adopted by the leaders of these six countries on 7 August 1986, it is stated that "they remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests", and in addition, "Both the qualitative and the quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race, and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing". The Joint Statement made by the six leaders on the eve of the New Year -- 1987 -- underlines the views which are also held by my delegation that there is no justification for nuclear testing by any country. My delegation is concerned over the reports that South Africa is developing facilities, on Marion Island in the Antarctic, capable of testing nuclear weapons. South Africa's nuclear weapon capability is threatening the African countries in general, and the front-line States in particular, with nuclear annihilation should African States persist with efforts to achieve freedom and justice for the black majority in South Africa. It goes against the proposal made in Cairo in 1964 by the Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity calling for the denuclearization of Africa. 549 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 16 (Mr. Afande, Kenya) My Government has urged countries that have aided South Africa in developing a nuclear weapons capability to halt all such activities in the interests of international peace and security and also to enable the implementation of the call for the denuclearization of Africa. All Member States of the United Nations Organization should adhere to United Nations General Assembly resolutions 41/55 A and B adopted during the forty-first session of the General Assembly in 1986 entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa" and the "Nuclear Capability of South Africa" respectively. Delegations in the Conference on Disarmament have informally and formally expressed positive projections that the Conference will be able to finalize a draft chemical weapons convention in its 1987 session and be in a position to present it to the forty-second session of this year's United Nations General Assembly. This optimism can only be manifested if all delegations work towards resolving the outstanding issues hampering the drafting of a chemical weapons convention. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will indeed hasten the consultations in this very important area. The keen interest of my delegation in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons stems from the conviction that chemical weapons, some of which do not require a sophisticated technological base to produce, and can, indeed, be produced by any country, should for ever be banned from the arsenals of States possessing these horrifying weapons. My delegation would like to sincerely thank Ambassador Cromartie, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, for steering the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as its Chairman for the 1986 session in a most commendable and satisfying manner. We also take this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Eketus, the distinguished representative of Sweden, on his being appointed as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the duration of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament. We have great confidence in his experience and we trust that under his direction the Ad Hoc Committee will be in a position to continue and initiate new approaches to resolve all outstanding problems hampering the conclusion of a draft chemical weapons convention by the end of the 1987 session of the Conference. My delegation recalls quite clearly that after the Summit Meeting between the two super-Powers in Geneva, in 1985, a Joint Statement issued by the United States and the USSR truthfully declared that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We were reassured by this statement as it indicated that it was not to the interest of the super-Powers to engage in a nuclear war. But we would be even more reassured if this joint declaration could be enhanced by immediate and concrete measures to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race not only in bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers but also in the Conference on Disarmament. The prevention of nuclear war is indeed a vital task and no energies should be spared in launching negotiations to realize this objective. We appeal to all delegations to work together towards establishing an appropriate body to consider this very important matter. 550 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 17 (Mr. Afande, Kenya) My delegation supports all efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-free zones. In this regard, we commend all the States Parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga which has declared a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, stretching from the Equator in the North to the Antarctic in the South and from the West Coast of Latin America to the West Coast of Australia. In calling for the prohibition of nuclear war including all related matters, non-nuclear-weapon States have, rightfully, proposed that the nuclear-weapon States should categorically assure them against the use of or threat of use of nuclear weapons or any one of them. It would be morally unjustified for any nuclear-weapon State to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State. The complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons would provide this basic assurance required by non-nuclear-weapon States, as the effects of nuclear weapons once unleashed would not distinguish between nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States. The realm of outer space, which has been referred to as the common heritage of mankind and should be confined exclusively for peaceful purposes to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all nations, has proved vitally useful in the sense that civil space satellites have proved crucial in communications, navigation, weather-forecasting and remote-sensing, among other vital uses. Regrettably, this realm has become militarized and the super-Power arms race has been extended into outer space. It is in the general interest of all mankind that space should not be used to further any aggressive military interests of any State especially those of the two super-Powers and their allies. To do so would threaten the security of the whole world from space as well as efforts to terminate the arms race on Earth. We are hopeful that the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for the 1987 session of the Conference will be able to address the problems related to this agenda item. We also believe that the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons for the 1987 session will provide a necessary forum for further progress in efforts aimed at reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Conference on Disarmament is expected to submit to the United Nations General Assembly a complete draft of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament before the close of its forty-first session, and we hope that all delegations will extend to Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, the distinguished representative of Mexico, who is Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the necessary co-operation in efforts towards realizing this required objective. On its part, my delegation, will extend its necessary co-operation to ensure progress in the work of this Ad Hoc Committee. I cannot conclude my statement without mentioning the forthcoming Conference on the question of the relationship between disarmament and 551 neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 18 (Mr. Afande, Kenya) development, to be held in New York in August this year. Although the Conference is of particular importance to developing countries, my delegation considers that all countries, developed and developing, are affected in one way or another by the nuclear and conventional arms race. Military expenditures are increasing with the progression of time and thF? nuclear-weapon States and their allies account for a large proportion of this expenditure, on the one hand. On the other hand, developing countries also contribute a substantial proportion to the continued rise in military expenditures, which is a saddening fact as such resources could be usefully invested in improving the lagging social and economic sectors of these countries. Many resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly have often expressed the concern of this world body for reducing and restraining military expenditures and for creating increased possibilities for re-allocating released resources towards socio-economic development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries. Kenya, as a developing country attaches great importance to the forthcoming Conference and appeals to some developed countries which have expressed doubt on the effectiveness of the Conference to attend it and contribute to the achievement of its desired objectives. Finally, the Conference on Disarmament has in its agenda indicated the major issues in disarmament which need to be addressed and negotiated upon in order to create a safer, freer and peaceful world. It cannot be denied that the non-aligned and neutral States in this Conference have made all efforts within their capability to bring about effective measures in the field of disarmament negotiations. These efforts, which are on record, have been aimed at initiating new approaches to all the questions before the Conference on Disarmament. Sadly, most of these efforts have not achieved any great Success within the Conference. The non-aligned and neutral States, in formulating new approaches and initiatives on disarmament questions, have always done so with the objective of fulfilling the dictates not only of the Charter of the United Nations but also of the Final Document adopted after the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament held in 1978, which in essence advocate complete and effective disarmament measures. We note that the third special session of the General Assembly, wholly devoted to the question of disarmament, is scheduled to take place in 1988. This will be 10 years after the first special session of the General Assembly devoted entirely to the same question. As at present position, the Conference on Disarmament will not have made any major achievements in negotiations manifesting in any disarmament treaty. Certainly, the expectations of the other participating member States in the third special session will be dampened when this fact is brought to their attention. We have one year to show to the world that the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament can produce tangible results. My delegation hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will adequately respond to this challenge by action and not by mere words. 552 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 19 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President as well as to the country that the President represents. I now give the floor to the last speaker on my list for today, the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Tonwe. Mr. TONWE (Nigeria): I thank you Mr. President. I would also like to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the crucial month of February 1987. The skilful manner in which you have conducted the affairs of the Conference during the last few weeks has produced the positive results we have obtained so early in the session. I wish to assure you and the delegation of your great country that you can count on the continued support of the Nigerian delegation. May I also congratulate Ambassador Alan Beesley of Canada for the efficient way he presided over our deliberations in the month of August and during the inter-sessional months. I cangot continue this statement without first paying tribute to a distinguished colleague and friend, Ambassador Donald Lowitz of the United States, whom the cold hand of death so prematurely took away from us at the beginning of the session. Ambassador Donald Lowitz was an affable diplomat who defended the interests of 'his great country convincingly, and, at the same time, demonstrated his respect for the interests of other nations, as they were conveyed by their representatives. Indeed, by his words, comportment and friendship, he made one feel that the arms race, which we are gathered here to try to stop, was a phenomenon that was out of character, even for the rival Powers. The loss of Ambassador Lowitz is tragic and I would like to convey through you, Mr. President, the heartfelt condolences of the Nigerian delegation to the United States delegation, to Shana Lowitz and to the entire family of the deceased. Permit me, Mr. President, to welcome the representatives of member States who have recently been appointed by their respective Governments to lead their delegation to the Conference. The statements made this morning by the distinguished representatives of Yugoslavia, the United States and Kenya, have given us a lot of food for thought -- some of it quite appetizing, other parts quite provocative. I am convinced that we would all like to reflect seriously on the propositions we have heard. I would not like here to go into details. I would only like to say that some of the things we have heard incite some reservations. We cannot today look at the topography of the disarmament field without being struck by a number of features and dates which have far-reaching consequences for our deliberations and negotiations at this Conference: November 1985, Reykjavik, 1993, 3 February 1987, etc. November 1985 and Reykjavik recall summits of hope, which, unfortunately, rapidly fizzled away. Nineteen-ninety-three and 3 February 1987 are dates which must remind us of national idiosyncracies and a determination we cannot ignore. The ideological schism, the ambitions, strategies, fears and divergences which paralyse summits, or fuel the arms race in rival States or alliances, 553 nprinqcifipci in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 20 (Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria) impose a tremendous responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva -- the unique multilateral negotiating forum. Consequently, instead of despair when we hear what we do not want to hear, the Conference will have to draw on its reserve of optimism, perseverance and creativeness. The Nigerian delegation recognizes the indispensability of bilateral talks on disarmament, but it does also believe that these talks do not in any way reduce the tremendous value of the role of the unique multilateral forum. We further recognize that disarmament has to be carried out by those who have amassed arms, especially the super-Powers; but we are also convinced that the enterprise is extremely important for the survival of all nations, big or small. It is, therefore, the duty of the Conference on Disarmament to see to it that the course of negotiations reflects the conscience of humanity. The Conference on Disarmament, having been duly mandated to act in the field, must not lose the right to take initiatives, nor relent in its endeavour to be kept fully informed about the substance of bilateral or regional disarmament negotiations. The Conference on Disarmament has been around long enough to know that relations between the super-Powers are often bedevilled by various subjective factors which exacerbate their fears and rivalry. As the Washington-based "World Priorities" put it: "Distrust between the two (super-Powers) has been fanned by exaggerated fantasies on both sides (and) mutual antagonism has created (in that context) a symbiosis which is as effective in driving the arms race as any co-operative agreement could be.". We do not need to have read the Prince to know that the said symbiosis is not entirely new. Competition is an important ingredient of any living organism, rivalry is the hallmark of Great Powers. If Great Powers had no rivals, they would invent them and if they were not opposed, they would develop into tyrants and oppress the people. The Nigerian delegation welcomes a healthy competition among the Powers, but would never support those who nourish inordinate ambitions. One such ambition, in our time, is the desire of States to establish a permanent military superiority, political and economic hegemony over the rest of the world, for all time. History is replete with cases of the rise and fall of Powers and Empires. The process, and the circumstances, of ascendancy and decline might differ in each case, but the basic human qualities and shortcomings which bring them about have, all through the ages, remained much the same. As a philosopher explained it, "those who do not study the past will repeat its errors, and those who do will find other ways to err". We must not surrender to the basic instincts of man, in the crucial field of disarmament. We must not find other ways to err. If we did, it would be because we have denied ourselves the creative genius of man. Those who have done so much to conquer their physical environment can no doubt do something to design solutions, albeit dynamic, to their socio-political problems. Time is not irrelevant. In the 1920s, disarmament negotiations collapsed ostensibly because the Powers could not agree on the relative weight to be attributed to the different weapons. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear 554 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 21 (Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria) weapons became the principal obstacle. Our planet is today threatened by the massive build-up of nuclear-weapon arsenals, and the overwhelming majority of mankind wishes to see this weapon banished for ever. But time is running out: When the super-Powers, two today, three, four tomorrow, have acquired "Star Wars" capabilities, only the strategy of massive retaliation would be perceived by other nuclear-weapon States to provide a minimum deterrence. Consequently, if this Conference still wishes to give priority to nuclear disarmament in the future, now is the time to concentrate its efforts on stopping the dangerous attempt to transfer the arms race to outer space. If we cannot acquire the moral force to dissuade the protagonists of Star Wars from militarizing outer space, we will have lost the battle for nuclear disarmament on Earth. The Nigerian delegation sincerely hopes that the prevention of the arms race in outer space will henceforth be placed in the foreground of our preoccupations at this Conference. My delegation would like to see a subsidiary body established without further delay, with a mandate that is meaningful and flexible and would lead progressively to an agreemeni. As a corollary of steps to be taken to halt the imminent militarization of outer space, the Conference must tackle the problem of eliminating the factor which generates mutual distrust and insecurity, which, in turn, fuels the desire to acquire some invulnerable weapon up there in outer space. The Nigerian delegation continues to believe that the first step in this direction is a nuclear-weapon-test ban. This should be followed by a freeze of all nuclear-weapon arsenals. Thereafter, negotiations to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons can seriously begin. The argument that tests do not prevent an acceptable, and therefore verifiable, agreement on nuclear-weapon cutbacks is not at all convincing. It is now common knowledge that testing permits nuclear-weapon States to refine and modernize their arsenals and thus aggravate the crisis of confidence. This cannot be said to support the aim of our negotiations. The argument about detection difficulties no longer holds. Scientists on both sides have confirmed that they can detect, by national means, nuclear explosions with yields of even less than 1 kiloton. In this connection, we welcome the indications that seismologists of the super-Powers have been exchanging data and visits. This should be intensified, as it would create the understanding and trust needed to produce and hold an agreement. To further improve the psychological and political environment for nuclear disarmament negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States should be prepared to give a legally binding undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States which do not possess such weapons. We make this proposal because we realize that some nuclear-weapon States will probably reject out of hand our previous suggestion that all States should renounce the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The Nigerian delegation still cannot understand, having regard to the disastrous consequences of a nuclear war, nuclear winter and all that, that our proposal was rejected by some Powers, which, none the less, implore the Conference to give priority to negotiating a ban on chemical weapons. And yet nuclear weapons are a greater threat to human survival than are chemical weapons; and there is no choice to be made between death by physical annihilation and death by asphyxiation. 555 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 22 (Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria) Several arguments have been advanced for holding back on giving the type of undertaking we envisage, or for imposing conditions. The Nigerian delegation appreciates that there are certain problems that have to be resolved. For example, what proviso would apply to States which are members of military alliances equipped with nuclear weapons; or States which have nuclear weapons on their.territory; or States which have no nuclear weapons but may exercise some discretion as to the use of those stationed on their territory. All these are questions which deserve special attention and would require special treaty provisions. The Nigerian delegation has no doubt that such provisions, which meet the legitimate concerns of all States, can be designed by the Conference. In this connection, the Nigerian delegation is highly encouraged by the prompt decision of the Conference to set up an Ad Hoc Committee on the so-called negative security assurances. We sincerely hope that the Committee will soon be able to commence concrete work on the text of a legal instrument that is generally acceptable. Having said that, the Nigerian delegation would like to say how pleased we are to note the amount of progress that has been made in the last year on the convention to ban chemical weapons. We would like to congratulate Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom for the significant work done in this respect under his chairmanship. We are glad that Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden, our dedicated colleague, has been elected to, hopefully, conclude the good work that has been done in this field so far. The prospect of a chemical weapons convention in the near future is, for my delegation, a source of confidence in the future of our disarmament negotiations. If it materializes, the convention would, in itself, be historic: it would be the first major disarmament agreement. Above all, it would demonstrate, once again, on a multilaterally significant issue, that the major Powers can co-operate intensively in diverse areas, if their national interests, or their perceptions of international problems, converge. It would further confirm our belief that given the political will, the Conference on Disarmament could make rapid progress in other areas. My delegation would like to reiterate the views we have expressed in the past that the final text of the chemical weapons convention should ensure that the destruction of all stockpiles and facilities would be done in such a manner that the present chemical-weapon Powers would not in any way be in a position to exploit their position during the transition period. Furthermore, it would have to guarantee in no uncertain terms, to the non-chemical-weapon Powers, the right to unfettered development of their budding chemical industries for peaceful purposes. The Nigerian delegation is glad to note that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Compretiensive Programme of Disarmament, under the distinguished chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles, has been relaunched. Given the energy and dedication of the Chairman, and the concern of all delegations to meet the deadline quite rightly set by the General Assembly, we believe that substantial progress can be made towards agreeing on a comprehensive programmP. 5S6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.391 23 (Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria) The work of the Conference this year is particularly crucial for the future of disarmament negotiations. Next year, the third special session on disarmament should be held. The Conference on Disarmament will then have to give an account of itself. Unless it can show evidence that its structure, procedures and results deserve an unqualified extension of its mandate, the Conference might have to face some unpleasant surprises. The Conference on Disarmament has a mandate from the United Nations. The same body has determined in various resolutions which areas should be given priority. It is wrong for certain States to seek to impose other priorities on the Conference, in disregard of the resolutions of the overwhelming majority of the international community. We must, therefore, at this Conference, give priority to nuclear disarmament and for that purpose put the non-militarization of outer space first. That is the best way to move ahead. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President and to the country that the President represents. This concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none. As there is no other business, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 26 February, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned. The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m. 557 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 , CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.392 26 February 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 26 February 1987, at 10 a.m. President: GE. 87-60254/7417E Mr Fan Guoxiang (China) 558 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 392nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. According to its programme of work, the Conference will today continue its consideration of agenda item 1, "Nuclear Test Ban" and item 2 "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament". Following rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member who wishes to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. On my list of speakers for today, I have the representatives of India, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I now give the floor to the first speaker, the representative of India, Ambassador Teja. Mx. TEJA (India): Mr. President, permit me to take this opportunity to extend to you the felicitations of my delegation on your assumption of the Presidency for this crucial month of February, the opening period of the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament. The manner in which the work of the Conference has got off to a smooth start bears eloquent testimony to your diplomatic skills and capabilities. I should like to assure you of my delegation's full co?operation in the discharge of your responsibilities. I would also like to avail myself of this occasion to convey our gratitude to Ambassador Beesley of Canada for having presided over the Conference in a most competent and exemplary manner during the important month of August and in the intersessional period. My delegation wishes to extend its sincere condolences to the delegation of the United States of America and to the family of the late Ambassador Donald Lowitz. In his untimely demise, we have lost a colleague whose professional skills and high personal qualities will be long remembered by all of us. I would like to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues who have joined the Conference on Disarmament: Ambassador Hacene of Algeria, Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia and Ambassador Nazarkine of the Soviet Union. Since I am substantively participating in the Conference for the first time, I greatly look forward to working closely with all of them and of course with other colleagues. The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament -- SSOD?III -- to be held next year, provides us with an appropriate moment to make an honest appraisal of our collective effort in this area and to take stock, briefly, of the successes and failures of the Conference on Disarmament during the last nine years. A careful analysis reveals that the achievements could have been more substantial but the fault surely does not lie in the charter of the Committee but rather in the lack of political will which, in turn, had a cumulative effect on the functioning of this sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament. The priorities established by the Final Document have unfortunately been distorted and almost reversed. There have been no meaningful negotiations on such 559 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R0001nninnnni_A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 3 (Mr. Teja, India) critically important items of our agenda as Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, Prevention of nuclear war, Nuclear test ban and Prevention of an arms race in outer space. No subsidiary bodies have been set up on halting the nuclear arms race or prevention of nuclear war. On a nuclear-test-ban treaty, which has long been considered as the crucial first step in ending the nuclear arms race, it was not possible to agree on an adequate negotiating mandate for an ad hoc committee. On the Prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Ad Hoc Committee has found itself hampered in its work, again because of the absence of a negotiating mandate. We draw attention to these flaws not to detract from the achievements of the Conference but to highlight the lamentable fact that lack of political will cannot but lead to a loss of urgency and hence momentum. One must therefore hope that in the year just before the SSOD-III, the Conference will focus on re-establishing the priorities in disarmament to enable itself to undertake negotiations on the critical items, as we -- all of us around this table -- had originally intended in 1978. The present session of the Conference on Disarmament takes place against the backdrop of Reykjavik. When we reflect that the United Nations had declared 1986 as the International Year of Peace, we cannot but conclude that Reykjavik meeting became a lost opportunity. None the less, we would like to be optimistic and consider it a positive development, in the sense that it indicated that a nuclear-free world can become a reality if the necessary political will can be mustered. Equally importantly, Reykjavik demonstrated that it is possible to overcome mutual fear and suspicions which have fuelled the arms race. It was not, of course, an isolated or sudden event. An earlier summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985 had led to their important joint conclusion that a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore must never be fought. The two leaders accepted that their countries would not engage in conventional or nuclear war or seek to achieve military superiority. It is to be hoped that after Reykjavik it will now be possible at the ongoing bilateral consultations taking place here in Geneva to make substantial progress towards translating these joint conclusions into legally binding instruments. While we welcome any progress in bilateral talks, this need not imply that the Conference on Disarmament can or should have no meaningful role. It has been unambiguously mandated to undertake negotiations on the fundamental aspects of nuclear disarmament. In the face of the universal concern about the danger of a nuclear war and its consequences for mankind, a multilateral approach is both logical and democratic. It would be a positive step if this Conference could establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate on item 2 of our agenda. The Final Document of SSOD-I has already provided us with the framework of the stages involved, commencing from cessation of improvements or development of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and leading to reductions in the existing stockpiles with a view to their ultimate elimination. The cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is closely linked to another item on our agenda: the prevention of nuclear war. We believe that nuclear weapons are not merely weapons of war but weapons of mass 560 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 4 (Mr. Teja, India) annihilation. The use of these weapons cannot be countenanced on any grounds whatsoever, least of all on abstractions based on esoteric doctrines of security. It is a cause for concern that so far it has not been possible to establish an ad hoc committee to consider appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. The Harare Declaration of the 8th Non-Alighed Summit reiterates that "the use of nuclear weapons besides being a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, would also be a crime against humanity". This is in recognition of the fact that the prevention of nuclear war is not only a moral imperative but linked to the survival of the human race. The Summit accordingly urged the nuclear-weapon States to agree, pending the achievement of the nuclear disarmament, to the conclusion of an international treaty on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It would contribute to the success of negotiations on item 3, if the Conference on Disarmament can undertake substantive work to develop a convention to forswear the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on lines similar to General Assembly resolution 41/60 F which has been adopted by overwhelming majority year after year since 1982. The Annex to this resolution provides for a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons which is based on the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. A legally binding commitment banning the use of nuclear weapons is therefore a logical step in the right direction. Twenty-seven years ago, Jawaharlal Nehru proposed a standstill for the suspension of nuclear-weapon testing, until an agreement on the control and prohibition of nuclear weapons could be achieved. India, therefore, attaches particular importance to the nuclear-test ban. We believe that a comprehensive treaty on the complete prohibition of tests of all types of nuclear weapons in all environments by all States is a prerequisite to halting the arms race. It is self-evident that unless we all agree to putting an end to nuclear-weapons tests, we shall not be able to achieve our goal of nuclear disarmament and the dangers of nuclear war will increase. It is this conviction which motivated the leaders of the Five-Continent Peace Initiative to call for an end to all nuclear testing, first in the Delhi Declaration and more recently in the Mexico Declaration. The 8th Non-Aligned Summit also addressed itself to this important issue in an unambiguous manner. The Harare Declaration states that a comprehensive test ban is a matter of the highest priority for the non-aligned countries. It emphasizes the "pressing need to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test ban treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapons tests by all States in all environments for all time". The alternative before us is this: a negotiated comprehensive test-ban treaty to de-escalate the nuclear-arms race and reduce the risk of nuclear war or a situation of non-negotiation in which continued nuclear-weapon testing accelerates the arms race and increases the danger of nuclear war. Our choice is clear! How can we achieve this objective? By merely talking about it or by making concrete efforts to reach agreements? The Conference on Disarmament is a negotiating body on disarmament, not a deliberative organ which task has been entrusted to the Disarmament Commission by the General Assembly. It is important to recall this distinction because any attempt to confuse the tasks of the deliberative and negotiating organs of the United Nations will only 561 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 5 (Mr. Teja, India) impede our work and will not be conducive to achieving constructive results. The Conference on Disarmament cannot therefore content itself by setting up a subsidiary body which has no authority to negotiate but only discuss. The approach to item 1 of our agenda has therefore to be one of negotiations, not that of non-negotiations. The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which was adopted by consensus nine years ago, has clearly stated that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. The same Declaration had also referred to the need to conclude urgently the negotiations which were then in progress on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests". This effort was unfortunately abandoned soon after the adoption of the consensus document. It cannot remain in that limbo and must be rescued from its position of obscurity. Basing ourselves on the deeply held and publicly stated position of non-aligned nations to which I have referred a little while ago, the Group of 21 in the Conference on Disarmament adopted by consensus an approach which is contained in document CD/520/Rev.2. This document clearly states our desire to establish an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban "to initiate the multilateral negotiations of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests". This position remains on the table. The position of the Western Group, as far as I am aware, is contained in document CD/521. We have recently heard arguments, some of them quite eloquent, that despite the serious differences in approach, the Conference should consider the setting up of an ad hoc committee without undertaking negotiations. It has been suggested that what is important is not the mandate but "practical" work and that certain shifts in the voting pattern on certain resolutions in the General Assembly are indicative of the growing convergence between the opposing views. With due respect and the best of goodwill, we find it difficult to agree with this proposition or with the suggestion that the basic issues of negotiations should be set aside. One delegation has authoritatively stated that on some nuclear-testing issues, it is prepared to resume work in a committee with "an appropriate non-negotiating mandate". Some delegations have raised the question of whether a negotiating mandate is absolutely necessary at the present time. Still others feel that the ad hoc committee could profitably concentrate on such issues as verification and compliance, a subject which has been under discussion by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts for the last 10 years. We are not convinced that piecemeal approaches with frequently shifting preferences can provide the answer to this problem. Since 1979, the year after the Final Document of SSOD-I was adopted, there have been 364 or 365 nuclear tests, as has been recorded by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The moratorium on nuclear testing which was being unilaterally observed by one of the super-Powers has been abandoned for reasons which are well known to the Committee. Nearly 25 years after the call given by the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty that as a provisional measure all nuclear test explosions should be halted, the tests 562 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 6 (Mr. Teja, India) have unfortunately continued. Under such circumstances, when confronted with an indefinite prospect of more nuclear tests, more nuclear tests, should this Conference be asked to set up committee to do less than what many of us have advocated over tests are conducted not merely to update the existing nuclear develop new weapon systems, when testing is justified not only on the perceived inadequacy of verification and compliance but on the more basic ground of national security, when the priority attached by some to a nuclear-test ban has been virtually reversed so that a test-ban treaty would come towards the end rather than in the earlier stages of the disarmament process, should the role of the Conference on Disarmament -- the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament -- be confined to an airy discussion of the issues, without any authority to engage in meaningful negotiations on the vital issues of the day. we are and I repeat, an ad hoc the years? When arsenals but to The answer to these questions is clear in so far as we are concerned. The setting up of an ad hoc committee under item 1 without the mandate to initiate multilateral negotiations of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests will defeat the very objective which we all wish to achieve. It may create an illusion of movement without any real movement and arouse false hopes that the Conference had broken new ground when nothing of that sort may in fact have happened. It would be tantamount to legitimizing nuclear-weapon tests and by implication the nuclear-arms race for an indefinite period. My delegation would be reluctant to take on such an onerous responsibility. We would therefore once again urge in all sincerity that the question of a negotiating mandate should be addressed with due deliberation and with more effort to persuade those who have not been in favour of it. This way, we would at least know the future direction in which we are moving even though the road may sometimes be hard and difficult. To do otherwise would mean obscuring our vision and getting lost among the footpaths of side issues without reaching the principal destination. I would now like to turn to item 5 of our agenda -- Prevention of an arms race in outer space -- which has all too obvious a relationship with the nuclear issues. The Six-Nation Initiative has placed particular emphasis on this question. The Delhi Declaration calls for the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons The Harare Declaration calls on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations urgently to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent the extension of the arms race in all its aspects into outer space and thus enhance the prospects of co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space. The Ad Hoc Committee, which has been obliged to function so far within a limited mandate, has reached certain conclusions which are reflected in last year's report contained in CD/726. This document concludes that the Ad Hoc Committee has examined and identified the need to reinforce the legal regime applicable to outer space; that the Ad Hoc Committee has examined and identified the need for strict compliance with existing agreements; and that the Ad Hoc Committee recognized the interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. 563 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 7 (Mr. Teja, India) What is therefore needed now is to undertake negotiations to reinforce the regimes by developing new agreements or agreement. The issue assumes greater urgency in view of the reports about the possibility of early deployment of the first phase of the ballistic missile defence foreseen in the Strategic Defence Initiative. The Conference was not in existence when nuclear weapons began to be developed. It would however be tragic if our Conference merely engages itself in discussion while development and deployment of space weapons takes the arms race into yet another dimension undermining the existing network of arms control agreements. This cannot but aggravate the threat of a nuclear war. The Conference must therefore address itself to the issue without further delay. My delegation is pleased to note the high priority attached to item 4 -- Chemical Weapons -- by the members of the Conference, especially the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Encouraging trends were noticed during 1986 and a fair amount of progress was achieved in refining the language of the draft convention. For this, I would like to express our sincere gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, and also the Chairmen of three Working Groups. We share the optimism expressed by some delegates about the possible conclusion of the Convention by the end of 1987 and are prepared to co-operate fully with the new Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, the distinguished representative of Sweden, to achieve this goal. It is already possible to visualize the final form of the CW Convention and it would be no exaggeration to state that it will be the most complex disarmament instrument that we have negotiated to date. Presently, the negotiations are at a delicate stage. It is therefore necessary that we organize our work in a manner that would enable us to deal most effectively with the pending issues. I would suggest that we occupy ourselves with the issues of principles while leaving the experts to iron out the technical and procedural questions. In this connection our delegation has attempted in the following paragraphs to indicate some of the priorities. The definition of a chemical weapon is a fundamental issue and a complicated one. The present definition based on toxicity has helped the Ad Hoc Committee in its deliberations but it is now widely felt, especially taking into account the consideration of non-prohibited activities, that this definition needs to be refined by incorporating other elements based on characteristics of chemical weapons and, therefore, the danger that they might pose to the Convention. Another area which is related to this issue is the classification of chemical products into different categories and the rationale for doing so. In this exercise, our delegation feels, we must not lose sight of the fact that the Convention is aimed at banning chemical weapons and not inhibiting the growth of chemical industry for peaceful purposes. Accordingly, the importance of Article XI of the Convention cannot be overlooked. It is our strong conviction that provisions for implementing international co-operation for economic and technological development of peaceful chemical industry will only serve to strengthen the Convention and its fundamental objectives. 564 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 8 (Mr. Teja, India) The issues relating to organizational aspects and the structure of the authority which will be responsible for the implementation of this Convention also deserve urgent and thorough consideration. Given the unique nature of this instrument, it is necessary to design new solutions to meet the requirements of the Convention. Finally, while still on chemical weapons, another significant aspect is that of the challenge inspection regime. It is heartening to note that there is now a convergence on the basic concepts underlying this measure and we hope that it will soon be possible to convert it into an agreement on the details of this exercise. An early resolution of this issue will go a long way in strengthening our determination to conclude the Convention by the end of 1987. In accordance with the decision of the General Assembly, the Conference is expected to present a comprehensive programme of disarmament before the end of the forty-first session. It is expected that the successful elaboration of this programme, which was to have been initially completed in 1982 for SSOD-II, will help reaffirm the priorities clearly established in the Final Document of SSOD-I. Some nuclear-weapon States have in the past refused to agree to specific measures as well as to a time-frame for these stages. It will be our effort to ensure that the Ad Hoc Committee on Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament under the able guidance of Ambassador Garcia Robles will be able to fulfil its mandate in accordance with the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. My delegation is pleased to note that it has been possible to set up during the first month itself, Ad Hoc Committees on items 6 and 7 -- dealing respectively with effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons including radiological weapons. We hope that these Committees can begin their work soon. Before concluding, I should like to briefly touch upon the work which is to be carried out in the forthcoming Conference on Disarmament and Development later this year. The Conference will provide all members with a historic opportunity to come to substantial agreement on this important issue. The Conference should avoid controversy and focus instead on the universally important subject in a positive manner. My delegation hopes that the successful conclusion of this Conference will provide a useful and significant impetus to our efforts in achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of India for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to my next speaker, the representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski. 565 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 9 Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Comrade President, it has been repeatedly stressed in this room that the Conference on Disarmament is a sole or a unique multilateral negotiating body of 40 States of all regions of the world, different political systems, large, medium and small, non-nuclear and nuclear, members of political and military alliances and non-aligned. This, no doubt, creates strong potential for producing concrete, effective results. The fact is, however, that this potential is still not fully awakened to become a leading force in working out real, effective measures for decreasing step by step the world's military arsenals, especially of weapons of mass destruction, until their final elimination. With a feeling of disappointment one has to admit that, though some progress has been made by the Conference on Disarmament every year, especially on chemical weapons prohibition, unfortunately so far no results have been achieved which could be translated into real disarmament measures. It is true that the work of this body depends to a large degree upon the state of the world political situation. I share the feeling which seems to prevail that though still far from being satisfactory, the overall political climate is now more propitious for substantial results to be achieved by the Conference than it was some years ago. The past year was proclaimed the International Year of Peace. Although there was not peace everywhere in the world this was a year of great significance for the future, for better prospects of lasting peace, based on far-reaching disarmament rather than the arms race. It was the year of the great Soviet initiative to free the world of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction before the turn of the century. This was not a programme addressed to a specific forum or nation. It was a programme addressed to all nations, to all disarmament forums. It was quite natural that also here, at the Conference on Disarmament, it occasioned not only significant interest, as it deserved, but also stirred up useful discussion and exchange of views. This programme still remains, as we call it in conference language, on the negotiating table, as was the case also during the Reykjavik Summit Meeting. That Meeting now belongs to history. It has heralded new hopes of a nuclear-free world. The positive results were, however, far less than they could have been. The far-reaching, bold Soviet proposals for reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons were again not matched by a similar willingness of the other major Power to promptly do away with nuclear weapons and prevent an arms race in outer space. The bilateral USSR-United States talks here in Geneva continue. We strongly believe that they will be carried on successfully and will bring concrete, positive results. Nineteen eighty-six -- the International Year of Peace -- was also a year of silence at the Soviet nuclear-test sites. This silence could have continued permanently if the United States had not chosen to carry on with its programme of nuclear testing. No matter whether it was a coincidence or 566 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 10 (Mr. Turbanski, Poland) wilful and careful planning, the first American nuclear test this year -- on 3 February, the opening date of the Conference's session -- was a challenge to world public opinion and a sign of disregard for the efforts of this Conference. The Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe resulted in the adoption of a document which is widely considered a convincing demonstration of a very concrete contribution to the strengthening of international stability and security. In many respects it could serve as a good example that intensive efforts and the spirit of compromise can lead to substantial results, that progress is possible even in a complicated international situation. In making this short overview of the main developments in the area of international security and disarmament in the past year I would like also to mention the important proposal of the socialist countries at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly on the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. Such a system is indispensable in a modern world, as we approach the twenty-first century. This is meant to be not only a system of peace and security but a system of collective thinking and mutual responsibility for the future of mankind, a system embracing not only political and military aspects but also economic, humanitarian, social and other important areas of international relations. Important political initiatives and proposals came from the non-aligned countries. I have especially in mind the Harare Declaration and the declarations of the leaders of the six States. At their Budapest summit meeting, the Warsaw Treaty member States put forward the idea of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. And last but not least, my country came forward with an important initiative at the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting to complete the mandate of the European Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament so as to enable it to consider and to undertake steps toward reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. These two last initiatives, though regional in scope, have broader, extraregional significance from the point of view of international security, confidence and stability. I have recalled only some examples of developments of the last year. They do not mean, however, that tensions in the international situation ceased to exist, that the arms race has stopped, or that the danger of nuclear holocaust has disappeared. Not at all. 561 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 11 (Mr. Turbanski, Poland) Though some of us do not like any time limits to be put before the Conference, it is worthwhile reiterating that in 1988 the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be convened. I fully agree with Ambassador J. Dhanapala of Sri Lanka that "the approach of SSOD-III must necessarily lend a sense of urgency to our work". It would be a political setback for the Conference, for all of us to come to the SSOD-III without substantial results. The agenda of the Conference on Disarmament has consisted of the same items for years. The same also applies to priorities. The only difference is that they are becoming more and more urgent every year. The whole complex of nuclear issues -- nuclear-test ban, cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war, though enjoying the highest priority among the vast majority of Conference members, has not yet received actual priority treatment by the Conference. It remains the firm belief of Poland that the solution of these issues is of fundamental importance for the security of all States and of all mankind. Poland has consistently considered the nuclear-test ban as a very important step towards the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, as a measure facilitating nuclear disarmament, and substantially contributing to international security and mutual confidence. The utmost urgency of the prohibition of nuclear testing was strongly emphasized during the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, which adopted four resolutions on this subject. Poland was among the vast majority of countries who voted for the adoption of all these resolutions. We hope that States members of the Conference on Disarmament which were not ready to join any of these resolutions will rethink their position so as to enable the Conference to start effective and business-like work on this item. We respect the security concerns of every country, but there is, in the nuclear age, only one security for all of us. That is why it was dispiriting to hear again that France, a country whose participation in the building of European and world security is so important, continues to be of the opinion that the cessation of nuclear testing does not constitute "a pre-condition for progress towards nuclear disarmament". Most of the speakers in the first month of the 1987 session have emphasized a nuclear-test ban as a matter of the highest priority and urgency, with substantial implications for the security of all States. Now, this first month is over but the Conference is still unable to move toward establishing an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. Interpretations of this fact could differ, but there is only one sad reality -- no substantial work is being done by the Conference on a nuclear-test ban. 568 npriacsified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 12 (Mr. Turbanski, Poland) This deplorable situation must be changed. We should again join our efforts and more courageously search for a compromise formula of a mandate for the committee. We should not forget, however, that the mandate, though important, is not an aim in itself. The Group of Scientific Experts which over the years of its activity, and especially by the last progress report, has demonstrated its significant contribution to the issue of nuclear-test ban verification is a positive exception in the overall picture of the Conference's inability to deal effectively with the prohibition of nuclear testing. The Group of Scientific Experts will meet again next week to begin its work on preparation of international experiment on the exchange and processing of levels I and II seismic data. Some useful experience was gained by experts who participated in the Canadian Workshop in October 1986, in which a Polish expert also took part. May I, Mr. President, use this opportunity to express our thanks to the Canadian authorities for their organization of this useful meeting. The importance of exchange of wave-form (level II) data and its significance for verification of the future nuclear-test ban treaty is obvious to everybody. But for the work of the Group to be fully effective and goal-oriented, it has to be supplemented by concrete proceedings in the ad hoc committee. We believe that when the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts meets again in the summer part of the session, the ad hoc committee will have long been at work. My delegation is for a prompt establishment of the ad hoc committee within the framework of which business-like work on the scope, compliance and verification of a treaty on a nuclear-test ban could be undertaken. Even those who regard "a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing as a long-term objective" would agree that neither of these issues could be effectively solved as a separate, autonomous issue, without due regard for their interrelationship. That is why we are in favour of work on all elements of a future treaty, as a complex. We also agree with those delegations who consider that working groups within the committee might be needed. We think that different approaches should be considered so as to enable the committee to make full use of the abundant material at the disposal of the Conference. More detailed views on possible items to be discussed within the ad hoc committee are offered in the document submitted by a Group of Socialist Countries on 13 June 1986 (CD/701). The task before us looms large; the sooner it is undertaken and accomplished the better for our ultimate goal -- the nuclear-test ban treaty. The informal meetings held during last year's session on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament were in our opinion constructive and useful. This year we should move toward the next step -- more structured and goal-oriented work preferably in a more formalized form. Poland still 569 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 13 (Mr. Turbanski, Poland) considers that the most desirable solution would be to establish a corresponding ad hoc committee, but we are also open to other constructive proposals. Prevention of nuclear war is a problem of global dimensions. It deserves indeed to be dealt with more seriously by this multilateral body. Here again we are in favour of the establishment of an appropriate ad hoc committee, but if this is not possible my delegation would be ready to actively participate in a structured discussion of the issue at informal plenary meetings or in any other form leading toward practical work. In this context I cannot but comment on the statement made at the plenary meeting two days ago: "Would not this forum risk becoming the theatre of the absurd if it were to devote much time to addressing the prevention of nuclear war, something quite unlikely". I think it could be useful to refer in this context to some opinions of scientists, including American ones, on the growing danger of accidental nuclear war, which in their view is not "something quite unlikely". Let me quote three examples from last year: First, the Conference on the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War held in Vancouver, Canada, in May 1986, concluded that the danger of accidental nuclear war was substantial and increasing, Second, three prominent American scientists in an article published last year in Journal of Peace and Research (vol. 23, No. 1, 1986) concluded that recent developments in strategic weaponry had led to increasing fears that the danger of nuclear war by accident was growing, Third, a similar conclusion was reached by the Pugwash Workshop on nuclear forces and accidental nuclear war held in December 1986. These are not only theoretical calculations the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail addressing the participants of the International reminded them that: "There are dozens -- I repeat dozens - moments when the possibility of using such countries was seriously considered" -- and to stress once again how close mankind has point-of-no-return". . The General Secretary of Gorbachev, recently Forum for Nuclear Free World, - of recorded and acknowledged weapons against other he continued "I am saying this come to the The greatest danger facing the world today is nuclear war. In fact, it would be a real "the theatre of absurd" if this forum called the Conference on Disarmament did not deal with this question. 570 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 14 (Mr. Turbanski, Poland) It is true that nuclear and other issues, being on our agenda, are also the subject of Soviet-American bilateral talks. Poland attaches the utmost importance to those negotiations. We strongly believe, however, that this Conference cannot be just an observer of those negotiations. It would be contrary to its mandate, to the decisions of the United Nations, and to the expectations of the world community. The concrete work of the Conference on Disarmament on the items connected with nuclear weapons should not be impeded by anybody or by any reason. The problem of nuclear weapons is not the problem of the security of only some States. It is not even the problem of the security of all of us. It is the problem of the survival of our civilization. And even if in this train in which we all travel together there are some more important passengers, there are also fellow-travellers who have the interest, right and duty to say in what direction the train should go. Before I finish I would like to make a short remark on another item of special interest to my delegation, chemical weapons. It has been so far the most advanced piece of work done by the Conference. We are very glad to see the evident progress already achieved during this session. The recent proposals of the Soviet Union are of great significance to our work. They open new avenues for making headway, clearly demonstrating the constructiveness of the Soviet approach and decisiveness to bring our work to a prompt and successful end. However, a similar approach is urgently needed on the part of others too, and we would like to see it coming. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkine. Mr. NAzARKINE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, as has been repeatedly stated by the Soviet side, our unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing cannot last indefinitely if the United States does not join in it. The statement issued by the Soviet Government of 18 December last year said quite explicitly that the Soviet Union would resume nuclear testing after the first United States nuclear explosion of 1987. You are well aware of the developments which occurred early this month -- I am referring to the United States nuclear explosion on 3 February, followed by yet another explosion. I wish to remind you that on the occasion of the explosion on 3 February our side stated that "The Soviet Union no longer considers itself bound by its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear testing and will begin at an appropriate time the implementation of its programme of nuclear testing". Today at 08.00 hours Moscow time the Soviet Union carried out an underground nuclear explosion of up to 20 kilotons at the test site near Semipalatinsk. This explosion was carried out to test research results in the field of nuclear explosion physics. 571 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 15 (Mr. Nazarkine, USSR) It must be clear that the resumption of testing is not our choice, but has been forced upon us. We are well aware that the real reason for the refusal of the United States side to join the Soviet moratorium or to agree on a nuclear-test ban is that the United States is openly counting on achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and the socialist countries by developing new types and classes of weapons. The nuclear testing carried out by the United States involves not only development of new nuclear warheads, but also the creation under the SDI programme of space-based strike weapons -- X-ray nuclear-driven lasers. Work is under way on a totally new weapon capable of destroying targets both in space and on Earth. The SDI programme, therefore, is the major obstacle not only to reducing the nuclear arsenals but also to ceasing nuclear testing. We emphasize that we regard a total nuclear-weapon-test ban as a priority measure -- I stress, a priority rather than a long-term measure -- aimed towards the limitation of nuclear arms and their subsequent elimination. We propose finding without delay a solution to this question. I wish to remind you that the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, M.S. Gorbachev, stated in his reply to the leaders of Argentina, India, Mexico, Greece, Sweden and Tanzania in connection with their Declaration of 1986, that "Even if we are compelled to resume nuclear testing, we would work as consistently as we do for a resumption of full-scale negotiations on the subject, which we are prepared to conduct in any form and in any forum, but, naturally, with the participation of the United States". We believe that the Conference on Disarmament, which under its mandate is a body for multilateral disarmament negotiations, is one such forum. We wish to emphasize yet again that the States blocking the initiation of negotiations on the subject assume a serious global responsibility. It is necessary to begin without delay practical work on a nuclear-test ban in the Conference on Disarmament, and to establish an ad hoc committee for this purpose. We also support proposals to take practical steps towards extending the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water to underground nuclear testing. The Ad Hoc Group of Seismological Experts will shortly resume its work in the framework of the Conference. The Soviet experts are already in Geneva and are ready to participate constructively in the Group's work with a view to developing a system of international seismic level II data exchange and preparing the international experiment. There is no need for me to remind you of our proposals on verifying compliance with a complete nuclear-test ban agreement. Seeking to use every opportunity to intensify efforts in this field, the Soviet Union has already expressed its willingness to make use of the proposals by the six leaders to this effect. The verification problem can no longer be used as an excuse for avoiding agreement. 572 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 16 (Mr. Nazarkine, USSR) We wish to reaffirm that if the United States halts its nuclear testing, the Soviet Union will be prepared to halt on a reciprocal basis the implementation of its own programme of nuclear testing any day or month. The Soviet Union remains a staunch supporter of a complete halt to all nuclear testing as a crucial, top-priority measure for achieving the main objective of curbing the race in nuclear arms and, subsequently, completely eliminating them. As before, the Soviet Union will actively work to achieve this goal. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Is there any member who would like to take the floor? Mr. HANSEN (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President. I listened with great care to all of the statements which have been made this morning and my delegation will indeed give careful consideration to the views which have been expressed. Of particular interest were the remarks made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Narzakine. I would like to make one or two brief comments that I think are useful to us in this forum, which many of you have said in the last two or three days is the only multilateral disarmament conference. I think that every nation, large or small, is, by its constitution, charged with the responsibility to provide for the defence of its people. That is certainly the case in my country. My country was not the first one to venture into outer space with weapons. We have for many years studied and analysed the questions of defence. We have for many years relied upon a concept with which many of you have voiced disagreement: the concept of mutually assured destruction. The President of the United States, as a man of vision, sought to find a different approach and therefore, as you all know, has instigated a programme of research which is commonly known as the Strategic Defence Initiative. Now, I started by mentioning a State's right and indeed obligation to provide for its own defence. We question no other country's right to the same but we demand our own right and of course we consult with friends and allies; of course, we take into consideration factors relating to balance, stability and the effect upon peace and security in our world. But the fact remains that the United States does not now have any defence against ballistic missiles. That fact often surprises people: that a country as large as mine would not have a defence against strategic missiles which represent in today's world the most blatant threat to the security of our country. Now we have begun a programme of research which has, in our view, shown that stragegic defence is possible. We are negotiating with the Soviet Union bilaterally, as you all know, in attempts to try to deal with this problem which has arisen from the standpoint not only of our own security but from the standpoint of international stability. We hope those negotiations bring results. 573 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 17 (Mr. Hansen, United States) Now let me tell you that within the area of nuclear testing, when you speak of X-ray lasers, less than 10 per cent of those tests deal in any way with X-ray lasers. The principal objection which is given to you and to the international media about the United States Strategic Defence Initiative seems to be based upon the premise that the SDI will provide the United States with some sort of space strike capability. In that regard, I should like to quote from a publication resulting from the work and analysis, not of American scientists, but of Soviet scientists, among them Mr. Velikhov, who is generally recognized to be the man in the Soviet Union charged with this particular responsibility. I now quote: "As regards the possibilities of destroying ground-based targets by lasers from space, there are even more uncertainties. Space-based laser weapons, although sufficiently powerful to destroy ICBMs in flight, would obviously be impotent against a wide variety of hard ground targets, such as missile silos, strategic command centres, aircraft under hard covers, and so forth. ... Space-based laser weapons would be extremely sensitive to the weather conditions over prospective targets. ... These considerations all strongly suggest that even under favourable weather conditions, laser systems of a space-based ballistic missile defence seem to have limited applicability against ground hard targets." I do not wish to engage in long debates with anyone, and certainly not in those which have a polemic character, but I do want to make sure that this body understands that we are not seeking a "space strike capability", and the best way for me to let you know that, is the fact that scientists agree that lasers have little potential for such an activity. Mr. NAZARKINE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I am not going to take up much time. I would simply like to say that in one of our forthcoming statements in the course of this session of the Conference on Disarmament we were precisely intending to refer to the issue which was just now mentioned by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Hansen, namely the possibilities of the Strategic Defence Initiative from the standpoint of offensive or strike potential. Hence I am not going to refer to this issue today but I shall revert to it in one of my statements. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil. Mr. SALLES (Brazil): I just wish to call the attention of the Conference to document CD/733/Add.1 which has recently been circulated. This is an addendum to document CD/733 which, as you recall, contained a letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to you, Mr. President, conveying the text of many resolutions dealing with disarmament as well as information concerning other resolutions relating to disarmament matters. The document CD/733/Add.1 gives notice of the inclusion in the information that the Secretary-General has transmitted to you of resolution 41/11 on the 574 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 18 (Mr. Salles, Brazil) Declaration of a Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic. I mention this because my delegation feels that this inclusion was necessary, as the document did not contain it. As you will recall, this resolution which was co-sponsored by Brazil and many other delegations from Latin America and Africa, had an overwhelming vote of approval of 124 votes against just 1 and 8 abstentions. We feel that the Declaration of a Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic is an initiative representing a very important contribution to the objectives we are here to promote and implement. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I see none. The President has learnt that now we have some other business to deal with. However, since some delegations need to conduct some consultations, I suggest that we suspend the meeting for half an hour. If this can be agreed upon, we can resume here in half an hour. I would also like to inform you, at the request of its Co-ordinator, that the Group of 21 will meet in room C.108 immediately. The meeting is suspended. The meeting was suspended at 12 noon and resumed at 12.40 p.m. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 392nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now resumed. We shall now deal with other matters. The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a Working Paper (CD/WP.268) containing a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee under item 5 of the agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". The draft mandate is identical to the mandate adopted by the Conference last year in document CD/694. I have conducted informal consultations with members from different groups, and in putting this Working Paper CD/WP.268 before the Conference for decision, I wish to state that, as is known to all members of the Conference and as reflected in the 1986 report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/732), consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space is covered by the mandate contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation would have preferred a clearer and more categorical text, but it is well aware that in this case time is of the essence and it would be wrong for your strenuous efforts, Mr. President, not to receive their due reward through the adoption of a decision on this basis. My delegation will therefore agree to our adopting this mandate, with a clear interpretation on the part of my 575 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R0001001onnni_4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 19 (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico) delegation, which we have been told is the interpretation that all groups and all delegations give to this text. Thus my delegation will accept this text, and I shall continue in English for greater accuracy: (spoke in English) "with the understanding that the mandate we are going to approve covers measures proposed with the aim of preventing an arms race in outer space". (continued in Spanish) As you, Mr. President, and all the other distinguished members of the Conference will have, noticed, the words I have used are taken from the penultimate paragraph of the document distributed to us as Rev.1, and from the words you have just spoken. Mention is made in that paragraph of "consideration of proposals for measures", etc. Thus my delegation's interpretation is the one I have just given, which will appear in the record of this meeting. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement, and I thank him for his co-operative spirit. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia. Mr. ROWE (Australia): Mr. President, I would like to express my appreciation for the untiring efforts you have made which have led to the decision that we are about to take, to adopt the mandate for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We attach great significance to the early resumption of work in this Committee on this very important subject, and we are very pleased that it has been possible to arrive at consensus in the Conference to allow that to happen. We, of course, fully support the resumption of that work on the basis of the mandate which, in fact, was in operation last year because we believe that there is a lot of very useful work which needs to be done before that mandate could be considered to be exhausted, and we certainly look forward to actively contributing to the work under that mandate. We also welcome the statement which you have read out and we certainly accept the terminology of that statement. We fully endorse the way in which that statement is phrased because we feel that that is a very accurate reflection of the state of affairs and of the understandings that certainly we hold about the matters referred to in that statement. I would like to express once again our appreciation for your efforts and our support for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee under the mandate which is proposed and, of course, taking full account of the Presidential statement which you have read out. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement, and also for the spirit of understanding he has displayed. I now give the floor to the representative of Venezuela. Ms. GONZALEZ (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President, I wish to express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you occupy the Presidency of the Conference of Disarmament for this month. I should also 576 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 20 (Ms. Gonzalez, Venezuela) like to express our appreciation for the efforts you have made to forge a consensus on the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Finally, I wish to say that my delegation associates itself with the interpretation given by Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, which fully reflects its own position. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Venezuela for her statement, and also for the spirit of co-operation she has expressed. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia. Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I too wish to thank you for the efforts you have made to enable the Conference to take the decision on the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I should also like to say that since the beginning of this session of the Conference the socialist countries have shown their keen interest for the Conference to take this decision as rapidly as possible. They have always shown themselves to be very flexible and most co-operative with respect to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, in order to forge ahead with the Conference's work and not waste precious time, a very important factor as the distinguished representative of Mexico pointed out. The socialist countries join in the consensus that is emerging on the mandate and the Presidential statement on the subject. I wish to say that the socialist countries are ready and prepared to make an active contribution, as in the past, to the work of this subsidiary body on this important and high-priority item of the Conference's agenda, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement, and for the spirit of co-operation he has displayed. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador Morelli Pando. Mr. MORELLI PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): On behalf of the Group of 21, I wish to express our deep appreciation and gratitude for the efforts you have made for the prompt re-establishment of the highly important Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the spirit of co-operation he has expressed. If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268. It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): A copy of the statement that I have just made has been distributed to all members. I have also requested the secretariat to circulate an informal paper containing a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the week 2-6 March. The timetable has been prepared 577 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100ionnn1-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 21 (The President) in consultation with the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if so required. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the informal paper. It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): Allow me now to make my concluding statement as President of the Conference for the month of February. In approaching the end of my term of Presidency, I wish to make a few remarks regarding the work done in the Conference on Disarmament during the month of February. Our first order of business for the annual session was to organize our work in order to begin our consideration of substantive matters without delay. The Conference was able to adopt its agenda for the 1987 session and the programme of work for the first part of the session at the very first plenary meeting. This was a welcome development, which was made possible thanks to the understanding and co-operation of all members of the Conference. This positive political atmosphere at the opening of the Conference also made it possible for us to agree, in accordance with the rules of procedure, to invite a number of non-members to participate in substantive questions relating to the work of the Conference. The Conference had also to consider organizational arrangements for the substantive items on the agenda. We were able to re-establish at the 2nd plenary meeting during the first week after the opening of the session the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, appoint an able Chairman, Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden, for that subsidiary body and continue the negotiating process on that agenda item. During the second week we have also been able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on item 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and on item 7 "Radiological Weapons". Today, after intensive consultations during the past week, we have also been able to reach agreement on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, under agenda item 5. Consultations are proceeding for the appointment of their Chairmen. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has also resumed its work under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, who has been leading that Committee with his well-known diplomatic competence. The Conference is also engaged in intensive consultations with a view to starting, as soon as possible, substantive work on other items on the agenda. Those consultations show an approximation of positions on organizational arrangements for some of those items. It will be up to my successor to continue those consultations and hopefully to succeed in consolidating agreement on those organizational questions. However, there is a Chinese proverb which says that a long journey has to start with the first step. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the progress achieved by the Conference during the month of February is merely the beginning of our substantive work for this y5ar. We shall spare no effort 573 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.392 22 (The President) to reconcile the differences among delegations and various groups, so that the Conference may discharge its functions as the sole multilateral negotiating body of the international community in the field of disarmament. A spirit of co-operation and compromise among delegations is required in the process of negotiations and consultations and I am sure that all members of the Conference will continue to show it in the coming months. From the statements made so far it can be seen clearly that delegations continue to attach great importance to the Conference on Disarmament as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. On this basis, we shall redouble our efforts in seeking common ground on various subjects on the agenda so that the Conference will be able to reach agreements on certain items at an early date, as the entire international community expects us to do. May I express my appreciation to all members for their assistance during my Presidency, and at the same time extend to my successor, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba, my best wishes for success during his Presidency. He can count on my full co-operation in the discharge of the duties of the office. Finally, I would like to express my sincerest thanks to all members of the secretariat of the Conference for their assistance extended to me during this month, particularly the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui. I wish also to extend my gratitude to all the staff of Conference Services, the interpreters and translators, for their hard work. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will meet next Tuesday, 3 March 1987. The plenary meeting is adjourned. The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m. 579 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 6 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.393 3 March 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 3 March 1987, at 10 a.m. President: GE. $7-60350/7627E Mr. Lechuga Hevia (Cuba) 580 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 2 The PRESIDENT (Translated from Spanish): I call to order the 393rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the outset, allow me to make a brief opening statement. It is, of course, our desire that the Conference on Disarmament may set up the committees that remain to be established and thus make a significant step forward along the path to disarmament. We are now in a new year, with a very special set of circumstances: viable proposals have been put forward which would appreciably reduce the nuclear arsenals of both sides, and the possibility has been demonstrated of checking the mad adventure of the arms race. The Conference on Disarmament has been given a primary role in this major undertaking of achieving firm and stable peace. It is the only multilateral negotiating body, and in it there are represented all the nuclear Powers and representatives of countries of different sizes and from differing geographical regions of all the continents and political and economic systems of the world spectrum. It therefore brings together the optimum conditions required to carry out such an important task. If it does not achieve its objectives, that is because the spirit of confrontation and narrow mindedness will have prevailed over the responsbility placed upon this body by the international community. Over the years efforts have been made to guide the work entrusted to the Conference along the paths of effective negotiations, but further efforts are now needed in the prevailing circumstances. There are crucial agenda items which have been the subject of exhaustive debate and analysis and which are still virtually deadlocked. Others have been given superficial consideration, with no real advances being made. This position is a sort of stalemate and stagnation, and it must be overcome, as has been said repeatedly here by almost everyone who has taken the floor. The prevailing circumstances of international relations are complex and dangerous, and daring measures must be adopted to ease and end the existing tensions. Good faith is also required, to undertake responsible negotiations that will meet the needs and aspirations of all peoples, since peace is indivisible. There can be no peace for some and not for others. Hence, we have to bury the old ideas that have no place in the world of today. We have to put an end to the illusions of military superiority, which must be replaced by peaceful relations of equitable co-operation. To our mind, the waste of material, scientific, human and technological resources for the manufacture of means of destruction cannot be dissociated from the growing needs of the vast majority of mankind that calls for the use of those riches to ease and satisfy their needs in the field of food, health care and culture. These are needs which it is daily more difficult to meet, fundamental requirements that cause death and disease and accentuate the backwardness of millions of people who will never enjoy the benefits of the scientific and technological advances that are today the privilege of small strata of the world's population, unless steps are taken to bring about a radical change in the situation. We would venture to say that it is a truism that there can be no peace without development, and no development without peace. 581 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 3 (The President) Therefore the alternative to general crisis is disarmament, with everything this involves in terms of confidence and a climate of peace. This is a key year for this essential task. To promote peace, to establish it as the normal standard of co-existence, is the goal this Conference can serve. Thanks to the diplomatic skill of my predecessor, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, a number of important organizational issues were solved during the month of February. We quickly adopted our agenda for the annual session and the programme of work for the first part of the session. Two Ad Hoc Committees are working actively and three others have been established. The only matter pending, for them to start their activities, is the appointment of their Chairmen. I invite members to consider this matter as soon as possible in their group consultations, so that we may be in a position to take prompt action on this question. There are also some other organizational arrangements which require our active consideration, such as those relating to agenda items 1, nuclear-test ban, 2, cessation of the nuclear-arms race agd nuclear disarmament, and 3, prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. We also need to look at various ideas relating to the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, that is, the first part of agenda item 7. There is also the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which we started to consider last year in informal consultations, and which, as we all agreed at the start of the session, we should take up again in 1987. I intend to consult members on all these questions. We know that on some of those issues disagreements still persist, while for others we should be able to find compromises which, although not entirely satisfactory for everyone, might help us to advance our work. I am sure that I can count on the assistance and co-operation of all the members of the Conference in trying to move on from organizational to substantive discussions on these questions. I am ready, in my capacity as President, to offer any assistance which might be necessary or to take initiatives whenever there are realistic prospects of success. That concludes my opening statement. In accordance with its programme of work the Conference begins today its consideration of item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing so to do may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I now give the floor to the first of the speakers, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose. Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, on behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. It gives me great satisfaction to see that the high office of President of the Conference is now being performed by the distinguished representative of Cuba, a country with which the German Democratic Republic has for many years been linked by fraternal relations. 582 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 4 (Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic) What is more, I have always appreciated, Comrade President, our close and inspiring personal co-operation in the field of disarmament. Knowing your outstanding qualities as an experienced diplomat, I am confident that the proceedings of the Conference will be steered by skilful hands. At the same time, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the outgoing President, the distinguished representative of the People's Republic of China, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, for the untiring and effective efforts he made to enable the Conference to quickly engage in practical and meaningful work. We have learned with profound sorrow of the sudden death of Norway's Foreign Minister, His Excellency Knut Frydenlund. With his passing away, the Norwegian people has lost a statesman of great international repute. I would like to ask the Norwegian Observer delegation to convey our heartfelt condolences to its Government. In my intervention today, I wish to introduce a Working Paper on item 1, entitled Nuclear-Test Ban, submitted by a group of socialist'countries. The document will be distributed with the symbol CD/743 in the next few days. Before coming to that, however, I should like to take this opportunity, with your kind permission, Comrade President, to draw the attention of the Conference to a statement jointly issued on I March 1987 by the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Council of State and the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic. The statement is in support of the latest ground-breaking initiative of the Soviet Union, which calls for the prompt conclusion of a separate accord on the complete elimination of nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe within the next five years. Allow me to quote the following passages: "Inspired by a sense of responsibility and readiness for compromise, the Soviet Union has responded to wishes and suggestions by leading Western politicians. There are no more excuses possible now. Words must be followed by deeds, for Reykjavik already saw a virtually finished agreement on that subject. It is now feasible, without great difficulty or delay, to arrive at a finalized accord on medium-range missiles. Such a bold initial step would bring within reach the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free Europe and of reducing the stockpiles of nuclear arms altogether. Like the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic believes it to be extremely important not to relent in the quest for agreement on a substantial reduction and the subsequent elimination of strategic armaments and, in this context, to prohibit any deployment of weapons in outer space. "The Party and Government leadership of the German Democratic Republic puts on record its agreement with the Soviet position that, immediately after the signing of such an accord, the short-range intermediate missiles deployed to counter the stationing of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in western Europe will be removed from the territory of the German Democratic Republic." Sg3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 5 (Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic) In this connection, I wish to let you know that Mr. Erich Honecker, Chairman of the German Democratic Republic's Council of State, has sent a message to Mr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which he has pointed out the historic chance this new Soviet initiative offers along the road to a world without nuclear weapons. Also, I wish to emphasize again that, besides the removal of medium-range and short-range intermediate nuclear weapons, the threat posed by the other theatre nuclear forces in Europe could be lessened quickly and effectively, if a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe were created, as proposed by Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. I should now like to revert to the introduction of CD/743. In view of the urgency of the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests as an initial step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, socialist countries deem it necessary for the Conference on Disarmament to considerably intensify work on item 1 of its agenda. Working Paper CD/743 serves this very purpose. It contains a statement of basic positions and proceeds from the recognition that achievement of an NTH treaty is a question of political decision-making, since there are no technical obstacles to an early conclusion of such an accord. It is deplorable indeed that the historic chance offered by the unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions has not been seized. This has forced the USSR to resume testing, the reasons for which have been well understood by delegations to the Conference. The Soviet Union has, however, repeatedly declared its readiness to return to the moratorium on nuclear testing, if the other side halts its nuclear explosions as well. That position was reaffirmed last Thursday by Ambassador Nazarkin, a fact which is to be welcomed. Therefore, socialist countries appeal once again to the United States to reconsider its policy on nuclear testing. Working Paper CD/743 takes account of the circumstance that the Conference on Disarmament has before it all the basic materials which may facilitate substantive work on item 1, e.g., the 1980 report of the trilateral negotiations, draft treaties on an NTB submitted by two delegations in the early 1980s, as well as other proposals and working papers. It calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee, which should carry out its tasks in two working groups dealing with contents and scope of the treaty and with compliance and verification, respectively. The Working Paper exhorts the Conference promptly to proceed to negotiations on every aspect of the matter. In order for substantive work to be commenced, all member States are called upon to display the flexibility needed to achieve a reasonable compromise on the mandate for an ad hoc committee. On the basis of the fundamental positions outlined in CD/743, the group on whose behalf I am speaking is prepared to present detailed views and suggestions on the issues relating to an NTBT. 584 npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 6 The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to my country and to myself. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin. Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translated from Russian): Comrade President, I am very pleased indeed to congratulate you, the representative of fraternal Cuba and an eminent diplomat, on the occasion of your accession to the post of the President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. I am confident that the work of the Conference on Disarmament, in which the delegation of the Republic of Cuba plays a significant role, will under your guidance be marked by advances on the issues on its agenda. May I assure you of the readiness of the delegation of the Soviet Union to co-operate with you in the discharge of your responsible duties. I am very gratified to note that relations between our two countries are built on a solid foundation of friendship tested over dozens of years of understanding and co-operation between the fraternal peoples of Cuba and the Soviet Union. I should also like to thank the distinguished representative of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Fan Guoxiang, for the great efforts he exerted as President of the Conference in the month of February. At the request of the Soviet delegation, a statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the CPSU Central Committee, dated 28 February 1987, has been distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament of 28 February of this year (CD/742). In that statement, Mikhail Gorbachev announced, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, the Soviet Union's proposal to separate the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the package of other issues and to conclude without delay a separate agreement on it. For such a step there is not merely a basis but an agreement that is actually ready. It was agreed in Reykjavik that the Soviet Union and the United States would eliminate all their medium-range missiles in Europe within the next five years. Within the same period, the number of Soviet missiles of this class in the Asian part of our territory would be cut down to 100 warheads on the understanding that the United States could leave the same number of medium-range-missile warheads in its national territory. Once the agreement on eliminating Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe is signed, the Soviet Union will withdraw from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, by agreement with the Governments of those countries, the extended-range theatre missiles which had been stationed there in response to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in western Europe. As for other theatre missiles, the Soviet Union is prepared immediately to begin talks with a view to reducing and eliminating them altogether. The Soviet Union has tabled these proposals at the Geneva talks with the United States. As pointed out by General Secretary Gorbachev, we have been assured more than once that if the Soviet Union singled out the question of medium-range 5SS Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 7 (Mr. Nazarkin, USSR) missiles from the Reykjavik package, agreement on their elimination in Europe would pose no difficulty. A good opportunity is now being offered of proving that in practice. General Secretary Gorbachev's statement of 28 February 1987 demonstrates the Soviet Union's willingness to find a solution to the problem of nuclear disarmament. This question also has an important place on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. In today's statement the Soviet delegation wishes to outline its approach to certain aspects of this problem (agenda item 2) and also to present a number of views on items 3 and 5 of the agenda. These items are closely interrelated, for in the final analysis they concern ways of attaining humanity's survival in the nuclear and space era. I believe we are, at least, all in agreement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. After all, a provision to this effect was recorded in the joint Soviet-American Statement on the results of the Geneva Summit in November 1985. At the same time there are substantial differences of opinion on the course to be pursued in order to prevent nuclear war, and these differences are widely reflected in the discussions at the Conference on Disarmament. Naturally, these differences are also reflected in practical actions, which is something that is particularly worrying. ? Before turning to these various views and approaches, I wish to make a preliminary clarification. Western representatives are inclined to emphasize that what should be discussed is prevention of any war, and not prevention of nuclear war. Naturally, we too are against any war: all the more so since a conventional war can easily develop, in the present conditions, into a nuclear war. At the same time we lay special emphasis on the fact that it is precisely nuclear war that should be prevented in the first place, for its consequences would be fatal for all humanity. I believe that on this question our differences are only in emphasis, though undoubtedly the underlying causes are more substantial. It is our view that attempts to equate nuclear war with conventional war stem from the concept of power politics, which permits the use of war and military force as a political instrument. I will not venture to define where this concept stems from -- inertia of thinking, sincere misconception or a desire to mislead. This concept of a policy of force mechanically applies the views of the pre-nuclear age to the present conditions of the nuclear and space era, which can be fatal to humanity for it poses the risk of war, conventional as well as nuclear. The position-of-strength policy would not be what it is if it did not permit the use of force, above all nuclear force. By contrast, we believe that it must be recognized that today, more weapons mean less, rather than more, security; and this is the truth. Today, a global nuclear war cannot be a continuation of rational policy, for it would put an end to all life, and therefore to all policies. The Chernobyl tragedy which occurred in my country last year has shown to the entire world the fatal effects and enormous force of the atom when it has gone out of control; and after all, this accident is nothing compared to the possible consequences of the explosion of even the smallest nuclear bomb by today's standards. 586 narlAqcifiAci in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 8 (Mr. Nazarkin, USSR) The position-of-strength policy, which allows for the possibility of using nuclear weapons, is also being underpinned in the West by a "theoretical basis" in the form of the concept of deterrence, according to which it is necessary for the United States and other Western nuclear Powers to build up nuclear arms in order to prevent the so-called "spread of communism". I am not going now to elaborate on the fallacy of the very idea of such deterrence, for there has been and there is no threat. The ulterior motive of the policy of deterrence is really quite different. A large number of United States documents, and, in particular, memoranda of the United States National Security Council which were declassified some years ago, have revealed that the United States pursued the objective of compelling the Soviet Union to change the basis of its foreign and domestic policies, that is, to cease to exist as the Soviet Union, and of tearing away parts of its territory. That was the minimum objective, whereas the maximum objective was as follows: to seek the "total disintegration and elimination of Soviet power" (National Security Council document NSC 20/1 of 18 August 1948). The declassified documents have revealed the United States military plans of that time which, proceeding from the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, were designed to pursue the above objective. I am referring to the plans code-named "Half-moon-Fleetwood- Doublestar" (1948), "Trojan", "Offtackle" (1949) and many others. President Dwight Eisenhower's documents, published recently, show that in the 1950s again, the United States leadership, on more than one occasion, considered using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. In particular, the President mentions that at least twice he considered giving the green light to nuclear bombing raids on the Soviet Union and on both occasions it took him a long time to decide whether to reject the plan of action or to give it the go-ahead. And when, in the early 1980s, the United States President, Ronald Reagan, for the first time referred to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" it was a reflection of the self-same approach, of the same concept of eradicating "evil" by force. Future historians will probably be able to see United States political documents and military plans of the 1980s, which will be declassified in due course when the limitation period expires. That is only, of course, if we succeed in preventing the implementation of the vicious ideas embodied in those plans. I am far from arguing that the United States leadership consciously wants to unleash nuclear war against us. That would be madness, and this fact is perfectly well realized by responsible leaders. However, in the political circles of the United States and its allies, despite their leaders' declarations of the inadmissibility of nuclear war, the conviction that nuclear weapons are necessary continues to prevail. In his statement at the Conference on 24 February last, the United States representative, Ambassador Hansen, said that deterrence "is not the invention of undisciplined strategists" but a fact of life. Unfortunately, he is right. However, this "fact of life" did not arise spontaneously. It stems from a certain policy, as indeed does the arms race, but if the arms race is a 587 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 9 (Mr. Nazarkin, USSR) "fact of life", does that mean that we have to reconcile ourselves with this fact of life? That would mean voluntarily to condemn oneself and all humanity to inevitable death. Of course, the destructive power of nuclear weapons deters potential aggressors. That is precisely why we have such weapons. This is probably what Ambassador Hansen meant when he referred, on 24 February, to the fact that the Soviet Union also relies on the deterrence factor. But here I would like to draw your attention to the following differences. Firstly, on arms questions, we proceed from the criterion of reasonable sufficiency, tailoring the nature and the level of this limit to the positions and actions of the United States and its allies. The Western countries use the "deterrent" nature of nuclear weapons as a basis for their concept of deterrence, by which they seek to justify the build-up and improvement of nuclear arms. As a result, deterrence in this Western sense is conducive to a continued arms race and as nuclear weapons pile up, the likelihood.that they will remain "obedient" grows smaller. The spread of those weapons, the sophistication of related technical systems, increased transportation, the constant risk of malfunction, human weakness or someone's ill will -- all this put together constitutes a broad range of unpredictable factors upon which humanity's survivaris dependent. Secondly, even if we were to follow the concept of nuclear deterrence, there is no denying that the nuclear safeguard is neither faultless nor everlasting. At any moment it can become a death sentence for mankind. That is why we propose eliminating nuclear weapons altogether. To that we receive the reply that if nuclear weapons were eliminated, this would increase the risk of conventional war, which, given modern conventional arms, can also cause great casualties. Supporters of this view are undoubtedly right that any war, and not only nuclear war, should be prevented, but we do not agree that this can be achieved with the help of nuclear weapons. We should use other means than a nuclear guillotine. As a means to that end, we propose the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security. This is our theoretical doctrine if you wish -- our alternative to the concept of deterrence. On the basis of it, the socialist countries have elaborated a concrete political platform. This system is based on the principle that one cannot build one's own security at the expense of the security of others. Its main areas, military, political, economic and humanitarian, from an organic whole. We seek to translate this platform into a practical course of action. You are aware of our programme for eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000. This programme should be implemented in stages, and those stages are interrelated and have clear-cut timeframes. Our Reykjavik initiatives, our new proposal on medium-range missiles, our proposals presented at the Conference on Disarmament, including those related to banning chemical weapons, proposals on arms limitation and disarmament, put forward in other forums, proceed from our concept of comprehensive security. We are by no means proposing that disarmament be limited to the nuclear field alone. The Soviet Union is in favour of disarmament measures in other areas as well, including the area of conventional arms. 588 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 10 (Mr. Nazarkin, USSR) We have signed the Delhi Declaration, which brings together our philosophical and political approaches to building a nuclear-free and non-violent world and the approaches of that great country, India, and the thousands of millions of people represented by the non-aligned movement. We support India's proposal to conclude an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the concept of international economic security and have presented new approaches to humanitarian problems of the third basket of the Helsinki accord. We are in favour of building policies on the basis of new political thinking which, as General Secretary Gorbachev pointed out, "means an ability to listen to the voice of the public, the European and world public, to understand the concerns and interests of other peoples and not to separate one's own security from the security of neighbours in our interconnected world". That is what we propose instead of nuclear deterrence, which even in its best version of reduced levels of nuclear arms, does not exclude the risk of a nuclear holocaust and, in its worst version, leads to an accelerated nuclear-arms race which greatly increases this risk. I should point out that the fallacy of the concept of nuclear deterrence was recognized by none other than the United States President, Ronald Reagan, when arguing in favour of the Strategic Defence Initiative: he stated that the new ABM system is designed to render nuclear weapons "obsolete and ineffective". Of course, even if the SDI were to lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons, that would only come with the elimination of everything else on our planet, including human civilization. However, the mere fact of President Reagan's recognizing the need to eliminate nuclear weapons is important. But what will happen to nuclear deterrence in that case? The intention is perhaps to replace the nuclear deterrent by space deterrence, but then, where does the "exclusively defensive" nature of the SDI come in? On this point I wish to elaborate a little bit further. In his statement on 26 February, Ambassador Hansen argued that the SDI is designed for defensive purposes only, and even quoted Soviet Academician E. Velikhov to support this argument. I have to point out that selective quoting is in itself a risky business because out of context it can present a distorted picture. In fact, objective scientific data indicate that an X-ray laser (referred to at the 26 February meeting) is characterized by important absorption in all substances, including air. Laser X-rays, therefore, are absorbed even in the residual layers of the atmosphere about 150 km above the Earth. In accordance with the declared goals, the X-ray lasers to be developed under the SDI are designed to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles in the active section of their flight path, that is, already in the upper layers of the atmosphere. But cannot these same lasers be used against other space targets? For example, against early-warning satellites with the aim of blinding the other side in the event of a first nuclear strike against it? Technically, it would seem to be even easier than to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles; but is that defence? 589 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 11 (Mr. Nazarkin, USSR) On the other hand, objective scientific data quoted by Academician Velikhov and many other experts, including United States experts indicate that if a laser beam is powerful enough it can make a hole in the atmosphere and consequently destroy a target on Earth. I can refer, for example, to data provided by a United States expert Robert English, published very recently in the International Herald Tribune, on 19 and 20 February 1987. Based on an analysis of the technical possibilities of space laser weapons and of current thinking in the United States Administration, the author comes to the conclusion that the SDI involves the development of space weapons for destroying targets on Earth as well. Finally, I have to point out that the division of arms into "offensive" and "defensive" weapons is in itself very relative. Basically, only absolutely passive means of defence can be regarded as purely defensive. If a defence system contains active destructive elements it can always, with a varying degree of effectiveness, be used as an offensive means. At the same time, even passive means of defence increase the effectiveness of destructive means. For example, how should we classify tanks, as offensive or defensive weapons? On the one hand, they have fire-power enabling them to hit targets and on the other hand, strong armour protecting their crew from destruction -- so what is a tank? The answer is probably to be found not in the military and technical characteristics of a given type of weapon but in the political philosophy of those who possess it. As for the balance of forces, it is determined by both offensive and defensive arms and that is why it is absolutely incorrect to say that one type of weapon is bad because it is offensive and another is good because it is defensive. If, hypothetically speaking, each of the two sides possesses one hundred offensive missiles, that is, a ratio 1:1, and then one of the sides creates defensive means which can neutralize 50 per cent of the offensive missiles of the other side, it is quite obvious that the balance of offensive weapons will change to become a ratio of 1:2 in favour of the side which has the so-called defensive means. The SDI programme, whatever defensive labels it may be given, is designed to alter the balance of forces to the advantage of the United States. However, it is not just a question of changing the balance of forces. The implementation of this programme would completely destabilize the military and strategic situation in the world as a whole and create a situation where the question of whether a war is "to be or not to be?" would be decided in a matter of seconds; and the human will's part in this decision would be reduced to a minimum: the decision would essentially be left to computers. We make no secret of the fact that we regard the SDI as an attempt to draw the Soviet Union into a qualitatively new arms race -- the laser-weapons race. Through the SDI the United States is trying to find a way out of the nuclear deadlock, to acquire these weapons which, while matching nuclear weapons in effectiveness, unlike nuclear weapons would, if used, leave the 590 nni-laccifiinri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 12 (Mr. Nazarkin, USSR) attacker unharmed. These qualitatively new weapons would make it possible to deliver extremely accurate "surgical" strikes on the most vital targets of the other side. This, according to the plans of SDI supporters, would make it possible, to dictate one's will to other countries while pointing the laser beam at them, and also to avoid the unacceptable consequences of the use of nuclear weapons -- nuclear winter, widespread radiation, adverse genetic and other consequences. This will be a weapon for the rich, available only to the select few. These seem to be the plans. Lately, there have been attempts by the United States Administration to adopt a so-called broad interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. These attempts are nothing more than a desire to justify, with the help of legal casuistry, the policy of circumventing and violating the above Treaty with a view to speeding up SDI development, making it irreversible, leaving future United States Administrations incapable of modifying their position on the SDI for many years to come. The Soviet Union has been and continues to be in favour of preserving the ABM Treaty, strengthening the regime established by it, and abiding by the generally-recognized traditional interpretation of all its provisions. At the same time, without abandoning our fundamental position on preventing an arms race in outer space, we are prepared to seek mutually acceptable agreements with the United States, taking into account the commitment of the present Administration to the SDI programme. Our proposal on strengthening the regime of the ABM Treaty by way of a mutual undertaking not to withdraw from the Treaty for 10 years along with strict compliance with all its provisions, goes in this direction. We propose agreeing on the dividing line between activities that are prohibited or permitted under the Treaty. Today I have touched upon a number of important issues under discussion in the Conference of Disarmament, proceeding from our philosophy of a secure world, as we envisage it. In concluding, I wish to point out that, naturally, the rebuilding of international security anew can only be based on confidence. Of course, the path is not easy. I will not elaborate on the reasons for the acute lack of confidence we are facing today. I believe that it is best to look into the future, rather than to turn to or be bound by the past. It is necessary to analyse the past, but we should not be its prisoners. Confidence can be built on the basis of co-operation, getting to know each other, finding solutions to common problems. We cannot accept the argument that confidence comes first and only then everything else, including disarmament. We are in favour of advancing towards the building and strengthening of confidence through common endeavours; and each of us should set about this task for himself. That is what we are doing, and that is why we are doing so. Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals on the medium-range missiles put forward on 28 February are the most recent confirmation of this line of action. But the path to confidence, like the path to disarmament, is a two-way one, requiring reciprocal steps. Sc; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R0001001 onnni-et Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 13 The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement, and for the kind words addressed to my country and to the Chair. I have no more speakers on my list for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I call on the representative of the United States of America. Mr. HANSEN (United States of America): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to extend the congratulations of my delegation to yourself as you occupy the chair of President of this Conference. my delegation will work closely with you in a co-operative mode to further the work in which we all have an interest. It is appropriate as well to extend once again our appreciation to Ambassador Fan for the work which he accomplished during his tenure as President of the Conference. I do not have prepared remarks today, but I should like nevertheless to make a few comments that I trust will be of use to all of our delegations in the contemplations which we must make as part of the deliberative process of the Conference. May I begin by making two observations. First, the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, stated on 11 November 1981 that the objective in all arms control and disarmament negotiations should be deep reductions, significant reductions of military capabilities. That programme, chat philosophy, is starting to be reflected in our bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear issues. The second observation I would wish to make is that the very idea of zero intermediate-range nuclear missiles originated with my Government in concert with consultations with those countries in Europe with whom we are joined in alliance. It was in fact an approach which sought to prevent deployment of further systems, to bring about some greater stability in the question of nuclear forces. It is proper to note as well that at Reykjavik the agreement to reduce intermediate-range nuclear weapons was at hand. It was not the United States which wrapped the package and tied the bow. That this package is now being untied, we regard as a positive development. The United States has long believed that progress in one area of negotiations regarding nuclear weapons should not be held hostage to progress in other areas. We, and our allies, have consistently urged that we seek early progress on reductions in offensive nuclear forces in both the strategic negotiations and in those dealing with intermediate-range nuclear forces. Thus, we do welcome this apparent Soviet willingness to move forward in the INF negotiations for which we have been ready since the Geneva Summit of November 1985. We note that the General Secretary has said that proposals are to be placed on the table in Geneva. We have seen these proposals and we welcome them. And it is, in fact, our view that we look to progress in the negotiations themselves rather than in public statements. We want to make progress a real possibility. We intend to make our readiness for that progress concrete by tabling specific treaty language in the very near future. 592 ilprlaccifiAci in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 14 (Mr. Hansen, United States) I should not have taken the floor today at all if it were not for one statement made by my distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin. Much of what has been said has been said before in one form or another and I should suspect that you may be somewhat bored with the discourse between the United States and Soviet delegations which has often taken place in this hall. I should like to refer to the statement by Ambassador Nazarkin, which I find particularly unfortunate, on page 11 of the English text. This statement indicates in one way or another, and I should add probably most directly, that the United States has the desire to dictate its will to other countries. This is patently false. It is counter to our political system. It is counter to our political ideology. It is counter to our basic understandings of democracy and government. But the statement contains another fallacy. That fallacy relates to the idea that one might even be able to achieve something by pointing a laser from outer space at someone or something on Earth. Even the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union pointed out in his intervention today that the properties of lasers are such that their efficiency as a weapon is almost exclusively limited to space. Therefore it becomes difficult to understand how such a weapon, despite articles in the free press, could be used against States to dictate one's will. During the last plenary session I quoted from a Soviet study, not an American study, not done'by political commentators but by scientists. I quoted from this study to show the universality of understanding among scientists. I should like to quote again: "Kilovolt X-rays are strongly absorbed in all substances including air." (Atmosphere, ladies and gentlemen, is generally composed of air.) "And so a kilovolt X-ray beam is absorbed in upper atmosphere (higher than 100 km). True, if the laser beam is sufficiently powerful, it might 'drill' through the atmosphere. But this property of X-ray lasers is best exploited by firing not downwards from space but upwards from an altitude of 80-90 km from under a relatively thin atmospheric layer when the target is in space." I do not regard this as a selective quotation. I regard this as a statement of scientific fact which is relevant to issues under consideration. I think that we all recognize that this Conference deals with issues which are both scientific in their essence and political in their manifestation. We must learn to deal with both of these manifestations, both of these elements, in the most objective, dispassionate manner. If we do this, then we enhance our opportunities to make progress. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America for his statement and for what he said about supporting the work of the President. Now, you will remember that at the last plenary meeting the Conference adopted a decision re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. A number of non-members have already requested to participate in the work of that Ad Hoc Committee. Requests have been received from Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Austria, Denmark, Greece, 593 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001_4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 ? r? _ _11 CD/PV.393 15 (The President) Spain and Senegal. As no objection has been raised to those requests for participation which were communicated to all members earlier during the session, I suggest that we hold an informal meeting next Thursday, after the list of speakers had been exhausted, in order to consider those requests. We will afterwards resume the plenary meeting and formalize the relevant draft decisions. If there is no objection I shall consider that the Conference agrees to hold the aforementioned informal meeting on Thursday. It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Are there any further speakers? The distinguished representative of the Soviet union has the floor. Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all I should like to express my satisfaction at the positive assessment of our recent proposal on medium-range missiles that has just been voiced by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Hansen. Secondly, I should like to make a number of comments on his reaction to my statement today. First of all, as far as his reaction to the part of my statement referring to plans to turn the SDI into a weapon which could enable its possessor to dictate to others. At the beginning of my statement I referred to a whole series of documents of the United States which were declassified and which prompted me to draw the conclusion I did draw. Indeed, the fact remains a fact that the military plans which were developed and which did exist in the United States, and which then subsequently became public when they were declassified, were based on intentions to carry out a nuclear strike against our country; this is an objective fact, unfortunately. Consequently, of course, I cannot accept the harsh words which Ambassador Hansen used regarding this assumption of mine, as the general policy based on the concept of so-called nuclear deterrence has not changed. At this time today we sense and observe a businesslike approach to political problems. As for Ambassador Hansen's reaction to my comments regarding the SDI, I do not see any contradiction here, quite frankly, between the fact that he today referred to the statement of scientific experts of 26 February and what I myself said; but he just cited a part of the full picture. I should like just to reaffirm this once again. X-ray lasers are absorbed in various substances, including the atmosphere of the air. So, to be sure, an X-ray laser is more effective when used against targets which are not separated from the laser beam source by air, and particularly if they are on the Earth. But in my statement I referred to the possibility of using lasers against satellites and to this I can add the possibility of using laser weapons against aircraft in the upper layers of the atmosphere. Finally, I did cite considerations with respect to the general balance of forces, which is determined by offensive and defensive weapons. I think that after Ambassador Hansen has studied our statement today more carefully we will have the chance to exchange views on this issue in a more thoroughgoing manner. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. Are there any further speakers? Before 594 r.nnv Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.393 16 (The President) adjourning, I should like to express my condolences to the distinguished representative of Norway on the passing away of the distinguished Minister of Foreign Affairs of that country. The next plenary meeting will be held on Thursday, 5 March, at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned. The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m. 595 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R0001oninnnni_a Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.394 5 March 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva. on Thursday, 5 March 1987, at 10 a.m. President: GE. 87-50370/6029e Mr. Lechuga Hevia (Cuba) 596 nprlacRified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 394th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today continues the consideration of agenda item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any other matter related to the work of that Conference. Once we have heard all the speakers on my list for today, I intend to suspend the plenary meeting in order to consider the requests by non-member States to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee re-established under agenda item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Immediately after the informal meeting, we shall resume the plenary meeting to formalize any agreements we have reached informally. On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Italy, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia and Australia. I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Pugliese. Mr. PUGLIESE (Italy): Mr. President, please allow me at the outset to associate myself with the warm congratulations and good wishes that have been extended to you on your taking over the high office of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. We are all confident that under your guidance the Conference shall be able to successfully move into the substantive phase of our deliberations. I wish, at the same time, to associate myself with all the delegations in expressing all our appreciation to Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of China who had the difficult task of presiding over this Conference during the month of February, a time of particular significance for the work of the entire session. Thanks to his intelligent and constructive action and to the dynamism with which he carried out his duties, considerable progress has already been made. We all owe to Ambassador Fan Guoxiang the achieving of the very impressive outcome of re-establishing in the very first month of our work a total of five ad hoc committees on some priority items of our agenda. May T also take this opportunity, being myself a newcomer, to welcome other colleagues who have recently joined us, and thanking my other distinguished colleagues for the warm welcome they have extended to me. I wish to assure you all of the full co-operation of the Italian delegation. It is also my desire on this occasion to remember Ambassador Donald Lowitz whom I had the chance to meet only too briefly. Nevertheless, I could fully appreciate his human and professional qualities. I wish to reiterate, through you, Mr. President, the sincere condolences of the Italian delegation to his family and to the United States delegation. The practice of prefacing statements in the general debate of the Conference with comments on the international political situation and on the state of the East-West dialogue, particularly in the field of disarmament, reflects the awareness that our work is certainly not taking place in a vacuum, but instead is influenced by various intertwined developments. 597 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDIDg2_ni Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 ? r? _ _11 CD/PV.394 3 (Mr. Pugliese, Italy) On the one hand, it is the view of my Government that we have ground for feeling encouraged by the latest developments in the US-USSR nuclear and space talks and that, in particular, the Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev allowed significant progress to be made and opened new possibilities of great interest. We hope that difficulties in the way of concrete agreements will soon be overcome and that this will grant a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals, in line with the expectations of all peoples of the world. In this framework, we are of course aware of the interconnections existing between various aspects of the strategic equation. But we also recognize the enormous difficulties involved in trying to deal with, and agree on, solutions for all such aspects at the same time. This is why the Italian Government is in favour of a pragmatic approach that should make it possible to keep separate questions that are not homogeneous, and to conclude concrete agreements for the reduction of arsenals in a context of stability, whenever that may be possible. On the other hand, the sinister echo of gunfire continues to be heard in many regions of the world and that reminds us, all too sharply, that the world situation is fraught with great uncertainty and that the arms race is the practical expression of feelings of insecurity and distrust. Men and women throughout the world long for peace. But well-turned speeches and proclamations of good intentions are useless if in practice they are contradicted by recourse to force and the open flouting of international law. The Italian Government has always endeavoured -- and intends to spare no effort -- to ensure the elimination of all obstacles and all threats to peace. Peace in a context of security is a fundamental cornerstone of our foreign policy, and we are committed to working towards this goal by a continuous process of consistent and responsible decisions and conduct. This is the purpose of our loyal participation in the Atlantic Alliance, a defensive community which has provided a significant contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the world in recent years. The same peaceful approach underlies our membership to the European Community, an association of free peoples sharing a common heritage of traditions and culture. Italy believes that the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in a framework of stability, transparency of intentions and capabilities and of general respect for the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, is the basic condition for a true and positive peace. That must be and remain our final goal and we must make every effort to gradually achieve it, if we really want to prepare a better future for mankind. Intermediate goals with a view to that final result might be represented by the establishment of a balance of forces, both 598 r.nnv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 4 (Mr. Pugliese, Italy) in the nuclear and conventional field, at lower and lower, indeed at the lowest possible, levels of armaments to ensure the maintenance of defence capabilities and stability. We acknowledge that security perceptions and requirements differ in the various regions of the world, they differ indeed from country to country. We respect all approaches to security issues by all countries since we believe that only through the preservation of security it is possible to undertake collective steps toward effective disarmament. At the same time we feel entitled to respect for our own policy which, while looking upon deterrence as an essential element to our national security, does pursue security and equilibrium at the lowest levels of all types of armaments. For many years the question of the ban on nuclear testing in all environments has been one of the main issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. It is therefore regrettable that this forum has been unable to find a way out of the procedural "imbroglio" which has prevented it, for more than two years now, from continuing practical work on this matter. My Government remains firmly committed to the pursuit of a verifiable comprehensive test ban. As this delegation has often reiterated, the Italian Government is in favour of a CTBT and attaches great importance and significance to the accomplishment of progress towards such an objective. Naturally we do not ignore that the problem of a comprehensive test ban cannot be discussed separately from other issues concerning disarmament and strategic stability. Therefore it is our view that positive results would best be achieved through a step-by-step approach, and that a solution would be easier if substantial and balanced reductions in number and quality of offensive weapons could be agreed upon and implemented. Another important aspect of this problem is verification. In fact, Italy believes that a test-ban treaty would be unacceptable unless it contained adequate provisions for verification to ensure compliance by all parties. This issue is really a key one, because clandestine nuclear testing might have far-reaching consequences for the general framework of international security and stability. In our opinion, verification problems can be gradually solved also through improved technology, and allow for the implementation of a step-by-step approach to a CTB. In this context a first significant step would certainly be represented by the ratification of the TTB Treaty of 1974 and of the PNE Treaty of 1976. The Italian Government has been encouraged by the talks held between the United States and the USSR in Geneva on the possibility of limitations on tests and considers this to be of good omen also for the work of this Conference on this specific issue. My delegation remains convinced of the value of further concrete work towards a comprehensive test ban at this Conference. Several substantive Working Papers on behalf of a group of Western States members of the Conference have been tabled on various aspects of a CTB and have not yet been discussed. thoroughly. 59C Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-n11RRIPnnni nn innnn4 A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 5 (Mr. Pugliese, Italy) My delegation is therefore eager to resume our practical work on all the substantive aspects of a CTB and in particular on such key issues as scope, verification and compliance, in line with our commitment to make any possible effort towards the goal of bringing about a cessation of all nuclear tests. We have pointed out many times our willingness to begin work immediately on a concrete examination of essential issues that would be involved in a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The draft mandate contained in document CD/521 is a proposal by which we continue to stand. In our firm view, that mandate, if adopted, would lead immediately to the creation of a subsidiary body in which a substantive examination of central issues relevant to the formulation of a CTBT could be undertaken with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject. We have further exemplified our position on this item in a detailed way by presenting a suggested programme of work for an ad hoc committee under item 1, which is included in document CD/621. My Government recognizes also that these issues are complex and difficult to solve and that they should be thoroughly examined in a constructive way, i.e., by sitting down together, in a properly mandated ad hoc committee, and working together to try to resolve them. The negotiation of a global ban on the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, which seems to us one of the most important and urgent disarmament goals, has achieved encouraging progress during the 1986 session. Steps forward have been made regarding a more efficient compilation of Articles III, IV and V; a great amount of work was also accomplished by Working Group A with regard to Article VI, in connection with the criteria and the listing of the various categories of chemicals. As for Article IX, we wish to express our appreciation and thanks to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom and to Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia: the four points on which Ambassador Cromartie detected a convergence of views constitute, in the opinion of the Italian delegation, a sound basis for a solution of the key issue of on-challenge verification. Indeed, while not minimizing the importance of other outstanding items, I believe that, after all, the success of our work depends largely on our capability to reach an agreement on a convention banning chemical weapons and that consequently we should aim at conclusive results during this year. The main difficulties lying ahead in this context are still connected with the problem of verification which, indeed, is not simply a technical one. It is a problem having an obvious political dimension; admittedly, verification can also have a confidence-building effect. By envisaging a verification system for a convention banning all chemical weapons and prescribing their removal from the military arsenals we believe that the Italian delegation is aware that "intrusive" and stringent forms of verification may sometimes be seen by some as restraining national sovereign discretion to a certain extent, or as being prejudicial to the protection of national industrial and commercial secrets. However, we are convinced that such concerns should be overcome through a careful assessment and a better knowledge of the implications of different types of verification, in a spirit 600 Cnnifi7ori rnpv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 6 (Mr. Pugliese, Italy) of mutual co-operation and goodwill. Moreover, we believe that the elimination of such a hideous category of weapons and the confidence that an eventual ban is being loyally complied with, are priority goals for all countries and, especially, for those, such as Italy, which have long renounced the chemical military option. It is vital to ensure that prohibited chemicals are neither manufactured in previous production facilities, nor in new ones; that States should not manufacture "single purpose" chemical warfare agents or their precursors and that "dual-purpose" agents or precursors should not be diverted to warfare purposes. We are convinced that an effective verification system should include systematic inspections and "on-challenge" inspections of a stringent nature. On this question, there are two Western Working Papers on the table: CD/500 by the delegation of the United States and CD/715 by the delegation of the United Kingdom. My Government considers it essential that a verification of compliance should represent a basic obligation. On the other hand States signing the Convention have also the right to demonstrate their compliance with it, when they are faced with a challenge. In this respect the Italian delegation considers that the recent proposals made by the USSR delegation on 17 February last, while still requiring some expansion of their scope, represent an interesting contribution and may hold promise of constructive negotiations. My delegation shares with others the awareness of the importance and urgency attached to agenda item 5, concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Indeed, my Government addresses this issue with the highest interest and sense of priority. Therefore we wish first of all to express our deepest satisfaction for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee almost at the very beginning of this session of the Conference. My Government believes that an arms race in outer space should be prevented, that in the context of a general and complete disarmament outer space should be devoted to preaceful activities, and that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific development. In this respect the two major space and nuclear Powers share the greatest responsibility in the search for effective and verifiable agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I believe that there is a general awareness that a competitive drive towards the deployment of armaments in outer space would be a costly and undesirable endeavour. Current trends in the bilateral talks here in Geneva allow us to hope for a constructive approach in spite of the complexities of the issues involved. In this context we believe that it will be most important for the major space Powers to agree on a common approach in dealing with these problems, including those connected with the offence-defence relationship. 601 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP97-ni1RRPnnni f1/14 nr?nrs A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 7 (Mr. Pugliese, Italy) It is of the utmost importance to make sure that space research and activities are consistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and that they are aimed at solely defensive purposes. This Conference can play an important and useful role in the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space which has an essential interest for all States. During the last session, the Ad Hoc Committee, despite a regrettable delay in getting down to substantive work, was able to clarify some important aspects concerning the existing legal regime in relation to arms control in outer space, to consider some relevant issues, and to examine some of the activities which are currently being carried out in outer space. We hope that this work will be continued, with renewed energy this year and that further progress in the examination of the complex and various issues connected with this item will be achieved. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the events of the past months have shown to be full of promise for our work in this Conference. We want to foster our efforts in order to build on what has so far been accomplished. For this purpose we shall try to take advantage of all available avenues constantly bearing in mind the essential requirements of international security and stability. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin. Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): On 4 March the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons completed, as you know, the consideration of a cluster of issues relating to chemical weapon stockpiles. This offers an opportunity to take stock of the first results of this year's negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons. On the whole we are satisfied with the intensive start made in the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Ekeus. It is our hope that in future this momentum will be maintained in the negotiations. In its statement in the plenary of the Conference on 17 February, the Soviet delegation, wishing from the outset to give a fresh impetus to the negotiations, outlined a number of proposals with a view to reaching a speedy agreement on the question assigned to the first cluster for discussion. These proposals contained comprehensive provisions for declarations to be made by each State party to a future convention specifying detailed information on locations of chemical weapon stocks (storage facilities) at the time the convention enters into force; for closure of storage facilities and prevention of movement of stocks; and for effective verification of the closed storage facilities on the basis of systematic international inspections along with permanent use of instruments. The positive significance of these proposals has just been noted by the distinguished representative of Italy, Ambassador Pugliese. 602 im,,,Inecifiori in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 8 (Mr. Nazarkin, USSR) Until recently, the fact that the question of declarations of storage facilities remained unresolved gave rise to a pessimistic view of the prospects for a speedy conclusion of the convention. In presenting its proposals the Soviet Union proceeded from the interest of finding without delay a solution to this question. We are satisfied that these proposals of ours have made it possible to take a major step forward at the negotiations and we hope that progress on the question of declaration and international verification of chemical stockpile locations will have a positive effect on the work on other subjects and on the whole process of the subsequent negotiations. Wishing to maintain the momentum in our work, the Soviet delegation is making a proposal for a resolution to the question of a time-frame for elimination of chemical weapons, in view of the situation which has emerged at the negotiations. As you know, the Soviet Union's earlier proposal, motivated by the desire to see the process of chemical weapon destruction initiated as quickly as possible, was that this destruction should begin not later than six months after the convention enters into force. That proposal met with objections, in particular from the United States, which stated that it was not ready to proceed to the elimination of chemical weapons shortly after the convention entered into force. In view of this fact, we are prepared not to insist on our proposal which, of course, remains valid, and we do not object to beginning the destruction of chemical weapons not later than after one year. We are also prepared, taking into account that the convention would provide for permanent international verification of chemical weapon destruction facilities and the full responsibility of States for the way those facilities operate, not to insist that such facilities should in all cases be State-owned. We expect that these additional proposals will make it possible to find appropriate solutions. As the documents of the Ad Hoc Committee indicate, a number of provisions of article 4 ("chemical weapons") and Annex 4 have not been finalized yet. There are naturally various reasons for that -- objective difficulties and complicated technical issues which have yet to be resolved -- but we cannot ignore the obstacles which might very well not have been there had all delegations adopted a constructive approach. This applies above all to the question of destruction of chemical weapons. On 17 February the Soviet Union proposed that all chemical weapons should be destroyed. In presenting that proposal we took into account the difficulties referred to by the United States delegation which had for a long time been opposed to the very concept of diversion of chemical weapons for permitted purposes. Wishing to meet the concerns of our partners in the negotiations we withdrew our requirement that a State should have the right to decide on the ways of eliminating chemical weapon stockpiles, although I should point out that our arguments that diversion might be economically justified remain valid. It appeared that since we accepted the United States position agreement was at hand. However, the United States delegation has again blocked agreement and, quite contrary to its previous position, has suddenly begun to insist on diversion of chemical weapon stocks. This fact is of course regrettable. The Soviet delegation reaffirms its willingness to 603 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100irmni-et Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 9 (Mr. Nazarkin, USSR) seek a solution to the question of the elimination of chemical weapons. That requires now, above all, that the United States delegation should present concrete proposals on the types and quantities of chemical weapons the United States would like to divert. One of the most difficult of the outstanding questions is the problem of the order of elimination of chemical weapon stocks. Discussions on the question have shown above all the technical difficulties involved in working out a so-called equivalent unit for comparing various categories of chemicals. In view of this fact and of possible differences in the composition of chemical weapon stockpiles we would like to propose that the following order of elimination of chemical weapon stockpiles be discussed. Firstly, the whole elimination period shall be divided into nine one-year periods. Secondly, within each one-year period a State party shall eliminate one-ninth of its chemical-weapon stockpiles in each of the existing categories. Thirdly, a State party may carry out the elimination of chemical weapons at a faster pace than under the agreed order of elimination. We would be interested to hear the views of other delegations on these questions. The Soviet delegation is prepared, in the course of further , negotations, to seek mutually acceptable solutions on the question of the order of elimination of chemical weapons. It is our hope that by the end of the spring session of the Conference the full text of Article 4 and Annex 4 will be finalized. The Soviet Union is in favour of achieving, as a matter of principle, the prompt and complete elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production. The Soviet side has made repeated statements to this effect on a number of occasions, including at the highest level. In this context we should like once again to draw your attention to the statement of General Secretary Gorbachev of 15 January 1986, in which it was stated inter alia that "We are prepared to ensure a timely declaration of the location of enterprises producing chemical weapons and the cessation of their production, and we are ready to start developing procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base and to proceed, soon after the Convention enters into force, to the elimination of the stockpiles of chemical weapons". This statement makes it clear beyond any doubt that in pursuing chemical disarmament we do not seek unilateral disarmament of the other side. In case such a convention is concluded chemical weapons and the production base for their manufacture are to be destroyed by all States possessing such weapons, including both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is now proceeding to the consideration of the cluster of questions relating to non-production of chemical weapons in the commercial (civil) industry. This, if anything, is the most difficult aspect of the convention. In November 1986 the Soviet Union made a series of proposals on the subject which, as is widely recognized, have considerably advanced the negotiations. Today we would like to present some new ideas on this question. 604 Ar,r,rnved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 10 (Mr. Nazarkin, USSR) Important work lies ahead in order to finalize the lists for various categories of chemicals which would be subjected to different regimes of limitation and verification. We expect category I, along with super-toxic lethal chemicals possessing a set of properties characteristic of chemical warfare agents and key components of binary chemical weapons, to cover incapacities as well. The viability of a future convention will be ensured only when it is able to keep pace with the times and the achievements of applied and fundamental chemistry and to prevent the development of chemical weapons. This purpose could be served among other things by basic guidelines for revision of the lists of chemicals which would be initially included in the convention. We propose that such a revision be carried out both on a periodical (annual) basis and at the request of any State party as new chemicals appear, as the production technology for such chemicals develops, and on the basis of the declarations by States of their chemical weapon stockpiles. One of the possible loop-holes for breaching the convention might be through the commercial production of super-toxic lethal chemicals. Nobody denies the risk to the convention posed by the high level of toxicity of these chemicals, for toxicity is the determining property of a chemical warfare agent. Consequently there should be a general interest in removing this risk. As you know, at one time the Soviet Union proposed applying most stringent prohibition measures to the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals. This position, however, met with objections from a number of parties to the negotiations, based on commercial consideration, who argued in favour of preserving the procedure and methods of production of these chemicals in the commercial industry existing in their countries. Back in 1985, at the initiative of Western delegations, provisions were developed for a division of super-toxic lethal chemicals into two categories: super-toxic lethal chemicals used in chemical weapons and super-toxic lethal chemicals which cannot be used in chemical weapons. At the time this agreement which provided for international on-site verification of the production of these chemicals was welcomed by Western countries as a major success in the negotiations. In preparing its proposals which were presented in November 1986 the Soviet Union took into account the position of Western countries and agreed to divide super-toxic lethal chemicals into two categories and spelled out specific ideas on a regime for permitted production of such chemicals. The way to work the finalization of the relevant provisions of the convention now seemed open. However, the issue of permitted production of super-toxic lethal chemicals began to slide: one would not wish to believe that in the place of progress towards agreement there might be backward movement on the question which appeared to be ripe for a final solution. With a view to contributing to the success of the work on the question of non-production of chemical weapons in the commercial industry and in particular facilitating progress towards agreement on regimes for the 605 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 niA_Rnock," hA 4?--- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 11 (Mr. Nazarkin, USSR) production of super-toxic lethal chemicals which do not possess a set of properties characteristic of chemical warfare agents, that is category 2 chemicals, we are presenting an additional proposal on the threshold for annual capacity above which facilities for the production of such chemicals are to be declared and subjected to systematic verification. The annual volume of production of each such chemical included into the list for this category would be set at 10 kilograms according to our proposal. The frequency and timing of systematic international inspection would be determined by the Consultative Committee taking into account the risk to the convention posed by a given chemical or facility. The question of challenge on-site inspection undoubtedly deserves the special attention of the parties to the negotiations. The fact that there is no agreement on this essential element of the verification mechanism of a future convention hampers agreement on quite a number of other issues relating to a comprehensive and total chemical-weapons ban. The Soviet Union, in the course of negotiations, has presented some ideas which, taking into account the position of other States, are aimed at bringing closer the positions of the parties to the negotiations. Progress towards a mutually acceptable agreement has also been facilitated by the proposals of the United Kingdom, Pakistan and the paper of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia. The result has been that it has been possible for the first time to register some areas of convergence on the question of challenge inspections which are outlined in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, document CD/734. In particular, there is general agreement that the procedure for processing a challenge should ensure that inspections be carried out in the shortest time-frame. It would be fair to say as well that the parties to the negotiations recognize that the locations and facilities to be subject to challenge inspections differ, and that that difference is based not on ownership of such locations and facilities but on their objective relevance to the scope of the convention. No one disagrees that in certain cases no refusal of an inspection to the full extent requested would be permitted -- for example, in the event of suspected use of chemical weapons and inspections of locations and facilities declared under the convention. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that there might be exceptional cases when the conduct of an inspection could jeopardize the supreme interests of a State party. In those cases, carefully considered means are required which, on the one hand, would ensure the integrity of the convention and confidence in compliance with it, and on the other hand would take into account the legitimate interests (political defence, economic, etc.) of a State party. It is our view that in this respect a good balance was struck in the British paper. We believe we should make maximum use as a basis for agreement of the idea of using alternative measures in cases where a State deems access of inspectors to the location unfeasible, an idea contained in that paper. ? 606 C,--,;+;-,.,-irnnv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 12 (Mr. Nazarkin, USSR) The Soviet delegation is in favour of an active search for mutually acceptable solutions on challenge inspections, and intends actively to participate in this process. We call on all parties to take the same course of reasonable compromise. The current spring part of the Conference's session is to a large extent decisive for negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. The Soviet delegation will continue to work actively and consistently for overall progress in the negotiations, to seek mutually acceptable solutions and a speedy conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I now call on the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda. Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Comrade President, my delegation is deeply satisfied in welcoming you, the distinguished representative of revolutionary, socialist Cuba, to the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The ties of friendship and close co-operation between our two countries will undoubtedly be extended to your Presidency, and you can count on the fullest support' and assistance of my delegation in your effort to complete the establishment of a number of working bodies of the Conference and to start their practical work. We again congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of China, who presided with success over our work in the opening month of this session. My delegation joins those who expressed condolences to the delegation of Norway in connection with the passing away of the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Knut Frydenlund. Let me also express my personal sympathy to the delegation of Hungary in view of the untimely demise of the ambassador to Switzerland, Ambassador Komives. He was the first representative of his country in the Conference on Disarmament, actually at the time of the ENDC, and fulfilled his task here twice. We knew him as a dedicated representative of his country and an excellent colleague. The agenda of this Conference contains a number of items related to nuclear disarmament as well as to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is thus only natural that participants in the Conference follow with keen interest the current bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States. Developments at these negotiations have always found a certain echo in this room, especially if these developments were encouraging. An important milestone in this regard was the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik in October of last year. A number of delegations, including my own, have already given their assessment of the results of that meeting. For us the basic criterion was that all positive elements which were achieved in Reykjavik should be maintained and developed further, instead of being reversed and forgotten. 607 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 13 (Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia) On 28 February the Soviet Union advanced proposals which built on the achievements of Reykjavik and at the same time create favourable conditions for further agreements to be achieved. The statement of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, contains a proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe and to conclude the relevant agreement separately from other issues. This proposal is based on the agreement reached in Reykjavik that the USSR and the United States eliminate all their medium-range missiles in Europe within the next five years. The remaining missiles of this class would be limited to 100 warheads on both sides. In the case of the Soviet Union these will be deployed in the Asian part of the territory, while the United States will have all its respective missiles deployed on its national territory. The immediate impact of such an agreement and its implementation would be a substantial reduction of the danger of military confrontation in Europe and adjacent regions which Czechoslovakia, a country in the centre of Europe, welcomes most heartily. When NATO started the implementation of its 1979 decision on the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe the Government of Czechoslovakia, mindful of a qualitatively new, direct threat to its security, concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on the stationing of longer-range theatre missiles on Czechoslovak territory. It was stressed then and repeated, that this measure was in reply to the NATO deployment and that if Pershing-2 and cruise missiles were removed :rom Europe, there would be no need for the longer-range theatre missiles to be maintained on Czechoslovak territory. It was a position of principle and in the statement of General Secretary Gorbachev it is clearly said that as soon as the agreement on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe is signed, the Soviet Union will withdraw from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, on the basis of agreement with the Governments of those countries, longer-range theatre missiles. In other words, once the threat which caused the stationing of these weapons is removed, there will be no need to keep them on the territory of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia any longer. The recent Soviet proposal has met with considerable interest and highly positive reactions from many countries. It is thus justified to hope that it could lead to some concrete, tangible results in the near future. Apart from improving the political climate in Europe, the elimination of medium-range missiles from that continent would represent an important sign of political will and readiness to engage in the process of nuclear disarmament and would give us realistic hope that the key problems of nuclear disarmament on the agenda of our Conference would finally be addressed in a constructive, business-like manner. One of the essential prerequisites for the radical and definite solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament -- the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals -- is the willingness of States, especially those owning nuclear weapons, to address the problems of war and peace, of security of States in its complexity. And this complexity today is much deeper and wider than it was still some years ago. During the Second World War old, so to speak classical, concepts of military thinking still could be applied, when the issues of individual battles were decided mainly by one side's capability to 608 - rifi7d Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 14 (Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia) mobilize in certain regions at a certain time a prevailing quantity of armed forces and military hardware and by using them skilfully. But with the appearance of nuclear weapons this concept gradually became obsolete since huge nuclear stockpiles and their fast means of delivery will quickly transform any limited conflict into a world conflagration. In the final analysis, the Earth as a whole has become one military theatre and could be easily turned into a battlefield without any limitations. Rather, there would be one limitation -- all military operations would be carried on on the Earth or in the air, with all weapon systems being launched from the Earth or from the air. But from the beginning of the 1980s we have witnessed an effort to remove even this last limitation. Any attempt to bring the arms race into outer space, to deploy weapons there, irrespective of whether we fix on them a defensive or offensive label, would represent a qualitatively new threat against the Earth. During our last two plenary meetings an exchange of views developed with respect to directed-energy weapons and their possible use in space and from space against the Earth. Ambassador Hansen of the United States tried to explain that, for example, laser weapons could only be used beyond atmosphere, against ballistic missiles during their trajectory through space. Ambassador Nazarkin then drew our attention to the fact that lasers could already now be used in outer space also for offence against other objects, e.g. early-warning satellites, and that with sufficient concentration of energy they could also penetrate, to some extent, through the atmosphere and attack aircraft, for example, in its upper layers. Even Ambassador Hansen then agreed that lasers could drill through atmosphere, even if he preferred the upward drill. In connection with this exchange my delegation would like to stress just one more aspect. What was discussed were more or less existing or near possibilities of lasers. But what is going to happen 20 to 30 years from now, once weapons have been permanently installed in outer space? We are confident that the present arguments about how lasers cannot penetrate through the atmosphere will seem, to future analysts, rather obsolete, if not ridiculous. And we should not forget that directed-energy weapons represent only one form of possible weapons to be installed in outer space. Already now various other types are mentioned, and it might be safely presumed that several decades from now, if human civilization survives, a whole panoply of strike space weapons could be developed. And it is now for us a high-priority task to stop the penetration of weapons into outer space, and to make it impossible to develop new and highly destructive space weapons. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and the kind words addressed to my country and to myself. Ambassador Vejvoda has just made reference to the sad demise of Ambassador Imre Komives of Hungary, who was during two different sessions the representative of his country in this negotiating body, Chairman of the then Committee on Disarmament and also of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. He served with distinction the multilateral disarmament negotiating body and was an outstanding representative of his country, Hungary. He was also the friend of many of us here. I personally remember him with great respect as we were companions during my first tour of duty in 609 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-o11ARPnnninninnnni A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 15 (The President) Geneva. May I, on behalf of the Conference, transmit our deep condolences to the delegation of Hungary and to the family of Ambassador Komives. I now call on the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler. Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, I welcome you to the Chair of this Conference for the month of March and heartily express the willingness of my delegation to co-operate with you fully as you preside over this important Conference. Last month we made splendid progress and for this we are deeply indebted to your predecessor, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of the People's Republic of China. In the statement I made on the opening day of the Conference I said that Australia had great hopes for the Conference in 1987. I also said that one of the reasons for our optimism was that the opening month of the Conference would be in Ambassador Fan's hands. Our optimism has already been justified and the reasons for it were more than fulfilled, and we thank Ambassador Fan for this. The wisest and most experienced amongst us, Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, pointed out on an informal occasion last week that if one looks at our agenda and sets to one side the final item, that of the drafting of our report, one is left with eight other substantive items. In his remarks he noted that if agreement were reached on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and other arrangements for specific handling of two other items were agreed to, then there would remain only one item on which enabling action was required, and then we would be at work on all items. Last week the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space was established, and today, I understand, we will appoint the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Aldo Pugliese of Italy. I think it is also true that the specific arrangements for items 2 and 3 of our agenda are in train. So, as is usual, Ambassador Garcia Robles' analysis of the situation is correct. Putting it simply, we are under way for 1987 and the deck has been cleared for agreement on getting work started under that last item, in fact the first item of our agenda -- nuclear test ban. And this item is the subject of my statement today. This truly gratifying set of developments rests, I believe, on the active influence within our Conference during these opening weeks of a word, a concept, which has been on everyone's lips -- convergence. On the very first day of our Conference, on 3 February, this concept, this phenomenon and its desirability, was referred to frequently. Since then we have seen it applied in action with excellent results. I believe it can serve us well now with regard to item 1 of our agenda, an item to which every delegation in this room attaches undoubted priority importance. 610 - cminiti7pri r.onv AoProved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 16 (Mr. Butler, Australia) To demonstrate this point I would like briefly to remind the Conference of some of the statements that have already been made on item 1. I hasten to say, as all will appreciate, that making a choice between various statements is always a difficult business. So I want this to be clear. The only motive I have had in making the following choices is to give fair evidence of the existence of convergence with respect to item 1 of our agenda. On 3 February, in the first statement made at this year's session of the Conference, Ambassador Garcia Robles said this: "The need this year, (is) to establish without further delay an ad hoc committee with the objective of ... carrying out the multilateral negotiations of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear test explosions." On the same day the Chairperson of the Swedish delegation, Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin, said: said: "It is time for the convergence in the General Assembly to be translated by us into a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban ... it is time for the Conference on Disarmament to start practical work on its first agenda item. All relevant matters should be addressed: scope and content, as well as compliance and verification." On 26 February, the leader of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Nazarkin "It is necessary to begin without delay practical work on nuclear test ban in the Conference on Disarmament and to establish an ad hoc committee for this purpose." A statement of very great significance was made by the leader of the United States delegation, Ambassador Hansen, on 24 February. He said: "This Conference can neither replace nor duplicate the delicate work which is just getting under way bilaterally. Nevertheless, this Conference can usefully consider and work on a number of nuclear testing issues, including compliance and verification issues essential to any future accord. The Conference on Disarmament can make contributions on these and other test ban issues of particular importance." These statements demonstrate convergence that is clear, but it would be misleading to gloss over differences of view that have also been expressed. For example, on 26 February the leader of the delegation of India, Ambassador Teja, expressed reservations about the establishment of an ad hoc committee unless it had a negotiating mandate, and was directed specifically to nuclear-weapon tests. 611 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-ni 1RRpnnninninrIllf14 A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 17 (Mr. Butler, Australia) Ambassador Teja said that unless this approach were taken we might "create the illusion of movement without any real movement and arouse false hopes that the Conference on Disarmament had broken new ground when nothing of that sort may in fact have happened". He said that if his approach were accepted "we would at least know the future direction in which we are moving even though the road may be sometimes hard and difficult. To do otherwise would mean obscuring our vision and getting lost among the footpaths of side-issues, without reaching the principal destination". This concept of the "principal destination" is of course the central one, and it is here that I believe we also are witnessing convergence. For example, I return to Ambassador Hansen's statement, which designated specifically that "the ultimate objective is that of banning nuclear tests". By the way, not nuclear-weapon tests, nuclear tests, all tests. He went on: "The United States seeks to engage in a process which will result in practical and realistic steps in the area of nuclear testing". Be went on to state the United States view of what it sees to be certain key relationships, such As between cuts in nuclear weapons, improved verification capabilities and what the United States calls (and oe---.r6 may not agree) the long-term objective of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty. With all respect to my Indian friend and colleague, I cannot agree that to start practical work now would in any way sidetrack us from the real issue, what he himself has called the principal destination -- how could it? He says his Government is committed to that destination, although possibly qualified by the Indian use of the term weapons testing. Nevertheless that principal destination is one to which he says, and all of us around this table say, we are committed. We all know, as the Indian Ambassador has pointed out, that the way ahead is difficult and that there are areas of disagreement but to say as he does, that because of these difficulties we should not even start our work, is a logic my delegation cannot support. Our concern is that while bilateral discussions continue between the major nuclear-weapon States both on nuclear-weapon reductions and on the issue of reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear testing, this vital body, our Conference, should deny itself the role and influence it can and must have on these issues: we should not deny ourselves that role. Both super-Powers in their recent statements on this subject have allowed and admitted that role and that influence to this Conference. They have both endorsed it. We all often stress the urgency and importance of this Conference playing its proper role especially on the nuclear-testing issue. we can do it. 612 nnrnved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 18 (Mr. Butler, Australia) Convergence is at hand. The gaps between us are in fact small, as I hope the citations I have made have indicated, we should act now. This practical, sober and realistic approach, if I may be allowed to say so, was probably put most clearly, indeed I thought it was put brilliantly, by the leader of the Japanese delegation, Ambassador Yamada, in his statement of 10 February. He emphasized the existence of common purpose and perception on the nuclear-testing issue which had been revealed at the last General Assembly and is now evident in this Conference. He said: "There is common perception of the subject matter of the work. There is recognition of the importance of verification and willingness to participate in its implementation. Now is the chance to resume substantial work on a CTB". With regard to the mandate language having reviewed the existing drafts and relevant recent resolutions of the General Assembly, he noted "that there can be much in common" between the words "with a view to the negotiation of a treaty" on the one hand and the words "with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty". Above all, he said these words and they are words with which my delegation heartily agrees: "It must be possible for us to proceed in a spirit of co-operation to establish an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate to commence substantial work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the beginning of this session. Indeed, it would be our collective responsibility to do so." In conclusion, one of my Government's abiding concerns is the question of where would we be, in the pursuit of this vital objective of an end to all nuclear testing, if we failed again this year to have this Conference play its proper role? Why should we sit and let time pass when other relevant negotiations are taking place, when we have a role to play in assisting negotiations? What would we say to ourselves if the time came, next year or the year after, when the States possessing nuclear weapons or conducting nuclear tests said "We are ready, we have got a treaty, where are the means of verification, how can we put this into action, what has the Conference on Disarmament done?"; and the answer is, "We have sat on our hands, we have not done the work, we were waiting". Our Australian concern is that we do this work now so that when the treaty required to bring about an end to all nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time is ready and open for signature and implementation, we are there with the technical means, the means of verification, to bring that treaty into action, and not have to say "we sat on our hands for five years, give us another three or four years while we work out what you need to make that treaty come into force." That work can be done now. With the current convergences we should be able to agree, as Ambassador Yamada has said, to an appropriate mandate to start that work now. 613 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 4b ?r:- CD/PV.394 19 (Mr. Butler, Australia) Technical aspects of it are under way, in the view of the scientific experts -- they are meeting now. We have proposed in Working Paper CD/717 that this Conference should decide to establish a global seismological network: the elements, the bones, the fabric of it are already there, but we have proposed putting it into place now, so that when the treaty is ready either through this Conference, through bilateral negotiation, or a combination of both, that network will be in operation and thus the treaty will be in operation on the earliest possible day. We are not alone -- others have made proposals, some similar, some complementary. The materials we require are at hand. Convergence is with us and I appeal to this Conference to bring to a conclusion, without further delay, a decision on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1 of our agenda. Spanish): I thank the representative of the kind words addressed to the on my list for today. Does any other I give the floor to the representative of The PRESIDENT (translated from Australia for his statement and for President. I have no more speakers delegation wish to take the floor? Hungary, Ambassador Meiszter. Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Mr. President, allow me to thank you and those who expressed words of sympathy and condolence on the occasion of the untimely demise of my compatriot, the late Ambassador Imre Komives, who served with devotion the same cause we are striving for. My delegation will convey their words to the Hungarian Government and to the grieving family of Ambassador Imre Komives. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, I shall now suspend the meeting and convene in five minutes' time an informal meeting of the Conference in order to consider the various requests from non-member States to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee established under agenda item 5. I also wish to announce that the consultations on the appointment of the Chairman of that Ad Hoc Committee have come to a successful conclusion, and when we resume the plenary we can formalize the appointment of its Chairman. The plenary meeting was suspended at 11.25 a.m. and resumed at 11.45 a.m. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 394th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. As a consequence of the results of the informal meeting we have just held, the Conference will proceed to consider the requests from non-member States to participate in the Committee established under agenda item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In accordance with the practice established by my predecessor during the month of February, I suggest that we consider the requests together, as there have been no objections to Working Papers CD/WP.269 to 279, containing the draft decisions on the participation of Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Portgual, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Senegal. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decisions. It was so decided. 614 r.npv Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.394 20 The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now wish to refer to the question of the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The consensus we have reached is to appoint Ambassador Aldo Pugliese of Italy as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I shall therefore take it that the Conference agrees to that appointment. It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should like to congratulate Ambassadore Pugliese, on behalf of all members of the Conference as well as myself, on the appointment on which we have just decided. Naturally, I wish him every success in his important duties, which I am sure he will carry out efficiently, given his well-known diplomatic ability. I give the floor to Ambassador Pugliese. Mr. PUGLIESE (Italy): Mr. President, I would simply like to thank you and, through you, to express my gratitude to all the distinguished members of the Conference on Disarmament for the confidence they have placed in the Italian delegation by agreeing that I should serve as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee that will be dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. ? The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The secretariat has today circulated at my request a timetable of meetings for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. As usual, the timetable has been prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the various Ad Hoc Committees; it is tentative and may be altered if necessary. In this connection, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 5, Ambassador Pugliese, will begin consultations on the most suitable date for the subsidiary body to begin its work. Once he has completed his consultations, the timetable will be revised and circulated once again if the Committee is to meet next week. If there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable. It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now intend to adjourn the plenary meeting if no other member wishes to take the floor. The next plenary meeting on the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 10 March, at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned. The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m. 615 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.395 10 March 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 10 March 1987, at 10 a.m. President: Mr. Lechuga Hevia GE. 87-60384/7611E 616. (Cuba) npriacsified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.395 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 395th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. First of all, I should like to extend, on behalf of the Conference, a warm welcome to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who is present here today at this plenary meeting. I also wish to convey to him the best wishes of all members of the Conference for success in the performance of his duties. In his message to us immediately after he assumed his important duties as Under-Secretary-General in the Department of Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Akashi recalled the great importance which the Secretary-General attaches to the significant role played by the Conference on Disarmament, and expressed his personal concern that the Conference's needs should be entirely satisfied by the Department of Disarmament Affairs. I am sure that all members will appreciate Mr. Akashi's comments, which reflect his commitment to the important duties he is now discharging. In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today continues the consideration of agenda item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of Procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any other matter related to the work of the Conference. I note the presence in the public gallery today of the participants in the Conference of Women with the United Nations for Disarmament, Understanding, Co-operation and Action, currently being held in the Palais des Nations. This Conference coincides, significantly, with International Women's Day and so I should like to convey our congratulations to all the women who, from different positions, participate in the affocts aimed at disarmament and arms limitation. I therefore welcome today the women in the public gallery of the Conference on Disarmament. Furtherwre, today is an exceptional day: I must announce that we have no speakers. I think this is the first time in two years that there ha,7e been no speakers in zni Conference. However, in accordance with the practice of the Conference 1 would like to ask if any delegation wishes to take the floor. I see none, and therefore we shall adjourn the meeting. The nest plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 12 March, at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned. The meeting rose at 10.25 a.m. 617 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 : CIA-RDP92-ni iRRRnnni nni (Inn/14 A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.396 12 March 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 12 March 1987, at 10 a.m. President: GE.87-60398/7657E Mr. Lechuga Hevia 618 (Cuba) im,,,,Inecifiori in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.396 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 396th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In accordance with its programme of work the Conference today continues the consideration of agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, members may raise any other matter related to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik, to whom I give the floor. Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): Thank you, Mr. President. Allow me to congratulate you on your presidency in the month of March. Your nation has in its coat of arms the rising sun, as a symbol of hope, a key that opens doors to find solutions and a palm tree with fruit, as the symbol of the fruitbearer, from which we all hope to reap. All of this, I hope augurs well for our work this month under your able and experienced chairmanship. I wish to thank Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of the People's Republic of China for the very able way in which he guided the Conference in February. The Chinese philosopher K'ang Yu Wei once remarked: "Going froth the level plain to the mountain peak, we must pass by the foothill slopes before we can ascend". Ambassador Fan has in fact guided us in passing the foothill slopes. We will remember Ambassador Don Lowitz as an eminent colleague and a good friend. Responding to Mrs. Lowitz' letter to the members of this Conference, I can assure her that it was for us really a joy and a privilege to have known him. Allow me to welcome the newly appointed Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi. / also welcome the Ambassadors who arrived since I last spoke in July: Ambassadors Morelli Pando of Peru, Teja of India, Hacene of Algeria, Morel of France, Dolgu of Romania, Yamada of Japan, Pugliese of Italy, Kosin of Yugoslavia, Nazarkin of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Hansen of the United States. We are grateful for the contributions made by their predecessors, whom we wish well. First, I wish to make a brief remark on the overall setting in which we have resumed this year's spring session. The Reykjavik Summit has placed East-West relations in a new perspective. It was undoubtedly a milestone on the road towards arms control and disarmament. There was, and fortunately still is, a prospect for arms-control agreements of potentially major significance. We are satisfied to note that the United States and the Soviet Union are building further on the foundations that were laid at Reykjavik. We are encouraged that recently an important stumbling block on the road to further progress has been removed, as the Soviet Union has accepted the delinkage of outer space issues from the negotiations on intermediate-range ballistic missiles. 619 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RnPq9_ni Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.396 3 (Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands) We are confident that movement in the bilateral talks will also favour the climate in which this Conference will work. I am thinking not only of the most important issue which the Conference considers, the establishment of a chemical-weapons convention, but also of the complementary role the Conference can play on issues related to those that are the subject of negotiations between the two major nuclear and space Powers. In July last year I addressed some substantial issues with regard to a nuclear-test ban. Needless to say, the Netherlands Government is, as it has always has been, in favour of a CTB and has considered its realization an important goal to be achieved. Regrettably, progress on the road towards a CTB has been slow. But we see it as a positive sign that currently talks are being held by Soviet and United States experts on the subject of nuclear tests, in particular on the verification of the TTBT and PNE Treaties. We look forward to the ratification of these Treaties as a step on the road to a comprehensive ban. We also welcome the discussions being conducted by United States and Soviet experts on the idea of interim steps with respect to nuclear tests, to which I shall return in a moment. We are encouraged by the increasing awareness, as demonstrated in the international debate on the test-ban issue, that an effective test-ban agreement requires a stringent verification regime and -- and this is very important -- that such a regime should be technically feasible. At their Ixtapi meeting, the countries of the Five Continents Initiative, the New Delhi Six, rightly recognized in their statement that verification is an important issue and accordingly forwarded useful proposals to enhance verification capabilities. Verification no longer seems an issue that, as such, divides us, although, of course, a great deal of work still has to be done. It is encouraging that the Soviet delegation has accepted so-called level II data exchange and is ready to participate in a practical test envisaged for 1988 on the basis of such data during a test run. We also took note of Soviet declarations to the effect that the USSR is open to the most strict forms of verification, such as on-site inspection and the use of all possibilities of seismology. We regret that such on-site inspection was not permitted during the recent Soviet test on 26 February and, as I said earlier, that the Soviet Union did not accept the invitation of the United States Government to observe and monitor a test at the Nevada site. With a view to bringing about the cessation of nuclear testing, we wish to reiterate our hope that the two major nuclear Powers will continue to explore the possibilities of reducing tests, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the reduction of arsenals. Fewer nuclear weapons, few nuclear tests; and depending on the scope of the arms control agreement, no tests for certain types of nuclear weapons. In this context, we recall the statement of Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic on 17 February, in which he said that the concept of interim steps has always been part of the socialist approach to a CTB. 620 in Part - Sanitized CODV Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.396 4 (Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands) If, as we hope, such steps lead the major nuclear Powers on the road towards a CTB, it would be a great pity that the Conference should remain an impotent observer. As long as we cannot negotiate on the treaty itself, we in the Conference should do everything feasible that will bring us nearer to the goal. That includes work that can be undertaken under the mandate proposed by a group of Western countries (CD/521). It seems of little interest to us whether that work will be granted the title of "negotiations". It is not on the basis of such labelling that major nations can be forced to negotiate on a final treaty banning all testing. In fact, we hope that such practical work will also bridge differences that separate those who consider a CTB an immediate objective and others who, for the time being, consider it from a different perspective. Let us, on the basis of CD/521, finally resume the substantive work on scope, verification and compliance related to a comprehensive test ban. For too long we have been waiting for a thorough discussion of the many interesting papers that have been submitted, such as the ones presented by the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Norway and Australia. As Ambassador Turbanski of Poland underlined in his intervention on 26 February, it is unfortunate that more than a month has passed and that we are unable to do substantial work on the subject. We wish to echo the Polish Ambassador's reminder that the mandate, though important, is not an aim in itself. Let me also say something on the objective as such of a CTB. We believe that we must, with respect to the objective of a CTB, be realistic. A CTB remains in our view an important tool to slow down the nuclear-arms race. It would also have great political significance, and as such set an example to nations that possess -- or are on the verge of acquiring -- a nuclear explosive capability. However even in a world in which a CTB would reign, this would unfortunately not put a definite end to the nuclear-arms race. A CTB can never be a substitute for deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. We fail to understand those who argue that a comprehensive test ban is even a prerequisite to halting the arms race. Some have said here in this room that, unless we all agree to putting an end to nuclear-weapon tests, we shall not be able to achieve our goal of nuclear disarmament; that without a CTB the dangers of nuclear war will even increase. We on our side are more optimistic about the perspectives of the bilateral nuclear talks going on elsewhere in Geneva. In short, for my Government, which attaches very high priority to the question of the test ban, the reduction and the ultimate abolition of nuclear arsenals, is of even greater importance. The cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament are, of course, major issues. The Conference should certainly address these issues. But can we consider those themes completely separate from the question of conventional arms control? Various resolutions accepted at last year's General Assembly, in particular resolutions 41/59 C and 41/59 G, point out, in fact, the importance to be attached to conventional arms control and disarmament. 621 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R0001001nnnn1_4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.396 5 (Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands) We agree with Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia, when on 24 February, he underlined the importance of conventional weapons that continue to absorb most of the resources spent on arms and take a heavy toll of human life in so-called local wars. The development of conventional weapons systems is indeed making those weapons increasingly dangerous and very destructive. The Atlantic Alliance agreed in Halifax on the objective of the establishment of a comprehensive, verifiable and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels in the whole of Europe. The Warsaw Pact expressed its interest in conventional arms reductions as well. The elimination of conventional disparities in Europe will certainly be conducive to future nuclear disarmament. My Government hopes that a systematic exchange of views in the Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of a nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament will be continued. But as Ambassador Hansen of the United States rightly asked: "Where on the programme of work for 1987 is there provision for this Conference to undertake arms control and disarmament efforts which might contribute to the ending of the destruction, pain and suffering now taking place in diverse parts of the world because conventional weapons are being used?". We all know there are countries that are vocal when it concerns nuclear weapons -- which they do not possess -- but that are often tacit on conventional weapons -- which they do possess. We fully respect the deeply felt concern of those delegations about the threat of nuclear war. However, we do think that a more balanced approach, reflecting also the anxiety about actual and often very indiscriminate killings by conventional weapons, would be a more proper response to our common aspirations. A more balanced approach is also required if we take into account the urgent need for scarce resources, in particular in developing countries, whose plight is a matter of great concern to my Government, as it is to the international community as a whole. My Government considers the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons within certain areas through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones to be of great importance. Such zones are conducive to stability and security in the respective area. They also tend to set an example for countries in other areas, although we acknowledge that the establishment of such zones is less complicated in areas where up to now nuclear weapons have not been introduced. My Government feels that certain conditions should be fulfilled to make such regional endeavours successful, also in the longer run. The agreements reached should be the fruit of initiatives from within the region, which itself should be clearly defined. Preferably all countries in the region must be prepared to join and the agreement should be supported by an adequate verification regime. The agreement should include guarantees from the nuclear Powers. Generally speaking, it is, of course, of great importance that all participating countries pay attention to the effective functioning of the nuclear-free zone. It is in this spirit that my Government appreciates the establishment of the Treaty of Rarotonga on a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, on which the distinguished Ambassador of Australia, Richard Butler, gave us interesting information in his speech on 3 February 1987. 622 n.rincQifipri in Part - Sanitized Coov Approved for Release 2012/06/11 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.396 6 (Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands) Since the beginning of the space age, technology has made progress with gigantic steps and space has become an aspect of our daily life. The Soviet Union, the United States, China, India, Japan and the countries working together in the European Space Agency have placed satellites in orbit and other countries will certainly follow suit. Almost from the start there has also been a steady increase in military activities in space. In the 1970s the borderlines between civil and military use of space became vaguer. Now, up to approximately 75 per cent of the satellites launched have only or mainly military purposes. For one and a half years, the Conference on Disarmament has, in an Ad Hoc Committee, examined problems in relation to a possible arms race in outer space. We have gradually come to grips with the immense complexities of the issues involved. We believe that the discussions on the subject in the Ad Hoc Committee were serious and profound and that the Committee should this year go on in the same spirit. We should, in our view, concentrate more than before on relevant new developments as far as the military use of outer space is concerned. We feel that, building on those discussions, it would be possible for this Committee to come forward with some specific recommendations for stability-enhancing measures. Of particular concern to my Government is the protection of satellites that on account of, for instance, their contribution to greater transparency, crisis management and early warning against nuclear attacks, perform a stabilizing role. The search for a satisfactory regime in this field is a very complex task. One of the complicating factors is, of course, that not all satellites concerned play only such a stabilizing role. An approach complementary to the bilateral negotiations with regard to the protection of high-orbit satellites seems to us of particular importance. The analytic discussions on the legal regime have been interesting. However, what is lacking is consensus on what is and what is not covered by existing international law. We realize it will be very difficult to agree on a paper in which common ground would be defined. But it seems to be of great importance that a serious effort should be made. It would be a good idea if at some moment legal experts from capitals be invited to assist us in our discussions. Other useful work can be done in the Committee. Confidence-building measures constitute an area to be further explored. We favour a strengthening of the United Nations registration agreement of 1975. The exchange of more detailed information on all space activities and even prior notification on the launching of space objects are themes the Committee may wish to address. 623 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.396 7 (Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands) In accordance with decision A/41/421 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, we hope work on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament under the highly esteemed chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles will be finalized during this session. We trust the approach of all concerned will be realistic, so as to ensure that the comprehensive programme can indeed be established at the next General Assembly. From the beginning, the Netherlands has supported the Swedish proposal made in June 1980 to broaden the scope of the draft treaty on radiological weapons by including the issue of attacks on nuclear facilities. However, as we all know, for various reasons, a number of delegations were not in favour of accepting such a two-track approach and were not prepared to bring the two issues under one international legal instrument. We regret this, but it seems realistic to recognize that from the outset the two-track approach has been controversial. The question we ought to discuss in the Ad Hoc Committee is whether it would not. be possible to find a compromise by now concentrating on an agreement on track A (radiological weapons proper), parallel to an explicit understanding that track B (the attacks on nuclear facilities) will be the subject of further negotiations here ?this body. Let me emphasize that such a phased approach should in no way be considered as an expression of doubt on the competence of bilis body as the negotiating forum on track B. On the contrary, as we have stated before, we consider the Conference to be the competent body where attacks on both installations for peaceful use and installations for military purposes can be treated adequately. The IAEA, which is responsible for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, is not the appropriate forum for this topic. We believe the future legal instrument dealing with these attacks ought to be based on the concept of indiscriminate warfare through mass destruction. We should aim at the prevention of mass destructive indiscriminate effects and if we do so, the distinction between military and civil facilities is not relevant. My delegation is aware of the objections some have raised against the approach I have just sketched. The issue of the competence of the Conference as well as the assessment of the urgency of the issue of attacks have been stumbling blocks that prevented us from making more progress. But we believe that those differences can be addressed in such a way that no vital security or other interests are liable to be affected. In our opinion the time has come for Governments to deal with the issue and break the impasse. Neither questions of competence, nor the attitude of benign neglect, may be reasons to stumble on as we did before. 624 npriacsified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.396 8 (Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands) Finally, a few words on chemical weapons. Negotiations on chemical weapons are beginning to take a decisive turn. Due to the patient and painstaking efforts of last year's Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Cromartie, and his staff, we can now work on the basis of a so-called "rolling text", which provides us, in spite of the multitude of square brackets -- and perhaps also because of those brackets -- with an excellent starting point from which the negotiations can proceed. We are grateful to Ian Cromartie for the dedication and insight with which he and his colleagues have guided the work. We congratulate Ambassador Ekeus on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for this year. We know the chairmanship to be in good hands. Many colleagues have said we should make use of the momentum in the negotiations. In fact, our goal should be to reach agreement before the end of the year. As I myself said in July last year, my delegation indeed hopes that before the end of the year we can break the back of the problems. Recent moves made by the Soviet delegation are indeed encouraging. We hope this sets the trend for further progress. However, we also wish to voice a note of caution. A variety of important and sensitive issues must still .be addressed. A reat number of practical issues have to be dealt with at some moment before an agreement be signed. It would not-be wise to leave major loopholes in the convention that aould later lead to misinterpretation and arouse suspicion on implementation, if not worse. Three major areas of disagreement have plagued this Conference for many years. They concern challenge inspection, the question how to verify that the civil chemical industry is not misused for the production of chemical weapons and the issue of how to declare and monitor existing chemical weapons stockpiles. Although in particular on the first of those issues, challenge inspection, we still have a long way to go, it is reassuring to note that on each of these issues progress has been made in recent months. Let me first take the subject on which, in our view, the most significant steps have been made, the declaration and monitoring of stocks. It has now become clear that the Soviet Union is prepared under the convention to make a declaration containing detailed information on locations of chemical-weapon stocks shortly after the entry into force of the convention. We welcome this, because we infer from it that a system of successive declarations, phased out over the entire period of destruction is no longer deemed necessary. We were also happy to note that destruction, rather than diversion, of CW stocks for peaceful purposes is now the objective, even if the issue of a possible diversion of stocks on a very limited scale is not finally settled yet. A lot of substantive work still remains to be done on the issue of stocks -- I mention only the sensitive issue of the order in which stocks must 625 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.396 9 (Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands) be destroyed -- but we feel that a good basis is now available for further consultations and negotiations on remaining issues. This work is, as I understand, well under way under the able guidance of the item co-ordinator for Cluster I, Mr. Nieuwenhuys. In the area of verification of non-production of chemical weapons, the second major issue I just mentioned, the work of the Conference drew great benefit from informal consultations in the inter-sessional period at the end of last year, and from the deliberations at the session in January. In that relatively brief period discussion of hitherto "untouchable" issues appeared to be possible. We hope that the spirit prevailing in that period will continue to inspire us in these weeks when the Committee is dealing with article VI of the convention. My delegation welcomes Soviet concurrence with the notion of risk in determining the stringency of verification of non-production. In our view, the risk factor -- essentially the risk that a civil chemical plant will in fact violate the convention -- is important in determining the intensity with which the plant in question should be subject to a monitoring regime. The idea of defining a threshold for annual production, to which Ambassador Nazarkin referred in his statement on 5 March, has been under discussion for some time. Such a quantitative criterion would indeed provide us with one of the factors to determine the risk involved. In the coming weeks we shall have to get down to the level of practical implementation: what factors are relevant to determine the risks various chemical substances and types of production pose and consequently which inspection regime will be applied for each of them? We are encouraged by the constructive suggestions the item co-ordinator for Cluster III, Mr. Macedo, has recently made on this point. Useful work on the classification of substances has already been done by the former Chairman of Working Group A, Mr. Richard Rowe. Under his guidance three categories of substances were elaborated under article VI, together with a first outline of a regime for each category. While generally appreciative of the progress achieved so far, my delegation realizes that a number of important issues related to monitoring of production of chemicals have hardly been addressed. The still virtually unexplored and very complex area of commercially produced super-toxic lethal chemicals and the risk they may pose to the convention is only an illustration of the many important problems awaiting a judicious solution. As for on-site challenge inspections, the third outstanding and perhaps most important issue of disagreement, my delegation appreciates that in his latest interventions, Ambassador Nazarkin has made observations that seem to narrow down some of the differences. We acknowledge that the Soviet delegation has identified two important areas where requests for challenge inspections cannot be refused and that it has broadly supported the British approach for alternative solutions in exceptional circumstances. 626 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-0.1168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.396 10 (Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands) However, we are still faced with the essential problem of how to act in case stocks or facilities have not been registered and challenge inspections are refused. Especially in countries with a large territory and with traditionally less open systems of communication, this can present a major problem, if no adequate verification regime is established. Since this problem goes to the heart of the convention, I think it may be useful to explain what we see as the crux of challenge inspections. When the convention enters into force the envisaged system of routine inspection will in general give adequate assurances that existing stockpiles of chemical weapons are destroyed and no new stockpiles are built. However, doubts may arise, in particular about places and facilities that are not declared. The root of the problem may in such cases be misunderstanding, perhaps of a technical nature, and it is obvious that a challenge inspection can most effectively dissipate any misgivings. But the doubts expressed may also be based on suspicion that a State Party is in fact deliberately not properly implementing the convention. Cases such as clandestine stockpiling and production of chemical weapons should indeed also be covered by the convention. It is of crucial importance that in cases of such malevolent practices no legal, procedural or other obstacle can be put in the way of a justified request for challenge inspection. For the effective functioning of the convention, confidence in its implementation is essential. Confidence can only be instilled if intrusive on-site inspection is, in those cases of supposed malpractices, guaranteed. The United States delegation has, now three years ago, in its proposal under article X (CD/500) rightly pointed out the way in which we should find a solution. We feel the British approach, as presented in CD/715, building on the United States proposal, to be a realistic one. The British Working Paper advanced the idea that in exceptional circumstances, in particular for national security reasons, alternative measures may be proposed by the challenged State, but those should be to the satisfaction of the challenging State. If the latter State is not satisfied and if the challenged State cannot in time advance other alternative measures, contracting parties will face a situation in which the challenged State may be declared as violating the convention. It is clear that all parties have an interest that such a crisis will never break out. It could in fact undermine the overall functioning of the treaty as such. It is therefore of the greatest importance that in the coming months we seek a solution which minimizes the risk that such a crisis situation will in fact lead to the breaking down of the convention. But the rule should remain that the complaining party has the right to international challenge inspection on the spot. 627 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.396 11 (Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands) Some delegations have suggested that we could make good use of the example of the confidence-building measures (CBMs) that were agreed upon in Stockholm in September 1986, in the framework of the European Disarmament Conference. We agree with those delegations in so far as we should be inspired by the constructive spirit which led to results at the Stockholm Conference. But we believe the parallel cannot be drawn any further because, as Ambassador Von Stillpnagel rightly said, the negotiations in Stockholm served a different purpose. In Stockholm the objective was to build confidence. Here our more radical objective is the complete abolition of all chemical weapons. We cannot confine ourselves to a system that gives "some" confidence. What we need is a system of verification that gives full confidence. Full confidence will also require full confidence in the organization we shall establish and in the rules of decision-making we shall draft. I refer in this context to the Netherlands Working Paper CD/445 of March 1984, on the size and structure of a chemical disarmament inspectorate. But there is far more to it. As Ambassador Cromartie said in his final statement as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on 3 February, provisions under article IX, but also under article VIII, of the convention would be required to underpin confidence in the convention. Provisions on a strong organization and on strong rules of decision-making should provide the necessary confidence in the draft convention as a whole, to enable it to be concluded. A lot of important work is still waiting for us. Differences must be bridged, resistance overcome. Let us assist the President of the Ad Hoc Committee in setting priorities by first focusing on the major issues. I call upon all delegations to contribute to a common effort to bring the convention on chemical weapons to an early conclusion. Mr. President, a famous countryman of yours, the Cuban poet Jose Marti, said on building a nation a century ago what we today can say about building a chemical weapons convention. Like a nation, a chemical weapons convention "is not a complex of wheels (of fortune), nor a wild horse race, but a stride upward concerted by real men". The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President, and of course for his reference to my country's coat of arms as an allegorical expression of good omen for our work, as it were. I have no more speakers on my list. Does any other representative wish to take the floor? I see none. 628 nariaccifipn in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.396 12 (The President) I have requested the secretariat to circulate today a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. As usual, the timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees; it is purely indicative and may be modified if necessary. In this connection, I wish to inform the Conference that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space will meet tomorrow afternoon at 4.30 p.m. in this room. Subsequent meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee will be decided on in the light of the results of the consultations currently taking place, and therefore the timetable does not contain a specific reference to the Ad Hoc Committee's next meeting. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable. It was so decided. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 17 March, at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned. The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m. 629 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD/PV.397 17 March 1987 ENGLISH FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva: on Tuesday, 17 March 1987, at 10 a.m. President: GE.87-60416/614n Mr. Lechuga Hevia (Cuba) 630 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.397 2 The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 397th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today begins the consideration of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, in conformity with rule 3 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any other matter related to the work of the Conference. . I should like to recall that Saturday, 14 March, three days ago, marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of uninterrupted multilateral negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation. On 14 March 1962, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament began its work, at the level of foreign ministers. Since then, a number of major agreements have been concluded in the negotiating body. Despite all the hopes that could be placed in a negotiating process that would set mankind on the path towards the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the arms race has continued unchecked. New systems of nuclear weapons have been developed, and the arsenals of such weapons have attained such dimensions that in the event of a nuclear conflict the annihilation of mankind would be inevitable. It is no accident, then, that today we are beginning the consideration precisely of agenda item 3. Conventional forces have acquired a destructive capability previously unknown, and military expenditures have reached astronomical heights which were unthinkable 25 years ago. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the world would be an even more dangerous place to live in had it not been for the conclusion of the agreements negotiated in this Council chamber during the period in question. In any event, despite those agreements and all the efforts made in negotiations, no one can say that today we are nearer our objective than in 1962. But precisely because of the universal nature of the danger facing us and the variety of threats to which we are subjected, in the present circumstances there can be no giving way to despair or frustration. The sheer scale of the risk posed by the arms race and of the task facing us mean that there is no valid alternative to the existence of a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, as stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and therefore it is to be hoped that this anniversary will lead us to pursue actively our search for agreements on effective disarmament measures. I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Norway, Bulgaria, Spain, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In accordance with the decision adopted by the Conference at its 387th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the personal adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Dr. Bakkevig. In doing so I should like to recall that the Conference had been expecting the visit of His Excellency The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sadly passed away a few days ago. I have already had occasion to convey to the representative of Norway the sincere condolences of the Conference on this sad loss. I now give the floor to Dr. Bakkevig. 631 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.397 3 Mr. BAKKEVIG (Norway): Mr. President, first of all let me express my satisfaction at the honour and privilege of addressing the Conference on Disarmament. May I also extend to you, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia, the distinguished representative of Cuba, my congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference for the month of March. I thank you also for the kind welcome you extended to me. Allow me also, through you, Mr. President, to express the gratitude of the Norwegian Government for the expressions of condolences in this Conference occasioned by the sudden death of the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Knut Frydenlund, who was scheduled to address the Conference. May I also express my profound condolences and sympathy over the sudden death of Ambassador Donald Lowitz of the United States. Ambassador Lowitz took part in the CD Workshop on Seismological Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban in Oslo in June 1985, and had plans to visit our country again in May of this year. It is the profound belief of my Government that the nations of the world cannot, in the era of nuclear weapons, obtain real security at the expense of each other. They must explore the areas of mutual interest and, on the basis of such common ground as may be found, create alternatives to a situation dominated by distrust and arms build-up. Collective security must be based on confidence-building measures, arms-control agreements and co-operation across the international divides of security arrangments. Recently there have been hopeful signals of new momentum in the nuclear as well as in the conventional field of arms control. We are pleased to observe that developments in a positive direction are taking place. Thus the Stockholm Conference last year succeeded in reaching an agreement on security and confidence-building measures in Europe. If properly implemented these measures will in our view serve to enhance security on this continent. Furthermore, new negotiations are now about to start in Vienna with a view to eliminating existing disparities and establishing conventional stability at lower levels of forces. The Reykjavik meeting last autumn between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signalled willingness to deal with the important problems of arms control in a constructive manner. We welcome the latest developments concerning the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles. An agreement to eliminate these weapons from Europe will have the full support of the Norwegian Government. We do hope that the initiatives taken by the United States and the Soviet Union will lead to the early signing of an agreement. The parties must, of course, take appropriate steps to secure adequate verification and agree on parallel limitations of short-range intermediate-range nuclear missiles in order to prevent a possible circumvention of an INF agreement. It is our hope that recent developments in the East/West context will have a positive impact on the disarmament efforts on the multilateral level as well. A global, comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons is urgently needed. Norway has taken active part in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production 6 32 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/11: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100100001-4 CD/PV.397 4 (Mr. Bakkevig, Norway) stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons made significant progress on important questions in 1986. Difficult problems still remain to be resolved, particularly in the field of verification. However, the momentum in the negotiations has been sustained, and we are pleased to note the progress achieved so far during the 1987 session. We feel assured that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1987, Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden, will spare no efforts in trying to find early and satisfactory solutions to the outstanding problems. In particular, it is necessary to work out details for verification regimes, including routine and on-site inspection on challenge of all facilities and sites where violations could occur. No doubt, solving these questions represents a difficult and complex task. We noted in this regard the statement of Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union at the plenary meeting on 5 March, when he said that "chemical weapons and the production base for their manufacture are to be destroyed by all States possessing such weapons, including both the Soviet Union and the United States". The Norwegian Government attaches importance as well to the bilateral consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union on an effective and verifiable global convention on chemical weapons. These consultations have already contributed positively to the negotiating process within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. A basic and still unresolved question is the elaboration of modalities for handling requests for on-site inspection on challenge. Norway is of the opinion that the provisions concerning routine on-site inspections should be supplemented by a stringent system for on-site inspections to verify allegations of non-compliance. This would provide the ultimate source of confidence in the convention. Such a system has to satisfy certain criteria, of which the following three are the most essential: firstly, the challenged State must be under the obligation to demonstrate to other States, and especially the challenging State, that it complies with the provisions of the convention. Secondly, an inspection would have to be undertaken immediately after the issue of a challenge. Thirdly, the investigation should be detailed and comprehensive. Whereas Norway takes part in all aspects of the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban in the Conference on Disarmament, we have put special emphasis on the question of verification of alleged use of these weapons. In 1981 the Norwegian