I WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT YOUR PROPOSAL FOR AN NSC-LED EFFORT TO DENY THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES ACCESS TO SENSITIVE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION THROUGH NTIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B00181R000900030002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/30: CIA-RDP92B00181R000900030002-i
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/30: CIA-RDP92B00181R000900030002-7
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/30: CIA-RDP92B00181R000900030002-7
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Honorable Malcolm Baldrige
Secretary of Commerce
Washington, D.C. 20230
Dear Mac:
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1 MAR 1985
kkix- 4- 3 Mr
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I wholeheartedly support your proposal for an NSC-led effort
to deny the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries access
to sensitive scientific and technical information through NTIS.
As you know, we all have sought to develop effective ways for
reducing the overall flow of militarily useful U.S. and Western
technology that is strengthening Soviet military capabilities.
Recent legislation allowing DoD to control sensitive, non-
classified information of military importance has been helpful
from our point of view.
In November 1984 DoD initiated a new review of the release of
all technical data. That month I issued new directives requiring
document reviews for export control considerations, which will
lead to marking documents (including formerly classified documents)
that are found to be sensitive and controlling their distribution.
Because NTIS' mission is to disseminate technical data publicly,
the Department of Defense (DoD) will not provide any export-
controlled technical data to NTIS in the future. The DoD appears
to have already made some progress in this regard. I am sure
your staff has pointed out that only one of the DoD studies you
cite as being available in NTIS (Polymeric Microelectronics) is
dated after 1981.
I fully agree with you that we should make a coordinated,
government-wide attack on the loss of S&T information. The
National Security Council (NSC) could establish general guide-
lines, using already-implemented programs as examples. I propose
that the NSC assign this effort to the Senior Interagency Group
(SIG) on the Transfer of Strategic Technology. That SIG includes
the relevant government agencies and can address this particular
problem of technology transfer control in terms of broader Admin-
istration policy. I presume that some sort of working group would
be established to involve policy officials familiar with the
issue.
Finally, let me note that we also do not want to relax
our efforts in stopping illegal trade in militarily-significant
technology. You mention that this source accounts for little
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more than 10 percent of Soviet acquisitions. But this technology
is the "quality ten percent" that has been specifically targeted
by Soviet intelligence under the direction of the Soviet military
R&D authorities. We want to continue the Reagan Administration
momentum in controlling this severe loss and improving the manage-
ment of our export control system.
I look forward to continued cooperation in these and other
matters of technology transfer management.
Sincerely,
;
cc: Secretary of State
Attorney General
Secretary of Energy
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
r-A---4p1P.Director, Central Intelligence
Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/30: CIA-RDP92B00181R000900030002-7