ESTIMATE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY OF THE USSR TO PRODUCE SUBMARINES UNDER AN INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R000300010004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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ESTIMATE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY OF THE USSR
TO PRODUCE SUBMARINES UNDER AN INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PROGRAM
#IC-SSC-WPI
April 1957
Subcommittee on Shipbuilding
of the
Economic Intelligence Committee
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the industrial capability
of the USSR to. produce submarines under an all out industrial mobiliza-
tion pro grant calling for the production of an implements of war. The
effect ;of attacks by the US or Allied armed forces on Soviet productions
in the event of war, have not been considered in this estimate.
Mobilization of the shipbuilding industry for expansion of submarine
construction is considered in three separate phases.
The fire .'period (Phase A) considers optimum utilization of
specialized facilities currently'used for submarime production.
The second period (Phase B) considers for submarine construction
the use of certain additional building ways and sites not used since
World War II for the construction of major naval surface vessels.
Finally,, generalized consideration is given (Phase 0) to additional
methods of expanding submarine output.
Special attention is given to the time interval between H-day
(mobilization day) and the achievement of the probable optimum rate of
output,.
The supply of the two major components - steel and diesel engines and
the required increase in shipyard labor is also discussed..
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F1c30RS 1
JSSRt ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF SUBMARINES
UNDDi 3 PHASES OF INDUSTRIAL MDBILIZATION
Months 4 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48
I)
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I, Majimata of the Canabiflt r o the USSR to
Three Phases of Inclus:tr ,l Mobilization
Becaus. of the probable high priority that will be assigned to
submarine production, it is assumed that allocation of resources will be
adequate for the several phases and that no delays will be encountered,
The time interval between U-day and the achievement of the probable peak
(optimum) production is estimated on the basis of US.analogy modified by
the knowledge of Soviet achievementw in the industrial field since World
War II.
All estimates of Soviet production capability are for one type of
submarine - the "W"-Clase.* It is recognized that other types of
suomarineso having different characteristics that may vary building
time, may be constructed during the period,, but no attempt is made- to
estimate either the type or rate of output.
The estimated production of submarines under the three phases of
industrial mobilization is shown graphically in Figure 1.** An analysis
of each of those phases is contained in the following pages.
It is assumed that the first phase in mobilization will be to
raise the annual output from the special construction facilities
currently engaged in the production of submarines, The current annual
output (1956) from these facilities is about 70 "W"-Class and 25
Class. An equivalent for average yearly production in terms of "W"-
Class is about 90 and it is estimated that this rate can be raised to 156.
The facilities currently engaged in the production of submarines
and the estimated annual rate of output of "W"-Class employing 3 labor
shiftso*** is shown in Table 1.**"*
* The "W"'-glass submarine is the leading Soviet lone, range submarine
with respect to numbers built, Over 200 have been constructed since
1951, This Class has diesel and electric propulsions and conventional
armament and has a standard displacement of about 1.050 tons and a light
ship weight of about 880 tons,
Figure 1 follows page 2.
See page for manpower analysis,
**** Table 1 appears on page 3,
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Table 1
Phase A
Special Facilities Currently Engaged in the Construction of Submarines
and Estimated Optimum Annual Rate of Output
Location ShIgyard.
Leningrad Baltic #189
Krylov #194
Sudomekh #196
Gorkiy. Krasnoye
Sormovo #112
Nikolayev Nosenko #4444
Komsomolsk',', Komsomoisk #199
Number of
Berths, (Ways
Sites oks
4
Annual Rate Annual Rate
of Output of
Per rtha Oututa
4 c/ 16
4 c/ 16
4 c/
4.5
'Is
3
214
58
1oe` s after M-day.
0j"'
No aubz arines have been raportec from this facility, howerter, 3 tr
considered to be part of Phase A' estii sta.
Because of the cooperation amo : shipyards ih; the Leningrad.area
i --theproduction of submarine compacts, an overall average Waal
Qutput af per way or site was assigned,
The facilities listed in Table 1 are specially suited for the
assembly of ships by using sectional method of construction,.i.e. the
joining together on the building ways, on the building sites, and in
the building docks of assembled hull sections which are prefabricated
in shops in the yard or adjacent plants. In the Nosenko Shipyard in
Nikolayev the method of assembly closely follows assembly line tochnique.
Production in the Krasnoye Sormovo Shipyard, the leading submarine
production yard in the USSR, was at the rate of l submarine per berth
(site) every 2 months in 1952 .when the yard had only 3 berths for
submarine construction. This production rate was not rnaintained when
the additional 10 berths were completed, but it does indicate a capa-
bility of the shipyard and a rate of production by sectional construction
method. Because of high priority assigned to submarine construction
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in 1952, it is thought that the rate of 1 submarine per berth every
months represents a maximum rate by trained labor and carefully scheduled
construction sequence. It is possible that Soviet engineers and planners
were engaged in a production rate exercise to test the feasibility of
this method. Under national mobilization the skilled labor force would
be relatively decreased and nude up of semi-qualified labor thereby
reducing-the overall annual rate of output.
Other shipyards listed in Table 1 engaged in submarine production
during the past several years but never attained the rate of output
achieved by Krasnoye Sormovo Shipyard with the possible exception'of the
Nosenko Shipyard, The estimated optimum annual rate of output from these
yards, shown in Table 1, is based on the shipyards# record of production
and available data on facilities and supporting shops.
A yearly output amounting to an equivalent of 156 "W"-Class
submarines from 39 building berths averages 3 months per submarine per
berth or an average output of 4 "W"-Ma as submarines per berth per year,
It should be noted that submarines are approximately 90-95 percent
complete when launched from these facilities,
The sectional assembly method of constructing submarines cannot be
compared with US methods because this technique is not employed in the
US, By contrast, it can be pointed out that two leading US submarine
builders the Electric Boat Company and the Portsmouth Naval Yard,under
US mobilization plans, indicate after the construction of the 16th vessel
a construction schedule of approximately 9 months, (!e months on"4he
building way and 41 months fitting out) not including 1 month lead time,
to produce a slightly larger submarine of approximately 1,600 standard
displacement tons.
B. Phase B,.- Optimum Annual Rate of out t From the Special
Submarine Construction Facilities and Hea&Dv
Available Additional Facilities. (Phase oludev
se .
It is assumed that the second phase in mobilization will be to
raise the annual output by adding certain facilities which have not been
used since World War II for the construction of major naval surface
vessels but could easily be made suitable for submarine construction.
The estimated annual output of "W"-Class submarines employing
3 labor shifts* from these facilities and including total of Phase A, is
shown in Table 2.*
# Sea page for manpower analysis.
Table 2 appears on page 5.
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Table 2
Theoretical Allocation of Additional Facilities
to Submarine Construction and Estimated Optimum Annual Rate of Output
Location Shipywd
Leningrad Baltic
Zhdanov #190
Kronshtadt
Nikolayev Nosenko #
Sevastopol Sevastopol #4497
Molotovsk Molotovsk #1402
Molotovsk #1402
Optimum optimum
Number Annual Rate Annual Rate
of Berths of Output of
LWaya & Sites) Per Berth Ou t g/
2 2m5
14 2.5 W
6 2.5 V,
5 2.5W
7Y
Phase A a 3,56
Ckand Total Phase B
a. Optimum annual rate obtained 27 months after M-day* First vessel
completed 21 months after M-day.
b. Based on approximately 5 months on the building berth and 5 months
fitting-out. Inasmuch as fitting out is not done on the building berth
but at a fitting-out quay, the annual production rate is based on time
on the building berth only.
c. Based on 6 months on the building berth.
d. From Table 1.
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As none of these facilities have been used for submarine construction
after World War II,p the estimated rate of output is based firsts on the
assumption that these facilities will be improved to a level equal to
similar facilities currently engaged in destroyer production; seconds on
Soviet capability for naval construction and thirds on the use of construc-
tion technology- analogous with US submarine building yards.
US mobilization plans for experienced submarine building yards
schedule delivery of the first submarine 18 months after M-day and near-
maximum production 24 months after M-day. The schedule at near-maxima
production is approximately hJ months on the building way and !& months
fitting-out,
Two of the yards listed in Table 2, the Baltic and the Nosefko
shipyards# are already engaged in submarine construction and'should reach
optimum annnal rate of production on. the additional facilities in
relatively. short time.
The Zhdanov.Shipyard has built submarine sections since World War II
and should have little difficulty in reaching optimum production rate
within 27 months.
Kronshtadt, Sevastopol, and Molotovsk shipyards may need slightly
more time to reach optimum production depending on the availability of
necessary skilled personnel.
Molotovsk Shipyard is also handicapped by more difficult working
conditions on the open air ways because of the lack of adequate weight
handling facilities and because of severe winter weather conditions,
Ten of the ways at Plolotovek, therefore, are estimates to require about
SO percent more way time than for the other yards. Two of the open air
ways at Molotovsk are served by an assembly shop and is considered able
to follow the average production rate
C. Phase C - Discussion of Additional Methods for Expanding -Submarine
Production.
Assuming that no greater utilization of existing shipbuilding
facilities is possible, than contemplated under Phases A and B, then
any additional submarine production must come from industrial expansion.
Additional production may be accomplished by expanding assembly
shops and building ways in existing shipyards; by converting certain
industrial machine and metal working ships to the assembly of submarine
hull and wachinery components into large submarine subsections for
shipment to newly built assembly shipyards, either in the USSR or possibly
in the satellite countries; and by building new component producing plants.
The extent of conversion and expansion under Phase C cannot be
estimated because undoubtedly it will be determined on the basis of Soviet
objectives and on maintaining balance in the allocation of resources to
other military sectors and consumer goods.
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IIe Stej1, Diesel and Manpower Availabil
Overall industrial capability to support expanded submarine produc-
tion is believed to be adequate. An examination of steel and diesel
engine production and manpower availability produce little evidence of
the likelihood of shortages in these major areas.
The optimum production of submarines under Phase B possibly will
require about 300,000 tons of high tensile steel annually for pressure
hull construction. The USSR has ample open hearth and electric furnace
production capacity to produce many times the required special quality
ingot steel and in addition it has adequate plate mill capacity to roll
the necessary plates.
The diesel engine manufacturing capability of the USSR industry has
been expanded to meet requirements for the dieselization of railroads.
Currently, submarine diesels are produced by the Kolomna Locomotive Plant
and similar 2000 h.p. diesels for railroad locomotives are produced by
the Xharl.kov Transport Maritime Building Plant. Under the railroad
dieselization program approximately 8,000 to 10#000 locomotive diesels
are scheduled for production from these and other plants during the Sixth
Five-Year plan. It becomes apparent that under an industrial mobilization
.programs with a reduction in the allocation of diesels to railroads, this
industry easily could support a submarine program of 1400 to 500 boats,.
No exhaustive study has been made of the potential supply of other
components? however, viewed in light of the industrial progress made in
.the USSR since World War II it is thought that an annual component output
somewhat in excess of the total required under Phase B is possible.
It is estimated that 36,000 people are currently employed in produc-
tive or direct shipyard labor to produce submarines.. Under Phase A this
figure will rise to 63,000 and under Phase B to 91#000. Expansion through
Phase B.will require about a 200 percent increase, however, in "terms of
absolute figures this increase is not large.
The estimate of required manpower is based on the following formula:
AB.aM
Oor
A ? Total standard displacement tons (SDT) produced in one year.
B s Manhours required to produce one (1) SDT.
s 884 (US analogy)
C e Manhoure in one Soviet manyear.
s 2224. (365 - 87. 8 r 2224. 87 days s 52 Sundays, 12 days
vacation, 16 days absenteeism and 7 national holidays.)
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Therefore:
Current employment.: 36,000
. 2224
Phase A employment . 3~2 8% = 63sOg0
Phase B employment w 22R~~ - 91,0000
No great difficulty is anticipated in recruiting the additional
labor force from lower priority shipbuilding and repair activities and
from some consumer goods industries.
It is assumed that under industrial mobilization 3 labor shifts
will be used in submarine construction and that the percentage of total
direct labor employed in each shift probably will be in the same order
as indicated in US mobilization plans
First Shifts 60 percent
Second Shift : 30 percent
Third Shift 10 percent
These percentages may vary in the case of mass production yards where
the highest efficiency is obtained by more or leas continuous operation
of automatic and semi-automatic machinery in the prefabrication shops.
Because of the use of automatic and semi-automatic machinery in the
sectional construction of submarines,, a greater percentage of lower
skilled labor can be employed than formerly when similar work was done
manually.
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