SINO-SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS 1 JANUARY-30 JUNE 1960

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CIA-RDP92B01090R000400010010-2
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RIPPUB
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S
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126
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December 20, 2016
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September 5, 2006
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10
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Publication Date: 
August 31, 1960
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REPORT
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SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400610010-2 ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT SINO-SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC AC'rilkl IN UNITE R DEVELOPED AREA 1 JANUARY' = 30 JUNE 1960 EI4-114--S9 31 August 1960 ECONOMIC I14 rELLIGENCE COMM I RETURN TO RECORDS IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE JO >_,~wr OX_ Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 W ARRING This nxate, i; y ccn taans information affecting the Natiorsai Defense -of the United States within the :-ean?ng of the espionage laws, Title 18, is d Se--s. 7 and 994, the trans- mission or .r velaton of which In any manner to an U -n- LU ` rice( per a is t irohibited by law. Pr - ed c;nd Disseminated by Cer P=al Ir.telligence Agency Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 SECRET ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT SINO-SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC ACTIVITI IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1960 EIC-R14-S9 ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTE SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92B01090R000400010010-2 FOREWORD The reports on Sino-Soviet Bloc economic activities in underde- veloped areas in the EIC-R1A series provide periodic summari=es az,i analytical interpretations of significant developments in the ecc?- nomic relations of Bloc countries with underdeveloped countries cat' the Free World. These developments are reported on a current, fa=- tual basis in the Biweekly Reports in the EIC-WGR-1 series, .order the same title. This report, covering the 6 months from 1 January throuop 30 June 1960, constitutes the ninth periodic supplement to ITITC-R1+, the background report on Sino-Soviet Bloc Postwar Economic Aetivi~ie in Underdeveloped Areas, 8 August 1956, SECRET. The present supp,e- went relates noteworthy noneconomic activities to the economic opf the Bloc foreign aid program in 1954. An outstanding feature in the evolution of the Bloc e(,-onou: c aid program is the growing importance of large umbrella cred._s pr)- vided by the USSR for general development purposes. Such credits -on- stitute 80 percent of all financial pledges made by Bloc countries in the first 6 months of 1960 and nearly 70 percent of total economic credits and grants extended since January 1954. By offering such credits long before they can be utilized, the USSR reaps substantial propaganda gains at no immediate cost. At the same time, triter e c:r!dit. * P. 103, below. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 foster the development of state at the expense of private enterprise and assure the recipient country that substantial foreign aid funds will be available when needed to meet the requirements of long-range economic plans. By extending new credits the USSR sought to consolidate past gains in Indonesia, Iraq, and the UAR as well as to capitalize on prolific opportunities in Cuba. With the signing of these new eco- nomic agreements the USSR committed itself to finance a major part of Indonesia's projected industrial development program, to resuscitate the Baghdad-Basra railroad link, to complete the Aswan High Dam, and to succor the revolutionary economic schemes of the Castro regime. Between the spring of 1959 and the spring of 1960, no signi- ficant new Bloc credits for military equipment were extended. Ex- tensive discussions involving substantial fund.: were held with the governments of Cambodia, Cuba, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and the UAR. The progress of these talks has been such that announcement of Bloc military aid agreements with one or more of these countries can be expected in the near future. Although the Bloc continued to press its offensive in the Middle East and Asia, notable gains were scored in Africa and Latin America. By midyear 1960, Bloc specialists held an impressive number of positions as advisers to major departments in the governments of Guinea and Cuba. In the former, Bloc experts also were placed in direct charge of government operating units. Supervision of the Bloc program in Guinea is exercised by Soviet Ambassador Solod -- the first Soviet Ambassador to Egypt and a ranking Soviet Foreign Ministry expert on the Middle East. Spe- cialists from Moscow and Prague serve as high-level advisers to the Ministries of Finance, Public Works, and National Economy and the Plan as well as to the Director of Port Operations. In addition, Czecho- slovak:; have been appointed by the Government of Guinea to the posts of Director of Airports and Director of News Services. Bloc relations with Cuba throughout the first 6 months of 1960 were conducted in a calculated manner, with the pledge of Soviet financial.. support for industrialization and the conclusion of trade agreements with various Bloc countries holding the center of the stage. By the end of June, Premier Khrushchev had accepted an invitation to visit Cuba; the USSR had established a foreign.-aid office in Havana; and Bloc experts were serving as advisers in the National Bank of Cuba, the Economic Development Commission, the Institute for Agrarian Reform, the Petroleum Institute, and the Institute of Mining. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BOl090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 At the same time, Bloc representatives in Cuba apparently- cautioned local Communists against hasty attempts to seize power overtly. Instead, they appear to have placed great stress on the importance of gathering de facto control of the 'revolutionary move- ment in the hands of the Cuban Communist Party. In this endeavor, emphasis probably also was given to increasing the degree -f Comp;uniss control over the system of internal security. Early in July the USSR indicated that it was ready to step up its support of the Castro government. Sergey Kudryavtsev, a f':ir- mer consul at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa and a highly skilled or- ganizer of espionage networks, was named Soviet Ambassador to Cuba. Shortly thereafter, in the wake of deteriorating US-Cuban relations, Premier Khrushchev publicly announced Soviet diplomatic and finan2ial_ support for the Government of Cuba in its differences with the Urited States, thus setting the stage for a new and more intimate relatiDn- ship between Cuba and the USSR. B. Credits and Grants* 1. Extensions a. 1 January - 30 June 1960 During the first 6 months of 1960, Sino-Soviet Bloc countries extended a record $786 million in new economic credits and grants to underdeveloped countries (see Figure 1**). The U38R pro- vided most of this sum, and all but a minor fraction was in the form of credits (see Table 1***). b. 1 January 1954 - 30 June 1960t By the end of June, Bloc credits and grants extended to underdeveloped countries passed the $4+ billion mark -- $ >> b lioi, * Credit and grant extensions refer to minimum amounts of assi.=t- ance earmarked under bilateral general assistance or project agref- ments. Bloc credit and grant obligations refer to those portions of credits and grants extended which have been designated for specific uses or for which utilization has been arranged by firm construction or delivery contracts. Credit and grant drawings refer to those por- tions of credits and grants extended and obligated which have beer spent for Bloc equipment or for the services of Bloc personnel. ** Following p. 10. ** Table 1 follows on p. 10. t For statistical details, see Tables 8 and 9, pp. 79 and 80, re- spectively, below. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Bloc Credits and Grants Extended to Underdeveloped Countries January-June 1960 Amount (Million Current US $) C t Underdeveloped Country Total Credits Grants Purpose Bloc oun ry 785,7 757.6 28.1 Afghanistan .i. 3.5 Wheat Cuba 100.0 Economic development Guinea 0.2 Patrol boats Indonesia 250.0 Economic development Indonesia 2.4 Hospital Iraq 45.0 Baghdad-Basra railroad UAR -- Egypt 287.0 Aswan High Dam Czechoslovakia Cuba 20.0 Economic development India 1.7 Tire factory UAR -- Egypt 20.8 Equipment and machinery East Germany Ghana 3.1 Industrial projects Communist China Guinea 1.0 Industrial projects Rice Nepal 21.0 Economic development Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/0 IA- DP92BO109OR000400010010-2 SECRET EXTENSIONS OF BLOC ECONOMIC CREDITS AND GRANTS TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, BY 6-MONTH PERIODS July-December 1957 to January-June 1960 Current 800 - 3,600 3,200 2,800 2,400 2,000 1,600 1,200 800 400 0 JULY-DEC. JAN.-JUNE i(IIV-DEC. 1957 1958 958 July-December January-June 1957 1958 JAN, ?IUNE JULY-DEC. JAN.-JUNE 1959 1959 1960 July-December January-June 1958 1959 SECRET I_,..._ , I J _-.. .. July-December J~ IJa~y_h =J 1959 1960-- Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 for economic and $0.8 billion for military assistance (see 'able 2). The USSR alone accounted for more than 75 percent of the aid provided for all purposes. Bloc Economic and Military Credits and Grants Extended to Underdeveloped Countries, by Recipient Area/ January 1954 - June 1960 Total Economic Military Total (million current US $) 4,051+ 3,231 822 Percent of total to countries in: Middle East 47 40 75 Africa 4 5 Negligi ale Asia 40 44 25 Europe 3 4 0 Latin America 6 7 0 a. For additional details, see Table 9, p. 0, The Bloc credit program is coming more and more t,) be dominated by large umbrella credits provided by the USSR for general economic development schemes. Nearly 70 percent of total Bloc ec-)- nomic assistance since January 1954 is represented by 13 major li:es of credit -- each of which is for $100 million or more -- all ext~mnd i by the USSR to 9 underdeveloped countries.* Among these countries, only India, with its comprehensive economic plans, has entered in,o negotiations for large umbrella credits with specific and detailed proposals concerning allocations of the funds to be provided. * For details of these lines of credit, see Table 11, p. 83, bel,.w. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 2. Obligations* a. Current and Cumulative Preliminary survey work and negotiations on projects being considered under existing economic and technical accords during the first 6 months of 1960 resulted in agreements that obligated al- most $900 million of outstanding credits and grants. By late June, 80 percent of Bloc credits and grants extended for economic and mili- tary purposes had been obligated, thus maintaining about the same pro- portion that prevailed at the end of 1959? b. Allocation of Economic Aid OBLIGATION OF BLOC ECONOMIC CREDITS AND GRANTS TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, BY TYPE OF PROJECT A. of 30 lone 1960 More than one-half of all funds obligated under the Bloc's economic assistance program have been channeled into projects that Hnahh, Edo> of the dam were being substantially neutralized by developing Western assistance programs which were having a growing impact on the UAR. Announcement of Soviet participation in the second stage of the A3wan High Dam was timed to coincide with the start of the well-pu_d_,lici,ed US trade mission and was just before the arrival in Cairo of a hirr,h_ level West German economic mission that was expected to discuss GP participation in the second stage. Another important element in he Soviet decision to highlight this economic aid to the UAR was un- doubtedly its value in the Bloc's current intensive drive to cult_vat+ the emerging nations of Africa. By trading on the UAR's name, any[ wig. the dam as a specific example, the USSR is indubitably trying to __n- crease its influence and prestige in the newly independent A 'ricai states by creating a favorable image of itself as an economic bentfac for who attaches no conditions to assistance. There is no evidence that the Nasser regime intc_r_is t mitigate its repression of domestic Communism or its opposition t-; Communism in the Arab World. The UAR reacted strongly to BulgaritLn attempts to indoctrinate UAR students in Sofia and to alleged Bul-ariti encouragement of Communist activity in the Syrian sector. During his tour of Syria in February, Nasser devoted one of his speeches there tt an attack on Communism. on 18 January 1960 it was officially announced that t.e USSR would assist the UAR in the completion of the Aswan High Dam. This new aid agreement will represent a credit of $387 million, ix.- cluding the original loan of $100 million for construction of the first stage of the dam. As now planned, the Soviet credits represent total foreign exchange requirements for construction. Remaining ?erm> and provisions of the new loan agreement are said to be the same s.s those of the former -- 2.5 percent interest and repayment in equal installments over 12 years starting in 1964. A Czechoslovak-UAR agreement signed in June provides for a 5-year credit of $20.8 million for the purchase of machinery and. equipment to be used in the construction of various public utility projects in the Egyptian sector. Czechoslovak concentration on rural and municipal projects promises to give Czechoslovakia a commandirg position in the supply of this type of equipment to the UAR. The execution of projects under the $175 million Soviet credit has been slow, and actual additions to the volume of industrial. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 production have been virtually nil. On 8 May 1960 the first project, a mill for spinning fine cotton yarns, was opened in Damietta, and another mill, financed under the Soviet credit, is under construction. Completion of larger contracts is years away, even in those cases for which equipment contracts have been signed. Most of the delays have been caused, however, not by the Bloc countries but by the Egyptians, who either have been casting around for better deals elsewhere or have set impossible terms, specifications, and conditions. Implementation of the Soviet agreement of October 1957 with the Syrian sector has been confined mostly to surveys and plan- ning; only about $25 million of the $150 million extended has been drawn. Inaction in Damascus probably is the cause. A Soviet mission arrived in Damascus last spring and in May announced that a protocol regarding implementation of projects in the Syrian sector was being prepared. The Damascus press reports that these projects may include proposals on a railroad line between .Aleppo and Qamishli, topographical work in the Euphrates area, and the construction of an ammonium nitrate fertilizer plant with a capacity of 110,000 metric tons. Contract projects presently under construction are the Ar Rastan and Muhradah dams by Bulgarians and a cement plant at Aleppo by the East Germans. No definite information is available on the number of Bloc technicians in the UAR except for those working on the Aswan High Dam project. The number considered necessary for that project is now 70, 30 of whom had arrived by the middle of May. These technicians have had little or no contact with the local labor force but are en- gaged only in advising their counterparts among the Egyptian upper- level technicians. The Czechoslovak-UAR trade agreement now in force is valid for 3 years from 1 January 1959, and the payments agreement for 1 year from the date of ratification, both with an_automatic extension of equivalent periods if notice of termination is not given. Terms of the agreements are not unusual, except that 'Lists are attached for specific development projects for which Czechoslovakia stands ready to provide equipment, machinery, and materials. In the case of UAR pur- chases, Czechoslovakia insures corresponding purchases of cotton and other goods from the UAR. In the course of a review of UAR-Soviet trade, Soviet of- ficials objected to being deprived of Egyptian export discounts and UAR officials protested Soviet resales of Egyptian cotton in Western European markets. A protocol was eventually signed, hopefully envi- sioning a total trade exchange of $287 million per year for both sec- tors of the UAR. - 36 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Egyptian imports from the Bloc dropped by more than i.6 pcent in 1959 compared with 1958. Because Egypt's total imports so fell, however, the Bloc's relative position as a supplier Egypt clined only slightly. But during the first 4 months of 1%-0, when Egypt's total imports increased slightly compared with the same per!) of 1959, the Bloc's relative position as a supplier suffered. This fact appears to confirm that Egypt prefers to trade with n(-)n-Blc_- countries and will do so when it can. Although exports to the Bloc have risen in 1960 and the USSR remains by far the largest purchiser of Egyptian goods, the Bloc share fell from 52 percent in 11)59 t 47 percent in the first part of 1960. Trade data for 1959 reveal a decline in Bloc trade with the Syrian sector. Over-all trade with the Bloc reached a :peak In 1958 when exports reached 31.4 percent and imports (excluding arias) were 12.1 percent of the total foreign trade of the Syrian recto: In 1959 these shares were reduced to 12.3 percent and 11.2 serceit, respectively. France replaced the USSR as a purchaser of 1;Jrian cote-- ton in 1959, and it continued to be the leading buyer in trie cur,ent export season. The proportion of cotton sales to the Bloc and Com- munist China, however, rose to about 35 percent during the c urreait season, compared with 30 percent last year. The difference was ome= what after the first shock of Indonesia's execution of its ban against Chinese traders in rural areas in late 1959 and early 1960. Fricy,ion continued, however, and relations worsened sharply again in the lt;.te spring as both sides reacted emotionally to an incident arioing from the repatriation of a shipload of Chinese. For the moment, econoaic cooperation between the two countries was out of the question, and Indonesia dropped China's $30 million credit offer from consideraa:ion. Business newspapers in Djakarta reacted skeptically ti= tht- announcement of the USSR's new $250 million line of credit, point_ng out that only some $25 million had been drawn from the previous $:l7.E million credit, although it had been ratified by the Indonesian PL.r- liament Bally 2 years before. Soviet construction projects under:aker have indeed gone slowly because of Indonesian delays. Serious co.t- struction work has begun only on the Asian Games stadium at Djakarta and on the Southeast Borneo road network. Initial construction c3n- tracts for the West Java steel plant have been signed, and the Am -toin?. shipbuilding and oceanographic school and the superphosphate plan; for Central Java remained in the survey stage. Moreover, rapid progress cannot be expected. Nearly everything, from day labor and foodstuffs to construction machine ?y, must be imported to the work sites at Amboina and Southeast Dorne- on the ships of Indonesia's very undependable interisland services. The Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 relatively sophisticated construction method; adopted for the Asian Games stadium require large quantities of aggregates that are more refined than Indonesian contractors are accustomed to process and that must be brought from a considerable distance outside Djakarta. Affecting all the projects, but most particularly the steel and superphosphate plants, is Indonesia's failure to begin training managers and technicians. Negotiations on the use of the $250 million credit began in Djakarta in mid-June and are to be carried. forward during First Minister. Djuanda's visit to Moscow in early July. With its emphasis on relatively advanced technology -- major projects in iron and steel are planned as well as introductory programs in atomic energy -- it is unlikely that the new line of credit will be drawn any more rapidly than the first. There is as yet no evidence as to how much of the total will be allocated to projects involving; delivery of equipment only. Speed of execution is, however, only one of several fac- tors to be considered in assessing the impact of the Soviet program, and the fact remains that the projects will effectively identify the USSR with the achievement of Indonesian aspirations on a national and particularly on a provincial level. Thus construction of a large modern technical school is a major event in stagnant Amboina, as is the large-scale Soviet effort in the backward. provinces of Southeast Borneo. In the Asian Games stadium and the West Java steel mill the USSR is supplying status symbols of national importance. Moreover, negotiations on the use of the $250 million overlap with the last stages of preparing Indonesia's Second Five Year Plan, permitting the USSR to offer immediate support to the most promising projects now being considered. Evidence of other credits contracted during the first 6 months of the year is still incomplete. During the period, Indonesia arranged to buy 70,000 telephones and five 1,500-ton freighters from Hungary at a total cost of about $6 million. It is certain that a substantial part of the purchase price was financed on credit, prob- ably at fairly long term. In May the Indonesian Air Force took de- livery of the first 4 of 20 Soviet helicopters under an October 1959 contract that specifies a total price of $5.5 million, no downpayment, and terms of 10 years at 2 percent. Indonesia is also reported to have accepted the Soviet offer of a cruiser, several submarines, and other naval equipment made during Khrushchev's visit in February, but no details of the transaction are known. Bloc technical assistance programs were considerably more active in early 1960 than in the previous 6 months. Intensified sur- vey work accounted for much of the increase, as Soviet survey teams - 56 - Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 of one or two to half a dozen men paid repeated visits to actaal ?r proposed construction sites in Amboina, Southeast Borneo,.anu Javi. A small group of East German experts surveyed for a textile mill Ln Medan, a Czechoslovak team investigated the possibilities o!' buil,iin a cement plant near Makassar, and Polish experts began a survey f=)r the shipyard to be constructed in the Celebes. The number ~_i Boy technicians stationed at construction sites also increased. It i estimated that the Soviet engineering team assigned to the krneo rows.: project was built up from 6 to 25 men; perhaps as many Soviet exp=arts were employed at the Asian Games project. Groups of two and three Czechoslovaks are still stationed at the mechanized rice prot':ects in North and South Sumatra and in South Borneo. Apparently none hav,! any agricultural training, and they operate only as maintenance a?id repair men. A single Czechoslovak manager remains at the Intirub tire factory at Djakarta. The largest concentration of Bloc personnel continued to be the same 50 Polish and East German officers employed by the na- tional shipping line Pelni. Working relations with Indone.ens were satisfactory on the whole, although during the spring there was some bad feeling at the Asian Games and mechanized rice projects. The Bloc drive to penetrate higher education in indonesia showed considerable progress in the first half of 1960, largely bre- cause of the sponsorship of Indonesia's fellow-traveling Minister of Education. A program implementing the cultural convention signed dur? ing Khrushchev's visit in February was initialed in June, and sho?tly afterward Indonesia announced that the number of Indonesian E,_udeets studying in the USSR would double during the coming school year. The number of Indonesian students attending Rumanian, Polish, and. Cze:ho- slovak universities also is rising. Bloc trade with Indonesia increased again in the secom.d half of 1959, and for the first time the Bloc share of Indonesian ex- ports exceeded 10 percent, up from 6.4 percent in the preceding hLlf- year. The value of Indonesia's imports from the Bloc -- still dr?-.wn almost entirely from Communist China -- also increased, but the BJJoc share fell from 14.3 percent to 71.4 percent. Although its perform- ance improved as the year went on, Communist China fell behind schedule in rice deliveries and delivered only 267,000 tons out of a contrected. total of 340,000 tons. As a result the Indonesian Government did not place large rice orders in Communist China for 1960 delivery, and the Bloc share in the Indonesian import market is expected to drop ap;?re- ciably this year. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 S-E-C-R-E-T 6. Federation of Malaya and Singapore Vigorous antisubversion policies left little scope for either Bloc or local Communist activity in the Federation of Malaya in the past 6 months. In May the Federation Government declared the 12-year-old Communist-provoked "emergency" at an end. Extraordinary policy powers granted under emergency legislation lapse at the end of July, but Parliament has already enacted an internal security law pro- viding an even stronger array of antisubversion weapons. The Federa- tion holds in readiness antidumping tariff authority specifically de- signed, to control an aggressive Bloc export campaign such as Mainland China waged in 1958. Although in June Prime Minister Rahman startled his colleagues in the government by advocating Communist China's ad- mission to the UN as a necessary step in the search for world peace, the Federation intends to continue its policy of nonrecognition of all.. Bloc governments. Controls on travel and remittance to Communist China remain in effect. Federation attitudes exert a powerful discipline on Com- munist and pro-Communist activity in Singapore. Both the opportunist leadership of the ruling Peoples Action Party (PAP) and the Party's strong extremist wing accept merger with the Federation as a major political goal, simply because neither feels it could long survive in power without Federation economic cooperation. Equally important is the Federation's decisive voice in the Singapore Internal Security Council and its influence on the manner in which the UK exercises its retained prerogatives in the fields of foreign relations, defense, and public security. Although the Singapore Government pressed hard for accept- ance of the visit, there is no reason to believe that it intended to seek closer relations with the Bloc immediately. Its intention, rather, appears to have been to test the UK's resolution to defend UK preroga- tives as well as to dramatize its need for foreign assistance on a large scale and also to reaffirm its willingness to seek assistance from the Bloc if sufficient capital were not forthcoming from the Free World.. Although current high rubber prices give Singapore a surface prosperity, private investment is flagging and unemployment remains high. As yet the PAP can show little progress toward its much-publicized goal of economic development. It is possible, also, that the PAP leadership feels that some measure of Bloc sponsorship would be an asset in its struggle against growing extremist pressure within the party itself. The leadership is clearly digging in against an expected extremist on- slaught: preventive detention authority has been extended for an un- precedented 5 years, the trade union movement reorganized, and the - 58- Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 right to strike circumscribed. A limited pattern of cooperation with UK authorities and the opposition has been established. Malaya-Singapore imports from Communist China show only slight recovery from the 1959 slump that followed reciprocal emb&rgoe3 imposed in late 1958. Imports of Chinese goods amounted to 4.6 prce r of total imports in the first 4 months of 1960, compared with, 4.1 per- cent in the corresponding period of 1959, whereas purchases 'f go-ids from other Bloc countries remained trivial. Except for Peip ng's ban on direct exports of textiles to the Federation -- imposed in Ser;em- ber 1959 in retaliation against alleged Federation discrimination -- the China import trade is now free of quantitative restrictions. Corn munist China's sales in the Federation remain low as a result of he closing of Bank of China branches in March 1959 and continued police surveillance of merchants who handle Chinese Communist goods. Soviet purchases of rubber, whose exceptional volume in 1959 catapulted the USSR into fourth place among Malaya's customers, fell off sharply in 1960. Increased exports to Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and Poland somewhat offset the drop, but the Bloc's share of Malaya- Singapore exports decreased from 14 percent in the first 4 me>nths of 1959 to 8 percent in the same period in 1960. 7. Nepal The pace of Communist Bloc activity in Nepal was cons-der. ably accelerated in the first 6 months of 1960 in an effort to inoure Nepal's continued neutrality and to discourage Western influence. Car- munist China was especially concerned to overcome Nepalese suspic_ons arising out of Peiping's repressive actions in Tibet and its aggreessie actions on the Sino-Nepalese border. During Prime Minister Koira-'-a's visit to Peiping in March, Communist China agreed to a definition of the Nepalese-Tibetan border, offered $21 million to Nepal in gram aic, and proposed the conclusion of a Sino-Nepalese treaty of peace ann friendship, whereas Nepal agreed to permit the establishment of a resident Chinese Communist Embassy in Katmandu, to accept Chinese Com- munist technicians, and to send Nepalese technicians to Communist Chira for training. At the same time that both the USSR and Communist Chira have been working to appear friendly and reasonable to the Nepalese Government, they have also been stepping up their subversion and r;rope- ganda campaigns. The Chinese Communists have been propagandizing among Nepalese border tribes of Tibetan ethnic origin in an effort to irjduce an allegiance to Tibet. Along with the USSR, the Chinese Communists reportedly have given covert backing to at least two campaigns of Nepa- lese opposition groups designed to embarrass the Nepalese Congress government. Both Bloc countries reportedly have strengthened their Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 liaison with the local Communist Party. In addition, there has been some expansion of the distribution of Chinese Communist and Soviet publications by the Nepalese Communist Party through eight reading rooms throughout the country. Nepal's economic relations with the Bloc were highlighted by the signing in Peiping in March-of a $21 million economic and tech- nical cooperation agreement with Communist China. The agreement stipu- lated that the $21 million grant to Nepal plus an additional $8.4 mil- lion (unused portion of a 1956 Chinese grant to Nepal) are to be drawn within the next 3 years, although the period of validity may be extended by mutual agreement. Chinese Communist technicians will be sent to Nepal, and Nepalese will receive training in China. The new aid as well as the unexpended balance from the earlier grant will be spent on specific projects -- roads, a paper mill, a cement plant, and power fa- cilities. It is very doubtful whether Nepal will be able to utilize all of the grant within 3 years, but continuation of the agreement be- yond this period is provided for. Reaction in Nepal to the agreement was very favorable. A cement plant near Hitaura and a paper mill in the Nepal- ganj area of western Nepal are apparently the first projects to be built with funds from the Chinese grant. In early June, there were 15 Chi- nese Communist technicians in Nepal engaged in making feasibility studies for the cement and paper plants, with 20 more expected before the end. of the year. As far as is known, formal project agreements for these installations have not yet been signed between the two coun- tries, and implementation of the grant is not expected until a Nepalese team has observed the working of comparable installations in Communist China. Chou En-lai in a speech before a Nepalese trade organization suggested joint Chinese-Nepalese construction of a road linking Nepal with Tibet, but Prime Minister Koirala rejected the idea, citing the uneconomical nature of such a project in the light of the small amount of trade between the two countries. Nepalese officials confirmed press reports that Nepal has accepted a Soviet offer to make a detailed ground survey of an east- west road running the length of the southern plain of Nepal. An earlier aerial. survey for such a road was completed last year under the terms of the 1959 grant-aid agreement with Nepal. Acceptance of the Soviet offer has increased very materially the likelihood of the USSR's ultimately actually building the 550-mile road, which if suc- cessfully done would be an impressive monument to Soviet engineering skill and have a great propaganda impact in Nepal. The cost of the detailed ground survey probably will be met from the 1959 Soviet- Nepal agreement. The Soviet technicians apparently have favorably impressed various Nepalese officials with the speed and efficiency Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 of their preliminary surveys of the east-west road project. Meal.- while, Soviet technicians reportedly have surveyed the area: and chosen the sites for the sugar mill, hydroelectric project. and:c.ig arette factory. Additional Soviet teams are expected in October to supervise the actual construction. In spite of Nepal's acquiescence in Chinese demands That a provision for sending Chinese technicians to Nepal be included in the grant-aid agreement, Nepal remains reluctant to accept such -echw nicians in great numbers and probably will seek to confine their presence in the country to a minimum period of time. There is e^_i- dence that Nepal is concerned over Bloc interference in its :internal affairs, although Soviet and Chinese diplomatic personnel reside2:t ir. Katmandu allegedly have been involved rather than Bloc technicians. The Chinese Communists reportedly spent $4,000 to finance demonsra tions against the Gandak agreement (an Indian-Nepalese power protect in eastern Nepal) and offered another $4,000 to three Nepalese nnws- papers for anti-Indian propaganda. The Government of Nepal has v.arn?= Bloc personnel against becoming involved in Nepal's domestic affF:irs. Nepal's need for developmental assistance, its neutralist foreign policy, its desire to avoid undue dependence on India, aid it? geographic proximity to Communist China combine to make it r~cepiive to attractive Bloc overtures and reluctant to antagonize the Blot. Nepal is vulnerable to BLoc subversion and propaganda carried on with- in the country because of the great degree of political illiteracy it the electorate and its lack of national identity together with the severe weakness of local government organization. Given these fec- tors and indications that some progress will be made on aid projects, it seems probable that the increase in Bloc influence during the first half of 1960 will remain a threat to internal stability. 8. Thailand Thailand cointinues to be a difficult area for Sino-Soviet activities. Since the October 1958 Army coup, the government; has maintained the strong measures aimed at controlling the kingdom's small Communist movement, and it is doubtful that Thailand will under- take a serious reassessment of its alignment with the West and active participation in SEATO. Greater receptivity to Bloc trade in. 1960 is motivated primarily by Thailand's desire to increase exports. Over-all trade deficits have widened in 1958 and 1959, but balance- of-payments difficulties have been avoided by greater relian_-e ors external aid. If Thailand's exports to the Bloc should increase; this trade may be used to dramatize both Thai dissatisfaction with US support to neighboring neutrals and the need for greater financial assistance. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Other than in the field of trade, Thailand continues to restrict severely its relations with the Bloc. The Thai Government has agreed to permit the stationing of a TASS representative in Bang- kok to replace the one who was deported in October 1958 for "activi- ties dangerous to the peace and security of the nation," but his ac- tivities doubtless will be carefully circumscribed by the Thai police. No exchanges of cultural delegations between Thailand and members of the Bloc took place during the first half of 1960, and no Thai students have left for study in Bloc countries. Thailand's trade with the Bloc in 1959 and the first 2 months of 1960 continued to represent only about 1 percent of total trade. The chief change in the trade pattern in 1959 was the curtail- ment of trade with Communist China and the entry of the USSR and Czechoslovakia into the Thai rubber market. Thailand's exports to the Bloc in 1959 were almost entirely rubber shipments -- $2.1 million to the USSR and nearly $0.3 million to Czechoslovakia. A ban on imports from Communist China imposed in January 1959 prevented imports from this source. The ban was effective in preventing not only the small amount of direct imports but also the larger quantities of Chinese goods entering Thailand by way of Hong Kong. Bloc countries appear to be increasing their efforts to stimulate trade in 1960. Rubber authorized for shipment to the USSR and Czechoslovakia amounted to about 4,000 tons for the first 4 months. This figure may be compared with rubber exports to the Bloc of 3,302 tons in 1959, which represented about 2 percent of total rubber ex- ports. Although purchases at the new rate may not be continued for the balance of the year, they are already substantial enough to indi- cate a step-up in Bloc trading activity. D. Europe 1. Iceland The Bloc continued to utilize the Icelandic Communist Party as a vehicle for the advancement of its political goals in Iceland: (a) the elimination of US forces, (b) Iceland's withdrawal from NATO, and (c) the establishment of economic dependence on the Bloc. The Icelandic Communist Party has a membership of about 900 and polled 16 percent of the vote in the October 1959 elections. It supports the Bloc propaganda effort through its press and front organizations. The Communists have especially sought to exploit the lengthy Icelandic dis- pute with the UK over UK trawlers, protected'by the British frigates, fishing close to Iceland. The Communists point to the fact that for the last 8 years the Bloc has furnished the principal market for pro- cessed herring and frozen fish fillets, products that Iceland can sell in the West only with difficulty. - 62 - Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 In February 1960, Iceland took drastic action to stab.4lizt its economy and to improve the competitive position of its exports by a 57-percent devaluation of its currency. The effectiveness of tl e currency devaluation, however, may be limited by expected increases ix the tariff on fish in potential markets of the European Economic Com munity (EEC), and this tends to jeopardize Iceland's effort to miz.i- mize its trade with Bloc countries. The other NATO member countries have agreed to discuss special conditions that could be afforded ':ce- land to help it out of its trade dilemma. Trade between Iceland, and the Soviet Bloc in 191)9 rem ine at about the same level as Jr 1958. Icelandic exports to tke Soviet Bloc accounted for 34+ percent of the total, and imports from the .floc amounted to 31 percent of the total, about the same as in 1x,8. (om- position of trade remained virtually unchanged. The USSR co tines s tc be the largest single trading partner, closely followed by the Un ted States. In January 1960 an extension until 1962 of the original Icelandic-Soviet trade agreement of 1953 was signed in Moscow. The level of exports and imports is not known, but it appears that thra total value of trade will be approximately the same as that of tho last several years. The Icelandic delegation succeeded in getting thv USSR to accept a larger quantity of salted herring than that whidi thy- USSR originally had intended. After signing the Soviet-Icelandic Trait Protocol, members of the Icelandic delegation to Moscow stopped is Warsaw to discuss pending trade problems. Bloc efforts to influence Iceland in political and eco- nomic matters have met with increased resistance. With the -ucce;s- ful launching of the Stabilization Program, the country may soon ')e able to consider membership in the European Free Trade Assoc:i.atioi (EFTA). A membership would assist Iceland in reducing present com- mercial dependence on Soviet Bloc countries.- Although Bloc tffor'tis to separate Iceland from NATO have not been successful, a solutio' to the UK fishery problem is needed to make Iceland a stable member of NATO. 2. Portugal Portugal's trade with the European Satellites is quite small and exists chiefly to enable Portugal to market its surplus cork. On the other hand, trade with the USSR, which is on a barter basis, consists largely of the exchange of miscellaneous Portuguese commodities for Soviet petroleum and petroleum products. Althou;:-l the Portuguese authorities also permit the procurement of machinery items from the USSR, they make it a condition of purchase that nei.the=- -63- Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92B01090R000400010010-2 the installation nor the functioning of such machines shall require the assistance of the suppliers. Trade with the USSR, therefore, cannot be used. as a device for getting Soviet technical personnel into Portugal. In 1959, Portugal's total imports from the Bloc were about 1 percent of total Portugese imports, and exports amounted to about 2.3 percent of total exports. Within the Bloc, Czechoslovakia and the USSR are Portugal's most important trading partners. Preliminary fig- ures indicate that Portugal's trade with the Bloc in 1960 has not in- creased above the 1959 level. Spain Spanish trade relations with the Bloc have never been intensive. Although closer ties with the Free World system of for- eign commerce may be expected to make trade overtures by the Bloc less interesting to Spain, it is probable that at least a small amount of Bloc trade will continue. The Bloc is a market for some of Spain's agricultural and mineral products, and Spain can find use for indus- trial equipment from almost any source. For several years, Spain has negotiated trade and payments agreements between its foreign exchange office and the central banks of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, whereas pri- vate barter agreements govern trade with the USSR and East Germany. There are some indications that Spain may negotiate unofficial trade and payments agreements with the latter two countries. In 1959, Spain's trade with the Bloc rose slightly above that of 1958, accounting for 2.4 percent of its total imports and for 4.2-percent of its exports. Its most important trading partners in 1959 were Czechoslovakia and the USSR, which together accounted for more than one-half of Spain's total Bloc trade. As in previous years, Spanish trade with the Bloc was based chiefly on the exchange of cork, citrus fruits, nuts, minerals, and metals for machinery and equipment and miscellaneous fabricated items. Trade agreements for 1960 were negotiated between the Spanish Foreign Exchange Office and the Central Bank of Czechoslo- vakia for an exchange in 1960 of goods worth $9 million each way. A supplementary agreement with Poland was negotiated in March 1960 that provides for Poland to supply $3 million worth of machinery of various types to Spain in return for $3 million worth of marine craft and re- lated equipment. -64- Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92B01090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 4+. Yugoslavia Yugoslavia's relations with the Bloc during the irst, half of 1960 were highlighted by the polemics that arose with Mcs_.ow'? at- tack on the attitude that Belgrade took toward the U-2 incident &rd t < summit failure. In a statement on 17 May, Tito deplored the U-2 1.nci- dent but argued that it should not be used as a "pretext" for wre-!kin- the summit. The Chinese Communist and Albanian press imnedlatel~ seized upon Tito's statement as proof of Yugoslavia's willingness to serve the imperialist aggressor, but their attacks were quickly aver shadowed by a sweeping denunciation of Belgrade's revisionist int~rt and external policies carried in the 23 May issue of Moscow's Kowmu.- nist. This attack was the first from the USSR since early ~s59 ad appeared to foreshadow a harder Bloc policy toward Yugoslavia. At the end of June, however, Yugoslav-Bloc relations seemed to be continuing along the same lines of limited detente a; they had in 1959 and early 1960. Except for Chinese Communist and Albanian diatribes, there has been almost no followup on the Komm,- nist attack. Even a sharp Yugoslav rebuttal has gone unanswered. State-to-state relations (mainly economic) have not deteriorated. There has been no change in the status of the Bloc credit program in Yugoslavia. Yugoslav-Bloc trade in the first quarter of 1960 was 33 percent higher than in the same period of 1959. Exports rose 20.4 percent and imports rose 42 percent. The USSR, East Germany Poland, and Czechoslovakia were Yugoslavia's largest Bloc trading partners, in that order. Yugoslavia's trade with Bloc countries Las increased, but the Bloc's percentage of total Yugoslav trade has i:e- clined because of the growth of Yugoslav trade with the rest of t.-,e world. Yugoslavia's trade with the Bloc countries in the first quarter of 1960 was 24+.7 percent of its total trade, during the f-rst luarter of 1959 it was 26.6 percent, and for all of 1959 it was 27.3 percent. Yugoslavia and the USSR scheduled negotiations to begin in July for a 5-year agreement to succeed the 3-year agreement (1958-60) signed in April 1957. These negotiations are another ix- dication that Moscow apparently desires to maintain normal economic relations with Belgrade. E. Latin America 1. Argentina During the first half of 1960, Argentina continued ite campaign to curb local Communist activities and to diminish the - 65 - Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 importance of its Bloc ties. Government moves to suppress Communist propaganda and to Outlaw the Communist Party gained force as local Communists sought to capitalize on Argentina's economic problems in order to subvert the economic stabilization program. Local Communists, in conjunction with the Peronistas, staged a ballot boycott in an at- tempt to destroy the validity of the Argentine congressional elections. In spite of the existence of diplomatic relations with the USSR and five Satellites, cultural exchanges between the Bloc and Argentina were minimal. In a typical attempt to bolster the Bloc's weakening posi- tion, high-level delegations from the USSR, Hungary, Poland, Czecho- slovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania attended the 25 May celebration of the 150th anniversary of Argentine independence to which all countries represented in Buenos Aires had been invited. Among the representa- tives was Soviet First Deputy Premier Kosygin (who signed a new protocol to the Argentine-Soviet credit agreement) and the Ministers of Foreign Trade of Hungary and Poland. During the first half of 1960, Argentina, as part of its general move toward multilateral trade, took further steps to terminate its bilateral agreements with all Bloc coun- tries except the USSR. Although the level of trade in 1960 should not fall significantly below the 1959 level, this move and revisions in the Soviet credit noted below seem calculated to diminish Soviet economic penetration in Argentina. In February, Argentina announced that $50 million of the $100 million Soviet credit for development of the Argentine oil indus- try would be diverted to other areas of the economy. This intention was ratified by the signing of a protocol to the agreement when Kosygin visited Argentina in May. According to the protocol, the $50 million may be used for the purchase of road construction equipment, mining equipment, and other machinery. With the $32 million previously com- mitted to the purchase of oil industry equipment, the use to which $82 million of the $100 million credit can be put has not been speci- fied. The remaining $18 million has been kept in reserve for use by the Argentine government-owned petroleum company YFF (Yacimientos Petroli.feros Fiscales). As of 1 June, only $10.3 million worth of petroleum equipment had been delivered to Argentina. According to a YPF spokesman, four technicians at most may enter Argentina in con- nection with the credit. Orders for Soviet. helicopters and for five deep-well drilling rigs have been canceled or postponed, and some dissatisfaction has been shown by YPF over the failure to get pipe under the credit. The purchase of 80 Hungarian railroad coaches and rail- road machinery and equipment was announced in May. This transaction, amounting to $11.2 million, was authorized in October 1959 and was Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 E-C-R-E-T made under deferred payment within the framework of the expy.l-.ng Argentine-Hungarian payments agreement. Terms were not givens. Argentine-Bloc trade in 1959 declined from the 95b level; however, the Bloc's share of total trade remained at approximately 5 percent, the same as the year before. This over-all decline in total Bloc trade may continue into 1960, but increased impor,s of equipment under the $100 million Soviet credit together wit.:. the e' - livery of Hungarian rail equipment could maintain the present .evEL. On the other hand, Argentina's approach to self-sufficiency in of production and its present moves toward cancellation of its cilateral agreements will tend to discourage trade with the Bloc. Bloc influence in Argentina appears to have weatcened n the last 6 months. A concerted drive by the government to reduce local Communist activities coupled with its economic reform measuaes have brought about a less favorable atmosphere for Bloc activity. 2. Brazil During the first half of 1960, Brazil was second only to Cuba as a target for Bloc activity in Latin America. Especially strong efforts were made to exploit Brazil's anxious search for new markets and credits for its ambitious program of industrialzatio3 and economic development. Poland and Czechoslovakia, which presertly have diplomatic relations with Brazil, sought to strengthen these ties; and the USSR and the other Bloc countries made a sustained ef- fort toward establishing diplomatic relations. Effective propaganda was slanted toward the development program, emphasizing the economic accomplishments of the Communist Bloc and its potential as a vast aev market. In addition, the Bloc has continued to play on Brazil's en sitive feelings of nationalism, especially their more extreme and anti-American manifestations. The tangible results of the Soviet trade offensive, a- though significant, have been less impressive. By midyear, after protracted negotiations, trade resulting from the much-vaunted Soiiet- Brazilian trade agreement was only beginning. Some feeling:. of d-s- illusionment began to appear in certain sectors of Brazilian opin-on, helped no small amount by revelations of the defecting chief' of tie resident Hungarian trade mission that Hungary was using comrsercia:_ representatives in Brazil as intelligence agents. Trade, however continued at a generally accelerated pace in an atmosphere still considered friendly. Although no new long-term credits were extended to Br:Lzil in the first half of 1960, several proposals were reported as penc_ing. - 67 - Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 According to the Sao Paulo press of April, Brazil was considering a Polish offer to build a steel plant with an annual capacity of 150,000 to 250,000 tons at a cost of $30 million, to be repaid over an 8-year period. A press report that the head of the Soviet trade mission visiting Brazil in May had offered to study Brazilian proposals for long-term Soviet investments at low interest rates in large projects was later denied by the mission head and was probably a trial balloon A Czechoslovak proposal to manufacture Zetor tractors in Brazil may involve a credit offer. This proposal was endorsed by the Brazilian government Automotive Industry Executive Group as one of ten projects approved for implementation in the program to establish a national farm tractor industry. In January, three Soviet technicians arrived in Sao Paulo for the reported purpose of assisting the private Companhia Industrial de Boehas :Betuminosas (CIRB) in developing its Paraiba Valley oil shale deposits in Sao Paulo State. After making preliminary surveys and presenting their findings before the National Petroleum Council, the group departed late in April with a 200-ton sample of Brazilian shale to be further analyzed in the USSR. The project contemplated by the company involves the conversion of shale into natural gas to supply the Paraiba Valley and ultimately Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Some doubt exists concerning the motive of the company in employing the technicians and the seriousness of their interest in developing the deposits. The technicians have not yet returned to Brazil, but the press in Sao Paulo has reported that 20 Soviet engineers are com- ing to Brazil in connection with this project. According to Radio Warsaw, Polish technicians completed their activities in connection with the completion of a caustic soda plant in Cabo Frio and returned home, having been in Brazil from late 1959 to April 1960. Brazilian-Bloc trade during 1959 was the highest in Bra- zilian history, amounting to 4 percent of Brazil's total trade, com- pared with 3 percent in 1958. Especially notable was the development of significant trade with the USSR and East Germany, neither of which traded on a regular basis with Brazil before 1958. The ranking Bloc traders in Brazil, however, were still Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. During the first 6 months of 1960, Brazil signed new 5- year trade agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Both agree- ments call for a yearly total trade turnover of $70 million and pro- vide for the exchange of Brazilian coffee, cocoa beans, and other agricultural products for Polish and Czechoslovak machinery and capital. goods. If the quotas provided for are realized, trade be- Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 between Brazil and both Poland and Czechoslovakia will increase sub- stantially. The new agreements are the first long-term pa,---r,- signed by Poland and Czechoslovakia with Brazil. The first official Soviet mission to visit Brazil since the severance of diplomatic relations in 1957 arrived in Rio de V-anei- in May to discuss the implementation of the December 1959 Soviet- Brazilian trade agreement. After a month of discussion, contracts were signed for Brazilian imports of 150,000 tons of Soviet wheat valued at $10.3 million, 100,000 tons of diesel oil valued ac $2.3 million, and 600,000 tons of Soviet crude oil valued at $7.5 million; Brazil will export 11,800 tons of coffee valued at $8.24 mil- lion. The amounts of petroleum products and wheat contracted are those specified in the agreement. The USSR was given until June 961 to ship the petroleum, an extension of 6 months beyond the period contemplated by the agreement. Problems apparently have arisen con- cerning the specifications of the Soviet crude oil. The amounts fall short of the $25 million each way specified in the trade agreement and represent an $11.9 million import surplus for Brazil. In order to fulfill the terms of the trade agreement, the USSR would have to make additional 1960 purchases of 8,200 tons of coffee plus $9 mil- lion worth of other Brazilian products, and Brazil would have to purchase $5 million worth of machinery, chemicals, oil industry equip- ment, and other products. No plans for further 1960 purchases have been announced. The propaganda image of vast Eastern European ma?ketv~ probably has been the most effective weapon employed by the Bloc in its economic offensive in Brazil since it plays upon Brazil*c own desires to open new markets for coffee and other products and to -get commodities needed for development from non-hard-currency areas. With the impetus of the new Polish, Czechoslovak, and Soviet trade agreements, this image may gain substantive reinforcement in 1960. The Bloc share could rise to as high as 10 percent of Brazil's 19b0 trade if the target increases with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR take place. Various factors, however, may limit significantly the long-run success of Bloc trade promotion efforts. First. the commodity that Brazil is primarily interested in marketing, .-off?e, has never been an important consumption item for Bloc countries. In this connection it may be significant that the USSR failed t:; pur- chase in 1960 even the relatively small quantity of coffee called for by the trade agreement. Second, the high expectations of the Bra- zilians probably will suffer a setback when it is discovered that Bloc trade is no panacea for all economic ills. The small amount of trade resulting from the Soviet agreements has already been the source 25X1 has a pei to dampen some Brazilian enthusiasm for Bloc trade. -69- S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 In spite of the recent emergence of some difficulties, Soviet Bloc prestige in Brazil over the last 6 months has on balance been increasing. Continued efforts to raise the tempo of economic relations by the renegotiation of agreements, the exchange of trade missions, and other trade activities have served to keep the issue before the eyes of the Brazilians. The signing of contracts under the Soviet agreements and the negotiation of a new Czechoslovak agreement should be sufficient to maintain a Brazilian attitude fa- vorable to Bloc economic ties for the near future. The seeds of dis- illusiion may have been planted, however, and, if so, the Soviet Bloc may soon encounter decreased receptivity toward its future promotional activities. 3. Cuba During the first 6 months of 1960 the Bloc energetically sought to identify itself closely with the Cuban revolution, and Cuba assumed an increasing pro-Soviet orientation both in its foreign pol- icy and in its internal affairs. As Cuba's relations with the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere have deteriorated, this desire on the part of both parties for closer relationships has mani- fested itself on all levels of activity. Diplomatically, the period found Cuba reestablishing relations with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland and contemplating relations with other Bloc regimes, in- cluding those of East Germany and Communist China. During this period a greatly increased exchange of persons between the two areas has been noted. Highlights included the arrival in Havana of the Soviet scientific, technical, and cultural exhibition inaugurated by Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan, the arrival of the Peking Opera Company, and the exchange of trade union, student, and other groups between Cuba and the Bloc. In June, Soviet Premier Khrushchev an- nounced acceptance of a Castro invitation to=visit Cuba in the near future. The Cuban-sponsored Latin American news agency Prensa Latina and the various Bloc agencies, including PAP, CTK, TASS, and NCNA have exchanged news coverage and have increasingly followed a common line, while Soviet and especially Chinese Communist news comment has fo- cused upon the Cuban struggle against "Yankee imperialism." Recently the Bloc has begun to use Havana as a base for its propaganda and sub- versive efforts throughout Latin America. In the first 7 months of 1960, in. response to Cuba's an- nounced desire to expand its markets and diversify its imports, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Communist China all signed trade or payments agreements with Cuba. In addition, the USSR granted Cuba a $100 million credit, Czechoslovakia granted a $20 mil- lion credit, Cuba and Communist China negotiated a technical assist- ance and credit agreement, and numerous Bloc technicians began to Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 S-E-C-R-E-T appear in the country. Sugar sales to the Bloc in 1960 far exceered those of any previous year. In February 1960, in conjunction with a Soviet-Cuban ;radf agreement, the USSR extended to Cuba a $100 million line of credit at 2.5 percent interest, repayable in 12 years. This first credit ti Cuba extended by a Bloc nation is to be used for new plants and fps=r- tories during the period 1961-65 and envisions extensive Soviet tech- nical assistance. In June, Czechoslovakia granted to Cuba s, $20'nnil- lion credit to be used for its industrial expansion program- It. s a 10-year credit payable at 2.5 percent interest. East Germany a:id Poland probably also have extended long-term credits to Cuba. In June and early July a Cuban economic mission, headid by the Executive Director of the National Institute of Agra f_an RF=form (INRA), Nunez Jimenez, visited the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany to discuss Bloc assistance in Cuba's industria:iizati-.on program. Upon his return, Nunez stated that his mission hac.c.one-cadet. agreements for the purchase of 32 complete factories, including 7 frot. the USSR, 12 from Poland, 8 from Czechoslovakia, and 5 from East Ger- many. Included in these factories are a 1-million-ton-capar ty steel mill to be erected with Soviet assistance, two powerplants, two teexti:(? mills, various metalworking plants, and miscellaneous light industrie,. Nunez also announced that Bloc trade missions visiting Cuba in thf' first 6 months of 1960 had agreed to furnish an additional 21+ complete factories. Nunez stated that the cost of all 32 of the fac~,ories for which his mission had negotiated was $84 million, of which 15 mi:_lioi represented foreign exchange costs. Neither the domestic nor the for, eign exchange costs of the other 24+ plants are known. Recent reports of an increasing influx of Bloc vechnif^ian seem plausible. Probably about 35 Soviet technicians, connected 14ith surveys of Cuba's economy and potential development, were in Cuba by the end of June. A team of Soviet specialists has completed a miiera survey of Pinar del Rio province. Other teams have been reported as- sisting the Cuban Petroleum Institute, and some probably are invoe_ved in agricultural surveys in cooperation with INRA. Rumors of the pres- ence of military advisers have persisted for some time, and some a'.loc military personnel may be in Cuba. Some of the technicians repor-?:ed may have been in Cuba since the Soviet exposition and the Mikoyan visit in February, whereas others have arrived via Venezuela and Curacao. Technicians from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and 7ommunis China may also be in Cuba. An increase in the number of Bloc per- sonnel should result from the credit agreement signed with Czechor;lo- vakia and from visits of the Nunez Jimenez and Raul Castro missions to the Bloc. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 In the field of trade, Cuba's ties with the Bloc increased rapidly during the last half of 1959 and the first half of 1960. Trade for all of 1959 came to no more than about $20 million. However, dur- ing the last few months of 1959, the Bloc and particularly the USSR, made a number of large sugar purchases for both 1959 and 1960 delivery that began to change dramatically the nature and extent of Cuba's trade with the Bloc. By 13 February, the date of the new Soviet-Cuban trade agreement, the USSR had agreed to purchase 1 million Spanish long tons* of Cuban sugar for 1960 delivery. This amount was increased in mid- July when the USSR agreed to purchase the 700,000 tons which the United States dropped from its Cuban import quota. In addition, sugar pur- chases of other Bloc countries for 1960 probably will come to between 500,000 and 700,000** tons. Thus total Bloc purchases for 1960 amount to approximately 2.4 million tons with a total value of nearly $160 million. The maximum value of Bloc purchases in the past was $42 mil- lion in 1957. Not all of the Bloc purchases will represent increased exports for Cuba. Cuban sugar exports are regulated by quotas estab- lished under the International Sugar Agreement, and therefore exports cannot be increased unless the quotas are enlarged. The International Sugar Council, which administers the Sugar Agreement, has increased the Cuban. quota by about 630,000 tons since.the first of the year and has also permitted Cuba to sell 700,000 tons to the USSR outside the regular quota. Thus, in effect, Cuba has had a total increase of 1.3 million tons in the size of its quota. This sum is more than a million tons short of its total commitments to export to the Bloc in 1960, and. this amount has been diverted from Western markets. Both the USSR and Communist China, in addition to the large purchase for delivery in 1960, have also made commitments for future sugar purchases. The trade agreement between Cuba and the USSR signed in February calls for the USSR to buy 1 million tons annually from 1961. to 1964. The trade agreement signed with Communist China on 23 July provides that China will purchase 500,000 tons annually over a 5-year period. The Soviet agreement provides that 20 percent of the sugar purchases will be paid for in hard currency, with the remainder paid by the delivery of Soviet commodities. The Chinese agreement has a similar provision covering sales during the first year with sales in subsequent years made on a strictly barter basis. Thus the two agree- ments indicate not only that large quantities of Cuban sugar will be exported to the Bloc during the next 5 years but also that Cuba will * The Spanish long ton is the conventional unit of measure used in the international sugar market and is equal to 2,271.6 US pounds. ** The exact total of all Bloc purchases has not been determined, because it is not clear exactly how much sugar will be exported to Communist China under the 23 July agreement. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 S-E-C-R-E-T necessarily be required to import substantial amounts from both tie USSR and Communist China. Implementation of the Soviet treaty began almost im- mediately. Shipments of sugar to the USSR moved steadily t*irough the first half of the year, and imports from the USSR also began n substantial amounts. Cuba has contracted for at least 900,000 metric tons of Soviet crude oil at a price of $2.75 per barrel. This $l1'.3 million transaction will absorb 58.6 percent of the value of the 1+25,000 Spanish long tons of sugar that Cuba sold to the USSR under the February agreement and is equivalent to Cuba's oil needs for _00 days. As the small government-owned refinery does not have the c3.pac- ity to handle this amount of oil, it asked each of the three foreign oil companies to handle 300,000 tons of Soviet crude oil in their re- fineries. Their refusal lead to "intervention" by the Cuban Gove-n- ment of one major refinery by the end of June and of the remainiz3 two in early July. After the government took over operating control of the foreign refineries, Cuba's normal petroleum imports From W,ste., sources came to a complete halt. Following the rupture of normal oil supplies, it seems probable that Cuba concluded additional petroleum purchases from the USSR. Besides petroleum, Cuba is importing fer- tilizer from the USSR in substantial quantities and has also contr..act, for the delivery of 20,000 metric tons of Soviet wheat. Other trade agreements with the Bloc are less exclensire than either the Soviet or Chinese Communist accords. In March an East German trade mission signed a 1-year interbank payments agre- ment with Cuba. Also in March a trade and payments agreement waw signed with Poland that is very general in nature and is little aDre than a framework or preliminary agreement. Neither the East German nor the Polish agreement established specific trade goals but ratier makes general provisions for the exchange of Cuban sugar and other agricultural products for machinery and industrial installations. In June, Czechoslovakia also signed a trade and payments agreement c,' un- specified amount with Cuba. Implementation of these agreements h3.s gone forward rapidly as East Germany contracted for 60,000 Spanis3 lo?- tons of sugar and Poland agreed to take 150,000 tons. (Some of these sales, however, may not have taken place within the framework of he trade agreements.) Some imports also have been received from all three of these Bloc countries. Official Cuban statistics on trade with the Bloc. as tell as with the rest of the world, have been virtually nonexistent si3.ce early 1959. Based on known shipments of sugar to the Bloc and on oth-~r exports known to have been made, Cuba's total Bloc exports in 195) approximately $16.5 million, compared with exports to the Bloc of $17.7 million in 1958, and represent approximately 2.5 perco.ont of Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Cuba's total exports in 1958, the last year-for which complete sta- tistics are available. No figures are available concerning Cuba's total trade or its import pattern in 1959, although goods valued at $700,oOo were shipped from the Bloc in the first 6 months. It is probable that imports from the Bloc were not significantly larger in 1959 than the $2 million level of past years. The Bloc's influence in Cuban economic affairs, like that in other fields, has grown sharply in the last 6 months. With the impact of the new trade and credit agreements only beginning to be felt, this influence should increase even further during the year as economic deterioration in Cuba and worsening relations with the United States make Cuba more dependent on foreign economic aid. 4. Uruguay In spite of the existence of extensive diplomatic and trade relations between Uruguay and the Bloc and Uruguay's continued economic problems, Bloc influence in Uruguayan domestic affairs has, if anything, diminished. The five Bloc diplomatic missions in Monte- video (Soviet, Czechoslovak, Polish, Rumanian, and Bulgarian) and the two resident commercial missions (Hungarian and East German) have lent encouragement to the formation of a Communist-dominated central trade union movement and have indicated their opposition to economic reform moves which the Uruguayan Government has undertaken with US support. A severe trade imbalance and the adverse effect on prices of currency devaluation have increased economic discontent in Uruguay, but Bloc efforts to capitalize on these difficulties have not been particularly successful. The Uruguayan Government's failure to accept a Soviet offer to buy for cash $25 million worth of wool in return for $16.5 mil- lion worth of oil on short-term credit has caused the USSR to withdraw from the Uruguayan wool market, thus considerably decreasing Uruguay's trade with the Bloc in the first half of 1960. Direct trade with the Bloc in 1959 equaled $40.8 million, approximately 16 percent of Uruguay's total trade. Direct exports to the Bloc dropped from $29.4 million in 1958 to $27.4 million in 1959, a decline which was in line with the almost complete paralysis of Uruguayan wool exports in the last 3 months of 1959. In spite of this decline, exports to the Bloc represented 28 percent of total 1959 ex- ports, including 43.4 percent of the chief export commodity, wool. In 1958 the Bloc took 21 percent of direct exports. Imports from the Bloc rose to 9 percent of total imports, compared with 5 percent in 1958. This advance was achieved chiefly at the expense of Western Europe. - 74 - Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Preliminary statistics for the first 4 months of 19& in- dicate a sizable drop in Soviet Bloc trade. In that period the i~loe accounted for 11 percent of total Uruguayan exports and for 2 percent, of its imports. During this per`od, Communist China purchased .6 sd lion of wool tops, the largest amount for any Bloc country and aaaproi mately equal to Communist China's total 1959 purchases from Urugay. Sales to the USSR were less than $100,000. A November 1959 Soviet offer to purchase $25 million wort1 of wool from the 1959/60 clip if Uruguay purchased petroleum valt.ed s1 $16.5 million was not acted upon by the Uruguayan Government. AL a result, the USSR, which in 1959 was the largest purchaser of Urufaaye.r wool, refrained from entering the 1959/60 wool market. This witt dram exacerbated the partial paralysis in the market, so that by the + nd of April 1960 only 4+6 percent of the current wool clip had beer, expr rtes compared with 62 percent at the same time in 1959. In May 1`360 the Ii? made a new offer to buy for cash $75 million worth of wool ^ver s 3- year period if Uruguay purchased $50 million of petroleum products, paying for shipments on terms of 270 to 360 days credit. In add Lion, the USSR proposed the immediate purchase for convertible currency of low-grade wool valued at $13 million. Since the bulk of the unsold Uruguayan wool is of this quality, the offer is particularly attiao ti;a: to many Uruguayans. The government, however, has not made any dccisiat about this new offer. If it is not accepted, then the Soviet absence from the Uruguayan wool market probably would continue. Otier BI-)c countries have continued to purchase Uruguayan wool, although tot~Ll B purchases from the 1959/60 wool clip through April amount to only 15: percent of Uruguay's wool exports. The USSR may have again entered the Uruguayan market through indirect purchases, as the Netherlanis, the major transshipment point for this product, remains a sizable pur- chaser. A continuing economic crisis in Uruguay, a weakening if prices in Western markets for the lower grade wool, and internal rac- tors leading to Uruguayan unwillingness to sell wool at current w-)rld market prices combine to make the Soviet offers attractive to mat. Uruguayans. An apparent government desire to avoid accepting the Sov_t proposals, however, appears to diminish short-term Uruguayan-Bloc trait prospects. The tendency of Uruguay to seek short-term expedients in place of the long-term solutions has helped the Soviet Bloc to ice!p on foot in the door. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 STATISTICAL APPENDIX Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Bloc Credits and Grants to Underdeveloped Countries Extended, Obligated, and Drawn January 1954 - June 1960 Recipient Co:.ntry Iota.l USSR European Satellites ^ -tal European Iateilite= Comnist China Total 4,053.8 3,045.6 Middle East 1,912.6 1,508.7 1,724.6 1,362.7 5.1 Afvhnist 25 -1 241.9 13.8 0 246.6 233.4 13.2 0 0.l 0 6.1 2 5 Iraq 300.5 300.5 0 0 163.0 163.0 . 118.0 Pakistan 3.2 3.2 0 0 3.2 3.2 3.2 wksx 17.11 R.k; 7.5 a 37.1 9.6 7,g 0 19 UAB -- Egypt 565.6 585.6 275.3 4.7 928.5 685.6 -33.2 4.7 2 405 UAR -- Syria 304.3 242.2 62.1 0 304.3 242.2 62.1 C . 178 6 Yemen 60.7 25.7 18.0 17.0 56.0 25.7 18.0 12.3 . 28.0 Africa 159.8 137.0 21.3 1.5 4 89 0 79 3 9 1 . . . .5 6.2 Ethiopia 113.6 101.8 11.8 0 48.2 43.8 4.4 0 3 3 Ghana 3.1 0 3.1 0 3.1 0 3.1 0 . 0 Guinea 43.1 35.2 6.4 1.5 38.1 35.2 1.4 1.5 2.4 Asia 1,638.5 1,123.9 378.3 136.3 1 275 5 4 859 8 4 4 Burma 12.0 12.1, 0 0 , . 12.3 . 12.0 33 .1 0 LL- _ 0 74.5.5 11 0 Cambodia 34.7 6.0 0.7 28.0 29.1 6.0 0.7 22.4 . 23.7 Ceylon 58.0 30.0 1.7 26.3 27.4 23.3 1.7 2.4 4 6 India 807.7 684.2 123.5 0 777.7 684.2 93.5 0 . 9 150 Indonesia 685.0 384.2 252.4 48.4 417.6 126.4 242.8 46.4 . 280.1 Nepal 41.1 7.5 0 33.6 11.7 7.5 0 4.2 4.2 Europe 1157 76.0 _.9.7 Iceland 4.6 3.1 1.5 4.6 ~.1 1.- i.. j Ya sonla~is ~YY:i ?2:9 ?a:2 Latin America 227.2 200.0 Argentina 103.7 100.9 Rrwvri # .~ -a .. ~uua 123.3 mow. c 0 European Cor.~uriat sacei1ites China 0 118.0 3.2 1A 174.6 116.7 5.7 2.2 2.0 0 0.2 11.' 2.5 0 0 0 0 0 225.9 4.7 61.9 0 18.0 4.3 3.2 0_8 1.8 0 0 0 1.4 0.8 196.7 204.8 73.0 11.0 0 0 5.0 0.7 18.0 0.5 1.7 2.4 139.3 11.6 0 40.9 190.8 48.4 0 0 4.2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Bloc Economic and Military Credits and 'ur.n,-- Extended to Underdeveloped Countries by Recipient Area and Country January 1954 - June 1960 Million Current US $ Area and Country Total Economic Total 4, 053.8 3,231.3 822.5 Middle East 1,912.6 1,296.5 616.1 Afghanistan 255.1 216.7 38.4 Iran 6.1 6.1 0 Iraq 300.5 182.5 118.0 Pakistan 3.2 3.2 0 Turkey 17.1 17.1 0 UAR -- Egypt 965.6 650.6 315.0 UAP -- Syria 304.3 176.6 X7.7 Yemen 60.7 43.7 17.0 Africa 159.8 159.3 0.5 Ethiopia 113.6 113.6 0 Ghana 3.1 3.1 0 Guinea 43.1 42.6 0.5 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Table 9 (Continued) Million Current US Area and Country 1,638.5 1,432.6 Military 205.9 Burma 12.0 12.0 0 Cambodia 34.7 34.7 0 Ceylon 58.0 58. C 0 India 807.7 807.7 0 Indonesia 685.0 479.1 205.9 Nepal 41.1 41.1 0 115.7 115.7 Iceland 4.6 4.6 0 Yugoslavia 111.1 111.1 0 227.2 227.2 Argentina 103.7 103.7 0 Brazil 3.5 3.5 0 Cuba 120.0 126.0 0 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Eio^ Ecnomi7 and Military Credits and Grants to Underdeveloped Countries Extended and Drawn. by Year January 1954 - June 1960 Million Current US Extensions Drawings Year Total Economic Military T otal Economic Military Total ;, :53 . 3, 231.3 822.5 1 462.2 653.1 809.1 1960 (Jan-Jun) 785.7 785.7 0 135.1 89.0 46.1 1959 901.0 889.0 12.0 409.7 167.8 241.9 1958 1,017.1 561.7 455.4 373.0 204.6 168.4 1957 279.8 226.8 53.0 166.2 81.2 85.0 1956 710.1 608.0 1 102.1 364.9 107.2 257.7 1955 349.3 149.3 200.0 13.3 3.3 10.0 1954 lo.8 10.8 0 0 0 0 a. Excluding about $350 million in credit extended to Yugoslavia and subsequently either canceled or allowed to expire. - 82 - Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Terms of Major Soviet Lines of Credit Extended to Underdeveloped Countries January 1954 - June 1960 Recipient Country Date Established Currency Unit in Which Denominated India Feb 1955 Rupee Afghanistan Iso 1.956 US dollar India Nov 1956) Rupee JAR -- Syria Oct 1957 Ruble JAR -- Egypt Jan 1958 Ruble Argentina Oct 1958 US dollar UAR -- Egypt Dec 1958 Ruble India Jul 1959 Ruble Ruble Ethiopia Jul 1959 Ruble Indonesia Feb 1960 US dollar UAR -- Egypt Feb 1960 Ruble Definition of Currency Unit in Which Denominated 0.186621 grams of gold ner rupee Unknown Unknown 0.222168 grams of gold per ruble 0.222168 grams of ro18 per ruble $35 per ounce of gold 0.222168 grges of gold per ruble 0.222168 grams of gold per ruble 0.222168 grams of gold per ruble Unknown Not defined 0.222168 grams of gold per ruble Value (Million Current us Date Drawing Began Date Line of Credit Expires Interest Rate (Percent) Amortization Period 115.5 Jan-Jun 1956 Not specified 2.5 12 pears begirning_ year 100.0 Mar 1956 Unknown 2.0 after dra-.:ing 22 years beginning 8 years 126.3 Jun-Dec 1959 Unknown 2.5 after drawing 12 years beginning 1 year 150.0 Apr 1958 Oct 1964 2.5 after dra-.ing 12 years 175.0 May-Nov 1958 Jan 1962 100.0 Dec 1959 Oct 1961 2.5 10 years 100.0 Mar-Jun 1959 Not specified 2.5 12 years beginning in 1964 137.5 None to date Not specified 2.5 12 years beginning 1 year 100.0 Jun 1960 Jul 1969 2.5 after drawing 17 years, but flexible 250.0 None to date Jul 1967 2.5 12 years beginning 1 year 287.0 None to date Not specified 2.5 after drawing 12 years beginning 1 year after completion of con- Feb _ 0 f1. da it e1. ~. 66$ ro Rr a nY 11.1. goad per dollar except ner- haps technicians Form of Repayment Good_ or oonvertib:e currency Goods :,tee _erabie pounds st rling, or other convert- ible currency agreed on Goads or convertible ourreaev Goods and/or convertible currency (Bottom, agricultural oammodi- ties, and/or convertible currency US dollars credited to the Soviet account with the Argentine Central Bank Egyptian pounds credited to the Soviet account with the Central Bank of the UAR for the purchase of Egyptian goals Convertible Iraqi dinars credited to the Soviet ac- count sith the Central Bank of Iraq Goods or convertible currency Goods or convertible currency Goods, pounds sterling, or other convertible currency Fgyptian pounds credited to the Soviet account with the Central Bank of the UAF for the purchase of rgyptiar. m n.d the U:S etc be oet in dol.. Lars. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 S-E-C-R-E-T Table 12 Bloc Economic Technicians in Underdeveloped Countries J January-June 1960 Total European , Communist tr d C Bloc USSR Satellites b/ China y oun Area an - Total 5,68o 3,69o 12020 970 Middle East 3,795 2,415, 680 700 Afghani:>tan 1,140 1,025 115 0 Iran 30 5 25 0 Iraq 425 295 130 0 Pakistan 5 0 5 0 Turkey 105 15 90 0 UAR Egypt 485 375 110 0 lAR -- Syria 475 300 175 0 Yemen 1,130 400 30 700 J Africa 195 50 80 65 Ethiopia 25 20 5 0 Ghana 5 5 , Guinea 165 25 75 65 0 Libya 0 Moree.cco 0 0 Asia 1.,565 1,175 185 205 Burma 50 45 5 0 Cambodia 210 20 J 190 Ceylon 40 10 30 0 India 1,100 1,000 100 0 Indonesia 125 75 50 0 Nepal 40 25 0 15 Latin Am rica 115 1F0 75 0 Argentina 45 0 45 0 Brazil 25 5 20 0 Chile 5 0 5 0 Cuba 40 35 5 0 Europ,, 10 0 0 Yuge sla via 10 10 C) 0 a. Minimum estimates of personnel present for a period of 1 month or more. Personnel engaged -solely in commercial or military activities are excluded. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five. b. Including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. c. Including technicians and laborers. d. A few specialists are believed to have been present. They are not included in sub- totals or the total. -84- Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Military Personnel from Underdeveloped Countries Trained in the Bloc J January 1955 - June 1960 Country Sending Trainees Total Bloc USSR European Satellites 4,220 1,715 2,505 Afghanistan 520 520 0 Guinea 60 40 20 Indonesia 1,510 10 1,500 Iraq 280 235 45 UAR -- Egypt 1,325 515 81o UAR -- Syria 525 395 130 a. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five. b. Including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and East Germany. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Table 14 Academic Students from Underdeveloped Countries Trained January 195b - June 1960 Area and Country Total Bloc USSR European Satellites Communist China Total 2,770 1,415 1,250 l~. Middle East 1,635 980 bj> 20 Afghanistan 25 15 10 0 Greece 30 0 30 0 Iraq 610 400 190 20 UAR 925 530 395 0 Yemen 45 35 10 0 Africa 170 280 0 Ethiopia 15 5 10 0 Ghana 65 15 50 0 Guinea 180 100 80 0 Sudan 190 50 140 0 -86- Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Table 14 (Continued) Area and Country Total Bloc USSR European Satellites Communist China 540 245 210 Burma 40 30 10 0 Ceylon 15 5 10 C India 115 50 60 5 Indonesia 355 150 130 75 Other 15 10 0 5 Latin America 145 20 125 0 Bolivia 50 0 50 Chile 10 0 10 Colombia 30 0 30 Mexico 25 0 25 Other 30 20 10 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Table 15 e the _ _ Technical S tudeniN from s i'Underdeveloped Countries Tra n_d - the B_% January 1956 - June 19611 .Area and Country Total Bloc USSR European Satellites Communist China Total 2 3 1,405 250 Middle East 1, u5 75 Afghanistan 45 40 5 0 Iran 5 0 5 0 Iraq 365 195 170 0 Turkey 50 50 0 0 UAR 575 100 475 0 Yemen 75 0 0 75 Asia 1,265 1,020 70 175 Cambodia 175 0 0 175 India 1,050 1,005 45 0 Indonesia 25 0 25 0 Nepal 15 15 0 0 Latin America 10 0 10 0 0 0 a. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five. b. Including Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Table 16 Bloc Trade with Selected Underdeveloped Countries a/ 195+-59 Million Current US $ Total Trade Europe Middle East and Africa Asia Latin America Year Total Exports Imports Total Exports Imports Total Exports Imports Total Exports Imports Total Exports Im orts p 1954 870 402 468 43 18 25 367 ?60 207 206 113 93 254 112 143 1955 1,242 584 658 109 52 57 513 240 273 285 138 146 335 153 182 1956 186 799 '697 233 -35 -03 571 279. 299 434 245 i69 2+i) 130 lu 9 1957 1,794 677 917 316 180 135 820 390 429 464 235 229 195 71 124 1958 2,237 1,174 1,063 409 243 166 958 495 463 602 327 275 268 108 160 19,59 2,266 1,085 1,181 421 226 198 873 451 422 684 282 403 285 127 158 1958 Jan-Jun 1,033 539 494 194 123 71 467 222 245 242 143 99 131 51 79 Jul-Dec 1,204 635 569 215 120 94 492 274 218 360 184 176 138 57 81 Jan-Jun 1,082 540 543 197 113 84 440 210 231 304 138 167 140 79 61 Jul-Dec 1,184 546 639 226 112 114 433 241 192 380 144 236 145 48 97 a. All values have been rounded to the nearest million. Totals are derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the rounded components. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Bloc Exports to Selected Underdeveloped Countries /* 1958 and 1959 Million Current US $ Total Bloc USSR European Satellites Communist China 1 Area and Country 1958 1959 1958 1959 c t' 1958 1959 `_'l 1958 1959 _/ Total 1,173.9 1,085.2 382.9 .. 342.9 555.6 524.1 235.4 Middle East 455.6 399.8 170.2 163.0 246.6 202.9 38.9 33.9 Afghanistan 27.3 32.5 23.0 28.0 3.8 4.0 0.5 0.5 Greece 39.7 42.2 14.3 16.o 25.4 25.9 0.1 0.3 Iran 37.7 36.6 26.3 22.5 11.5 14.1 -- Iraq 6.0 18.2 J 4.0 5.8 10.7 0.2 3.5 Israel 7.8 6.2 0.6 0.3 7.2 5.8 d/ Jordan 7.5 2.5 0.2 -- 6.9 2.5 0.4 K mit 5.5 -- 1.1 -- 3.3 -- 1.1 Lebanon 6.5 7.8 1.2 1.6 5.3 6.3 Pakistan 16.1 7.9 2.0 0.8 3.7 2.9 10.3 4.2 Turkey 57.3 42.4 6.9 6.6 50.3 35.8 -- -- UAR -- Egypt 219.5 183.6 90.9 77.1 103.5 82.6 25.1 23.9 UAR -- Syria 24.7 19.9 3.7 6.1 19.9 12.3 1.2 1.5 * Footnotes for Table 17 follow on p. 93- - 90 - Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Table 17 Bloc Exports to Selected Underdeveloped Countries a/ 1958 and 1959 (Continued) Million Current US Total Bloc USSR European Satellites Communist China Area and Country 1958 1959 1958 1959 1958 1959 1958 1959 Africa 39.6 51.2 2.3 .44 18.6 29.7 18.7 14.2 Ghana 6.8 10.2 1 6.1 8.0 0.7 2.2 Guinea -- 9.0 1.0 -- 8.o -- -- Morocco 22.2 15.4 1.2 2.5 5.0 4.9 16.0 8.0 Sudan 8.0 12.4 0.5 2.9 5.9 7.0 1.5 2.6 Tunisia 2.6 4.2 0.6 1.0 1.6 1.8 0.5 1.4 Asia 327.3 281.6 108.4 62.7 45.1 53.7 ' 173.8 2 165 . Burma 31.3 25.4 4.1 3.9 10.6 5.1 16.6 16.4 Cambodia 5.4 6.2 0.2 1.1 0.4 0.8 4.7 4.3 Ceylon 33.8 36.4 0.2 0.5 1.8 4.4 31.9 31.5 India 137.4 97.0 100.9 53.1 23.0 31.2 13.5 12.8 Indonesia 47.3 57.7 1.5 2.7 2.9 5.8 43.0 49.1 Laos 0.2 -- -- d/ 0.2 -- 0.3 0./ 4. Ph: ippines -- J Thailand 3.1 3.1 1.2 0.7 1.9 2.4 I Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Bloc Exports to Selected Underdeveloped Countries J 1958 and 1959 (Continued) Million Current US $ Total Bloc USSR European Satellites Communist China b Area and Country 1958 1959 Cj' 1958 1959 2/ 1958 1959 1958 195;L Europe 243.1 - 225.5 77.6 79.7 163.5 142.6 2.0 3.2 Iceland 27.7 29.1 15.0 15.2 12.7 13.8 J i/ Portugal 3.2 4.7 0.8 1.7 2.2 2.8 0.2 0.2 Spain 17.1 19.5 4.0 5.1 12.7 13.9 0.3 0.4 Yugoslavia 195.1 172.3 57.8 57.6 135.9 112.1 1.4 2.6 Latin America 108.3 127.0 24.4 30.1 81.8 95.2 2.0 1.6 Argentina 55.8 49.1 17.9 21.9 38.0 27.2 Brazil 29.0 49.3 -- 1.3 29.0 41.9 J~ 0.1 Chile 2.3 1.1 0.1 -- 0.8 0.4 1.4 0.7 Colombia 1.0 2.6 -- 1.0 2.5 -- 0.1 Cuba 2.0 1.4 J 2.0 1.4 Ecuador 0.1 -- -- -- 0.1 -- -- -- Mexico 2.3 2.4 0.4 0.5 1.6 1.5 0.3 0.5 Paraguay Peru 0.9 0.8 1/ 0.9 0.8 d Uruguay 10.3 13.4 6.0 6.4 4.3 7.0 Venezuela 4.5 6.8 0.1 V 4.3 6.5 0.2 0.3 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Bloc Exports to Selected Underdeveloped Countries of 1958 and 1959 (Continued) a. These data are based on official trade statistics of the Free World countries involved with the exception of Afghanistan, Burma, India, Thailand, and Uruguay) -- that is, the Bloc exports indicated are the Free World trading partners' reported imports. All values have been rounded to the nearest $100,000. A dash (--) entry indicates that no figure for trade is known, although some trade may have taken place. Totals are derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the rounded components. b. The figures for Communist China include the following exports: Current US$ From North Vietnam From Mongolia From North Korea Country 1958 1959 1959 1959 Yugoslavia 0.1 million India 2.4 million Less than 50,000 1.1 million Indonesia 1.2 million Cambodia and Laos Less than 50,000 Less than 50,000 Less than 50,000 UAR -- Egypt 0.1 million 0.1 million c. Trade figures for January December 1959 are at a 12-month rate for the following: Venezuela for January-May,; :ran, Lebanc, and Chile fcr Januar ..JurrnE; and Jean far yanaary-Se ;tem`,)c . d. Less than $50,000. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Table 18 Bloc Imports from Selected Underdeveloped Countries a* 1958 and 1959 Million Current US $ Total Bloc USSR European Satellites Communist China J Area and Country 1958 1959 1958 1959 1958 1959 1958 1959 1,063.2 1,181.3 385.8 465.0 493.6 529.3 i84.o 186.7 436.2 377.7 177.1 135.3 209.4 203.4 49.8 38.9 Afghanistan 16.2 20.0 13.0 16.0 2.7 3.5 0.5 0.5 Greece 37.6 33.6 16.8 11.8 20.8 21.8 0.1 Iran 30.8 17.4 25.5 10.7 5.3 6.7 -- Iraq 6.1-1 2.5 1.7 1.9 Israel 6.7 5.2 0.1 6.7 5.1 Jordan 0.9 0.9 -- -- 0.9 0.9 -- -- Lebanon 2.5 0.7 1.4 0.2 1.1 0.5 -- -- Pakistan 21.2 10.9 6.6 3.5 7.1 6.7 7.6 0.7 Turkey 62.6 41.0 13.1 4.8 49.5 36.2 -- -- UAR -- Egypt 220.8 229.6 82.1 81.4 103.8 112.5 34.9 35.7 UAR -- Syria 36.9 12.3 18.6 4.3 11.5 7.8 6.7 0.1 * Footnotes for Table 18 follow on p. 97. - 94 - Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Table 18 Bloc Imports from Selected Underdeveloped Countries a 1958 and 1959 (Continued) Million Current US Total Bloc USSR European Satellites Communist China Area and Country 1958 1959 c/ 1958 1959 c 1958 1959 c 1958 1959 Africa 26.9 44.7 3.3 12.6 18.4 21.7 5.2 10.2 Ghana 1.1 6.2 1.1 5.5 d 0.7 -- -- Guinea 5.2 -- 0.5 -- 4.7 -- -- Morocco 13.9 14.5 1.5 1.3 9.3 6.6 3.1 6.5 Sudan 9.1 14.1 1 4.3 7.0 6.8 2.1 2.9 Tunisia 2.8 4.7 0.7 1.0 2.1 2.9 -- 0.8 Asia 274.7 402.8 108.0 204..5 55.1 68.6 111.5 129.7 Burma 8.8 3.0 1.0 5.8 1.6 3.0 0.4 Cambodia 0.2 2.5 -- -- 0.2 1.1 -- 1.4 Ceylon 21.5 23.7 4.2 6.4 1.0 0.9 16.3 16.4 India 71.0 110.4 49.0 63.7 14.3 28.0 7.7 18.7 Indonesia 54.1 72.3 10.0 15.5 0.7 3.7 43.4 53.1 Laos -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Malaya y15. X36. 44.8 115. 8 33.-- Philippines h - 3.2 - 2.4 -- -- 2.1 -- 0.1 -- 0. -- 3.1 -` 0 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Table 18 Imports from Selected. Underdeveloped Countries 1958 and 1959 (Continued) Million Current US $ Total Bloc USSR European Satellites Communist China Area and Country 1958 1959 JZ 1958 1959 1958 1959 2 1958 1959 Europe 165.5 198.4 49.7 64.9 110.8 130.3 5.0 3.2 Iceland 22.9 21.9 10.8 11.9 12.1 10.0 -- -- Portugal 5.2 6.7 1.9 1.6 3.1 4.5 0.2 0.6 Spain 10.1 21.0 0.7 4.2 9.2 15.7 0.2 1.1 Yugoslavia 127.3 148.8 36.3 47.2 86.4 100.1 4.6 1.5 160.0 157.7 47.7 47.7 99.9 105.3 12.5 4.7 Argentina 63.6 54.1 15.5 19.3 48.0 34.5 0.1 0.4 Brazil 45.8 55.3 -- 3.7 38.3 51.6 7.5 d' Chile 0.3 -- -- -- 0.3 -- -- -- Colombia 1.9 2.7 1.8 -- 0.1 2.7 -- -- Cuba 17.7 16.5 14.1 16.3 0.1 3.6 0.1 Ecuador 0.2 -- -- -- 0.2 -- -- -- Mexico 0.6 1.6 0.3 d 0.3 1.5 Paraguay Peru 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 - Uruguay 29.4 27.4 16.3 8.4 12.1 16.2 1.0 2.8 Venezuela - 96 - Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Bloc Imports from Selected Underdeveloped Countries 1958 and 1959 (Continued) a. These data are based on official trade statistics of the Free World countries involved with the exception of Afghanistan, Burma, India, Thailand, and. Uruguay) -- that is, the Bloc imports indicated are the Free World trading partners' reported exports. All values have been rounded to the nearest $100,000. A dash (--) entry indicates that no figure for trade is known, although some trade may have taken place. Totals are derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the rounded components. b. The figures for Communist China include the following imports: Current US $ To North Vietnam To Mongolia To North Korea Origin 1958 1959 1959 1959 Yugoslavia 100,000 India 500, 000 600,000 400, 000 UAR -- Egypt 300,000 c. Trade figures for January-December 1959 are at a 12-month rate for the following: for January-June, Cuba for January-August, and. Jordan for January-September. d, Less than $50,000. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Number oI 'Trade and Pa;-men ,6 r r e e i a e .itia Let,r:ee : B __.. December 1958 - June 196 Estimated Number as of 30 June 1960 Increase over Estimated Estimated Estimated Area and Country Number Number as of 31 December 1959 Number as of 31 December 1959 Number as of 30 June 1959 Number as of 31 December 1958 l 196 0 b/ 186 b/ 174 bf Tota Middle East 73 -2 75 71 66 Afghanistan 4 0 4 4 4 Greece 7 0 7 7 7 Iran 4 0 4 4 4 Iraq 11 0 11 8 3 Israel 4 0 4 4 4 Lebanon 6 -2 8 7 7 Pakistan 4 0 4 4 4 Turkey 7 0 7 7 7 UAR -- Egypt 11 0 11 11 11 UAR -- Syria 9 0 9 9 9 Yemen 6 0 6 6 6 * Footnotes for Table 19 follow on p. 100. - 98 - Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Table 19 Number of Trade and Payments Agreements Between Bloc and Underdeveloped Countries a/ December 1958 - June 1960 (Continued) Estimated Number as of 30 June 1960 Area and Country Number Number as of 31 December 1959 Estimated Number as of 31 December 1959 Estimate? Number as of 30 June 1959 Estimated. Number as of 31 December 1958 Africa 28 +1 27 26 22 Ethiopia 2 0 2 1 1 Guinea 5 0 5 5 2 Morocco 7 0 7 7 7 Sudan 7 0 7 7 6 Tunisia 7 +1 6 6 6 Asia 40 -2 42 41 39 Burma 8 -1 9 8 8 Cambodia 5 0 5 5 5 Ceylon 7 0 7 7 7 India 10 -1 11 11 10 Indonesia 10 0 10 10 9 Nepal 0 02 02,/ 0C/ 6 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Number of Trade and Payments Agreements Between Bloc an d-3 Underdeveloped _'O" tries December 1958 - June 1960 (Continued) Estimated Number as of 30 June 196o Area and Country Number Increase over Number as of 31 December 1959 Estimated Number as of 31 December 1959 Estimated Number as of 30 June 1959 Estimated Number as of 31 December 1958 Europe 26 0 26 22 25 Iceland 6 0 6 6 6 Portugal if 0 if if if Spain 6 0 6 5 5 Yugoslavia 10 0 10 10 10 Latin America 29 26 23 22 Argentina 6 -1 7 7 7 Brazil 6 0 6 5 5 Colombia 5 0 5 3 2 Cuba if +4 0 0 0 Mexico 1 0 1 1 1 Uruguay 7 0 7 7 7 a. Including agreements known to be in force, agreements which are assumed to have been tacitly renewed, and newly signed agreements of uncertain date of entry into force. Agreements include government-to-government agreements as well as nongovernmental agreements; the latter are listed only when they assume the practical characteristics of a government-to-government agreement. Barter agreements and contracts are not included. b. Totals have been corrected. c. Subsequent information indicates that the Communist China - Nepal agreement reported pre- viously is not a trade agreement. - 100 - Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Types of Trade and Payments Agreements Between Bloc and Underdeveloped Countries as of June 1960 J* Czecho- East Communist North North Area and Country Albania Bulgaria slovakia Germany Hungary Poland Rumania USSR China Mongolia Korea Vietnam Middle East Afghanistan TP TP TP TP Greece IF TP PP TP TP TP TP Iran TP TP TP TP Iraq T T T T T T I T T T T Israel TP TP TP TP Lebanon T TP TP b TP TP TP Pakistan T T T T Turkey TP TP TP TP TP TP TP UAR -- Egypt TP TP TP TP TP TP TP TP TP TP TP UAR -- Syria TP T TP TP TP TP TP TP TP Yemen T TP T T T TP Ethiopia T T Guinea TP TP T TP TP Morocco T TP T T T TP T Sudan T P P TP P T T Tunisia T TP T+ T TP TP TP Burma T . 2/ T T T T Cambodia TP TP Ceylon TP TP TP TP TP India -PP T P Ty TP PP TP Indonepin T PP T T TP TI, Nepal _ T TP TP TP PP T TP TP } SP Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Types of Trade and Payments Agreements Between Bloc and Ui cerdeve, open uuntr- es as of June 1960 al (Continued) Czecho- East Communist North ;forth Area and Country Albania Bu_Lgaria s cva is Germany Hungary Poland Rlyat_ c China i _etn= Europe Iceland 1'F TP TF TP Tr TP Portugal P P P P . Spain P P P P P T Yugoslavia TP TP TP TP TP TP TP TP IF 1'F Argentina T TP . J' T T T TP . Brazil TP P P TP P TP . Colombia T T T T T . Cuba TP- Pf 1'P+ T'P+ . Mexico TP . Uruguay P TP P P P TP P . a. Including agreements known to be in force, agreements which are assumed to have been tacitly renewed, and newly signed agreements 4e- of uncertain date of entry into force. Agreements include government-to-government agreements as the latter are listed only when they assume the practical characteristics of a government-to-government agreement. Barter agreements and contracts are not included. b. Agreement was allowed to lapse. c. Agreement was terminated. d. Subsequent information indicates that this agreement is not a trade agreement. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Number of Hours per Week of International Broadcasting by Radio Stations in the Bloc to Free World Areas June 1959 and June 1960 Hours per Total Bloc USSR and European Satellites Communist China and Far Eastern Clandestine Satellites stations June June 1960 1959 June June 196o 1959 June June June June 1960 19 60 1959 59 19 2,999 2,567 1,908 1,717 31 665 160 18~ Middle East, Africa, and South Asia 707 497 601 439 84 40 22 18 Far East 808 653 126 110 682 543 o 0 Latin America 158 107 126 93 32 14 o o North America 323 284 260 253 56 24 7 7 Western Europe J 862 858 697 688 56 32 log 138 Other J 141 168 98 134 21 12 22 22 a. Excluding Yugosla-via. b. Target area not determined. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 rn Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS ECONOMIC' INTELLIGENCE REPORT SINO-SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC ACTT ' IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS 1 JANU -,RY - 30 JUNE 1960 IMM. RY (The complete text of tF i= report has been published sepa -iteE IC--R14-S9 31 Augur 1960 ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMII Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 This rn4 ? . la; ontat3.s information affecting the Nat, Taal r+efensi.. of the United States within a : meaning of the espionage laws, Tittle 1.8, aSC, Seci3.'! 93 and 794, the trans- mission revelation-.)f which. in any manner to an um:, hori:ed -person is prohibited by law. P --tad and Disseminated by dual Intel igence Agency Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 The reports on Sino-Soviet Bloc economic activities in under?'e- veloped areas in the EIC-R14 series provide periodic summaries ar.d analytical interpretations of significant developments in the eco- nomic relations of Bloc countries with underdeveloped countries of the Free World. These developments are reported on a current, factual basis in the Biweekly Reports in the EIC-WGR-1 series, under the same title. This report, covering the 6 months from 1 January through 30 Tune 1960, constitutes the ninth periodic supplement to EIC-R14, the tack ground report on Sino-Soviet Bloc Postwar Economic Activities in Underdeveloped Areas, 8 August 1956, SECRET. The present supple.:ant relates noteworthy noneconomic activities to the economic operatijns of the Bloc in underdeveloped countries in order to place the eccaomi_! aspects in the perspective of the over-all programs of the Bloc iz these countries. This report was prepared by a Working Group of the Economic Intelligence Committee, including representatives of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, Commerce, and Agriculture; the International Cooperation Administration; th Office of the Secretary of Defense; and the Central Intelligence Agency. It was approved by the Economic Intelligence Committee on 10 August 1960. For purposes of this report, the term underdeveloped. areas in- cludes the following Free World countries: (1) all countries in the Middle East, including Afghanistan, Cyprus, Greece, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria); (2) all independent countries in Africa, except the Union of South Africa; (3) all coun- tries in Asia; (4+) all independent countries in Latin America; and (5) Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and Yugoslavia. The complete text of this report has been published separatel.f as EIC-R14-S9. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 SINO-SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 19 O Summary Throughout the semiannual period ending 30 June 1960, the Bloc prosecuted its economic offensive in underdeveloped areas with grog- ing vigor. As in preceding periods, the political content and direc- tion of the economic aid program were apparent in the choice of target countries, the type of assistance provided, and the timing of aid offers. Although the Bloc continued to press its offensive in the Middle East and Asia, impressive new gains were scored in Africa avid Latin America. During the first 6 months of 1960 the Bloc extended more than $785 million** in financial assistance to underdeveloped countries, all for economic development. The level thus established is well above the high-water mark set in the last 6 months of 1959. C redis and grants extended in the 12-month period ending 30 June 1960 acc)unt for more than 1+0 percent of the economic credits and grants provided since 1951. Only one military assistance agreement was concluded between the Bloc and underdeveloped, countries in the first half of 1960. This accord, reached by the USSR and the United Arab Republic (UAR) some time in the spring, probably provides a sizable line of credit. With the obligation of almost $900 million of outstanding creel-Its and grants in the first 6 months, approximately 80 percent of Bloc financial aid extended for all purposes had been obligated by midyear 1960. Of the funds obligated for economic assistance, one-half have been allocated to industrial projects; one-fifth to agriculture (in- cluding reclamation, irrigation, and hydroelectric power); and one- seventh to transportation and communications. * See the chart, Figure 3, following p. 6. Credit and grant ex- tensions refer to minimum amounts of economic assistance earmarked under bilateral general assistance or project agreements. Boo, cr dit and grant obligations refer to those portions of credits and grant,, extended which have been designated for specific uses or for which utilization has been arranged by firm construction or delivery con- tracts. Credit and grant drawings refer to those portions of credits and grants extended and obligate which have been used for Bloc egjdp- ment or for the services of Bloc personnel. ** Unless otherwise indicated, all dollar values in this report are in terms of US dollars. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Drawings on Bloc credits and grants during the first 6 months of 1960 amounted to $135 million, almost two-thirds of which went for economic development projects. By midyear, almost all of the $820 million provided under military aid agreements and one-fifth of the more than $3.2 billion extended for economic: assistance had been spent. `Technical Assistance* In the first 6 months of 1960, 6,900 Bloc technicians -- 5,700 economic and 1,200 military -- were present in underdeveloped coun- tries for periods of 1 month or longer. This figure may be compared with about 6,500 technicians -- 5,000 economic and 1,500 military -- present in the previous 6-month period. By midyear 1960, 9,400 nationals of underdeveloped countries were pursuing or had completed courses of instruction at various institu- tions in the Bloc. Of this number, 2,800 were academic students, 2,400 were technical students, and 4,200 were military trainees. Although Bloc imports increased 11 percent and Bloc exports de- clined 8 percent, the level of Bloc trade with underdeveloped coun- tries in 1959 remained the same as in 1958, in contrast to an average annual increase of 20 percent between 1956 and 1958. Although the European Satellites retained their preeminent position in Bloc trade with underdeveloped countries, the USSR increased its share to well over one-third of the total. Except for the Middle East, Bloc trade with all of the underde- veloped areas in 1959 showed an increase above 1958. A 13-percent decline in trade with the Middle East -- a region that accounted for about 40 percent of trade turnover in recent years -- was the main factor underlying the precipitous drop in the rate of growth of trade between 1958 and 1959. Industrial countries of the Free World experienced a leveling off in their trade with underdeveloped countries similar to that noted for the Bloc. As a result, the relative share in the trade of underde- veloped countries for the two major power groups in 1959 remained about the same as in 1958 -- 93 percent for the industrial countries of the Free World, 7 percent for the Bloc. The USSR made vigorous efforts in Afghanistan during the first half' of 1960 to expedite its extensive program of economic assistance * See the map, Figure 4, following p. 6. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO1090R000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 in that country. An outstanding achievement from an economic and a propagandistic point of view was the discovery in April of a najoar deposit of high-quality petroleum and gas. This discovery by Soviet and Rumanian experts was promptly followed by a Soviet offer to aesist Afghanistan in producing, refining, and marketing the newly discovered oil and gas. In addition, the USSR has offered to finance a substan- tial part of Afghanistan's Second Five Year Plan. Soviet performance in implementing projects in Afghanistan has been very good in spite of shortages of local currency and skilled manpower. There is every in- dication that this creditable record has made an increasingly favcrable impression on the Afghans and has led them to exercise less caution with respect to closer economic and military relations with the Bloc. During the first half of the year, the USSR and Afghanistan signed construction contracts for several major projects -- new roads, a dam and a hydroelectric powerplant, another airfield, and several cement plants. The number of Soviet technicians employed on various projects in Afghanistan had increased to more than 1,000 by midyear, and further increases are expected as new projects get underway. The position of the Bloc in the UAR improved perceptibly. The USSR achieved a considerable propaganda coup when in January, shortly after the inauguration of work on the Aswan High Dam, it extended a second long-term credit for completion of the project. As a result, the USSR is able to assure its presence in Egypt for some time to come and to exclude Western nations from participation in a project that has wide popular appeal. The UAR policies of neutralism abroad and anti-Communism at home have tended to offset Bloc gains. Progress on Bloc aid projects has been slow, and completion of the larger 11roj- ects for which contracts have been signed in years away. Delays in implementing projects have been caused primarily by the UAR desire to shop for better deals elsewhere. By the end of June, less than one- third of the 1958 Soviet industrialization credit to Egypt and less than one-fifth of the 1957 Soviet development credit to Syria had been spent. Iraqi relations with the West improved, whereas those with the Bloc showed some tendency to deteriorate. In part, this tendency reflected Iraqi disappointment with the rate of progress achieved under the 1959 Soviet economic aid agreement. An unofficial visit by Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan in April failed to dispel this Sisal.. pointment or to improve the climate of political relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Government in May accepted a new Soviet credit to be used for rehabilitation of the Basra-Baghdad railroad. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Elsewhere in the Middle East the prestige of the Bloc in Yemen was enhanced by the impressive progress made on Yemen's first modern port and road. Two of three Bloc aid projects in Iran were completed, and two additional Bloc credits for the purchase and installation of textile equipment were extended to private firms. The USSR attempted to exploit the political situation in Turkey following the military coup of 27 May by pressing the new government to improve relations be- tween the two countries. Part of the pressure campaign consisted of a general Soviet offer to provide large-scale aid for economic develop- ment. Pakistani officials displayed a willingness to consider Soviet economic assistance, and negotiations were begun in June for Bloc aid in exploring for petroleum and mineral deposits. Africa .Bloc diplomatic representations, trade overtures, and offers of aid increased dramatically in several key African states. There was a growing interest in Bloc offers of assistance, although only one Bloc credit offer was accepted. Ghana received its first Bloc aid, an industrial credit of $3.1 mil- lion from East Germany, and was considering an additional large-scale offer from the USSR. Surveys of industrial projects and the training of Ghanaians were carried out by East Germany during this period. Trade rose significantly as a result of energetic tactics pursued by the Bloc. Guinea received several gifts from the Bloc, including a substan- tial rice grant from Communist China. Implementation of the July 1959 Soviet credit was assured by the conclusion of a protocol under which Moscow will provide material and technical assistance for sev- eral key industrial projects. The number of Bloc technicians working on surveys, constructing industrial plants, and acting as advisers to key Guinean ministries rose sharply. A large number of Chinese Com- munists arrived to assist in rice-growing projects. Trade with the Bloc expanded significantly. Although the Bloc made important efforts to strengthen its initial foothold in Ethiopia, actual gains were somewhat circumscribed by growing Ethiopian wariness of Soviet subversion. Czechoslovakia and the USSR prodded Ethiopia to hasten utilization of credits that they ex- tended in July 1959. In March 1960 an agreement was signed with the USSR that mentioned an, oil refinery, a gold ore dressing plant, geo- logical and mineralogical surveys, and a feasibility study for a metal- lurgical plant, but actual implementation does not appear to be as- sured. The number of Bloc technicians in Ethiopia and the Bloc's share of Ethiopia's trade remained small. Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010-2 The Bloc vigorously pursued its economic offensive in India, Indonesia, and Nepal. India remained firmly committed to a policy of nonalignment and to a belief that even larger amounts of Bloc aid can be absorbed without creating a serious dependence on the Bloc. Obligation of Soviet credits for specific projects under the 't'hird Five Year Plan highlighted the Bloc aid program in India. Indian acceptance of a Soviet offer to aid in petroleum development as wall as to supply large quantities of petroleum products further increased the Bloc's role in India's petroleum industry. Poland for the first time extended credit for India's industrial development program. Although friction in Sino-Indonesian relations continued, eco- nomic ties with the USSR were strengthened. Indonesia accepted a $250 million Soviet credit for economic development. ImplementatJon of Bloc aid programs proceeded at a more active pace, and the number of Bloc technicians present increased. Trade with the Bloc rose in 1959, and for the first time the Bloc share of Indonesian exports ex- ceeded 10 percent of the total. The Bloc accelerated its efforts to insure Nepal's neutrality, to reduce Western influence, and to overcome suspicions aroused by Chines Communist border aggression. Nepal accepted an additional grant of $21 million from Peiping and agreed (1) to permit the establishment of a resident Communist Chinese Embassy, (2) to accept Chinese Communist technicians, and (3) to send Nepalese technicians to Communist Chia for training. The present Burmese Government, more favorably disposed than its predecessor to Bloc economic overtures, is considering credit offe-s by Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and East Germany. Two more contracts under the 1958 Soviet credit to Ceylon were concluded, but only one project is under construction. The reduced volume of rice and rub1090 R 000400010010-2 - Approved For Release 2006/09106 CIA-RDP92BO109OR000400010010=2 ;W.- O _: 1J.a Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92B01090R000400010010-2 SECRET FORIGN NATIONALS NOI RELEASABLE TO ,NOT RELEASABLE TO ~OREBGN NATIONALS 3ERET Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP92B01090R000400010010-2