SEA SURVEILLANCE BY EARTH SATELLITE VEHICLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002500050061-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: March 2, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/08: CIA-RDP92BO109OR002500050061-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/08: CIA-RDP92BO109OR002500050061-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/08 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR002500050061-9
Handle Via
BYEMAN-COMINT
Control Systems Only
From:
To:
Subject:
1 March 1965
BYE-26023/65(Navy)
Navy Member, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
Sea Surveillance by Earth Satellite Vehicles
1. Navy and Air Force personnel and the (S) NRO for some time
have been studying problems of world-wide sea surveillance. (S) NRO has
concluded that it is feasible to contribute to sea surveillance by earth
satellite vehicles, and that necessary capabilities should be incorporated
into the
under the jurisdiction of the (S) NRO. Before the (S) NRO expends (TS)
NRP funds for further development and adaptation of capability for sea
surveillance, the intelligence requirement for such a capability must receive
USIB approval.
2. While the general threat from missile launching submarines
and surface ships at sea is easy to recognize, there are also other national
intelligence requirements for current position and identification data on other
ships and craft engaged in military, intelligence collection, or clandestine
activities. Under conditions of cold war the movement of such less obviously
identifiable threats may be of particular national and military concern because
they may be indicators. The extensive operations to locate and identify Soviet
missile-transporting merchant ships enroute to Cuba in the summer of 1962,
and subsequent efforts to report on suspect arms carriers elsewhere in the
world illustrate national intelligence requirements for effective sea surveil-
lance. At present most intelligence on naval and maritime movements is
derived from port observers, accredited diplomatic personnel, and 25X1
air and surface surveillance of strategic water areas by naval forces. In
times of tension and most of these sources become less effective 25X1
or may be diverted to other tasks, while the needs for current national and
tactical intelligence become more critical.
3. The intelligence requirements for sea surveillance include
identification and tracking of those targets which can threaten U. S. forces
or our allies, or engage in operations affecting U. S. national interests.
They are:
a. Nuclear and conventional submarines.
b. Missile launching cruisers, destroyers, and
smaller craft such as OSA and KOMAR boats.
Handle Via
BYEMAN-COMINT
Control Systems Only
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/08: CIA-RDP92BO109OR002500050061-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/08 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR002500050061-9
Handle Via
BYEMAN-COMINT
Control Systems Only
c. Merchant ships over 1000 gross register tons..
d. Certain smaller craft down to 100 gross register
tons equivalent, such as signal intelligence collection trawlers,
high speed raiders, and clandestine agent transports.
Sea surveillance of such targets, once identified, should be able to provide
current data on position within 50 nautical miles, course within + 250,
speed + 5 knots, and be at least 90% effective in continuous reporting.
4. While this requirement is essentially national, it should
be noted that the position, movements, and identity of all ships and sub-
marines in a particular area also has major tactical significance. Expeditious
collection and dissemination of such tactical data do however determine the
effectiveness of forces in entire theaters of operations, and have major
strategic consequences. This x equirement should be regarded as both of
strategic and tactical importance.
5. For the information of COMOR, it is estimated that a satellite
surveillance system to contribute to satisfaction of these requirements calls
for extensive technical capabilities. Effective sea surveillance of maritime
targets which can be positioned over two thirds of the earth=s surface, and
move unpredictably within their speed capabilities, may require means for
rapid, repeated, all-weather,, night-or-day location and identification of
seaborne surface and subsurface targets, to distinguish specific targets
of interest from among the many ships and craft at sea. Without prejudging,
(S) NRO considers such a system might include:
a. Multiple sensors such as I I means to
command moored so4abubys.,. infra;red;and radar,_ optical obser-
vation equipment, and photo: sys_temsclof. adequate. re,solutior to
record observations;
and since (S) NRO can proceed with planned action as soon as the requirement
is approved, it is recommended COMOR submit this, requirement to TJSTB at
the earliest opportunity, and not attempt to present it with other long range
requirements.
combination of elements since so few persons have access t
b. Processing and command/ communications equipment;
c. Compatibility with data processing systems to
permit rapid analysis and transmission of intelligence to users.
6. Since a sea surveillance requirement involves such a specific
signed
B. L. Garbow
TOP SECRET
Handle Via
BYE -40550- 65BYEMAN-COMINT
Control Systems Only
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/08: CIA-RDP92BO109OR002500050061-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/08: CIA-RDP92BO109OR002500050061-9
I VI V L 4 IN L.I
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COMOR-D- 13/ 39
Copyr 1 DCI TCO for USIB/S
22 TSO cC A
23 TCO
24-33 Asst Ops/NPIC
34 Special Center TCO
35, 36 CGS
37, 38 CIA COMOR Member
39 CGS Reqr/ReconGrp
40 Ch/COMOR Wkg Grp
41 AD/SI
42 DDP TCO
43 DDS&T TCO
44 C /Action/ D
45 SAS/DDS&T
46 AD/EL
47 AD/SA
48 FA/OSA
49 ID / OSA
50 SS/OSA
51 SAL/OSA
52-55 SA(COMOR)/DDS&T
BYE-40550-65
Handle Via
BYEMAN-COMINT
Control Systems Only
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TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/08: CIA-RDP92BO109OR002500050061-9