SANITIZATION OF ODE PHOTOGRAPHY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002600020033-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: July 25, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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25 July 1958
SANITIZATION OF ODE PHOTOGRAPHY
1. Admiral Burke in his letter to the Director poses a critical
issue, namely, the release in some form of TALENT photography col-
lected over the USSR Bloc to meet Navy needs arising from its x c.
bility to prepare pilots to deliver weapons against asi-,igned targets' in the
event of war. While not stated officially in writing thus far, the same
need exists for the Air Force.
2. The TALENT Control System does not exist for itself.
Justification. for it arises only from the need to protect the fact of US
overflight of the Soviet Bloc (and. other areas as designated) and to
protect data bearing on the collection vehicle and the systems. Insofar
as any form of US control overflight is highly sensitive for political and
military reasons, any product which reveals that fact must be most
securely handled. Release of sanitized photography from highly secure
control systems can only be considered when attribution is possible which
will not adversely affect the US Government position internationally or
even domestically in the event of untoward exposure of material to un-
ut'x~.o izea: p:;.rson.s. Insofar as data can be derived from photography
which discloses the characteristics of the vehicle or systems, and inso-
far as such vehicles or systems represent unique R & D achievement,
the photographic product should be most securely handled.
3. The DCI, ran advice of the agencies participating in, the TALENT
Control System, has authorized the release of Middle East photography in
a classified SECRET NOFORN CONTINUOUS RECEIPT REQUIRED, pro-
vided certain technical steps are taken in the preparation of materials to
prevent exposure to non-TALENT cleared officials of data bearing upon al-
titude, scale, camera configuration characteristics and track. Whereas it
is presumed that the 9 x 9 format of the initial reproduction from TALENT
material will allow for the plausible excuse that such format is used by
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other countries and thus cannot be pinned for certain on the US, there is
room for speculation and accusations that the material resulted from US
overflight of the Middle East,
4, Justification for the decision to release sanitized Middle East
material from the TALENT system rests on the following reasoning: .
The area overflown while not in all regards friendly at least
is not considered as hostile as that of the Soviet Bloc. At any
rate, no portion of the area possesses the military or the political
power comparable to that of the Bloc. Furthermore, plausibility
that other nations have overflown the Middle 25X1 D
East areas is much higher than in the case of the USSR Bloc, Both
the Suez crisis and turbulent conditions in the Middle East since
then have created pressures initially (felt by the Army and subse-
quently by the Navy) to engage in such planning activities as would
place them in a state of adequate readiness for emergency. Such
25X1 C emergency has recently developed. Thus, it is judged that the
circumstances outweigh the possible political and military hazard
which might develop from, say, an accusation in the UN that the
25X1 C US had overflown the Middle East,
5, In the case of ODE photography, i, a., TALENT photography
over the USSR and its satellites, there are no inhibitions to applying the
same technical alterations to the photography for the purpose of aaniti-
zation different from the problems faced in the Middle East material,
It is recognized that the highest quality of photographic material is
required in nice photogrammetric interpretation and thus no degradation
of the quality of the material may be tolerated. Such quality would not
appear to be necessary to meet the Navy (and possible Air Force) pilot
briefing requirements where landmark recognition rather than interpretation
is called for. It would be feasible to make ODE material conform to all
appearances to GENETRIX, to other balloon photography if available, or
World War. II German photography, Gross natural andcultural features
of the landscape could be preserved and identified. Both GENETRIX and
German photography over the- Soviet Bloc are known by the Russians to
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have been accomplished although not to what extent. Furthermore, both
types of photography are generally known among intelligence and operational
personnel of the US Government even though they may never have seen the
photography. Where isolated frames in limited numbers were made available
to pilots being briefed on strike, targets, there would be no exposure to track.
Attribution to either GENETRIX or German photography could be plausible.
The Navy request included stretches of photography of perhaps 60 to 100
miles leading to the strike targets. This need could not be safely met if
track is to be protected.
6. Whereas GENETRIX photography is normally at 350 oblique,
some pictures, due to the swaying of the balloon, were taken on the vertical.
The coincidence of a number of prints available on the vertical need not be
generally known since each pilot deals only with his specific targets.
7. If the TALENT photography were degraded to permit plausible
attribution to GENETRIX (possibly other balloon) or German photography
and classified accordingly (probably SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL), could
the material be restricted from wide-spread. circulation normally expected
of materials so classified? The answer is in the negative unless the
military service involved were to provide controls to ensure that the
materials are retained and used only in the war planning facilities.
8. In the event that in the near future balloon photography were
to become available possessing a quality as high or higher than that
achieved by TALENT, it would appear that:
a. Such material must be placed in a control system with
limitations comparable to TALENT (else the key and sensitive
fact of overflight cannot be protected), or if no such control
system is established
b. TALENT materials sanitized and in single and unrelated
frames should be released in the same lower classification as the
new balloon photography holds (single frame is mentioned because
otherwise track could be established).
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a. That Admiral Burke's request be approved provided all
prints conform to and are labeled GENETRIX and controlled as
the Admiral indicates, date being indicated as since 1953.
(Note: Comparative examples of GENETRIX and TALENT sanitized
photography (to conform to GENETRIX) are shown at Tab A.)
b. That if the foregoing is not acceptable, TALENT photography
as required should be made to conform to newly acquired balloon
photography if such photography is released under only a TOP SECRET
or SECRET NOFORN classification.
C. That if neither recommendation a nor b above are acceptable,
the Navy be requested to clear into the TALENT system such pilots
as are required to meet their needs using unsanitized TALENT
photography.
25X1A
Chairman
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee
Attachment
Tab A a/s para 9 a (NOT on draft)
1-SA/PD/DCI
2-OACSI
3 - ONI
4-AFCIN
5-AFCIN-Z
6-NSA
7-State Dept
8-Exec Secy UAB
9-OCI
10-OSI
11-ESO
12-ORR
13-10
14-Ch HTA
15- TS-0-
16-SO DPS/DCI
17-DD/P
18-HTA/OCR
19T Chmn ARC
20-PS/DCI chrono
21-SO
25X1A
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