NEED FOR LOW-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE OF CUBA IN CONNECTION WITH SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002600090021-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 19, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR002266_00090021-8
19 March 1963
SU$J.ECTtl Need for Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba
in Connection with Soviet Troop Withdrawals
REFERENCE. USIB-D-41,14/13 (COMOR-D-24/48), 21 Feb 63.
1..; The United States Intelligence Board on 21 February
approved the requirements for low-level reconnaissance of both
Soviet military camps and unidentified installations in Cuba ,see
reference). That document dates,
Order of battle for ground forces , n 4 cannot be fully
Nstablished from high-level photography or apparently
from collateral sources, Low-level photography, if
carried gut comprehensively and simultaneously, might
enable us to make a more valid appraisal of the extent
of Soviet deployment, including indications of the intro-
duction or pullout of personnel and equipment or turnover
of equipment to the Cubans.
It also recommended that high-level photography be suppimented by
low-level photography of certain unidentified installations.
Z. Since 21 February and especially since 6 March which
was the last time that the Board considered the need for low-level
reconnaissance of Cuba, high-altitude coverage almost daily over
the four largest Soviet military camps, A.rtemisa, Remedica, Holguin,
and Santiago de las Vegas and the headquarters at Torrens has failed
to reveal signs of withdrawal which would equate to the numbers of
Soviet military personnel known to have sailed from Havana. Indeed,
with the exception of the removal of a few tents and a radar or connmu-
racation,s site at Holguin and the observation on two occasions of some
unidentified gear between. barracks wings at Rem e dos, the appearance
of the camps, as interpreted from high=-level photography, has been
remarkably static, with little- evidence of the sort of activity which
might be expected if the camps were as occupied as they have been
estimated to be. It is impossible on the basis of high altitude coverage
and limited ground htings by Western observers to identify the units
locations, or arras of service,! from which the departing personnel have
been withdrawn.
Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : C14PVB01090R002600090021-8
 Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR002600090021-8
SECRET
3. The estimate of 17, 500 Soviet military personnel in Cuba
is based on a manning factor for the military equipment and Soviet in-
stallations known to be present in Cuba. The actual number of Soviet
military personnel in Cuba could have been less, even prior to the
recent departures. It is essential, therefore, to attempt to determine
whethe r the major Soviet camps are manned on a more than caretaker
basis. Low-level coverage offers a greater possibility of making this
determination and of discovering signs of impending or accomplished
troop withdrawals.
4. At the same time, the suspicions held concerning cer-
tain of the 18 unidentified installations in Cuba listed in Tab A of the
referenced report continue in force, and the prospects for clarifica-
tion from other than low-level coverage continue to be,, small.
II The community is Irr, igrazement with regard t'ru. the, need
for low-level reconnaissance of the 5 military camps. Whereas on a
long-term basis the unidentified installations are of prime importance
for coverage, the coverage of the 5 military camps is critical at the
moment in connection with reported troop withdrawal
6. Recommendation, It is recommended that low-level
photographic missions be initiated over the Soviet camps at Arternisa,
Remedios, Holguin, Santiago de las Vegas, and Torrens and the un-
identified installations at El Horno, Mayari Arriba, Santiago de Cuba,
and the underground installations at Holguin (No.. 13 at Tab A of Ref..
Chairman
Corozriitte , on Overhead Reconnaissance
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP92BO109OR002600090021-8