REQUIREMENTS FOR LOW-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE OF CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002600090029-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: February 21, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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S E C R E T USIB-D-41.14/13
(COMOR-D-24/48)
21 February 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Requirements for Low-level Reconnaissance of Cuba
1. The minute of the meeting of the Special Group on 15 February
1963 requested a comprehensive study of low-level reconnaissance of
Cuba. The minute stated that "such a study would include consideration
of the strategic significance of proposed targets. " COMOR has reviewed
its previous recommendations for low-level photography and sets forth
below its present thinking pursuant to the above injunction.
2. Of major concern to the United States Government is the
introduction into Cuba of offensive weapons (MRBMs or IRBMs and
bombers) or the release from concealment of any such equipment which
may not have been removed from Cuba and which might be deployed to
already prepared basic installations. There is therefore a continuing
requirement to investigate suspect and unexplained military activities
which might be associated with offensive weapons systems and nuclear
energy activities.
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USIB -.D-41 14/13
(COMOR-D-24/48)
21 February 1963
3. Two categories of targets which might give us information
concerning the presence or introduction of offensive weapons in Cuba
are ships suspect of carrying military equipment and personnel, and
a number of unidentified installations, which include underground or
unusual facilities.
a. Ships: We consider the monitoring of large-hatch ships
(suspect of carrying offensive weapons) and other ships designated
of "special interest" (e. g. , troop carriers) entering Cuba to be
2d5 hYajor importance.
these ships are in port they should be covered during the day-
time by low-level photography to supplement high-level coverage.
In addition and based on recent experience, COMOR is convinced
that suspicious military equipment will be unloaded at night and,
therefore, believes that nighttime photography will likewise be
required.
b. Unidentified Installations: A number of unidentified
installations, the majority of which include underground facilities,
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S E C R E T
USIB -D-41.14/13
(COMOR-D-24/48)
21 February 1963
have been isolated by high-level coverage. These installations
(listed at Tab A) are strongly suspect: as being established for
weapons storage of some sort. With high-level coverage and
with some low-level coverage in the past we have not been able
to explain the enigma which these facilities present However,
we do know that in many cases an appraisal of the photography
over a period of time shows the growth and expansion of such
facilities. We consider their existence and continued develop-
ment as sinister. We also believe that low-level photography
can contribute to explaining the uses for which these facilities
are intended. We again recognize that in due course, depending
upon the nature of our findings, nighttime or other types of
photography (such as camouflage detection) may be required
and justifiable.
4. In addition to surveillance of any offensive threat, the number
of Soviet personnel and the amount of ground forces equipment presently
located in Cuba is a cause of major concern. Order of battle for
ground forces, including the presence of such modern weapons as the
FROG, cannot be fully established from high-level photography or
apparently from collateral sources. Low-level photography if carried
out comprehensively and simultaneously might enable us to make a more
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S E C R E T USIB -D-41,14/13
(COMOR-D-24/48)
21 February 1963
valid appraisal of the extent of Soviet deployment including indications
of the introduction or pullout of personnel and,equipn nt ,Q".~.rJU,r 'pve of
equipment to the Cubans.
5. Surface-to-air missiles are not an offensive threat although
the nature of their deployment may indicate they are intended for the
protection of offensive installations. Originally this was the case for
some of the SAMs in Cuba but such redeployment as has been accomplished
since the departure of the IRBM-MRBMs for the most part suggests
strategic defense of the territory of Cuba. At the moment we do not
nominate SAMs as low-level targets although this may change.
6. Cruise-missile sites have been covered regularly through
high-level reconnaissance and no ominous force level changes have been
revealed. As for the crates which have been associated with cruise
missiles, a comprehensive and simultaneous low-level coverage of all
crate sites, periodically repeated, would be needed to be more con-
clusive on this question. It is our opinion that, at this time, the cruise-
missile activity is only a defense against invasion and is not significant
in terms of an offensive threat against the continental United States.
This may change in which case targets in this category may be recom-
mended.
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S E C R E T
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(COMOR-D-24/48)
21 February 1963
7. If cruise-missile sites are deployed so as to pose a threat
to Guantanamo, the Board may wish to include this within the concept
of an offensive threat against the United States. In that case cruise-
missile sites in the vicinity of Guantanamo might be justified for low-
level reconnaissance.
8. Recommendations
a. That high-level photography of activities related to
impending movement of Soviet personnel and equipment be
supplemented by low-level photography and, where particularly
required, photography at night. This coverage should include
the ships in port identified as suspect and the associated encamp-
ments listed in Tab B. There is an immediate need to cover
4 passenger and 4 cargo ships.
b. That high-level photography be supplemented by low--
level photography of the unidentified installations listed in Tab A
in the order of priority indicated as soon as practicable.
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S E C R E T
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