RECOMMENDATIONS OF AD HOC REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE FOR USE OF TALENT TO DETERMINE THE STATUS OF THE SOVIET ICBM THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002600270001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 8, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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8 September 1959
SUBJECT: Recommendations of Ad Hoc Requirements Committee for Use of
TALENT to Determine the Status of the Soviet ICBM Threat
1. The concern of the US Goyernment regarding the threat posed
bb the Soviet ICBM was the prime motive which culminated in Mission
I. The three hypotheses which were tested, together with the
results of exploitation to date, are as follows:
a. That the USSR is currently deploying ICBMs and that the
Ural rail network constitutes one of the most likely areas for
such deployment.
Comment: We have concluded that ICBM sites probably
are not located on the one-fourth portion of the rail
network covered by usable photography. However, inasmuch
as the major part of the network was not covered, we
continue to regard the Urals area as likely for ICBM
deployment.
b. That plans for deployment would be revealed by new in-
stallations, training areas, or other activity developed at Tyura
Tam since the 1957 TALENT coverage.
Comment: While photography of the area discloses a
great deal of information pertinent to the Soviet missile
research and development program, it has not provided any
evidence of the mode, location or extent of ICBM deploy-
ment.
c. That evidence concerning the suspected ICBM aerial
production facility at Sverdlovsk would provide some indication
of the size and pace of the ICBM program.
Comment: Such a facility has not yet been identified
in photography.
2. With the above considerations in mind, the ARC, in pursuance of
the USIB conclusion that the nature and extent of Soviet ICBM deployment
is the most critical intelligence objective, has carefully re-examined
this problem in terms of both TALENT capabilities and those of all other
sources as well. It has concluded that TALENT photography continues to
offer the only possibility at this time and within an adequate time.
period for resolving this problem and that other sources offer little,
if any, prospect.
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3. Consequently, the ARC recommends (the Navy dissent is set. forth
separately as Tab B) that a systematic aerial reconnaissance search of
selected areas of'the USSR be initiated to determine whether there now
exists or will soon exist a Soviet operational ICBM capability of major
strategic significance. We believe that this judgment can be made only
by obtaining reliable evidence on the magnitude and pace of the Soviet
ICBM deployment program as reflected by the number and type of launching
sites already completed or in preparation. Inasmuch as ',the number and
type of sites are of utmost importance in making this judgment, we
believe that the most effective use of the TALENT asset requires an
extension of the search concept recently employed in the Ural mission.
Accordingly, it is proposed that the several most likely deployment
areas in the USSR be systematically covered, in order of their probability
by TALENT missions which are recognized as search missions and that the
search be continued until positive results are achieved or sufficient
coverage is obtained to establish that no major ICBM deployment program
exists. Provided the search program is carried out within a relatively
short period of time (preferably not more than one year), we believe
that it may enable US intelligence to ascertain with a high degree of
assurance the status of Soviet operational ICBM capabilities. Tab A
with an Annex and an illustrative map sets forth in detail the rationale
for our recommended search program. It is important to note that a
significant number of the highest priority targets would be covered by
the foregoing.
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4. Admittedly, a high confidence answer to the nature and extent
of the threat from ICBM deployment could not be achieved by only partial
coverage of the regions proposed. However, coverage of certain key areas
may disclose one or more ICBM sites, thus achieving a partial answer on
the operational status of the Soviet missile system and may well provide
positive evidence of the mode of deployment as well as valuable information
on their missile capabilities. This information would directly affect
our national estimates and might also affect our further planning for the
use of TALENT, as well as other sources. On the other hand, faced with
repeated negative findings, we might begin to suspect that no large scale
ICBM deployment program is in being. We might, therefore, wish to propose
further search in order to establish this suspicion with greater confidence.
The most important areas which may contribute to a partial answer on the
threat from ICBM deployment are set forth below.
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6. For information there is attached as the TALENT list of USSR
Targets for Highest Priority coverage as agreed by the ARC 25X1
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