STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92R01136R000100140005-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2014
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 27, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

, Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/08: CIA-RDP92R01136R000100140005-3
A 15190 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
By Mr. BIDEN ([or hintielf. Mr. Tii
MOND. Mr. KENNEDY And Mr. BATGII):
S. 1822. A bill to make certain amend-
ments to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
and to improve certain provLsions relating to
Imposition and collection of criminal fines,
and fnr other purposes: placed on the calen-
dar.
By Mr. STAFFORD (by request):
S. 1823. A bill to amend title 23, United
States Code, to provide for the construction
of new Loll highways and for other pur-
poses; to the Committee on Environment
and Public Works.
By Mr. CRANSTON:
S. 1824. A bill to amend the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958 to require that capacity
levels be established at certain airport.s: to
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.
By Mr..BYP.D (for Mr. CRANSTON (for
himself and Mr. D'Axuvro)):
S.J. Res. 209. Joint resolution to provide
for the extension of certain programs relat-
ing to housing and community development,
and for other purposes; placed on the calen-
dar.
SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT
AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS
The following concurrent resolutions
and Senate resolutions were read, and
referred (or acted upon), as indicated:
By Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr.
Mr:rwatkum. Mr. HA-reft. Ms. MTKUL-
SKI. Mr. Pau, Mr. DOLE. Mr. Doan,
Mr. GLENN, Mr. CRANSTON. Mr.
DUREN/WAGER, Mr. LAUTENDEPG, Mr.
SIMON. Mr. Mtn-MIRAN. Mr. CONRAD.
Mr. MA1SUNAGA. Mr. CHAFEE. Mr.
KERRY. Mr. WEIGHER. Mr. THUR?
MOND, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. DECONCINI,
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. ADAMS. Mr. WARNER,
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. BRAD-
LEY. Mr. BOND. Mr. MITCHELL. Mr.
PRCKAIIRE. Mr. DIXON. Mr. STAFFORD,
Mr. NUNN, Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. GARN.
Mr. SHELBY, Mr. PRYOR. Mr.
D'AMATO. Mr. BENTSEN. and Mr. SAN-
FORD):
S. Res. 303. A resolution to commend the
efforts and commitment of the organizers
and participants of "Justice For All Day,'
November 17. 1987: to the Committee on the
Judiciary.
By Mr. LEAHY; from the Committee
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and For-
est ry:
S. Res. 304. An original resolution to In-
crease the amount allocated to the Commit-
tee on Agriculture. Nutrition. and Forestry
by S. Res. 80 relating to committee funding
for fiscal year 1938: to the Committee on
Rules and Administration.
By Mr. BYRD (for himself and Mr.
DOLE):
S. Res. 305. A resolution to direct the
Senate legal counsel to represent arid to Au-
thorize the production of documents by
Philip Q. Cohen In the case of Moreno
versus Small Business Administration. et al.;
considered and agreed to.
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED
BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By VI- MICTER:
A bilno make requirements
fAtiRreparation, and transmittal to
the Congress. of Presidential findings
for certain intelligence operations: to
provide mandatory penalties for de-
ceiving Congress; ?nri In act:much pn
lipdtlyendClit Insciector General for
: to the Select Committee on
In lelh,encc.
NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM AcT
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, hear-
ings before the Senate Intelligence
Committee and joint hearings before
the Select Senate and House Commit-
tees on the Iran/Contra matter have
demonstrated the need for significant
action in order to establish the appro-
priate role for congressional oversight
pursuant to the checks and balances
contemplated by the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Notwithstanding any action
which may be taken by the President
by way of Executive order on this
issue, legislative change is necessary to
impose statutory requirements govern-
ing this or future administrations
w here any such Executive orders
might be countermanded.
This bill has four goals:
First, to encourage timely consulta-
tion with key Members of Congress to
obtain the benefit of their insights to
avoid future blunders like the transac-
tion with Iran on arms for hostages;
Second. to provide for effective con-
gressional oversight by specific statu-
tory requirements establishing precise
time limits for notice where the Presi-
dent decides not to consult in advance;
Third, to establish mandatory penal-
ties where executive branch officials
make false statements to congressional
committees: and
Fourth, to add an Inspector General
for the Central Intelligence Agency to
help assure lawful internal compliance
on matters which do not come within
the purview of congressional over-
sight.
SECTION 2
Notwithstanding the obvious failure
of the executive branch to provide req-
uisite information to Congress under
the provisions of existing statutes,
some have argued that there was com-
pliance because of the vagaries of cur-
r( nt law. In order to prevent, a repeti-
tiln of such conduct, the National Se-
curity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413) and
section 662 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2422). known as
the Hughes-Ryan amendment, are
made more specific by this bill. Exist-
ing law prohibits the expenditure of
funds by the Central Intelligence
Agency for covert activities "unless
and until the President finds that
each such operation Ls important to
the national security of the United
States." Efforts have been made to
justify the CIA's action in the Iran/
Contra matter by contentions that an
oral finding was sufficient and that a
later written finding could retroactive-
ly justify earlier covert action.
This bill unequivocally requires that
the finding be in writing and that the
President shall give notice and a copy
of any finding to the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees con-
temporaneously with the finding, but
irs. no event later than 24 hours after it,
is made. A limited exception is provid-
ed for an oral finding in situations
where the President deems that imme-
? October 27, 1987
diate action by the United States is re-
quired to deal with the emergency sit-
uation affecting vital national inter-
ests and time does not permit the
preparation of a written finding. In
that event, the finding must be imme-
diately reduced to writing after the
action is orally approved, with the
written finding to be completed no
Inter than 24 hours after the making
of the oral finding.
Where an oral finding is used, there
is the additional requirement that the
written finding shall include a state-
ment of the reasons of the President
for having first proceeded with an oral
finding. This bill further provides that
a finding shall be effective only with
respect to operations beginning after
the finding was made by the President
In order to preclude any contention
that the finding may retroactively
cover prior CIA operations.
These statutory requirements leave
no room for doubt that no covert
action may be undertaken without
complying with the requirements of a
written finding and the requisite
notice, by any personnel of the execu-
tive branch or anyone acting on les
behalf including foreign governments
or any individual. This specific provi-
sion would preclude any future argu-
ment that the delivery of arms to Iran
was legally justified, after the fact, by
a retroactive finding or that other en-
tities or actors were not bound by the
same limitations affecting the CIA.
This bill further removes any possi-
ble ambiguity in section 501(b) of the
President's obligation to notify the
House and Senate Intelligence Com-
mittees of covert action. Section 501(b)
now provides:
(b) The President shall fully inform the
Intelligence committees in a timely fashion
of intelligence operations in foreign coun-
tries, other than activities intended solely
for obtaining necessary intelligence, for
which prior notice was not given under sub-
section (a) and shall provide a statement of
the reasons for not giving prior notice.
The phrase "for which prior notice
was not given under subsection (a)"
carries the direct implication that the
House and Senate Intelligence Com-
mittees should have been "fully and
currently informed- of covert activi-
ties which are covered by section
501(b). It is obvious that the President
did not comply with section 501(b) to
inform the Intelligence Committees in
a "timely fashion" where some 14
months elapsed from the time of the
first covert action on the Iranian arms
sales to the time that information
reached the Intelligence Committees.
Yet, some have contended that the ex-
igencies of the situation excused the
President from giving earlier notice so
that requirements of a "timely fash-
ion" were observed.
'This bill removes any room for such
future arguments by requiring tw
President to give notice to the Intelli-
gence Committees contemporaneousiy
with any written or oral finding. in
order to remove any conceivable ambi-
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October 27, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
guity as to the meaning of "contempo-
raneously." a time certain is added re-
quiring the information to be trans-
mitted no later than 24 hours after
the making of an oral or written find-
ing. Absent the experience of the
Iran/Contra matter, it. would seem un-
necessary to put a 24-hour limitation
after the requirement of "contempora-
neously," but the recent experience
that a time certain be affixed so that
no one can later claim that "contem-
poraneously" means days, weeks,
months, or even years later.
The requirement that the President
shall contemporaneously inform the
Intelligence Committees is intended to
provide a procedure where the Intelli-
gence Comniittees might be consulted
in advance so that the President would
have the benefit of their thinking If
he so chose. The language of section
501(a)(1) to keep the Intelligence
Committees "fully and currently in-
formed of all intelligence activities"
suggests a design for congressional
input. Even with such contemporane-
ous information and the possibility of
congressional input, it would remain
within the President's power to pro-
ceed or not as he chooses.
There is much to recommend the
availability of the institutional experi-
ence of the Senate and House Intelli-
gence Committees. Had there been a
review by the Intelligence Committees
of the sale of arms to Iran, it is likely
that the policy would never have been
implemented. Had members of the
Senate and House Intelligence Com-
mittees joined the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense and
ethers in discouraging Presidential
action in selling arms to Iran, the
President might well have ceased and
desisted on his own. Had the President
declined to terminate that disastrous
policy, then the Congress might have
utilized its power to terminate funding
through its appropriations powers,
thereby ending the sale of arms to
Iran.
The President's obligations on con-
gressional oversight are further limit-
ed by excluding notice to the Intelli-
gence Committees where the Presi-
dent determines that it is essential to
limit such disclosure to meet extraor-
dinary circumstances affecting the
vital interests of the United States. In
that event, such notice is to be given
only to the chairman and ranking mi-
nority members of the Intelligence
Committees, the Speaker and minority
leader of the House of Representatives
and the majority and minority leaders
of the Senate. That more limited dis-
closure gives sufficient assurances of
preservation of secrecy. A valid argu-
ment could be made that notice should
go only to the leadership of both
Houses in the interests of secrecy, but
the greater familiarity of the chair-
man and vice-chairman of the Intelli-
gence Committees warrants their
being included.
SECTION 3
This bill further provides for a man-
datory sentence of imprisonment for
any officer or employee of the United
States who provides false information
to any committee or subcommittee of
the Senate or House of Representa-
tives. No matter how rigorous or ex-
acting statutory requirements may be,
the oversight function of Congress
cannot be accomplished if executive
branch officials present false or mis-
leading testimony to the Congress.
This is especially problemsome
where witnesses appear before the In-
telligence Committees in a secret ses-
sion. Where evidence is provided in a
public session, there is an opportunity
for others to learn of the false infor-
mation and to come forward with the
truth so that the congressional over-
sight committees can perform their
functions. That is not possible where
key executive officials appear in secret
and provide false information to the
Oversight Committees. Under those
circumstances, the committees realisti-
cally have little or no opportunity to
determine the truth.
While false official statements to
such congressional committees are
covered by section 1001 of the Crimi-
nal Code, (18 U.S.C. 1001). this kind of
misconduct, either in secret or public
session. Is so serious that it warrants a
mandatory jail sentence.
While there has been experience
with witnesses who return to the com-
mittee to apologize for prior testimo-
ny, such apologies fall far short of cor-
recting the enormous damage which
has been done. Obviously, there is no
way to know how much false, decep-
tive, or misleading evidence has been
presented in secret where the truthful
information has never come to the at-
tention of the committees. This man-
datory jail sentence is intended to put
members of the executive branch on
notice that the matter is extremely se-
rious as reflected by the heavy penal-
ty.
It is obviously well within the ambit
for any witness who appears before a
congressional committee to decline to
answer any question until that witness
has had an opportunity to reflect on
the question or to consult with his or
her superior. Simply stated, it is un-
derstandable if a witness declines to
answer or asks for a delay, but it is in-
tolerable for false or deceptive answers
to be made. The committee would
doubtless consider not insisting on an
answer where some reason was ad-
vanced for nondisclosure. Where any
witness chooses to decline to answer a
question, there is always an opportuni-
ty for further consideration by both
the witness and the committee.
In any event, an enforceable legal
obligation to answer does not arise as
a practical matter until citation for
contempt of Ccngress is obtained and
the court orders an answer. It is only
at this point that a witness Is subject
to a sanction for contempt for failing
to answer.
S 15191
This bill further provides that
anyone who gives such false or decep-
tive information may recant and avoid
possible criminal liability by correcting
the record within 5 days. This 5-day
period should be ample time for re-
thinking the issue and time to make
the appropriate correction.
SECTION 4
The Inspector 'MIMI al Act of 1978,
Public Law 95-452, established inde-
pendent Presidentially-appointed and
Senate confirmed IG's in 19 Federal
departments and agencies. The cre-
ation of these statutory IG's has im-
proved the effectiveness of the Feder-
al Government. The act also ensures
that both the Congress and agency
heads are receiving independent as-
sessments of programs and operations
for which they are accountable or
have oversight responsibility. Howev-
er. the CIA was not included.
Currently, the Inspector General for
CIA is usually appointed internally.
That process is not conductive to ob-
jectivity.
A prime example was the CIA's
mining of the harbors of Nicaragua.
The CIA official with operational re-
sponsibility for that action was next
appointed to the position of Inspector
General. While he disqualified himself
from the ensuring 1G investigation of
that activity, it is difficult to calculate
the objectivity of that investigation by
virtue of his presence.
The Intelligence Committee has had
access to some IG reports in past
years, but for the most part, it has not
exercised oversight over the intelli-
gence community's IG's. That has
been a responsibility of the Intelli-
gence Oversight Board. The Iran-
Contra investigations have raised seri-
ous questions about the effectiveness
of that body. The Tower Commission
found that (I11-22): "Lieutenant Colo-
nel North and Vice Admiral Poin-
dexter received legal advice from the
President's Intelligence Oversight
Board that the restriction on lethal as-
sistance to the Contras did not cover
the NSC staff." In addition, review of
Executive Order 12334, which estab-
lishes the Intelligence Oversight
Board, and the operations of the
Board itself reveal that the Board is
not adequately staffed, that the qual-
ity of its legal counsel has been dem-
onstrated to be less than thorough
and experienced, and, finally, that its
effectiveness is not held in high regard
by the Intelligence Committees.
This bill would greatly increase the
independence and credibility of the
CIA's Inspector General by making
the IG a permanent, statutory official
subject to appointment by the Presi-
dent and confirmation by the Senate
with limitations on grounds for dismis-
sal. To increase accountability to Con-
gress. semiannual and special reports
by the Inspector General must be
promptly submitted to the Intelli-
gence Committees, as well as to the
Director of the CIA.
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S 15192 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE October 27, 1987
Secrecy is provided for, as is subpoe-
na power. While the Director may halt
an audit, or investigation, he may do so
only if:
First. it concerns an ongoing oper-
ation:
Second, he finds it vital to national
security; and
Third, he reports to the Intelligence
Committees within 7 days on the rea-
sons.
The combined effect of an independ-
ent IG, mandatory penalties for de-
ceiving Congress, and statutory re-
ouirements on notice to Congress on
covert action along with written find-
ings are therapeutic steps which
should be taken in light of our expert-
enCe from the Iran/Contra matter.
After the eiroblem.s were publicly dis-
closed on the failure of the executive
branch to notify the Intelligence Com-
mittees on the sale of arms to Iran,
there was an exchange of correspond-
ence between the President and the
Senate Intelligence Committee. The
President wrote to Chairman BOREN
by 1?1.1er dated August 7, 1987. ex-
pressing his support for certain key
concepts recommended by the Senate
Intelligence Committee. Paragraph 6
of the President's letter stated:
In all but the most exceptional circum-
ane-s. timely notification to Congress
litid-r Section 5011b) of the National S:tcuri-
ly Act of 1947. as amended. v:ill not be de-
1:,yerl beyond two working days of the initi-
al ion of a spe.cial actIN ity.
In my judgment. where notice may
not be given even in the most excep-
t3ital circumstances" the fundamen-
1.11 requirement of notice is defeated
because it remains with the purview of
the President to determine what con-
'totes the "exceptional circum-
s? ances." Precise requirements are nee-
( ?;.,,ary as set forth in this proposed
ion.
_ ?
el/1"11.)-iy-Mr. LAUTENBERG:
S. 1819. A bid to amend the National
Drier Registration Act of 1982 to
a:Isist in the identification of operators
of aircraft who have driving problems
by permitting access to the National
Driver Register: to the Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion.
IDENTIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT OPERATORS WHO
HAVE DRIVING PROBLEMS
? Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President,
I rise today to introduce a bill aimed
at closing a serious loophole in our
aviation safety network.
This bill would authorize individuals
to provide the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration with access to the Nation-
al Driver Register ENDIll in reviewing
pilot applications for medical certifica-
tion. It would allow the FAA to use
this information to verify information
provided by pilots, and to help evalu-
ate whether the airman meets mini-
mum medical standards prescribed by
the FAA.
The FAA would not. be provided
access to Information more than 3
years old. unless that. information per-
tain.s to a revocation or suspension of a
drivers license that is still in effect.
The FAA would not be permitted to
use the information for purposes not
set out in statute.
In addition, the airman would be
provided the opportunity to review the
NDR information and comment on it
in writing. This would protect against
false identification of an applicant,
and give the applicant the opportunity
to provide any explanation for infor-
mation in the NDR.
With enactment of this provision, It
is intended that the FAA will promul-
gate regulations to require authoriza-
tion of access to the NDR as a condi-
tion of the medical certification proc-
In order to legally fly, any pilot
must receive regular medical certifica-
tion. The majority of the exams are
performed by private physicians ace
proved by the FAA.
There are several classes of certifica-
tion. First-class certification is for air-
line pilots, and must be renewed every
6 months. Second-class certification is
for commercial pilots, flight engineers,
and flight navigators. It is renewed an-
nually. Private pilots receive third-
class certification, which must be re-
newed every 24 months.
Currently, the FAA requires pilots
seeking certification to report drug or
alcohol problems, including drunk
driving convictions. This is a require-
ment too many do not comply with.
And the FAA does not know who those
people are. Therein lies the problem.
Although the majority of pilots take
the re!iponsibility that comes with
their license seriously, there are those
that don't. There are these who might
drink and fly. There are those who
would not comply with FAA's report-
ing requirements.
A report by DOT's inspector general
in February of this year rev,!aied that
this reporting system is faulty. There
are 711.648 active airmen rice.4. certified
by the FAA. The inspector general
found that about 10.300 of these pilots
had their driving license suspended or
revoked for DWI convictions in the
last 7 years.
However, 7,850 of the 10.300?of 76
percent?did not repert this informa-
tion to the FAA.
These are the people?those who in-
tentionally do not comply with,Feder-
al requirements?whom this bill would
specifically address.
Mr. President, let me cite a few ex-
amples of where the voluntary report-
ing system proved lacking.
In February 1986. a commercial
cargo pilot wa-s killed when his plane
crashed in Tennessee, 3 hours after
leaving Milwaukee. His blood alcohol
content. (BAC) was found to be 0.158,
four times higher than the level FAA
considers the threshold of impair-
ment..
A review of his driving record indi-
cated a history of drunk driving: 18
months earlier, he demolished his van
while driving 100 miles per hour. AL
that time, his BAC was 0.26. From
1981 to 1984, he had seven DWI con-
victions. and had his drivers license re-
voked.
Yet, he could still fly. And the FAA
had no way of knowing about his
record.
The inspector general's Investigation
turned up 262 first-class pilots with at
least 1 drunk driving conviction. They
Included a pilot who had two separate
DWI convictions, resulting in a 5-year
revocation of his drivers license., The
IG also found 29 second- and third-
class pilots who had 3 or more DWI
convictions since 1983. Combined, the
29 pilots had 94 DWI convictions in
that time. This included 1 third-class
pilot who had 3 convictions and had
his license suspended for 10 years.
Yet, they all could fly, and the FAA
had no way of checking into their
records.
Mr. President, this is a gap we need
to close. A driving record can indicate
a pattern of behavior. If someone has
a history of drunk driving convictions.
we have a right to think about wheth-
er we want to allow that person in the
cockpit of a plane.
The FAA already has the interest in
knowing. Its medical certification ap-
plication form asks for a great deal of
information about a pilot's back-
ground. Included on that form is an
Inquiry about whether the applicant
ever had, or now has traffic or other
convictions.
But, under current law, the FAA
cannot verify the information the ap-
plicant provides. The FAA should not
fly blind while some pilots fly drunk.
This bill would remove the obstacle
that prevents the FAA from confirm-
ing pilots' backgrounds.
This change has long been endorsed
by the National Transportation Safety
Board, and is supported by the De-
partment of Transportation. I would
note, Mr. President. that similar provi-
sions were included in the Rail Safety
Improvement Act, which I introduced
in April, and in S. 1539, the rail safety
legislation subsequently reported by
the Senate Commerce Committee.
I intend to offer this bill as an
amendment to the Airport and Airway
Capacity Expansion Act. when it is
considered on the Senate floor. I urge
my colleagues to support this impor-
tant legislation.
I ask unanimous consent that the
text of this bill be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the bill
was ordered to be printed in tlw
RECORD, as follows:
S. 1819
Be it enacted by the Senate and HOIL,i. of
Representatives of the United Steles of
America in ('on cress assembled. That Sec-
tion 206 of the National Driver Register Aet
of 1982 t23 U.S.C. 401 not'-) is amended as
follows:
(1) In subsection (a). paragraph (I) is
amended by substituting the word "trans-
portation" for -highway".
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