JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92T00277R000600150002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1980
• Content Type: MISC

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e,
178 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
forces and the Phalangists in Lebanon. If
the Awwali river is going to be as efficient a
.'line of IDF deployment as it has been in
separating so far Haddad's men from the
Phalankists, we - had better look for
another line. The Phalangists areforever
trying to' infiltrate the south, to raid the
refugee camps in the Sidon region and to
shOw the inhabitants, as well as Haddad
and the IDF, who the real boss is. Some of
Haddad'vmen, too, -led by "Haddad's Eli
Hobeika;".yaf?young man nicknamed
"Arna:IN"'keep trying to kill Palestinians.
to.remeniber the name
"Arttab;" ;,for,':'events in Ain el-Hilweh
might,i;oon_givpiisiowner the same kind of
reputationqh'atEli Hobeika "earned" in
?Sabra and .Shatila. , ? ? . ?
?-The IDF, which wag forced to bring in.
tanks:in Order to disperse a riot in the
refugee camp of Bourj al-Shemali after a
local youngster had beetcshot dead by an
Israeli patrol there, has at least twice
clashed with .Haddad's men in the Sidon
region. In one indent, one of Haddad's
armored cars insisted on chasing a private
car along the coastal road. When an Israeli
officer blocked. .the way of the armored
car, Haddad's men tried to run him over.
The officer very nearly opencd fife on
them: Only when-the Israeli c`ommander
of the Haddad men was brought in, was
order restored. In the other incident,
Haddad's men put up a private check-
point on the Sidon fishing pier next to an
IDF road block and began to extract
"taxes" from the fishermen. When one of
the fishermen refused to pay up, he was
shot and badly injured. A scuffle broke
out over this with the IDF, at which shots
were very nearly fired. Such incidents are
, going to increase, because Haddad's men
covet. the job ,of
. The relaxation of the Israeli army's con-
trol over them has not resulted in a discus-
sion about Haddad's future status in the
southern unit of the Lebanese army, but
only about his imminent return to that
army. The moment Haddad will cease to
receive his salary, his equipment and his
men's training from Israel, mutual
tions will come to an end. If he will not be
able to get help.from Israel, he will not
help Israel. Even if the implementation of
the agreement. with Lebanon ? is delayed
and cooperation with Haddad in the lsrae-
li-contr011ed ,areas continues,, the aliena-
tion between, the major's forces and the
IDF will get worse.
Meanwhile, - Israeli .soldiers--,ordered
to man road blocks, fight things out wi11:1
Haddadists and Phalangistsiguard :Ansar,
camp, or .,drive along the coastal road
which is liable to frequent atticks--are,,
preferring to 'sacrifice their leave rather
than risk a dangerous bus journey. Two
weeks ago, veteran,, paratroopers were
seen to embrace one another upon their
arrival back in Metulla as if they had won a
battle or been released from jail, instead of
just having completed their service in
Lebanon.....
MOSSAD: AN INTELLIGENCE
FAILURE
One ? branch of the Israeli intelligence
services, Mossad, came up for re-appraisal in
an, article in the Israeli monthly. Monitin
(April 5983) by Kol Israel radio reporter
Haim Hecht. Hecht looked at the institution's
role in the Lebanon war, its much earlier
moves?as far back as 1975?to involve itself
in Lebanese internal'., politics, and at the
rivalry between Mossad. and Military
Intelligence:
Tuesday?August 23, 1983,. 1:50 am:'
Kamal Assachi speaker of the Lebanese
Parliament, announces: Bashir Gemayel is
the next president of Lebanon. Outside
? e,
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' zs.
the election halt in the car-park of the
Faidiyeh military college, a group of sic
armed men are listening to the direct
broadcast. Three of them are &allies
closest assistants in the Phalangist head-
' itiiiarters:and the-other three are Israelis:
."Bashir Gemayel is the president-elect!"
cries the Lebanese radio broadcaster.lhe
group in the car;parle jumps up. One of
? the Israelis 'points .his kalashnikov-
?
wards and shoots hysterically into thesky:
The aeCondisraeli'falls into the arrria bf
13aShir's itsiistant.'lind ? the two dance
tokether, for jorThe sitme, night aiiariy
takes place in honor of the new president;
. elect. Rafirl [Rafael .Eitrrn] Wanders arotind
-. pairitlooking ? somewhat detached.
People' at the party seem drunk . with
viciory shakine,hands `-'as if 'saying,,
"We'Vedone it! Theywon the ChamPiori-
A senior army officer who attended
.the'party (having been almost forted to
attend) niutterartook at them;each one
Of therry.think.s:Ahat he is a- mini Edgar
Hoover.,They Made a king in the republic
of the agsurd,Vnd they can't sober up, We
?
shall suffer from this man."
'
Bashir reached., the presidential :chair:
through. a Violent path; and the Israelis
served ' as his fists. ; Mossad dragged the
state of Israel into -a vioterft and bloody
? adventure. According :to -Mossad;? Israel
would begin to reap political and military
gains with Baahir's election'. The first days
after the "elections" proved that the fruits'
of the "victory" were not guaranteed at ?
all. The. president-elect began talking'
differently; in a-manner not at all pleasant
to-Israeli ears:On two occasions he simply
Made-fun?Of arid insulted the Chief of
Staff; 'Rafael Elan, and a group of senior
officers-who Were With him. 'The .Mcissad
people, who were supposed to deliver the
goods, defended?Bashir, and trieck'tci find
excuses and explanations: Thei:laven't,
sobered up yet.
FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS 179
On Tuesday, September 14, 1983, a
strong explosion destroyed the Phalangist
headquarters in Ashrafiyeh. The presi-
dent-elect, Bashir' 'was killed. Prime
Minister Begin published a short notice:
Israel has lost a dear friend. At the same
time, smiling Israeli' officers were raising
their.: glasses' ,ancl.:.sighing with -relief,
"Thank God We are ridof that reptile..."
But: 'the = Of--Bashir! was still, alive
? among; the Pluilangiats entered.; the
refugee car-rips:of Sabra and Shatila. The
massacre was unavoidable:...;
="Insensitiviti?my ais!," says=1 mem-
ber of Military Intelligence (MI) who was
a;:close, observer of ties between Mossad
and the Phalarigists'. "just as one and one
are two;;,Bashir.and? the?Phalartgists plus
governing Poweriecjirala Sabra and?Shatila.
It's a. shame that:-In the end it's not. the
righe?people- ? who - pay for it." Several
paragraphs in .the Kahan report give the
whole Story: .Mossad was responsible
for contacts with the. Phalangists and at
different .times had :very close contacts
with the leaders of the Phalange. ;
documents , presented to. the [Kahan]
commission- 'and' testimonies heard we
learn that Mossad and MI did not agree on
the subject: of;-ties -with the .Phalangists.
Affected by the continuous contacts-with
the leadership of_ the Phalange,' Mossad
had a :veil/ positive -opinion concerning
tightening of relations with the Pha-
lange. . .In the testimony of the head of
Mossad on 27 December 1982, he said,
among other things, 'that Mossad tried to
present the matter objectively bursince it
was the hody'inAarge of maintaining the
Contacts, I admit that subjective relations
had ,been .created.- I.must accept this. In
contacts one speaks' with people, relations
develop.' On the other hand; MI empha-
sized in it :estimatiow ? thesidanger of
relations With the Phalange mainly because
they are unreliable and weak in military
4
?
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180 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
power and for other reasons.''
What had happened, and how was it
that the State of Israel chose to accept the
"subjective" information in spite of the
warnings of MI,and other bodies in the
Army?
"Ever since, 1932, the Maronite Chris-
tianimajOrity in Lebanonhas been weak-
ening. The Lebanese constitution has not
changed and it gives die Christian minor-
itY- great political advantages. With this
bacicgrOund the. civil War -was unavoid-
able. The christiins" wanted to maintain
theindominahf-position and had a real
problem of protecting their physical
'existenec:These facts,created a good basis
for 1:Yz'11:elitig;_ti,f,With the State of Israel:
One ofthe basi assumptions of the
Israeli intelligence ComMunitir is that it is
possible tp k:bxig's.?,thp:.. strength and
influetice of the Arab world- by creating
alliances. aRcl .contacts with ethnie and
r political minorities in the Middle East In
the--days.:4?the .idtaarakh governments a
"funtionalr.alliance.was made with the
Phalange. and there is no evidence to show
that the: then government. had any great
hopes.. of the . alliance. .Mossad was in
charge of cOntacta With the Phalange. "We
will:help them' -ca. help ,themselves" was
the way.. the them Minister 'of Defense,
Shimon Peres,.explained thd`eontacts with
the-Christians-in the north of Lebanon.
Theidea, of course, was to maintain secret
contacts, and; the fact of giving them
, military aid Was also kept quiet in spite of
the fact that this aid included tanks and
heavy.artillery., ,
,,The. first contacts with' the Christians
the organized "Christian" militias]
in South Lebanon were established in the
mid-70s, whenRaful was Commander of
the iNortherty.Cornmand:f Raful made
these contactsout olinstinct.,A suppor-
Oe:Christian belt in South Lebanon was a
'safetyx. belt' I 'for, 'us, he, said. General
I.
Avigdor (Yanush) Ben-Gal, who replaced
Ra'ful in the Northern Command, added
to Raful's instinct momentum and sophis-
tication. It was he who created Major
Haddad, not Haddad the man, but Haddad
as . representing ' a :system: Israeli inter-
vention in Lebanon- with maximum
control.'
The same kitchen fed both the Chris-
tians in the north and Haddad's men in the
south., -Both received tanks and,-. heavy
artillery. Both received Israeli-made khaki
uniforms. The Christians in the north had
a badge attached to the pocket, While- the
Christiana in the south attached the badge
,to their -shoulders...
At general ;staff aneetingi . and , in-: the
Ministry,of,Detense.,:. the -patrons of both
systems tried-toestablish,goals for their
clients and to get budgets tor them. At ;his
stage the Israeli -political-milieu was not
yet required to decide between the two
conceptions, and the work-continued in
two parallel lines:.Mossad in the north of
Lebanon and the Army in the south. In
September '1977, Major Haddad's met*
were part of an Israeli military operation
for the first time?conquering Tel
Sueifa?known later as the "cooperative
operation.',' What had been until the
"cooperative operation" humanitarian
aid, now became-open military assistance
given to Haddad's militias by, the Israeli
army. -After the .Litant,, Operation in
1978,* Haddad became- an element that
even Bashir, who used to treat the Major
with contempt, had to take into account.
But, as was to be discovered later, Bashir's
school has solutions wlicch are simple, fast.
and strong, but nOt elegant. Bashir wanted
Haddad's head, and there was someone
who told him that it would be okay.
*In which Haddad's men were responsible for
a number of Aurders, partichlarl* in the town
of Khiyyam?Ed.
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The Kahan report does not mention the
date ' of July 7, 1980. But that Was
definitely a key date in the developments
that lead to Sabra and Shatila-It was on
that .day -that Bashir and his 'men liqui-
dated the Chamounist militia.** It was a
brutal massacre in the best mafia tradi-
tion...-But this time the Phalange did not
masaacre rivals: they shot their own
brothers and allies:The Phalange entered
the Country Club in Beirut that mbrning
and .-shot ? any moving target. Fathers,
mothers and. children were massacred at
the Pooh It was Bashfr's intimate friends
who committed the.?-brutal murder of
Chanioun's_ family. The sarne friends
'Stood two years later in -the car park of
Faidiyeh; the same friends who danced for
jOY; embraced by;Israelis.? The events of
Jilly 7 stand in the face of all those who
told the Kahan cOnuniision, "We were
surprised, we, ?didn't know, we didn't
think they were capableof. . ."
? If there were different views concerning
the Plialangr within MI up to July 7;1980,
from that day onwards MI adopted a clear
position, maintaining its warnings of the
danger of close ties with the Phalange, of
their small niimber and their limited mil-
itary potential; and conaluding that the
Christians had no chance of ever again
becoming therdominant force in Lebanon.
On the other hand, the assumption was
that if there should ever be another stable
Christian regime in Lebanon, it would be
another pro-Eastern Arab state. MI re-
garded the Mossad position?that envis-
aged a pro-Western Lebanon under the
leadership ? of Bashir and a peace treaty
with Israel?as a.fantasy and an illusion.
How could snch a gap between the posi-
tions Of Mossad and MI develop? The ex-
planation is so simple it is hard to believe.
**Of past Lebanese PresideiiiCimille
Chamoun?Ed.
FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS 181
It is almost ridiculous. MI people are ex-
perts in Middle East studies who evaluate
the situation; they read newspapers and
speeches and intelligence reports; includ-
ing Mossad reports. Aided by. all tEese;
they cryitallize, a sterile evaluation,: an
analysis free of personal inclinationgor of
any emotional influence.- .
The story of Mossad was told, in short,
in the words-of the head of Mossad to the
Kahan commission:."Mossad did its best
to present the topiC and to look at it objec-
tively, but since Mossad was directly in
charge of the contacts, Laccept the as-
sumption that subjective relations devel-
oped. I must accept this. Within such rela- -'
dons one-speaks with people ,''relations '
develop," "TheMossad people in JOunieh
sat -inside Bashir's ?bottom," is the war a
senior: member of the intelligence..com-
munitrdefined the situation. He can see
no other way to explain why every ques-
tion Was considered by Mossad according
to the criteria of "what Bashir says." 4
The story of Mossad in Beirut reminds
me in i frightening way of the spy stories
in the cinema, of the spy who falls in love
with the woman agent of the other side.
No doubt the Mossad agents in Lebanon
fell under the spell of their partners. Eat-
ing together, having all-night parties and
gambling together ? at Jounieh Casino
created a situation in which the Israeli
agents, who were supposed to warn and
supply estimates and information concern-
ing the Phalange, were caught in a strong
emotional bond wiih their clients. It is
well known' that the Phalange are very
good at public relations. Ass journalist, I
can say, from my own personal experience
that the way.I was received:at their head-
quarters in Beirut made me forget for a
few long moments all,those chapters. of
the civil war that cried out a thousand
times chat .1 was . sitting among _cold-.
blooded murderers. The conversations,
?""
4
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182 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
were ? conducted.: with the best French
,- manners; and the ,Dior perfume on the
handsome.secretaries affected me; it was
impossible nor to admire the quotations
they brought into the Political discussion
from, the: writings, of philosophers and
'theoreticians: lam a journalist and I may
' be blinded by. thecovet;of the:Sorbonne
;..and Dior, Kit how Was it pOssiblethat the
?Mossad ;people,. agent's trained for. their
.'ints' Sion:Were-led,. .astray? How was it pos-
sibleu'siatiqiistitution, a body that
represents hunian, technological, eco-,
riomid sand adrninistrative resources as-
sembled to estimate developments in the
.
political and:Tstiategic arena failed in this
.. manner?. To-the'elements of human Weak-.
tiesom-enticinect.abereee-rihould.^:itdci
another element. that Will brink tis closer
to understanding thialailure: professional
ride.MoSsad Wanted,i6 'succeed at any
price --The -heads!of MOssad had . known
seVeral faitUres and uiiently needed a new
projeet; they waved to present Israel With
a:strategic success. Mossad- genuinely be-
lieved that the systems used by the Shah of
Iran, by Haile...Selassie;of Ethiopia ? and
General Delimfof Morocco.coUld func-
tion and enable ustO:contiol Lebanon. In
their position papers,. When diey.tried to
Persuade the political milieu, they contin-
ually: inentioned Hafer al-Assad, a presi-
dent who'repreSents an ethnic minority of
10 percent and governs his country with
success.. ? ?3 ? ?
.,.A1Ve shall git,etnilitary backing to Bashir
and psuccesi shall be ours: They did not
grasp that Sabra and Shatila were also sure
to take- place because their position papers
were the surepreacription for :the mass-
acre in the-carnpS: Mistaken assumptions,
the desire to presenta success and?human
weaknesses, all made Up--Mossad's
con-
ception t In the summer'of 1981';koSsad's
position gradually became die'state
tion, and this process hadlo end With the.
war in Lebanon.,
_There is another incident in the list of
Mossad's failures that should be men-
tioned here:-,the story .of the shooting
down -of. the helicopters 'at Jabal Sannin,
later knowre,as . the "missiles crisis."
Accordinglto7Bashir-,-the Syrians were. the
enemy; the bigge.,st obstacle4to his control
of :Lebanon: ?The_ ,. Phalange.: understood -
'that Iiaelithittis, the Israelfarmy, was the
o;tly.o.? force that, could Solve the Syrian
probleril. fot; them; ? thus, Bashir had an
obvious interest in getting:Israel involved
With'the Syrians,;This Was openly said at
the i;Phalsinge headquarters., Moreover,
fioni .1982-the Phalange took several steps
whi? were clearly, a...provocation.: :Any
agent after'.a two.:mOnthlaeginners'-course
-Woulcb have :understo-od:that he .should
have sent warning?signsto Jerusalem. The
warnings sent bythe.Mossad people from
Jonniehivere vety "witery;" and that is an
. understatement; andi &shit, continued
sending his men to the_.Bekaa area. The -4
Syrians did'. not ' this since they
regarded the, Beyaa-. as the. territory in
which they have exclusive influence, and
as a most important strategic area, fearing
that in the case of war -Israel -would make
use of the Bekaa to-bypass the Syrian army
andAhreaten? Damascus . directly. ,Bashir
read the map coriectly. The Jews made the
mistake.- TheThalange entered Zahleh [in
the Bekaa] and the clash With the Syrians
becnmer unavoidable: In April 1981 the
whole area was! ow- 'fire: The Syrians
bombarded Zahleh;o?The- net woven by
Bashir: began ?to, elbse.7:Bashir sent- more
units. The Syrians reacted by sending coml.
mando .uniti and -helicopters.,Bashies
units were being pounded; 'they.; had no.
chance against the Syrian army; But Bashif
knew: that all?-?Watt-going ae6ording to his
plan. This wasthe time to call the Mossad
people. .-Through v the 4anieli ? agents ? at
Jottnieh he sent an SOS call to Jerusalem
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"You. inust .save us; An investment of -
Mani.yeara will be lost. The Syrians are
taking `aver," and other such "convincing
: reasons" that the cunning Bashir ? knew
MoSsabl would buy. And indeed, these
Israeli-agents who were supposed to warn
IstiteLand to give.a cool, objective, open-
eyedintretedible estimate stialloWed the
? bait: Telegrams ? went; out ;?rapidly from
JoUnich; to Jerusalem and - were almost
hyatericatin tone ..The Israeli government,
??cv eonld not decide how to react, was
iirfact already bound by its commitment
:iciitheiAtilenke. At the same time there
? wasorneope who.: grasped-,at last. that
)Bashir had deceived him- and was clan-
gefiSt'ialraut Begin refused-6 accepr.this
eValtiatiohtlince-i: the .(-?concept -.built by
.14-oici tied .i-;Begitii:inivrm'commitment
thtiki,?;,inirriC'Of principles;Iike, himself
would nOt retreat from. The. government
gave:otdet.s...to,litie army to act and the air
force shot two Syrian helicopters.-
Tite.4est of thestory is written in the
history 156:Oki of the warmn Lebanon: the
SVriariVeticied by posting missiles in the
Bekaa, tension rose 'sky high and Begin
said 4,stliit' Riful and ? Yanush 4. are .-: pre-
- ? .
pat&ht4and?Bashir Gerriayel smiled. The
Mos* people in Jotinieh smiled as well;
heiicli?twas Sa?sfied, and they be-?
lietied that vtaiigood for the State of Israel:
? Theiviete.eaptivated by their own con-
? cept andcontinued to preparethe way for
Bashir,to reach'ptesidential office on the
targeted:date of September 1982..
While Menahem Begin held the Minis-
, .
trrOf Defensei-Mossad managed to per-
suadelOthersewith its Lebanese concept,
but there was still some hesitation in Jeru-
salenis tikhowiar Israel should be corn-
mittedj tor-the Christians, in. the north of
Lebanort.-Wheit Arik [Ariel] Sharon-was
appointed Minister of Defense at the end
ofistirninei4:198 1 ,,all the above parties-
found themselves "partners in a totally dd.-
FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS 183
ferent? game: It took Sharon only three
months: of study to learn; that Mossad's
involvement with the .-Phalange was a
silver rilatelor him. Mossad's concept fit-
ted,very well with .the first stage of his
and-strategic Alfatal brow to the
PLO and a new order in Lebanon-were to
be 'a. Promising. beginning. In: January,
Sharon visited Jounieh to arrange matters
with; Bashir The Mossad :Mew were the
? oveii)leased..rnatchniakers; of .course:
They: were; sttie -thaf. Sharon :mould- tell
their concept 'and:guide the steps andtheli
were not disaisprOinted.c. ; :? ? '
The "National Defense lJnit" (NDU)
of the Ministry of Defense became a pavg
erfulinstrumentilt7SharOn's handa.:SOthO'
ofithe officers serving inthe NDU had
served in3/11,1ritthe:pasti Under the nw
11,
regime the''enjoyed attacking all MI posr.,
'lion papers; Sharon's directions wereto ?
disregard trivialities and specific data and
to concentrate 'Ott:the' .general 'concept:
This atmosphere at the Ministry of De-.?
fense was of cOurse fertile grotind for
Mossad. The agents continued to send in
information, and. in:Jerusalem the details
were worked into position'papeis'which
always encouraged Mossad and Praised it'
Repres'entatives of.,MI and the:Northern
Command had no. chance with?their dif-
fering . positions ;ht. the decisive discus-
sions. It was soon clear that Sharon him
self made-all thedecisions. He fired, and
the ND.1.1 surrounded themark with a
target-like. circle-oft, dantand estimates
proving that he had hit the target. Those
who disputed this position had no chance
in other areas, stih as -government discus-
sions or. the Knesset Committee for For-.
eign and Secnritir Affairs.-Sharon always:
came-better Prepared than all thv.others, -
withniany documents,, maps and'position
papers: The:-NDqc011eeted data:for him ?
over the heads of all the army men; and he
could always-base all his eta ints'on Missed ?
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184 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
reports. At such meitings.Sharon always
had Sane loyal partners, and one, has to
admit that-he knew-how to make use of
them. The general director of the Foreign
Office was Dave Kiniche,- an- ex7Mossad
maw' one, : those- -Who formulated
MosSaci's.: Lebanese ? :position and who
invested many,years in developing it: The
Chief of Staff, Eitan,rnade many remark's
that earned him the nickname of .''Phalang-
Efrairn Foram, Begin's military
saisisiiritcte. signed; Menachem Begin lost
his last objective cOniacts with the true
feelings of the drmy; and Sharon's way to
Beitiit7'Was '? ?
By the end of summer : pat,._Yanush
BetirGiir finished serving:: as. the coin-,
inaridef:Of the ',Northern:. Command and
viasseplaced by GeneralArnii Drori.Ve
intisthoteherelhatYinush believed that
there-was something for Israel to seek in
Beirtit, but -even- imhis.boldest'sceriatioS
he did not dream that MOSSad 'would go so'
far in Order to save -Haddad. But by that
time, Ylinush was-powerless as far as the
real politicartnd strategic decisions were
concerned. Sharon would not speak with-
himh ? commanded ' the Israeli
forces in theeisternirbOt and conducted
the. at against Syrians, but Sharon
didn't--;viSielis.,headiluarters even once.
Aniir DrOri-is not the type to raise a scan-
dal at a government meeting or staff meet-
ings in the ?Ministry. olDefense. He is a
true -soldier. Whenever he could, he pre-
sented the Northern Command position, ?
but he had no chance a'gainst the joint:
front,-Mossad, NDU, Sharon.
"The army -did not believe that Bashir
would: be elected to the presidency. No
one believed that MOssad; Which they re-
garded as it marginal. part, of, the system;
would manage ,to drag--Israel-into deep-
involvement in .the Lehi-Mete: elections..
The hardest time fortheNiii.dietn Com-
? raand Werethe days betivien Ba`shir's elec-
tiOn and his death. The events of the Leb;
anese "democratic" elections proved that
no response of the system would be sur-
prising any more.
- There were IDF officers who realized
what was.happening, hnd more and inciie
of them could be seen together with the.'
Phalange at Joimieh and Beirut. ,The Mos-
sad people mere the heroes of the day.
Amir Drori refrained from any social con-
' tacts? with, the,-.Phalange. He limited- his
contacts -with-- them ..tO, the ' minimum
necessary....:; . . ?
, ? At joint meetings of Israeli officers and
Phalange, Bashir,demanded:4"Donkleave
Beirut yet. Give-us ?w Weeks and we will
get . organize& ,We;,will Control' the husi-
nessil.t.proriiised -.Bashir7-1-and
one-humble:request.ofthelsraelf Aimy:
pleases disarm the Ditize and Palestinian
forces.. Any: sensible person should have
understood that. what,. was. -later- to .be
known as 'the massacre of Sabra and Sha-
tila was' only atvegetarians curiosity in the
framework of the general- murder whiqh
was defined as "getting organized."
In 'order to: write this article- 1-sat long
hours -with 'people who can be defined as
close to.the intelligence community.'The
concept of:a -journalise is,very strange to
them. And here I sit with them and I heat
frightening- and- fascinating :stories from
them. I hear painful definitions and strong
words. I feel deep .frustration and not, a
small amount of anger. Why are you tell-
ing me all this? The question becomes al-
most:.-unavoidable. -They:'look at each
other; and -the ,:olded: One among them
replies: "In Lwell-ordered- state such as
England, we would: have -gone to some
senior personality- in Whitehall. After a
short and secret investigation some People
would have been given a modest pensibn,
and' would. have gone *live in a modest
mansion somewhere in thectiuntry on the
shored ,of a stream. for. the test of .their
,
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?
lives: hi the US, the Washington Post
would get hold of the story, and after -a
public scandal and sharp attacks the
president would deliver-a personal mes-
sage on'TV and then go to play golf. In any
state behind the iron ctirta,in no doubt
some .people would have been _stood.
against the wall: Ansi here. .," he sighs.
"Believe me, 1 we wrote;?we cried, we -re-
signed,we warned: and it was like pissing
into thea:" L r-.
- Now the army is busy implementing the
Haddad conceptin South Lebanon. They
?
are no implementing iniiilementing plans in South Leb-
andii;r;plans.',?!WhiC-11 ..were ` prepared six
months ago, plans rejected by the Mossad
experts as; conventional/and uniinagina-
tiire,Slic Months in'tebatioriz.:Six months
witir al,teirible:Aliiily.'.blood price. The
Israeli representatives at .the negotia-
tions with Lebanorrate now struggling to
'save sOinethine4 that grand strategy that
emerge' dcin?the school of Mossad and
Sharoir;and faierriustbe smiling ironical-
ly, since the?Jaei'd of the Israeli delegations
to theiestalks".ii Dave Kimche, the man
who-Avai-,..headi-Of. the Lebanon desk in
Mnssa`d'fOrfmany years.
,
THE HISTADRUT AND
? 4:DISCRIMINAtION
? The Israeli?ttracle; union organization,.
Histadrut; has 'long given, tacit support to
policies ? which discriminate against Pales-
tinian workers fin 'brad, whether they are
Israeli, citizens ; : Palestinians from the
territories occUpied by-,Israel .in 1967. An
article, lryjournalist,Avslialom Kaveh in the
Hebrew, slaily--.?Al Hamishmar (April 1,
1983) ilescribecl - the ',Situation for the Pales-
tinian iisOiker iiii the Tel Aviv area, and
showed- Histadrites' failure to encourage any
feelinfel of csolitlaritY. nyethe..lsraeli Jewish
'worker frkli,nealestiniaireotmterpart.
?
FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS 185
Many factories in the center of Israel,.
and especially in . the textile and metal.
sectors,. are now.facing real difficulties.
Another of the fruits of the 1967' war,
which some fools. still, call the war of
viCtory, was the abundance of cheap
labor* that was followed by neglect of
technology,. and that is maybe the main;
reason for the deterioration of these
factories. Haim,Sarori'member of the-Tel,
Aviv Workers- Council' of ,Histadrut
claims, "The Jewish biain stopped think-
ing with the, invasion -of cheap labor; we
stopped :thinking'. about .:progress, and'
modern teclinology.-Unti14967 tRe food;
textile, costriiction:and i-lietalrindustries
were bne;iiiirce, of pnde Now it is no
longer so.nWhen a Jewish Worker leries
production-line, the emplOyer hurries to
replace him with an Arab worker..It is true
that few Jews seek work in these branches,
but the employers are also to blame for'.
this sad situation:- the flight of- Jewish
labor from manual- Work. The average
employer. doesn't bother to seek, tn-
courage, invest and pay for it.
Cheap labor also damages the organized,
worker. Because the emPloyer, has an.
unlimited source of labor in the occupied
territories, he can threaten the Organized.
worker, -whether Jewish -or Arab Israeli
citizen,: with dismissal,-'since .he_can ,be
replaced by someone else who will dci.:
The -Tel Aviv ? Workers Council has to
deal with this problem;Tens of thousands
of workers are not organized and in the
end, says Haim Saror, "We have diffi-
culties in protecting -the Jewish worker."
For the- einployer the unorganized
worker is a financial paradise. He "saves"
on social-benefits 'uP, to 45 percent. The
unorganized wOrker he-paid directlrand
does not pay taxes:There ianci contr.:51, and
Pales'finian ioicirkerslrom? the newly:
occupied terriniriel?Ed:;,,.. ?
7'
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186 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
?" even the official Labor Exchange, that did
attempt to control this situation, has long
since given up. This has created ,social
anti-dorms that affect our lives in many
ways. Haim Saror and other Israeli trade
unionists say. quite clearly; "We have:no
,way: to control the situation." .Workers.
from the - occupiedr territories :Save-
Money andvraftet.six.?or seven; years.in,:
indiistr buy - land in their :Village: and.
leaVe. Work., ?Tlkeir, ties to the, land are
stronger than to industry." One example.
of:how:the organized workers suffer from.
this situation is the -.-wholesale vegetable-
and fruit Market in Tel. Aviv a
porters:, company,,losed;toi employ,: Jews,
..ancl......Arabs.' 'from ',Israel:, :After ;.'1.9671.'
worker's from the tertitciriesarrived,and
, were- absorbed; into: the company. -They-
were emploimd acCording to the .ustial-
terrns, Gradually; the :wholesale dealers
ffiund:.,otitiihat it ;would . not only, he;
cheaperfbut4so More convenient to deal
directly with the Arab porters; and they:
cancelled their contracts with Biderman
and took over'- the: Workers-. from the
territories. -.The,Arab.wotkers:earn more
directly now, but theyare stip exploited to
the same orient when; for-example,: they-
have to sleep in the store housesas well as
serve as guards for very low wages.. This
damaged the Biderman porters company.
The Labor Exchange knows what is going
on, but 'does not dare to interfere in'
matters of the market, fearing the whole.,.:
sale merchants will close down the
market. ? ??
Shlomo Barak of the Tel Aviv Workers
Council speaks about discrimination and
deprivation "that cannot befought." He
tells us about one of.the factories,in Ben
Avigdor.Street where half theworkers are
Arabs and: half are. Jews: .The union
negotiated employer's participation in
holiday payments. But the employer is not
willing to pay similar sums to -Workers
from the territorie4, claiming that he
already pays a fortune for their transport
expenses: He claims that as they are-xiot
Israeli, citizens, he doe( not have to pay:
The Jews in the factory won't strike for.
theitiellow workers So where is internar
? tional solidarity? . ; ?
Hairn. iSaror::.?:!!Intertiational workers'.
solidsiiircan be _seen' in the. personal
-
iteamieht of 'the Workers -by the 'trade
union activists." He says that with a bitter
smile. He doesn't., expect the Jews to
participkte,in this issue.7The4employers
want to reach a siniationMythich all Arab
workers Israelis and Will be
non-union members and ,,iore:iLtnow,too
much about such MatterS:- -.-
IUs worthwhile .listenitig, to. Shlomo
Barak:, "Accoiding to ' my -.management
rules;:_ within the. trade union: Arabs
cannot \be, members the.. workers
colinciliAliey,Must receive fulltights, but
they.'cannot-represent Wctrkers. I cannq
be sure ,that- workers from the territories
won't.incife the public, and itseems to me
that- the:AMb worker-is ncitixirticularly
interested in developing Israeli industry in
any case, the Jewish worker: Wouldn't
accept the Arab as his superior." Think
about-that::: ... .Z
The trade tthionlasnOcOntiol Over the
dismissal of Arab workers from the
territories and the employers can do as
they wish: Tel Aviv cooperatives, such as
"Ha!Argaz;" give them fultunion protec-
tion,; but; they are the ,,exceptiOn. The
worst winking conditions can be found in
the garages.' Only-two or- three of them
have joined the collective agreements and
the restare thug out Of the contiol of the
trade union-and the labor Exchange)
.Baruch Lazatovitz deals With :several
metal factotiesiin TeL Aviv.: He says that
the. 'discrimination. mr the Matter of
benefits isone of the mott-clifficult isgues
to deal with.11aim Saror: "This situation
1
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