CONCEPT PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92T00306R000100120014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 3, 2013
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: January 1, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/03: CIA-RDP92T00306R000100120014-5
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CONCEPT PAPER
This estimate assesses the possible content, likelihood and implications
of Soviet initiatives--either as a negotiation proposal or a unilateral
initiative--to curtail conventional arms.
Several convergent circumstances may have placed the Soviets in a position
where significant unilateral conventional arms reductions or proposals for
mutual reductions will serve their national interest and place the US in a
reactive posture:
o The massive procurement of Soviet armaments from the early 1970s to the
1980s has provided a modernized combined arms force which is probably
larger than that required by the NATO "threat."
o Even highly asymMetrical reductions--3:1 or 4:1 in NATO's favor--could
weaken NATO without significantly diminishing Warsaw Pact strength..
o Retention of obsolescent arms provides a huge Soviet/Warsaw Pact
inventory of relatively less effective, man-intensive weaponry ripe for
retirement.
o The Soviet economy is not responding to perestroyka, leading Gorbachev
to seek additional resources from other sectors of the economy,
particularly defense.
o Perestroyka will create unprecedented demands for skilled Slavic
technicians coincident with a declining manpower pool.
o Gorbachev's public relations agenda seeks to portray a less threatening,
more accommodating, less militarized Soviet Union.
o The recent INF agreement and publicity regarding possible 50 percent
cuts in strategic arms have led to heightened expectations among the
Western public that conventional cuts are in the offing.
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o There is a popular perception within NATO that defense spending should
be reduced.
o There is relatively little agreement within NATO as to a common
position or a strategy for achieving conventional arms reductions.
o The upcoming US election campaign and the subsequent government
transition will increase US difficulties in responding to a Soviet
initiative and complicate negotiations with NATO allies.
The foregoing appear to offer the Soviet leadership the opportunity to
seize the initiative in conventional arms control at relatively low cost.
Proposals for deep mutual conventional arms cuts could put pressure on a new
US administration to agree to proposals which might erode the conventional
imbalance even further in the Soviets favor in Central Europe. Unilateral
Soviet initiatives could provide the Soviets with a significant propaganda
coup. This estimate, outlining possible Soviet initiatives, their effect on
the military balance, and probable allied reaction, would enable US
policymakers to consider alternative responses to a range of
actions by the Soviets in conventional arms control.
The premise of this estimate is highly speculative and will
possible major
require
examination of military, economic, and political issues- from both the Soviet
and NATO view. In addition to capitalizing on current research available,
we intend to bring experts together for "brainstorming" sessions to consider
various key issues. A July publication is desired
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KEY QUESTIONS
I. What is the incentive--political (internal and external), economic or
military--for the Soviets to propose significant conventional arms
control initiatives?
II. What are the internal political dynamics which might encourage or impede
Soviet arms control initiatives?
What significant cuts might the Soviets propose/unilaterally take, and
what would the results be on the military balance? What are the
likelihoods of the various initiatives and why?
IV. How much warning of a Soviet decision/announcement might we expect?
V. What are likely reactions of NATO/other Allies of the US to possible
Soviet initiatives?
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I. Soviet Incentives
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?Past Soviet arms control initiatives
?SOviet external political objectives
?Soviet economic requirements
?Soviet internal political dynamics
?East/West military balance
II. Possible Soviet Conventional Arms Reduction Initiatives and their Impact
on the Military Balance (representative examples of initiatives shown
here; others will be developed during research):
?Early Retirement of Equipment/Demobilization of Personnel
?Reductions in Units
-Restructuring
'Elimination/Reduction of Particular Weapons Systems
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III Likelihood of Soviet Initiatives (above)
VI. Warning
V. Overall Implications for NATO and US
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