ANALYSIS OF AGENCY CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93-01161R000100010024-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: July 23, 1958
• Content Type: MF

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23 July 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Analysis of Agency Congressional Relations
and Proposals for Joint Committee on
Intelligence
1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph
for approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency has the fundamental problem
common to all Executive agencies of establishing relations with the
Congress in order to inform the Congress appropriately and to obtain
from the Congress the necessary authorities and funds. There are,
however, four major aspects of the problem, none of which is
experienced by other Executive agencies.
a. While many agencies have security problems, CIA
is the only one where security applies to such basic matters as
personnel, budgets, organization, and expenditures. Information on
these matters is withheld from the public and given under strict
security wraps to but a very limited number of congressmen. This
breeds suspicion and distrust on the part of congressmen not informed,
many of whom are still unaware that a limited number are fully
informed on these matters. The security problem, therefore, is
different in nature as well as degree from that of other Executive
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agencies and is a large element in promoting the Joint Committee
idea.
b. The end product of the Agency is the finished intelligence
prepared for the top policy makers of the Executive Branch. Sound
arguments can be made that such finished intelligence is the exclusive
property of the President in view of his responsibility for the conduct
of foragn affairs. While the Congress has a legitimate interest in
knowing whether they are getting a valuable return for the funds they
appropriate, there is a serious question whether they have a legitimate
interest in the substance of that product. 'Ti Intelligence is a major
influence in policy decisions but is by no means the only one, and the
final decision may be based upon capabilities, commitments, or other
overriding features which will lead to a direction contrary to that
indicated by intelligence. To provide the Congress with the intelligence
information alone could well lead to serious political difficulties in
which the Ag ency would be caught squarely between the Executive and
Legislative Branches.
c. CIA is different from other Executive agencies in that they
can deal with the Congress each representing its entire functional responsi-
bility
whereas CIA is merely the focal point of the functional intelligence
community in which are components of other departments and agencies
which have their own direct responsibility to the Congress. ,his presents a
formidable jurisdictional problem, and, while it is one for the Congress to
resolve, it is pertinent to our consideration of the Agency's congressional
relations.
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d. CIA is charged with the conduct of covert operations which,
while related to the intelligence function, are not basically an intelligence
activity and are carried out in accordance with policy directives from those
Executive elements involved in the national security and in the conduct of
foreign affairs. In the case of congressional consideration of such
activities, there would be involved policy considerations for which CIA
does not have the responsibility.
3. In view of the problems outlined above, no one existing
committee of the Congress has full jurisdiction over the central intelligence
function. Outside of the Appropriations Committee, the Armed Services
and Foreign Relations Committees have the most obvious claim to jurisdiction.
The Government Operations Committees have legitimate interests, and such
Committees as the Judiciary and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
have at least a peripheral interest. In practice, responsibility has been
assigned to Subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees of both
Houses.
4. We will attempt to appraise the relative merits of handling
CIA legislative problems under the present system and under a Joint
Committee system.
5. Under the present system security on the Subcommittees has
been excellent, but it must be assumed that a properlyestablished Joint
Committee will be equally secure. The problem of its staff will be
discussed later. The present Subcommittees have not been able to
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dispel the growing distrust and suspicion of CIA. This results primarily
from lack of time, certainly not from any lack of desire to support CIA.
In fact, some congressmen do not know the Subcommittees have been
established and many do not know that they hold hearings and are briefed
by the Agency. Individual members have spoken up to defend CIA in
Committee and on the Floor, but there is no concerted program of doing
so. The establishment of a Joint Committee would in itself serve to
lessen some of the suspicions. and its reports to the Houses would probably
satisfy the desire to know that CIA is being looked at. Furthermore, it
/would be incumbent on a Joint Committee to look after CIA's interests
in the many ways they could be affected by congressional activities.
On our over-all congressional relations, therefore, the Joint Committee
would probably be better than the present system of separate Subcommittees.
6. The establishment of a Joint Committee might well have some
adverse affect on relations with foreign intelligence services but
probably this would be of short duration as they could be brought to
understand that fundamentally nothing had been changed.
7. On the question of producing finished intelligence on demand
of the Congress, there would seem to be little difference in the fundamental
problem between Subcommittees and a Joint Committee. However, so far
the Subcommittees have shown no intention of raising this issue, although
it may come up at any time. There is more likelihood of a Joint Committee
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raising the issue as most of the Resolutions specify that such a Joint
Committee would go into the coordination and utilization of intelligence
as well as the problem of gathering it. While the Joint Committee might,
therefore, be more insistent than the present arrangement, on the other
hand it 40ould be the sole point of debate whereas at present other
Committees, such as Foreign Relations, are not clearly precluded from
demanding such intelligence. On this point, therefore, there seems no
preference as between the present organization and the Joint Committee.
8. On the question of jurisdiction there are certain advantages
to be seen in a Joint Committee. At present other committees can
claim jurisdiction over certain matters pertaining to CIA, and such claim
might not be successfully opposed by the Subcommittees. For instance,
if we want legislation relating to personnel it might well have to be
handled by the Post Office and Civil Service Committees. The Joint
Committee as proposed in most Resolution would probably claim exclusive
jurisdiction in all matters except appropriations. All ClAaffairs, therefore,
would be handled by a knowledgeable, secure committee. On this point
the balance points somewhat to a Joint Committee.
9. On the question of covert operations, again there seems to be
little basic difference in dealing with the Subcommittees or with a Joint
Committee. However, the existence of a Joint Committee would tend
to bring the issue in focus. So far the Subcommittees have not seriously
considered policies under which CIA conducts its covert activities. A
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Joint Committee could almost certainly be expected to study such problems
more carefully and might well be critical of policies, instructions, or
particularly limitations put on by State or Defense. The problem of
such policy guidance is delicate enough without having a third party,
particularly a congressional group, enter a debate. So, on balance,
the Subcommitteesystem may be preferable from this point of view,
although there is nothing to prevent the problem from arising with them
also.
10. Some benefits from a Joint Committee, therefore, appear in
connection with the specific points discussed above. Other general