LETTER TO MR. RICHARD H. MOREFIELD(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R000800010002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: LETTER

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AIGDCJSFi by
- ES STRENGTHS AND ARMY DISP051TIOhS l I ~
1`~ ~ i ~
i
ARMY Total Personnel Strength 173,000
Present Dis ositlon
1 E t Java Borneo Celebes Other
as
EO i 2'?56, Sec. 3 (a)
ii .,.1 ~., a ~ .~ ~:; sr.ov:n
~DeC135~iP/ ~ ~, ._
Sumatra Nest Java Gent. Jaya
33 Inf Bns 26 Inf Bns 12 Inf 13ns 4 Inf Bns 1 I~ Bns 31 T4P Bn 5 Inf Bns
2 MP Bns ] MP Bn 1 MP Bn I Amd Sq 1 Mtn Arty Bn
2 Amd Sqs 2 Amd Sqs 1 FA Bnq 1 A-'9-A SQ
2 FA Bns 2 FA Sqs
1 AAA Bn ,
NAVY Personnel Strength 9,932 (including 2,299 marines)
Shi Stren th
1 destroyer (DD) 5 ~~'
2 coastal destroyers (DO) 1 ACS
2 escorts (PCE) 2 Ate'
3 patrol escorts (PF) 1 AO
2 motor gunboats (PGM) 29 `i'P
14-16 inshore minesR-eepers (MSI) 4 YTL
AIR FORGE 1vlilit.ary Personnel Strength (appro~mate) Total: 11,402
115 pilots
40 trainee pilots
]39 other air crew
294 total
Aircraft Stren th - Total aircraft: 271
Jet Piston
2 fighters ]2 fighters 80 misc. (piston)
21 trainers 17 lt. bombers 6 helicop era
5 lt. bombers 82 trainers
46 transports
Aircraft from the Bloc
Received
20-35 MIG-17 0 - _
30 IL-28 5 ? None of these are believed
20 IIr14 19 ?? to be in operational units.
g0 ?SIG-15
g helicopters --
'Includes I ILr14 presented to Sukarno for per: on a] use.
?? Includes 13 U-MIG-15's (Tra!ners)
APPf~lYEO FOR RELEASE
G~I~ _....:..~~~EaE
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 genee, US~
F; and the Deputy Director Jor Inteliigen.ce, They
``Joint StaIJ. The Atomic Energy~Commission Representative .
. to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau ~o~ tn_ ?
vestigation, abstained, the subject being outside_ of their .
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ATIONAL:~ INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER b5--58
~t~~ a~~r~o~~?. r~r ~~vDOr~~s~~
- ~.- ~ - ? ? - .. . ?..~,-~; C~ RBta ~. ~. ~}4ATMEN~ OF STATE
'~ ' - _ Irr
_ . . _ ' - -- . - ' 4NItJi ?~~- ~ ~! R~ Chan~erolas;!~y to
12 Augvst 1
xo
? - Submitted by the
DIP.ECTOR OF CE'rTR4L L~"TELLIGEIrCE
The JollouTinD intellioerice oroanizatiana warticinatEd in fh.
preparatipn of this estimate: The Central Intelligcnce Agcricy
and the intcllfgence organizations of the Departments of
State,?the Army, the Naiy, the Afr Force, and The Joint 5ta~.
?? Concurred in by the ' ' - '. -
_ Ih-T'ELLIGENCE ADVISORY CO~II-ITITEE
" on 12 August 195d. Concurring adere The? Director of Intellf- '
yence and P.esearch, Department_oJ State; the Assistant GhieJ .?
?
of Staff, Intelligence, Deparirtlent,oJ the Army;
-the Director ?
' of naval InfelIigenee;lthe Assistant Chie1~ of SiaD, Ir:n Indonesian poli:
tics. ? (Para. 34)
and were driven from the major population
centers. Government forces ai-e better led;
more numerous, and have the i~ttport.ant ad-
~?antage of air superiority. Hov~'ever, the
rebels are now proving to be eflective guer-
rilla fighters and are seriously harassin; goc~
eminent forces and hampering the rcest ab
lishment of civil authority in 1`'orth and Cen~
tral Sumatra and in Northern Celebes.
10. The strength and general ]ocat'ion of ma?
jor armed rebel groups (excluding the Darui
Islam) are estimated to b2 approsin;ately a:
follows:
Northern Sumatra
2000-3000
Central Si~ntatra-
Fukitinggi area
1000-2000
South Sumatra
100-500
Northern and Central
Celebes
In addition, several thousand young men re
port.edly have volunteered to serve ~~?ith the
rebels. Supplies of amts and ammunition arc
low, communication among the Various group:
is probably poor, and coordination of tltei~
operations is weak.
11. There appears to be considerable a;rce
ment among the ? rebel leaders, hon~e~ er, it
terms of overall political objectives. Tlte~
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seek to gain for the outer islands a gt-cater
~?oice in the central government and a larger
share. of government revenues which are de-
rxved largely from exports produced in the
`outer islands. They also desire a more eftec-
live and less ctnrupt government free of Com-
~n~unist influence, and a reduction of Sukarno's
~ role in the government. These objectives are
~ shared by most politically as are outer-
islanders, but there is wide disagreement con-
cerning the proper method to achieve them.
rzast Sumatrans remained inactive and did
not support armed rebellion, especially after
the rebel forces failed t.o resist the landing of
government troops. Rebel strength a?as also
veeakened by animosities among tribal and re-
ligious groups on Sumatra and Celebes and
by the failure of the Darul Islam, a fanatical
Moslem movement in revolt against the gov-
ernment since independence, to join forces
~xlith the rebels. While there had been some
sympathy on Java for certain of the aims of
the dissidents, sympathy for the rebels as a
group greatly diminished when they est.ab-
li~hed a rival government.
12. The rebels lack the military capability and
the political follo~;~ing to reestablish their con-
trol ai major populated areas in North and
Central Sumatra and Northern Celebes.
Nevertheless, they are now receiving some
local popular support and can continue guer-
rilla warfare for a prolonged period, even
without outside assistance. This makes neces-
sary the maintenance of large numbers of
government troops on Sumatra and Celebes,
a requirement that is an economic drain and
a growing political liability because most of
the government troops are Javanese. Fur-
thermore, the rebels can cause the govern-
ment serious financial loss, especially on Su-
matra, by harassing rubber and oil production
and export.
13. With a supply of arms and ammunition
from the outside, the rebels could substan-
tially increase the level of harassment and
could seize and ]told for a time sizeable areas
and some major to? The
nearest alrftclds available are Ari~bon and
tiiorotai; both could support small-scale oper-
ations on short notice, but abuild-up to sup-
port major or sustained operations against
Biak vrould require two or three months.
12. Over the next six months, with the n~?ces-
saiy airflcld and nthcr preparations, Indo-
nesia could assemble invasion tortes super.oc
in strength to the defense facets at Biak, tl-,e
main Dutch strenehotd. However, Indo-
nesian ability to caardinate operations of a
scale necessary to seize end $ald Biak is very
~1'he Indonesian a1.ts Farce has received about
23 AtIQ flchtcrs and trainers and aAout 20 IL-l:8
bombers trom tlu Slat. We do not beUeve that
these tlrcraft arc likely to bye operational In
the near tuturaCF-oaf w, fc ih ! he so?~ ~ e trkt~
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doubtful, and preparalioru for such an oper-
ation could probably be detected in view of
the naval and air deployment that would be
necessary- Indonesia, on the other hand,
does have the capability to land a torte a( up
? to 1,000 met, and to capture one of the lesser
Dutch settlements, and it would have a good
chance of launching such an assault without
' prior detectian-
13. The Indonesians also have the capability
to infiltrate aficnts to small groups into West
New Guinea to subvert th? Papuan popula-
tion. They have~donc this in the past, but to
little, if any, avail. The agents have either
been quickly identified and rounded up, with
Papuan asistance, nr they have had little
success anions the Papuan people, most of
whom are at an e~trem2ly primitive stage
of devclcpmcut.
B. Intentions
14.
tlnue to be a major Indonesian foreign policy
objective. Th1s would probably continue to
be the case even If PKI strength and influence
avere reduced greatly, or l~ Sukarno were to
leave the scene.
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SECRET
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5t. !i 1`IdJi.i.l,ivi. u+i.vv.~~ 4.~t~~~? t a coup in
the rear future with the support of most
of t :~ ^ .-t~; ~.~~ hel~eve that he would
;',
probably succeed. (Para. 26)
5. In the absence of firm and unified op-
position from Army and political leaders,
President ~u4carnv will pz-abduiy proceed
to reorganize his cabinet, giving stronger
representation to the Nationalist Party
(PNI) and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU).
He may also include one or two PKI mem-
bers. Although Sukarno will continue to
rely upon the Army to counterbalance the
PKI and to play an important adminis-
trative role, he will seek to diminish the
Army's political influence and will prob-
ably attempt to curtail Nasution's power.
(Para. 27)
DISCUSSION
6. Indonesia is in a decline of serious nrapor-
tions. Its economy is disorganized and weak;
political power is becoming increasingly polar-
ized between the Army and the Communist
Party (PKI) ; its people are split deeply on
a wide variety of issues; a continuing rebellion
is sapping its remaining strength; and popu-
lar discontent, particularly in urban areas, is
increasing. ~
7. Since 1952 there has been a consistent up-
ward trend in PKI influence and strength.
This has been due primarily to the ineffective-
ness and disunity of the non-Communist ele-
ments, to Sukarno's willingness to permit the
PKI to prosper by posing as a nationalistic,
pro-Sukarno movement, and to 'the organiza-
tional abilities of the PKI itself. Since 1957,
hoveever, this trend has been countered by
the increasing political and administrative
role played by the Army as a consequence of
its responsibilities under the martial laW reg-
ulatiors imposed to cope with the dissidence
iri the outer is;anas ana l.~arul isam terrorism
on Java.
8. Sukarno has now had nearly a year of com-
plete formal power as President, Prime Min-
ister, and Supreme Commander. Thus far
he has made no constructive move to utilize
his authority for an attack on the ~cauntry's
problems. He has spent mcst of his time
in a fruitless process which he calls "retool-
ing." Clearly, this constant reorganizatioi: of
Indonesia's political bodies and institutions is,
on the one hand, a substitute for decisions
and corrective action, and on the other,
manipulation to maintain his personal posi-
tion.
9. During March Sukarno undertook a series
of reorganizations which contributed to the
undermining cf public confidence and in-
creased the political potential of the PKI. On
5 March, Sukarno relieved the members of
Parliament of their functions and on the 27th
he announced the appointment of the mem-
bers -of a new Parliament, yet to be estab-
lished, in which the Masjumi would be vir-
tually excluded and the PKI strengthened.
Also on the 27th, Sukarno appointed a gener-
ally leftist preparatory committee to -organize
the National Front, a mass organization to
be led by Sukarno and supported by govern-
ment money. It is intended as a rival to the
political parties.
10. During the month, he also reorganized the
staff of his Central War Administration. To
re-emphasize civilian control, Sukarno became
Central War Administrator ana r~arneu
Djuanda First Deputy. Although the Army
still appears to dominate the structure, Nasu-
tion was moved from Central War Administra-
tor to Second Deputy War Administrator. At
the same time, there is an indication that
Sukarno may be' building up Suryadarma and
the Air Force to counterbalance Nasution and
the Army. Meanwhile, Sukarno has pressed
a reorganization of regional government
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which included the appuii~iri~er~t of Commu-
nists a5 Ir'cputy GUvernars in several regions.
I1. In his foreign relatiocis, uc~pite sharp
differences with Peiping over the status of the
Chinese residents of Indonesia, Sukarno has
w.,..,,m? mnra .aPAntt- involved with the USSR.
P~tr~-^.~ K. ~r~~~shr.hev's two-week vsit which
endedyon 1 March, Sukarno accepted a $250
million seven-year credit, a cultural agreement
and, despite Nary opposition, an offer of a
cruiser and three or four submarines.
12. On 1 April, with public discontent rising
and the economy in chaos, with political
parties seeking to form an opposition bloc,
with the reorganization of political institu-
tions still up in the air, and with the lines of
conflict between the Army and the PKI more
tightly drawn than ever, Sukarno departed on
a two-month world tour.
11. PUBLIC DISCONTENT
13. The consequences of a long period of eco-
nomic dislocation and stagnation are begin-
ning to have a political impact.~'~ Consumer
goods are in short supply; blackmar~Ceting and
hoarding have increased; and inflation con-
tinues to be a serious problem_ The sad state
of the economy is due primarily to misman-
agement, neglect, and dislocations resulting
from ultranationalistic, politically motivated
moves such as the seizure of Dutch properties,
the m~.ss expulsion of Dutch nationals, and
the ?repressive measures against the economi-
cally important Overseas Chinese. The oper-
ations of the RPI rebels and of the Darul Islam
terrorists add to the government's economic
problems. They have disrupted ? communi-
cations and normal productive activity. The
RPI raids on rubber plantations and smug-
gling ac~ivities by the Kr'1 and others have
reduced the government's foreign exchange.
Military operations against the various rebel
and dissident groups place a severe strain on
the government's budget.
14. The Indonesian people, particularly the
Javanese, have demonstrated _a remarkable
capacity for gassive acceptance of political
chaos and economic decline. The rural pop-
ulation is cushioned against dire privation by
its subsistence economy. The urban popula-
tion, which is most important in the political
context, is hit, first and hardest by any eco-
nomic downturn. Current reports indicate
that there is widespread and increasing public
grumbling and unrest, in rural as well as ur-
ban areas, as a result of economic hardship
and the lack of constructive government
countermeasures.
15. The Communists are in the best position
to capitalize on this growing public discontent.
Through their mass organizaticns, they are
able to agitate and to take advantage of the
situation to win adherents to their solutions.
The Army has the difficult and thankless task
of enforcing the prevailing economic regula-
tions, maintaining public order, and, to a con-
siderable extent, distributing consumer goods.
Consequently, the Army is highly vulnerable
to public criticism. Public discontent is
tarnishing the image of Sukarno. Given con-
tinued economic decline and political disor-
ganization, which appears probable, it is likely
that the time will come when Sukarno's major
remaining asset-his hold on the masses--will
be in peril. In these circumstances, an ero-
sion of Sukarno's prestige among the Indo-
nesian people would be an important factor
in any decision by the Army or the PKI to at-
tempt to bring about a major political change.
III. LIKELIHOOD OF A COUP
An Army Coup
16. Same key Army officers are urging Nasu-
tion to bolder and more decisive action. An
increasing number of political leaders, and
some military leaders as well, believe that
Sukarno's power must be greatly reduced or
eliminated if Indonesia's economic and politi-
cal decline is to be halted and an eventual
f ~,._?
Communist L'dKCV Y Cl u Y GL ~C:4. ~ .-, v ~-
political leaders, alarmed over prospects of the
eventual extinction of their parties, have set
aside their natural distrust of the Army and
probably would be inclined to support an
Army effort to eliminate or at least reduce the
authority and influence of Sukarno.
17. The Army has many ~ assets for a coup.
These include a near monopoly of arms and
control of much of the country's administra-
tive machinery through its functions under
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I,IIG S.c?~~~~ ;, ..- ~ r-`rninictration. The Army
would probably have the support of important
NaW elements, most non-Communist political
leaders, and much of tl~e civil service.
18. However, there are a number of factors
working against aNasution-led Army Gaup.
The Army is not a uni[ied organization respon-
sive to cetiirai coni.lai. T~asution does not
have the assured backing and support of sev-
eral important regional and unit commanders,
and the extent of Army backing in an anti-
Sukarna move would be uncertain. Nasution
and the Army do not have widf popular sup-
port. Sukarno's hold on the masses is still
formidable. The PKI, with its mass follow-
ing, its strong organization, and its influence
i i labor and peasant organizations would offer
stout opposition. The Air Force command
would almost certainly oppose an Army coup
effort, although some pilots, with their air-
craft, would probably go over to the Army side.
19. Moreover, Nasution has not demonstrated
the dynamic characteristics required for such
a decisive and risky move. His position as
Chief of Staff is not secure aid without the
leverage of that office he would not be a major
influence in Indonesian affairs. He undoubt-
edly remembers well the October 1952 affair in
which he tried a show of force against Su-
karno,failed because he lacked sufficient Arrny
and popular support, and suffered several
years of total eclipse as a consequence.
20. Finally, there is considerable disagreement
among the military and apposition political
leaders as to the nature, method, and timing
of a move to curtail Sukarno's power. More-
over, there is little basic cohesion or identity
of interests among the various anti-Sukarno
and anti-Communist groups and leaders.
L1. Nevertheless, a number of recent deveiop-
rnents indicate that Nasution has been seek-
ing to organize support and backing from both
military and political Ieaders. These include
:griny encouragement and support of the or-
ganizational efforts of the Democratic League
made up of the leadership of several" of the
parties opposed to Sukarna's new Parliament.
Also the newspapers controlled by the parties
making up the League have launched a viru-
lent campaign against the installation of Su-
karno's appointed Parliament and against his
rumored plan to include the PI~I in the cab-
inet. Moreover, the press has attacked Su-
harno personal]y in an unprecedented manner.
These attacks could not be made without
Nasution's support and protection, and in-
formed Indonesians are almost certainly aware
of this. Since Sukarno's departure, Nasution
has also called, on short notice, a conference
of regional commanders and has toured im-
portant parts of the country meeting with key
military and political figures.
22. These developments may indicate that ?
Nasution and the Army are seeking only the
limited objectives of preventing a diminution
of the Army's position and of forcing Sukarno
to accept restrictions on his monopoly of polit-
icalpower and a parliamentary formula which
would bolster the anti-Communist elements
in the government. Nasution may also be
attempting, in this }process, to ascertain the
backing he would have for a move to seize
"power. In any event, he may find that he
has Created a situation, wittingly or unwit-
tingly, in which he will have to make a move
to seize power or face dismissal or the cur-
tailment of his power upon Sukarno's return.
23. These recent developments, we believe, in-
crease the odds that Nasution and the Army
may attempt to seize power during the next
two or three months. However, on balance,
we believe that the chances are still less than
even that a coup will be undertaken. In any
event, relations between Sukarno and Nasu-
tion will probably be marked by growing sus-
picion and tension."~
24. It is possible that Sukarno may precipitate
matters by dismissing Nasution as Chief of
Staff. Such an initiative on Sukarno's pact
' The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, believes that since Su-
karno's departure i April 1960 on a world tour,
there have been evidences of political maneu-
vering, primarily below the Nasution level. Con-
flicting reports have been received regarding
prospects for a move by Nasution with Arms sup-
port to seize power. The Assistant Chief of Staff
for InteIIigence, Department of the Array, be-
lieves that while the temptation to take direct
political action may exist, such a move by Nasu-
tion is unlikely at this time.
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--~~? st ~~!ate Nasution to attempt a take-
r::--..
over, even ii he had not been planning one.
In such circumstances, Nasution's ability to
muster the necessary support among key mili-
tary commanders would probably depend in
part upon the attitude of the Army toward
Nec~e~inn~c s?c~essor. If. S~.ikarno appointed
Rrt ~ffirer respected by the Army, Nasution
would probably not be able to undertake a
coup. If, on the other hand, Nasution's suc-
cessor were unacceptable to the Army, Nasu-
tion would probably have a good chance of
winning Army support for a move against
Sukarno.
25. If the Army were to attempt a coup, Su-
karno's absence from the country during the
present unsettled period would seem to pro-
vide agood opportunity. It would also be
advantageous to undertake the coup when
farmer Vice President Hotta (due to depart
for the US on April 29) was out of the coun-
try. He probably would play an important
role in the post-coup period, and his absence
would make it easier to clear him of implica-
tion in the coup plot. ~iowever, it may be
that the Army leader's, if they are planning
to take power, would prefer to make their
effort after Sukarno comes home (in early
June) so as to have physical control of him.
26. If Nasution does attempt a coup in the
near future with the support of most of the
Army, we believe that he would probably suc-
ceed. His chances of carrying the Army with
him in a coup effort would depend, we believe,
upon his ability to convince key army com-
manders that the trends toward economic and
political deterioration and towards increased
PKI strength and influence could not. be re-
versed unless 5ukarno's power were greatly re-
duced. The PKI would almost certainly op-
pose an Army coup and a prolonged period
of strife and insecurity would probably ensue.
The success of the new regime in bringing
the situation under control would depend to
a considerable extent on a satisfactory settle-
' ment R-i th the RPI rebels. , We believe that
under these circumstances, a settlement could
be negotiated with the RPI rebels, although
it would be difficult to achieve. A settlement
with the Darul Islam would be less likely.
27. In the absence of firm and unified opposi-
tion from Army and political leaders, Sukarno
will probably proceed to reorganize his cabinet.
He will probably give stronger representation
to the PNI and the NU, and he may also in-
clude one or two PKI members. Although
Sukarno will continue to rely upon the Army
to counterbalance the PKI and to play an im-
portant administrative role, he will seek to
diminish the Army's political influence and
will probably attempt to curtail Nasution's
power. Nasution may lose the Defense M;n-
istry and, in time, be eased out as Chief of
Staff. The President apparently has began to
look to the PNI and the NU as sources of sup-
port to compensate for a diminished Army role.
A PKI Coup
28. For the foreseeable future, a PKI uprising,
involving either violence or paralyzing strikes,
is unlikely. The Communist strategy prob-
ably is to seek power by legal and parliamen-
tary means. The PKI is probably the largest
political party in the country and by all odds
the best organized and led. It would have
a good chance aP playing a major role in the
Indonesian cabinet in the next year or tw?o
as a result of national elections if they are
held, or as a result of playing upon Sukarno
i# the elections are postponed.
29. The current Communist strategy appears
to be that of encouraging a split between the
Army and Sukarno, joiriing the latter to im-
pair the Army's independent pcwer, and then
devouring Sukarno at their leisure. At the
same time, the Communists appear to be fol-
lowingthe equally profitable course cf identify-
ing themselves with growing popular discon-
tent, waiting for the continuing economic de-
cline to erode Sukarno's mass popularity to
the point at which he falls into their hands.
The one event which probably would push
them into open revolt in the near future would
be an Army move against them serious enough
to threaten their existence; this, however,
seems unlikely as long as Sukarno is in a posi-
tion to forestall it. In any case, the Army
would be unlikely to move against the PKI un-
less provoked by a Communist inspired inci-
dent of some magnitude.
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Approved For Releases 2.00~/D$/16 _:.CIA-RDP93B01194ROOOr800010002,11~- ~? i ~ ~ - ~ -
_ - '_`l:--?~'?~?'~ _~?'~'~~ DNITED _STATES??T2~'TELLIGENCE,BOARD 1"-,~.f-'_.,_ .
ant Chief of-Naval Operations for, Intelligence, Department.. _r
-Of the Navy;? the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; '~?
?_ the_Direetor.for.InteRi9ence'_The Joint Sta,~; the_~Assistaat?_ '~
Director o~ th'e?National Security Agency: _The Atomic L~nergy`-'.-?; '?_:~ .'?
' and ~ theme' inteilfyence'?or~aniaatians 'of the ~ Departments' of -??~= ~~ r - -
;'?'~ of?Stafl for_Intelligence, Department.of,the.Arrry; the Assist-`.;~-"
' pence and?Researeh, Department of State; the Assistant Ghief ,~_
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' 4?
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THE WEST NEW GUINEA PROBLEM
THE PROBLEM
To est~rnate probable developments in the West New Guinea situation over the
next six m nths or so.
CONCLUSIONS
r
1. We believe that Indonesia will not at-
tempt an armed attack against West New
Guinea during the next six months at
least. Indgnesia will probably continue
to seek its objectives in New Guinea by
international political pressure and by at-
tempts to subvert the Papuans and Indo-
nesians in West New Guinea. (Pass.
10-11, A-9)`
2. Dutch re~forcement of its New Guinea
defenses and the planned flag-showing
cruise by the aircraft carrier KAREL
DOORMAN. will evoke an intense emo-
tional and nationalistic response in Indo-
nesia. Ho~ever, we believe that neither
the Dutch ~ior the Indonesians will at-
tempt to provoke an armed conflict. Al-
though we believe that a deliberate mili-
tary action~is unlikely during the period
of this estimate, we cannot exclude the
possibility of military incidents, such as
an irrational attack against Dutch naval
units or settlements in New Guinea or an
accidental armed clash. (Pass. Y2-14)
3. The furor over Dutch action will al-
most certainly work to the advantage of
both Sukarno and the Communists: It
will enable Sukarno to rally opinion be-
hind him and divert attention from Indo-
nesia's internal problems. The PKI will
be able to consolidate further its claim as
a nationalist movement and Sukarno's
most loyal supporter. Any efforts of Gen-
eral Nasution and the army to combine
with anti-Communis~ elements against
Sukarno's tendency to increase Commu-
nist participation in the government will
be seriously undermined. (Para. YS)
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~iscussioN
I. INTRODUCTION
4. The unresolved, long-smoldering dispute of
the Dutch and the Indonesians over West New
Guinea 1 has been sparked to possible crisis
proportions once more by the Dutch an-
nouncement that they intend to send their
only aircraft carrier, the KAREL DOORMAN,
and reinforcements for their air and ground
forces to West New Guinea this summer. This
has already evoked a highly emotional re-
sponse in Indonesia, which has included a mob
invasion of the Dutch Embassy, reiteration of
extreme claims for Indonesian territorial
waters, and threats of armed action against
the KAREL DOORMAN if it traverses these
waters. These developments threaten the
present efforts of the Indonesian Army and
moderate political elements to marshal op-
position to )?resident Sukarno's tendency to
increase Communist participation in the gov-
ernment and to the Communist Farty of Indo-
nesia (PKI) .
II. MOTIVES
5. The Dutch. In the Dutch view the Indo-
nesian claim to West New Guinea is both
le;ally and ethnically groundless. The Dutch
consider the Indonesians to be generally ir-
r~sponsible and feel that it is the Dutch ob-
ligation to protect the Papuans from being
The status of West New Gulnea has officially
been disputed since December 1949, when the Fte-
publle of Indonesia achieved independence. At
that time the Netherlands and Indonesia agreed
that the status of West New Gulnea would re-
main unchanged, a,?!th the provision that Dutch-
Indonesl~z negotiations would be held within one
year to determine its final disposition. Negotla-
tlons were hgld !n 195a-1951 and in 1955; in all
cases, however, they ended In failure. In 1951
West New Guinea was listed as "Netherlands New
Gulnea" in the revised list of territories of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands as It appeared !r1 the
Netherlands constitution. In 1956 the Indo-
nesian parliament created the"Province of West
Irian," thereby formally including It !n the terri-
tories of the Republic o[ Indonesia. Indonesian
attempts to place the West New Gulnea issue on
the UN agenda in 1954, 1956, and 1957 Palled to
receive the requisite support.
forcibly absorbed by Indonesia. Q,n these is-
sues there Is a considerable amount of una.
nimity among the Dutch and a high degree of
feeling.
6. The decision to send the KAREL DOOR-
MAN at this time springs from growing Dutch
belief that Indonesia's military capabilities for
action against West New Guinea are increas-
ing as a result of arms shipments from both
the Communist Bloc and the West. The
Dutch are also convinced that the Indonesians
plan to establish a resistance movement in
West New Guinea which could serve as a pre-
textfor bringing the dispute into the UN. For
over a year the Dutch have tried, with little
success, to buy US arms; they have noa? ap-
parently decided to reinforce New Guinea as
best they can, even if this means delayed avail-
ability of some NATO-earmarked forces. The
Dutch also wish to show the flag in the Far
East.
7. The Indonesians. West New Guinea is a
highly emotional issue to virtually all Indo-
nesians. They consider that the Dutch posi-
tion is a typical example of the perfidy of the
ex-colonial power. The continuing Dutch
hold on what the Indonesians call "West
Irian" is considered by the latter to be an
affront to their national integrity. Indo-
nesian leaders have used the issue widely for
international political propaganda, and at
home have made it the hall-mark of national
patriotism. Sukarno in particular has used
the West Irian issue to distract attention from
the country's own economic and political
troubles.
8. The Indonesian leaders probably expect
that in the long term they can gain West New
Guinea without resort to full-scale military
assault. They welcome the growing Atrican-
Asian voice in the UN, believing that this will
eventually result in irresistible international
pressure on the Dutch to give up West New
Guinea. To the Indonesians, the proposed re-
inforcement postpones acquisition of "their"
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territory, and is probably also considered as a
threat to East Indonesia.
9. The Australians. The Australians, who
control the eastern half of the island, also
have a major concern in the future of West
New Guinea. They regard the area as a buffer
between themselves and Asia, and believe that
their national security requires that it remain
in friendly, non-Communist hands. Hence
they approve Dutch determination to hold
onto the area, although they may question the
specific means and timing of Dutch reinforce-
ment.
III. PROSPECTS
10. We believe that the Indonesians will not
attempt an armed attack against West New
Guinea during the next six months at least.-'
The Indonesian Government has reiterated its
intention to seek a peaceful solution to the
West New Guinea problem. The US has on
several occasions painted out to the Indonesian
Government that the US would be against the
use of torte by Indonesia in West New Guinea.
In any event, the Indonesian military leaders
in particular probably estimate that the Indo-
nesian armed forces are too deeply involved
with the RPI rebellion and the Internal secu-
rity problems resulting from Darul Islam ac-
tivities to risk a major diversion of military
resources. Moreover, they probably have
doubts of their ability to land and maintain
an invasion force of adequate size in the face
of armed opposition. They fear that Australia
would support the Dutch militarily and that
the Dutch would have UK and possibly US
political support. In addition, the govern-
ment probably feels that an overt assault
would compromise its effort to win West New
Guinea by international political means.
11. The Indonesians will probably continue to
seek their objectives in West NEw Guinea by
means other' than overt military action.
These will almost certainly include an acceler-
ated effort to build up anti-Dutch feeling
among the Indonesians living in West New
Guinea and among the Papuans, and to create
an anti-Dutch underground movement. On
~~
'See ~tili~ary CapabilitIea Annex_
the international level, the Indonesians will
continue efforts to win diplomatic support,
especi~.lly among the Asian and African states.
They may again request, this time with some
chance of success, that the West New Guinea
issue be inscribed on the UN agenda.
12. If, as seems likely, the ~ Dutch carry
through their announced plans to send the
KAREL DOORMAN to West New Guinea, the
anti-Dutch temper of the Indonesian people
will become more intense. All political parties
will compete in asserting Indonesia's honor
and innocence, and in castigating the Dutch.
The leftists and Communists will press even
more vigorously and with greater prospect of
success their line that the US, as a Nether-
lands ally and a source of Dutch arms, is pri-
marily responsible" for the continued "colonial
occupation" of West New Guinea. Sukarno
will be at the head of the anti-Dutch parade
doing what he can to unite the Indonesian
people in an znti-Dutch crusade. He will
probably allow demonstrations against foreign
enterprises, such as Shell and Unilever, in
which there is considerable Dutch investment,
and may even threaten to nationalize them.
He may also seek assurances of Bloc support.
In the-absence of Dutch provocation, such as
sailing through coastal waters, the Indonesian
Government will probably not attack the
KAREL DOORMAN force.
13. We believe that the Dutch will not take
a deliberately provocative course. They a?i'.1
almost certainly not wish to increase the risk
of having the West New Guinea question
brought before the UN. They probabl}? be-
lieve that they can achieve both their military
objective of reinforcing West New Guinea and
their political and psychological aim of show-
ing the flag without risking armed action. It
is possible that the Dutch will seek to test
Indonesian claims to certain waters that are
generally considered to be international, but
we believe this course to be unlikely.
14. Thus we believe that a deliberate military
action. is unlikely during the period of this
estimate. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude
the possibility of military incidents, such as
an irc?ational attack against Dutch na~~al units
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or settlements New Guinea or an accidental
armed clash.
15. The furor over Dutch acticn will almost
certainly wor to the advantage of both
Sukarno and a Communists. It will enable
Sukarno to ra ly opinion behind him and di-
vert attention ram Indonesia's internal prob-
lems. The P I will be able to further con-
solidate its claim as a ns,tionalist movement
and as Sukar o's mast loyal supporter. Any
efTorts of Gen ral Nasution and the army to
combine wit anti-Communist elements
against Sukar o's tendency to increase Com-
munist partic ation in the government will
be criticized a prejudicial to national unity
and will be s iously undermined. Sukarno
may use the oc asion to press forward with his
plan for a national front government with in-
creased PKI re resentation.
lfi. These effects would be even worse in the
event, contrary to our estimate, that the Dutch
clearly take a provocative course. In such
circumstances, Indonesian Air Force units
would probably attempt to attack the Dutch
force, and might also attempt to bomb Dutch
positions in West New Guinea. Armed
clashes would unify both the Indonesians and
the Dutch against one another, raise the pos-
sibility of Australian or other military inter-
vention and at a minimum harden and greatly
complicate the West New Guinea question for
the future. The Dutch would almost cer-
tainly call on the US for immediate, active sup-
port against Indonesian aggression. ;vlean-
while, the rallying of Indonesian opinion
around Sukarno would virtually eliminate ef-
fective non-Communist opposition to his
policies fur some time.
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ANNEX: MILITARY CAPABILITIES
1. West New Guinea is very lightly defended.
by the Dutch. Ground strength consists of
about 1,000 marines scattered in company-
strength units end about 4D0 army troops
manning a light antiaircraft unit in Biak.
Naval strength is only 2 destroyers and 1
destroyer escor `; naval personnel number
about 1,400. Duch air strength (all naval)
consists of 9 operational propeller day fighters.
Police number about 1,500, mostly unarmed
Papua^.s.
2. The Dutch de>rensive capability will be sub-
stantially increased by the eventual receipt of
a squadron of 24' Hawker Hunter subsonic jet
aircraft, the first~l2 to be delivered aboard the
KAREL DOORMAN. In addition, the Dutch
Army plans to send one reinforced infantry
battalion of 1,100'~men, and another light anti-
aircraft unit of 4 0 men. The Dutch Govern-
ment has annou ced plans for the formation
of a Papuan volu teer corps, and unconfirmed
reports indicate t at the first Papuans will be
"ln barracks" by ~he end of 1960 or early 1961.
In addition to .announced permanent re-
inforcements, the KAREL DOORMAN and its
accompanying destroyers will add consider-
ably to the overall ability of the Dutch to
defend West Neal Guinea as long as they re-
main- on station ' the area, which they pres-
ently plan to dot rough the end of 1960.
3. The Indonesia's have only limited capa-
bilities for invadi~g and holding areas of West
New Guinea. They could probably land a
force adequate tQ capture one of the small
Dutch settlements in western and southern
~i'est New Guinea. They might be able to
launch such an ~ssault without prior detec-
tion, and could meet logistical requirements
for maintaining at least minimum supplies.
4. The maximum to~ce which the Indonesians
could make available for large"r operations
against Biak, the main Dutch stronghold, or
against other areas Would be.about 7,000-8,000
mcccrdtely well,-equipped infantry troops.
Approv
These could be committed without reduc-
ing present operations against rebel forces.
Waterlift capabilities exist for an overall trool:
movement of about 3,500 men, most of it ad-
ministrative lift. However, specialized assault
craft could probably move no more than a
reinforced battalion (up to 1,000 men) onto
the beaches in an opposed landing. This force
could be supported by about 500 paratroops,
and by a naval strength of about 2 destroyers,
2 coastal destroyers, perhaps 2 submazines,
and about 40 patrol vessels. The air force
could offer some air cover aver the western
tip of the Vogelkop Peninsula, in addition to
providing airlift for the paratroops. Such an
invasion force would be far superior in
strength to the defense forces at Biak, but the
Indonesian ability to coordinate and sustain
combined operations of the scale necessary to
seize and hold Biak is very doubtful. The
preparations for such an operation could prob-
ably be detected in view of the naval and air
deployment that would be necessary.
5. Utilizing 8-25, B`26, and II?-28 aircraft
operating from Pitu airfield on Morotai, the
Indonesian Air Force could launch small scale
attacks on Biak and the western half of West
New Guinea. Until the KAREL DOORMAN
arrives, Dutch capacity to defend against In-
donesian air raids will be almost negligible,
limited to the light antiaircraft unit now based
at Biak.
B. The bulk of Indonesian naval and air
strength is concentrated in Java and south-
ern Sumatra. Any attempt by the KAREL
DOORMAN to transit the Java Sea would risk
Indonesian retaliation and be in the area of
greatest Indonesian strike capability. Dutch
transit of the Celebes Sea or the Banda Sea,
although still within waters considered terri-
torial by the Indonesians, would not be sub-
ject to the same degree of ;indignation nor to
as much Indonesian firepower.
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7. On balance, it would appear that Dutch
capabilities to defend West New Guinea from
avert attack by the Indonesians will, through
the end of 1960, increase more rapidly than
Indonesian offensive capabilities. This will
not substantially reduce the capability of the
Indonesians to capture one of the lesser Dutch
settlements. In addition, Indonesian aiz ca-
pabilities for attack support will probably in-
crease in coming months, as cargo and tor-
pedo bomber aircraft on order from the US
and the UK are delivered, and Indonesian
pilots training in IL^28 operations return
lrom Czechdslovakia. In any event, the lo-
stic difficulties Indanesia would face in con-
tinuing to support major operations would be
largely offset by those of the Dutch in sustain-
ing ground and air defense over any appreci-
able length of time.
$. Australian military capabilities in the West
New Guinea. area could be built up to sub-
st.a..~tial proportions in a matter of days. If
the Australians decided to go to the aid of
the Dutch, they could do sa almost immedi-
ately by bomber flights from Darwin directed
against the assault area or against Indonesian
airfields on Morotai or Amboina.
9. The Indonesians continue to have the abil-
ity to infiltrate agents in small groups into
West New Guinea, and there are. recent indi-
cations that they may be attempting to step
up the tempo of such covert operations. How-
ever, West New Guinea fs a most inhospitable
clime, settlements are widely scattered, and
there are not many target groups. The
Papuans are a very primitive people. Most of
them are politically apathetic and are prob-
ably reasonably satisfied with the present
order of things. The Papuans in general, and
the small number of educated ones in particu-
lar, distrust and con~ider as rivals the people
of Indonesian descent living in New Guinea.
The more than 10,000 resident Indonesians
are probably the chief target of covert opera-
tions and subversive activities from without.
However, most of them are Dutch nationals,
refugees from Indanesia, or peoples from the
East Indonesian area where there Ls a long-
standing antagonism toward the Javanese
and toward rule from Djakarta. Moreover,
the Dutch probably have them under effective
security check. Thus, Indonesian prospects
for building a significant resistance movement
within the near future are slight. .
SEC~tET
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 se"2OU51d~t'f6 : CIA='~5~3~0'1'li
To: The Hon. Robert Cutter
Spetiat Assistant to the President
for Nationst Security Affairs
! h[r. Dutles lyas ssked me to forward
I to you the attached memorandum con-
i tziniu~ this Agency's views on the situation
in Iadone ~ ia.
J. Earnzan
Exec five Officer
~4
J ~O N
~~
.~~I
`'
~ti
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 I~Ir.MOAAND U1`i
r """`~' 0"0 /16:CIA-RDP93B01194R00080~010002-1
31 January 158
PAOBhBLE Di:VELOPI~:EN'_'S IN INDONESIA
1. We believe that t`ae Padan~ group probably will deliver
its oltitratut:s to the central government on or_about 5 February.
While the Fadang leaders :re soil reluctant to takes the final
step of breaking with Java and, possibly, causing a civil war,
they s ar co~mittgd to ursus their ob'eztive? of airing
~~
anew government in Djakarta which will act to reduce Com-
~_
muniat strength. will permit more autonomy to the. outer i~landa,
and will give the 1at~a reatcr shir f national revenues. Be-
cause of their reluctance. they wi11 robably be lino
~ negotiate with the central overnmeot even though the negotiations
are prolonged Xar beyond the fivs day limit. However, fi do.
progress i? made in the negotiations, if the central government
TOP T
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should reject their dcmand? out of hand, or ii tLe cer~tr:1 govcrn-
meat begins to receive large quantities o! Bloc arms. the chances
are batter than even that tb~_Pacl_ ~br . xritb`~a
and establish a "Provisional t;ovcrnment of Indonesia."
2. ?be major factors which auppa:z this estimate are :r
a. The group o: provicccial arm leaders, Hussein.
Barlian. and Sum:ial. plus Simbolon, Djambek. and Lubis,
seem fully united on undcrtaki:~g some action to force a
change in the central sovernment. ?hey probably believe
they have or can gain the s rt of most of the military
on Horneo and in the Mo ,sad the Darul Islam roups
on Java and those which control most of Scuth Celebes.
b. The leader of the Natsir wick o[ the Mas jumi
party and their families have recen d a.
W e believe this action is important as an indication of the
seriousness of Natsir intentions. ?has. the Padang group
seems asrured oI the rapport of major elements of one of
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Natsir will
the lour principal Indonesian political paxties.
ort of the M?-~Jur~._?n tht outer islands
have the active-~supp
Mas.umi on Java. The padaag group also ha? some
support tro:n the small PSI-park which has its strength
._......1--- -.~..__..
Y:--:~:~:_;_~,~;;. ~=:__: ; _ . ~>.:..:.. :_o:~~: ~ art of the.
and at leapt the 'passive support f a _ ?'~_~_ -
among the intellcetuals and in the civil service.
c. The Padanq group prcba5ly estirr~ates tlist the osi-
lion of Djwanda and Sukarno han been weakened-hY-.~'e
troubles which have repulted from the anti-Dutch cam ign.
The dissident leaders also know frorri I~rlai`~umt negotiations
with the PYI that ?orna o_` the PNI leaders are deeply coA-
eerned about the row~h of Co~nun~st influence and axe in
agreement that there ?hou'_d be a change of government.
They probably also estimata that D'u~ even though
coxnrnitted to no change of government until Sukarna's
return, desirer ?? reR~?
d. Most important of all. the Padang group probably
estimates that it .can ottai W ?te artlcularl U5
s~3y Moreover, the Group. in Present circumstances,
-3-
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 believer it could suCCeesiull? resist an militar action
~.~~::
by tha forces layal~to the central government. unless
y ~~~~ ._ _ . .. _...
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the latter should obtain a massive supply of arms. ia-
cludina planes aad`~warehips, from the Sloe.
Probable Immediate Res nse of the C_ntral Government
to the U3dmatum
? 3, _We believe that S:?rtana. the actin President. and
ultimatum. but will do
Djuanda wil~rtf~u~e tea ca itulai
so with a "soft" answer whith will probab~,r,Best negotia-
Lion. Neither of these leaders wishes to push the situation to
r
the breaking point nor to bring sbaut a civil war. However,
their ability to maneuver is restricted because both appear
determined to honor their commitment to Sukarno to maintain
the rtatus qua until he re~ t~~ ? T'ht aentral governrr-ent, at
robabl will not attem t to put pressure
least is the short run, p Y p
on the outer islands by cutting off the pay of army units sad sub-
tidies to provincial governments in the dissident provinces.
by_.strengthening garrisons of ,Iovanese troops on Sumatra and
the other outer irlards. or by increasing blockade operations
to halt barter trade.
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 4. The Pzdan - rauwould rotabl a ree to Lie ov rn-
peziod ~givon in the ultimatiun. ~ It is dif:3cult to say haw lunge
the Padaag group would be willing to tali and the extent to
menus offer to rie otiats snd.would not hold to the five day
which their deteshnination to act might drain away.
S. The outcome of such neg?rtiatiaas is unclear. ?he
Padaag group's,baraaining position would be strengthened by
its growing military capabilities and the possibiLty of outside
suppart. both of which will be evident to tha central govern-
ment. Pressure against the government by anw-Corr-rnunist
elerr_ents on Java who sympathize with the F'adar:g group's ob-
jettives will also b? a factor. On the ether band. the central
gavernment would have strong and vccifcrous support from the
PKI and a:creme nationalist elements in the non-Cammuaist
parties on Java. It would continue to draw on Sukarno's inIIuence
and prestige, which. though reducedo a-ould continue to be great,
particularly among We masses and certain elements ai the
arrned tortes. Ib position would be greatly strengthened if
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b: iha Central gcvernrrsent's ini3al pur ?se in seekin~to
PNI leaders to tallabnrate with the Padang group because of
the tlose xssociatioa of their ohiei rival, the I~iaa jumi, with
this group and because o: the c;e:i~ands of tha group for con-
'sideratle provincial autcnomy.
either I~Iat:s ar the sultan of Jcgjakarts had refused to hays
anything to 3a with the Padang groups proposals. The
central government is aided also by the:.disinclination~of the
negotiate would~e to ata~l un~ ti~!~ara? return's, or at least
until it can obtain niS views. For Sukarno, th.ce courses of
action would be pos9ihle: he could agree to t5e fozaatioa of
s x~ew government; ha could seek to prolong the talks w~'-a
taking steps to weaken or to dastray the Padang group: or he
could class out the negotiation and undertzkr forceful measures
to defeat the Padang group. Yn the event Su:carno sh?uld pro-
long his stay abroad and the Padang group became restive.
_ -
Djuanda and Nasution might be torcad eventually to sot on
their own initiat;.ve and either instal a new government or break
otf the negotiatioar.
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?h~ A intment o~ a New Government
7. We believe that the chances are better than e~ n that
Sukarno will accede to the:appoigtme~~ oia.nev~goYCrn~~at.
especially if it can be dOAe in a manner which "saves. his face."
Hororever, it would probably not meet fully any of the major
points contained in the Padaag croup's ultimatum. It would
probably ba made up of non-Co:nmLnist political leaders and
mi ht ' uc;+ it would robabl not be a ove rnment
committed to ri rou tion ainst the Com.-nunists. At bast.
it might agree to the removal of a tew known Con.-nuaiats from
key positions. Such a fuzzy oute~me. while not satisfactory.
would probably be accepted by the Padanp group, at least for
r
atrial period. T'ha provincial leaders would probably attempt
to maintain their cohesion duriag ?uch a trial period ia~ ordex
to negotiate with the new government for their other objectives.
and. if necessary. to_issue s new sad ?tiffcr ultimatum.
Prolongation of Ne~odations
. _.
8. If the central government adopted this tactic. the
Padang group would be is s dilcnarna. Ii they broke off tba
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talks. th=y would bear the onus and probably lose support
on Java. Such action might also teed to bring tae PNI and the
PKI togethar. On the other hand. if the talks continued tha
tentral government world be gaining tuna is which to seek the
defection of various elements gmon~; the outer islanders sad to
build up its own armed strength.
J
9. T'he chances are rotabl somewhat bEtter than even
that in this situation the Pa3an~ arauz`~~t 1~b?ld together and
would eventuall send another~ltimatum. Evid=:~ce of as ex-
tensive build up of the c. pabilities of the armed forces on
Java would probably sraed up such a decision by the Padang
group. If the government i.-~ reply gave little or no satisfaction,
thi? might oecome the point st which the outer islands break
with Java. _.
A Break-off of Ne otiations b the Czntral Guvernmcnt
r~
10. If, u n Sukarno's return. the central overnment ~, ~'*~w?
should adopt a firm line and break off ne otiations. the chaace?
are about even that the Padaa~ groupwould in reaction set itself
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 up :ir the "Provisional Government of Indonesia". cut oft all
_~~
revenue to tha central government;seek to initiate covert -
opexatione - oa Java to bring down tte Bove rams at. and appeal
for international retc+gnition and nczore awns. In turn. the cea-
~. ?Y -
tral ~overaz~nent would adopt similar courses of action and would
stop the IIoa- of revenues to the rebel areas, would ^eek to estab-
t:.~.-
lash a blockade of those areas. and would also appeal for inter-
national support and aasistaa:.e. It would probably deaauace the
-r
US a? the cause of the aituatioa. Although both sidas would be
reluctant t~ initiate serious military action. the chances of a full
blown Civil war d3vclo;.ing would be g:~atly iacrea.?~d.
A Civil War Situation
ll. If a full break should occur between Java a_-rd the outer
islands. and it bostil3ties a?loulC: be in before the Djakarta govern-
rir-ent had obtained substantial sup lies of military equipment. tha
Padang gro would have a better position in the outer islands
than would the central overament. It could probably count an the
loyalty of the pecpl~ and of the forces dixectly under its command
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 3 d 1''~Rtf~`E~$ 0 b b 10
on Sumatra and northcrn Celebes. It would probably alga have
the support of the Atjehnese in northern Sumatra, the Darin
Islam torcee in South Celebes. the Amboinssc and groups in
the other Moluccas which support ttie Eaat Indonesian Rcpublie
movement. and some elennenb on Bornao. `liie are unable to
estimate the outcome of an effort by the Padang group to defeat
the central government on Java. It would depend ir. large
measure on the loyalty of Javanese army uait? to the central
government. tha ca?abilities of the Communists, tho possible
reaction within the army should the Commurista seize or be
given :he role of l;aZerrhip of the gavern~me:-t. and oa the
military capabilities of the forces loyal to the Padang group.
At a minimurr~, the Padang group could robabl launch tairl
wider read uer:illa war:a on Java. V~'hile it probably would
not be able to land significant forces from the outer islands.
it could count on the Darin Islam, the Moale:n Youth Grou,4 -
(GPiI~, possibly some units from the Silavangi Division is .
J
bleat Java, and some voluatrers from the Masjumi and possibly ~ ~~'-.
from the PNI and the NU. -
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Reaction~of Nan-C~rrmunist Co~antrier
probably elicit-littla respoase~ either from the Afro-Asian
countries or other noa-Coriarnuaiat countries. However if
lx. The presentation of the Padang group's ulamattsrr~
aid the. negotiations. ;which ~-e thitslt likely to tollow. will
the Djakarta goveram~nt pu ;litly char ed the U5 as actin in
support of the outer islanders. the Afro-Arica preae would
almost_certainly echo, auc`~ charges.
l3. If the Pad ~ fared a "?rcvi~i~nsl Covern-
rrrient of Indonesia". most non-Comn:ur:i over:~-z,er-ts would
reek to remain neutrrl a:~d ^orne o the Airo-Asian ovarnments
would probably offer their ood officer is ho r ~~ everting a
civil war. Most of there countries would be concerned that
unlesr the situation was rerolved fairly gvickly~ the Soviet Sloc
would intervene to the greatest extent possible cn the side of
the central government. thw raising the passib~.ity of a civil
war of the Spanish variaty. which potentially could blow up ic-to
a x~najor war. At the ^Frne time. the neutral Moslem countries
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would also have sympathy for the Moslem leaders of the
Padang group. Suppart for the Paden you would rol,ably
--------
increase considerably. even among the~.Afro-Asian neutrals.
if the Communists should attempt to ^eize control of the govera-
meat oa Jara.
14. Ii civil wrar actually broke out. most Afro-Asian
countries would continue to remain neutral and mould not ex-
tend recognition to the Palang group. A ma}or factor determining
their attitude would be whither or not the Comri~urists had
seised power on Java; if this happened. probably Aialaya.
Zhailand. South Vietrurn. the Philippines. Nationalist China.
South Korea. and possibly Japan would recognise and at least
extend diplomatic su rt to the Padaag group. T'Se general
treed on the part of most Afro-Asian countries would be to seek
to close out the hostilities as quickly as possible.
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Aeutions of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1S. ?he Blx has already made generous otters of asr~st-
ance to tb4 central government and the presentation ~t tha
Padsng groups ultimatum would have relatively little immediate
Qtiect on Bloc cations. Ii the Bloc leaders eariae to estimate
'
the US was involved is so:ra manner. the Communist prase
that
would scream abut "US im}~erialism", and would press its
arms and technicians on the central government with increased
urgency. It is possible that the Soviet Union would raise this
irsue in the United Nations. There would be little change in
the character of the Floc csmpaisn against the West and the
VS if the Pads-ng group brok. with Jaya but the intensity might
increase. ?he Blx leaders might at this point order the PICT
to lam~ch a major effort to seise control of the Indonesian govern-
went.
16. Ii ciril war should be im, the Sino-Sariet Bloc would
coatinne to offer diplomatic and material arsistance b the. -?- -~
Indonesian government. Ii the Comrnuaists bad coatis to paver
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 on Java. t6a Sino-Soviet BIx tr~ight talk in tersru of seadiag
rroluateere. However. we believe tLat Sinn- oviet Bloe
would not attem t t ~~rc_ with its own iorceo or major
anmbere of voluateere, evea to saw a Commvatet go~-ern-
:Went. Z'ha ehaacer would be much greater that the Soviet
Vaioa would raise the issue in tha VII.
QEF
ALLEN W ;'D ULLES
Director of Central Iutslligence
Distribution:
?he President
?he Secretary of State
Mr. Cutle r
Mr. Robertson
Geaeral Erskine
Admiral Stump
Intr. Cun~miut
General Sc bow
Admiral Frost
General Lewis
C,eni ral Collins
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