DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW GUIDELINES FOR FBIS MATERIAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R000900050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 7, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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7 NOV 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FROM:
Director o Information Services, DA
SUBJECT: Declassification Review Guidelines for FBIS Material
1. The Director of the Records Declassification Division of the
National Archives and Records Service (NARS) has requested an updated
version of the FBIS/FDD guidelines. Such a guideline was last issued
by your office in 1977 and covered FBIS/FDD reports, 1946-1950. A
copy is attached for your convenience. These guidelines are used by
NARS to treat classified FBIS material which they encounter among the
records of other U.S. Government agencies.
2. Please review these guidelines to determine whether they
remain current and should be updated, replaced by new guidelines, or
should be cancelled altogether. For your background use, I am also
attaching a copy of the Agency guideline that was sent to NARS in
February 1983. As you will see, based on the general Agency guidance,
MARS can be asked to hold all CIA information and documents for classi-
fication review by CIA personnel. If that is necessary, then CIA must
provide reviewers. This is currently done by the Classification Review
Division; they will continue to do so, but may ask you for some internal
use only guidance. However, if there are categories of FBIS material
which could be handled accurately and securely by cleared NARS personnel
acting within your written guidelines, it would be the most efficient
way of handling that particular material. Therefore, I am requesting
your assistance in this matter.
Attachments:
A. Guidelines for FBIS Reports
1946-1950
B. Guidelines for Agency Records
1946-1954
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DDA/OIS/CRD/
(04 November 1983)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/atts
1 - RMD w/atts
1 - CRD File w/DDS&T Guidelines w/atts
1 - CRD Chrono w/o atts
1 - OIS Chrono w/o atts
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 Approved For Rel se 2005/08/24: CIA-RD
P93B01194R
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Mr. Edwin A. Thompson,
Director, Records Declassification Division
National Archives and Records Service
Eighth Street and Penna. Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20408,
Dear Alan:
00050001-7
2 3 AUG 1977
The attached declassification review guidelines have
been approved by.theDirector, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. They were prepared as a result of action initiated
by_the,RecordsReview Branch and are intended to assist
your staff in identifying the reports, documents, and
other information originated by, or clearly attributable
to,.F$IS, the Foreign Documents Division and their prede-
cessort, which may or may not be declassified without
further review.
It .is understood that-FBIS will make a reviewer available
to decide upon that material requiring further action, once
a sufficient quantity is identified by your staff.
Please direct all questions concerning applicability
of these guidelines to the Records Review Branch.
Sincerely,
Attachment
STAT
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2 3 AUG 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Systems Analysis Staff
Chief, Records Review S,xanch/ISAS;
Director, Records ,t ecla.ssificatian Division
FROM: Director, Foreign Broadcast Information,
Service
SUBJECT: Guidelines for the Decl ssification Review
4
of FBIS/FDD Reports, 19
6=1958
REFERENCE: ' NND Staff Information Memo-.-Declassification
of Records Originated by.the.Foreign
Broadcast Intelligence Service (23 Mar. 76)
I. INTRODUCTION
The following guidelines are established for the
declassification review of reports originated by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (previously known as the
Foreign Broadcast Information Branch or the Foreign Broad-
cast Information Division) and the Foreign Documents Division
(FDD). Unless otherwise stated, the effective time period
for this guideline is 31 July '1946 to 31 December 1950 as
far as FBIS/FBIB/FBID reports are concerned and from
1 December 1946 to 31 December 1950 as far as reports of
1DD and its predecessors are concerned. (See attachment
for a chronology of FBIS and FDD.)
II. FBIS
1. FBIS/FBIB/FBID translations of foreign broadcasts
may be declassified without further review when classified
RESTRICTED unless otherwise noted below. Such translations
marked For Official Use Only (FOUO) may be considered
unclassified from the national security standpoint. Broad-
cast translations classified CONFIDENTIAL or above will be
identified for review by FBIS representatives.
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2. The following FBIS publications have been declas-
sified for the periods indicated:
a. Survey of USSR Broadcasts, 22 April 1'947 -
19 June 1958.
b. Survey of-Far East Broadcasts, 12 October
1950 - 26 June 1958.
c. Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts,
5 October 1950 - 18 June.1958.
3. Other titles in this media analysis series are to
be identified for further review by FBIS representatives.
4. The following specific FBIS report series are to
be identified for further review by FBIS representatives,
regardless of date:
a. FBIS Special Reports, 1946-1950 (Confidential).
or b. FBIS Far East Information Abstracts, 1949-1950
(Confidential).
c. Ad Hoc FBIS Reports, 1950 (Secret).
d. FBID, USSR and Satellite Abstracts (economic
and industrial information, 1949-1950, classified
Confidential).
e. FBID Facts and Figures, 1948 (Confidential).
1. FDD publications based on translations of open
sources (newspapers; journals, monographs, books, etc.)
which are classified RESTRICTED or above are to be identified
for further review by FDD representatives, regardless of
date.
These report categories include:
a. CIG Documents Branch Summaries, 1946-1947.
b. FDD Periodical Abstracts, 1947-1950 (Secret).
c. FDD Summary Special, 1950 (Secret).
-2-
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 STAT
STAT
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d. FDD Press Extracts, 1947-1948 (Secret).
C. FDD Washington Document Center Information
Series, 1946 (Confidential).
f. FDD Washington Document Center Publications,
1946-1947 (Restricted).
g. FDD Washington Document Center Report,
1946-1947 (Secret).
h. FDD Washington Document Center Summary,
1946 (Secret).
i. FDD. Translation Specials,, 1950 (Secret).
j. FDD Title Cards (WDC Translations and
Summaries, 1946-1950, Secret).
k. FDD Summaries, 1946-1950 (Secret).
3. The following categories of reports issued by FDD
are to be identified for review by FDD representatives,
regardless of date, because they are based upon not
n
FDD-initiated translations of open sources.
and classified submissions for translations by other
CIA components, non-CIA governmental components, and foreign
government agencies:
b. FDD Translation (similar in content to the
Q Report. but including reportage in excess of 15
pages and/or embodying tabular or illustrative
material);
c. U Report (an unpublished translation prepared
in a single-copy typewritten draft in response to a
specific request of interest only to the requestor);
d. Consolidated Translation Survey, 1946-1950
(Secret);
e. FDD/CTS Supplement, 1950 (Secret);
f.{ FDD Consolidated Translation Survey, 1949-
1950 (Confidential).
STAT
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IV.. CONCLUSIONS
1. All documents and information originated by or
clearly attributable to the FBIS (including FBIB and FBID)
and the FDD not otherwise described in the preceding
guidelines are to be identified for further review by
representatives of FBIS and FDD.
2. Upon request, FBIS and FDIC will make staff officers
available for the examination of material requiring further
review.
3. Citations, extracts, and quotations of FBIS and
FDD material not automatically declassified under this
guideline, which appear in the records of other organiza-
tions, are to be identified for further review by FBIS and/or
FDD representatives.
Attachment
,RPP...30i19.4B.00.0900050001-7
 National Archives and Records Service,
Eighth Street $ Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
DD/A Registry
2 5 FEB 1983,
Archivist of the United States
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I ' WAIkINGTON.. D.C. 2O5O5
Dr. Robert M. Warner
Dear Dr. Warner:
Enclosed are the "Guidelines for,, Identifying and Handling CIA Information
During Declassification Review of Records from the Period 1946-54," as
required by Section 3.3(a) of Executive Order 12356 and Section 2001.(c)(3)(i)
of Information Security Oversjght Office. Directive Number 1. The guidelines
.were coordinated in draft with-*...' Thompson of your staff.
The policy at CIA is that our offices must review information for which
we are responsible before it can; be declassified and released to the public.
.In the attached guidelines we, Ve attempted to explain the reasoning behind
that policy. In,addition, were described our activities as an intelligence
agency as they relate to the creation and protection of classified records, and
we have tried to anticipate, at.least::in a broad sense, where such records
might be encountered in the files of other U.S. Government agencies. Finally,
we have provided a three-page listing of the various types of intelligence
reports and publications that CIA produced during the period with descriptions
and comments about where they may' be held in governmental records.
The enclosed guidelines s rsede the "Central Intelligence Agency
,Systematic Review Guidelines" tried by Director Stansfield Turner which were
issued pursuant to Executive Order 12065 and forwarded under a letter of
5 June 1979.
Previously issued guidelines covering the records of the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS), material of the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS), and the Foreign Documents Division (FDD) remain in effect but
will be reviewed and considered for revision as necessary.
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM
ENCLOSURE
I ll? EMIR 193B01194R000900050001-7
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25X1
Sincerely,
Larry E'. Fitzwater
Deputy Director
for
A iiidni.steation
25X1
these guidelines, please contact Director of .Tnfornia t. ion
Services Directorate of. Adminstration, CIA, Min 1 nptnn, D.C. 20505,
I hope that the enclosed guidelines will he iiscCul in your systematic
declassification review program. Should you hnve an questions concerning
Enclosure
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/encl and atts
1 - DDA Subject w/encl and atts
1 - DDA Chrono
1 - D/OIS Subject w/encl and atts
1 - D/OIS Chrono
Vt - CRD Liaison w/NARS w/encl and atts
Chrono
(22 February 1983)
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I TA
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o ec asszfy or even downgrade information from other intelligence services
without their concurrence.' (C)
BACKGROUND
clandestine work, provide s. rt to ie1ements that are engaged in clandestine
work, pr are involved.in p c destinely acquired information into a
finished intelligence product ., ,':teeer their role, there is an interrela-
tionship among these elemenfi ch.mke$ them all sensitive to one degree
or another and an extosure ih oz~ can;; lead to an exposure in another. It
requires a thorough understand ng of these components and their interrela-
tionships to.assess the degree..of sensitivity of information relating to
intelligence matters and pass credible judgment on its classification status. (U)
The inherent sensitivity-of intelligence organizations is attested to by
the fact that no other nation allows, let alone requires, its intelligence
organization to make its records public except after a minimum'bf 30 years
and then sources and methods are still completely protected. This point is
important from another aspect: the intelligence services of nations friendly
to the U.S. are keenly aware of the situation created by the Freedom of
Information Act, the Privacy Act, mandatory review, and systematic declassifi-
cation review, and are very sensitive.; to the possibility that information
that they pass to the U.S. government.,may be exposed. For this reason, we do
n t d 1
INTRODUCTION
This guideline will serve as the; basis for identifying and handling
information which was originated between 1946 and 1954 by the CIA or one of
its predecessor` organizations or 1s information from that period which
falls under CIA. jurisdiction. This guideline provides no authority to declassify
information. _ts purpose is,to provide_background and general descriptions
intended to-aid declassifi tfr"{,fin rev r personnel to identify CIA material
that may be found 1 n. the recpp~ ;of o, : , r agencies. When such material is
found it must be reviewed + lass cation by CIA personnel. This is
necessary because an intelji e, agepcy has special security problems.
All components of an intell ce agency are either directly involved in
During the years 1946 to 1954, U.S. intelligence was passing through a
transitional period., The Office of.Strategic Services (OSS), which played
the major U.S.'intelligence role~dur' WWII, was disbanded on 1 October 1945
It was succeeded by the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) which existed for one
year. The records of the OSS,and',the.,,$SJ reflect a wartime context, being
staffed with military personnel, and putting emphasis on "hot war" activities
related to,the achievement of military objectives. On 22 January 1946 the
Central Intelligence; Group (CIG) was created and began to take in more
civilians while it succeeded inebsorb. g the SSU by the end of October 1946.
The CIG in 'turn was.replaced by-the CIA,on 18 September 1947. The CIA was
c t
xe
d
e
CL as a civilian organiation andizas, ,one . today. (U)
NOTICE
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page
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The world environment also was in transition: from wartime, to peacetime,
then very quickly into .a "cold war," followed after a few years with hostilities
in Korea, 1950-54.. 'Intglligence. activities during the period 1946-54 were not
of wartime.n-atWe but they continued to have a strong paramilitary cast.
Considerable resources were-devoted t special activities aimed at strengthen-
ing the West and weakening the East through various kinds of direct action
operations. Measures were. urdertaken'to prepare for a "hot `gar" situation.
Refugee atui especiallydefectRor,debriefings were an important source of
.intelligence information although classical intelligence collection operations
were not ignored. 'Throughou4 this period the "iron curtain" between the West
and East Proved very. di:ffi .forour relatively young intelligence agencies
to penetrate, and.# est
lfol; ,the f'ow.of even overt information to the
West. That forced co,liect Iforts'into many unlikely areas which normally
would be considered pvert~
Tearing-,this.er od:, CIA end the other U, S. national security agencies
were .leax'ni.ng to totird ntellt genre act; v; t; es and
urn
channels 'tliems,elves i - r
gtfer IJ. S.. government agencies to get
The identification of_* i.ntelligence related documents and information can
be very difficult, and one purpose, of,this guideline is to assist the records
reviewer in identifying records that relate to intelligence and, more
specifically, to CIA. When files are encountered that relate to CIA, or
relate to intelligence matters, but the specific organization cannot be
determined, they should be given to CIA for declassification review. (U)
GENERAL GUIDELINE
For the_purpose,of identifying information relating to CIA we may break
down its activities into four,.major.areas: Plans and Policies; Collection;
Processing and Analysis; and Production and Dissemination. Following is a
brief general description of.each of these areas intended to serve as a
fra
k
i
h
mewor
w
thin w
ich to identify CIA intelligence related information. (U)
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Plans and Policies - Overall guidance to the intelligence
community comes rom 'National ,Security Council (NSC). Many
intelligence activities, particularly special activities, are
initiated. by.the NSC or by, presidential commissions such as the
Psychological Strategy Board (PSB).or the Operations Coordinating
Board.(OCB). Several agencies may be involved in discussing and
eventually adopting and.foz lating such guidance and the record
of such collective activities may be held by all .the participating
agencies. The implementat on of such plans must be. coordinated at
all levels and with the many.,.types of units. This broad involvement
will be documented and. , thatrecord.will be found somewhere in the
files of the participating agencies. At the NSC level planning
papers often do 'not indicate.the,.source of the specific information
used. In such a document if an intelligence matter is involved and
.it is-,not possible to. .identify ;the specific agency or department
responsible' fora the information,,,; CIA would like to have the
opportunity to review that_,material. Classified planning and
policy. records relating , to; intelligence activities normally will
require protection for long periods of time because (1) they
officially confirm.U.S. involvement and preclude the use of plausible
denial and, (2)' might provide details which could compromise
intelligence sources and methods. (C)
Collection - The acquisition of intelligence information by
all meto o human and technical. This involves the
development, placement, and exploitation of sources that can
obtain the intelligence information that our government needs.
The protection of these intelligence sources is paramount to
preserve the flow. of.intelligence information, to prevent disruption
in our foreign relations,, to protect. those persons and organizations
who risk themselves on.our behalf, to protect our national
investment in costly projects and technical devices, and to prevent
the targeted, persons and.countries from becoming aware of our
intelligence efforts and degree of success so they will not take
actions to nullify the results. obtained or take aggressive
countermeasures detrimental to our national security. (U)
25X1
FNTIAL ...... _.. __. ~...,. r.r.~..
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While it isgeneral
ly,known, and therefore unclassified, that
CIA conducts inte11igen~ operations around the world, the details
and ,.specifics The. CIA's covert presence abroad
is made possible ;by
e of..covor, and to maintain that cover
th
U S
e
h
s
d
p
f
e
governm } t C tl
t
at a
peci
Wle
g
ic CIA
. . ;,. presence exists 61
~~LL is also important to protect friends
`
and .allies and. ,to:,avo
~. al ? r latl ' r Y? a
Security Classification
Collections of.'their raw field reports can reveal a great deal about
the organization that produced them. Therefore, all raw, unevaluated,
field intelligence reports related 1 January 1946 or later are
withheld from automatic; Op-classification under the authority of a
letter from the DCI.to 0i' vi
of the U.S. dated 16 October
1978 which was approved by the Archivist. (U)
component.,= an allied cotx-y, or general description of the nature
of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and one of these
components is classified CIDENTIAL unless a higher classification
orno,.classification has been specified by mutual agreement with the
government or organization concerned. Finally, intelligence agency
elements are,; stationed abroad to'obtain and report information.
,
e~fiectivo ,18 Ja~nuary,'1
Attachment A), states that the ..fact of
intelligence cooperation etween"the U.S. and a specific governmental
91.
Foreign Intelligehce Or'
25X1
Processing and Analysis - Processing is the conversion of
technica ata into information useful to the intelligence analyst.
An example would be the development of film from overhead
reconnaissance, and its ' exan ination and reporting by photo interpreters.
Since most of this conversion falls under the heading of
"intelligence methods", the process and technical parameters are
always classified, with the most highly classified information
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rton
irn our foreign relations by. not
~r-~.,in specific countries or of our
Inte11igence Directive (DCID)
{.i,ce:;`on Liaison Relationships With
ani#tions and Foreign Security Services
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+develppent of countermeasures to
.$ cess, gfthe system and data which, if
berg
40 A0
divuiQed., . Auld ` :
-negate coJ. ect of
arising from such 'joint activities must be
.'classified. 4p
coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C)
technic l allect an a joint effort,` with CIA sharing
contracting, appropriat t s, testing, etc. with other agencies.
Consvequently, many'docummments,concerning such joint efforts will be
found `., n. the. files.. of all, participating agencies. The review of
of Def s 'I'hs resea derelppment of advanced methods of
ield of 'er JN ip 4 oint effort by CIA and other
f + y) 3
u. S. gcrv imen a pai ocularly elements of the Department
process us ed by all "Y"s ts. Btmt the fact that the Agency employs
unique int 11 se 6:.0 tb+ .ogies, for example, to estimate the
casts of orei t de. ,, , ctivities, is classified. So are
essing the impact of natural
analytica3 s
;Tui ass
resources,;sc ence and 't iology development, and food and
population factors on for ign military, political, and economic
responses to. the US. The substantive intelligence produced by
such analysis is often unaviiilable any other way. (C)
As in the:case of.processing, CIA has often shared analysis
duties with other government agencies, with many of the private
"think tanks, ".and-withinAlyticgl institutions sponsored by
various American universities. CtA often has-shared in contracts
other U.S.government,agencies have. had with such institutions.
Once..again, this will result in ciocuments of interest to CIA being
found'in many files within; and: outside the intelligence, community,
and review of these classified records from joint activities must
be coordinated with all.the agencies involved. (C)
Production and Dissemination - The basic informational end
product an i t_61T genre sere ce is the finished intelligence
report. It results from. the collation, analysis, and evaluation
of information;available on a particular subject from all sources
both overt and covert.; ' (Attachment B is a list of many of the
finished intelligence products that were published and disseminated
by CIA'during the period 1.946.54.) Most finished intelligence
reports are classified. 'Many of. them include information from
other U.S. government agencies or from foreign governments. This
means that classification review must be coordinated with other
interested elements before the information can be downgraded or
man ,:;spec fic, tecnni.?c es t w;L l ;be classified. The weighing and
-Lng estab,is, of priorities for collection data and its use in
estimatingoreign'capabllities and intentions is an intellectual
soiut nn soil stt r, fr+ ting our policy makers There are
__-Ana .ysas is generai..y; mown. ana unaerstooa as the collation
and, proces i ig of, raft .. frpmmz zany different sources to find the
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declassi.fted. !In some cases the titles of' intelligence reports
tn.~y`be s+ r-sitivo grid 'req tb careful handling. Also, these
publications receive very wide distribution throughout the U.S.
government and therefor, will. be ;found in considerable jiurd:,crs and
in a variety. of files 'not only in the records of intelligence and
national security' agencies ` init. other U. S.. government agencies as
well. (U)
As.noted above, information that CIA is responsible for may appear ill
docwnrients which are not clearly discernible as CIA-originated, or in doc mnents
originated by other agencies This makes the identification of CIA involvement
very difficult. As a bottom line, ?we-'request reviewers to coordinate with CIA
any information in any doc; nt bearing on, or suspected of bearing on, any of
the topics discussed in this paper. Queries should. be directed to the
Classification Review Division; Office of Information Services Direc.'toratc, of
Administration, CIA, Washington, .D.C. 20505, or telephone 25X1
Attachments:
A. DCID
B. CIA INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS PRODUCED
DURING THE PERIOD 1946-54
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE ON LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS
WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND FOREIGN
SECURITY SERVICES
(Effective 18 January 1982)
Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order
12333, and Executive Order 12065, the following is established as security
classification guidance to representatives of U.S. departments, agencies and military
commands who conduct, supervise or coordinate intelligence liaison with foreign
intelligence and security services and international organization.
1. The fact of broad, general intelligence cooperation with a country or group of
countries with which the United States maintains formal military alliances or
agreements (e.g., NATO) is unclassified.
2. The fact of intelligence cooperation between the United States and a specific
governmental component in an allied country (see 1 above), or general description of
the nature of intelligence cooperation between the United States and one of the
foregoing parties is classified Confidential unless a higher classification or no
classification is specified by mutual agreement with the government or organization
concerned.
3. The fact of intelligence cooperation between the United States and specifically
named foreign countries and governmental components thereof with which the
United States is not allied is classified Secret unless a different classification is
mutually agreed upon.
4. Details of or specifics concerning any intelligence liaison or exchange agreement
will be classified according to content.
5. The identities (including name or title) of foreign governmental or military
personnel who provide intelligence pursuant to such agreements or liaison
relationships will be protected at the same level of classification which applies to the
fact of the intelligence cooperation, or at such different level as may be mutually
agreed upon.
6. Information classified in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 above shall
not be released to any component of either a foreign government or an international
organization without the mutual agreement of the originating parties.
7. Information classified in accordance with this guidance shall be protected as
specified in applicable Executive Orders and may be declassified only in accordance
with the mutual desires of the United States and the foreign government or
international organization whose interests are involved.
8. This directive does not apply to any liaison relationship that is concerned with
U.S. internal security functions, or with criminal or disciplinary matters that are not
directly related to foreign intelligence.
' This directive supersedes DCID 1/10 effective 18 May 1976. Nothing in this directive shall supersede
the guidance provided in DCID 6/3.
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
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The follow - gis'.a'list fof
were produced and dis'semina
1946-54. Copies may be four
.a en that , 1
. g cy . had need of or
publications often changed
sheets with a CIA letterhe ? o a<
however. a plain cover can only
,
er ---_;_ 4
the ('TA rav 3i t' TJa c ? r~ltnX : ?'nr aer~?ri +.. .+v. i4 c.,. ml.: s .. z ~.
publications that are', or could be attributable to CIA, they should be
forwarded to the Classificatipri Review Division, Office of Information
Services, Directorate of Administration, CIA, Washington,D.C. 20505.
National Intelli ence Surveys (NIS) - Encyclopedic compendium
of facts a ut a specs ic'country-, published by section, with
contributions from all members of the intelligence community; e.g.,
USSR: Agriculture, Bolivia: Naval Forces, etc. The sections were
pu lis e as complete , dhd some sections were updated several
times before the program ended.. The NIS's succeeded the JANIS
reports, a similar series published during World War II by a Joint
Army-Navy team.
is ray L.tvupiei.e a b cuirern lI~S 7.L4 on J ;Ien)ory can mai a it but there may be
other.series'found in coven t:-files.` As experience reveals additional
-term problems or situations, and project policy analysis into the
future.
the United States intelligence Board (USIB)), with contributions
from,all~-members of the intelligence community. NIS's cover long
CIA, on behalf of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) (later
National'Intelli ence Estimate (NIE) Produced and
coordinate during this perioby the Office of National Estimates
Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE) - originally
calleSL-1s, later ca a s. iginated the same way as the
NIE's, except that they are spot reports covering immediate
problems or crises.
Cufrerit Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) - Brief reports alerting
the intelligence cc qty senior policy officials to world
events of particular interest. Published daily by the Office of
Current Intelligence and given wide distribution.
version of the ~IB,
MORI/CDF this page
GENCE REPORTS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CIA.
PUBLICATIONS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CIA.
,shed intelligence publications that
the government during the period
reign- intelligence. The titles of: the
years, as did the designations of many
,,went number. In:certain cases,
eoctmient title was substituted
or
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,UNCLASSIFIED
 Approved For ft ease 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R600900050001-7
(CAS), and its codeword version,
yi t+r (CIWR) - longer, more
es on;current problem'areas-'-'published
re annexes which gave a fuller treatment
aeannexes. were sometimes published
p riodics~lly.by the Current. Support Staff of the Office of Research
Current Support Memos.and t7~trrent Support Briefslow level
c
n
monographs o economis .s jests of current interest Pblished
"u
.:and; Reports. Some: items were codeword.
on' Party doctrine. Totes studies 'were published in series,.by
spect$;o anternationa sm; e'.g., the Sim-Soviet dispute
scnoiariy reports on various
Studies:: pro by the nor search to on International
t ,4 B80 'Pi rs, `CAB'A~t", pe `ers,r and POLO Papers - were' Staff
subject matter.. Sometimes they were called projects.
Studies in ;In1~ei]i articles and book reviews of lastin
g
interes ri rote
gencex story, published (during this period) by
:
the. CIA,. pfficefof..Tra , on a :quarterly basis. Classified, but
some times':appeaireed with , tmclassified annex attached.
intelligence interest. 'These were. classified to protect the method
of acquisition and/or the intelligence interest. During most of
this period., the Foreign Document Division was part of the'`CIA,.
Office of Operations. Hence, many FDD translations appeared as
Office of Operations (00) reports.
Forei Document Division (FDD) Translations of foreign
language articles from books, magazines, and periodicals of
Consolidated Translation Surve Longer reports by FDD which
numerous foreign language articles of intelligence interest
? for the latest information (often scientific, technical, or economic)
on a single subject, e.g., Soviet electronics, Chinese Medicine, etc.
Forei Broadcast Information Division Daily Report (FBID)
published in five volumes daily except Saturday and unday) by area
of.the world, in both classified:arid unclassified versions. At
that time, FBID was subordinated..'to the Office of Operations.
Radio Propaganda Reports - produced by FBID's Radio Propaganda
Branch.. , ; }ese, reports a'"Tyed Cotnaiist policies, and especially
policy c angel, as evtdence,by their radio propaganda broadcasts.
These were classified.
MORI/CDF this page
Approved For Relea uBC SI AFPDB01194R000900050001-7
 Nulner-bili Sere s t Reits Dad D
e
io action aeries,
Current^ the o nment r is - . r.:: ID reporting o in ormat1 on
fore
gn
ad
o
b
d
_
Via!' T.: ..
+~ .
i
,
roa
casts. For -
example, because . of the. .b6 larity of rarl i
countries often,' came
these reports. Published as necessary.
These were claccifiiaA
OCR Reference Aids The Gra hies De
p
25X1
, gster, Industrial Register
and Sp,
ecia egister o',the?.Office of Central Reference also
produced reference aids in 7h6 fields of film and still photography,
plant intelligence,.and.other non-biographic fields.
Intelligence Publications Index (IPI) - a bibliographic aid
which in exe c asst i articles a
int
lli
.
e
gence interest from all
U. S..government sources (includin
cont
g
ractors) and was disseminated
throughout the intelligence comity. These were classified.
d .-._...:i ~.._ , _
Pohl i chPrl monthl
y an
matter ?may wua,ily p.receaea by the subject
onom~,c telli ence Re orts, Scientific Intelligence
a c me ence? orts,
Re its Geo oto ra sic me L :LA
rtS
periodically. Classifie and disseminated nacccordingctossubject matters
but usually single subje4s,
y e me igence free orate - monograp s produced
( 1111,.Lriy~:J1.L1Ljj
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Intelligence Memoranda
-'alt
,
o preceded by the subject in the title
,
as S?i~enti is to i e iem
d
or8n
m
t - shorter than reports, and usua
wi ess rese
lly
an cool:
t ori. Clas
ifi
s
ed and published as
the occasion warranted. MORIICDF this
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STAT