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August 19, 2005
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November 7, 1963
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Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194090005 7 NOV 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service FROM: Director o Information Services, DA SUBJECT: Declassification Review Guidelines for FBIS Material 1. The Director of the Records Declassification Division of the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) has requested an updated version of the FBIS/FDD guidelines. Such a guideline was last issued by your office in 1977 and covered FBIS/FDD reports, 1946-1950. A copy is attached for your convenience. These guidelines are used by NARS to treat classified FBIS material which they encounter among the records of other U.S. Government agencies. 2. Please review these guidelines to determine whether they remain current and should be updated, replaced by new guidelines, or should be cancelled altogether. For your background use, I am also attaching a copy of the Agency guideline that was sent to NARS in February 1983. As you will see, based on the general Agency guidance, MARS can be asked to hold all CIA information and documents for classi- fication review by CIA personnel. If that is necessary, then CIA must provide reviewers. This is currently done by the Classification Review Division; they will continue to do so, but may ask you for some internal use only guidance. However, if there are categories of FBIS material which could be handled accurately and securely by cleared NARS personnel acting within your written guidelines, it would be the most efficient way of handling that particular material. Therefore, I am requesting your assistance in this matter. Attachments: A. Guidelines for FBIS Reports 1946-1950 B. Guidelines for Agency Records 1946-1954 Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R000900050001-7 Approved For FWase 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194RWO900050001-7 DDA/OIS/CRD/ (04 November 1983) Distribution: Orig - Addressee w/atts 1 - RMD w/atts 1 - CRD File w/DDS&T Guidelines w/atts 1 - CRD Chrono w/o atts 1 - OIS Chrono w/o atts Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R000900050001-7 Approved For Rel se 2005/08/24: CIA-RD P93B01194R CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 Mr. Edwin A. Thompson, Director, Records Declassification Division National Archives and Records Service Eighth Street and Penna. Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20408, Dear Alan: 00050001-7 2 3 AUG 1977 The attached declassification review guidelines have been approved by.theDirector, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. They were prepared as a result of action initiated by_the,RecordsReview Branch and are intended to assist your staff in identifying the reports, documents, and other information originated by, or clearly attributable to,.F$IS, the Foreign Documents Division and their prede- cessort, which may or may not be declassified without further review. It .is understood that-FBIS will make a reviewer available to decide upon that material requiring further action, once a sufficient quantity is identified by your staff. Please direct all questions concerning applicability of these guidelines to the Records Review Branch. Sincerely, Attachment STAT Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R000900050001-7 Approved For Reese 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194RO 5900050001-7 2 3 AUG 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Systems Analysis Staff Chief, Records Review S,xanch/ISAS; Director, Records ,t ecla.ssificatian Division FROM: Director, Foreign Broadcast Information, Service SUBJECT: Guidelines for the Decl ssification Review 4 of FBIS/FDD Reports, 19 6=1958 REFERENCE: ' NND Staff Information Memo-.-Declassification of Records Originated by.the.Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (23 Mar. 76) I. INTRODUCTION The following guidelines are established for the declassification review of reports originated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (previously known as the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch or the Foreign Broad- cast Information Division) and the Foreign Documents Division (FDD). Unless otherwise stated, the effective time period for this guideline is 31 July '1946 to 31 December 1950 as far as FBIS/FBIB/FBID reports are concerned and from 1 December 1946 to 31 December 1950 as far as reports of 1DD and its predecessors are concerned. (See attachment for a chronology of FBIS and FDD.) II. FBIS 1. FBIS/FBIB/FBID translations of foreign broadcasts may be declassified without further review when classified RESTRICTED unless otherwise noted below. Such translations marked For Official Use Only (FOUO) may be considered unclassified from the national security standpoint. Broad- cast translations classified CONFIDENTIAL or above will be identified for review by FBIS representatives. Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R000900050001-7 Approved ForR ase 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93BO119 0900050001-7 2. The following FBIS publications have been declas- sified for the periods indicated: a. Survey of USSR Broadcasts, 22 April 1'947 - 19 June 1958. b. Survey of-Far East Broadcasts, 12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958. c. Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts, 5 October 1950 - 18 June.1958. 3. Other titles in this media analysis series are to be identified for further review by FBIS representatives. 4. The following specific FBIS report series are to be identified for further review by FBIS representatives, regardless of date: a. FBIS Special Reports, 1946-1950 (Confidential). or b. FBIS Far East Information Abstracts, 1949-1950 (Confidential). c. Ad Hoc FBIS Reports, 1950 (Secret). d. FBID, USSR and Satellite Abstracts (economic and industrial information, 1949-1950, classified Confidential). e. FBID Facts and Figures, 1948 (Confidential). 1. FDD publications based on translations of open sources (newspapers; journals, monographs, books, etc.) which are classified RESTRICTED or above are to be identified for further review by FDD representatives, regardless of date. These report categories include: a. CIG Documents Branch Summaries, 1946-1947. b. FDD Periodical Abstracts, 1947-1950 (Secret). c. FDD Summary Special, 1950 (Secret). -2- Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R000900050001-7 STAT STAT Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R00090005000Fr d. FDD Press Extracts, 1947-1948 (Secret). C. FDD Washington Document Center Information Series, 1946 (Confidential). f. FDD Washington Document Center Publications, 1946-1947 (Restricted). g. FDD Washington Document Center Report, 1946-1947 (Secret). h. FDD Washington Document Center Summary, 1946 (Secret). i. FDD. Translation Specials,, 1950 (Secret). j. FDD Title Cards (WDC Translations and Summaries, 1946-1950, Secret). k. FDD Summaries, 1946-1950 (Secret). 3. The following categories of reports issued by FDD are to be identified for review by FDD representatives, regardless of date, because they are based upon not n FDD-initiated translations of open sources. and classified submissions for translations by other CIA components, non-CIA governmental components, and foreign government agencies: b. FDD Translation (similar in content to the Q Report. but including reportage in excess of 15 pages and/or embodying tabular or illustrative material); c. U Report (an unpublished translation prepared in a single-copy typewritten draft in response to a specific request of interest only to the requestor); d. Consolidated Translation Survey, 1946-1950 (Secret); e. FDD/CTS Supplement, 1950 (Secret); f.{ FDD Consolidated Translation Survey, 1949- 1950 (Confidential). STAT Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01 1 94R000900050001-7 Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B0W4R000900050001-7 IV.. CONCLUSIONS 1. All documents and information originated by or clearly attributable to the FBIS (including FBIB and FBID) and the FDD not otherwise described in the preceding guidelines are to be identified for further review by representatives of FBIS and FDD. 2. Upon request, FBIS and FDIC will make staff officers available for the examination of material requiring further review. 3. Citations, extracts, and quotations of FBIS and FDD material not automatically declassified under this guideline, which appear in the records of other organiza- tions, are to be identified for further review by FBIS and/or FDD representatives. Attachment ,RPP...30i19.4B.00.0900050001-7 National Archives and Records Service, Eighth Street $ Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. DD/A Registry 2 5 FEB 1983, Archivist of the United States Approved For Release 2005108124: CIA-RDP93B01194R0909000 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY I ' WAIkINGTON.. D.C. 2O5O5 Dr. Robert M. Warner Dear Dr. Warner: Enclosed are the "Guidelines for,, Identifying and Handling CIA Information During Declassification Review of Records from the Period 1946-54," as required by Section 3.3(a) of Executive Order 12356 and Section 2001.(c)(3)(i) of Information Security Oversjght Office. Directive Number 1. The guidelines .were coordinated in draft with-*...' Thompson of your staff. The policy at CIA is that our offices must review information for which we are responsible before it can; be declassified and released to the public. .In the attached guidelines we, Ve attempted to explain the reasoning behind that policy. In,addition, were described our activities as an intelligence agency as they relate to the creation and protection of classified records, and we have tried to anticipate, at.least::in a broad sense, where such records might be encountered in the files of other U.S. Government agencies. Finally, we have provided a three-page listing of the various types of intelligence reports and publications that CIA produced during the period with descriptions and comments about where they may' be held in governmental records. The enclosed guidelines s rsede the "Central Intelligence Agency ,Systematic Review Guidelines" tried by Director Stansfield Turner which were issued pursuant to Executive Order 12065 and forwarded under a letter of 5 June 1979. Previously issued guidelines covering the records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), material of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and the Foreign Documents Division (FDD) remain in effect but will be reviewed and considered for revision as necessary. UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE I ll? EMIR 193B01194R000900050001-7 Approved Foc Re seY05/0JA IA-RQP9~01 14RIe0900050001-7 25X1 Sincerely, Larry E'. Fitzwater Deputy Director for A iiidni.steation 25X1 these guidelines, please contact Director of .Tnfornia t. ion Services Directorate of. Adminstration, CIA, Min 1 nptnn, D.C. 20505, I hope that the enclosed guidelines will he iiscCul in your systematic declassification review program. Should you hnve an questions concerning Enclosure Distribution: Orig - Addressee w/encl and atts 1 - DDA Subject w/encl and atts 1 - DDA Chrono 1 - D/OIS Subject w/encl and atts 1 - D/OIS Chrono Vt - CRD Liaison w/NARS w/encl and atts Chrono (22 February 1983) Approved For Rele $3B01I94R000900050001-7 I TA ( %. %a iriurmw t i/-L ( Approved For` Re` &se 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194Rb 900050001-7 o ec asszfy or even downgrade information from other intelligence services without their concurrence.' (C) BACKGROUND clandestine work, provide s. rt to ie1ements that are engaged in clandestine work, pr are p c destinely acquired information into a finished intelligence product ., ,':teeer their role, there is an interrela- tionship among these elemenfi ch.mke$ them all sensitive to one degree or another and an extosure ih oz~ can;; lead to an exposure in another. It requires a thorough understand ng of these components and their interrela- tionships to.assess the degree..of sensitivity of information relating to intelligence matters and pass credible judgment on its classification status. (U) The inherent sensitivity-of intelligence organizations is attested to by the fact that no other nation allows, let alone requires, its intelligence organization to make its records public except after a minimum'bf 30 years and then sources and methods are still completely protected. This point is important from another aspect: the intelligence services of nations friendly to the U.S. are keenly aware of the situation created by the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, mandatory review, and systematic declassifi- cation review, and are very sensitive.; to the possibility that information that they pass to the U.S. government.,may be exposed. For this reason, we do n t d 1 INTRODUCTION This guideline will serve as the; basis for identifying and handling information which was originated between 1946 and 1954 by the CIA or one of its predecessor` organizations or 1s information from that period which falls under CIA. jurisdiction. This guideline provides no authority to declassify information. _ts purpose is,to provide_background and general descriptions intended to-aid declassifi tfr"{,fin rev r personnel to identify CIA material that may be found 1 n. the recpp~ ;of o, : , r agencies. When such material is found it must be reviewed + lass cation by CIA personnel. This is necessary because an intelji e, agepcy has special security problems. All components of an intell ce agency are either directly involved in During the years 1946 to 1954, U.S. intelligence was passing through a transitional period., The Office of.Strategic Services (OSS), which played the major U.S.'intelligence role~dur' WWII, was disbanded on 1 October 1945 It was succeeded by the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) which existed for one year. The records of the OSS,and',the.,,$SJ reflect a wartime context, being staffed with military personnel, and putting emphasis on "hot war" activities related to,the achievement of military objectives. On 22 January 1946 the Central Intelligence; Group (CIG) was created and began to take in more civilians while it succeeded inebsorb. g the SSU by the end of October 1946. The CIG in 'turn was.replaced by-the CIA,on 18 September 1947. The CIA was c t xe d e CL as a civilian organiation andizas, ,one . today. (U) NOTICE # 4 1 ,1=rwC ed Fol- Release tD , A B011 MORI/ CDF this page 25X1 %0 `a/1 141 1i/1.1 '4 ! 1/-%L_ Approved For'Ret 'se 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194ROQC900050001-7 The world environment also was in transition: from wartime, to peacetime, then very quickly into .a "cold war," followed after a few years with hostilities in Korea, 1950-54.. 'Intglligence. activities during the period 1946-54 were not of wartime.n-atWe but they continued to have a strong paramilitary cast. Considerable resources were-devoted t special activities aimed at strengthen- ing the West and weakening the East through various kinds of direct action operations. Measures were. urdertaken'to prepare for a "hot `gar" situation. Refugee atui especiallydefectRor,debriefings were an important source of .intelligence information although classical intelligence collection operations were not ignored. 'Throughou4 this period the "iron curtain" between the West and East Proved very. di:ffi .forour relatively young intelligence agencies to penetrate, and.# est lfol; ,the f'ow.of even overt information to the West. That forced co,liect Iforts'into many unlikely areas which normally would be considered pvert~ Tearing-, od:, CIA end the other U, S. national security agencies were .leax' to totird ntellt genre act; v; t; es and urn channels 'tliems,elves i - r gtfer IJ. S.. government agencies to get The identification of_* i.ntelligence related documents and information can be very difficult, and one purpose, of,this guideline is to assist the records reviewer in identifying records that relate to intelligence and, more specifically, to CIA. When files are encountered that relate to CIA, or relate to intelligence matters, but the specific organization cannot be determined, they should be given to CIA for declassification review. (U) GENERAL GUIDELINE For the_purpose,of identifying information relating to CIA we may break down its activities into four,.major.areas: Plans and Policies; Collection; Processing and Analysis; and Production and Dissemination. Following is a brief general description of.each of these areas intended to serve as a fra k i h mewor w thin w ich to identify CIA intelligence related information. (U) MORI/CDF this page 00~50/SY& this page Approved For Releas 2DU-L01 I 9480009 0 ..v. .. ILs1.4 14 I 1/-%&- ( Approved For'Re1Wse 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194RW900050001-7 Plans and Policies - Overall guidance to the intelligence community comes rom 'National ,Security Council (NSC). Many intelligence activities, particularly special activities, are initiated. by.the NSC or by, presidential commissions such as the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB).or the Operations Coordinating Board.(OCB). Several agencies may be involved in discussing and eventually adopting and.foz lating such guidance and the record of such collective activities may be held by all .the participating agencies. The implementat on of such plans must be. coordinated at all levels and with the many.,.types of units. This broad involvement will be documented and. , thatrecord.will be found somewhere in the files of the participating agencies. At the NSC level planning papers often do 'not indicate.the,.source of the specific information used. In such a document if an intelligence matter is involved and .it is-,not possible to. .identify ;the specific agency or department responsible' fora the information,,,; CIA would like to have the opportunity to review that_,material. Classified planning and policy. records relating , to; intelligence activities normally will require protection for long periods of time because (1) they officially confirm.U.S. involvement and preclude the use of plausible denial and, (2)' might provide details which could compromise intelligence sources and methods. (C) Collection - The acquisition of intelligence information by all meto o human and technical. This involves the development, placement, and exploitation of sources that can obtain the intelligence information that our government needs. The protection of these intelligence sources is paramount to preserve the flow. of.intelligence information, to prevent disruption in our foreign relations,, to protect. those persons and organizations who risk themselves on.our behalf, to protect our national investment in costly projects and technical devices, and to prevent the targeted, persons and.countries from becoming aware of our intelligence efforts and degree of success so they will not take actions to nullify the results. obtained or take aggressive countermeasures detrimental to our national security. (U) 25X1 FNTIAL ...... _.. __. ~...,. r.r.~.. Approved For Release 2005/08/24,,: 3 CIA-RDP93BOl ge Approved For Re1tse 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194Rdbi'lEJ00050001-7 While it isgeneral ly,known, and therefore unclassified, that CIA conducts inte11igen~ operations around the world, the details and ,.specifics The. CIA's covert presence abroad is made possible ;by e of..covor, and to maintain that cover th U S e h s d p f e governm } t C tl t at a peci Wle g ic CIA . . ;,. presence exists 61 ~~LL is also important to protect friends ` and .allies and. ,to:,avo ~. al ? r latl ' r Y? a Security Classification Collections of.'their raw field reports can reveal a great deal about the organization that produced them. Therefore, all raw, unevaluated, field intelligence reports related 1 January 1946 or later are withheld from automatic; Op-classification under the authority of a letter from the 0i' vi of the U.S. dated 16 October 1978 which was approved by the Archivist. (U) component.,= an allied cotx-y, or general description of the nature of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and one of these components is classified CIDENTIAL unless a higher classification orno,.classification has been specified by mutual agreement with the government or organization concerned. Finally, intelligence agency elements are,; stationed abroad to'obtain and report information. , e~fiectivo ,18 Ja~nuary,'1 Attachment A), states that the ..fact of intelligence cooperation etween"the U.S. and a specific governmental 91. Foreign Intelligehce Or' 25X1 Processing and Analysis - Processing is the conversion of technica ata into information useful to the intelligence analyst. An example would be the development of film from overhead reconnaissance, and its ' exan ination and reporting by photo interpreters. Since most of this conversion falls under the heading of "intelligence methods", the process and technical parameters are always classified, with the most highly classified information MORI/CDF this page Approved For ReleaseCD(;"I1.~ L1,1194R000900050001-7 rton irn our foreign relations by. not ~r-~.,in specific countries or of our Inte11igence Directive (DCID) {.i,ce:;`on Liaison Relationships With ani#tions and Foreign Security Services Approved For M ease 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194100900050001-7 +develppent of countermeasures to .$ cess, gfthe system and data which, if berg 40 A0 divuiQed., . Auld ` : -negate coJ. ect of arising from such 'joint activities must be .'classified. 4p coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C) technic l allect an a joint effort,` with CIA sharing contracting, appropriat t s, testing, etc. with other agencies. Consvequently, many'docummments,concerning such joint efforts will be found `., n. the. files.. of all, participating agencies. The review of of Def s 'I'hs resea derelppment of advanced methods of ield of 'er JN ip 4 oint effort by CIA and other f + y) 3 u. S. gcrv imen a pai ocularly elements of the Department process us ed by all "Y"s ts. Btmt the fact that the Agency employs unique int 11 se 6:.0 tb+ .ogies, for example, to estimate the casts of orei t de. ,, , ctivities, is classified. So are essing the impact of natural analytica3 s ;Tui ass resources,;sc ence and 't iology development, and food and population factors on for ign military, political, and economic responses to. the US. The substantive intelligence produced by such analysis is often unaviiilable any other way. (C) As in the:case of.processing, CIA has often shared analysis duties with other government agencies, with many of the private "think tanks, ".and-withinAlyticgl institutions sponsored by various American universities. CtA often has-shared in contracts other U.S.government,agencies have. had with such institutions. Once..again, this will result in ciocuments of interest to CIA being found'in many files within; and: outside the intelligence, community, and review of these classified records from joint activities must be coordinated with all.the agencies involved. (C) Production and Dissemination - The basic informational end product an i t_61T genre sere ce is the finished intelligence report. It results from. the collation, analysis, and evaluation of information;available on a particular subject from all sources both overt and covert.; ' (Attachment B is a list of many of the finished intelligence products that were published and disseminated by CIA'during the period 1.946.54.) Most finished intelligence reports are classified. 'Many of. them include information from other U.S. government agencies or from foreign governments. This means that classification review must be coordinated with other interested elements before the information can be downgraded or man ,:;spec fic, tecnni.?c es t w;L l ;be classified. The weighing and -Lng estab,is, of priorities for collection data and its use in estimatingoreign'capabllities and intentions is an intellectual soiut nn soil stt r, fr+ ting our policy makers There are __-Ana .ysas is generai..y; mown. ana unaerstooa as the collation and, proces i ig of, raft .. frpmmz zany different sources to find the MORI/CDF this page Approved Fdr Releas NPJ : F TfA1L01194R000900050001-7 Approved F 6r Retease;;2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194Re00900050001-7 declassi.fted. !In some cases the titles of' intelligence reports tn.~y`be s+ r-sitivo grid 'req tb careful handling. Also, these publications receive very wide distribution throughout the U.S. government and therefor, will. be ;found in considerable jiurd:,crs and in a variety. of files 'not only in the records of intelligence and national security' agencies ` init. other U. S.. government agencies as well. (U) As.noted above, information that CIA is responsible for may appear ill docwnrients which are not clearly discernible as CIA-originated, or in doc mnents originated by other agencies This makes the identification of CIA involvement very difficult. As a bottom line, ?we-'request reviewers to coordinate with CIA any information in any doc; nt bearing on, or suspected of bearing on, any of the topics discussed in this paper. Queries should. be directed to the Classification Review Division; Office of Information Services Direc.'toratc, of Administration, CIA, Washington, .D.C. 20505, or telephone 25X1 Attachments: A. DCID B. CIA INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS PRODUCED DURING THE PERIOD 1946-54 MORI/CDF this page Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R(900050001-7ATTACIiMENT A DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 1 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE ON LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND FOREIGN SECURITY SERVICES (Effective 18 January 1982) Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, and Executive Order 12065, the following is established as security classification guidance to representatives of U.S. departments, agencies and military commands who conduct, supervise or coordinate intelligence liaison with foreign intelligence and security services and international organization. 1. The fact of broad, general intelligence cooperation with a country or group of countries with which the United States maintains formal military alliances or agreements (e.g., NATO) is unclassified. 2. The fact of intelligence cooperation between the United States and a specific governmental component in an allied country (see 1 above), or general description of the nature of intelligence cooperation between the United States and one of the foregoing parties is classified Confidential unless a higher classification or no classification is specified by mutual agreement with the government or organization concerned. 3. The fact of intelligence cooperation between the United States and specifically named foreign countries and governmental components thereof with which the United States is not allied is classified Secret unless a different classification is mutually agreed upon. 4. Details of or specifics concerning any intelligence liaison or exchange agreement will be classified according to content. 5. The identities (including name or title) of foreign governmental or military personnel who provide intelligence pursuant to such agreements or liaison relationships will be protected at the same level of classification which applies to the fact of the intelligence cooperation, or at such different level as may be mutually agreed upon. 6. Information classified in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 above shall not be released to any component of either a foreign government or an international organization without the mutual agreement of the originating parties. 7. Information classified in accordance with this guidance shall be protected as specified in applicable Executive Orders and may be declassified only in accordance with the mutual desires of the United States and the foreign government or international organization whose interests are involved. 8. This directive does not apply to any liaison relationship that is concerned with U.S. internal security functions, or with criminal or disciplinary matters that are not directly related to foreign intelligence. ' This directive supersedes DCID 1/10 effective 18 May 1976. Nothing in this directive shall supersede the guidance provided in DCID 6/3. William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence MORI/CDF this page I Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R000900050001-7 Approved For Rease 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194Rba6900050001-7 The follow - gis'.a'list fof were produced and dis'semina 1946-54. Copies may be four .a en that , 1 . g cy . had need of or publications often changed sheets with a CIA letterhe ? o a< however. a plain cover can only , er ---_;_ 4 the ('TA rav 3i t' TJa c ? r~ltnX : ?'nr aer~?ri +.. .+v. i4 c.,. ml.: s .. z ~. publications that are', or could be attributable to CIA, they should be forwarded to the Classificatipri Review Division, Office of Information Services, Directorate of Administration, CIA, Washington,D.C. 20505. National Intelli ence Surveys (NIS) - Encyclopedic compendium of facts a ut a specs ic'country-, published by section, with contributions from all members of the intelligence community; e.g., USSR: Agriculture, Bolivia: Naval Forces, etc. The sections were pu lis e as complete , dhd some sections were updated several times before the program ended.. The NIS's succeeded the JANIS reports, a similar series published during World War II by a Joint Army-Navy team. is ray L.tvupiei.e a b cuirern lI~S 7.L4 on J ;Ien)ory can mai a it but there may be other.series'found in coven t:-files.` As experience reveals additional -term problems or situations, and project policy analysis into the future. the United States intelligence Board (USIB)), with contributions from,all~-members of the intelligence community. NIS's cover long CIA, on behalf of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) (later National'Intelli ence Estimate (NIE) Produced and coordinate during this perioby the Office of National Estimates Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE) - originally calleSL-1s, later ca a s. iginated the same way as the NIE's, except that they are spot reports covering immediate problems or crises. Cufrerit Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) - Brief reports alerting the intelligence cc qty senior policy officials to world events of particular interest. Published daily by the Office of Current Intelligence and given wide distribution. version of the ~IB, MORI/CDF this page GENCE REPORTS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CIA. PUBLICATIONS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CIA. ,shed intelligence publications that the government during the period reign- intelligence. The titles of: the years, as did the designations of many ,,went number. In:certain cases, eoctmient title was substituted or Approved for Release 2005/08/24 CIA-RDP93B01194R000900050001-7 ,UNCLASSIFIED Approved For ft ease 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R600900050001-7 (CAS), and its codeword version, yi t+r (CIWR) - longer, more es on;current problem'areas-'-'published re annexes which gave a fuller treatment aeannexes. were sometimes published p the Current. Support Staff of the Office of Research Current Support Memos.and t7~trrent Support Briefslow level c n monographs o economis .s jests of current interest Pblished "u .:and; Reports. Some: items were codeword. on' Party doctrine. Totes studies 'were published in series,.by spect$;o anternationa sm; e'.g., the Sim-Soviet dispute scnoiariy reports on various Studies:: pro by the nor search to on International t ,4 B80 'Pi rs, `CAB'A~t", pe `ers,r and POLO Papers - were' Staff subject matter.. Sometimes they were called projects. Studies in ;In1~ei]i articles and book reviews of lastin g interes ri rote gencex story, published (during this period) by : the. CIA,. pfficefof..Tra , on a :quarterly basis. Classified, but some times':appeaireed with , tmclassified annex attached. intelligence interest. 'These were. classified to protect the method of acquisition and/or the intelligence interest. During most of this period., the Foreign Document Division was part of the'`CIA,. Office of Operations. Hence, many FDD translations appeared as Office of Operations (00) reports. Forei Document Division (FDD) Translations of foreign language articles from books, magazines, and periodicals of Consolidated Translation Surve Longer reports by FDD which numerous foreign language articles of intelligence interest ? for the latest information (often scientific, technical, or economic) on a single subject, e.g., Soviet electronics, Chinese Medicine, etc. Forei Broadcast Information Division Daily Report (FBID) published in five volumes daily except Saturday and unday) by area of.the world, in both classified:arid unclassified versions. At that time, FBID was subordinated..'to the Office of Operations. Radio Propaganda Reports - produced by FBID's Radio Propaganda Branch.. , ; }ese, reports a'"Tyed Cotnaiist policies, and especially policy c angel, as evtdence,by their radio propaganda broadcasts. These were classified. MORI/CDF this page Approved For Relea uBC SI AFPDB01194R000900050001-7 Nulner-bili Sere s t Reits Dad D e io action aeries, Current^ the o nment r is - . r.:: ID reporting o in ormat1 on fore gn ad o b d _ Via!' T.: .. +~ . i , roa casts. For - example, because . of the. .b6 larity of rarl i countries often,' came these reports. Published as necessary. These were claccifiiaA OCR Reference Aids The Gra hies De p 25X1 , gster, Industrial Register and Sp, ecia egister o',the?.Office of Central Reference also produced reference aids in 7h6 fields of film and still photography, plant intelligence,.and.other non-biographic fields. Intelligence Publications Index (IPI) - a bibliographic aid which in exe c asst i articles a int lli . e gence interest from all U. S..government sources (includin cont g ractors) and was disseminated throughout the intelligence comity. These were classified. d .-._...:i ~.._ , _ Pohl i chPrl monthl y an matter ?may wua,ily p.receaea by the subject onom~,c telli ence Re orts, Scientific Intelligence a c me ence? orts, Re its Geo oto ra sic me L :LA rtS periodically. Classifie and disseminated nacccordingctossubject matters but usually single subje4s, y e me igence free orate - monograp s produced ( 1111,.Lriy~:J1.L1Ljj Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B01194RDQ9800050001-7 Intelligence Memoranda -'alt , o preceded by the subject in the title , as S?i~enti is to i e iem d or8n m t - shorter than reports, and usua wi ess rese lly an cool: t ori. Clas ifi s ed and published as the occasion warranted. MORIICDF this Approved For ReleaNQf$SCDB01194R000900050001-7 STAT