A SUGGESTION FOR HANDLING CERTAIN MANUSCRIPTS WRITTEN BY CURRENT AND FORMER CIA EMPLOYEES (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001000030019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: August 19, 1981
• Content Type: MF

L ( EN1 !A L
Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP93B0l194R001000030019-8
19 August 1981
itill-4ORAiJDUM FOR: Director of Information Services
25X1 FROM:
,azet, assi-.-icat_ion Review Division
SLJBJEC'f: A Suggestion for Hand-ling Certain Manuscripts
Written by Current and Former CIA Friip loyees (U)
1. The statistics over the past several year,, demonstrate that the number
of int.elIigence -related writings by present and former CIA employees has steadily
increased. This constant -flow of informmtinn has made mailable to the public
an increasingly detailed picture of the CIA even though the publications review
procedure has been established to l?egulate that flow. Ibis procedure has not been
(and probably cannot be made) perfect, and in spite of the best intentions by
all parties concerned, some s i gn i f i.cant disc insures of classified information
have been made. 't'hese di se icaures have included the names of CIA personnel, the
location or confennati.on of the existence of CIA stations and bases abroad, the
identification of CTA organizational units; at various levels, the covers used
(even specific cover slots), operational methods used, internal administrative
procedures, foreign liaison relationships, operational targets, the complete
Cory' of actual cases, and even the identification of sources. Inevitably, as
vague and minor details accumulate, they take on larger meaning, and the whole
comes out greater than the sun of its parts. (U)
2. There are few aspects of an intelligence service and its activities
which are not sensitive to some degree. Supportive of this fact is the broad
sweep of the CIA regulation covering access to, and release of, official infor-
mation. This regulation defines official information as all information, whether
classified or unclassified, that is originated, received, or controlled by the
Agency in pursuance of law or in connection with the discharge of official duties.
It is the policy of this Agency that such information is not to be used for
personal use or benefit and may not be Copied or removed from the files of the
Agency for any purpose except in connection with official business. When people
join an organization of this nature, they recognize that they are taking a
position of trust and confidentiality, 'I'bis is formally established and reinforced
by the signing of a secrecy agreement. From that point forward they are almost
constantly exposed to sensitive and classified information either by working directly
in clandestine activities, in support of them, or in processing the product from
them. The information gained from this constant, personal, and intimate immersion
will. so permeate one's experience that it would hardly be possible to write or speak
raeaningOil ly about intelligence matters without drawing upon this knowledge or sort ins
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FIDENTIAL.
 CONFIDENTIAL
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it out from irrformat.ion learned elsewhere. To stay in the business one must learn
to protect the Agency's covert activities and the sensitive .information with which
one comes into contact. That the majority of personnel recognize this need and
successfully abide by it is attested to by the small number fired for security
indiscretions .. Recen.tl.y, however, this requirement for secrecy seems to be accepted
by some as valid while one works for CIA but somehow is considered to lose its
validity when one leaves the Agency, as though termination of one's employment a]50
te1Tninates the requirement to protect this sensitive information, or causes the 25X1
informat-ion to lose its sonsitivit? because personal involvement has ceased. (U)
erta inly, ill the field of U. S. lore i
Tr -relal i
it
l,
ons,
seems reasonable to assume
that the public exposures of CIA i nvolvemerit ill restoring the Shah to the throne in
1 r,aan played a rote i n the takeover $o years 1 a ter of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and
the holding of our hostages. (C)
4. TO prevent the compromise of clrassi l ied information in the writings of
present and former Agency employees, the Agency implemented the publications review
procedure. 'ilie internal guidelines used in review have been sharply drawer so that
they fall well wi thin legal requirements, and in practice they have been mcticulous_i y
and defensively applied to avoid confrontation and possible legal actions. In the
past., ,;one material has been released that we would withhold today under current
guidelines, an indication that we have recognized that this threat is developing
and therefore have found it necessary to become more restrictive. 1?oni those who
favor the release of more information we are continually confronted with irgwnents
which are usually reduced to "if you released that then, you should ho able to
release this now." Once any release begins, there is constant pressure to release
viol e, in ari increasingly concent'r'ic and never-ending cycle. Sonic authors have
reacted almost maliciously to our deletions by noting theri and then refashioning
the sensitive information in wording that still would tend to compromise but not
essentially he classifiable. (11)
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5. To staunch this flow of sensitive information, it is rccor llenJccd that
CIA adopt a guideline that would withhold in toto all writings by employees and
former employees that are non-fictional. accounts of actual situations and act.i-
vities conducted by or on dhaif of the CIA. This would include accounts of all
covert operational activities of an FI, Cl, and CA nature as well as those
administrative, developmental, and support activities related to them. It would
include internal administrative, procedural, and operational methods used to
process intelligence information and produce a finished intelligence product.
Writings concerned solely with finished intelligence or other types of products
normally disseminated by Clik, and scholarly writings concerned with the general
situation in the intelligence field or in the intelligence community could be
published after appropriate review and approval. Roman-a-clef novels with CIA
themes would be reviewed on a case-by case basis, and purely fictional wrttin~,s
that vary widely from true accounts will be released. It is suggested that this
guideline be implemented by revising the Agency's regulations on review of pub.li-
cations and by issuing the necessary guidelines to reviewers who will recommend
withholding entire manuscripts that fall within the restricted categories. The
basis for withholding will normally he to protect intelligence activities, sources
and methods, with finer distinctions possible to protect foreign government infor-
mation and CIA organizational data. (li)
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Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 Manuscript Review Policy "; Procedures
rono
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