PROTECTING CIA EQUITIES IN 1945-49 STATE RECORDS ACCESSIONED TO NARS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001300070009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 10, 1979
• Content Type: MF

0%6'fay F`i It
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10 September 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Services Staff
STATINTL FR(M:
I
SUBJECT: Protecting CIA Equities in 1945-49 State Records
Accessioned to MARS
1. CRD has completed its survey of the Department of State's Central
Foreign Policy Files for the years 1945-49 which were accessioned to NABS
in December 1970. In the survey over three million unclassified index
cards and other related classified documents were checked to identify which
categories contained information compromising to CIA. The risk factor in
each category was estimated and a determination made as to the type of
action required to protect CIA information from unauthorized disclosure.
The results of this survey and the proposed solutions are contained in a
4 September 1979 "Memorandum for the Record" which is Attachment A. Mr.
Edwin A. Thompson, Director, Declassification DiV ision, NABS, orally agreed
to the solutions and CRD will prepare a formal memorandum of record.
2. Basically, the problem centers on State and Foreign Service Post
indices which contain extracts or summaries of classified documents; however,
these indices were never classified because they were used in a controlled
and classified area and considered classified. However they were unmarked
when accessioned to NABS and are treated by NABS as unclassified. Some of
the index cards presumably have been made available to members of the public
in the past. A team of CRD officers surveyed nineteen indices at NAPS and
identified about 4,725 cards as of CIA interest. In some cases sensitive
cards must be screened and removed from the file leaving the remainder in
place; in others the amount of sensitive information is so great that the
entire index or series must be restricted. Each of these indices or series
is identified in Attachment A along with the action r uired to protect
CIA equities.
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STATINTL
Chief, Classification Review Division
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3. The classified documents from which the unclassified indices were
made contain more complete information and represent a potential threat even
though MARS personnel are supposed to screen. the documents before they are
shown to a member of the public. NABS personnel use guidelines received
from State or instructions contained in the accessioning agreement. Although
NAILS normally requests other agencies to review documents of interest to them,
NABS personnel do not always recognize those of CIA interest. In order to
ensure that CIA equities are properly protected, we plan to review three files
from the 1945-49 period which NABS has not screened to date because they are
"full of Agency material." The proposed special review team will also check
generally on NABS' screening of 97 other files which contain extensive CIA
information. This work will require at least a two-man team working about 4
weeks at NARS.
4. The State records of the 1945'-49 period are unique in that this
period includes the records of CIA and three of its predecessor organizations
-- the OSS, SSU and the CIG. These records are difficult to review because
different levels of sensitivity are involved, ranging from the least sensi-
tive OSS to the most sensitive CIA. For this reason an OSS reviewer will be
assigned to work with a CRD reviewer on records originated in the 1945-46
period.
5. The next block of the State Department's Central Foreign Policy
Files ready for accessioning to NARS covers the period 1950-54. State
recently offered this group of files to NABS but the latter would not accept
it because the accompanying State declassification guidelines were considered
too general to be useful. MARS is now waiting for State to provide more
specific declassification guidelines. One difference in the 1950-54 State
records, according to NABS personnel, is that in 1951 State started using a
reduced-in-size photocopy of the first page of the document as the file
"card." In this event and if classification markings are visible in the
photocopies, these index "cards" are properly classified and the indices will
have to be handled accordingly. Thus the job of protecting CIA equities
should be easier for this group of records. CRD plans to contact Mr. Clayton
E. McManaway, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Classification and
Declassification, regarding the 1950-54 Central Foreign Policy Files to
determine any problems and propose solutions if necessary.
STATINTL
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4 September 1979
IRANDUM FOR THE RECORD
STATINTL FROM :
Operations ran , Classification Review Division
SUBJECT: A Description of State Department's Central Foreign Policy
Files for 1945-49 Accessioned to NABS; Problems for CIA and
Their Solutions
1. The Central Foreign Policy Files of the Department of State for
the period 1945-49 were accessioned to NABS in December 1970 to become
part of Record Group No. 59 and are held in the Diplomatic Records Branch
(NNFD - NN for National Archives, F for Civil Archives Division, and D
for Diplomatic Branch). Attachment A is a copy of the Appraisal Report
on Transfer Offer for these records dated 22 December 1970. The following
paragraphs describe how these records are handled at NABS, which portions
contain information relating to CIA and its predecessor organizations,
what portions of those records require continued protection, and the pro-
cedures necessary to provide an acceptable level of protection for CIA
equities.
2. The Central Foreign Policy Files, 1945-44., may be divided into
two categories: 1) indices of 3x5 cards and 2) the documents from which
the indices were created. There are three basic indices: 1) Name Cards
- alphabetically by name of person or organization; 2) S urce Cards -
alphabetically by Foreign Service Post or other source source being the
originator of the document); and 3) Subject Cards - nun rically by sub-
ject classification number, i.e., file number. The doc vents are filed
according to a decimal system of subject classifications i.e., a decimal
system of file numbers. For example, the 103.918 series is for OSS general
matters; 103.91802 is for OSS personnel matters; and further breakdowns are
possible. State used extensive cross-referencing in this system so there
are many more index cards than documents; also many documents are missing
for reasons unknown to NNFD personnel. We have concentrated on identifying
those portions of the indices and documents which contain information of
a sensitive nature relating to CIA and its predecessor organizations. On
a general note it should be kept in mind that the documents are screened
by NABS personnel to identify those which require continue protection
but the indices remain unclassified just as received from State and are
not screener yI l1 personneatFiough they do at times contain compro-
mising information.
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3. The document screening occurs in two ways which overlap. NNFD
personnel screen boxes of documents on an opportunity basis and personnel
of the Declassification Branch of NARS perform a complete systematic re-
view. When a request for a document is made and the document is in a box
which has not yet been officially screened, in addition to reviewing the
requested document the NNFD staff tries to screen all the documents in
the box. In this preliminary screening documents requiring continued
classification protection or protection under the Privacy Act are replaced
with a Withdrawal Notice and placed in a manila envelope in the rear of
the same box. When the Declassification Branch conducts its systematic
review all the documents which require continued classification (except
those requiring protection solely under the Privacy Act) are replaced by
a Withdrawal Notice and removed entirely from the box and stored in a
special classified project in a vault on a different floor of the MARS
building. Material which is restricted solely under the Privacy Act is
not removed from the box but is kept in a manila envelope in the rear of
the box. All classification screening is conducted using guidelines pro-
vided in the agreement accessioning the records to MARS and using such
guidelines as provided by State to MARS over the years. When the person-
nel of the Declassification Branch are unable to decide on the classifi-
cation of a document, they refer it to the agency or agencies concerned
for a determination. Such referral is done only at the time the document
is requested by a customer. Once the official screening of the box is
completed by the Declassification Branch, that fact is indicated by a
large white tab affixed to the outside of the box making it very obvious
which boxes have been and which have not been screened. All the Central
Foreign Policy Files for 1945-49 have been screened except for the follow-
ing six files which are of interest to us:
The 101.5 and 101.502 files (2 boxes) (SSU and CIG Material)
The 101.61 and 101.6102 files (7 boxes) (CIG and CIA Material)
The 103.918 and 103.91802 files (7 boxes) (OSS Material)
4. When a request for a document is received, a member of the NNFD
staff will locate the box in which the document is filed. If the box of
documents has been screened as indicated by the tab on the box, the
employee will remove the manila envelope containing any Privacy Act mate-
rial; the rest of the material will be left in the box and given to the
requestor. If the NNFD employee questions whether the document should
be released (particularly in boxes screened only by the Declassification
Branch) or they find a Withdrawal Notice in place of the document, they
will tell the requestor that the document is classified and must be re-
quested.u_mder FOIA. If the requestor initiates an FOIA request, the NNFD
personnel will refer the document to the responsible agency or agencies
for a determination whether or not it can be released. With this system,
the public or customer access to classified documents is controlled by a
member of the NNFD staff; however, in the process they are given access
to an entire box of screened documents.
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5. The indices pose a different problem for us because they are not
marked classified, are not screened and they are made available to certain
manbers of the public. (In preparing the 3x5 cards, State employees
failed. to note on the card the classification level of the document being
indexed since the cards were used by State in a classified area only.
Unfortunately, in NABS possession the cards are considered unclassified!)
Bona fide researchers and persons considered to have legitimate interests
in these documents are allowed into the NNFD area to review documents and,
in varying ways, to search the indices. In the case of the Name Card
Index, and only in this case, the individual is permitted to go into the
stack area and search that index. In the case of all the other indices,
the individual explains his desires and file cards by the batch or handful
are brought to him by NNFD personnel to be searched by the requestor in
the area set aside for use by researchers. As noted above, the file cards
have not been screened and they are not screened before they are given to
the requestor. At our request, NABS has put a restriction on certain
index series which will not be given to researchers until we have decided
whether or not they should be restricted permanently because of the infor-
mation they contain.
6. The period 1945-49 covers the last year of the OSS, the total
existence of the SSTJ and CIG, and the first years of the CIA. Generally,
we are less strict with OSS and SSU material than we are with CIG and
CIA material (See Attachment B - CRP 79-008/OSS - for declassification
guidelines covering the period 1945-47). This means the application of
somewhat different declassification standards to different portions of STATINTL
the records of this period. It also means that some OSS and SSU informa-
tion may require continued protection because it ties directly into the
CIG or the CIA.
7. Information compromising to CIA and its predecessor organizations
is contained throughout one of the basic indices and in certain series
within the other two basic indices. There follows a description of the
areas of interest to CIA in the indices and document files. This includes
the number of cards involved in each index, the dates covered in the index,
the substance of the content as reflected in the cards, and the procedures
required to protect CIA equities in both the indices and the documents
on file:
A. Name Card Index - an alphabetical listing by name of person
or organization. This index contains approximately 620,000 cards.
To lessen the task of screening this index and yet keep the result
within acceptable limits of risk, we first obtained a printout of
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STATINTL
Action required: Check the document referred to on the
card. If the document has been replaced with a Withdrawal Notice,
send the card to the special project to be fastened to the document.
A sterile card referring to the special project will be substituted
in the index replacing the dummy card (NOTE: These sterile index
cards will be prepared by NARS personnel.) If the document, in our
judgment, requires protection, ask NARS to withdraw it and handle
as any other such classified document. If the referenced document
does not require continued classification, leave it as filed and
return the index card to the card file unless it contains compro-
mising information (Special Index No., etc.); in such a case the
index card will be placed in the special project and replaced in the
index by a sterile card. Public access to these restricted documents
and withdrawn index cards will be possible otily through FOIA, Privacy
Act or Mandatory Review requests and in these cases the document and
card must be reviewed or referred to CIA where necessary. (NOTE:
NARS has agreed to and is currently handling records for the 1940-44
period in this way and Mr. Alan Thompson, Chief of the Declassifica-
tion Branch, has confirmed that they will handle the 1945-49 records
in the same manner.)
B. Source Cards - alphabetically by Foreign Service Post or
other source, i.e., "TO" and "FROM" correspondence between the State
Department and its Posts or other government agencies (not people.
or sources as used in the intelligence vernacular).
1) From OSS to State - About 50 cards dated from. 1 January
1945 to 31 January 1946. This is a general file with material
relating to a variety of subjects. These cards were reviewed
and found to contain nothing sensitive.
Action required: Release.
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2) From State to OSS - Twenty-one cards dated from 1 to 29
January 1945. This is a general file relating to a variety of
subjects. These cards were reviewed and they contained nothing
sensitive.
Action required: Release.
3) From the JCS to State and from State to the JCS - About
600 cards dated from 1 January 1945 to 15 February 1946. This
is a general file relating to a variety of subjects including
references to the SSU. The chance that this index would contain
information still sensitive to the Agency is considered small.
Action required: Since there are only 600 cards, review
and withdraw any sensitive cards. Replace sensitive cards with
sterile cards and handle the withdrawn index cards the same as
those withdrawn from the Central Name Index, to include checking
and withholding the referenced document if necessary (see para 7A
above).
4) From CIG to State - About 300 cards dated. from 15 February
1946 to 1 September 1947. This is a general file with material
relating to a variety of subjects.
Action required: Review and withdraw sensitive cards;
handle the withdrawn cards and referenced documents as noted
above.
5) From State to CIG - About 50 cards dated from 9 July 1946
to 1 September 1947. This is a general file with material relating
to a variety of subjects.
Action required: Review and withdraw sensitive cards;
handle the withdrawn cards and referenced documents as noted above.
6) From CIA to State - About 150 cards dated from 17 Septem-
ber 1947 to 31 December 1949. This is a general file with material
relating to a variety of subjects.
Action required: Review and withdraw sensitive cards;
handle the withdrawn cards and referenced documents as noted above.
7) From State to CIA - About 100 cards dated from 22 Septem-
ber 1947 to 12 December 1949. This is a general file with material
relating to a variety of subjects.
Action required: Review and withdraw sensitive cards,
handle the withdrawn cards and referenced documents as noted above.
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C. Subject Cards - filed numerically by subject classification
number.
1) Index 103.918 - About 800 cards dated from 1 January
1945 to 31 December 1945 plus 15 cards dated after 1 January
1946. This index refers to general matters of the OSS primarily
but some references are made to the SSU. This file was used
exclusively for OSS and SSU correspondence which means that
this file number effectively indicates an OSS or SSU connection.
Action required: Review and withdraw sensitive cards;
screen the documents in this file to ensure all our intelligence
equities are protected. These files have not been screened by
NABS personnel. Any documents to be withheld will be kept in
the special project with the index card affixed if applicable
as detailed above.
2) Index 103.91802 - About 450 cards dated from 1 January
1945 to 31 December 1945 plus 12 cards dated after 1 January
1946. This file deals with OSS and SSU personnel matters.
Action required: Review and withdraw any sensitive
cards; screen the documents and handle as 7C1 above.
3) Index 101.5 - About 175 cards dated from 15 December
1945 to 9 February 1949. The contents refer to SSU and CIG
general matters but include six cards dated after September
1947 and therefore refer to CIA.
Action required: Review and withdraw sensitive cards;
screen the documents and handle as in 7Cl above.
4) Index 101.502 - About 400 cards dated from 2 January
1947 to 23 October 1948. The contents refer to CIG and CIA
personnel matters primarily covering overseas assignments.
Action required: The proportion of these cards which
spell out the CIG or CIA connection is so high that the entire
index should be removed and restricted. NARS previously agreed
to remove some indices from the 1940-44 period and they have
encountered no problems from taking that action. Also, screen
the documents and handle as in 7C1 above.
5) Indices 101.6 and 101.61 - About 1000 cards dated from
5 February 1947 to 23 December 1949 referring to intelligence
policy matters and to implementing and coordinating intelligence
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activities abroad much of it dealing with CIG and CIA. As
examples, it includes a basic instruction on the status of CIG?
h 1948 CIG bud et;
Action required: Screen the index, and if the number
of cards requiring protection is sufficiently large, consider
asking NARS to restrict the entire index; otherwise, screen out
those cards requiring protection. It is also recommended that
we screen the six boxes of documents relating to this file to
ensure that all documents requiring protection have been with-
drawn (these are archives boxes).
6) Index 101.6102 - About 800 cards dated from 7 January
1947 to 31 December 1949. This index refers to CIG and CIA
personnel matters and to some general administrative correspon-
dence. This file number refers exclusively to CIG or CIA
matters.
Action required: Restrict the entire index and screen
the documents held in the files to ensure all CIA equities are
protected.
7) Index 811.20200 - About 400 cards dated from 17 January
1945 to 13 December 1949. This appears to be a general U.S.
intelligence activity file but contains dbrrespondence relating
to assignment of SSU personnel; publications procurement; dis-
posal of government property; coordination of certain intelli-
gence activities; financial accountings; forwarding OSS reports
bV.~yu
tion of the U.S. intelligence services, among others.
Action required: Screen the index and remove any sensi-
tive cards. Screen the documents in the file to the extent
indicated as necessary by the extent of compromising information
found or indicated in the cards.
8) Indices 811.20200 A and 811,20200 B - A total of 25 cards
dated from 13 January 1949 to 28 November 1949. Relates to
general U.S. intelligence community matters. The cards have
been screened and nothing sensitive was found.
Action required: Release.
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9) Index 811.20200 D - About 11,400 cards dated from 1
January 1945 to 31 December 1949. The material contained in
this file appears to be the same in nature as that contained.
in 811.20200 listed above. Attachment C provides a random
sampling of the cards in this index.
Action required: The 28-card sample contains only one
reference to the SSU; otherwise the cards are innocuous. There-
fore, it is suggested.that we release the card index (11,400
cards) but screen the'81 boxes of documents relating to this
index. This material has already been screened and much of the
material withdrawn so the job will not be too demanding.
10) Index 811.20200 E - About 200 cards dated from 8 Septem-
ber 1947 to 31 December 1949, All the material appears to deal
with finance and accounting matters concerning CIG and CIA per-
sonnel.
Action required: Restrict the entire index. Screen the
documents to ensure that those still sensitive have been removed.
11) Index 811.20200 FAMILY - About 700 cards dated from 2
January 1945 to 22 July 1949. STATINTL
Action required: Screen the index and based on the
extent of compromising information found or indicated take the
STATINTL necessary action with the documents in the files relating to
this index.
9. There are 16mm microfilm copies of the three basic indices which
also must be considered. The only existing 16mm copy of the Name Card
Index was retained by State and will not be transferred to NARS "until
the frequency of name checks decreases to a level acceptable to the cus-
todial divisions." According to NNFD personnel, that index has not yet
been transferred to NABS. The copies of the other two indices, the
Source Cards and Subject Cards, were transferred to MARS and are stored
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at NNFD, but according to NNFD personnel, are never used. In this benign
situation no action at this time is warranted. In our correspondence to
NABS concerning this group of records we will mention the existence of
these microfilm record copies and alert NABS that they must be screened
and purged of sensitive material before being placed in the public domain.
10. Summary of Actions Required: The actions required to protect CIA
equities as stated above are the same as we used to protect sensitive in-
formation concerning the OSS which appeared in the Central Foreign Policy
Files for the period 1940-44. We have discussed with Mr. Alan Thompson,
Chief of the Declassification Branch at NARS, our desire to use the same
procedures with the 1945-1949 records and have received his oral concurrence
to do so. NABS personnel will make up the approximately 500 substitute
file cards which we will file. We will also review approximately 4,725
file cards to screen out those containing sensitive information and which
will have to be replaced by substitute cards as above. In addition we will
screen the documents referred to in paragraph 3 (16 boxes) and paragraph
7C(9) (81 boxes) as well as those documents requiring individual screening
as indicated from review of the various indices cited in paragraph 7. We
will ask NARS to restrict in their entirety three index series totaling
about 1,400 cards: Index 101.502 of about 400 cards; Index 101.6102 of
about 800 cards; and Index 811.20200 E of about 200 cards. Finally, we
will alert NABS to the potential problem with the 16mm microfilm copy of
the indices.
11. State Department's Central Form Policy Files for the Period
1950-54: This block oFMate records is now ready-
ea y foraccessioning to NABS.
ate as offered this block of records to NABS already but NARS refused to
accept them until State furnishes more detailed declassification guidelines.
State is currently wrestling with this problem and. has not re-submitted its
offer as of this writing. In the Fall of 1977 CRD personnel met with State
Department officials concerning the 1950-54-records and specifically dis-
cussed the indices for those records. State assured us that the indices
would be screened and compromising information removed. More recently, on
26 June 1979, Mr. Frank M. Machak of State in a telecon with Chief of the
Operations Branch in CRD hedged on this point indicating that only some
offensive index cards may have been removed and that we might want to re-
view the 1950-54 block of records and also read the special guidelines
State had prepared covering them. This apparently refers to the guidelines
rejected by NABS as too general in nature. One major difference in the
1950-54 block of records is that, according to NARS personnel, in 1951
State began using a reduced.-in-size photocopy of a document (or initial
page of the document) as the index card. If this proves to be the case
and the classification of the documents is picked up on the photocopy, the
index cards will be classified and NABS will have to handle them accordingly.
In any case, we should survey the 1950-54 records at the earliest possible
date to ensure that our established procedures to protect CIA equities can
be applied as in the past or whether some adjustments will be required.
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?? MFR
AVAILABILITY OF RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'
AvTxoazrY: The provisions of this Part 6
tssued under see. 4, Act of May 26, 1949, 63
7tat. 13 1, as amended 22 U.S.C. 2958; Act of
Aug. 31, 1951, 65 Stat. 290, 31 U.S.C. 483a;
Executive Order 10501 of Nov. 10, 1953, as
amended; 5 U.S.C. 852.
? 6.1 Definitions.
As used in this part, the following
definitions shall apply:
(a) The term "identifiable" means, in
the context of a request for a record, a
reasonably specific description of the
particular record sought, such as date,
format, and subject matter, which will
permit its location.
(b) The term "record" Includes all
books, papers, maps, photographs, or
other documentary material, or copies
thereof, regardless of physical form or
characteristics, made in or received by
.he Department of State, and preserved
A,$ evidence of Its organization, functions,
policies, decisions, procedures, opera-
,:.ions, or other activities.
6.2 Availability of records.
(a) All identifiable records of the De-
partment of State shall be made avail-
able to the public upon compliance with
the procedures, established in this part,
except to the extent .a record is deter-
mined by the Deputy Legal Advisor for
Administration to be exempt from dis-
-:losure.
(b) Unclassified information, docu-
ments, and forms which have previously
been provided to the public as part of
she normal services of the Department
of State will continue to be made avail-
.;able without regard to the -following
sections.
'_a 6.3 Availability of statements of pol-
icy, interpretations, msnoale, Instruc-
tions.
Statements of Policy, interpretations,
j dni1nistrative manuals (or portions
thereof), opinions, orders, and instrue-
tiobs to staff which affect any member
of the public will be made available to
the public for Inspection and copying' in
the public rending room, except to the
extent they are determined by the Deputy
Legal Adviser to be exempt from dis-
closure.
? 6.4 Records which may be exempt
from disclosure.
The following categories are examples
ui records maintained by the. Depart-
ment of State which may be exempted
from disclosure:
(a) Records required to be withheld
by Executive order or other authority,
relating to national defense or foreign
policy. Included in this category are
records required by Executive Order
1OSO1, as amended, to be kept secret in
the interests of national defense or fo1-
eign policy. Disclosure of records in this
category will be made to the public only
In the manner established by 16.9.
(b) Records related solely to internal
personnel rules ' and practices. Included
in this cttegory are Internal rules and
practices relating to management opera-
tions which cannot be disclosed to the
public without substantial prejudice to
the effective performance of a significant
function of the Department of State.
(c) Records specifically exempted
from disclosure by statute. Included in
this category are records relating to the
officers and employees of the Foreign
Service, including efficiency records
(sec. 81.2 of the Foreign Service Act of
1946, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 986), and
the records of the Department of State
or of diplomatic and consular officers of
the United States pertaining to the is-
suance or refusal of visas or permits to
enter the United States (sec. 222(f) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. 1202(f)).
(d) Information given In confidence.
Included in this category are records
reflecting commercial and financial In-
formation, as well as other information,
obtained from any person and custom-
arily regarded as privileged and con-
fidential by the person from whom they
were obtained.
(e) Interagency or intragency memo-
randums or letters. Included in this cate-
gory are records such as interagency
communications and Internal drafts,
memorandums between officials and
agencies, opinions and interpretations
prepared by staff or consultants; records
of the deliberations of staff personnel;
and records whose premature disclosure
would Interfere with the achievement of
the purpose far which they were being
prepared.
(f) Personnel, medical, and other files.
Included in this category are personnel
and medical files and other files con-
taining private or personnel information
which, if disclosed to the public, would
amount to a clearly unwarranted in-
vasion of the privacy of any person to
whom the Information pertains.
(9) Investigatory fles. Included in
this category are files compiled for the
enforcement of all laws, or prepared in
connection with Government litigation
and adjudicative proceedings, except for
those portions of such files which are
by law available to. persons in litigation
with the Department, In which case such
portions will be made available to such
litigants.
? 6.5 Authority to release and certify, or
to withhold records.
.(a) Except as provided. in ? 6.9, au-
thority is hereby delegated to the Chief,
Records Services Division, to furnish
copies of records to any person entitled
thereto pursuant to these regulations,
and upon request to provide certified
copies thereof in accordance with Part
131 of this chapter.
(b) A determination by the Deputy
Legal Adviser for Administration to deny
a request to make a record available Is
final, and no appeal will be received by
the Department of State from such a de-
termination. This determination shall
be in written form, clearly stating the
basis upon which the record has been
withheld.
6.6 Public reading room.
A public reading room or area where
the records described in ? 6.3 shall be
made available is located in the Depart-
ment of State, 2201 C Street NW., Wash-
ington, D.C, The receptionist will refer
the applicant to the proper room. Fees
will not be charged for access by the
public to this room or the records con-
tained therein, but fees in accordance
with $ 8.8 will be charged for furnishing
copies thereof.
? 6.7 Manner of requesting records.
(a) Identifiable records may be re-
quested by the public in person from 10
a.m. to 4 p.m., Department of State, 2201
C Street NW., Washington, D.C., where
the receptionist will refer the applicant
to the proper office for service and the
necessary forms for making a request.
Requests by mail should be addressed
to the Chief, Records Services Division,
Department of -State. Washington, D.C.
20520.
(b) In view of the decentralized na-
ture of the files of the Department of
State, it will generally not be possible
to make the requested records avail-
able immediately upon request. Records
will be made available as promptly as
is reasonable under the particular cir-
cumstances involved.
(c) Original or record copies of rec-
ords will not be permitted, to leave the
custody of the lawful custodian thereof.
Copies, -duly certified upon request, will
be furnished in lieu thereof in accord-
ance with established fees.
(d) Requests relating to records of
any other Federal agency, copies of which
are on file in the Department of State,
will normally be referred to that agency
for consideration.
(e) The burden of adequately Identi-
fying the record so requested lies with
the requesting person. Such person may
seek appropriate assistance from the
Chief, Records Services Division, or a
member of his staff, in identifying the
record sought.
* Federal Register, Vol. 33, No. 93, May 11, 1968, p. 7078 (Code of Federal Rej(ulations,
Title 22, Part 6); Foreign Affairs Manual, Vol. 5, Section 480, Appendix A 4
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6.8 Schedule of fees and method of
payment for services rendered,
(a) The following specific fees shall
:e applicable with respect to services
?erldered to members of the public under
his part:
1) Searching for records, per hour or
fraction thereof. (This charge mus..
accompany request and will be re-
tained whether or not an identi-
fiable records is located.) ------ $3.30
3) Other facilitative services and in-
dex assistance-minimum charge.
per hour or fraction thereof---- 3.50
3) Copies made by photostat or
otherwise (per page) ------------ .40
4) Certification of each record as
a true copy -------------------- .75
5) Certification of each record as a
true copy, under seal of Depart-
ment -------------------------
6) For each signed statement of neg-
ative result of search for record__
7) For each signed statement of non-
1.00
1.00
availability of record ---------- No fee.
(b) Fees for services performed other
itan under this part, as described in
0.2(b), will be charged in accordance
vith Parts 21 and 22 of this chapter.
(c) When no specific fee has been es-
ablished for a service, or the request for
t service does not fall under one of the
kbove categories due to the amount or
.ize or type thereof, the Chief, Records
cervices Division is authorized to estab-
ish an appropriate fee pursuant to the
;riteria established in Bureau of the
iudget Circular No. A-25, entitled "User
:harges."
(d) When a request for identifiable
-ecords is made by mail pursuant to
63(a), it should be accompanied by
omittance of the total fee chargeable,
as well as a self-addressed stamped
'nvelope, if special mail services are
lesired.
(e) Fees must be paid In full prior to
.ssuance of requested copies. If un-
-ertainty as to the existence of a record,
)r as to the number of sheets to be copied
)r certified, precludes remitting the exact
fee chargeable with the request, the De-
?)artment of State .will inform the in-
.crested party of the exact amount
required.
(f) Remittances shall be in the form
hither of a personal check or bank'draft
drawn on a bank in the continental
United States, a postal moneg order, or
cash. Remittances shall be made payable
to the order of the Department of State.
The Department will assume no re-
'q)~onsibility for cash which is lost in the
mail.
(g) A receipt for fees paid will be given
my upon request. Refund of fees paid
for services actually rendered will not be
made.
6.9 Access to classified foreign policy
records for nonofficial research pur?
poses.
(a) General policy. (1) The Depart-
utent permits access to its classified for-
i ign policy records by individuals en-
gaged in private research as liberally as
possible, consistent with the national in-
terest, the maintenance of friendly rela-
tions with other nations, the efficient op-
eration of the Department, and the ad-
ministrative feasibility of servicing re-
quests for access to records.
(2) Former incumbants of senior posi-
tions within the Department shall be
accorded access to records relating to
their own activities, except in those
cases where the Secretary of State de-
termines that such access would not serve
the national interest. Such persons en-
joying access to sensitive materials may
be required to submit their notes for
clearance by the Department prior to
the publication of any manuscript pre-
pared as ?a result of such access.
(b) Three periods with respect to ac-
cess by nonofficial res.9archers to the for-
eign policy records of the Department-
(1) Closed period. The foreign policy rec-
ords of the Department are in general
closed to access by nonofficial researchers
in advance of the publication of the De-
partment's documentary series entitled
"Foreign Relations of the United States."
The beginning date of the closed period
will be advanced automatically as the
annual "Foreign Relations" volumes are
released. Copies of identifiable unclassi-
fied foreign policy records of this period
may be obtained in accordance with the
procedures set forth in the preceding
sections of this part.
(2) Open period. The open period is
the period up to 30 years from the cur-
rent year. The foreign policy records of
the Department for the open period are
in the National Archives and may be
consulted under regulations issued by
the National Archives.
(3) Restricted period. The restricted
period is the period between the open
period and the closed period. Access to
foreign policy records in the restricted
period shall be confined to qualified re-
searchers demonstrating a scholarly or
professional need for the information
contained in such records. Access to these
records of the restricted period will be
granted only to U.S. citizens. Copies of
identifiable unclassified foreign policy
records of this period may be obtained
in accordance with the procedures set
forth in the preceding sections of this
hart.
(e) Special restrictions on access to
classified records in addition to the gen-
eral restrictions listed in paragraph (b)
of this section. (1) The use of clas ied
records or information therefrom is'sub-
ject to the Department's security regula-
tions.
(2) Access to certain types of foreign
policy records will not be given if their
publication, in whole or in part, would
be contrary to the interests of national
defense or foreign policy, such as (i)
materials which might tend tQ prejudice
the conduct of foreign relations by the
U.S. Government; (ii) materials em-
bodying opinions or comments which
might give needless offense to other na-
tions or individuals abroad; and (iii)
materials which would violate a con-
fidence reposed in the Department of
State.
(3) In general, foreign policy records
originated by a foreign government or
another agency of the U.S. Government
and not yet published or opened to access
by that government or agency, will not
be made available to researchers without
the consent'of the government or agency
concerned.
(d) Application for nonofficial access
to foreign policy records in the restricted
and closed periods-(1.) Submission of
application. A written application for
access to foreign policy records in the
restricted and closed periods shall be
submitted to the Director, Historical
Office, Department of State, Washington,
D.C. 20520.
(2) Information to be furnished in ap-
plication. The application shall contain
a description of the nature and scope
of the proposed study and the types of
records required. Administrative con-
siderations make it necessary for the
researcher to confine his request to
records on specific topics. The applicant
also shall provide data establishing his
citizenship, academic background and
research experience. The' application
shall be accompanied by appropriate
references or, preferably by letters of
recommendation.
(3) Departmental action on the ap-
plication. The Director of the Historical
Office shall determine the nature and
extent of access to be granted, and any
special restrictions to be placed on the
use of the information, and shall notify
the applicant whether access to the
desired records can be granted. If access
is granted, the Director will then make
any necessary arrangements for the ap-
plicant to consult the records, subject to
such conditions as may be agreed upon.
(e) Clearance of notes or materials
resulting from nonofficial use of records
for research purposes. The researcher
who has been granted access to classified
foreign policy records shall be required
to agree, in advance of his access to
records; to submit to the Director of the
Historical Office for purpose of review, all
such notes or manuscripts as the re-
searcher may prepare from the records.
The Director of the Historical Office shall
review and then transmit the cleared
notes or manuscripts to the researcher,
deleting such items as the Department
may deem necessary to withhold.
Part 133, Research in Department of
State Records, Is deleted from Chapter
1 of Title 22 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.
For the Secretary of State.
(SEAL] IDAR RTMESTAD,
Deputy Under Secretary
MAY 3, 1D68. for Administration.
MAY
Doc. 68-5632; Filed, May 10, 1968;
8:47 a.m.]
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2 Ju1y 1979
.
Classification Review Procedure CRP 79-32 and
----- re CRP 79-008/0SS
GUIDELINES FOR TI-ll REVIEW OF RECORDS FOR 'rill-, PERIOD
FROM T'Tli'? E.ND OF OSS TO 111E BEGINNING OF CIA
1.October 1 45 - Sc tcmber1 7
BACKGROUND
On 20 September 1945 President Harry Truman signed an Executive Order
breaking up the OSS as of 1 October 1945 and directing the Secretary of
State to take the lead in developing the program for a comprehensive and
coordinated foreign intelligence system. The Research and Analysis (RT,A)
and Presentation Branches of the OSS went intact to the State Department.
The remaining activities of the OSS (mostly clandestine services) were
assigned to the War Department which was to keep them separate in the
Strategic Services Unit (SSU) established by the Executive Order for that
purpose and to keep those activities to serve as a nucleus for a possible
central intelligence service.
On 22 January 1946 President Truman issued a Presidential Directive
which established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) functioning directly
under the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). The NIA consisted of
representatives of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and a personal
representative of the President. The Director of CIG was appointed by the
President. His duties included planning to coordinate departmental intel-
ligence activities; recommending policies and-objectives of the "national
intelligence missi.on;" correlating and evaluating intelligence for strategic
and national policy and disseminating it within the Government; performing
functions related to intelligence as the President and NIA might direct;
and performing services of common concern where those services could be
performed more efficiently by a central organization. Significantly, the
Director of CIG was not given the duty of directly collecting intelligence.
The CIG was described as "a cooperative interdepartmental activity." Since
the SSU had been expected only to serve an interim function, the Executive
Order of 20 September 1945 directed the Secretary of War-to discontinue the
SSU as soon as its functions and facilities could be: 1) placed in a new
central intelligence organization; 2) placed in the War Department; or 3)
STATINTL dropped entirely. Chief of the SSU, was to superintend
the liquidation of those SSU activities to be dropped entirely during
peacetime. On 29 January 1946 the Secretary of War directed that the SSU
should be liquidated by 30 June 1946. The Director of CIG was to take what
records he wanted from SSU through the Secretary of War and retain operational
control over them. Title to the records was to be settled later.
felt that SSU plans, properties and personnel must. be maintained because
they were indispensable for the procurement of intelligence in peacetime.
On 14 February 1946 he urged that the SSU be placed under the Director of CIG.
STATINTL
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9
 STATfiNTV-
As ther4pir~vto` #~l~s'e2/bF1t111-~J~6RJ4ROC13~Ob~A?E~9i-pct the
entire unit, an interdepartmental committee was organized under Colonel
to study this question. The committee found support for the opinion
that the SSU, as was, ought not go to the C0G. Ihe committee had heard that
the bulk of intelligence information came from friendly governments; that
much material came from other sources than secret collection; that SSU
personnel had not been adequately screened; and that many clandestine personnel
had become exposed during WW II. 'glue committee thought that the SSU should
be reorganized and the desired portion placed under the CIG as a "going
concern." The committee thought that CIG should closely coordinate clandestine
operations, concentrate on the USSR and the Satellites, penetrate key institu-
tions to aid possible U.S. military operations, develop liaison with foreign
STAT intelligence agencies I Iwhile
overt collection of intelligence in ornation should remain wit i the other U. S.
Government agencies. The committee also recognized the interrelationship
between the SSU and the RE1A Branch (still located in the State Department)
and urged that their activities be integrated because the R&A Branch was
"closely geared to the secret intelligence branches as their chief guide."
The committee also felt that the Director of CIG should take authority and
responsibility for liquidation of the SSU.
STATINTL
STATINTL
On 3 April 1946 the final liquidation of SSU was postponed from
30 June 1946 to 30 June 1917. Meanwhile, the Chief of SSU was directed to
obey the instructions from the Director of CIG. This made it possible for
Assistant Director and Acting Chief of Operational. Services of
CIG, to take over such SS1.1 assets as the Director of CIG wanted while unwanted
assets would be absorbed into the War Department or abandoned. The arrange-
ments for the transfer of SSU to the CIG through the War Department were
complicated but it enabled the CIG to take legally what it wanted while
Chief of the SSU, got rid of unwanted facilities through the War
Department. Although no specific legal action,was taken, the passage of time
and the inferential approval of the National Security Act of 1947 appears to
have vested title of SSU property to the CIG.
In June 1946 General Vandenberg became the Director of CIG (replacing
Admiral Souers). Vandenberg felt that the Director of CIG must be the NIA's
executive officer and he immediately struck out to obtain greater authority
and independence for the CIG. While his ideas met resistance from the member
agencies of NIA, Vandenberg did win some points. For example, Vandenberg
wanted the CIG to conduct all espionage and counter-espionage for the collec-
tion of foreign intelligence abroad. This proposal was modified to allow the
Director of CIG to conduct only those "organized federal" operations which
were outside the U.S. and its possessions, but still left CIG with the
authority to collect intelligence information. The purpose of the revision
was to permit the military services to collect intelligence for departmental
purposes and it was meant to protect the FBI in performing its duties within
the U.S. Vandenberg then established the Office of Special Operations to
collect foreign intelligence. 'During the summer and fall of 1.946, the CIG
arranged to take over the personnel, undercover agents, and foreign stations
of the SSU. By mid-October 1946 the liquidation of SSU was complete. (SSU as
a bonafld.e organization never actually went out of business. The C/IMS/I)DO
is Uie current chief of SSU and is authorized to conduct certain business for
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and on behalf of SSU. 1M1ost SSU activities involve clee ing ou special
requests from EX-SSU or OSS personnel.) Field stations were notified that
effective 19 October 1.946 "SSU discontinues all overseas activities and the
Office of Spec al7Dj)_1Sraflons of CIG assumes responsibility for conducting
espionage and counterespionage in the field for collection of foreign intel-
ligence information required for national security."
As noted above, the CIG takeover of the SSU stretched over a period of
several months in 1946. During this period. the CIG took over many of the
personnel, installations, facilities and cover arrangements and units as well
as administrative practices of the SSU. 'I'lius you will find CIG, after
19 October 1946, using SSU cover unit designations and letterhead stationery
from such units making it difficult to identify CIG documents from appearance
alone. It could be argued that if the letterhead is SSU then it is an SSU
document. Be that as it may, for general purposes in classification review
consider all records created before 19 October 1946 as SSU and all records
created after that date as CIG.
GUIDELINES
For our general use in the classification review process, the date of
19 October 1946 will be considered the pivotal date marking the "end" of the
and the " eginning" of the CIG. Generally speaking, records dated prior
551
to 19 October 19,16 will be considered SSU documents and those created after
that date will be considered CIG documents.
The methods of organization and operation used by the SSIJ were very
similar to those developed and used by the OSS. The SSU was essentially a
military unit, staffed mostly by military personnel and housed in the War
Department under military command. It is therefore pertinent for us to review
SSU documents under those guidelines developed for and used in the classifi-
cation review of OSS records. The CIG on the other hand, very soon after its
creation began to take on an independent life and although many CIG personnel
continued to be military it quickly attracted more civilians and it was not
under direct military command. We will, therefore, look at CIG documents as
relating closely to the beginnings of the CIA and will review CIG documents
under those guidelines developed. for and used in the classification review of
CIA records. As a general rule, the OSS review team will be responsible for
reviewing documents originated before 19 October 1946 and the other CRD
reviewers will be responsible for those documents ro ginated after 19 October
1946. This date is not intended to be an absolute rule; as in all review
iaor , individual judgement must be used. For example, a document originated
after 19 October 1.946 might refer to the past and to activities or problems
of the SSU making it in essence a more or less typical SSU document containing
material relating to the SSU. Such a document should be reviewed as being
essentially a SSU document and using the OSS guidelines to judge the classifi-
cation action. On the other hand, a document originated before 19 October 194()
might refer to the future and to activities or problems relating to the CIG
making it in essence a more or less typical CIG document. This type document
should be reviewed as a CIG document using the CIA guidelines.
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All reviewers should be especially alert for these types of documents
and pay particular attention to their classification review. If there is
any question, coordination should be effected between the CRI) Operations
Branch/OSS and the CO Operations Branch/CIA through the Chief of the CRD
Operations Branch.
The major categories of information which most likely will require
continued protection are: 1) information which -identifies sources; 2)
foreign government information and details of intelligence agreements we
had with foreign governments; 3) information revealing unique intelligence
methods not generally known or used and not outdated; and 4) information
which could still cause negative reactions that could impact adversely on
current or future U.S. foreign relations. Some more specific guidelines
are as follows:
1. Protect all sources to avoid creation of a reputation that U.S.
intelligence services cannot protect their sources. A rare exception to
this rule might be possible where the contact was fleeting, incidental,
insignificant and overt.
2. Identification as an SSU staffer will be judged and handled the
same way as it is for an OSS staffer. Staffers generally will not be
protected merely because they later worked for the CIG or the CIA. If
however, the person engaged in sensitive work for CIG or the CIA, their
SSU (and OSS) employment may be exempted from declassification to protect
the later sensitive work or position in the CIG or the CIA.
3. Persons who served under non-official cover are protected at all
times as is their cover.
STATINTL
Chief
,
Classification Review Division
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