SPEECH TO AFIO CONVENTION: "THE STATE OF ANALYSIS"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01478R000100200002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 14, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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SPEECH TO AFIO CONVENTION: "THE STATE OF ANALYSIS"
14 OCTOBER 1988
It is very constructive that this convention is focused on the
state of analysis in our intelligence community. And I am
pleased to be able to make a presentation to you on this
important topic, one that has received a lot of attention in
the academic world and within the family, so to speak, but too
little from the general public.
Let me give you my bottom line right off: The state of
analysis is, on the whole, very healthy. It has improved in
recent years, and it promises to get even better in the
future, There are problems, some very old, some quite new; but
they can be managed,
I reach this judgment neither casually nor as some kind of
cheer leader, I have spent the most of a 25 year professional
life in and around intelligence analysis, as an analyst and a
manager of analysts, as a critic and assessor of the
performance of analytic organizations, as a National
Intelligence Officer and, now, as a manager of a body of such
officers, as a consumer of intelligence at the National
Security Council, and finally as a member of a think tank and
even as a consultant.
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So I have pondered this animal from many vantage points over a
good number of years in which much has changed. The views I
shall offer you have been screened for propriety and security
by colleagues. But I want to make clear that these views are
my own, and should not be attributed to the DCI or other
Community managers.
The bulk of my remarks will dwell on the two factors which are
dominating the development of intelligence analysis: people
and advanced data processing. But first I want to offer some
more philosophical thoughts on the role and nature of analysis.
The Role and Nature of Analysis
Most students of intelligence know analysis as one of the links
in the chain of activities that form the entire intelligence
process, from defining requirements, to collection, to
processing, analysis, production, impact on policy, and then
back to defining the requirements that guide collection. Yet
analysis is as much a glue that holds the whole process
together as it is a specific link: Without analysis at every
step -- namely, thoughtful and systematic assessment of the
meaning of data for answering the questions of customers -- no
step of the intelligence process can work. Exotic.and
sensitive collection is what makes official intelligence
unique, that is, what distinguishes it from scholarship or
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Journalism. But analysis is what makes it really intelligence,
that is, focused on real problems and intelligible to a
customer.
Standing against this ubiquitous necessity for analysis is one
of the less healthy phenomena of our business, namely the
barrier between the two cultures of analysis and operations. I
sense a positive trend toward lowering this barrier, but it is
painfully slow.
Although it started learning from others, primarily the
British, the United States has developed its own intelligence
style. I haven't done a rigorous study of this, but I suspect
our intelligence style puts more emphasis on analysis than do
other advanced intelligence systems. I have the impression
that we put a higher proportion of our overall intelligence
resources into processing and analysis. We also, I believe,
push intelligence analysis deeper into what In other cultures
is regarded as the province of the statesman. Thus, American
--intelligence analysts spend a lot of time trying to discover
the answers to what I call mysteries, as opposed to secrets, a
distinction I find extremely useful but which is not often
consciously made by analysts. A secret is the answer to a
question which somebody knows or which can be found in some
reservoir of information; it is a collectible. A mystery, on
the other hand, can only be resolved by God or, if you wish, by
history. A hard fact like the radar cross section of a new
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Soviet aircraft, or even a soft fact like the real intentions
of Gorbachev about economic reform...these are secrets,
Whither Iran after Khomeini, on the other hand, or the impact
of AIDS on underdeveloped countries, these are mysteries.
Cracking secrets can sometimes help resolve mysteries, but in
the main we must rely on the tools of science to provide
inevitably uncertain answers, It is fundamentally America's
respect for science that has made analysis so important a part
of our intelligence culture. And why analysts have to spend
time on both secrets and mysteries. Both add zest, drama, and
gravity to our work, But the combination over a growing
panorama of topics is what makes it impossible to reduce the
business of analysis to some rules or codes comparable, let us
say, to tradecraft or orbital mechanics in the collection
disciplines. The only rules which apply across the board are
reason, logic, and intellectual honesty,
The one issue that has drawn intermittent public attention to
intelligence analysis is that of honesty, or "objectivity",
usually in connection with some political controversy. Our
national security requires objective intelligence analysis:
this is truly the measure of our work, But outside critics as
well as inside participants must understand in a mature way the
conditions in which the measure must be met. Rarely in our
business are there provably true answers to the really big
questions. We cannot do our work without getting close to the
policymaker and the policy process. Providing intelligence
4
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support to policy is like being a parson in a bordello. There
are temptations and risks; but without running them, no sinners
can be saved. The more serious dangers arise when intelligence
analysis is too distant from policy, and corrective views don't
even have a chance to form,
In this context, charges that policymakers or intelligence
managers dictate analytical conclusions and thereby, as the
expression has it, "politicize" intelligence analysis are
usually overdrawn and often just plain wrong. During the
1970s, I spent many years fighting city hall on a major topic.
In my case it was assessing the Soviet appetite for strategic
nuclear superiority, My views did not prevail until the
evidence became so convincing as to make it hardly an
intelligence problem any longer. Now even Soviet spokesmen are
admitting that the hawkish views I held were right all along,
At no time, however, did I fail to get my views heard or even
to get them, appropriately identified, to policymakers. Nor
was I shunned on other topics because my views were rejected on
this one,
In my opinion, the most important threats to objectivity come
not from the chain of command or the policymaker. Rather they
come from fashion and general intellectual conventions, on one
hand, and from smug attachment by individuals to their own
opinions, on the other. The antidotes to these ills are always
at hand, curiosity and openmindedness, the liberal use of which
is what makes intelligence analysis fun as well as productive.
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The Human Cadre
When I returned to CIA headquarters in the mid-1980s after a
six-year absence in other government and private employment, I
was struck by the omnipresence of computer terminals and the
large number of very bright, very new, and very young faces.
These two impressions arise from the most dynamic and
influential trends in intelligence analysis: new and better
people, and new and better ways of handling data.
The observations I want to offer about both these topics arise
primarily from CIA's experience because the Agency's statistics
were most accessible and my personal impressions have been
formed there. But many of the trends I'll mention are also
evident at DIA and probably other Community components. Where
this is not the case, perhaps other speakers will offer
corrective points. Out of security considerations, I shall not
present any hard quantitative data.
With the growth of intelligence budgets in the early.1980s, the
analytical complement of the Intelligence Community grew
substantially. Other activities also grew so the size of
analytic components, such as the CIA's Directorate of
Intelligence, stayed about the some relative to other
components and the proportion of analysts versus other types of
personnel also stayed about the some. But the total number of
analysts grew significantly.
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This new cadre of recruits showed some qualitative improvements
over earlier cohorts.
Their test scores were higher than their counterparts' in
the 1970s on analytical aptitudes, interpersonal skills,
and work attitudes,
Larger percentages of the newcomers had advanced degrees
and other specialized academic preparation.
More had had overseas travel experience through tourism or
study, although interestingly, there was a statistically
significant drop in the foreign language capabilties of the
newcomers. This appears to have resulted from the
unfortunate relaxation of language requirements in our
universities.
On the whole, however, we saw both a quantitative and a
qualitative boost to the analytical cadre. Why did this
happen, beyond mere budget growth? Several factors were
involved. The economic slump of the early 1980s made
government employment more attractive to university graduates
at that time; it also noticeably reduced the attrition rate
among employees. In addition, the Agency adopted special
programs to attract quality recruits, such as the Graduate
Fellows Program, and focused recruiting efforts on specialities
in high demand, such as, engineers and economists.
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As a result of this, the analytical workforce at CIA is
unusually young, half being under 35 years old. By and large
they came to the Agency without prior analytic experience.
This has made for an inexperienced workforce, but one which, as
it acquires training and experience, offers great promise for
the future, Because of the all-volunteer military, a much
higher proportion of these recruits than in the past has no
experience with military service, a problem to be compensated
for in some areas where prior service gave a head start to
military analysts, In DIA, however, the median age is about a
decade older and more military experience is represented in the
analytical cadre; so, from a community point of view, this
problem is not acute.
Our managers and personnel people have noted some interesting
attitude shifts among these newcomers. They are more
performance oriented than their predecessors, but also more
advancement oriented, and less committed to a given Job or
organization. In a word -- if I can use it non-pejoratively --
we too have acquired our yuppies. This, it seems to me, adds
to the challenge of management in the years ahead.
In the past, the typical career development pattern for
analysts was to get a fairly large number of different
journeyman-level assignements clustered in a general
discipline, like economics or military. analysis, or perhaps in
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varied fields, and then to move into management. Herein has
lain a management dilemma as old as our various services. How
do you strike the right balance between the generalist and the
specialist? Generalists are, by definition, the most broadly
capable people, especially for management. So your more able
people want to be or are encouraged to be generalists, But the
generalist is not the one who knows an obscure but suddenly
vital topic inside and out; he's not-a real expert in
anything. Intelligence needs real experts. Further, how do
you strike the balance between management and advanced analytic
.achievement as paths to promotion? Much talked about in the
past, both CIA and DIA have recently made real progress in
setting aside supergrade positions for senior analysts as a
means of easing this dilemma.
To make the most of the new influx of talented young people we
got in the early 1980s, I think Community managers are going to
have to work harder and show more imagination in addressing
these problems in the future. Budget prospects bode for
clogged headroom, thus limited advancement potential; the
relative financial attractiveness of federal employment in
general seems unlikely to grow. We could face a situation
where the best and brightest of our new recruits get
pessimistic about their prospects just when they are getting
the experience they need to perform at peak, but before they
are really shackled by the golden handcuffs of retirement
benefits, If we don't rise to this challenge, we could lose
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the promise inherent in the new cohorts. If we do, however,
maturation of this new generation of analysts could make it the
best ever in production and management. .
Advanced Data Processing and Electronic Tools
Let me now turn to the other dynamic factor on the analysis
scene: Advanced Data Processing. I need to warn you that I am
a real amateur in this field, a friendly and curious user, by
no means an expert. But this makes it all the more obvious to
me that we are witnessing a revolution in intelligence analysis,
Now, US intelligence grew up with and on computers. Indeed we
have been pathfinders and inventors of all manner of advances
in the service of needs which were very demanding and put us on
the technological frontier of computer science. On the whole,.
I believe, the needs that drove our innovation in ADP over most
of the past 40 years were, while technologically very
demanding, also highly specialized, e.g., in cryptography, or.
weapons analysis. Innovation of this sort continues at what
seems to be an ever accelerating pace: worldwide crop and
agriculture analysis, for example; or assembly of large
specialized data bases on such new topics as terrorism,
narcotics, or AIDS. All these topics demand new computer-based
tools.
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The subject matter of importance to US intelligence is
continuing to expand, constantly adding new topics while the
old ones stay on the agenda. Specialized, large-scale ADP
tools for analysis are helping cope with the expanding work
load.
I am fascinated, however, by another phenomenon, no less
remarkable for the fact that it is becoming commonplace: The
role of advanced electronic data handling and messaging in
shaping the day-to-day work of all analysts, no matter what
their specialty or need for special ADP tools. Another word
for it is the electronic office.
This is an area where the Agency has also been a pioneer, This
revolution was just beginning when I was the manager of a
so-called pilot branch for a new electronic mail and filing
system in the mid-1970s. My colleagues and I were able to
watch the unfolding of a crisis of that time faster than our
Operations Center, Now this revolution is in full swing.
Analysts can read electronically a large volume of mail
assigned to them by profiles they design themselves. They can
rummage around at will in the total current data base of
incoming or recent mail to explore ad hoc topics. They can
select out of this blizzard of material the reports they want
to file, quickly assigning them to multiple files. Then they
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can rummage back through what they've decided to save and
manipulate it in various ways. They can send a copy to a
friend, with a comment or an extended dissertation, and in due
course get a comment back, all electronically.
This is the electronic mailbox, shoebox, and filedrawer
combined, Of course, there are always problems: Mainframes
crash, my hardware or software won't do exactly what I want,
some specialized data or mailflow isn't on the system, no
keyword search profile will guarantee that a pertinent report
wasn't missed.
But, nevertheless, this stuff is extremely powerful. It allows
the analyst to scan or read his routine mail with much greater
speed than hardcopy allows. It allows for more elegant and
varied storage regimes. It allows for poking speedily into
topics not routinely examined. And, I think most important, it
allows rapid communication with colleagues about data or
reports. Nothing in intelligence analysis is as creative as
the colleague who bursts into your office with a report
shouting "Get a load of this, will you;" Now it can be done
remotely, rapidly, and, in my experience, with no less verbal
impact.
This work environment is now typical: it will soon become
universal. The volume of incoming information has more than
tripled in the last decade and promises to grow even faster in
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the next. Without the capabilities.of electronic mail, we
simply could not cope. The impact has already been
considerable even in very soft areas, such as political
analysis, which are usually thought to be unfriendly to
advanced data processing. From the time of Guttenberg the key
to understanding an unfamiliar society has been to read
intelligently, ADP allows the analyst to read more
intelligently and faster, however old fashioned his analytic
methods, It will take a lot of money and management to make
sure our systems keep up with the demand of information flows
in the future.
I on on the lookout for some developments that will amplify the
already considerable impact of the ADP revolution on
intelligence. Let me mention three that I think important:
I think we are moving toward a situation where the analyst,
perhaps with the help of an ADP specialist at his elbow,
can quickly design a specialized ADP software tool to work
a problem unique to him, and perhaps needed only
temporarily, This will bring the full power of ADP to the
service of the whole family of analysts.
I suspect the pace and efficiency of innovation will
accelerate as people who have grown up with ADP move into
management positions replacing those who now know, but do
not really feel, how important it is.
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Finally, electronic communications and mail make it much
easier for the manager and even the policymaking customer
to plug into the analyst's data environment. It is not
widely appreciated how much raw intelligence reporting is
now available electronically to the policymakers who
constitute the customer community, This should permit new
kinds of communication between analysts and customers.
In a related area, the graphics capability of modern ADP
systems has had a considerable impact on physical production of
final reports, helping to make the production of richly
illustrated and therefore more communicative products easier.
How About the Duality and Impact of the Product?
You may well now ask: With more and better people and more
powerful capabilities to move and absorb data, are we producing
better analysis?
This is a hard question to answer convincingly. But I am
convinced the answer is yes.
First, the professional standards of inteligence products
have measurably improved in recent years. There is more
interdisciplinary analysis. Clearer distinction is made
between fact and Judgment, and better sourcing is offered.
There is more attention to audience needs and more use of
outside experts to review products.
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Second, the very fact'that US intelligence has managed to
keep up with the information explosion is testimony to an
improved overall performance,
Third, I'll just give you my personal view as one who has
sat on the receiving end. I think the product from all the
major agencies is better than it was a decade ago. The
money and the attention given to US intelligence during the
1980s have brought dividends.
There are going to be problems in the years ahead bound up one
way or another with the austere budgets that we all expect,
But I suspect they will not be the most severe in areas of
analysis, but rather in other areas. The American formula for
organizing intelligence analysis has, I think, proved itself.
A family of agencies of different but overlapping, and hence,
somewhat competing concerns, of differing sizes, and
differently subordinated: This makes for a rich and
informative intelligence product. If the US government
sometimes acts dumb in the world, it's usually for want of a
kind of intelligence other than we are discussing here.
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Association of
Former
Intelligence
Officers
HONORARY BOARD
OF DIRECTORS
The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
Chairman
John Barron
The Honorable W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley,
The Honorable David Packard
John Anson Smith
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Walter L. Pforzheimer, Chairman
Dr. Louis W. Tordella, Vice Chairman.
MEMBERS
Captain Richard W. Bates,USN(Ret.)
John F. Blake
Ann Caracristi
Robert T. Crowley
Lieutenant General John J. Davis,
USA(Ret.)
Brigadier General Harry T. Hagaman,
USMC(Ret.)
Samuel Halpern
Lawrence R. Houston (Legal Advisor)
Major General Richard X. Larkin,
USA(Ret.)
Newton S. Miler
David Atlee Phillips
Lawrence B. Sulc
Major General Jack E. Thomas,
USAF(Ret.)
Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.,
USAF(Ret.)
John Waller
W. Raymond Wannall
John S. Warner
Lloyd George Wiggins
Ernest J. Zellmer
OFFICERS
President
Rear Admiral Donald P. Harvey,
USN(Ret.)
Vice President
Charles A. Briggs
Secretary
Mrs. Charlotta P. Engrav
Treasurer
Robert J. Novak
Executive Director
John K. Greaney
Administrator
Mrs. Gretchen Campbell
Periscope Editor
Edward F. Sayle
News Commentary Editor
Hans Moses
6723 WHITTIER AVENUE, SUITE 303A
McLEAN, VIRGINIA 22101
PHONE [phone]
September 22, 1988
Dear Convention Participant:
We are pleased that you have accepted AFIO's invitation to
participate in our fourteenth annual convention. Enclosed is a
schedule that will provide you with an overview of participants
and timing, and a sketch of the hotel's location including
parking information.
We would appreciate receiving in advance, a written copy of
your prepared remarks or notes you care to use during your
presentation. This would be helpful in accurately reflecting the
events of the convention for AFIO members who are not able
to attend.
Please send us a brief biographic summary to be used for
introductions. You should be aware that representatives of the
media may be in attendance.
It would be our pleasure to have you attend 'our luncheon
on the day you speak, and ask that you let us know.
If you have any questions, please call.
SinqQre1y,
ohn K. Greaney
Executive Director
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AFIO CONVENTION 1988
DATE: OCTOBER 14TH & 15TH, 1988
PLACE:_ THE SHERATON TYSON HOTEL
1988 Convention Theme will be, "Analysis Today and Tomorrow." A slate of speakers and panels
made up of distinguished practitioners from throughout the Intelligence Community, government and the academic
world will range from a keynote address on "The State of Analysis" through discussions of assessing the quality of
analysis, the current utility of the NIE, marketing analysis to consumers, developing analysts to meet future require-
ments, and the verification challenge.
Friday morning, October 14th:.
0930-1015 The State of Analysis
Dr. Fritz Ermarth, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, CIA.
1030-1200 Assessing the Quality of Intelligence
-Chairman: Dr. Michael Vlahos, Foreign. Service Institute
Miss Helene Boatner, CIA
Mr. Douglas George, IC Staff
Maj. Gen. Harry E. Soyster, USA -Intelligence and Security
Command and Director-designate, DIA
1300-1430 Friday luncheon, October 14th:
Mr. Herbert E. Meyer, Former Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, CIA,
will discuss Marketing Analysis: Prescription- for Change.
Friday afternoon, October- 14th:
1445-1600 Developing the Analyst: A Report from the Community
Chairman: Mr. Craig Wilson
Director, Resources & Training, OSD
RADM Howard Roop, USN(Ret.)
Commandant, Defense Intelligence College.
Saturday morning,October 15th:
0900-1030 The National Intelligence Estimate
Chairman: Professor James Lucas
Dean, School of Professional Studies, DIC
Lt.Gen. Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF(Ret.)
Former Director, NSA
Mr. Barry Kelly, NSC Staff
Dr. Douglas MacEachin, CIA.
1045-1200 The Intelligence Role in Arms Control
Chairman: Maj.Gen. Jack E. Thomas, USAF(Ret.)
Brig.Gen. Roland LaJoie
Director, On Site Inspection, Agency
Col. Joseph Naftzinger, USA(Ret.), DIA
Lt.Gen. Edward L. Rowny, USA(Ret.)
Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State
on Arms Control Matters
1300-1430 Saturday luncheon, October 15th:
The Honorable Robert Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
Saturday evening banquet, October 15th:
1900-2000 Reception/Cash Bar
2000-2200 Ambassador Anne Armstrong
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).
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his facilities guide is offered to you with assurance
that beyond the surface of this beautifully appointed
structure, there is a dedicated staff of people interested
in and eager to serve you.
These individuals detail assignments so thoroughly that any
meeting you plan will contribute to the credit of all involved.
SHERATON
PREMIERE AT
TYSONSCORNER
UL~~S~ .
TOLL ROAD
WASHINGTON ryy
DULLES
INTERNATIONAL
aftil- AIRPORT
For complete information, call the Director of Marketing at [phone],
contact any Sheraton Sales Office, or call toll free:
in U.S. [phone]; in Eastern Canada [phone];
in Western Canada [phone].
Parking: Free parking is available at the hotel on two levels.
VV~~ a S;0"
Sheraton Premiere
at Tysons Corner
The hospitality people of ITT
8861 LEESBURG PIKE
TYSONS CORNERNIENNA, VIRGINIA 22180
703/448-1234
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Draft of Speech to the AFIO on "The State of Analysis"
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
NIC #03169-88
Fritz W. Ermarth
Chairman, NIC
DATE
12 October 1988
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
6 DDC I
,
2.
4.
5.
6.
C/NIC
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
Chairman
NIC 03169-88
12 October 1988
SUBJECT: Draft of Speech to the AFIO on "The State of Analysis"
Here is the final draft of the speech I lan to Friday morning
to the AFIO. It is based on material whic gathered for me STAT
and which was sent to you earlier by Dave Gries. That stuff was very
carefully gone over to avoid classified information, and I stuck closely to
it; so I don't think classification is a problem. But I do hope you can
give the draft enough of a scan to determine whether I'm singing from the
same music you will be using on Saturday. / -~
Attachment:
As stated
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NIC 03169-88
12 October 1988
SUBJECT: Draft of Speech to the AFIO on "The State of Analysis"
DCI/C/NIC:FWErmarth~ (120ct88)
Distribution:
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2 - U/NIG files
STATAT
STAT
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DRAFT
SPEECH TO AFIO CONVENTION: "THE STATE OF ANALYSIS"
It is extremely constructive that this convention is focused on the state of
analysis in our intelligence community. And I am pleased to be able to make
a presentation to you on this important topic, one that has received a lot
of attention in the academic world and within the family, so to speak, but
too little from the general public.
Let me give you my bottom line right off: The state of analysis is, on the
whole, very healthy. It has improved in recent years, and it has the
promise of getting even better in the future. There are problems, some very
old, some quite new; but they,can be managed.
I reach this judgment neither casually nor as some kind of cheer leader. I
have spent the most of a 25 year professional life in and around
intelligence analysis, as an analyst and a manager of analysts, as a critic
and assessor of the performance of analytic organizations, as a National
Intelligence Officer and, now, as a manager of a body of such officers, as a
consumer of intelligence at the National Security Council, and finally as a
member of a think tank and even as a consultant.
So I have walked around and pondered this animal from many vantage points
over a good number of years in which much has changed. The views I shall
offer you have been screened for propriety and security by colleagues. And
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I want to express special thanks to Mrs. Olga MacEachin for gathering the
data and insights that inform my remarks. But I want to make clear that
these views are my own, and should not be attributed to the DCI or other
Community managers.
The bulk of my remarks will dwell on the two factors which are dominating
the development of intelligence analysis: people and advanced data
processing. But first I want to offer some more philosophical thoughts on
the role and nature of analysis.
The Role and Nature of Analysis
Most students of intelligence know analysis as one of the links in the chain
of activities that form the entire intelligence process, from defining
requirements, to collection, to processing, analysis, production, impact on
policy, and then back to defining the requirements that guide collection.
Yet analysis is as much a glue that holds the whole process together as it
is a specific link: Without analysis at every step -- namely, thoughtful
and systematic assessment of the meaning of data for answering the questions
of customers -- no step of the intelligence process can work. Exotic and
sensitive collection is what makes official intelligence unique, that is,
what distinguishes it from scholarship or journalism. But analysis is what
makes it really intelligence, that is, focused on real problems and
intelligible to a customer.
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Standing against this ubiquitous necessity for analysis is one of the less
healthy phenomena of our business, namely the barrier between the two
cultures of analysis and operations. I sense a positive trend toward
lowering this barrier, but it is painfully slow.
Although it started learning from others, primarily the British, the United
States has developed its own intelligence style. I haven't done a rigorous
study of this, but I suspect our intelligence style puts more emphasis on
analysis than do other advanced intelligence systems. I have the impression
that we put a higher proportion of our overall intelligence resources into
processing and analysis. We also, I believe, push intelligence analysis
deeper into what in other cultures is regarded as the province of the
statesman. Thus, American intelligence analysts spend a lot of time trying
to discover the answers to what I call mysteries, as opposed to secrets, a
distinction I find extremely useful but which is not often consciously made
by analysts. A secret is the answer to a question which somebody knows or
which can be found in some reservoir of information; it is a collectible. A
mystery, on the other hand, can only be resolved by God or, if you wish, by
history. A hard fact like the radar cross section of a new Soviet aircraft,
or even a soft fact like the real intentions of Gorbachev about economic
reform...these are secrets. Whither Iran after Khomeini, on the other hand,
or the impact of AIDS on underdeveloped countries, these are mysteries.
Cracking secrets can sometimes help resolve mysteries, but in the main we
must rely on the tools of science to provide inevitably uncertain answers.
It is fundamentally America's respect for science that has made analysis so
important a part of our intelligence culture. And why analysts have to
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spend time on both secrets and mysteries. Both add zest, drama, and gravity
to our work. But the combination over a growing panorama of topics is what
makes it impossible to reduce the business of analysis to some rules or
codes comparable, let us say, to tradecraft or orbital mechanics in the
collection disciplines. The only rules which apply across the board are
reason, logic, and intellectual honesty..
The one issue that has drawn intermittent public attention to intelligence
analysis is that of honesty, or "objectivity", usually in connection with
some political controversy. This matter is of utmost importance. National
security and the fate of individuals and organizations can be influenced by
it. But it has to be dealt with in a grown up way. Rarely in our business
are there provably true answers to the really big questions. We cannot do
our work without getting close to the policymaker and the policy process.
Providing intelligence support to policy is like being a parson in a
bordello. There are risks, but without running them, no sinners are. saved.
The more serious dangers arise when intelligence analysis is too distant
from policy, and corrective views don't even have a chance to form.
In this context, charges of politicized intelligence analysis, dictated by
policy or management are usually overdrawn or just wrong, in my experience.
I spent many years fighting city hall on a major topic, in my case it was
the Soviet appetite for strategic nuclear superiority in the 1970s. My
views did not prevail until the evidence became so convincing as to make it
hardly an intelligence problem any longer. Now even Soviet spokesmen are
admitting that I and my hawkish friends were right all along. At no time,
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however, did I fail to get my views heard or even to get them, appropriately
identified, to policymakers: Nor was I shunned on other topics because my
views were rejected on this one.
In my view, the most important threats to objectivity come not from the
chain of command or the policymaker directly. Rather they come from fashion
and general intellectual conventions on one hand, and from smug attachment
by individuals to their own opinions, on the other. The antidotes to these
ills are always at hand, curiosity and openmindedness, the liberal use of
which is what makes intelligence analysis fun as well as productive.
The.Human Cadre
When I returned to CIA headquarters in the mid-1980s after an eight-year
absence in other government and private employment, I was struck by the
omnipresence of computer terminals and the large number of very bright, very
new, and very young faces. These two impressions arise from the most
dynamic and influential trends in intelligence analysis: new and better
people, and new and better ways of handling data.
The observations I want to offer about both these topics arise primarily
from CIA's experience because the Agency's data were most accessible and my
personal impressions have been formed there. But many of the trends I'll
mention are also evident at DIA and probably other Community components.
Where this is not the case, perhaps other speakers will offer corrective
points. Out of security considerations, I shall not offer any hard
quantitative data.
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With the growth of intelligence budgets in the early 1980s, the analytical
complement of the Intelligence Community grew substantially. Other
activities also grew so the size of analytic components, such as the CIA's
Directorate of Intelligence, stayed about the same relative to other
components and the proportion of analysts versus other types of personel
also stayed about the same. But the total number of analysts grew
significantly.
This new cadre of recruits showed some qualitative improvements over earlier
cohorts.
Their test scores were higher than their counterparts' in the 1970s on
analytical aptitudes, interpersonal skills, and work attitudes.
Larger percentages of the newcomers had advanced degrees and other
specialized academic preparation.
More had had overseas travel experience through tourism or study,
although interestingly, there was a statistically significant drop in
the language.capabilties of the newcomers. This appears to have
resulted from the unfortunate relaxation of language requirements in our
universities.
On the whole, however, we saw both a quantitative and a qualitative boost to
the analytical cadre. Why did this happen, beyond mere budget growth?
Several factors were involved. The economic slump of the early 1980s made
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government employment more attractive to university graduates at that time;
it also noticeably reduced the attrition rate among employed analysts. In
addition, the Agency adopted special programs to attract quality recruits,
such as the Graduate Fellows Program, and focused recruiting efforts on
specialities in high demand, such as engineers and economists.
As a result of this, the analytical workforce at CIA is unusually young,
half being under 35 years old. By and large they came to the Agency without
prior analytic experience. This.has made for an inexperienced workforce,
but one which, as it acquires training and experience, offers great promise
for the future. Because of the all-volunteer military, a much higher
proportion of these recruits than in the past has no experience with
military service, a problem to be compensated for in some areas where past
.service gave a head start to military analysts. In DIA, however, the median
age is about a decade older and more military experience is represented in
the analytical cadre; so, from a community point of view, this problem is
not acute.
Our managers and personnel people have noted some interesting attitude
shifts among these newcomers. There are more performance oriented than
their predecessors, but also more advancement oriented, and less committed
to a given job or organization. In a word -- if I can use it
non-pejoratively -- we too have acquired our yuppies. This, it seems to me,
adds to the challenge of management in the years ahead.
In the past, the typical career development pattern for analysts was to get
a fairly large number of different journeyman-level assignements clustered
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in a general discipline, like economics or military analysis, or perhaps in
varied fields, and then to move into management. Herein has lain a
management di-lemma as old as our various services. How do you strike the
right balance between the generalist and the specialist? Generalists are,
by definition, the most broadly capable people, especially for management.
So your more able people want to be or are encouraged to be generalists.
But the generalist is not the one who. knows an obscure but suddenly vital
topic inside and out; he's not a real expert in anything. Intelligence
needs real experts. Further, how do you strike the balance between
management and advanced analytic achievement as paths to promotion? Much
talked about in the past, both CIA and DIA have recently made real progress
in setting aside supergrade positions for senior analysts as a means of
easing this dilemma.
To make the most of the new influx of talented young people we got in the
early 1980s, I think Community managers are going to have to work harder and
show more imagination in addressing these problems in the future. Budget
prospects bode for clogged headroom, thus limited advancement potential; the
relative financial attractiveness of federal employment in general seems
unlikely to grow. We could face a situation where the best and brightest of
our new recruits get pessimistic about their prospects just when they are
getting the experience they need to perform at peak, but before they are
really shackled by the golden handcuffs of retirement benefits. If we don't
rise to this challenge, we could lose the promise inherent in the new
cohorts. If we do, however, maturation of this new generation of analysts
could make it the best ever in production and management.
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Advanced Data Processing and Electronic Tools
Let me now turn to the other dynamic factor on the analysis scene: Advanced
Data Processing. I need to warn you that I am a real amateur in this field,
a friendly and curious user, by no means an expert. But this makes it all
the more obvious to me that we are witnessing a revolution in intelligence
analysis.
Now, US intelligence grew up with and on computers. Indeed we have been
pathfinders and inventors of all manner of advances in the service of needs
which were very demanding and put us on the technological frontier of
computer science. One the whole, I believe, the needs that drove our
innovation in ADP over most of the past 40 years were, while technologically
very demanding, also highly specialized, e.g., in cryptography, or weapons
analysis. Innovation of this sort continues at what seems to be an ever
accelerating pace: worldwide crop and agriculture analysis, for example; or
assembly of large specialized data bases on such new topics as terrorism,
narcotics, or AIDS.
The subject matter of importance to US intelligence is continuing to expand,
constantly adding new topics while the old ones continue to stay on the
agenda. Specialized, large-scale ADP tools for analysis are helping cope
with the expanding work load.
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I am fascinated, however, by another phenomenon, no less remarkable for the
fact that it is becoming commonplace: The role of advanced electronic data
handling and messaging in shaping the day-to-day work of all analysts, no
matter what their specialty or need for special ADP tools. Another word for
it is the electronic office.
This is an area where the Agency has also been a pioneer. This revolution
was just beginning when I was the manager of a so-called pilot branch for a
new electronic mail and filing system in the mid-1970s. I and-my colleagues
were able to watch the unfolding of a crisis of that time faster than our
Operations Center. Now this revolution is in full swing.
Analysts can read electronically a large volume of mail assigned to them by
profiles they design. They can rummage around at will in the total current
data base of incoming or recent mail to explore ad hoc topics. They can
select out of this blizzard of material the reports they want to file,
quickly assigning them to multiple files. Then they can rummage back
through what they've decided to save and manipulate it in various ways.
They can send a copy to a friend, with a comment or an extended
dissertation, and in due course get a comment back, all electronically.
This is the electronic mailbox, shoebox, and filedrawer combined. Of
course, there are always problems: Mainframes crash, my hardware or
software won't do exactly what I want, some specialized data or mailflow
isn't on the system, no keyword search profile will guarantee that a
pertinent report wasn't missed.
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But, nevertheless, this stuff is extremely powerful. It allows the analyst
to scan or read his routine mail with much greater spead than hardcopy
allows. It allows for more elegant and varied storage regimes. It allows
for poking speedily into topics not routinely examined. And, I think most
important, it allows rapid communication with colleagues about data or
reports. Nothing in intelligence analysis is as creative as the colleague
who bursts into your office with a report shouting "Get a load of this, will
you!" Now it can be done remotely, rapidly, and, in my experience, with no
less verbal impact.
This work environment is now typical; it will soon become universal. The
volume of incoming information has more than tripled in the last decade and
promises to grow even faster in the next. Without the capabilities of
electronic mail, we simply could not cope. The impact has already been
considerable even in very soft areas, such as political analysis, which are
usually thought to be unfriendly to advanced data processing. From the time
of Guttenberg the key to understanding an unfamiliar society has been to
read intelligently. ADP allows the analyst to read more intelligently and
faster, however old fashioned his analytic methods. It will take a lot of
money and management to make sure our systems. keep up with the demand of
information flows in the future.
I am on the lookout for some developments that will amplify the already
considerable impact of the ADP revolution on intelligence. Let me mention
three that I think important:
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I think we are moving toward a situation where the analyst, perhaps with
the help of an ADP specialist at his elbow, can quickly design a
specialized ADP software tool to work a problem unique to him, and
perhaps needed only temporarily. This will bring the full power of ADP
to the service of the whole family of analysts
I suspect the pace and efficiency of innovation will accelerate as
people who have grown up with ADP move into management positions
replacing those who now know, but do not really feel, how important it
Finally, electronic communications and mail makes it much easier for the
manager and even the policymaking customer to plug into the analyst's
data environment. It is not widely appreciated how much raw
intelligence reporting is now available electronically to the
policymakers who constitute the customer community. This should permit
new kinds of communication between analysts and customers.
In a related area, the graphics capability of modern ADP systems has had a
considerable impact on physical production of final reports, helping to make
the production of richly illustrated and therefore more communicative
products easier.
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How About the Quality and Impact of the Product?
You may well now ask: With more and better people and more powerful
capabilities to move and absorb data, are we producing better analysis?
This is a hard question to answer convincingly. But I am convinced the
answer is yes.
First, the professional standards of inteligence products have
measurably improved in recent years. There is more interdisciplinary
analysis. Clearer distinction is made between fact and judgment, and
better sourcing is offered. There is more attention to audience needs
and more use of outside experts to review products.
Second, the very fact that US intelligence has managed to keep up with
the information explosion is testimony to an improved overall
performance.
Third, I'll just give you my personal view as one who has sat on the
receiving end. I think the product from all the major agencies is
better than it was a decade ago. The money and the attention given to
US intelligence during the 1980s have brought dividends.
There are going to be problems in the years ahead bound up one way or
another with the austere budgets that we all expect. But I.suspect they
will not be the most severe in areas of analysis, but rather in other
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areas. The American formula for organizing intelligence analysis has, I
think, proved itself. A family of agencies of different but overlapping,
and hence, somewhat competing concerns, of differing sizes, and differently
subordinated: This makes for a rich and informative intelligence product.
If the US government sometimes acts dumb.in the world, its usually for want
of another kind of intelligence than we are discussing here.
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (optional)
Request to Address Association of Former Intelligence Officers
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO. NIC #02120-22
Fritz W
Ermarth
DATE
.
Chairman NIC
15 Junp 1922
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
D/Public Affairs
~~/
v~?1
1. For concurrence
2.
ER
4.
5.
DDCI
--
_7
5. For concurrence
7.
8.
DCI
8. For approval
9.
10.
1 _4
4
11.
91"
~~JE47 Fritz W. Ermarth
HQS
t`-W6-
13.
-
14.
15.
FX C
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I A L
19 July 1988
QUESTIONS ON THE STATE OF ANALYSIS
Human Resources
What is the size of the analytic community at CIA, in the IC overall? What
percentage of total employees in CIA, INR, DIA are in analytic components?
How has the size of this community varied over the years? How has it grown
in CIA during the 1980s? Has it grown likewise in INR and DIA?
What has growth done to the age/grade structure of analytic components in
the main agencies?
How do the more recent recruits compare with earlier generations in prior
academic preparation and job experience, language or other specialized
skills, testing scores?
Information Handling Environment
Can we measure what the IC has investing in ADP for analysis over recent
years, screening out investment for specialized applications like
cryptography and technical analysis?
How has the information-handling environment of the "average non-technical
analyst" changed over the past ten years, e.g., what's his work station look
like, how does he get his mail?
What can he do that he could not do before? What new problems have arisen?
Do analysts feel that CIA and the IC in general are on top of the problems?
Methodologies
Have analytic methodologies advanced in measurable or describable ways? Any
safely unclassified examples (OGI a good source).
Management
Has growth and changing.age structure imposed new approaches to management
of analysis?
Products
Can we compare the gross numbers, varieties, and presentational styles of
current products with those of past decades?
NOTE: I suspect, or at least hope, that useful data on people and budgets
can be gotten from the IC Staff on the Community, and the CIA comptroller on
CIA. OIT must have a canned "geewhiz" briefing or brochure on its ADP
- -advances (but not problems, maybe). Management issues will have to be
explored through talking to people.
CO L
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Public Affairs
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
Chairman
NIC #02180-88
15 June 1988
SUBJECT: Request to Address Association of Former Intelligence
Officers
I have been asked by the AFIO to address its fall session on "The State
of Analysis" in the US Intelligence Community (see TAB). I understand that
the Agency regards this association as a respectable outfit and believe we
should applaud its intent to focus an annual session on analysis. There
will be a number of presentations on the topic in addition to mine. Press
will not be invited, but a number of members of the association are active
journalists. Substantive proceedings will be off the record.
Recommendation: That you approve my giv'ng the quested presentation.
Attachment:
As stated
F ZoII
Director, Public Affairs Datel
STAT
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NIC #02180-88
15 June 1988
SUBJECT: Request to Address Association of Former Intelligence
Officers
DCI/C/NIC:FWErmarthl I(15 June 88)
Distribution:
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