COLOMBIA'S BATTLE AGAINST THE DRUG MAFIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T00451R000400050002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1988
• Content Type: NIE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/02 : CIA-RDP93T00451R000400050002-1
Director of Central Intelligence
National Intelligence Estimate
5 0 - 5 2 EXTRAS CB
Colombia's Battle Against
the Drug Mafia: Implications
for the United States
Key Judgments
el-re
NIE 88-88W
April 1988
Copy
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence organizations of the
Departments of State and the Treasury, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the US
Customs Service, and the US Coast Guard.
Also Participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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NIE 88-88W
COLOMBIA'S BATTLE AGAINST
THE DRUG MAFIA: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES
KEY JUDGMENTS
SECRET
The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
with regular distribution.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The release from jail of drug kingpin Jorge Ochoa and spiraling
violence by major traffickers have demonstrated the inability of
President Virgilio Barco's government to implement an effective .and
sustained counternarcotics strategy. With the powerful drug mafia
holding the upper hand, Barco is likely to continue antidrug coordina-
tion with the United States, but the odds of his taking sustained and
strong action?particularly extraditions?against the major drug Organi-
zations are slim. He is also likely to emphasize the need for narcotics
consumer countries, particularly the United States, to strengthen inter-
nal demand reduction programs. Moreover, we believe ColOrnbiii.
official and public acceptance of trafficker activity will grow as the
narcotics situation continues to deteriorate.
The major drug trafficking organizations, fearful of any new
Colombian extradition treaty with the United States, are relentlessly
increasing their use of corruption, intimidation, and violence against
Colombia's judicial system, particularly the seriously threatened Su-
preme Court; key opinion makers in the media, the schools, and the
business community; and counternarcotics personnel in the military and
police organizations. The traffickers are winning the war with these
tactics while Barco, although alert to the growing threat, is
unable to eliminate drug-related corruption. Support for
President Barco on narcotics issues, moreover, is limited in the govern-
ment and among influential political, military, and church leaders.
Since Ochoa's release, Barco has publicly reaffirmed his intent to
continue fighting major trafficking organizations and has permitted
more active antidrug initiatives by the military. While unlikely in the
near term to seriously threaten the power of the major drug organiza-
tions, he is likely to emphasize enforcement actions against targets the
drug mafia views as replaceable or expendable: chemical stockpiles,
marijuana operations, and small-scale cocaine facilities. He will proba-
bly continue to be reluctant to systematically target major cocaine
laboratories and operations. This is partly to avoid a major confrontation
with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia's
largest insurgent group, in whose territory coca is grown and cocaine is
sometimes produced.
President Barco's inability to adequately address US counternar-
cotics concerns may complicate a range of diplomatic issues. Prolonged
frictions over narcotics control could erode Barco's generally pro-
American stance and cause increased Colombian resentment of US
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pressure for extradition. Therefore, Barco is likely to allow further US
involvement in his counternarcotics programs only if it is not widely
publicized.
Continued US and Colombian efforts to strengthen Bogota's counter-
narcotics capabilities could escalate the threat of attacks against US
Enibassy and law - enforcernent personnel. Events since Ochoa'S release
iii'Decernber 1987 have also increased the likelihood that drug traffickers
might 'cai-ry out a high-visibility attack on official US facilities? in
Colombia or even in the United States.
Events of the last few months only solidify the conviction that
prompted the scheduling of this Estimate: Colombia's illegal narcotics
trade will continue to grow. It will be an increasing threat to US
interests in Colombia and in the region for the balance of Barco's
presidency, due to expire in August 1990, and probably beyond. The
United States will continue to be a key target for the traffickers, both as
a market and for violent reprisals.
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