SENIOR REVIEW PANEL COMMENTS ON DRAFT NIE 97-87: PERU: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS UNDER GARCIA, INTERNALLY DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC-04234-87
1 December 1987
Senior Review Panel
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft
WEE 97-87: Peru: Economic and Political
Prospects Under Garcia, internally dated
30 November 1987
1. The Panel considers the Peruvian draft well-conceived,
clearly drafted, and admirably focused on the key political and
economic issues facing the Garcia government to 1990. The
appendices--while still not the complete list specified in the
Table of Contents--contain much useful information for
policymakers. We particularly commend the excellent integration
of political and economic analysis.
2. There are, we think, a few--if less substantial--
weaknesses in the present draft. Among them:
a. Generality. The draft lacks specifics, statistics,
hard data--particularly on recent and projected economic
trends; the structure of debt and its servicing; the
substance of IMF-Peruvian negotiations; party strengths,
organizations, and platforms; insurgency trends. Perhaps
some of this will be available when the appendices on
"Graphics/Tables," "Economic Indicators" and "Map--Locator
and Insurgent Operating Areas" are available. We would
strongly favor the incorporation of selected graphics in the
text.
b. Length. We think the draft an admirable candidate
for present guidelines stipulating "in the range of 10 to 20
pages." (i) Its preparation, as we understand it, stems from
a request by State/INR; (ii) much of its background material
will be familiar to the policy community concerned with Peru;
and (iii) it derives more from a general interest in Peru
than from any specific policy concern.
c. Supplementaries. We think there are a few
additional matters which may deserve analytic attention.
These follow.
py ,Signers
_OADR
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3. The Catholic Church: A Political Actor? The paper
makes no mention of the Catholic Church's role as a political
actor and ideological influence, despite the part the Peruvian
Church (specifically Father Gustavo Gutierrez) played in the
conception and dissemination of the Marxist variant of Liberation
Theology. A number of questions arise. Is there a politically
active wing of the Church? Has Liberation Theology spread? Does
the Church compete with the Sendero Luminoso or Tupac Amaru for
the allegiance of the Indian and university youth sectors? Does
the clergy participate in political protests and guerrilla
groups? What are the political orientations of the Church
leadership and clergy? A section on the Church, essential to
round out the analysis, could be done in a few paragraphs, well
within the upper range of 20 pages.
4. Communist Bloc Relations: North Korea? Policy readers
may be stimulated by the comment that APRA members, approximately
300, may have "received weapons and explosives in North Korea
since 1986" (page 17), and wonder about the extent of Peru's
relations with North Korea, especially in view of Garcia's past
connections. Has Garcia's government or APRA maintained ties
with North Korea since 1985? If so, on what basis? Is the
relationship deepening, casual or sporadic? Some brief review of
Peru's ties with North Korea would be helpful in the section on
"Relations with the Communist Bloc."
5. Counterinsurgency Prospects. The text notes the
possibility of Garcia and the military implementing "a more
comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy" (pages 32-33). The
Appendix on "Peruvian Military Strength" thoroughly substantiates
that the military are organized, trained, and equipped
principally for conventional defense against the perceived threat
from Chile and Ecuador. What would be required to reconfigure
both the government and the armed forces for an effective
counterinsurgency strategy? At what cost? Over what time? Is
there any evidence that the Peruvians are considering--or have
begun to develop--an improved counterinsurgency capability?
6. Regional Influence. The text's references to Garcia's
role in the "Group of Eight" and his advocacy of "a common
hardline debt posture" (page 27) seem to us much too
elliptical. We would imagine these subjects might be of special
interest to US policymakers, and think the Community might
usefully speculate on their prospects to 1990. Will Garcia
attempt to play a leadership role in the "Group"? Does he see it
as an alternative to the OAS which might substantially increase
Peru's influence in hemispheric affairs? How hard is he likely
to push his debt ideas?
7. US Interests. A military coup that deposes Garcia may
well pose, as the paper concludes, a "severe setback for
democratic forces in Peru" and for US regional policy. There
are, of course, military coups and military coups--some led by
extremist junior officers and NCOs; others by conservative,
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transition-minded leaders. And there may be even worse
scenarios, more damaging to US interests: for examples (and
despite their apparently limited present prospects) a power
seizure by the Sendero Luminoso; or, if the economy should spin
out of control, such severe political instability that a
revolutionary takeover--fueled by Peru's radical associates--
becomes imminent.
William Leonhart
4
McPherson
2?.6iniph
cc: AC/NIC (Mr. Hutchinson)
NIO for Latin America
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James D. Theberge