NIOS III: THE MANAGEMENT OF NFAC PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100010018-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 2, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/27: CIA-RDP93T01132R000100010018-4
0 NFAC #3467-79
2 July 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : NIOs III: The Management of NFAC Production
1. In my last memorandum I noted that crafting an organizational
solution for the NIOs depended on the relative weights given to the
"Community interest" and to managerial efficiency, but emphasized that.
underlying both was the problem of organizing production in a rational
way. I also noted the overriding need to reduce the number of officers
reporting to DD/NFA. Further thought leads me to the conclusion that
these last two statements are linked.
2. NFAC production probably cannot be and should not be centrally
managed in pursuit of some ideal highly-structured long-term plan. NFAC
is too large; there are too many analysts working on too many complex
and interrelated subjects. The foreign world we deal with and the re-
quirements of the Administration we serve change too fast for any plan
to survive. The priorities of current reporting, policy support, and
research vary from day to day and area to area. Moreover, analysts
perversely pursue their individual careers without regard for planned
buildup of expertise. These factors impose on management a need to deal
philosophically with a degree of chaos.
3. This does not mean that we should be entirely the prisoners of
events. NFAC management can identify a fair number of major problems it
wants continually covered in depth and of projects it wants undertaken,
it can intervene regularly to single out projects underway which it
believes should receive special attention, and it can enforce a discipline
on the way its components shape their individual programs to foster
coordination and focus work on its highest priorities. What it cannot
do is impose a rigid plan or exercise centralized control over pro-
duction, for to do either is to sacrifice flexibility of response.
Responsibility for carrying out these guidelines and for shaping the
mass of production not covered by them should remain decentralized.
Note, however, that centralized control and planning tends to foster
.interdisciplinary work; it would be important not to sacrifice our gains
here.
4. Decentralization does not have to mean retaining the present
organization, which has a congeries of Office Directors, NIOs, and Staff
heads reporting directly to DD/NFA and in which it is unclear to all
which matters are under centralized control and which are delegated.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/27: CIA-RDP93T01132R000100010018-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved
As noted above, centralized planning and control of production is
cumbersome and probably impossible. Fully decentralized control, as
practised in the past, results in confusion, waste, and institutional
arrogance; it is equally undesirable in the face of budgetary limitations
and pressure from the Congress and Executive Branch for better perfor-
mance. We need to find a middle solution.
5. The activities of OSI, OWI and OSR are closely related. The
same is true of those of OPA, OER and portions of OGCR. Could these
relationships be translated into organizational groupings below the NFAC
level? If so, it might be possible to delegate production management to
these groupings, leaving DD/NFA in a position to manage by exception.
Group managers would have smaller, more coherent programs to deal with
(the responsibilities of the two groups only overlap in a fundamental
way in the Soviet area), more time to give to production,and more
familiarity with analytic problems and analytic resources. Larger
groupings than the individual offices would provide more flexibility in
responding to the unplanned and unrefuseable demand. Finally, the
organizational pattern would itself express the need for interdisciplinary
work; formation of a politico-economic group would make possible a move
toward geographic organization and its accompanying interdisciplinary
gains. In fact, if NFAC's general efficiency needs a measure of dele-
gation and a reduction in the span of DD/NFA's control, an answer may be
found in extension of this principle, bringing all NFAC's present components
under a few group managers.
6. Such an organization would not per se solve the NIO-Office
Director problem. Were the NIOs to remain independent of the production
elements, some of the present tension might be alleviated by the clear
elevation of the group manager to a superior position. On the other
hand, the NIOs might be seen as ineffectual and Community interests
might be shortchanged. It would be a delicate matter for DD/NFA to
maintain a balance. If on the other hand the NIOs were integrated in
the production groups, a step that might appear attractive, the present
concept of the NIO as the DCI's staff officer would be undercut and the
Community interest would require special attention. Either course,
however, carries fewer disadvantages than their present undefined
status.
Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer
for Warning
All paragraphs in this memo
are classified SECRET
CCPDCT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/27 _ CIA-RDP93T01132R000100010018-4