OBTAINING CLEARANCE FROM ORCON AND OTHER DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100020006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 1, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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NIC EX
MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT . Obtaining Clearance From ORCON and Other
Dissemination Controls
1. DDO officials have reminded us that all NIC personnel must be
careful to follow the prescribed procedures in obtaining DDO approval to
use ORCON or other controlled data in our publications -- as spelled out
in the attached DDO memo, "Guidance for Obtaining Relief from Dissemina-
tion Controls." The points DDO officials have particularly made to NIC
personnel are that we:
-- Be sure to begin the release process at an early stage in
drafting, not at the last moment.
-- Include with our requests a full bibliography of the
specific DDO controlled dissem documents in question.
Each document should be keyed to the specific paragraph/
paragraphs in the text where it was used.
-- Check with DDO for release even in cases where the data
in specific source documents have been subsumed in
broader NIC analytic judgments.
2. All NIC officers are directed to follow these procedures -- and
to bring this memo/attachment to the attention of new 'icers as they
join the NIC.
Att: a/s
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MNORNNDLThI FOR: NIOs, Assistant NIOs, and AG Officers
Please take heed of the attached DO
request for compliance.
STAT
Date 28 April 82
FORM
5-75 1 U l EDITIONS IOUS
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SECRET
27 APR 1982
DDI- 35 ),- P-
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
THROUGH: Deputy Director for Operations
FROM:
Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff
SUBJECT: Compliance with Dissemination Controls Appearing on
DO Intelligence Information Reports
REFERENCE: DCID 1/7, Control of Dissemination of Intelligence
Information Reports
1. Referenced Director of Central Intelligence Directive (copy
attached) establishes certain common controls and procedures for the dis-
semination and use of intelligence information to ensure that, while facil-
itating its exchange for intelligence purposes, it will be adequately
protected. These controls, commonly known as dissemination controls, are
applied selectively to intelligence information reports, including those of
the Directorate of Operations (DO), and to finished intelligence and other
intelligence material to ensure that the information is not used in a manner
contrary to the limitations imposed by the dissemination controls without
the approval of the originator of the information.
2. We have noted occasional failures on the part of the users of DO
intelligence information to "clear" reports for use in finished intelligence,
briefings or other derived product, particularly with regard to reports
carrying the control marking "Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator" (ORCON). This marking requires that the informa-
tion not be disseminated beyond the headquarters elements of the recipient
organizations and not be incorporated in whole or in part into other reports
or briefings without the advance permission of the originator.
3. These dissemination controls are designed primarily to protect
sources and methods 25X1
The viability and productivity 2 A11
of these sources depends upon our ability to protect them from exposure,
25X1
2`25X1
Df: ; VATIVE CL BY SIGNER
^ DECL)9REVW ON 26APR02
DERIVED FROM D9c ? 1
SECRET
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SECRET
5. Your full cooperation in adhering to the policies and procedures
established for the clearance of DO information for further use and/or
dissemination is of vital importance. To this end, we would appreciate your
circulating within your component appropriate reminders to ensure compliance
with DCID 1/7. With your concurrence, we would like to brief selected
audiences within your component to explain in detail the clearance procedures
and facilities. Arrangements for such briefings can be made directly with
Attachment a/s
SECRET
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DCID No. 1/7
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1 /7 '
CONTROL OF DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
(Effective 4 May 1981)
Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive
Orders 12036 and 12065, the following controls on the dissemination and use of intel-
ligence information and related materials (hereafter referred to as intelligence)! are
hereby established.
1. Purpose
This directive establishes certain common controls and procedures for the
dissemination and use of intelligence to ensure that, while facilitating its interchange
for intelligence purposes, it will be adequately protected. This directive amplifies
applicable portions of the 2 October 1978 Information Security Oversight Office
(ISOO) Directive #1 which implements Executive Order (EO) 12065. It also prescribes
additional controls on the dissemination of intelligence to foreign governments and to
foreign nationals and immigrant aliens, including those employed by the US Govern-
ment. Policy on release of intelligence to contractors and consultants is set forth in the
Attachment.
2. General
a. Applicability. The controls and procedures set forth in this directive shall be
uniformly applied in the dissemination and use of intelligence originated by all Intel-
ligence Community organizations as defined by Section 4-207, EO 12036.
b. Implementation. The substance of this directive shall be published in appro-
priate regulatory or notice media of each Intelligence Community organization, to-
gether with appropriate procedures permitting rapid interagency consultation
concerning the dissemination and use of intelligence. For this purpose, each Intel-
ligence Community organization will designate a primary referent. Originators of
intelligence bearing control markings or other restrictions required by this directive
shall ensure that requests concerning them are answered promptly.
c. "Need-To-Know" Principle. "Need-to-know" is a determination by an au-
thorized holder of classified information that access to specific classified material in
his or her possession is required by one or more other persons to perform a specific and
officially authorized function essential to accomplish a national security task or as
required by Federal Statute, Executive Order, or directly applicable regulation. In
addition to an established "need-to-know," a person must possess an appropriate secu-
rity clearance and access approvals, as required, prior to being provided classified
information.
' This directive supersedes DCID No. 1/7, effective 18 May 1976.
' For purposes of this directive the terms "intelligence information and related materials" (or "intel-
ligence') mean:
(1) "Foreign intelligence" and "counterintelligence," as these terms are defined in EO 12036, and
(2) Information describing US foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities, sources and
methods, equipment, and methodology used for the acquisition, processing, or exploitation of such intel-
ligence, foreign military hardware obtained for exploitation, and photography or recordings resulting
from such US intelligence collection efforts.
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3. Use and Dissemination Among US Intelligence Community Organi7wtiorri
a. "Third Agency" Rule. The ISOO Directive implementing EO 12065 states
that, except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947,
classified information originating in one US agency shall not be disseminated outside
any other agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the
originating agency. This is commonly described as the "third agency" rule.
b. Advance Authorization. To facilitate the dissemination and different uses
made of classified intelligence within and among Intelligence Community organiza-
tions and to assure the timely provision of intelligence to consumers, it is necessary to
provide controlled relief to the "third agency rule" within the Intelligence Commu-
nity in addition to that provided by the National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC 403
(d)). Accordingly, Intelligence Community organizations are hereby authorized to use
each other's classified intelligence in their respective intelligence documents, publica-
tions or other information media, and to disseminate their products to other Intel-
ligence Community organizations except as specifically restricted by control markings
prescribed in paragraph 6. Classified intelligence documents, even though they bear
no control markings will not be released in their original form to third agencies with-
out permission of the originator.
4. Use and Dissemination to Other US Organizations
Classified intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control markings, will
not be released in its original form to US organizations outside of the intelligence
Community without permission of the originator. Any organization disseminating
intelligence beyond the organizations of the Intelligence Community shall be responsi-
ble for ensuring that recipient organizations understand and agree to observe the
restrictions prescribed by this directive and maintain adequate safeguards.
5. Foreign Dissemination of Intelligence
a. Dissemination to Immigrant Aliens, Foreign Contractors, and Other Foreign
Nationals.
(1) Classified intelligence, even though it bears no control markings, will not be
released in any form to foreign nationals or immigrant aliens (including US Govern-
ment employed, utilized or integrated foreign nationals and immigrant aliens) with-
out permission of the originator.
(2) Release of classified intelligence to a foreign contractor/company under
contract to the US Government will be made according to paragraph 5b through the
government under which the contractor/company operates. Direct US-to-foreign
contractor/company release is prohibited.
b. Dissemination to Foreign Governments.
Classified intelligence, even though it bears no control markings authorized by
this Directive, will not be released in its original form to foreign governments without
permission of the originator. Information contained in classified intelligence of an-
other Intelligence Community organization, and which bears no restrictive control
markings, may be used by the recipient Intelligence Community organization in re-
ports disseminated to foreign governments 3 provided:
(1) No reference is made to the source documents upon which the released
product is based.
3 Excepting RESTRICTED DATA and FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA, which is prohibited from
foreign dissemination under Sections 123 and 144 of Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended.
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(2) The information is extracted or paraphrased to insure that the source or
manner of acquisition of the intelligence cannot be deduced or revealed in any
manner.
(3) Foreign release is made through established foreign disclosure channels and
procedures, such as prescribed in DCID 6/1, DCID 6/2, and DCID 1/13.
6. Authorized Control Markings
a. "WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED" (WNINTEL)
(1) This marking is used, with a security classification, to identify information
whose sensitivity requires constraints on its further dissemination and use. This
marking may be used only on intelligence which identifies or would reasonably
permit identification of an intelligence source or method which is susceptible to
countermeasures that could nullify or reduce its effectiveness.
(2) Classified intelligence so marked shall not be disseminated in any manner
outside authorized channels' without the permission of the originator and an assess-
ment by the senior intelligence officer in the disseminating agency as to the poten-
tial risks to the national security and to the intelligence sources or methods involved.
In making such assessment, consideration should be given to reducing the risk to the
intelligence sources or methods which provided the intelligence by sanitizing or
paraphrasing the information so as to permit its wider dissemination. To avoid
confusion as to the extent of dissemination and use restrictions governing the in-
formation involved, the marking may not be used in conjunction with special access
or Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) controls. This marking may be
abbreviated as "WNINTEL" or as "WN."
b. "DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CON-
TROLLED BY ORIGINATOR" (ORCON)
(1) This marking is used, with a security classification, to enable a continuing
knowledge and supervision by the originator of the use made of the information
involved. This marking may be used only on intelligence which clearly identifies or
would reasonably permit ready identification of an intelligence source or method
which is particularly susceptible to countermeasures that would nullify or measur-
ably reduce its effectiveness. This marking may not be used when an item of in-
formation will reasonably be protected by use of other markings specified herein, or
by the application of the "need-to-know" principle and the safeguarding procedures
of the security classification system.
(2) Information bearing this marking may not be disseminated beyond the
headquarters elements ? of the recipient organizations and may not be incorporated
in whole or in part into other reports or briefings without the advance permission of
and under conditions specified by the originator. As this is the most restrictive
marking herein, agencies will establish procedures to ensure that it is only applied to
particularly sensitive intelligence and that timely procedures are established to re-
view requests for further dissemination of intelligence bearing this marking. This
marking may be abbreviated as "ORCON" or as "OC."
' Unless otherwise specified by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the National
Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) or as agreed to between originating and recipient agencies, authorized
channels are the Intelligence Community, as defined in Section 4-207, EO 12036, and Intelligence
Community contractors and consultants and officials of agencies represented on the NFIB as determined
on a "need-to-know" basis by recipient senior intelligence officials.
At the discretion of the originator, the term "headquarters elements" may include specified subordi-
nate intelligence-producing components.
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c. "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS" (NOCON-
TRACT)
This marking is used, with a security classification, to prohibit the dissemination
of information to contractors or consultants (hereinafter contractors) without the
permission of the originator. This marking may be used only on intelligence which, if
disclosed to a contractor, would actually or potentially give him a competitive advan-
tage which could reasonably be expected to cause a conflict of interest with his obliga-
tion to maintain the security of the information; or which was provided by a source on
the express or implied condition that it not be made available to contractors. The
restrictions applicable to this marking do not apply to consultants hired under Office
of Personnel Management procedures, or comparable procedures derived from
authorities vested in heads of organizations by law, and who are normally considered
to be extensions of the office by which they are employed. This marking may be
abbreviated as "NOCONTRACT" or as "NC."
d. "CAUTION-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED" (PROPIN)
This marking is used, with or without a security classification, to identify in-
formation provided by a commercial firm or private source under an express or im-
plied understanding that the information will be protected as a trade secret or propri-
etary data believed to have actual or potential value. Information bearing this marking
shall not be disseminated in any form to an individual, organization, or foreign gov-
ernment which has any interests, actual or potential, in competition with the source of
the information without the permission of the originator. This marking may be used in
conjunction with the "NOCONTRACT" marking to preclude dissemination to any
contractor. This marking may be abbreviated as "PROPIN" or as "PR."
e. "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" (NOFORN)
This marking is used with a security classification to identify intelligence that
may not be released in any form to foreign governments, foreign nationals, or non-US
citizens without permission of the originator. This marking may be used on intel-
ligence which if released to a foreign government or national(s) could jeopardize intel-
ligence sources or methods, or when it would not be in the best interests of the United
States to release the information from a policy standpoint upon specific determination
by a Senior Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community. Senior Intelligence
Officers of US Intelligence Community organizations are responsible for developing,
publishing and maintaining guidelines consistent with the policy guidance herein for
use in determining the foreign releasability of intelligence they collect or produce.
These guidelines shall be used in assigning NOFORN control markings, and by pri-
mary referents (paragraph 2.b. above applies) in responding to inquiries from other
organizations on application of this control. This marking may be abbreviated
"NOFORN" or as "NF."
f. "AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO (name of country(ies)/international
organization)" (REL )
This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that an originator has
predetermined to be releasable or has released, through established foreign disclosure
procedures and channels, to the foreign country(ies)/organization indicated. No other
foreign dissemination of the material is authorized (in any form) without the permis-
sion of the originator. This marking may be abbreviated "REL (abbreviated name of
country(ies)/international organization)." In the case of intelligence controlled under
DCID 6/2, authorized distribution indicators, published separately, may be used in-
stead of the "REL" control marking.
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7. Procedures Governing Use of Control Markings
a. Any recipient desiring to use intelligence in a manner contrary to the restric-
tions established by the control markings set forth above shall obtain the advance
permission of the originating agency. Such permission applies only to the specific
purposes agreed to by the originator and does not automatically apply to all recipients.
Originators should insure that prompt consideration is given to recipients' requests in
these regards, with particular attention to reviewing, and editing if necessary, sani-
tized or paraphrased versions to derive a text suitable for release subject to lesser or no
control markings.
b. The control markings authorized above shall be shown on the title page, front
cover, and other applicable pages of documents, incorporated in the text of electrical
communications, shown on graphics, and associated (in full or abbreviated form) with
data stored or processed in automatic data processing systems. The control markings
also shall be indicated by parenthetical use of the marking abbreviations at the begin-
ning or end of the appropriate portions. If.the control markings apply to several or all
portions, the document may be marked with a statement to this effect rather than
marking each portion individually.
c. The control markings in paragraph 6 shall be individually assigned at the time
of preparation of intelligence products and used in conjunction with security clas-
sifications and other markings specified by EO 12065 and its implementing ISOO
Directive. The markings shall be carried forward to any new format in which the
same information is incorporated, including oral and visual presentations.
8. Reporting Unauthorized Disclosures
Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings that result in
unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the intelligence of another shall be reported
to the Director of Central intelligence through the DCI Security Committee.
9. Obsolete Restrictions and Markings
The following markings are obsolete and will not be used subsequent to the date
of this directive: WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED, CONTROLLED DISSEM, NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY,
INTEL COMPONENTS ONLY, LIMITED, CONTINUED CONTROL, NO
DISSEM ABROAD, BACKGROUND USE ONLY, WARNING NOTICE-SEN-
SITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, NO FOR-
EIGN DISSEM, USIB ONLY, AND NFIB ONLY. Questions with respect to the cur-
rent application of control markings authorized by earlier directives on the
dissemination and control of intelligence and use on documents issued prior to the date
of this directive should be referred to the originating agency or department.
WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/7
(Attachment)
DCI POLICY ON RELEASE OF INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION TO CONTRACTORS AND CONSULTANTS'
1. So that Intelligence Community agencies may better discharge their respon-
sibilities, they may release selected intelligence information and related materials
(hereafter referred to as intelligence): to contractors and consultants (hereafter re-
ferred to as contractors) without referral to the originating agency, provided that:
a. Release' is made only to private individuals or organizations certified by
the Senior Intelligence Officer of the sponsoring Intelligence Community organiza-
tion as being under contract to the United States Government for the purpose of
performing classified services in support of the mission of his or a member
organization;' as having a demonstrated "need-to-know;" and an appropriate secu-
rity clearance or access approval. If retention of intelligence by the contractor is
required, the contractor must have an approved storage facility.
b. The Senior Intelligence Officer of the sponsoring agency, or his designee(s),
is responsible for ensuring that releases to contractors are made pursuant to this
policy statement and through established channels.
c. The sponsoring agency maintains a record of material released.
d. Contractors maintain such records as will permit them to account for all
intelligence received, disposed of or destroyed, produced and held by them for the
duration of the contract, and to permit identification of all persons who have had
access to intelligence in their custody.
' General policy is set forth in DCID 1/7, "Control of Dissemination of Intelligence Information,"
effective 4 May 1981. See DCID No. 1/19 for minimum standards for control of Sensitive Compart-
mented Information (SCI) released to contractors. In accordance with paragraph 6c, DCID 1/7, Intel-
ligence Community organizations agree that government-owned, contractor-operated laboratories
performing classified services in support of the intelligence mission of an Intelligence Community
organization, and which are designated authorized channels by the Senior Intelligence Officer (as
defined in DCID 1/19) concerned, are not considered contractors for the purposes of this policy
statement.
' For purposes of this attachment, the terms "selected intelligence information and related materials"
(or "intelligence") mean:
(1) "Foreign intelligence" and "counterintelligence" as these terms are defined in EO 12036.
(2) Information describing US foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities, sources and
methods, equipment and methodology used for the acquisition, processing, or exploitation of such intel-
ligence, foreign military hardware obtained for exploitation, and photography or recordings resulting
from such US intelligence collection efforts.
(3) Intelligence produced and disseminated by CIA, INR/State, DIA, FBI, NSA, ACSI/Army,
ACSI/Air Force, Naval Intelligence Command, DOE and the military commands. This specifically
excludes Foreign Service reporting and SCI. Permission to release Foreign Service reporting must be
obtained from the Department of State. Release of SCI is governed by lateral agreements and advise-
ments between intelligence Community organizations.
' Release is the authorized visual, oral, or physical disclosure of classified intelligence.
Non-Intelligence Community government components under contract to fulfill an intelligence sup-
port role may be treated as members of the Intelligence Community rather than as contractors. When so
treated, it shall be solely for the specific purposes agreed upon and shall in no case include authority to
disseminate further intelligence made available to them.
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e. Contractors do not reproduce any intelligence without the permission of the
sponsoring agency, and classify, control and account for reproduced copies in the same
manner as for originals.
f. Contractors destroy intelligence only according to guidelines and by standards
set by the sponsoring agency.
g. Contractors make provision to ensure that intelligence in their custody is not
released to foreign nationals, whether or not they are employees or contractors them-
selves, except with the permission of the originating agency through the sponsoring
agency.
h. Contractors receiving intelligence do not release it: (1) to any of their compo-
nents or employees not directly engaged in providing services under the contract; or
(2) to any other contractor (including subcontractors), without the consent of the spon-
soring agency (which shall verify that any second contractors satisfy all security re-
quirements herein).
i. Contractors agree that all intelligence released to them, all reproductions
thereof, and all other material they may generate based on or incorporating data
therefrom (including authorized reproductions), remain the property of the US Gov-
ernment and will be returned upon request of the sponsoring agency or expiration of
the contract, whichever comes first.
j. Sponsoring agencies arrange for and contractors agree that, upon expiration of
contracts: (1) all released intelligence, all reproductions thereof, and all other materials
based on or incorporating data therefrom, are returned to the sponsoring agency; or (2)
all or a specified part of such items are retained by the contractor under all applicable
security and accountability controls when the contractors have specific needs for such
retention that are validated by sponsoring agencies.
k. Sponsoring agencies delete: (1) the CIA seal, (2) the phrase "Directorate of
Operations," (3) the place acquired, (4) the field number, (5) the source description,
and (6) field dissemination, from all CIA Directorate of Operations reports passed to
contractors, unless prior approval to do otherwise is obtained from CIA.
2. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Special National Intelligence Estimates
(SNIEs), National Intelligence Analytical Memoranda and Interagency Memoranda
may not be released to contractors. Such materials shall be marked NOT RELEAS-
ABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS. However, information in them may
be made available to contractors, without identification as national intelligence, by the
Senior Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community agency authorizing its
release.
3. Intelligence which by reason of sensitivity of content bears control markings
"CAUTION-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED," "NOT RELEAS-
ABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS," or "DISSEMINATION AND
EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR," as speci-
fied in DCID 1/7, may not be released to contractors unless special permission has
been obtained from the originator.
4. Questions concerning the implementation of this policy and these procedures
shall be referred for appropriate action to the DCI Security Committee.
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