FURTHER INFO REQUESTED BY ONA REGARDING INTEL COMMUNITY DISSENT PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100030020-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 18, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

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Directorate of Intelligence
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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 1,
NFAC_~_`'.__
Memorandum for Holders-1 of
NFIB-14.2/8
30 September 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS-1 OF NFIB-14.2/8
FROM Walter Elder
Secretary
SUBJECT . Dissenting Positions in National Intelligence Estimates
and Memorandums
NFIB-14.2/8, 10 July 1980
The attached memoranda are forwarded for your information.
Attachments
A/S
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Attachment to
Memorandum for Holders-1 of
NFIB-14.2/8
30 September 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board
FROM : Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
SUBJECT : Dissenting Positions in National Intelligence Estimates
and Memorandums
Attached is the final version of the DCI's guidelines on dissenting
positions in NIEs. We received comments from a number of you and have
adjusted the text to reflect most if not all of your problems. In
particular, let it be understood that NIOs will not unilaterally change
dissenting language that reflects the personal positions of NFIB prin-
cipals.
Attachment
(15 September 1980)
Bruce C. erke. Jr.
CONFIDENTIAL
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JNF A UENTI AL
The Director of Central Intelligence
wuhir on. D. C.20505
Attachment to
Memorandum for Holders-1 of
NFIB-14.2/8
30 September 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the National Foreign Intelligence Board
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
National Intelligence Officers
Estimates and Memorandums
SUBJECT : Dissenting Positions in National Intelligence
2. Dissenting views and alternative assessments are important
factors in the process of preparing national intelligence; their clear
communication to the consumer is essential. Current DCI policy requires
that dissenting positions or alternative views appearing in national
intelligence be given treatment equal to the main text in length, de-
gree of detail, and rationale. National Intelligence Officers responsi-
ble for the preparation of national intelligence have been charged to
assure that the text of an estimate and dissenting views clearly show
the reasons each of the differing views is held. It is often the explana-
tion of the differing views that will be of greatest value to the reader.
guidance.
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide guidelines covering
the format, the procedures for submission, and the content of dissenting
positions in National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intel-
ligence Estimates, Interagency Intelligence Memorandums and Intelligence
Alert Memorandums. I want to assure that all members of the NFIB have
the fullest possible opportunity to present alternative judgments in
those instances where they find they differ with the DCI's findings set
forth in the main text of these estimative papers. Some recent NIE
practice, however, indicates -- substance apart -- that there is a
certain lack of order and clarity in the way we in NFIB are handling
problems of dissent. For this reason, I forward this memorandum of
3. The guidelines below are not intended to circumscribe in any
way the right of the NFIB members to dissent in NIEs but to assist the
DCI in clearly communicating to policymakers the findings of the Intel-
ligence Community on important foreign developments.
CONFIDENTIAL
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:~reI t sc.; ALta..ri"ent to
J1esncrandum for Molders-1 of
NFIB-14.2/8
30 September 1980
4. Format and Procedures
a. As has been standard practice throughout the
history of NIEs, the main text of national intelligence
issuances will contain the findings of the DCI. Dissents
of members of the NFIB, including the CIA member, will
appear in the same format as the findings of the main
text. The DCI will not himself take dissenting opinions.
b. The specific format selected by the NIO and the
dissenting agency representative will be fully coordi-
nated during the drafting process. Whether the main text
and dissenting positions are presented in separate para-
graphs, separate sections, or annexes will depend on the
nature and substance of the dissent, and will be deter-
mined through consultation between the NIO and represen-
tatives of the dissenting agency,On occasion, and with
the consent of the agency concerned, the dissent of a
single agency on a matter clearly secondary to the pur-
pose of the estimate may be accommodated in a footnote.
Footnotes may also be used when an agency wishes to re-
affirm a dissenting position taken in an earlier estimate.
c. The production schedule for the estimate should
provide sufficient time for staffing within agencies
and for the identification of dissenting positions as
early as possible after issuance of the first draft.
d. The NIO and agency representatives should agree
on the texts of dissenting positions appearing in sub-
sequent drafts of the estimate, which would be subject
to later review and approval by dissenting NFIB principals.
e. Prior to the pre-NFIB meeting of representatives
on the final draft of the estimate, agency representatives
should obtain the preliminary reaction of their principals
on the dissenting positions to appear in the estimate.
As in the past, the final decisions on the main text and
dissenting positions would be made during the deliberations
of the NFIB on the estimate.
5. Content
a. The NIOs and agencies participating in the pro-
duction of national intelligence should share the respon-
sibility for assuring that dissenting positions (1) ad-
dress issues within the scope of the estimate, (2) parallel
the main text in substance and degree of detail, and (3)
convey clear supporting rationale for the dissenting view.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Memorandum for Holders-1
NFIB-14.2/8
30 September 1980
b. The NIOs, acting for the DCI and working in con-
Junction with the dissenting agency or agencies, have the
editing authority to insure that dissents do indeed parallel
the main text in their format, coverage, and presentation;
they do not have the authority to change the substantive
thrust of the dissents, provided only that those dissents
present evidence and analysis and do not attribute positions
to the main text which the DCI neither states nor intends.
6. There will be no counter-dissents.
7. These guidelines are intended to apply to national intelligence
issuances prepared under scheduling procedures short of crash precedence.
The handling of dissents will have to be adjusted under compressed pro-
cedures to produce national intelligence issuances on an urgent basis.
8. Your coo Deratilqn in implementing these guidelines will be appre-
ciated.
STANSFIEL"URNER
(18 September 1980)
25X1
IV 25X1
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THE DRAFTING OF THE DISSENT IS LEFT ENTIRELY IN THE HANDS OF THE
DISSENTING OFFICE. THE NID STAFF EDITS THEM WITH A LIGHT HAND.
NID OCCASIONALLY DOES PUBLISH DISSENTS OF MORE THAN ONE PARAGRAPH.
THE NID STAFF ADVISES THE DISSENTING OFFICE THAT THE CO",IENT SHOULD
BE KEPT TO ONE PARAGRAPH. IF THE OFFICE WANTS TO PUBLISH A COUNTERPIECE, IT
SHOULD DO SO IN ITS OWN PUBLICATIONS. THIS GUIDELINE IS NORMALLY HEEDED. THE
IF THE NINNKK= COMMENT IS POORLY PUT OR NOT TO THE POINT, A
::CALL MAY BE MADE TO A SOMEWHAT SENIOR LEVEL IN THE DISSENTING OFFICE TO ASK
IS USELESS TO TRY TO PROTECT AN OFFICE FROM REPRESENTING ITS VIEWS POORLY.
WHETHER THE COMMENT IS WHAT IS WANTED. EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT IT FREQUENTLY
GIVEN COPIES OF DISSENTS BEFORE THEY ARE PUBLISHED, TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY
TO ADJUST THEIR OWN LANGUAGE AND TO ALLOW THEM TO NOTE ANY SUCH MISREPRESENTATION
IN DISSENTING DRAFTS AND TO DEAL WITH IT.
SO FAR, MISREPRESENTATION OF JUDGMENTS IN THE MAIN ARTICLE HAS
,NOT BEEN A PROBLEM IN DEALING WITH DRAFT DISSENTS. AUTHORS OF ARTICLES ARE
REJOINDERS TO DISSENTS ARE NOT PERMITTED. THE AUTHOR OF THE
ORIGINAL ARTICLE HAS NO CONTROL OVER TINE LANGUAGE OF THE DISSENT.
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SECRET
SSCI ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION QUESTIONS
17 MARCH 1983
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FF
QUESTION 7. To what degree does the NIE process foster competitive
analysis? Can you cite specific examples?
principle.
ANSWER. We rely principally upon the rather elaborate
NIE process itself to ensure the airing and consideration of competitive
analyses in the course of producing our estimates. As the answers to
earlier questions in this series have pointed out, many individuals and
organizations get involved in weighing the evidence upon which each
estimate is based. Many differing viewpoints on what that evidence
means will be voiced during the estimate's consideration, and it is the
rubbing of these ideas against each other throughout the process that
guarantees that no one analyst's viewpoint will automatically prevail.
Even though most drafts are written by one analyst, the review and
coordination processes described above usually result in some if not a
good many rather profound changes in the thrust of an estimate as the
process unfolds. In the larger sense, then, the competitive analysis
principle is the keystone of the national intelligence production
process, and every estimate we do is done in accord with this
In addition, the NIC has taken a number of steps to
increase the review of its work by both specialists and generalists who
are outside the Community's regular estimative apparatus. The DCI's
Senior Review Panel, a group of four distinguished senior officers with
many years of experience in international relations, comments on every
estimative Terms of Reference, Concept Paper, and first draft,
frequently coming up with suggestions that we adopt for improving,
expanding, or changing the exposition of a paper. And whenever possible
we seek the reactions of CIA and embassy officers abroad to our
drafts. To the degree that time permits, drafts are also reviewed by
outside consultants -- individuals from the academic, business, and
professional worlds who are among the country's most respected experts
QUESTION 8. National Intelligence Estimates, Special National
Intelligence Estimates, and Interagency Intelligence Memoranda
seem to be the only publications of the Community which can focus
policymaker attention on differences in analytic judgments among
A. Do you seek a consensus in those documents, or do you
encourage the airing of alternative views?
ANSWER. The whole point of the coordination process --
through which each NIE, SNIE, and IIM draft goes -- is to ensure that
any analytical viewpoint that competes with or differs from the
drafter's view gets a full hearing. Once heard, a differing view can
(a) be persuasive enough to become the stated view of all; (b) be
refuted persuasively enough to be dropped; or (c) be maintained, even
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SECRET
accomplish it only imperfectly.
though others disagree, and appear in the final estimate as a formal
dissent. In practice, either (a) or (b) tends to happen more often than
(c). Perhaps this is unfortunate, but it takes a good deal of extra
effort -- and more than a little courage -- to stand by one's guns and
articulate a viewpoint different than that being expressed by everyone
else, particularly when the others seem to have more evidence or greater
expertise on their side. We do our best to combat "groupthink" by
trying to draw out differences of view when we find them and they they
appear solidly based, but this admittedly is a difficult task and we
B. Can you explain why most interagency estimates relating to
non-Soviet subjects contain virtually no dissenting opinions?
world.
a number of Central American issues, oil market prospects, North Korean
attack plans, etc), but is certainly correct to say that dissents appear
more often in Soviet-related estimates than in any others. We think
this is because evidence on many Soviet matters is inherently indirect
and circumstantial, while in most other parts of the world there is a
larger component of directly verifiable -- and hence less arguable --
evidence. The fundamental importance of most Soviet issues for the US,
moreover, as well as their operational implications for US policy, may
lead agencies to dig in their heels in differences of judgment which
they'might be more inclined to soften in the case of less important
areas. Then, too, some agencies devote the bulk of their analytic
resources to coverage of Soviet affairs, putting them in a good position
to take issue with others on these matters, but leaving them far less
expert and less able to form independent judgments on other areas of the
estimates on non-Soviet-related topics (e.g.,
There have in fact been dissenting opinions in some
decided, leaving room for considerable differences of view.
judgments on matters about which the Soviets themselves have not
In our Soviet estimates in particular, the increased
sophistication and complexity of modern weapons systems and the long
lead times required for their development have placed greater demands on
intelligence for details of Soviet military policies and programs and
longer-range forecasts. This has led to a considerable expansion in the
number'of discrete judgments called for in estimates on Soviet military
matters -- and with it, an increase in the number of areas of potential
disagreement. We also find that forecasts about Soviet policies and
capabilities a decade or more in the future require intelligence
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JLVI\L I
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
19 December 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: I (Intelligence Liaison Staff
FROM: Harold P. Ford, NIO at Large
National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: Dissents in National Estimates
1. Dissenting views in national estimates are drafted by the
sponsoring NFIB agency, coordinated with the appropriate National
Intelligence Officer (that is, the chairman of the particular NIE), and
debated by Principals of the National Foreign Intelligence Board before
final approval for inclusion in an estimate. Alternative views are not
limited in length. They must, however, be confined to issues of some
substance within the scope of the estimate, parallel the text in
substance and degree of detail, and clearly convey the rationale
supporting the dissent.
2. The language of dissenting views may be lightly edited by the
National Intelligence Officer, acting for the Director of Central
Intelligence, in order to insure that the view parallels the text in
format, coverage, and presentation; and to establish that the dissent
does not attribute positions to the estimate which it does not in fact
include. National estimates do not contain counter-dissents.
_S_i Pr
OADk_
'1__Mut.tip1e
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