THE PLANETARY PRODUCT

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Progress Despite `the Blues' 1977-78
The Planetary Product
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D. C.
Summary /i
Statistical Preliminaries /I
Economic Progress in a Century of Cultural Crises /6
Survey by Region /13
Economic Power Ratios /23
Tables and Charts /26
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This report was prepared by Dr. Herbert Block, a consultant to the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, under the auspices of the
Department's external research program. The views and conclusions contained in the
report are solely the author's and should not be interpreted as representing the
official opinion or policy of the U.S. Government.
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Contents
Page
Summary ............................................... i-ii
Statistical Preliminaries ............................. 1
Focus on Areas and Long-Term Development .......... 1
Degree of Statistical Precision........... ..... o.o 1
Demography in an Age of Mass Migrations........... 1
Proliferation of Sovereignty ...................... 2
National Product Concepts .?............. ......... 2
"Real Growth" In a Time of Severe Inflation....... 3
Nations More or Less Developed., ..... _oo_ ...... 3
East and West.. ...... - ..... o....o ....... oo ..... o 4
The Purchasing Power Puzzle............. .... oo.... 5
Economic Progress in a Century of Cultural Crises..... 6
Planetary Product of 1900: 9 Percent of Today.... 6
US GNP Share in 1900 Same as Today, Russia's
Not Much Larger ................................. 7
Changing Size and Composition of Mankind .......... 8
The Long-Term GNP Growth Record ................... 9
The American Role in OECD Growth .................. 11
The 1970s: Wild Ups and Downs in West,
Mediocre in USSR ................................ 12
Survey by Region ...................................... 13
The Developed West ................................ 13
OPEC Affluent and Poor ............................ 17
The Less Developed West ........................... 17
The Developed East ................................ 19
The Less Developed East ........................... 20
Economic Power Ratios ................................. 23
Table 1. GNP Series Without Third World Supple-
ment for Selected Areas, 1950-78 ...... 26
Table 2. Planetary Product Without Third World
Supplement, 1975-78, by Country ....... 27
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Page
Table 3.
Summary of Planetary Product With Third
World Supplement, 1975-78 ............
35
Table 4.
Planetary Product With Third World
Supplement, 1978, by Continent ........
37
Table 5.
Number of Independent States by
Continent and Per Capita GNP Group
(With Third World Supplement).........
38
Table 6.
World Population in Mid-1978 by
Continent .............................
39
Table 7.
Planetary Product With Third World
Supplement in Selected Years,
1950-78 ...............................
40
Table 8.
Average Annual GNP Growth Rates by Area
or Country, 1950-78 ...................
41
Table 9.
Population and GNP Per Capita, Selected
Years, 1950-1978 ......................
42
Table 10. Ranking of Nations, 1978 Without Third
World Supplement ......................
43
Chart I.
Real Growth Rates 1973-1978 by Area....
44
Chart II.
Share of Important Areas in 1978 World
Population and World Output ...........
45
Chart III. Planetary Income Distribution by
National Income Bracket ...............
46
Chart IV.
Real Growth of GNP and Inflation
1964-1978 .............................
47
Chart V.
US, Soviet, Japanese, and PRC Gross
National Product ......................
48
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Summary
In the 1970s the flamboyant growthmanship of the preceding
decade has given way to disillusionment and malaise over
inflation, energy scarcity, the environment, and so forth.
Overall output has slackened practically everywhere on the
globe, and for the next several years progress is expected
to be slow. But the present mood should pass and it will be
realized that, interminable local conflicts notwithstanding,
the world at large has been at peace (of sorts) and that,
using the national product as a yardstick, output has
increased between 1971 and 1978 in all major areas of the
world by an annual average 4 percent in toto and by 2 percent
per capita. This is only 1 percentage point less than in the
1950s and 1960s and decidedly better than in the first half
of the century. Then the planetary product grew on average
by roughly 2.3 percent--or 1.5 percent per capita, given a
lower world population increase.
In 1978, global output was approximately $8.5 trillion,
or $2,000 per capita. Around 1900, expressed in 1978 dollars
(with a purchasing power one-eighth of 78 years earlier), the
planetary product aggregated $750 billion--perhaps $450 per
head, i.e., three-fourths that in the Third World today. The
American GNP per capita in 1900 was 2,230 present dollars or
two-thirds of what is now considered the "poverty level" of
personal income in this country. The share of the US in the
planetary product was 23 percent at the turn of the century
(now it is 25 percent); Russia's share was about 11 percent
(now 12.4 percent), which implies that the GNP ratio between
the two great powers has changed very little. Militarily
the Russia of 1900 was strong, the US quite unguarded under
geopolitical conditions far different from today's.
In the wake of two world wars the US assumed a lead
role. In 1950, when reconstruction of war torn nations was
well on its way, the American share in the planetary product
exceed_e_d__one-third. The reduction to what is pow_ 25 percent
of world output has by and large been the normal result of
postwar reconstruction, massively aided by Uncle Sam; whether
American policies have been less than perfect is up to you,
dear reader, to judge. Since 1950, US economic growth has
lagged behind the Western or world average, though less in
the 1970s than in the first twenty years. This means that the
developed West (minus the US) as well as the less developed
Western countries have expanded faster than the world average
and as fast or even faster than the Communist realm with its
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policy of forced growth. From 1950 to 1978 average annual
growth was 4.7 percent for the world as a whole, 3.3 percent
for the US, 4.6 percent for the non-Communist world includ-
ing the US, 5.3 percent for the West less the US, 5.0 per-
cent for the Communist area. For the years 1971-78 alone
the rates, in the same order, were 4.0, 3.2, 4.0, 4.4, and
4.0 percent--in other words, a similar relationship.
Average rates for many years efface short-term fluctu-
ations. The 1970s exposed the West to startling ups and
downs, while Soviet growth (disregarding a few years with
either exceptionally good or bad harvest weather) was not
only lower than in previous decades and also lower than
planned, but mediocre throughout. The Soviet economy has
entered a time of sluggishness; in a near future the world
may talk not about le mal Anglais but le mal Russe.
The growth rates just quoted and the underlying national
product series are the result of calculations beset with
statistical caveats and methological puzzles. There is,
first, the gap between (a) GNPs converted into dollars at
official rates of exchange floating with precarious control
and (b) GNPs converted at purchasing power equivalents. To
give one example: at the average 1978 rate of exchange the
Swiss GNP per capita was $14,057 (or 46 percent above the
American!); this report is using a procedure yielding a
figure of $8,654 for Switzerland. There is, second, the
problem of how to determine the usually underrated purchas-
ing power of less developed countries, especially in the
bottom groups. Whatever method is applied to weigh these
LDCs on the same scale as the richer nations--the report
discusses this almost intractable issue in some detail--the
fact remains that the inhabitants of these countries (the
elites excepted) are as poor as were the inhabitants of now
advanced nations at a time not long past. In recent decades
the Third World has made great strides (average annual GNP
growth 1950-78 was roughly 5 percent in toto and close to
3 percent per capita). Quite a few countries have expanded
their economies astoundingly (above all those with market
mechanism) and some of them have joined the club of the
economically advanced nations. That this may be a politic-
ally troubled process is most visible in the case of Iran.
Other countries are actually "retrodeveloping," i.e., their
GNP per capita or even in toto is declining as a result of
their inability to cope with economic and political problems
that have arisen since their ascent into the realm of (a
rather proliferated) sovereignty.
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Focus on Areas and Long-Term Development. This report,
an annual one-man effort, presents estimates of national
product in toto and per capita for all regions of the world.l/
It grew out of an East-West comparison undertaken thirty
years ago. In the mid-1960s it was extended to cover the
rest of the planet. The paper focuses on areas rather than
individual countries. It emphasizes long-term development
rather than business conditions of the current year. Extra-
polations are avoided; the future seems to take pleasure in
discomfiting model plumbers. Our statistical comments show
that even the past is uncertain. The data assembled for the
past three decades draw the author and any willing reader
into the economic and political issues of our time but
inevitably also into the methodology of how to define and
measure reality. What we perceive as reality depends on
definitions, assumptions, and hypotheses, their scope and
their limitations (a condition in no way limited to the
field of economic statistics).
Degree of Statistical Precision. The 1978 figures are
open to revisions. To be exact, they are even more prelimi-
nary than estimates for preceding years. Statistics are
often corrected after several years. Decimals do not neces-
sarily indicate precision. They are presented only to pre-
vent the distortions that totalling up rounded numbers are
likely to produce and facilitate further computations by the
reader.
Demography in an Age of Mass Migrations. Demographic
findings are not complicated by market valuations but they
have their own pitfalls. Censuses may inadvertently or
intentionally omit individuals or double-count them. Extra-
polations between censuses depend on estimated vital rates
and migrations. We live in an era of vast population move-
ments; millions cross borders with or without permits in
search of peace or jobs. As long as they are not (yet)
Interplanetary, such migrations ought not to affect world
totals. If the UN presents for mid-1978 (all population
estimates in this report refer to a July 1 date) a figure of
4,208 million, while we opt for over 4.3 billion, the differ-
1/-I wish to thank my friend, Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., whose
important contributions to economic sinology are mentioned
on page 21, for his great help in reviewing the manuscript
of this report.
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ence is largely due to uncertainties on Mainland China.
Recently Beijing (Peking) has greatly increased its popula-
tion figure (see below) and we can expect the UN to follow
suit.
Proliferation of Sovereignty. Table 5 of last year's
report listed for the end of 1977 a conglomeration of 158
independent (or sovereign) states. The.PRC and the Republic
of China were counted as two states (even though each claims
the territory of the other as its own), just as were the two
Germanys (now viewed as one nation in two states). In 1978
three dependencies became sovereign: the Solomon Islands,
Tuvalu, and Dominica. (Two more became independent in 1979:
St. Lucia and the Gilbert Islands under the name of Kiribati.)
Thus Table 5 of the current issue has a total of 161 states
as of the end of 1978. While both Chinas exhibit the full
paraphernalia of statehood, the US Government recognizes only
one China; if one takes account of this legal distinction,
the total declines to 160. The USSR is counted as one state,
even though it has three votes in the UN--for itself, the
Ukraine, and Byelorussia.
National Product Concepts. All economic aggregates in
this report refer to the concept of gross national product
(GNP). Statistical offices in Communist states prefer the
net material income concept (NMI); their figures are--aside
from a general reevaluation--adjusted to GNP by adding
depreciation as well as those services that Marxists con-
sider "non-productive."!/ Whether one operates with gross
national or gross domestic product depends on the purpose,
and with full data it is possible to move from one value to
the other by either adding to the GDP the net factor pay-
ments from abroad (i.e., the income of the country's resi-
dents earned in other countries through work or property
minus similar income earned in the country by residents in
the rest of the world) or deducting from the GNP net factor
payments from abroad. In the US the gap between GNP and
GDP is less than 1 percent, likewise in most other countries.
It is different in economies of the OPEC type; in 1972, i.e.,
before the oil crunch, Kuwait's GDP was 25 percent larger
than the GNP, in 1975 it was the other way around by 6.8 per-
cent. A particularly striking example of divergence between
the two values offers Djibouti, the French colony which
17 For details see the excellent Research Paper by John S.
Pitzer, USSR: Toward a Reconciliation of Marxist and
Western Measures of National Income, CIA, National Foreign
Assessment Center, ER 78-10505, October 1978.
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became independent in 1977. In 1976 its GDP was 3.1 times
as large as its GNP, the difference coming from France in
the form of salaries and other contributions.i/ It is
hardly necessary to add that for the world as a whole all
transfer payments cancel each other out so that GNP equals
GDP.
"Real Growth" in a Time of Severe Inflation. All
values in dollar refer to its purchasing power of 1978 and
all GNP growth rates are meant to be "real," i.e., deflated.
Between 1975 and 1978 (years recorded in Table 2 and others)
the US GNP deflator rose by 5.2, 5.8, and 7.4 percent,
respectively (see Chart IV). The corresponding GNP deflators
of other countries enter the calculations insofar as their
1973 GNPs (expressed in 1978 dollars) were extrapolated
forward and backward with their "real growth" rates. For
instance, if in 1973 some country had a GNP, converted at
exchange rates of March/April 1973, of 100 billion 1973
dollars or 143.75 billion 1978 dollars and if its "real
growth" of five years is given as 20 percent, Table 2 records
the GNP of that country for 1978 as 172.5 billion 1978
dollars. Whether the various deflators--or other price
indices--measure the local inflations correctly is another
question. The determination of prices for numberless
articles of ever-changing quality and usefulness, which are
being sold under equally dynamic demand conditions, is an
awesome task under any circumstances. In times of hefty
inflation there exists, in addition, the danger that the
indices become politicized, with monetary authorities
tempted to play down the price rise while producers and con-
sumers are inclined to exaggerate the overall inflation in
order to claim higher prices or incomes for themselves.
Nations More or Less Developed. In separating countries
on different levels of economic development I have shunned
controversies on their cultural, social, and political char-
acter by making a specific GNP per capita the watershed. In
the report for 1967 I established a divide of $1,000 between
developed and less developed economies. Converted into 1978
dollars with the US GNP deflator the amount is now $1,910
(and still climbing!). Within the two overall areas I have
distinguished three groups with different ranges of per
capita GNP (see Charts II and III).
As time passes, nations change from group to group,
usually--and fortunately--in an ascending order, occasionally
with a decline per capita or even in toto. Such shifts,
17 IMF Survey, February 19, 1979, pp. 50-51.
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sometimes only for a year or two (with politics or the weather
the cause), pose problems for a tabular presentation over
time. In Table 2 and other tables covering the years 1975-78,
each country is listed in the category it occupied in 1978.
Among the developed economies and in comparison to last
year's report, Japan and the Netherlands rose from the
second to the first group, Italy from the third to the
second group. In the Third World the Republic of Korea has
reached the upper of three categories; Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)
and Ghana slipped from the second to the third group. How-
ever, in Table 7 to 9 for the 25 years 1950-75, countries
are at the appropriate moment shifted from less developed to
developed status. To give examples on the Western side:
Spain moved into the developed realm after 1965, Greece in
1972, several OPEC members in 1973-74. On the Communist
side Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia were counted as
developed beginning in the early 1970s. These change-overs
affect group totals and rates. Without the ascent of the
aforementioned countries the average annual growth rate of
the Third World would be higher than 3.1 percent and that
of the developed West slightly lower than 4.0 percent dur-
ing the first half of the 1970s; the dollar values would
change correspondingly to higher or lower 1975 totals.
During the same period the GNPs of the less developed Commu-
nist realm declined only because some of the countries were
transferred to the developed group, the GNPs of which rose
correspondingly.
East and West. The report differentiates between Com-
munist and non-Communist countries, calling them occasionally
also East and West. These appellations are as unsatisfactory
as "developed" or "less developed." The expression non-
Communist is particularly unfortunate as are most negative
terms but "capitalist"--a misnomer from its very beginning--
would make even less sense. Table 7, extending from 1950 to
1978, (a) includes Cuba in the Communist world starting with
the 1960 entry, and (b) adds from 1975 on South Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos to the Communist world (the statistical
effect is small). At the Bucharest meeting of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) On June 27-29, 1979, Angola
and Ethiopia were admitted as observers; South Yemen (Aden)
appears interested in attaching itself to CEMA. Neverthe-
less, this report counts these three countries as non-
Communist. It is hardly necessary to add that "East" and
"West" have nothing to do with the compass; if Cuba is
"East" and Taiwan "West," the meaning is political. (Turkey,
a largely Asian nation, is now viewed as part of Western
Europe and UN population statistics have recently included
Israel in "Europe").
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The Purchasing Power Puzzle. This report has always
aimed--not always achieved--international comparison at
purchasing power equivalents, keeping in mind all prices,
not only those of goods and services entering foreign trans-
actions. Even for two nations equally developed and struc-
tured, official rates of exchange may be far from whatever
purchasing power parity, limited to internationally trade
products or not. Converted into dollars at average 1978
currency rates the Swiss per capita GNP was $14,057; I pre-
fer a figure of $8,654 (see Table 2). The undervaluation
of the dollar vis-a-vis the Swiss franc is explicable by
events on world monetary and financial markets but not as
an expression of relative price levels (an article on the
world economy in the Neue Zircher Zeitung of July 6, 1979,
p. 18, gives me to understand that not all of Switzerland's
exports cover the costs). My method of converting the GNPs
of OECD members into dollars not with current exchange rates
but with those of the spring of 1973 was explained in pre-
vious issues and will again be commented upon in a later
section (pp. 14-17),. For an important group of countries the
results are almost identical with those of the International
Comparison Project (ICP)..!/
In the case of two countries with marked differences in
economic development, purchasing power equivalents are
likely to differ from the values obtained with exchange
rates even if the latter correctly reflect the relations in
prices of internationally traded goods. These prices
usually express the scarcity values of the advanced society
(with, for example, its higher labor cost). Exchange rates
tend to underrate the social products of less developed
economies, the more so the less developed the country is. The
problem of international and intertemporal comparison is
basically intractable, though the Gilbert and Kravis method
offers a solution which nowadays is the best. Since a
global system of equivalents is not yet available,] this
17 The latest publication of this comprehensive project is
Irving B. Kravis, Alan Heston, Robert Summers, Interna-
tional Comparisons of Real Product and Purchasing Power,
United Nations International Comparison Project: Phase II,
Baltimore and London, 1978.
2/ An approach is made in an article by Kravis, Heston, and
Summers "Real GDP Per Capita For More Than One Hundred
Countries" in The Economic Journal, June 1978. It applies
to groups of countries for which purchasing power equiva-
lents are not available, the exchange rate deviation index
of one of sixteen "representative countries" which had
been researched in detail.
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report applies the Third World Supplements I devised years
ago, in the full realization that the supplements appear
low in specific cases (see below p. 17). Among the Commu-
nist countries fairly good purchasing equivalents are
available for the Warsaw Pact group; data for the PRC are
unsatisfactory (see below p. 20).
Two complications must be flagged. The growth of the
national product at purchasing power equivalents between
two benchmark years may differ from the real growth in local
currency. Let us for simplicity's sake assume that between
benchmark years a and b the GNP of the base country (the US)
remained unchanged while that of the other country increased
in local currency by a real 20 percent; then expressed at
deflated purchasing power equivalents the other country's
growth would be 20 percent only if the exchange rate devia-
tion index in both benchmark years were the same--which need
not be the case with scarcity relations changed from one
year to the other.
The second complication arises from the different com-
position of groups of countries as in the course of economic
development some of them move from one group to the other
and change either their Third World Supplement or, as in the
case of the ICP, the deviation index of their respective
"representative country." Such moves from bracket to brac-
ket add to the distortions noted above in the section on
"Nations More or Less Developed."
Economic Progress in a Century of Cultural Crises
Planetary Product of 1900: 9 Percent of Today. Since
our civilization is now believed to be passing through a
crisis, let us look back at those hale and hearty times
around 1900 when the Gay Nineties had just ended and the
so-called Century of the Child began. It was a world at
peace. But when war had broken out in August 1914, Thomas
Mann, voicing wide-spread sentiments, called it "putrid
from all those comforts, festering and stinking from a
civilization in decomposition.. .War! It is catharsis, liber-
ation...."I/ A "crisis of civilization" is sometimes cosy
compared to what follows. Let us relish our crisis while
it lasts.
1975, p. 988.
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"Those comforts" of the early century are hard to
measure. Even if the statistics were complete, how do we
compare an age of slow railroads with a satellite age? It
is therefore with trepidation that I estimate the planetary
product for the year 1900 at three-quarters of a trillion
1978 dollars (one-eighth as much, i.e., less than $100 bil-
lion in 1900 dollars). With a world population of 1.65 bil-
lion, GNP per capita was roughly $450 of 1978 value. The
1900 world average is actually below the 1978 per capita
GNP of the Third World of about $600 with our (low) Supple-
ment added or of the entire less developed world with about
$500.
At the beginning of this century a much larger area of
the world than now was--to use today's euphemism--"develop-
ing," in fact, many countries were not developing at all
but had been stagnant, perhaps for centuries or
millennia, with occasional ups and downs. This circumstance
would call for an average Third World Supplement (or average
deviation index) higher than applicable today; it would
increase the planetary product of the year 1900 and lower
the shares and ratios for advanced nations, but since the
extent of the adjustment cannot be guessed at, I limit
myself to this general word of caution.l/
US GNP Share in 1900 Same as Today, Russia's Not Much
Larger. The American statistics for the early 20th century
are fairly good; they show for 1900 a GNP of about 177 bil-
lion 1978 dollars in toto and, with 76 million inhabitants,
of $2,230 per capita (the average American was then below
the 1978 poverty level of $3,390 for one person below 65
years of age). The share of the US in the 1900 planetary
product of about $750 billion was 23 percent, i.e., slightly
below the current 25 percent. The 1900 ratio between per
capita GNP in the US and in the world was 5 : 1 ($2,230
450), practically the same as in 1978 ($9,640 : 1,955).
Russia was in 1900 a great power with a population 76
percent larger than that of the US (134 : 76 million) and a
total GNP of roughly $82 billion, or $610 per capita. The
resulting Russian-American ratio was 45 : 100 for total GNP
After completing this paper I received a copy of an
article on "Long Run Dynamics of Productivity Growth" by
Angus Maddison in the March issue of the Quarterly Review
of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Rome, 1979. Dr.
Paddison examines the performance of 16 Western countries
for the periods 1870-1913, 1913-50, and thereafter. I do
not feel that his findings contradict my calculations.
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and 27 : 100 for per capita GNP. The current ratios are
120 100 for population, 50 : 100 for total GNP, and
42 : 100 for per capita GNP. The overall change in the GNP
ratio is rather small, the per capita change startling.
The latter mirrors the huge losses of the Russian or Soviet
population in two world wars, revolutions from below and
above, and continuous privation, aside from the emigration
in Tsarist times (in close to 80 years the population
increased by only 0.8 percent per annum) as against condi-
tions in this country (American annual population increase
an average 1.4 percent from natural increase and immigration).
Changing Size and Composition of Mankind. This is the
place to mention that about a hundred years ago, in the hey-
day of colonization and "imperialism," a German demographer
predicted for 1980 populations of 900 million Anglo-Saxons,
300 million Russians, and 150 million Germans, while a
Frenchman peering into the 21st century, expected that Anglo-
Saxons, Russians, and Chinese each would multiply to 300-
500 millions, all other nations becoming insignificant.
The German scholar scored in the case of the Russians and
failed badly otherwise; the Frenchman's lower figure may be
right for what he called Anglo-Saxons and Russians, com-
pletely wrong for the Chinese.
What nobody expected at the beginning of this age was
a natural population increase accelerating from roughly
1/2 percent in the 19th century and up to the 1920s to 1 per-
cent during the next 30 years and close to 2 percent there-
after. Mankind increased half and again from 1900 to 1950
and once more from 1950 to 1971. The average covers an even
larger growth of the less developed world and a drastic
reduction in the increase of advanced nations, irrespective
of their political systems. This bifurcation of population
trends may arouse hope for an eventual leveling off of man-
kind's multiplication; in the meantime, however, it worries
nations with a very low or even declining natural increase,
particularly if they face within their boundaries fast-
growing minorities of different nationality, native (as in
the USSR) or immigrated (as Southern guest workers in
Northern Europe). The worries concern largely intangibles
1/ Hu be-Schleiden, Uberseeische Politik, 1883, and Leroy-
Beaulieu, De la Colonisation Chez les Peuples Modernes,
1874 and later editions. Both books are quoted in the
once famous textbook of the dean of the German Histori-
cal School Gustav Schmoller, Grundriss der Allgemeinen
Volkswirtschaftslehre, Leipzig, 1900, p. 182.
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(power, prestige, national survival) but also the size and
structure of the labor force as a factor of economic growth.
The Soviets are expected to increase in the next twenty
years by less than 0.8 percent in the annual average; the
Slavs among them will at best become stationary. The problem
is actually acute because in the five or six years to come
the annual increments to the working-age population will
shrink drastically (2.3 million in 1978, perhaps 0.3 million
in the mid-1980s). Moreover, the increments will come from
the native population of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.
By the year 2000 about one-third of the Soviets will be non-
Slavs. The populations of the two Germanys will hardly grow
during the rest of the century with immigrants supplying
the increase. Official forecasts envisage a decline of the
West German population (now 61.5 million) to 42 million by
the year 2030. What will be left of Hubbe-Schleiden's
150 million Germans? In both Germanys measures are being
taken to stimulate the birth rates. East Germany registered
some success in 1977-78 with aid to working mothers. The
Federal Republic considers a similar approach, and in the
State of Baden-Wurttemberg mothers, working or not, will
receive DM 2,000 (;pore than $1,000) at the birth of a child
beginning September 1, 1979. In other words, the world is
establishing at the same time family planning for less and
for more children. The real outcome may be quite different
from current forecasts; the case of the two defunct demo-
graphers quoted above provides a warning.
The Long-Term GNP Growth Record. The planetary product
grew 3.2 fold in the 50 years 1900-1950 and 3.2 fold again
in the 25 years 1950-1975. The indifferent performance in
the first half of the century (2.3 percent in the average
year) was, of course, affected by wars, revolutions, depres-
sions, and other crises of our civilization. In the six
decades up to the onset of the Great Depression in 1929,
advanced nations with a sufficiency of peace could be
expected to increase their GNP annually by 3 percent, the
so-called "historical rate." There were important excep-
tions by country and period. Even toward the end of the
past century and up to the First World War, Great Britain,
then at the height of its power, had a GNP growth of only
2.1 percent (average 1870-1913). During the same time span
US growth was twice as fast (1871-1913, 4.3 percent); even
after a deceleration to 3.1 percent during the troubled
period between 1913 and 1929 the American average of six
decades was still 4 percent. Tsarist Russia's industrial
output expanded by no less than 5.3 percent between 1870 and
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1913; it was the deadweight of agriculture that prevented
industry from moving the GNP by more than roughly 3 percent.i/
There is no need to recount the dismal performance of
countries suffering from the Great Depression. But exactly
at the same time, Stalin, under thunder and lightning,
created, very much in his image, the Soviet command economy.
He started a rapid build-up of industries, moving rural
masses into eventually more productive pursuits in the cities
and pushing investment at the expense of personal consump-
tion, stretching available resources and preventing infla-
tionary financing from unbalancing foreign economic relations
by making the ruble a strictly domestic currency.V Accord-
ing to Abram Bergson's calculations, the Soviet net national
product increased between 1928 and 1940 (the latter year
including a larger territory) by an average annual 4.2 per-
cent at 1937 ruble factor cost and by 9.3 percent with a
composite 1937 base. A/ The Nazi regime followed a basically
similar course, though with private enterprise maintained
and with greater attention to consumer needs. The net
national product of the Third Reich rose by a reported annual
9.3 percent between 1932 (when it was at low ebb) and 1939.E
1 The one an on y source of Russia's development in terms
of aggregates is Raymond W. Goldsmith's article "The
Economic Growth of Russia 1860-1913" in Economic Develop-
ment and Cultural Change, April 1961.
2/ Celebrating in April 1979 the 50th birthday of their
Stalinist economic system, the Soviets extolled the role
of the Party in developing their peculiar institutions.
They quoted copiously Lenin and Brezhnev but did not
mention Stalin. Imagine a history of Peter the Great's
government praising "the achievements of the Russian
people led by their Senate and Colleges" around 1700 and
quoting only the first and the last Romanov tsars. The
recent commemoration of 25 years Virgin Lands settlement
similarly exalted Brezhnev and passed over Khrushchev.
3/ See my article "Soviet Economic Performance in a Global
Context" in the forthcoming volume of the Joint Economic
Committee on The Soviet Economy in a Time of Change.
4/ Abram Bergson, Productivity and the Social System - The
U.S.S.R. and the West, Cambridge, Mass., and London,
1978, p. 122.
5/ Statistisches Bundesamt, Bevolkerung and Wirtschaft,
1872-1972, Stuttgart-Mainz, 1972, p. 265.
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The democratic West watch totalitarian growth with uneasy
wonderment.
In the meantime Western economic policy had begun to
learn from Keynes. A post-World War II depression--widely
predicted since people expect always more of the same--did
not take place. Instead a new chapter opened in economic
history. This high-growth chapter may have come to a close
in the 1970s. A noticeable slowdown accompanied by disil-
lusionment and self-doubt has given rise to the question
whether the world economy has entered a long-lasting period
of lower or even low growth or whether the stunted growth
would be limited to specific areas, above all to the
advanced industrial nations of the West.
The American Role in OECD Growth. For purposes of
this report I will separate the two decades up to 1970 from
the ensuing years and distinguish not only between East and
West, i.e., Communist and non-Communist areas, but also
between the West including and the West excluding the US.
The rationale for this latter distinction is the fact
that in the three decades since 1950 US economic growth has
lagged behind the Western or world average, though more in
the first twenty years than in the 1970s. Now the same can
be said of other countries (particularly the UK) but the US
is not just another country but an enormous chunk of the
world economy. In 1950 its share in the planetary product
was over 34 perc , of the West's product 43 percent. The
respective figures for 1970 are 26.5 and 34 percent, for
1978, Z4 and 3.2_pe_icent. This reduction was in part per-
fectly normal. As nations ravaged during the Second World
War regained their strength, the economic preeminence of
the US receded. This shift was actually fostered by
American financial help to friend and foe alike and the
Americanization of production processes in developed and
less developed countries. Whether and to what extent
errors in omission and commission in American policy and
performance have contributed to a diminished US role in the
world economy is a question I need not address in this
report; I see grounds for criticism at least in monetary
and currency matters.
Between 1951 and 1970 the American economy expanded by
an average annual 3.6 percent (the rate would be slightly
higher without the recession years at the end of the 1960s).
Average annual growth for the world as a whole was 4.9 per-
cent, for the West 4.8 percent, for the West less the US
5.5 percent, for the USSR 5.5 percent, for all Communist
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countries 5.4 percent, for OECD as a whole 4.5 percent, for
OECD less the US 6.0 percent, for the Third World roughly
5.5 percent.
The figures quoted in the preceding paragraph show
furthermore that between 1950 and 1970 growth rates in the
Communist world--and particularly in the USSR with a share
of around 58 percent in the combined Communist GNPs--were
slightly higher than in the entire West, equalled those of
the West outside the US, and were actually half a percent-
age point lower than in the OECD less the US. This means
that the Soviet-American GNP ratio increased from 33 : 100
in 1950 (when the USSR's reconstruction had not yet been
completed) to 48 : 100 in 1970 (see Chart V); the GNP
ratio between Western Europe and the USSR changed in the
West's favor from 45 to 52 : 100. The share of the USSR
in the planetary product rose slightly, from 11.4 percent
in 1950 to 12.8 percent in 1970.
The 1970s: Wild Ups and Downs in West, Mediocre in
USSR. In the eight years 1971-78 growth rates dipped in
general but decelerated less in the US (with its average
growth of 3.2 percent) than in most other areas. For the
world as a whole the rate was 4.0 percent, for the West
likewise, for the West less the US 4.4 percent, for the USSR
3.6 percent, for all Communist countries about 4 percent,
for OECD as a whole 3.5 percent, for OECD less the US 3.8
percent, for the Third World roughly 3.9 percent. The
record for the 1970s would be slightly lower with inclusion
of 1979-80, assuming that current signs of an economic down-
turn are validated. The latest OECD forecast for 1979 is
2 1/2 percent, and a recent estimate of the Institute for
the World Economy in Kiel, West Germany for 1980 is 2 per-
cent. CIA/OER, in a statement before the Joint Economic
Committee on July 26, 1979, expects for the USSR a GNP
growth of "somewhat less than 3 percent annually over the
next few years (down from our earlier estimate of about
4 percent)" and of 2 percent or even less than 1 percent in
the mid-1980s. Will the world in a near future talk about
le mal Russe?
Decades are measures of the calendar and not necessarily
of economic development but each of the three decades under
review has a degree of consistency. The 1950s were rehabil-
itation years in many parts of the world with a correspond-
ing fast growth and, at the same time, a period of consider-
able cyclical fluctuation in the preeminent US. The 1960s
were the years of growthmanship with only moderate oscilla-
tions. The 1970s exposed the West to startling ups and
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downs (illustrated in Chart I) with the reduced average
growth mentioned in the preceding paragraph, while Soviet
growth was not only lower than in previous decades and also
lower than planned, but mediocre throughout (disregarding a
few years with either exceptionally good or bad harvests--
such agricultural happenings influencing GNP movements
greatly in a country with an abnormally high weight of farm-
ing in its economic structure).
Survey By Region
The Developed West. What this report, in line with its
definitions, calls the developed West consisted until the
early 1970s of the members of the OECD (in its present com-
position, i.e., with Australia and New Zealand) less
Portugal and Turkey which then and now must be considered
as less developed, and with some minor additions such as
Puerto Rico and Outlying Territories of the US as well as
Israel. All these are highly productive units, their pro-
ductivity resulting from their political and economic
character: by and large pluralistic societies with market
economies operated by private enterprise, though with vary-
ing degrees of state intervention (sometimes apt and often
inept).
Since 1973 the group has been joined by more nations
outside of the OECD, namely oil producers suddenly grown
rich and superrich, aside from several small but highly
dynamic market economies (Singapore and Hong Kong). Getting
rich quick--individually or collectively--has its problems,
even if it is due to entrepreneurial abilities, much more so
if it is the result of a bonanza exploitable under the
existing political circumstances. The prime example of an
embarras de richesses is currently Iran which, for a brief
time, represented half of the affluent OPEC group's popula-
tion and one-third of its GNP and now appears to have
declined from "developed" to "developing" status (develop-
ing, that is, in the wrong direction). A very small bonanza
state might be able to establish itself, after exhausting
its exportable resources, as a rentier community. We are
thinking of Nauru, a tiny island in the Pacific with a hand-
ful of inhabitants but blessed with rich phosphate deposits;
in the longer run the fate of this unique state will depend
on the soundness of its investments, the controllability of
its guest workers, the lack of aggressive neighbors, and the
ability of its inhabitants to endure a pensioner's lot. But
nations of a mere normal size and position are easily torn
between conflicting modes of behavior and ideologies, apart
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from the sometimes dangerous presence of vast numbers of
guest workers with or without permits.
Over the years the share of the developed West in world
population and world product (about 18 and 63 percent,
respectively, in 1978) has changed little. The low popula-
tion increase of the advanced nations tends to reduce their
demographic share but this effect is offset by the latter-
day inclusion of the oil countries. The combined GNPs of
the affluent OPEC nations represents only 4 percent of the
developed Western GNPs and while they have soared after
the oil crunch of late 1973, the total is too small to
affect the output share of the advanced economies more than
marginally.
As in previous years the dollar value of the developed
Western GNPs requires explanation. Freely floating ex-
change rates may in theory reflect purchasing power pari-
ties, at least for internationally exchanged goods and
services and with some time lag until the new equilibrium
is reached. The managed rates of recent years are as far
from purchasing power parity as were often the fixed rates
of the past, particularly when they are badly managed.
The dollar has not only lost half of its internal purchas-
ing power in ten years, its external value has fallen
beneath its internal value vis-a-vis important currencies.
When foreign GNPs are converted into dollars at the average
1978 par rate market rate, the GNP of the European OECD
members is overvalued by one-fourth, that of Japan by one-
third; in the case of Switzerland and also Iceland the
overvaluation is more than 60 percent. A State Department
report using average exchange rates (quoted in the footnote
of the following table) calculates the Swiss 1978 per capita
GNP at $14,057; the appended Table 2 reports $8,654. The
Icelandic per capita GNP, $9,318, is seemingly as high as
the US per capita GNP ($9,640); the present report has a
figure of $5,706.
How reliable are the estimates in this report? They
are by no means precise (whereas the currency rates under-
lying the aforementioned State Department report are sta-
tistically correct) but they are closer--not to the value
international monetary markets ascribe to the dollar in
relation to local money but to purchasing power equiva-
lents. Our rates were again derived by extrapolating the
1973 GNPs converted at March/April 1973 rates of exchange
(see The Planetary Product in 1973, p. 19) to subsequent
years with the help of real growth rates in local currencies
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AGGREGATES IN THREE CALCULATIONS
(billions of 1978 dollars)
(1)
1975 GNP in
this report
(2)
1975 GDP
according
(3)
(2) : (1)
(4)
1975 GNP
at 1975
(5)
(4) : (1)
(6)
1978 GNP in
this re
ort
(7)
1978 GNP
1
(8)
Country or Area
to ICP
exchan
e rates
p
at
978
(7) : (6)
g
exchange rates
Germany, Fed.
Rep.
of
457.97
419.33
91.5
504.35
110.1
513.06
640.2
124.8
France
367.16
359.39
97.9
407.12
110.9
411.33
470.2
114.3
UK
236.73
296.72
125.3
279.27
118.0
254.18
309.6
121.8
Italy
192.53
225.16
116.9
206.43
107.2
210.68
235.2
111.6
Netherlands
81.02
82.41
101.7
96.40
119.0
88.09
130.6
148.3
Belgium
63.71
65.71
103.2
75.47
118.5
69.72
98.1
140.7
Japan
619.93
622.00
100.3
579.46
93.5
727.86
968.8
133.1
Total
2,019.05
2,070.72
102.6
2,148.50
106.4
2,274.92
2,852.7
125.4
Sources:
Column 2: Derived from Irving B. Kravis, Alan Heston, Robert Summers, et. al., International Comparisons of Real
Product and Purchasing Power, United Nations International Comparison Project: Phase II, Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1978, p. 133. "Approximate Indexes of Real GDP Per Capita" (Table 4.19, p. 133) for
1975 applied to the US GDP per capita for 1975, i.e., $7,109 at 1975 prices or $8,563 at 1978 prices.
Column 4: Economic Growth of OECD Countries, 1965-1975, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Report No. 382, April 2, 1976, p. 9.
Column 7: Same report for 1968-1978, p. 10, No. 1142, March 15, 1979.
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and the US GNP deflator to adapt 1973 dollar to its 1978
value (down 44 percent). In this context we repeat our
warning that the real growth rates depend on the reliability
of the price indices.
As a check I compared my results for seven OECD coun-
tries with the latest data published by the International
Comparison Project, namely for the year 1975, and with GNPs
converted at average rates of exchange for 1975. The
values are all in 1978 dollars. The countries enumerated
in the table represent about 84 percent of the OECD GNP
total not counting the base country, namely the US. For
the year 1975 the GNPs of the seven foreign countries are
2.6 percent larger in the ICP calculation than in our
Table 2, column 1; the official exchange rates yield a
value 25.1 percent higher. (See table on p. 15.)
The difference of 2.6 percent between my figures and
those of the ICP for seven countries combined is minimal
and the same is true for several specific nations, namely
for Japan (ICP versus this report 100.3), France (97.9),
the Netherlands (101.7), and Belgium (101.2). Even the
difference for West Germany is bearable (91.5). It is, how-
ever, considerable for Italy (116.9) and the UK (125.3).
There is, of course, some ground for deviation because of
revisions in the underlying statistics, the use of GDP
instead of GNP, and deflation. The ICP calculations them-
selves have undergone revisions; for the benchmark year
1970, looking at ICP publications in three different years
(1973, 1975, 1978), the exchange rate deviation index for
Japan changed from 1.64 to 1.45 to 1.49, for West Germany
from 1.13 to 1.19 to 1.22, for the UK from 1.47 to 1.35 to
1.39, for Italy from 1.32 to 1.30 to 1.37.1/ The higher
ICP figure for Italy is probably explicable in terms of
Italy's less developed Southern provinces; lesser develop-
ment is associated, on the whole, with higher exchange rate
deviation indices. In the case of the UK the trade conver-
sion factor of the spring of 1973 contributed to an under-
valuation of the pound, though this does not suffice to
explain the total difference. Since the present report, as
repeatedly stated, focuses on areas rather than specific
1/ The three indices are taken from (a) the ICP's Prelimi-
nary Report of January 1973, p. I-13a; (b) a report
prepared for the Econometric Society, Dallas, Texas,
December 1975, p. 14; (c) the volume quoted in the table
above, p. 10. It is, of course, inevitable that calcu-
lations are revised and improved in the course of
research.
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countries, the margin of error appears tolerable for the
OECD countries as a whole and also for at least four or
five of the seven countries; the values certainly make by
far more sense than those obtained with exchange rates of
later years.
OPEC Affluent and Poor. The aggregate data of the
advanced OECD countries are models of statistical precision
compared with the demographic and economic data for OPEC
members. As in previous issues of this report, the esti-
mates are those published in CIA's Handbook of Economic
Statistics and other sources of CIA/OER. They provide at
Tast an approximate idea of the size and development of
the various economies.
OPEC has 13 member states (enumerated in Table 2), of
which in 1978 eight were "affluent" and seven "less devel-
oped" (Iran is likely to return to the latter fold in 1979).
Not in OPEC but in its Arab sister organization OAPEC are
two additional less developed countries, Syria and--
suspended since April 1979--Egypt. Demographically,
"affluent" OPEC is weak (only 61 million inhabitants and,
if Iran is counted out, only 25 million), while the less
developed OPEC/OAPEC nations have close to 300 million
(Indonesia, Nigeria, and Egypt alone have 252 million
inhabitants). OPEC/OAPEC's combined GNPs amounted to
roughly $435 billion, half in its affluent, half in its
indigenous group. The total (with Third World Supplements
added) is about as large as France's GNP.
The Less Developed West. Within the Third World, India
is the largest unit with one-third of the group's population
and--without Supplement--10 percent of its GNP. We will
therefore use India as an example for some of the statis-
tical problems encountered.
There exists agreement on the desirability to increase
the GNP of India and other less developed countries beyond
the amounts obtained with the help of official exchange
rates--a problem discussed in each of the reports of this
series. I have staggered the Third World Supplements from
10 to 30 to 60 percent according to the level of the per
capita GNP (the lower the per capita figure, the higher the
Supplement), and in Tables 1 and 2 the Indian GNP of 1978
converted at the official rate into $105.1 billion was
1/ The latest issue is for 1978 and is designated ER 78-10365,
October 1978.
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raised by 60 percent to $168.1 billion. This may be too
low, and in the case of India--conditions differ from coun-
try to country--a 100 percent Supplement may be more
appropriate, in other words, a total of about $210 billion.
ICP devised for its benchmark year originally an exchange
rate deviation index of 3.70, which later it reduced first
to 3.49, then to 3.35. The index for 1973 is now 3.06..J
This index appears high; it may, for instance, overstate
the real value of Indian services as compared to services
in an advanced country and, in particular, the US as the
base country. I will return to this problem when I dis-
cuss the GNP ratio between India and the PRC.
There exists also some disagreement on the Indian
population. The official figure for mid-1978 is 643 mil-
lion; this report, following the US Bureau of the Census,
operates with a figure of 660.7 million. The difference is
actually only 2 3/4 percent, less than the range of uncer-
tainty for the US population, but given India's large
population, it is impressive in absolute terms, namely
18 million people. ICP is using official population esti-
mates; this implies a larger per capita GDP than the Bureau
of the Census figure.
While 18 million people are plenty enough for a whole
country (Canada has now 24 million), the number becomes
insignificant in the context of the Third World with hazy
population statistics in many nations and a total exceeding
2 billions. Suffice it to state that the Third World as
here defined (i.e., including the less developed OPEC mem-
bers) embraces 47 percent of mankind. One-third of humanity
belongs to the group with the lowest GNP per capita (an
average of $478). They are spread over more than one
hundred independent states (56 states in the lowest group,
as Table 5 shows for the end of 1978) and a dwindling number
of dependencies. Three-quarters of these sovereign states
were colonies until the Second World War (provoked to ensure
the domination of a Northern "master race") triggered the
latest and last decolonization move.
1/ Sources listed on p. 19, FN 1. Item (c) contains also
the index for 1973.
2/ According to the ICP book referred to under (c), services
of all kinds in the India of 1973 constituted 36.3 per-
cent of the GDP at international prices, 16.6 percent at
national prices (p. 124).
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In GNP terms the Third World produces, without our
Supplements, 12 percent of the world's product (the bottom
group less than 4 percent) and with Supplements close to
15 percent (lowest group 6 percent). ICP-type adjustments
would increase the GNP total of the Third World by about
$1 trillion, increasing its per capita GNP to roughly
$1,100. But the GNPs of the developed West would also
undergo a rise of about $200 billion. The share of the
developed West in the world product would decline (from our
63.5 percent) to 57 percent, while that of the Third World
would increase (from our close to 15 percent) to some
23 percent. However, ICP covers only the "West" (except
for Hungary); the Communist world would also require ICP-
type adjustments. They would affect--not the GNP values in
toto and per capita of the Third World but its share in the
world product.
Whatever methods are used to arrive at purchasing
power parities for the bottom groups in mankind's economic
structure, the fact remains that their inhabitants (the
elite excepted) are as poor as were the now advanced
nations in a time not long past (see p. 7). In recent
decades many less developed nations have made astounding
progress through their own efforts (including the establish-
ment of efficient economic systems) and through aid and
trade relations with the advanced West. This process of
acculturation will continue but it requires usually much
time and all too often evokes political friction internally
and between nations. Some countries are actually "retro-
developing," i.e., their GNP per capita or even in toto is
declining as the result of their inability to cope with
economic and political problems that have arisen since
their ascent into the realm of sovereignty.
The Developed East. The developed sphere under Commu-
nism consists nowadays of the USSR, of "Eastern Europe" as
it is called in Table 1, i.e., the six smaller members of
the Warsaw Pact, and of Yugoslavia. These countries embrace
9 percent of mankind and produce twice this percentage,
namely 18 percent of the planetary product (this ratio of
product to population is 63.5 : 18.3 in the developed West).
All the GNP figures denote purchasing power equivalents.
Over the years CIA/OER has elaborated detailed series on
Soviet national accounts by origin and end use. I was per-
mitted to append CIA's ruble calculations to my article
"The Soviet Economy in a Global Context" in the forthcoming
volume of the Joint Economic Committee on The Soviet Economy
in a Time of Change. Converted into dollars, my own GNP
figures are somewhat below CIA's dollar series, particularly
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in its latest revision which will also appear in the JEC
tome. I have tried to justify my diverging views in
Section IIA of-my JEC paper, comparing them on this occasion
briefly with the figures of other authors.
The GNP data for Eastern Europe are taken from Economic
Growth in Eastern Europe 1965-78 by Thad P. Alton and
Associates, Research Project on National Income in Eastern
Central Europe, New York, 1979. The Romanian estimate
yielding a per capita GNP above that of Poland and Hungary
appears to be on the high side.
As to Yugoslavia the GNP series is the one published
in the CIA Handbook of Economic Statistics 1978 (p. 17),
the population data are the generally accepted UN statistics.
However, a thoughtful Yugoslav author, No Vinski, presents
population estimates that are about 5 percent lower (for
1975, the last year Vinski covers, 20.25 millions instead
of the UN's 21.35 millions) because he believes the higher
figure includes Yugoslav emigrants. In Vinski's calcula-
tion the demographic impact on the per capita GNP is almost
offset by a 4 percent lower GNP in toto.17 The problem
Vinski tackles concerns many countries; as mentioned in
last year's issue, the Environmental Fund, a research organ-
ization in Washington, D.C., increases the US population
figure considerably on account of illegal or otherwise
uncounted immigrants, largely from Mexico, and reduces the
Mexican population figure correspondingly. Migrants cause
the demographers migraine.
The Less Developed East. The developed Communist area
is, with the important exception of Yugoslavia, identical
with the Warsaw Pact group. Of the less developed East,
leaving aside tiny Albania in its not too splended isola-
tion, a small portion is associated with the USSR (Vietnam,
North Korea of doubtful reliability, Mongolia, Cuba--the
17 No Vinski, Kretanje Dru'tvenog Proizvoda Svijeta Od
1910. Do 1975. Godine, Ekonomiski Institut Zagreb, 1978,
p. 116. Vinski has made a valiant attempt to provide
GNP and population data for the entire world from 1910-75.
2/ The Environmental Fund's mid-1978 population figure for
the US is 230.2 instead of an official 218.4 million, for
Mexico 61.8 instead of 65.8 million, the growth rate for
the US 1.7 instead of 0.7 percent, for Mexico 0.9 instead
of 3.3 percent. According to the Fund the US has almost
12 million more inhabitants or 5.4 percent more than
officially stated.
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status of Kampuchea and Laos is unclear). Ninety percent
of the region, by population, is represented by the People's
Republic of China. In our calculation the less developed
Communist area has a share of no less than 25.4 percent in
the world population, a share of 4.4 percent in the plane-
tary product. But the statistics are problematical. They
are very tentative for all the small countries enumerated
but the latter have limited importance in regard to man-
power and GNP; much more worrisome is the uncertainty
surrounding what will be a formidable superpower in a
foreseeable future.
In recent years the PRC Government had hinted at a
rather low population ("more than 700 million" or "830 mil-
lion" are figures divulged in the same year 1972) and for
1978 the UN, following Beijing's guidance, published an
estimate of about 860 million (I deducted Taiwan which the
UN includes in its Chinese figure). These reports have
always used the series elaborated by John S. Aird, Bureau
of the Census, FDAD; his medium number for mid-1978 is
1,003.9 million. As reported in The Washington Post,
May 14, 1979, Beijing authorities disclosed to prominent
American visitors that they are now using a figure that,
extended to mid-1978 and excluding Taiwan, amounts to about
966 million. A census is planned for 1980; the new official
information is still an uncertain estimate. It is only
3.9 percent below Aird's figure, and we see less reason than
ever to discard his calculations.
The most elaborate estimates of the PRC's GNP--intended
to come close to purchasing power parity--have always been
those of Arthur G. Ashbrook and Robert M. Field. They were
published and updated in the Joint Economic Committee
volumes on the economy of Mainland China of 1972, 1975, and
1978. Mr.. Field, in association with K. C. Yeh of the
RAND Corporation, has been heading up an ambitious effort
to construct a set of Chinese national income accounts along
US Department of Commerce lines, with publication scheduled
in 1980. I have opted for the series in the 1972 JEC tomel/
and have extrapolated it precariously to this date. Though
I am not a Sinologist, I consider the revised JEC series
17 Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., "China: Economic Policy and
Economic Results, 1949-71," in the Joint Economic Com-
mittee volume People's Republic of China: An Economic
Assessment, May 18, 1972, p. 5. Ashbrook's latest
article "China: Shift of Economic Gears in Mid-1970's"
appeared in the JEC publication Chinese Economy Post-Mao,
November 9, 1978, p. 208.
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as moving too fast. This new series has for the years
1952-70 an average annual growth rate of 5.6 percent; the
former rate was 4.1 percent. For 1971-78 the two authors
present an average rate of 6.6 percent; my uneducated guess
is above 5 percent and even this may be on the high side.
The increased rates of Ashbrook and Field happen to coin-
cide with the Soviet rates for the same periods (5.6 and
5.2 percent); their 1952-78 rate of 5.9 percent is almost
1 percentage point above the Soviet rate. It ought to be
remembered that the Soviet series has in 26 years only one
case of GNP decline or, to be exact, of zero growth (1963
minus 0.04 percent), while according to Ashbrook and Field
the PRC GNP dipped from 1958-61 by 37 percent and regained
the 1958 level only six years later; it declined by 4.3 per-
cent in 1967 and did not grow at all in 1976. Since the
agricultural production index used by Ashbrook and Field
for the period 1952-78 increased by an average annual
2-1/4 percent and their industrial index by 10.5 percent
(services are added to either agriculture or industry), the
PRC's agriculture has now a share of 30 percent in the GNP
by origin, industry of fully 70 percent. If it were
possible to improve the coverage of the slow-moving servi-
ces, if Ashbrook and Field were able to steer away from
physical output data, if they could gauge changes in
quality (which has deteriorated, in many fields) and take
account of the Gerschenkron Effect, their growth rates are
likely to return to those in their previous series (or would
even remain below them).
My series ends with a 1978 GNP of $324 billion, which
with Aird's population estimate, yields a per capita GNP of
$323. Ashbrook and Field provide much higher figures,
namely $437 billion and $435, respectively. The calcula-
tion for the PRC must be viewed in a broader context, in
particular in relation to the findings for India and the
USSR. If the Indian GNP were tripled to conform to the ICP
deviation index, it would rise to 315 billion in toto and
$477 per capita. The Indian-Chinese ratio would then be
72 : 100 and 110 : 100, respectively. Opinions differ as
to whether India or the PRC has the larger per capita GNP
(which must not be mistaken for consumption and says even
less on income distribution). I am inclined to favor the
PRC considering its decidedly faster growth over the postwar
decades and a number of important physical output data. If
this is correct, the indicated Indian-Chinese ratio would
require emendation with three alternatives in mind. Either
the demographic data underlying the per capita figures are
wrong (but Beijing's new pronouncements support the Aird
estimate!). Or the ICP purchasing power for India is on
the high side (see above p. 18). Or, finally, the Ashbrook-
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Field estimate for the PRC, instead of being too high, is
below the purchasing power equivalent. If the Indian-
Chinese ratio for GNP per capita were reversed (not 110
100 but, say, 100 : 110), the Ashbrook-Field figure would
rise from $435 to $525. With Aird's population figure the
PRC total would increase to $527 billion, i.e., half the
Soviet GNP. This is unlikely. Until better data are
available, I continue to use and extrapolate for the PRC
the series Ashbrook presented in the JEC volume for 1972
and for India a dollar series at nominal rates increased by
a 60 percent Third World Supplement, which I apply to poor
countries in general. The latter percentage is, as I have
admitted all along, on the low side and so is the resulting
Indian-Chinese ratio of 78 : 100 for GNP in toto and
52 : 100 per capita. If, the statistician's eye in a fine
frenzy rolling, I may express my hunch, I would raise my
Third World Supplement in the case of India to 100 percent
and increase the Chinese per capita GNP by about 10 percent
above the Indian. This would provide ratios for GNP in
toto of 60 : 100 in the Indian-Chinese comparison, of
20 : 100 in an Indian-Soviet comparison, of 24 : 100 in a
Sino-Soviet comparison, of 17 : 100 in a PRC-US comparison.
Economic Power Ratios
It is obvious that neither total nor per capita GNP is
a sufficient yardstick to measure political and military
power. If two countries engage in a power struggle of
short duration--the confrontation may in the end be limited
to diplomacy and propaganda--the men and weapons ready for
immediate action are, of course, of utmost importance. But
the economic strength that a large GNP indicates, particu-
larly when coupled with technological superiority, provides
a corresponding capability to arm and resist. For this
reason we use the accompanying tables for the following
select comparisons:
In 1978 the population of the Warsaw Pact members
numbered 65 percent that of NATO; the GNP ratio was 36 : 100
in toto, 55 : 100 per capita. The greater economic strength
collected in NATO is obvious. The political and military
balance is another story. Part of this story is the posi-
tion of the protagonist in each alliance system. In the
Warsaw Pact the USSR accounted for 71 percent of the popula-
tion and 73 percent of the GNP, in NATO the US for 53 per-
cent demographically, 37 percent economically. Decisions
are obviously easier to arrive at in a group consisting of
one superpower and six middle-sized countries than in the
NATO with one superpower and fourteen nations, great,
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medium, and small (not to mention the difference between
Eastern authoritarian and Western democratic rule). The
Soviet Union's largest partner, Poland, had a GNP 9.7 per-
cent that of the USSR; next in line was the GDR with
7.7 percent. Romania, at 6 to 7 percent of the Soviet GNP
and yet at sixes and sevens with its imperious Pact leader
plays a risky game. In NATO the West German GNP was
30.4 percent as large as the American converted into dollars
at the average 1978 exchange rate or 24.4 percent at a rate
closer to purchasing power equivalents; the corresponding
proportions for France (with its currency less overvalued
vis-a-vis the dollar than the mark) were 22.3 and 19.5 per-
cent, for the UK 14.6 and 11.2 percent, for Italy 12.1 and
10 percent. Even the latter ratio gives Italy more
economic weight in NATO than Poland possesses in the Warsaw
Pact.
Each superpower has military commitments besides NATO
and the Warsaw Pact. They range in form from multi- or
bilateral-treaties to policy declarations and in substance
from low-risk to high-risk associations and from solid to
brittle.!/ In the Soviet camp are Mongolia, North Korea,
Vietnam, and Cuba. The strength of commitments between the
USSR and several African and Asian countries is uncertain.
Beyond NATO, the US is firmly bound to Japan, South Korea,
Australia, New Zealand, and Israel; the American defense
treaty with the Republic of China continues into 1980;
security assistance is likely to go on beyond this date.
The US has given additional pledges to the Philippines and
Thailand (both members of ASEAN) and to others. The ASEAN
countries (others are Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore)
are not covered by explicit American commitments but their
outlook tends to tie them to the Western side. (In 1978
ASEAN as a whole had 247 million inhabitants and a GNP--
with Third World Supplement--of $165 billion, i.e., 44 per-
cent as much population and 4 percent as much GNP as NATO).
What stands out in a comparison limited to the countries
enumerated in the preceding paragraph (of course, not count-
ing the ASEAN group) is that the Soviet group with all its
associates encompasses about 10 percent of mankind and
18 percent of the planetary product, the Western group
1/ John M. Collins, in his book American and Soviet Military
Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington, D.C.,
1978, lists on pp. 161-165 the security commitments of
both sides as of early 1978.
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17 percent of the world's population and 58 percent of its
product. If the balance of power differs from the GNP
ratio it is not for lack of wherewithal on the part of the
US and its confederates. In fact, the US alone has close
to half as many people as the Soviet side and an output
(achieved with superior technology) 43 percent larger than
the USSR together with its allies.
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Table 1.
GNP SERIES WITHOUT THIRD WORLD SUPPLEMENT FOR
(in billions of 1978 dollars)
SELECTED AREAS, 1950-78
People's
United
OECD
Republic
Eastern
s
St
t
Canada
Brazil
Europe
Japan
India
of China
USSR Europe
Year
e
a
1950
811.40
51.73
17.56
626.77
73.81
39.50
70.10
269.68
110.40
1951
876.80
55.03
18.60
658.42
n.a.
40.61
81.60
280.19
n.a.
1952
910.26
58.93
20.22
665.07
93.64
41.66
96.25
296.02
n.a.
1953
945.70
61.64
20.72
702.61
98.88
44.12
102.56
312.15
n.a.
1954
933.38
60.89
22.82
732.51
104.65
45.22
106.70
328.92
n.a.
1955
995.89
67.93
24.39
772.31
113.90
46.76
117.20
357.60
142.96
1956
1,017.18
73.67
25.18
798.51
122.21
49.33
126.60
385.06
144.88
1957
1,035.58
75.39
27.21
841.13
131.31
48.65
133.90
408.85 /3
q
156.13
1958
1,033.45
77.13
29.30
859.49
138.68
52.49
148.40
440.24 S
163.91
1959
1,095.66
80.06
30.94
886.69
151.01
53.44
143.70
463.69
'
175.28
1960
1,120.60
82.38
33.94
977.01
171.14
57.02
138.90
479.31
186.91
1961
1,148.74
84.72
37.44
1,031.41
195.92
59.04
110.40
508.60
196.12
1962
1,215.35
90.49
39.39
1,078.30
209.67
60.66
120.20
526.80
200.43
1963
1,263.41
95.15
40.03
1,128.19
231.61
63.89
135.00
526.59
206.30
1964
1,329.88
101.53
41.19
1,196.32
262.05
68.75
150.85
574.18
217.56
1965
1,408.20
108.30
50.74
1,251.60
275.54
65.77
169.60
608.91
226.66
1966
1,492.00
115.82
52.65
1,299.54
302.54
66.51
179.30
645.96
240.05
1967
1,532.61
119.69
55.22
1,339.85
341.71
71.94
174.90
675.47
249.97
1968
1,599.68
126.68
61.39
1,412.11
387.53
73.98
173.30
715.16
260.12
1969
1,640.75
133.43
67.49
1,499.86
429.03
78.69
190.50
735.00
265.21
1970
1,635.42
136.79
73.43
1,579.21
475.93
83.24
217.00
790.17
273.28
1971
1,684.40
146.17
83.20
1,636.06
511.13
84.20
230.50
816.47
289.11-
1972
1,781.13
155.14
92.96
1,708.07
557.71
83.31
238.80
830.83
303.39
1973
1,878.31
166.84
105.89
1,800.27
612.55
87.57
257.30
892.90
317.27
1974
1,852.15
172.96
116.24
1,845.21
604.86
87.63
267.30
921.64
332.22
1975
1,828.60
174.80
122.84
1,812.68
619.93
90.85
283.33
940.40
345.96
1976
1,932.80
184.95
133.86
1,897.52
657.13
92.30
283.33
980.84
360.47
1977
2.027.50
189.93
140.10
1,935.25
687.96
97.84
300.50
1,014.19
372.62
3
1978
2,106.90/
196.58
148.93
1,993.23
727.86
105.08
323.94
1,046.64 /
384.3
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Table 2.
PLANETARY PRODUCT WITHOUT THIRD WORLD SUPPLEMENT,
1975-78, BY COUNTRY
(Value data in 1978 dollars)
Share in
1975 GNP
1976 GNP
Growth
1976 GNP
1977 GNP
Growth
1977 GNP
1978 GNP
Growth
1978 GNP
1978
Planetary
P
d
t
Population
i
Share in
1978 World
1978 GNP
ro
uc
M
d-1978
Population
per Capita
(billions)
(in %)
(billions)
(in %)
(billions)
(in %)
(billions)
(millions)
(in %)
(dollars)
7,208.47
5.0
7,569.69
3.9
7,862.04
4.0
8,173.44
100.00
4,327.48
100.00
1,889
Non-Communist Developed
Countries 4,736.65
5.5
4,997.30
3.6
5
178
83
3
7
5
371
92
65
72
,
.
.
,
.
.
790.99
18.28
6,791
With a per capita GNP of
$5,731 and more
3,958.78
5.6
4,181.68
4.0
4
347
13
3
9
4
515
69
55
25
,
.
.
,
.
.
545.62
12.61
8,276
In North America
2,003.40
5.7
2,117.74
4.7
2,217.43
3.9
2,303.48
28.17
242.17
5.60
9,512.1
US (50 States)
1,828.60
5.7
1,932.80
4.9
2,027.50
4
0
2
106
90
25
76
218
55
Canada 174.80
5.8
184.94
2.7
189.93
.
3.5
,
.
196.58
.
2.41
.
23.62
5.05
0.55
9,640
8,323
In Western Europe 1,161.82
4.9
1,219.03
2.3
1,247.51
2.9
1,283.81
15.70
162.47
3.75
7
902
Sweden 72.82
1.5
73.91
-2.5
72
11
2
3
73
73
0
90
,
Sw.tzerland 53.37
-1.4
52.63
2.7
.
54.05
.
1.0
.
54.59
.
0.67
8.29
6.31
0.19
0.15
8,894
8
651
Germany, Federal
,
Republic of 457.97
5.6
483.62
2.6
496.19
3.4
513.06
6.27
61.28
1.42
8
372
Norway 27.89
6.0
29.56
4.1
30.77
3.8
31.94
0.39
4.06
0.09
,
7
867
France 367.16
5.6
387.72
3.0
399.35
3.0
411.33
5.03
53.29
1.23
,
7
719
Denmark 35.56
5.3
37.44
1.8
38.11
1.0
38.87
0.47
5.11
0.12
,
7
607
Belgium 63.71
5.7
67.34
1.2
68.15
2.3
69.72
0.85
9.84
0.23
,
7
085
Luxembourg 2.32
2.9
2.39
1.3
2.42
2.5
2.48
0.36
,
6
889
Netherlands 81.02
4.6
84.42
2.3
86.36
2.0
88.09
1.08
13.93
0.32
,
6,324
In Oceania 89.01
3.8
92.39
2.1
94.33
2.5
96.69
1.18
14.22
0.33
6
800
Australia 89.01
3.8
92.39
2.1
94.33
2.5
96.69
1.18
14.22
0.33
,
6,800
In
Asia 619.93
6.0
657.13
5.2
687.96
5.8
727.86
8.90
115.00
2.66
6
329
Japan 619.93
6.0
657.13
5.2
687.96
5.8
727.86
8.90
115.00
2.66
,
6,329
In
OPEC 82.07
12.9
92.70
4.7
97.10
4.0
100.94
1.23
11.48
0
27
8
793
(-)atar 4.19
15.0
4.82
-12.0
4.30
15.0
4.94
0.23
.
,
22
000
Kuwait 13.53
6.5
14.41
-5.0
13.72
10.5
15.16
0.19
1.20
,
12,600
United Arab Emirates 6.68
14.0
7.62
8.0
8
23
-6
0
7
76
Saudi Arabia 43.45
8.0
46.93
15.0
.
53.97
.
1.0
.
54.51
0.67
0.80
6.50
0
15
9,700
8
400
Libya 14.22
12.0
15.92
6.0
16.88
10.0
18.57
0.23
2.75
.
,
6,750
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- 28 -
With a per capita GNP of
$3,821-$5,730
523.33
4.1
544.66
0.7
548.52
3.0
565.11
6.91
132.32
3.06
4,271
In Western Europe
490.91
4.3
511.90
0.7
515.57
3.0
531.23
6.50
125.02
2.89
4,249
Iceland
1.13
3.4
1.16
4.2
1.21
3.5
1.26
0.22
5,706
Austria
37.41
5.2
39.36
3.5
40.74
1.5
41.35
0.51
7.53
0.17
5,491
Finland
23.11
0.3
25.18
-0.5
23.07
3.0
23.76
0.29
4.75
0.11
5,002
United Kingaom
236.73
2.6
242.89
1.6
243.78
3.0
254.18
3.11
55.79
1.29
4,556
Italy
192.53
5.6
203.31
1.7
206.77
2.0
210.68
2.58
56.73
1.31
4,211
In Oceania
16.08
0.3
16.03
-1.8
15.84
0.8
15.97
0.20
3.12
0.07
5,119
New Zealand
16.08
0.3
16.03
-1.8
15.84
0.8
15.97
0.20
3.12
0.07
5,119
In Asia
14.91
2.3
15.25
2.4
15.62
4.9
16.38
0.20
3.87
0.09
4,233
Bahrain
1.26
11.0
1.40
6.6
1.49
4.0
1.55
0.30
5,167
Israel
13.65
1.5
13.85
2.0
14.13
5.0
14.83
0.18
3.57
0.08
4,154
1.43
4.1
1.48
0.7
1.49
3.0
1.53
0.31
4,935
With a per capita GNP of
$1,911-$3,820
254.54
6.5
270.96
4.5
283.18
2.8
291.12
3.56
113.05
2.59
2,575
In Western Europe
119.43
3.0
123.03
3.0
126.69
3.8
131.54
1.61
50.75
1.17
2,592
Ireland
8.86
3.2
9.14
5.5
9.64
6.5
10.27
3.22
0.07
3,189
Greece
20.85
5.9
22.08
3.7
22.90
5.5
24.16
0.30
9.38
0.22
2,576
Spain
88.19
2.1
90.04
2.4
92.20
3.0
95.00
1.16
37.11
0.86
2,560
Malta
0.54
17.0
0.64
9.0
0.69
9.0
0.75
0.34
2,225
Cyprus
0.99
14.6
1.13
11.0
1.26
8.5
1.36
0.70
1,954
Chiefly in Latin America
9.72
1.1
9.83
4.7
10.29
5.3
10.84
0.13
3.99
0.09
2,717
Puerto Rico and Outlying
Territories of the US
9.72
1.1
9.83
4.7
10.29
5.3
10.84
0.13
3.99
0.09
2,717
In Asia
18.14
12.2
20.36
7.7
21.92
7.9
23.64
0.29
7.76
0.18
3,046
Singapore
6.11
7.3
6.56
8.0
7.08
8.1
7.65
0.09
2.33
0
11
3,285
2
971
Hong Kong
10.04
16.0
11.65
8.0
12.58
8.3
13.62
0.19
4.58
.
,
Oman
1.99
8.0
2.15
5.0
2.26
5.0
2.37
0.85
2,788
In OPEC
104.77
9.9
115.15
5.6
121.58
5.6
122.27
1.50
49.43
1.14
2,474
Gabon
2.03
10.0
2.23
0
2.23
-13.0
1.98
0.56
3,530
Venezuela
33.51
7.4
36.00
7.5
38.69
6.5
41.21
0.50
13.13
0.30
3,139
Iran
69.23
11.1
76.92
2.8
80.66
-2.0
79.08
0.97
35.74
0.83
1,937
Others
2.48
4.5
2.59
4.3
2.70
4.7
2.83
1.12
2,527
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Table 2. (Cont'd) PLANETARY PRODUCT WITHOUT THIRD WORLD SUPPLEMENT, 1975-78, BY COUNTRY
(Value data in 1978 dollars)
Non-Communist Less
Developed Countries
With a per capita GNP of
Share in
1978 Share in
1976 GNP 1977 GNP 1973 GNP Planetary Population 1978 World 1978 GNP
1975 GNP Growth 1976 GNP Growth 1977 GNP Growth 1978 GNP Product Mid-1978 Population per Capita
(billions) (in o) (billions) (in o) (billions) (in %) (billions) (millions) (dollars)
$956-$1,910
440.51
5.4
464
21
5
2
488
12
4
9
.
.
.
.
511.98
6.26
404.32
9.34
1,266
In Western Europe
13.27
6.2
14.10
6.0
14.95
3.0
15.40
0.19
9.?'1
0
23
1
570
Portugal
13.27
6.2
14.10
6.0
14.95
3.0
15.40
0.19
9.81
.
0.23
,
1,570
In OPEC
31.76
10.3
35.04
8.0
37.85
8.0
40.89
0.50
30.80
0
71
1
328
Iraq
15.35
15.0
17.65
10.0
19.42
10.0
21.36
0.20
12.30
.
0
28
,
1
737
Algeria
16.41
6.0
17.39
6.0
18.43
6.0
19.53
0.24
18.50
.
0.43
,
1,056
In Asia
57.06
9.8
62.63
10.6
69.26
8.9
75.41
0.92
70.14
1
62
1
075
China, Rep. of (Taiwan)
17.41
11.7
19.45
7.9
21
00
8
8
22
84
0
.
,
Malaysia
10.73
11.3
11.94
8.0
.
12.90
.
8.0
.
13.93
.28
0.17
17.10
12
94
1,336
1
077
Lebanon
4.30
-50.0
2.80
40.0
4.00
-25.0
3.20
.
3.10
,
1
030
Korea, Re
public of
24.62
15.5
28.44
10.3
31.36
13.0
35.44
0.43
37.00
0.86
,
958
3.46
3.8
3.59
3.6
3. 72
4.6
3.89
72
3
0
09
1
045
Fiji
0.73
2.6
0.75
2.1
0.77
2.7
0.79
.
0.60
.
,
1
313
Various I
slands
2.73
4.0
2.84
4.0
2.95
4.0
3.10
3.12
,
994
41.43
3.3
42
79
1
2
43
29
3
2
.
.
.
.
44.63
0.55
34.52
0.80
1,294
Djibouti
0.16
6.0
0.17
6.0
0.18
6.0
0.19
0.11
1
727
South Afr
ica
35.65
2.7
36.54
0.5
36.72
2.7
37.73
0.43
27.50
0
64
,
1
372
Namibia
0.97
-1.0
0.96
1.0
0.97
1.0
0.98
0.90
.
,
1
090
Tunisia
4.65
10.0
5.12
6.0
5.42
6.5
5.78
6.01
,
961
Argentina
50.29
-2.9
48.88
4.7
51.17
-3.0
49.68
0.61
26.44
0
61
1
877
Trinidad
and Tobago
1.67
6.2
1.85
7.7
1.98
6.0
2.10
1.32
.
,
1
588
Chile
14.02
5.5
14.60
8.6
15.85
6.0
16.80
0.21
10.69
,
1
572
Uruguay
4.06
2.6
4.16
3.4
4.30
3.0
4.43
2.87
,
1,543
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Suriname
0.66
0
0.66
2.0
0.67
2.0
0.68
0.45
1,519
Brazil
122.84
9.2
133.86
4.7
140.10
6.3
148.93
1.82
116.38
2.69
1,456
Panama
2.52
-0.3
2.51
0.9
2.53
4.0
2.64
1.82
1,449
Jamaica
3.23
-6.9
3.02
-4.0
2.90
0
2.90
2.13
1,363
Costa Rica
2.23
4.3
2.36
7.7
2.54
5.0
2.69
2.11
1,276
Mexico
69.17
1.7
70.32
3.2
72.57
5.0
76.20
0.93
66.44
1.53
1,147
Guatemala
5.42
7.5
5.82
8.3
6.30
5.0
6.62
6.63
998
Peru
15.95
2.8
16.49
0.3
16.54
-1.0
16.37
0.20
17.01
963
Others
1.47
4.4
1.53
4.5
1.60
4.1
1.67
1.04
1,600
With a per capita GNP of
$479-$955
122.55
7.1
131.36
4.6
137.43
3.4
142.10
1.72
214.97
4.96
661
In Asia
1.50
15.0
1.73
10.0
1.90
10.0
2.09
2.97
704
Jordan
1.50
15.0
1.73
10.0
1.90
10.0
2.09
2.97
704
In Europe
(and Asia)
28.78
8.5
31.23
4.0
32.48
2.7
33.36
0.41
43.18
1.00
772
Turkey
28.78
8.5
31.23
4.0
32.48
2.7
33.36
0.41
43.18
1.00
772
In Latin America
27.76
5.1
29.19
5.1
30.69
5.8
32.49
0.40
44.92
1.03
723
Nicaragua
2.01
6.2
2.12
6.1
2.25
-4.0
2.16
2.50
866
Dominican Republic
3.81
5.0
4.06
4.4
4.24
3.1
4.37
5.25
833
Colombia
15.60
7.0
16.32
4.8
17.10
7.5
18.38
0.22
25.70
0.59
715
El Salvador
2.69
4.7
2.80
5.2
2.94
5.0
3.09
4.39
705
Paraguay
1.43
7.5
1.54
11.4
1.72
9.5
1.89
2.77
680
Guyana
0.53
-13.0
0.56
-6.0
0.52
-1.0
0.52
0.82
624
Honduras
1.46
6.4
1.55
7.7
1.67
8.6
1.82
3.12
583
Others
0.23
4.4
0.24
4.5
0.25
4.1
0.26
0.37
706
Syria
5.93
8.4
6.43
-1.0
6.34
0.5
6.37
8.37
761
Ecuador
4.27
9.8
4.69
6.4
4.99
6.4
5.30
7.81
678
Nigeria
32.46
12.5
36.52
6.6
38.93
3.0
40.10
0.49
70.38
1.63
570
Mauritius
0.61
7.0
0.65
6.5
0.69
6.5
0.73
0.90
50
817
Ivory Coast
4.62
12.5
5.20
7.8
5.61
2.9
5.77
7.
769
660
Liberia 1
0.93
3.1
0.96
3.0
0.99
3.0
1.01
1.54
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Table 2. (Cont'd) PLANETARY PRODUCT WITHOUT THIRD WORLD SUPPLEMENT, 1975-78, BY COUNTRY
(Value data in 1978 dollars)
1975 GNP
1976 GNP
Growth
1976 GNP
1977 GNP
Growth
1977 GNP
1978 GNP
Growth
1978 GNP
Share in
1978
Planetary
Product
Population
Mid-1978
Share in
1978 World
P
l
ti
1978 GNP
i
opu
a
on
per Cap
ta
(billions)
(in .)
(billions)
(in %)
(billions)
(in %)
(billions)
(millions)
(dollars)
Swaziland
0.28
11.0
0.32
4.5
0.33
4.5
0.34
0.54
634
Morocco
9.88
1.2
10.00
2.0
10.20
2.0
10.40
0.13
19.47
0.45
534
Congo, People's Rep. of
0.67
1.0
0.68
1.0
0.69
3.0
0.71
1.42
500
Angola
3.87
-10.0
3.52
-5.0
3.35
-5.0
3.19
6.05
527
Others
0.24
2.0
0.24
2.0
0.24
1.0
0.24
0.46
526
With a per capita GNP of
$478 and less
261.85
4.1
272.63
5.2
286.79
6.2
303
92
3
72
1
429
35
33
03
213
.
.
,
.
.
161.82
3.4
167.40
5.3
176.23
6.8
188
28
2
30
999
51
23
10
188
.
.
.
.
Philippines
18.19
6.7
19.42
6.1
20.51
6.5
21.85
0.27
46.02
1.06
475
Thailand
17.35
5.7
18.34
6.0
19.44
6.0
20.61
0.25
45.23
1.05
433
Yemen, People's
Democratic Republic
0.53
6.0
0.57
6.0
0.60
6.0
0.64
1.85
344
Yemen, Arab Republic
1.58
4.0
1.64
5.0
1.73
5.0
1.81
5.62
322
Sri Lanka
3.11
3.0
3.20
4.4
3.35
3.0
3.45
14.24
0.33
242
Pakistan
14.31
4.9
15.01
2.8
15.43
7.0
16.51
75.60
1.75
218
India
90.85
1.6
92.30
6.0
97.84
7.2
105.08
1.28
660.70
15.27
159
Burma
4.03
4.5
4.21
2.5
4.32
6.0
4.57
32.20
0.74
142
Afghanistan
2.32
2.7
2.39
2.5
2.45
3.0
2.51
20.67
0.48
122
Nepal
1.44
3.0
1.48
0.7
1.49
1.9
1.52
13.10
0.30
116
Bangladesh
7.10
13.3
7.83
1.7
7.96
8.0
8.60
82.90
1.92
104
Bhutan
1-0
1.1
1.1
1.12
1.26
90
Maldives
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.12
85
49.48
9.3
54.07
7.7
58.23
7
0
62
30
0
76
181
48
4
19
343
.
.
.
.
.
Egypt
12.48
11.3
13.89
8.3
15.04
7.0
16.09
40.82
0.94
394
Indonesia
37.00
8.6
40.18
7.5
43.19
7.0
46.21
0.56
140.66
3.25
329
Zambia
2.42
0.9
2.44
2.5
2.50
1.0
2.52
0.03
5.36
470
Rhodesia
3.52
-2.4
3.44
-6.9
3.22
-6.0
3.04
0.04
6.73
452
Cameroon
2.48
3.0
2.55
4.0
2.65
5.0
2.78
0.03
6.81
409
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Ghana
4.55
-3.0
4.42
-1.0
4.37
0
4.37
0.05
10.94
0.25
400
al
Sene
2.01
-2.3
1.96
4.5
2.05
-5.0
1.95
5.42
360
g
Botswana
0.09
10.0
0.21
10.0
0.23
5.0
0.25
0.73
337
Sudan
4.89
5.5
5.16
5.5
5.44
4.0
5.66
0.07
16.95
0.39
334
To
o
0.64
10.0
0.70
7.0
0.75
5.0
0.79
2.41
328
g
uatorial Guinea
E
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.32
312
q
Ken
a
3.28
5.0
3.44
4.5
3.59
4.5
3.75
0.05
15.30
0.35
245
y
ascar
Mada
2.04
0.5
2.05
2.8
2.10
2.8
2.16
9.72
227
g
Sierra Leone
0.69
-1.0
0.68
1.0
0.69
3.3
0.71
3.20
222
Mauritania
0.31
8.9
0.33
-0.7
0.33
0
0.33
1.56
213
The Gambia
0.11
0
0.11
0
0.11
-1.0
0.11
1.99
196
Central African Empire
0.34
3.0
0.35
3.0
0.36
2.0
0.37
1.91
194
Guinea
0.69
11.0
0.77
5.0
0.80
5.0
0.85
4.77
178
Rwanda
0.62
7.0
0.67
7.0
0.71
6.5
0.76
4.38
174
Tanzania
2.49
5.0
2.62
3.9
2.72
3.5
2.82
0.03
16.59
0.38
170
anda
U
2.02
-0.4
2.02
4.0
2.10
1.2
2.12
12.76
167
g
Malawi
0.76
7.0
0.82
5.7
0.86
5.7
0.91
5.73
159
Mozambique
2.08
-25.0
1.66
-5.0
1.58
-5.0
1.50
9.85
153
Zaire
3.68
-1.4
3.63
1.5
3.68
1.5
3.73
0.05
27.78
0.64
134
Benin
0.45
-3.0
0.44
8.0
0.48
4.0
0.50
3.38
133
Ni
er
0.48
18.7
0.57
4.0
0.59
7.0
0.64
4.99
127
g
Burundi
0.42
7.8
0.45
5.8
0.47
4.5
0.49
4.08
122
Lesotho
0.30
0.31
6.0
0.33
7.0
0.35
1.30
117
Ethiopia
3.24
2.0
3.30
1.0
3.33
1.0
3.36
0.04
29.40
0.68
114
Upper Volta
0.65
5.8
0.69
2.2
0.70
5.8
0.74
6.52
114
Mali
0.46
9.0
0.50
7.4
0.53
0.7
0.54
6.14
87
Chad
0.45
-22.0
0.37
-0.7
0.37
-0.9
0.37
4.29
86
Somalia
0.25
0
0.25
-2.3
0.26
0
0.26
3.66
70
Others
0.23
1.6
0.23
3.3
0.24
2.6
0.25
1.04
238
Bolivia
2.33
7.0
2.48
4.8
2.60
4.0
2.71
6.10
444
Haiti
0.95
4.7
0.99
2.5
1.02
3.6
1.06
4.83
219
Others
0.11
4.4
0.11
4.5
0.12
4.1
0.12
0.28
446
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Table 2. (Cont'd) PLANETARY PRODUCT WITHOUT THIRD WORLD SUPPLEMENT, 1975-78, BY COUNTRY
(Value data in 1978 dollars)
1975 GNP
1976 GNP
Growth
1976 GNP
1977 GNP
Growth
1977 GNP
1978 GNP
Growth
1978 GNP
Share in
1978
Planetary
P
d
t
Population
i
Share in
1978 World
1978 GNP
ro
uc
M
d-1978
Population
per Capita
(billions)
(in %)
(billions)
(in %)
(billions)
(in %)
(billions)
(millions)
(dollars)
1,648. 37
3.5
1,705.74
3.9
1
772
54
4
1
1
845
34 /
22
58
1
,
.
.
,
.
.
,490.97
34.45
1,238
Developed Communist
Countries
1,333.52
4.3
1,390.23
3.5
1
439
06
3
3
1
486
94
18
20
,
.
.
,
.
.
391.70
9.05
3,796
With a per capita GNP of
$3,821 or more
1,079.04
4.0
1,122.42
3.5
1
161
64
3
2
1
198
37
14
67
,
.
.
,
.
.
293.30
6.78
4,086
German Democratic Rep.
73.85
2.2
75.45
4.0
78.44
3.3
81.01
1.00
16.80
0.39
4,834
Czechoslovakia
64.79
2.1
66.13
4.3
69.01
2.5
70.72
0.86
15.10
0.35
4
673
USSR
940.40
4.3
980.84
3.4
1,014.19
3.2
1,046.64
12.81
261.40
6.04
,
4,004
with a per capita GNP of
$1,911-$3,820
5.2
267.81
3.4
277
42
4
0
288
57
3
53
.
.
.
.
98.40
2.27
2,933
Romania
56.14
11.7
62.70
3.2
64.71
4.2
67.45
0.83
21.90
0.51
3,083
Poland
98.58
4.1
102.66
2.8
105.50
2.7
108.34
1.33
35.00
0.81
3,094
Hungary
29.79
-0.1
29.77
5.0
31.25
2.5
32.06
0.39
10.70
0.25
3,000
Bulgaria
22.81
4.1
23.75
-0.2
23.71
4.4
24.75
0.30
8.80
0.20
2,799
Yugoslavia
47.16
3.8
48.93
6.8
52.15
6.7
55.97
0.68
22.00
0.51
2,544
Warsaw Pact
1,286.48
4.3
1,341.41
3.4
1,386.91
3.2
1,430.97
17.51
369.70
8.54
3,871
Six Smaller Pact Members
346.08
3.5
360.57
2.7
372.72
3.1
384.33
4.72
108.30
2.50
3,549
Less Developed Communist
Countries
314.85
0.2
315.51
5.7
333
48
7
5
358
40
4
38
1
.
.
.
.
,099.27
25.40
326
With a per capita GNP of
$956 or more
10.19
3.8
10.58
3.8
10
98
3
8
11
40
0
14
9
.
.
.
.
.80
0.25
1,163
3.8
10.58
3.8
10.98
3.8
11.40
0.14
9.80
0.25
1,163
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Less Developed Communist
Countries (Cont'd)
With a per capita GNP of
32
15
19
0
47
22
52
0
682
$479-$955
14.58
-1.7
14.33
0.5
14.40
6.4
.
.
.
.
Mongolia
1.03
5.0
1.09
2.0
1.11
3.0
1.14
1.58
720
Korea, Democratic
People's Republic
11.96
-3.0
11.60
0
11.60
7.2
12.44
0.15
18.20
0.42
684
Albania
1.59
3.0
1.64
3.0
1.69
3.0
1.74
2.69
647
With a per capita GNP of
$478 and less
PRC
283.33
0
283.33
6.1
300.50
7.8
323.94
3.96
1,003.90
23.20
323
Vietnam
5.91
6.0
6.40
5.0
6.72
2.0
6.85
0.08
51.60
1.19
132
Laos
0.25
4.0
0.26
4.0
0.27
3.0
0.28
3.50
79
Kampuchea
0.60
0.61
0.61
0.61
8.00
76
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Table 3. SUMMARY OF PLANETARY PRODUCT WITH THIRD WORLD SUPPLEMENT, 1975-78
(Value data in 1978 dollars)
GNP 1975
1976 GNP
Growth
GNP 1976
1977 GNP
Growth
GNP 1977
1978 GNP
Growth
GNP 1978
Share in
1978
Planetary
P
d
t
Population
Mid-1978
Share in
1978 World
i
1978 GNP
ro
uc
Populat
on
per Capita
(billions)
(in %)
(billions)
(in %)
(billions)
(in %)
(billions)
($)
(millions)
(in %)
(dollars)
World
7,455.52
5.0
7,828.35
3.9
8,133.63
4.0
8,459.45
100.00
4,327.48
100.00
1
955
Developed
6,070.17
5.2
6,387.53
3.6
6,617.89
3.7
6,858.86
81.08
1,182.69
27.33
,
5
799
Less Developed
1,385.35
4.0
1,440.82
5.2
1,515.74
5.6
1,600.59
18.92
3,144.79
72.67
,
509
Non-Communist
5,797.69
5.4
6,112.89
3.9
6,351.11
4.0
6,603.73
78.06
2,836.51
65.55
2
328
Communist
1,657.83
3.5
1,715.46
3.9
1,782.52
4.1
1,855.72
21.94
1,490.97
34.45
,
1,245
Developed Non-Communist
Countries
4,736.65
5.5
4,997.30
3.6
5,178.83
3.7
5,371.92
63.50
790.99
18.28
6,791
Less Developed Non-Communist
Countries
1,061.04
5.1
1,115.59
5.1
1
172
28
5
1
1
231
81
14
56
2
045
52
47
27
,
.
.
,
.
.
,
.
.
602
Developed Communist Countries
1,333.52
4.3
1,390.23
3.5
1,439.06
3.3
1,486.94
17.58
391.70
9.05
3
796
Less Developed Communist
,
Countries
324.31
0.3
325.23
5.6
343
46
7
4
368
78
4
36
1
099
27
25
40
.
.
.
.
,
.
.
336
World by GNP Per Capita Groups
Developed Countries
$5,731 or more
3,958.78
5.6
4,181.68
4.0
4,347.13
3.9
4,515.69
53.38
545.62
12.61
8
276
Non-Communist
2,958.78
5.6
4,181.68
4.0
4,347,13
3.9
4,515.69
53.38
545.62
12.61
,
8,276
Communist
$3,821-$5,730
1,602.37
4.0
1,667.0%
2.6
1,710.16
3.1
1,763.48
20.85
425.62
9.84
4,143
Non-Communist
523.33
4.1
544.66
0.7
548.52
3.0
565.11
6.68
132.32
3.06
4,271
Communist
1,079.04
4.0
1,122.42
3.5
1,161.64
3.2
1,198.37
14.17
293.30
6.78
4,086
$1,911-$3,820
509.02
5.8
538.77
4.1
560.60
3.4
579.69
6.85
211.45
4.89
2
741
Non-Communist
254.54
6.5
270.96
4.5
283.18
2.8
291.12
3.44
113.05
2.61
,
2,575
Communist
254.48
5.2
267.81
3.4
277.42
4.0
288.57
3.41
98.40
2.28
2,933
Less Developed Countries
$956-$1,910
495.77
5.3
522.27
5.1
549.01
4.9
575.72
6.81
414.12
9.57
1,390
Non-Communist
484.56
5.4
510.63
5.2
536.93
4.9
563.18
6.66
404.32
9.34
1,393
Communist
11.21
3.8
11.64
3.8
12.08
3.8
12.54
0.15
9.80
0.23
1,280
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Less Developed Countries (Cont'd)
28
202
39
2
32
234
41
5
863
$479-$955
176.37
6.2
187.38
4.2
195.21
3.6
.
.
.
.
Non-Communist
157.42
7.2
163.75
4.6
176.49
3.3
182.36
2.16
211.85
4.90
861
Communist
18.95
-1.7
18.63
0.5
18.72
6.4
19.92
0.23
22.47
0.51
887
$478 and less
713.11
2.5
731.17
5.5
771.52
6.6
822.59
9.72
2,496.35
57.69
330
Non-Communist
418.96
4.1
436.21
5.2
458.86
6.2
486.27
5.75
1,429.35
33.03
341
Communist
294.15
0.3
294.96
6.0
312.66
7.6
336.32
3.97
1,067.00
24.66
315
Important Countries or Groupings
4
90
218
55
05
5
639
9
Us
1,828.60
5.7
1,932.80
4.9
2,027.50
3.9
2,106.90
.
2
.
.
17
67
,
738
6
OECD Tota1J
4,551.06
5.3
4,791.59
3.6
4,962.05
3.8
5,152.38
60.91
764.70
.
,
151
of which: European OECD)
1,822.64
4.7
1,908.30
2.0
1,946.49
3.2
2,009.68
23.76
390.19
9.02
5,
5.0
1,518.27
2.1
1,550.77
3.1
1,598.68
18.90
259.55
6.00
6,159
NATO Tota1J
3,542.28
5.5
3,735.78
3.6
3,872.11
3.6
4,013.16
47.44
565.15
13.06
7,101
4
of which: European NATO)
1,538.88
5.1
1,618.04
2.3
1,654.68
3.3
1,709.98
20.21
322.98
7.46
5,29
USSR
940.40
4.3
980.84
3.4
1,014.19
3.2
1,046.64
12.37
261.40
6.04
4,004
871
Warsaw Pact Total
1,286.48
4.3
1,341.41
3.4
1,386.91
3.2
1,430.97
16.92
369.70
8.54
3,
PRC
283.33
0
283.33
6.1
300.50
7.8
323.94
3.83
1,003.90
23.20
323
OPEC(OAPEC) Total
356.41
10.8
394.83
6.1
418.83
3.9
435.17
5.14
359.75
8.32
1,210
664
3
of which: Affluent
186.84
11.2
207.85
5.2
218.68
2.1
223.21
2.64
60.91
1.41
,
709
Indigent
169.57
10.3
186.98
7.0
200.15
5.9
211.96
2.50
298.84
6.91
a/ Includes Third World Supplements for Portugal and Turkey (see text).
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Table 4. PLANETARY PRODUCT WITH THIRD WORLD SUPPLEMENT 1978 BY CONTINENT
(in billions of 1978 dollars)
US and
Canada
Latin
America
Europe
Asia
Africa
Oceania
Total
Share in
Planetary
P
d
t
ro
uc
2,316.09
474.60
3,497.00
1,776.75
276.69
118.33
8,459.46
100.0
Developed Non-Communist World
With Affluent OPEC Members
2,316.09
44.21
1,947.49
930.13
20.55
113.46
5,371.92
63.5
Affluent OPEC Members
41.21
--
161.45
20.55
--
223.21
2.6
Without OPEC
2,316.09
3.00
1,947.49
727.86
--
113.46
5,148.71
60.9
Less Developed Non-Communist World
With OPEC (OAPEC) Members
417.85
60.31
492.64
256.14
4.87
1,231.81
14.6
Less Developed OPEC (OAPEC)
6.89
--
105.72
99.35
--
211.96
2.5
Without OPEC (OAPEC)
410.96
60.31
386.92
156.79
4.87
1,019.85
12.1
48.10
--
267.17
119.90
--
435.17
5.1
2,316.09
462.06
2,007.80
1,422.77
276.69
118.33
6,603.73
78.1
Communist World
12.54
1,489.20
353
98
1
855
72
21
9
of which:
Developed
--
1,436.94
.
--
,
.
1,486.94
.
17.6
Less Developed
12.54
2.26
353.98
368.78
4.3
Share of
Total (%)
Continents in
a/ Includes Puerto Rico and Outlying Territories of the US.
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Table 5. NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT STATES BY CONTINENT AND PER CAPITA GNP GROUP
(WITH THIRD WORLD SUPPLEMENT)
US, Canada,
hamas
B
Latin
America
Europe
Asia
Africa
Oceania
Total
a
3
27
35
37
49
10
161
Non-Communist
3
26
26
31
49
10
145
Developed Non-Communist
3
1
24
10
2
3
43
of which: $5,731 or more
2
-
12
5
1
2
22
$3,821-$5,730
-
6
2
-
1
9
$1,911-$3,820
1
1
6
3
1
-
12
Less Developed Non-Communist
-
25
2
21
47
7
102
of which: $956-$1,910
13
1
5
4
1
24
$479-$955
7
1
2
10
3
22
$478 or less
5
-
14
33
3
56
Communist
1
9
16
8
8
Developed Communist
of which: $5,731 or more
3
-
-
-
3
$3,821-$5,731
_
5
-
-
-
5
$1,911-$3, 820
Less Developed Communist
1
1
6
-
-
8
of which: $956-$1,910
-
1
-
-
-
-
1
1
2
-
-
3
$479-$955
4
-
-
4
$478 or less
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Table 6. WORLD POPULATION IN MID-1978 BY CONTINENT
(in millions)
US and
Canada)
Latin
America
Europe
Asia
Af
i
Share in
r
ca
Oceania
Total
World
(%)
246.44
340.08
785.62
2,491.83
441.31
22.20
4,327.48
100.0
Developed Non-Communist World
With Affluent OPEC Members
246.44
14.13
338.24
171.10
3.74
17.34
790.99
18.3
Affluent OPEC Members
--
13.13
--
44.47
3.31
--
60.81
1.4
Without OPEC
246.44
1.00
338.24
126.63
0.43
17.34
730.08
16.9
Less Developed Non-Communist
World
With OPEC (OAPEC) Members
--
316.15
52.99
1,233.95
437.57
4.86
2,045.52
47.3
Less Developed OPEC (OAPEC)
--
7.81
--
161.33
129.70
--
298.84
6.9
Without OPEC (OAPEC)
--
308.34
52.99
1,072.62
307.87
4.86
1,746.68
40.4
--
20.94
--
205.80
132.83
--
359.75
8.3
246.44
330.28
391.23
1,405.05
441.31
22.20
2,836.51
65.6
Communist World
9.80
394.39
1,086.78
--
--
1,490.97
34.4
of which: Developed
-
391.70
--
--
--
391.70
9.0
Less Developed
9.80
2.69
1,086.78
--
--
1,099.27
25.4
Share of Continents in
Total ( o)
5. 7
7.8
18.2
57.6
10.2
0.5
4,327.48
100.0
a/ Includes Puerto Rico and Outlying Territories of the US and likewise Bermuda and the Bahamas.
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Table 7. PLANETARY PRODUCT WITH THIRD WORLD SUPPLEMENT IN SELECTED YEARS, 1950-78
(in billions of 1978 dollars)
960
1965
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
1950
1955
1
World 2,366.71
3,017.77
3,747.96
4,824.58
6,164.09
7,455.52
7
7,828.35
53
387
6
8,133.63
617
89
6
8,459.45
858.86
6
Developed Countries 1,936.16
2,457.06
3,009.04
3,848.40
18
976
4,910.45
64
253
1
6,070.1
35
385
1
.
,
1,440.83
.
,
1,515.74
,
1,600.59
Less Developed Countries 430.55
560.71
738.92
.
,
.
.
,
Non-Communist Countries 1,897.93
2,373.60
2,897.83
3,762.31
4,817.69
5,797.69
6,112.89
46
715
1
6,351.11
52
782
1
6,603.73
855.72
1
Communist Countries 468.78
644.17
850.13
1,062.27
1,346.40
1,657.83
.
,
.
,
,
Developed Non-Communist Countries 1,584.58
1,973.89
2,370.91
60
120
3,058.79
20
408
1
3,905.76
42
635
1
4,736.65
1,828.60
4,997.30
1,932.80
5,178.83
2,027.50
5,371.92
2,106.90
United States 811.40
995.89
.
1,
.
,
.
,
Developed Western Europe 597.00
735.30
919.32
17
263
1,168.26
96
333
1,532.15
11
416
1,770.63
457.97
1,852.19
483.62
1,887.82
496.19
1,944.47
513.06
of which: Germany, Fed. Rep. 123.67
193.79
.
.
.
72
35
399
33
411
France 113.58
140.05
180.10
238.81
304.87
367.16
387.
.
243
78
.
18
254
UK 126.06
144.28
163.94
191.98
215.36
236.73
242.89
.
77
206
.
68
210
Italy 57.08
76.26
99.90
128.27
171.24
192.53
203.31
.
.
58
196
Canada 51.73
67.93
82.38
108.30
136.79
174.80
184.95
39
189.93
94
33
.
69
96
Australia 28.80
34.56
44.89
56.61
73.53
89.01
92.
3
.
84
15
.
97
15
New Zealand n.a.
6.77
9.11
11.59
13.27
16.08
16.0
3
.
687
96
.
86
727
Japan 73.81
113.90
171.14
275.54
475.93
619.93
657.1
.
.
Less Developed Non-Communist
92
52
703
93
911
061.04
1
1,115.59
1,172.28
1,231.81
Countries 313.35
399.71
526.
.
23
105
.
18
133
,
145.36
147.68
156.54
168.13
of which: India 63.20
74.82
91.23
.
.
5
11
154
82
163
Brazil 19.32
26.83
37.33
55.81
80.77
135.12
147.2
.
.
Communist Countries
468.78
644.17
850.13
1,062.27
1,346.40
1,657.83
1,715.46
23
1,782.52
06
439
1
1,855.72
94
486
1
Developed Communist
Countries 351.58
483.17
638.13
789.61
1,004.69
1,333.52
1,390.
84
80
.
,
014
19
1
.
,
64
046
1
of which: USSR
269.68
357.60
479.31
608.91
790.17
71
41
940.40
31
324
.
9
23
325
.
,
343.46
.
,
368.78
Less Developed Communist Countries 117.20
161.00
212.00
90
8
272.66
60
169
.
3
00
217
.
283.33
.
283.33
300.50
323.94
of which: PRC
70.10
117.20
.
13
.
.
Memorandum Items
95
573
2
63
119
3
542.28
3
3,735.78
3,872.11
4,013.16
NATO Total 1,367.95
1,724.99
2,025.14
.
,
.
,
,
04
654
68
1
98
709
1
NATO in Europe 512.19
666.36
835.62
1,066.25
1,345.61
1,538.88
1,618.
41
.
,
91
386
1
.
,
97
430
1
Warsaw Pact 380.08
500.56
666.22
835.57
1,063.51
1,286.48
1,341.
57
.
,
72
372
.
,
66
384
Six Pact Members in Eastern Europe 110.40
142.96
186.91
226.66
273.34
346.08
356.41
360.
394.83
.
418.83
.
435.17
All OPEC (OAPEC) Members
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Table 8. AVERAGE ANNUAL GNP GROWTH RATES BY AREA OR COUNTRY, 1950-78
(in percent)
1951-55
1956-60
1961-65
1966-70
1971-75
1976-78
5.0
4.5
5.2
5.0
3.9
4.3
Developed
4.9
4.2
5.0
5.0
4.3
4.2
Less Developed
5.4
5.7
5.7
5.1
2.0
4.9
Non-Communist
4.6
4.1
5.4
5.1
3.6
4.5
Communist
6.6
5.7
4.6
4.8
4.3
3.8
4.6
3.7
5.2
5.0
4.0
4.3
United States
4.2
2.4
4.7
3.0
2.3
4.9
Canada
5.6
3.9
5.6
4.8
5.0
4
0
Australia
3.8
5.4
4.8
5.4
3.9
.
2.8
New Zealand
n. a.
6.1
4.9
2.8
3.9
-0
2
Japan
9.1
8.5
10.0
11.6
5.5
.
5.5
Developed Western Europe
4.3
4.6
4.9
5.6
3.0
3.2
of which: Germany, Fed. Rep.
9.4
6. 3
4.9
4.5
2.0
3.9
France
4.3
5.2
5.8
5.0
3.8
3.9
UK
2.7
2.6
3.2
2.4
1.9
2.4
Italy
6.5
5.6
5.1
6.0
2.4
3.1
Less Developed Non-Communist 5.0
5.7
6.0
5.3
3
1
5
1
of which: India 3.4
4.0
2.9
4.8
.
1.8
.
5.0
Brazil 6.8
6.8
8.4
7.7
10.8
6.6
Communist Countries 6.6
5.7
4.6
4.8
4.3
3.8
of which: USSR 5.8
6.0
4
9
5
4
3
5
Six Pact Members in
Eastern Europe 5.3
5.5
.
3.9
.
3.8
.
4.8
3.6
3.6
P RC 10.8
3. 5
4.1
5.1
5.5
4.6
Memorandum Items
NATO Total 4.8
3.3
4.9
3.9
2.6
4.3
NATO in Europe 5.4
4.6
5.0
4.8
2.7
3.6
Warsaw Pact 5.7
5.9
4.6
4.9
3.9
3.6
OECD Total 4.8
3.3
5.2
4.6
3.1
4.2
OECD Europe 5.1
4.4
5.0
4.7
2.9
3.3
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Mid-Year Population
Per Capita GNP
With Third World Supplement
(in millions)
(in 1978 dollars)
1950
1960 1970 1975
1978
1950
1960
1970
1975
1978
World 2,520.90
3,057.85 3,704.58 4,089.86
4,327.48
939
1,226
1,664
1,823
580
5
1,955
5
799
Developed 751.51
856.38 986.52 1,087.90
96
1,182.69
79
144
3
2,576
243
3,514
336
4,978
461
,
461
,
509
Less Developed 1,769.39
2,201.47
2,718.06
3,001.
.
,
Non-Communist 1,664.30
2,009.11
2,443.55
2,680.48
2,836.51
1,140
1,442
1,972
2,163
176
1
2,328
245
1
Communist 856.60
1,048.75
1,261.03
1,409.38
1,490.47
547
811
1,068
,
,
Developed Non-Communist 506.49
571.61
668.35
705.98
56
213
790.00
218
55
3,129
329
5
4,148
202
6
5,844
7,982
6,709
8.562
6,791
9,639
United States 152.27
180.67
204.88
.
.
,
,
Developed Western Europe 241.73
260.62
315.85
334.46
83
61
338.24
28
61
2,470
474
2
3,527
749
4
4,851
6,854
5,294
7,407
5,749
8,372
of which: Germany, Fed. Rep. of 49.99
55.42
60.71
.
.
,
,
966
6
719
7
France 41.74
45.68
50.67
52.71
53.29
2,721
3,943
5,721
,
,
556
4
UK 50.62
52.56
55.48
56.04
55.79
2,490
3,119
3,882
4,224
,
211
4
Italy 46.77
50.22
53.57
55.83
56.73
1,220
1,989
3,200
3,449
,
Canada 13.71
17.87
21.30
22.73
23.62
3,773
4,610
6,422
7,690
530
8,323
800
6
Australia 8.22
10.32
12.55
13.63
14.22
3,504
4,350
5,859
6,
204
5
,
167
5
New Zealand 1.91
2.37
2.82
3.09
3.12
n.a.
3,844
4,706
,
559
5
,
329
6
Japan 83.63
94.10
104.33
111.52
115.00
883
1,819
4,562
,
,
Less Developed Non-Communist 1,157.81
1,437.50
1,775.20
1,974.50
2,045.52
70
660
271
166
366
205
514
241
537
236
602
254
of which: India 381.00
445.80
553.60
618.50
.
272
1
602
1
Brazil 52.30
69.72
92.52
106.23
116.38
369
535
873
,
,
Communist Countries
856.60
1,048.74
1,261.03
1,409.38
1,490.97
547
811
1,068
1,112
4
4
1,245
796
3
Developed Communist
Countries 245.02
284.77
318.17
381.92
391.70
1,435
2,241
3,158
0
3,
697
,
004
4
of which: USSR
180.08
214.33
243.73
254.39
261.40
1,498
247
1
2,236
933
1
3,242
646
2
3,
3
258
,
549
3
Six Pact Members 88.50
96.71
103.32
106.18
108.30
,
,
,
,
,
Less Developed Communist
27
99
192
310
362
316
336
Countries
611.58
763.97
942.86
1,027.46
1,0
.
323
of which: PRC
547.00
683.10
846.60
943.00
1,003.90
128
203
256
300
Memorandum Items
3
265
246
4
864
5
6
405
101
7
NATO Total
419.00
477.00
532.00
553.05
565.15
,
,
,
,
4
,
294
5
NATO in Europe
243.00
278.00
305.80
316.59
322.98
2,108
3,006
4,400
,861
,
871
3
Warsaw Pact
268.58
311.04
347.05
360.57
369.70
1,415
2,142
3,064
3,568
,
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 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Table 10. RANKING OF NATIONS, 1978
(GNP Data Without Third World Supplement)
GNP in toto
GNP per capita
Population
i
(billi
1978 d
l
m
d-1978
on
o
lars)
(1978 dollars)
(million)
United States
2,106.9
Qatar
22,000
PRC (excl. Taiwan)
1
003
9
USSR
1,046.6
Kuwait
12,600
India
,
.
660.9
Liechtenstein
10,400
Japan
727.9
Brunei
10,000
USSR
261
4
Germany, Federal Rep.
513.1
United Arab Emirates
9,700
US
.
218
6
France
411.3
Indonesia
.
140
7
PRC (excl. Taiwan)
324.0
US
9,640
Japan
.
115
0
UK
254.2
Sweden
8,894
Brazil
.
116
4
Italy
210.7
Switzerland
8,651
.
Canada
196.6
Saudi Arabia
8,400
Bangladesh
82
9
Brazil
148.9
Germany, Federal Rep.
8,372
Pakistan
.
75
6
Poland
108.3
Canada
8,323
Nigeria
.
70
4
India
105.1
Norway
7,867
Mexico
.
66.4
France
7,719
Germany, Federal Rep
61
3
Australia
96.7
Denmark
7,607
.
Italy
.
56
7
Spain
95.0
Belgium
7,085
UK
.
55
8
Netherlands
88.1
Luxembourg
6,889
France
.
53
3
Germany, Democratic Rep.
81.0
Australia
6,800
Vietnam
.
51
6
Iran
79.1
Libya
6,750
.
Mexico
76.2
Japan
6,329
Philippines
46
0
Sweden
73.7
Netherlands
6,324
Thailand
.
45
2
Czechoslovakia
70.7
Iceland
5,706
Turkey
.
41
8
Belgium
69.7
Austria
5,491
Egypt
.
40
8
Romania
67.4
Bahrain
5,167
Spain
.
37
1
Yugoslavia
55.6
New Zealand
5,119
Korea, Republic of
.
37
0
Switzerland
54.6
Finland
5,002
Iran
.
35
7
Saudi Arabia
54.5
New Caledonia
5,000
Poland
.
35
0
Argentina
49.7
.
Indonesia
46.2
Germany, Democratic Rep.
4,834
Burma
Ethiopia
32.2
29
4
Austria
41. 3
Czechoslovakia
4,673
Zaire
.
27
8
Venezuela
41.2
UK
4,556
South Africa
.
27
5
Nigeria
40.1
Italy
4,211
Argentina
.
26
4
Turkey
33.4
Israel
4,154
Colombia
.
25
7
Bulgaria
32.5
USSR
4,004
Canada
.
23.6
Yugoslavia
22.0
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 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
WORLD
6.8
1976
WORLD
5.0
THIRD
WORLD
10.1
WORLD
2.6
COMMUNIST THIRD
LESS DEVELOPED WORLD
3.4 3.7
1974
1977
WORLD
3.9
THIRD THIRD COMMUNIST
WORLD WORLD LESS DEVELOPED
5.1 5.1 5.6
REAL GROWTH RATES 1973-1978 BY AREA
IN PERCENT
1975
1978
COMMUNIST
DEVELOPED
2.6
COMMUNIST
LESS DEVELOPED
5.0
WORLD
4.0
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 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
45 -
CHART II
SHARE OF IMPORTANT AREAS
IN 1978 WORLD POPULATION AND WORLD OUTPUT
POPULATION
4,327
U.S.
5.0% DEVELOPED
LESS DEVELOPED
NON-COMMUNIST
14.6%
LESS DEVELOPED INDIA
9/o
COMMUNIST PRC
4.4% 3.2%
DEVELOPED
COMMUNIST
9.0%
LESS DEVELOPED JNLAA ::::23.2%:::: DEVELOPED
NON-COMMUNIST 15.3% COMMUNIST
47.3% 17.6%
LESS DEVELOPED
COMMUNIST
25.4%
NON-COMMUNIST
18.3%
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
8,459 BILLIONS OF 1978 DOLLARS
DEVELOPED
NON-COMMUNIST
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- 46 -
CHART III
PLANETARY INCOME DISTRIBUTION
BY NATIONAL INCOME BRACKET
100% -100%
ABOVE $5,731
$3,821-$5,730
DEVELOPED ~~
COUNTRIES
$1,911-$3,820 6.8%
$956-$1,910 6.8%
LESS -$95 2.4%
DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES BELOW $478 9.7%
PLANETARY MANKIND
PRODUCT
NON-COMMUNIST COMMUNIST
POPULATION
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GNP
34.5%
6.8%
2.3%
21.9% .0.7%
POPULATION
 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 CIA-RDP93TO1142R000100030004-6
CHART IV
REAL GROWTH OF GNP AND INFLATION
1964-1978
OECD EUROPE
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 U.S., SOVIET, JAPANESE AND PRC GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
BILLIONS OF 1978 DOLLARS
1950
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- 48 -
1960
1970
1975
1978
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 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Previous issues of the Planetary Product for 1973, 1974, 1975, and 1976-77 were
released by Special Report No. 11, No. 22, No. 33, and No. 44.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8994
Economic Foreign Policy Series 15
Office of Public Communication
Bureau of Public Affairs
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 Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP93T01142R000100030004-6
Bureau of Public Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D C. 20520
Postage and Fees Paid
Department of State
STA-501
Official Business Third Class Bulk Rate
J
Mr. Philip H. Trezise
Brookings Institution
1775 Mass. Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
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