ATTACHED TALKING POINTS ON THE US-USSR JOINT COMMERICAL COMMISSION MEETING SCHEDULED FOR MAY 20-21 IN MOSCOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01142R000100160004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 25, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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1
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 02177-85
25 April 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: David B. Low
National Intelligence Officer for Economics
SUBJECT: Attached Talking Points on the US-USSR Joint
Commercial Commission Meeting Scheduled for
May 20-21 in Moscow
1. Attached are the subject talking points. They are based on six
recent papers by OSOVA and OGI as well as other current intelligence.
They have been reviewed by analysts from those two offices and discussed
with the NIO/USSR.
2. As I discussed with you this morning, these talking points were
developed in the context of-an anticipated initiative by the Commerce
Department to expand the kinds of oil and gas equipment which might be
exported to the Soviet Union by the United States. However, under the
present circumstances, including Gorbachev`s recent tough comments and
the Soviet statement on the Nicholson killing, Secretary Baldridge has
retreated from proposing-any such initiative. Thus, Commerce is relying
on and will act in accordance with NSDD 155 dated January 4, 1985 in
which it is stated:
"To avoid sending inconsistent signals to the allies and the
USSR, US oil and gas equipment sales should not be an area in
which the US should agree to an active program of trade expan-
sion pending further policy clarification by me (the President)."
Accordingly, the NSC meeting scheduled for Friday has been cancelled.
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SUBJECT: Talking Points on the US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission
Meeting Scheduled for May 20-21 in Moscow
3. The question at Saturday's meeting will be the circumstances
under which the JCC meeting should be allowed to proceed, if at all.
This makes moot for the time being the substantive question of expanding
US exports of oil and gas equipment and focuses attention on the politi-
cal environment and the kind of signal the Administration wishes to
convey.
Attachments:
A. The May 1985 JCC and the Soviet Agenda
B. Western Technology and Equipment and Soviet Energy
C. Background on Energy Projects Requested by Moscow for
JCC Discussion
D. Future Declines in Soviet Oil and Gas Earnings
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SUBJECT: Talking Points on the US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission
Meeting Scheduled for May 20-21 in Moscow
NI0/Econ/DL: 25 April 1985
Distribution:
Original - Addressees
1 - DDCI
1 - /DCI
1 - DCI/SA/IA
1 - Executive Registry (w/o atts.)
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - NIO/S&T
1 - D/OSOVA
1 - D/OGI
1 - NIO/Econ
- A NIO/Econ
1 - NIO/Econ Chrono File
1 - NIO/Econ File
,SEGKET
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S--
ATTA( -IMENT A
25 April 1985
THE MAY 1985 JCC AND THE SOVIET AGENDA
The ramifications of the May 20-21 meeting of the US-USSR Joint
Commercial Commission--the first in six years-will be more political
than economic.
Although generally disappointed with the contributions to their
economy of Western technology and equipment, the Soviets-
continue to hope for economic benefit in obtaining US technology
and goods.
More importantly at this stage, they view increased trade with
the US as a necessary adjunct to a general normalization of
relations and as an opportunity to gauge US commitment to
normalization.
Accordingly, Moscow probably expects the US to show some flexibility
in these talks. At the same time, the Soviets probably do not expect
substantial progress on key issues.
-- The Soviets hope that the prospect of increased trade will cause
affected US businessmen to urge the US Administration to avoid
policy decisions that Moscow would view as hostile (such as
stronger COCOM controls) and to adopt conciliatory positions on
broader issues such as arms control.
Some Soviet statements to US businessmen strongly suggest that
the two issues of arms control talks and renewal of US-Soviet
trade talks are closely linked in the minds of the Soviet
leadership.
While Moscow already has concluded, and will continue to conclude, a
few contracts to US suppliers, economic realities constrain any rapid
growth in bilateral trade over the 1985-1990 period.
-- Moscow has developed alternative suppliers in Eastern and
Western Europe to reduce dependence on US goods.
RET
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SECRET
SUBJECT: The May 1985 JCC and the Soviet Agenda
- The Soviets will have a smaller capacity for hard currency
earnings, at least through 1990, as a result of stagnant or
falling oil production.
-- Moscow will be selective in its equipment imports because of
past problems in productively assimilating Western technology.
Despite technical advantages in some product areas, US firms would
not likely see a large rise in sales absent government restrictions until
overall relations with the USSR improve.
-- In FY 1983 and 1984 export licenses in preparation for bidding
on Soviet projects were granted for $356 million in US sales.
-- Commerce Department can only confirm $2.6 million in shipments
over the period although the total may be in the range of $6 to
$10 million. This presumably reflects the Soviet
"black-listing" of US firms.
-- Political considerations aside, favorable financial terms and
the high dollar give West European and Japanese suppliers a
competitive edge in areas where their equipment is nearly on a
par with US quality.
At the January 1985 preliminary meeting between Under Secretary Olmer
and Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Sushkov, the latter stated that, while
the USSR was not expecting major improvements, he felt it would be useful
to see progress on such issues as port access for Soviet ships, bans on
US imports of Soviet furs and nickel, and the refusal to recertify
Aeroflot flights into this country.
-- The Soviets may be encouraged by such recent acts as the US
government's failure to ban imports of selected Soviet goods on
the ground that forced labor was used in their manufacture, and
the easing of certain COCOM restrictions (on personal computers,
for example).
-- More serious trade issues such as the granting of MFN status,
the reduction of trade controls on sensitive items or government
guarantees of contract sanctity they understand will probably
not be resolved soon.
See attached a list of the projects for discussion at the JCC Meeting
provided by the Soviet Trade Representative's office. Only the first
five appear to raise significant security issues.
2
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List OfProjectsProvided by the Soviet Trad,R Representative's Office
Sudoimport
/1. Factory. for the manufacturing of ice-tolerant offshore
y platforms for use in the far east.
2. Ice-tolerant offshore platforms for Sakhalin.
/3.
Underwater well-head equipment for operating oil and gas wells.
Mash1noim ort
4. Gas compressor station in Karachagan.
5. Equipment for the develop.-nent of Astrakhan gas deposits.
Tekhnopromimport
6. Equipment for manufacturing denim; capa1Fity: 60 million square
meters per year.
7. Equipment for sewing denim articles; calpacity: 20 million
pieces per year.
8. Equipment for production of non-alcoholic beverages, with
compensation in vodka.
9. Equipment for making cigarettes, with p1prtial compensation in
tobacco.
10. Equipment for the production of baby foirmula (milk) .
11. Equipment for the production of meat-based bullion cubes;
capacity: 125 million cubes per year.
12. Equipment for the production of meat baby food; capacity: 42
tons per shift.
13. Equipment for the production of textured soy protein;
capacity: 1200 tors per 24 hour period.
Tekhmashimport
14. Factory for the production of acetic acid: capacity: 150,000
tons per year.
15. Equipment for an amide fiber complex, including raw materail
production; capacity: 66,000 tons per year.
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Soviet project list (continued) 2
16. Equipment for the production of linear polyethylene.
17. Equipment for the production of vinyl-cyanide (acrylonitrile).
16. Equipment and technology for production of the herbicide
"Bazargan; " capci t;r: 6,600 tons per yej1r.
Metallurgimport
19. 'Self-propelled bor:Gng rigs used in mining.
Prom mash impor t
27. Factory for producing fire-proofing.
20. Glass-shaping lines for manufacturing pctrfume bottles in the
.2-.3 liter size range.
21. Equipment for the production of water bottles.
22. Equipment for the production of crystal goblets and glasses.
23. Equipment for the production of milk cal?tons.
24. Equipment for the production of plaster slabs.
25. Equipment for making concrete slabs and blocks from cement and
from crushed marble.
26. Equipment for the production of pre-fabricated, transportable,
spherical, vegetabale storage.containers,
28. Equipment for the production of cement fiIy dry method.
29. Equipment for making cartons from cardboard.
30. wood finishing equ:Ipment (millcutting lines), specifically for
putting together e,xtra-long pieces.
31. Equipment for the production of compressors for home
refrigerators.
32. Criss-cross stitch;4ng equipment.
33. Equipment for producing oversized plywood; capacity: 50,000
cubic meters per year.
April 9, 1985
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ATTACHMENT B
25 April 1985
WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT AND SOVIET ENERGY
Background
The USSR is the world's leading producer of oil and natural gas. By
1970, oil had displaced coal as the dominant fuel in the Soviet energy
balance, and we anticipate by 1990 natural gas will account for the
largest share of the USSR's primary energy production.
Oil output slipped to 12.3 million barrels per day last year, down
about 100,000 from 1983-the first year-to-year decline since WWII.
The falloff is due primarily to the advanced age of most of the
largest oil fields.
-- We expect an even larger decline in 1985, while investment in
the industry is planned to increase by about 15 percent.
-- Over the last several years oil production efforts have been
pushed in the near-term to the detriment of needed oil
exploration. Now, at the oldest oil fields in West Sibera,
production per well is down amidst wide-spread equipment and
corrosion problems. The newer fields are smaller and less
productive with increased need for pumps and maintenance.
-- Meanwhile, there have been two waves of management changes in
the oil ministry.
On the other hand, natural gas production has been growing at 7
percent annually, and the outlook for continued growth is excellent.
Coal production continues to stagnate.
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SUBJECT: Western Energy Technology and Equipment and Soviet Energy
The Need for Western Energy Technology and Equipment
Efforts to halt the decline in oil production and to develop certain
new gas reserves will force the Soviets to look to Western technology and
equipment.
Oil exploration and development is shifting to deeper deposits,
for which efficient exploitation requires Western exports
including seismic and drilling equipment as well as Western
technology for designing, producing, and integrating this
equipment.
The need for Western equipment will be particularly high to
exploit sour oil and gas from high-temperature and high-pressure
deposits in the Pre-Caspian Depression.
While the Soviets could continue to rely on indigenous
capability and shift the natural gas efforts to deposits more
easily developed, access to Western technology and equipment
would reduce project development times, cutting some by nearly
half.
Most equipment the Soviets will need is available from non-US
suppliers, although US firms and their affiliates and licensees abroad
are still generally the producers of the highest quality goods in most
areas.
-- US dominance of the worldwide petroleum equipment industry has
substantially eroded over the last ten years.
-- Equipment production capabilities in Western Europe and Japan
have been increasing rapidly over the last few years as they
have invested heavily to participate in development of North Sea
oil and gas.
The United States still maintains a substantial qualitative edge
in certain electronic sensing and data processing gear necessary
for seismic exploration and deep offshore drilling as well as
-advanced metallurgical capabilities for high-temperature and
high-pressure corrosion-resistant equipment, for drilling and
production.
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Subject: Western Technology and Equipment and Soviet Energy
Military Use
Substantial potential for diversion of Western electronics and
metallurgical technology embodied in petroleum equipment to
military-related use is believed to exist in the sale of "high-level"
equipment.
-- Much of the more sophisticated electronics technologies have
broad military-naval applications using image and signal data
processing with realtime analysis for targeting, mapping, and
locating.
-- The technologies embodied in corrosion-resistant production
equipment and in equipment for high-pressure and high-
temperature operating conditions are applicable to conventional
and nuclear weapons development, marine nuclear propulsion
systems, military rocket and jet engines, and other applications
in armaments.
Moreover, the technology used in the matching of components and
technological properties of hardware, as well as the
metal-processing and shaping technology used to manufacture
these items, has the potential to help Soviet military/defense
research efforts.
During the past few years, the United States has developed a
comprehensive policy aimed at stemming the flow of high-quality Western
technology and equipment to the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries by
expanding and upgrading export controls.
A formal US proposal addressing emerging technologies and 21 oil
and gas technology and equipment items was tabled in COCOM, and
several items were accepted for full COCOM control in January
1984.
Partial control was obtained over several other items, and
discussions on the remaining items were temporarily deferred or
dropped.
US national security controls cover essentially the same items
as COCOM while unilateral foreign policy controls cover the
remaining exploration and production items.
3
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25X1
SUBJECT: Western Energy Technology and Equipment and Soviet Energy
-- While these efforts probably have reduced Soviet access to
clearly "dual use" technologies embedded in Western petroleum
equipment, they have not significantly impeded Soviet efforts to
acquire Western gear needed to upgrade petroleum operations so
far.
Denial of Western production equipment for operation in corrosive and
high-pressure, high-temperature environments would substantially slow
progress in development of the petroleum resources in the Pre-Caspian
Depression and Central Asia.
-- It would also have serious--but not crippling--consequences for
operations in West Sibera.
-- Where operations were not halted by a lack of Western technology
and equipment, the myriad of inefficiencies associated with the
use of domestically-manufactured obsolescent equipment of poor
quality would boost production costs and tend to reduce the
percentage of oil in place that ultimately will be recovered.
-- In any event, the lead time for such projects is so long that
the impact on production would not be significant until the
1990s.
Even under the conditions indicated, the Soviet Union would be able
to supply its own essential needs for oil, including those of the armed
forces.
-- Unilateral action by the United States would have very little
impact.
-- Concerted action by all COCOM members would slow many Soviet
projects, raise their energy investment costs, and, in turn,
impose costs on other sectors of the economy. In light of
recent US experience in COCOM, however, it is doubtful that
COCOM would agree to any significant further expansion of
petroleum equipment-related export controls.
It is possible that these added costs and delays could, if coupled
with other considerations, promote tactical adjustments in Soviet foreign
policy. But we do not believe these pressures would be sufficient to
force basic changes in Soviet defense and foreign policies.
4
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FOREIGN AVAILABILITY OF EXPLORATION, DRILLING AND
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY FROM NON-US WESTERN SUPPLIERS IN 1985
Exploration Technology
High quality services and good foreign equipment available elsewhere,
particularly France, although US is preferred supplier for
acoustical/ultrasonic sensors and geophysical equipment.
Drilling Technology
High quality services and gear available outside US.
Production Equipment
US equipment is preferred for most "downhole" needs, including
packers, seals, valves, and submersible pumps. Other equipment is
available overseas.
Pipeline Construction
Equipment is available overseas.
Processing and Refining Technology
Equipment for most applications is available overseas.
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25X1
Western Technology and Equipment Likely To Be On
Nbscow's Shopping List During 1985-2000
For Offshore Projects:
o Seismic survey boats with simultaneous multi-survey capability using
state-of-the-art carputer hardware and software
o Drilling platforms and rigs (dynamic positioning and reentry
capability)
o Production jackets and modules (ice-resistant models)
o Pipeline construction materials, equipment, barges
o Drilling and production equipment and services
-- Drill pipe, collars, tool joints, bits, risers
-- Instruments for on-line monitoring of all
drilling operations and directional drilling
-- Blow-out preventers and controls
-- Casing, tubing, valves, packers, mandrels, seals
-- Wellheads, trees, valves, flowlines, gauges
(for surface or seafloor installation)
-- Subsea manifolds and gathering systems
-- Sutrnersible purps, and cables for electric power supply
-- Offshore processing and treating equipment
-- Drilling fluid and mud-logging services
-- Instruments for wellbore coring, testing
For Deep Onshore Projects:
o Onshore seismic surveying equipment (including weight-dropping and
vibration techniques) using state-of-the-art computer hardware and
software
o Deep-drilling rigs equipped for severe service
o Sour (H2S and OD2) oil and gas manifold and gathering systems
o Sulfur and carbon dioxide extraction technology
o Sour (H2S and Qh) oil and gas processing and treating equipment
o Blow-out preventers and controls for severe service
o Drill pipe, collars, tool joints, bits, and special drilling tools for
severe service
o Instruments for on-line monitoring of all drilling operations and
directional drilling
o Corrosion-resistant casing, tubing, valves, packers, mandrels, seals,
and related chemical inhibitor technology
o Wellheads, trees, valves, and flow lines for severe service
o Deep-pumping equipment (especially sutrnersible pumps and pure rods for
rod-and-beam pumps)
o Gas-lift equipment and compressor stations
o Drilling fluid and mud-logging services
o Instruments for well-bore coring, testing, measuring pressure and
terrperature, and logging
This table is Confidential.
S EQRET 25X1
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sI
25 April 1985
BACKGROUND ON ENERGY PROJECTS REQUESTED BY MOSCOW FOR JCC DISCUSSION
Astrakan' Gas Development
Construction of this deep onshore gas field began in 1983 with stages
II and III worth about $1.2 billion now out for bids. The Soviets expect
the field to produce 18 billion cubic meters of gas sometime in the
1990s. Engineering and management services and equipment for future
construction are generally available from non-US sources. Moscow may
look to the US for "downhole" equipment such as packers and safety valves.
Gas Compressors for Karachaganak
This is a $500 million gas field project including wells, pipelines,
and a gas processing plant; the project is already underway. A second
plant planned for construction will need at least three compressor
stations. Foreign firms and offshore affiliates and licensees of US
firms are capable of supplying the services and equipment for future
development.
Underwater Wellhead Equipment
Moscow will likely step up development of offshore Caspian Sea oil
and gas over the next five years. US firms and subsidiaries are
preferred suppliers of subsea wellhead equipment, but Norwegian, French,
and British companies are prepared to enter the market.
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SUBJECT: Background on Energy Projects Requested by Moscow for
JCC Discussion
Ice Tolerant Platforms for Sakhalin
Sakhalin development is stalled absent a Japanese commitment to
purchase 3 million tons of LNG annually. Should the project get
underway, three or more platforms could be added in waters 30 to 90
meters deep at an average cost of $100 million per unit. Numerous
foreign countries including Japan and Korea could supply platforms for
this project.
Ice-Resistant Offshore Platform Construction Yards
Platforms from the planned yards would be used in waters of the
Barents', Kara, and Okhotsk Seas. Several West European countries plus
Canada and Japan would be able to supply equipment and construction
services for these yards at cost ranging from $10 to $40 million per yard.
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.yam
25 April 1985
FUTURE DECLINES IN SOVIET OIL AND GAS EARNINGS
Hard currency earnings from exports of oil and gas will likely fall
sharply over the next five years.
-- Oil production declined slightly in 1984; hard currency oil
exports were maintained primarily by increasing reexports of
OPEC oil obtained by barter.
-- Oil sales account for nearly half of the Soviet Union's roughly
$32 billion annual hard currency earnings.
Even if the Soviets are able to sustain oil production at just under
current levels and keep domestic use from rising, hard currency earnings
from oil measured in constant dollars could decline by more than 50
percent by 1990.
-- Should oil production decline by 1 million b/d as some experts
predict, earnings would fall even more sharply to perhaps only
one quarter of current levels.
-- In either case, the decline in earnings will be even greater if
the presumed decline in deliveries to Eastern Europe is not
continued.
Gas sales cannot make up for lost oil earnings over the 1985-90 time
period.
-- Even under a maximum export scenario, hard currency earnings
from gas sales will rise by only about $1 billion in real terms
over the next five years.
The hard currency earnings decline (measured in constant dollars)
from reduced oil exports will become worse by the year 2000 even if oil
production can be maintained and real oil prices rise.
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SUBJECT: Future Declines in Soviet Oil and Gas Earnings
If the West Europeans abide by their agreement to limit gas
dependence, total earnings from oil and gas in the year 2000
will range from 40 percent to less than 70 percent of current
earnings. Extensive use of Western energy technology and
equipment would be needed to keep oil production and, hence,
revenues at the high end of the range.
Gas exports can make up the earnings gap in this time frame only
if the Soviets can convince the Europeans to buy 120 billion
cubic meters per year--roughly triple current levels.
2
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OIL PRODUCTION, EXPORTS, AND REVENUES
(million b/d)
1983 Actual
1990
Production
12.3
11.0
- 12.0
10.0
- 12.0
Internal Consumption
9.0
9.3
8.6
- 9.4
Soft Currency Exports
2.2
1.4
- 2.0
1.4
- 2.0
Hard Currency Exports
1.4
0.5
- 0.9
0.2
- 0.8
(Earnings, billion 1983$)
(15.6)
(3.90 - 7.0)
(1.7
- 6.9)
GAS PRODUCTION, EXPORTS, AND REVENUES
(billion cubic meters)
Production
536
620
950 - 1,000
Consumption
478
548
815 - 826
Soft Currency Exports
35
38
67
Hard Currency Exports
26
37
60 - 120
(Earnings, billion 1983$)
(3.2)
(4.1)
(5.8 -10.5)
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