UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA, NSDD-274

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP93T01142R000100210013-6
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RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 5, 2011
Sequence Number: 
13
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 7, 1987
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP93T01142R000100210013-6.pdf234.37 KB
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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON May 7, 1987 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/05: 61A-RDP93T01142R000100210013-6 CONFIDENTIAL Wi_d E71 ,EM 8/-1789X SY T M II SECRET ATTACHMENT MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THE DIRECTOR, UNITED..STATES INFORMATION AGENCY SUBJECT: United States policy Toward Angola, - a rue rresiaent nas approved policy toward Angola. IC) FOR THE PRESIDENT: Frank C. Carlucci Attachment CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTA-MMENT Declassify on: OADR I Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100210013-6 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100210013-6 SECRET SECRET SYSTEM II THE WHITE HOUSE 94470 WASHINGTON NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION May 7' 1987 DIRECTIVE NUMBER 274 UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA (C) All" National Security Decision Directive 212 of February 10, 1986 determined that the policiesof.the Angolan MPLA regime and increased Soviet bloc military assistance to that government posed a threat to important political, strategic, and economic interests of the U.S. and its allies in southern Africa. NSDD 212 enumerated U.S. policy objectives in the Angolan context and established a U.S. strategy of a) continuing to negotiate with the MPLA and South Africa on Cuban troop withdrawal in the context of Namibian independence while b) applying pressure on the MPLA to negotiate seriously, and to accept a negotiated settlement. (S) Since the approval of NSDD2, the Angolan military conflict has stabilized. Neither the MPLA n r-UNITA is in a position to achieve a military victory,espite.;Moscow's interjection of almost $1 billion in new'Soviet military assistance in support of a continuing attempt byAthe vfet Un ~n and its MPLA client to achieve a military solution "'o the,ci 4l war. U. S. efforts to negotiate Cuban troop w the iwal in t context of Namibian independence have been stal &`n'd by the `nwillingness of the MPLA regime to negotiate seriously:"-,4s) UNITA has made some progress n its efforts to develop broader international ties, but the MPLA remains unwilling to afford UNITA a fair share of power in the context of national reconciliation. Although Soviet/Cuban costs have risen, Moscow and Havana remain committed to the Luanda regime and to the maintenance of their presence and influence in Angola. (S) In light of these developments, U.S.'policy has been reviewed, and it has been determined that our objectives and strategy as established by NSDD 212 remain valid: --To seek an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian problem based on UNSCR 435, linked to Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. --To achieve an equitable "internal settlement of the Angolan conflict that affords UNITA a fair share of power; --To reduce and, if possible, eliminate Soviet and Soviet-proxy influence, military presence, and opportunities in Angola and southern Africa ,,(S) SECRET Declassify on: OADR S. F C R LE I I Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100210013-6 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100210013-6 SECRET The two-track strategy for achieving the objectives established by NSDD 212 has also been reviewed and, fundamentally valid. However, additional-actions are warranted on both tracks to achieve U.S. policy objektives.'(S) With regard to negotiations with the=MPLA and South Africa: --The U.S. will continue-to use all available diplomatic opportunities--including direct contacts with the parties to the Angola/Namibia negotiations--to bring negotiations on Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independence to a successful conclusion. --The U.S. will continue to insist on withdrawal of Cuban forces in the context of a settlement. The U.S. will also continue to insist that any initiative for Namibian independence outside the framework of UNSCR_435 meet the test of international acceptability. --With UNITA's interests in"mind, the U.S. will actively promote diplomatic initia?ves,to?include talks on the reopening of the Benguela Railroad, hick advance the objective of national With regard to pressures on the MP --The U.S. will acfive1y seek`and implement effective means of increasing pressure on.the""t4PLA toigree to a negotiated settlement. ,Rsv --A review will be conducted in order to ensure that U.S. support for UNITA is: consistent with our overall strategy; responsive to UNITA's needs; effective in raising the costs incurred by the MPLA regime and its Soviet and Cuban backers; acceptable to key African partners whose support is essential; and sustainable in Congress and with ,the. American public. --As a follow-up to the present,, interagency review, the Department of State shall convene an` interagency group to consider feasible and effective means of increasing economic pressures on the MPLA regime and recommend appropriate options to me within one month. Pending completion of that review, the specific economic pressures against the MPLA government set forth in NSDD 212 will remain in force. --The Department of-State, together with other appropriate agencies, will explore means of increasing UNITA's stature within SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP93TO1142R000100210013-6 I Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100210013-6 SECRET Angola and internationally through more effective information programs. The U.S. information efforts will also seek to undermine Cuba's ability to deploy troops to Angola through specially focused radio&programmi 4'br dcast t-to Cuba by Radio Marti and through Spanish lihqua. pr rams aimed at the Cuban troops deployed in Angola. T6 r. g~ test possible extent, the U.S. should seek to exacerbate diferences between the MPLA and their Soviet bloc supporters`andat dermine Soviet/Cuban efforts to portray themselves as assisting a legitimate and embattled African government. --Diplomatic efforts to obtain the support of our allies and other international parties in pressing the MPLA regime for a peaceful settlement and to assist UNITA in expanding its international ties will be continued and, if possible, expanded. The Department of State wiil otinue efforts to engage the Soviet Union in serious discuss io s to diminish and eventually eliminate Soviet military a9sist ce to Angola, to advance negotiations on Cuban troop'vit wal and Namibian independence, and to promote na '1 reconciliation between TTLTTT'A --The U.S. will co tin a dev opm nt, security assistance. ~-.-&ML9caa%.O it.L IIU-Ly to the U.S. which are t iea 'tined t Angolan conflict or strained by refugee flows froth-- t country. (S) SECRET SECRET (C) 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100210013-6