PHILIPPINE TRADE PACKAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01142R000100340003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 10, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100340003-3
DNIAL 25X1
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SUBJECT: (0,6mo
Philippine Trade Package
FROM:
Deane E. Hoffmann
Acting NIO for Economics
EXTENSION NO.
NIC 04238-86
DATE
10 September 1986
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1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100340003-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100340003-3
C0NE1.BENTIAL 25X1
e Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 04238-86
10 September 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deane E. Hoffmann
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Economics
SUBJECT: Philippine Trade Package
1. Action Requested: You may want to discuss with Secretary Shultz the
EPC decision on a trade package for the Philippines. It was decided Tuesday
not to improve the Philippines' sugar quota because of the high political
cost both here and abroad of singling out the Philippines as a special case
among LDCs. I think a strong argument should be made, however, that such a
high political cost would send President Aquino a strong message that we
consider her country singularly important and view the economic and
political situation in the countryside to be sufficiently troublesome and
acute to undertake special action beyond the currently planned aid and trade
packages.
2. Background: The Economic Policy Council yesterday approved a trade
package for the Philippines including (a) a more liberal textile agreement,
(b) establishment of a Japan-U.S.-Philippines trade committee, (c) provision
of more liberal trade preferences, and (d) establishment of a U.S.
Philippine Business Promotion Council. The EPC decided not to alter sugar
quotas, under which we import limited quantities of sugar at roughly three
times the world price. The decision was based on the unanimous
recommendation of the Trade Policy Review Group. The EPC reached agreement
without discussion; the Philippines was the last agenda item and members
were moving toward the door when Baker was asked what the group should do
about the package.
3. The trade package is essentially symbolic, although some substantial
measures could result from the Japan-U.S.-Philippines Trade Committee. As
with any trade package, its limitations reflect the political constraints
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
CONFI IAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/28 : CIA-RDP93T01142R0001(m4nnm21
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100340003-3
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Philippine Trade Package
of U.S. and GATT trade law and other considerations, such as wanting to
avoid alienating other trading partners as we move toward a new round of
GATT negotiations.
4. What concerns me about the EPC meeting was lack of opportunity to
argue that the Philippines is such a special case, and that political
considerations should be put aside in favor of a significant symbolic
gesture such as switching the South African sugar quota to the Philippines.
Although this would amount to only token assistance (roughly $5 million), it
would single out the Philippines as a truly special case and send President
Aquino a strong message that we are seriously concerned as demonstrated by
the high political cost of our actions.
Attachment:
Talking Points
1111-4//7
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Deane E. Hoff ann
CONFIDENTIAL
, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100340003-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100340003-3
CONFIDENTIA
SUBJECT: Philippine Trade Package
Acting NIO/Econ/DHOFFMANN:
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - Executive Secretary
1 - Executive Registry
1 - Acting C/NIC
1 - NIO/EA
1 - NIO/LA
2 - NIO/Econ Files
CONFIDENTIAL
10 September 1986 NIC 04238-86
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25X1
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100340003-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100340003-3
CONFI NTIAL 25X1
10 September 1986
TALKING POINTS: PHILIPPINES Trade Package
It seems to me that we should be conveying to President Aquino that we
consider the Philippines a very special case. An increase in the sugar
quota, perhaps at the expense of South Africa, would have done that nicely.
ORIN
Because it would carry such a high political cost vis-a-vis other
LDCs that have sugar quotas, it would send a strong message that we
care and are concerned.
Targeting aid for sugar-producing regions also points up our
concern about the stability of these areas.
Targeting the Philippines while not giving additional aid to
particularly needy countries such as Haiti also points up our
special concern with the Philippines insurgency.
I realize that the sugar quota issue was discussed at length last
February in the EPC, and it was decided that any changes in quota shares
would be too difficult politically even for high income beneficiaries. I
realize also there are strong arguments that we should not do anything to
make a bad program worse and violate GATT rules in the process.
- -
- -
Nevertheless, I think the balance of our current effort in the
Philippines falls too heavily on aid which translates into roads
and schools and does not contain enough trade elements which would
put funds directly in the hands of people in depressed areas.
Indeed, if a sugar initiative is totally impractical, I think we
should look again for other trade benefits that would directly
assist people in the countryside.
CONFIDENTIAL
npriacsified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/28: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100340003-3