NOTES ON PARAGRAPHS OF (Classified) SOVIET PLANS AND POLICIES RELATED TO THE GERMAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01468R000100010010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP93TO1468R000100010010-7
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Notes on Paragraphs of
the German Situation.
scope and nature of these exercises cannot yet be determined, but it should be
Soviet Plans and Policies related to
Para 1 -. October Exercises: In addition to the TASS announcement that the Warsaw
Pact forces will con uct exercises during October and November (which was made
subsequent to the source's report that combined exercises would begin in the first
week of October), there are a number of indications of impending exercises. The
possible to obtain considerable information on them as the
25X1 D1 a It should be noted that preparations required for & NSA
exercises would be equally consistent with an increased readiness posture "under the
& NSA guise of exercises, " as well as highly effective as a backdrop to further negotiations.
Para 2 -Purse of Exercises: As noted above, maneuvers would increase combat
r ineaneess but would also be consistent with political pressure for negotiations. The
subterfuge implied in real preparations under the guise of exercises will be difficult to
penetrate. The source is consistently ambiguous on the "strike first" and at no time
has specified whether the strike is to be intercontinental, a ground-air assault on
Western Europe or a limited attack along the Berlin access roads or air corridors.
Although the general context of this and other reports from this source tends to imply
a European attack, reference is made to a move into Iran and to the Chinese Com-
munists defending against attacks from Japan. There is a notable absence of references
to strategic missiles in discussions of the strike, despite the fact that the source has
numerous contacts among artillery officers.
Para 3 - Mobilization: There is no evidence that a general Soviet mobilization has
occurr or is contemplated. We consider 400,000 men to be a reasonable figure
for the number of men being retained in the Soviet armed forces in accordance with
the announcement that "necessary numbers" of men due for release this year would be
held in service until after the German peace treaty. Previous independent calculations
have led us to believe that as many as 350,000 conscripts would probably be retained.
The official statements have stipulated retention until the peace treaty is signed;
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& NSA
Para 4 - High Milit Officers: We have no information that unusual numbers of
Satellite officers are or have been in Moscow recently, but we do not necessarily
obtain such Information and consider It possible that incro ased numbers have been
there in connection with current Warsaw Pact planning. Several senior Soviet
officers (,Marshals Malinovskiy,, Grechko, Sokotovskiy and Golikov) have been on
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visits recently in Eastern Europe, which may be what source meant by "in the field."
Apart from Konev's appointment as CinC of GSFG, and of Army General Batov as
commander of the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary, we know of no other recent
changes in command in key areas.
e can
neither confirm nor r u e that missiles with nuclear warheads have recently been moved
to tactical and strategic missile bases, but this source has reported earlier that he knows
of two storage sites for nuclear warheads for missiles in the Soviet forces in Germany.
Para 5 - Khrushchev's Intentions.- Commented on in the General Assessment.
Para 6 - Par Dissensions: We cannot comment on differences within the Presidium but
note that Mikoyan would be a logical person to protest against Khrushchev's policies;
few others would have the seniority and status to oppose the leader. We believe that
the military is well tinder Party control and that the military leadership wilt bow to
Khrushchev's orders despite their more conservative misgivings on the power balance.
Khrushchev has recently stated--on 7 August--that in a Soviet-US clash "neither side
would be ready to admit defeat without having used all weapons, even the most
destructive--. "
Para 7 - Malinovskiy Views: We cannot assess the accuracy of Mal inovskly's remarks.
We have evidence that Mal inovskiy did attend a party conference in the Carpathian
Military District between 17 and 21 September but note that Malinovskiy is already a
Party delegate from Moscow and is unlikely to have been elected to represent Lvov.
Para 8 - Party Congress: We regard the description of the tone of the Party Congress
as quite p ausi e, although it is not clear whether the views in the rest of the para-
graph are those of the senior Party official orof the source. An aggressive militant
tone at the Congress is considered quite probable, particularly if no progress toward
negotiations has been accomplished by then; such a posture would also be consistent
with planned hostilities.
Para 9 - Attendance at Congress: We consider the attendance of foreign party officials
at a Soviet Party congress tore quite expectable, although it seems doubtful that Mao
would attend in the light of what we believe the state of Sino-Soviet relations to be.
if he does attend, it will have great implications as to the condition of the Sino-
Soviet relationship and as to the seriousness with which the Communist world is re-
garding the Berlin crisis.
There is evidence available that foreigners will be discouraged from visiting
Moscow in this period; the Embassy was informed on 27 September that only very
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limited and undesirable accommodations will be available for Embassy visitors for
the next six weeks, and KIM was ordered on 29 September to evacuate its quarters
in a downtown Moscow hotel. In addition, a group of Western peace marchers has
been ordered to be out of the Western USSR by 8 October.
With regard to a PVO combat alert, there have been reports, that a similar
alert was laid on during the 7 November celebrations in 1960, and one may be con-
sidered necessary for such an important gathering as the Party Congress in view of
current international tension. 25X1X4
Para 10 - Move Into Iran: Reports sources during August Indicated that
certain improvements were being made in Soviet military positions along the Iranian
border, including repairing of gun positions and french construction. It has also
been alleged that villages along a section of the border were evacuated several
months ago. There has been some red'rspositioning of major Soviet units within both
the Transcaucasus and Turkestan Military Districts, including the introduction of some
airborne elements, within the past 18 months, but there is no available evidence of
a current buildup of forces.
Although we consider it extremely unlikely that Soviet intelligence on
Iran; (which is certainly very good) could have erroneously identified three US missile
bases in Iran,, the Soviets lave made such charges in the past and have offered to show
Iranian officials where they were on a map.
Marshal Chuikov was identified as the CinC
of the Ground forces on 20 September in a Soviet press account of his visit to Tbilisi.
Nonetheless, we cannot discount that his deputy, Army General Zhadov, may now
be acting in this post and that Chuikov has been appointed to the Civil Defense
command, as stated by source. It Is also possible that Marshal Chuikov is holding such
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a post in addition to his duties as CinC of the Ground Forces, particularly since it
is considered possible that the normal responsibilities of the CinC of the Ground
Forces may include some duties in this field.
Marshal Sokolovskiy*a recent attendance at Bulgaria's Liberation Day
ceremonies may lend some support to the possibility that he is now occupying some
Important military post. We have no indication, other than two recent public
appearances in Moscow, once reportedly in uniform, that Marshal Zhukov now
occupies any official post.
Para 13 - Reinforcement of GSFG: Marshal Konev's command as CinC of GSFG
inc es seven armies, six gro and one air. If his command extends to Poland
(which is not illogical, although there are no other reports 25X1 D1
of this), he would command the equivalent of nine armies. The re n orcement NSA
g~
GSFG by six or more SAM units this year is supported by the Identification of several
new Soviet SAM sites and the withdrawal of the 100mm AA battalions from the
seven Soviet AAA brigades In East Germany. The report suggests, however, that a
further reinforcement of GSFG with SAM units is planned.
With regard to the possible planed reinforcement of Konev's command by
the Eighth Mechanized Army, this army is identified in the Carpathian Military
District, as stated by source, but we believe the designation "mechanized army"
to be obsolete In Soviet terminology and are curious as to its appearance In this
25X1 D1 a report. There is no indication as yet of an impending move by this army 25X1 D1
and recent observations of the garrisons of one of & NSA
& NSA its subordinate divisions showed apparently normal occupancy. There have been a
number of rumors from Poland, particularly In early September, of Impending
Soviet troop movements along the rail line from Lvov Into southeastern Poland, but
there has been no evidence that any significant movement of Soviet forces into or
across Poland has yet occurred. We also have no evidence as yet of the assembly of
rolling stock In Eastern Europe on a scale which would be required to support move-
ments of army size. However, some future movements, although not necessarily of
the Eighth Mechanized Amy, cannot be entirely discounted.
Para 14 - Nuclear Tests: We believe that the view may well be true that the present
nuclear tests are to check out delivery systems but note that only four of the twenty
shots can be associated with missiles, that air drops from BADGER/i'U-16s continue
(though this was tested in 1958), and that there is no evidence available of tests of
such more advanced weapons as air-to-surface nuclear missiles.