REVIEW OF ADVANCE INTELLIGENCE PERTAINING TO THE BERLIN WALL AND SYRIAN COUP INCIDENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00754R000100020022-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2009
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 12, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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USIB-D-28.5/1
12 February 1962
SUBJECT o Review of Advance Intelligence Pertaining to the
Berlin Wall and Syrian Coup Incidents
1. The attached memorandum from Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
enclosing a report and certain recommendations of the President?s
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, is forwarded for review.
2. Because of the relatively short deadline within which a reply
must be made, we presently propose to place this matter_ on the agenda
of the 14 February USIB meeting for prelin inary discussion, At t iat
time the Board will be asked to address itself to matters such as the
appropriate method of assembling relevant data and the allocation of
responsibility for preparation of a draft response to Mr. Bundy for
USIB consideration.
PFIAB review completed.
BAW
Attachment
DIA review(s) completed.
Executive Secretary
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 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Review of Advance Intelligence Pertaining to the,
Berlin Wall and Syrian Coup Incidents
Enclosed herewith is a report and recommendations
on the subject which were approved and submitted to the Presi-
dent on January 11, 1962, by the President's Foreign.
Intelligence Advisory Board.
The enclosure is being forwarded for your considera-
tion, in consultation with appropriate members, of the United .
States Intelligence Board. It is requested that, based on
such consideration, you furnish to'the President and the
President's Board a report containing your views and comments
on each of the recommendations contained in-theenplosure.
Submission: of your report bl- March 12, 1962,, wi
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be appreciated,
f ,
cc: President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
(Attention: J. Patrick Coyne)
Inclosure with USIB-D-28.5 1 dated 12 February 1962.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
In accordance with your request, made when this Board list ,.iet
with you, a study. has been made with a view to determining: (a) what
advance information was available to the U.S. Government from the
intelligence community concerning the "Berlin Wall" action of August 13:
and the Syrian coup which occurred on September 28, 1961; and (b) what
lessons.. might be learned from such study.
As a basis for our review. the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Departments of State and Defense (including the Military Intelligence
Services and the National Security Agency) were asked to identify and
siibniit any intelligence reports and related materials which constituted
advance`information regarding the Berlin and Syrian incidents.
reports
of the subjects under review by the Board; and (c) pertinent'National
Intelligence Estimates and other specialized intelligence publications
produced within the intelligence community for dissemination at highest
Government levels in support of the policy and decision-making process.
(Substantiating information which was developed in the course of our
review is being retained in the offices of the Board-for such further
reference as may be required.)
Our consideration of all of the intelligence documentation, which
was made available for the Board's review, leads us to the following
major conclusions:
1. The Berlin and Syrian incidents demonstrate that the
estimative processes of the intelligence community are not fully geared
to the timely production of current appraisals of developing cold war
crisis situations which are required for consideration by the President
and his principal policy advisers.,
2. In both the Berlin and Syrian cases, indications of imminent
significant developments were apparently lost sight of in the mass of
intelligence reports'which were produced --]over an extended
period of time.
Inclosure with USIB-D-28.51 dated 12 February 1962
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3. The surprise created by the 'Berlin and Syrian incidents.
might well have been reduced had the significant advance intelligence
which was available to the intelligence community been given. sensitive,.
continuing, and discriminating assessment for timely consideration by the
.-,President, the members of the National Security Council,, and other top.
policy officials. In reaching this conclusion we note that:
a. Although our foreign intelligence agencies produced
no reports which pinpointed in advance the specific date or
particulars of the "Berlin Wall" action, during the period:
preceding that event our intelligence collectors did obtain
information which pointed to the possible imminence of drastic
action by the East German regime to shut off the flow of
refugees into West Berlin; and
.b. While our foreign intelligence agencies did not report
advance-information as to the, date and particulars of the
Syrian coup, the intelligence which was available did point
to the likely imminence of a military revolt.
4+. In both the Berlin and Syrian events, more importance
should be attached to the failure of the intelligence community and the..
Department of State to provide adequate and timely appraisals of the
advance information which had been collected, than to their inability to
,estimate the exact nature of the events which were to occur. Had such
appraisals been prepared and appropriately channeled to our major policy-
making officials, there would have been little justification for the
United States to have been surprised so completely by the East German
planners and the Syrian plotters, even though no one could have been
expected to predict the precise form which those events would take.
5. The two case histories which we have studied illustrate the
importance of having in the estimative and appraisal process the most
alert, perceptive and qualified 'men obtainable. No machinery or multi-
plication of personnel can serve as a substitute for the sensitive judg-
ments which are required in the analysis of intelligence information and
the preparation of assessments thereof for consideration by our top policy
officials.
We have noted several explanations which have been offered to justify 25X1
of the two incidents.
Inclosure with USIB-D-28.5/1 dated 12 February 1962
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which was available as the basis for a meaningful appraisal.. Otherwise,
pretation as a failure to pull together all of the pertinent information' '
analysts and rejected for cause, this might present a question as to
whether, from the vantage point of hindsight, the analysts were correct.'-
in their interpretations. We raise no such question, however, for it
appears from our review that the fault was not so much an error of inter-
review reflected that these indications were considered by our intelligence
The Board realizes that questions of judgment, interpretation
and relative-priorities always confront the professional intelligence
officer in the field and at the headquarters level, in the process of
collecting, reporting, appraising and disseminating intelligence concern-
ing adeveloping political situation in a foreign country. There were
undoubtedly a number of factors which inhibited the acquisition of advance
information or the formulation of forecasts on the exact timing and the
specific character of the incidents which were about to occur in Berlin
and Syria.
Nevertheless, indications
of the imminence of the Berlin and Syrian incidents, appear to have been
available at the Washington headquarters of the Central Intelligence
Agency and other member agencies of the intelligence community. Had our
Inclosure with USTB-D-28.5/1 dated 12 February 1962
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say 'so far and no farther'."
the best indicator was
oruri nt, I1 zareu in amjor aaaress on August 10 (three
days. before the"Wd11" action), that "We have discussed the (refugee)
m,),titer with our Soviet friends and with representatives of the Warsaw
Pact states, and we have agreed that the time has come when one must
Rather than attempting to achieve unanimity in intelligence appraisals,
as was done in this instance,. it would appear that differing views which
are held by members of the intelligence community regarding matters of
substance should be reflected in the "Watch Report" and other intelligence
assessments.
Inclosure with USIB..D-28.5/1 dated 12 February 1962
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RECOMMENDATIONS
To the end that the President may be afforde{1 the earliest
opportunities for the advance consideration of counter-action to be taken
in response to developing cold war crisis situations, we recommend that:
Inclosure with USIP-D-28.5/1 dated 12 February 1962
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1. A sense of urgency be imparted at the field and headquarters,,^
levels of our intelligence agencies, with'a view to ensuring the timely
reporting, dissemination and assessment of foreign intelligence indicating
the imminence, of crisis situations which are of Potci= a3 significance to
2. Without imposiZig delay upon the transmittal of raw intel-
ligence to Washington, competent State Department officials in the
foreign countries involved exercise responsibility for preparing periodic
appraisals of all available intelligence concerning developing crisis.
situations, for use at the field collection level and for consideration
.by the Washington intelligence community in the-timely production of
analyses and estimates.
3. Procedures of the United States Intelligence Board and
its subordinate bodies, such as the Watch Committee, be.modified to insure
that the appraisals of such bodies will reflect any significant differences
of view-which may be developed in the course of the estimative process.
Ii-. In keeping with our earlier recommendations that the
Director of Central Intelligence serve as the President?s principal
intelligence officer with responsibility for assuring the timely flow
of intelligence to the White House, the Director of Central Intelligence
be requested to review', in consultation with appropriate White House
officials, existing arrangements and procedures to assure that: (a)
the Central Intelligence Agency?s intelligence assessments and spot
reports on developing crisis situations are made available for timely
consideration by the President and, where appropriate, by members of the
National Security Council; and (b) copies of assessments and spot reports
which are made available for such consideration from any other source be
furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence for his information
and for introduction into the intelligence estimating process.
?Ta es H.. Killian, Jr.
Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.
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-Inclosi.'re with USIB-D-28.5/1 dated 12 February 1962
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t4OATIO
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sense of urgency be imparted at the field and beadgirrartet: levels
of our int*tligenc agencies, with a view to ensuring the timely reporting, dise