WILL SOVIET BLOC REACTION TO INF DEPLOYMENT INCLUDE NEW MOVES AGAINST WEST BERLIN?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00754R000200260003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 9, 1983
• Content Type: MF

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SFCRIT
?I7T)P.ANDU"} FOR: NTn for Warning
FMr
ST JR, TECT
Wi 11 Soviet Bloc Peaction to TNr Denlovment Tnclude New
?'ones Against West Berlin?
1. You will note that my draft cover memo for the 4nri.l NTO r'-onthly
Reports raises the nossibility of some kind of restrictions on or harassment
of Western access to West and East Berlin. The notion that Soviet and/or East
Berman moves that would precini.tate something reserline a new "Berlin crisis"
would he di -Fficiilt for Corlmimity analysts to deal with because it challenges
conventional wisdom that both the Soviets and the East Germans have strong
incentives to maintain the status quo established by the ouadrinartite
Agreerrnt of 1971. T would endorse this vie?. of Soviet and East ferman
interests and intentions as a general rule, but-it will he innortant as the
denlovmen.t date approaches to keen this asstmmtion under close (and skentical)
review.
2. As the draft memo also notes, "Andronov has deepened the Soviet cormit-
ment to respond firmly to T7\7- denlovmert next winter." The Community's treatment
of possible Soviet reactions so far has focused on military countermeasures.
For examnle, what do the Soviets mean when they say they will place the U.S.
in "an analogous posi.ti.on?" TPBMIs in Nicaragua, Suriname, Grenada? additional
deployment of cruise-missile submarines off U.S. coasts? TP's in Siberia
nnnosite Alaska? ~Ti_litary countermeasures obviously have high priority in
the Cor"TrLmftv's projections. But when Andronov warns that a "chain reaction is
inevitable" and that the TTcSP, Past eermany (Warned sneci -17i tally) , and other
Warsaw Pact states "will. he compelled to adopt response measures," it would he
prudent to canvas a range of non-military "countermeasures" as well.
3. There can he no doubt that, from Moscow's standpoint, West rermanv will
nlav the crucial role in decidin' the fate of INF deployment and that Bonn,
therefore, will he the principal target of Sovi.et threats and inducements as the
deployment date arnroaches, and of Soviet reactions if deployment nroceed_s on
schedule. It would he remarkable indeed if the Soviet leaders were to ignore
the exposed nressure point that Berlin represents in their plans for defeating
TNr or, failing this, for responding to the consequent charve in the European
nuclear balance--a Change which Moscow itself has chosen to exaggerate an:' to
over-inflate the stakes in the TNT' issue.
4. For these reasons, it seems to me that analysts resnorsible for warning
with respect to Soviet intentions and moves should pa" close, attention to the
nossihle signals contained in Tionecker's cancellation o-r his visit to ''Test CerrTt ny
next fall--at a time when anti.-INT demonstrations will he in full voice--and to
East Germany's threat in late :April to curtail West German access to West Berlin.
Moscow radio on 4 "tav broadcast a Berlin TASS dispatch on a Neues Deutschland
article on East-West r-errk?n relations which drew a direct connection between
INF deployment and the state of German relations and the security- of West Berlin:
"The deployment of the new US nuclear svstems..would in no way facilitate the
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establishment of normal, not to mention good-neighborly relations. Nobody,
should forget that the (PP cannot he blackmailed, that any such attempt would
be damaging not only to the rJ)P but also to the ?C and also West Perlin, which
as is knovm, does not belong to the Fnr and cannot he administered by it."
The TASS dispatch concluded by affirming that, ''On the basis of concluded treaties
we (the CDR) want to act and will act in accordance with the princinles of
neaceful coexistence in the interests of ensuring mace in Europe and develoning
good relations between the two rerman states." Neues Deutschland and T..SS
discreetly refrained from saving how the situation might he changed if West
rerrany disregards "concluded treaties" and ignores the recniirements of peaceful
coexistence in West Berlin.
5. Tt is predictable that this not-so-subtle hint will he followed by a
stream of more ominous and specific warnings about the possible implications for
West Berlin and Fast-West rerman relations if Bonn proceeds with IME deployment.
You may recall that in my warning prolectior. for 1983 (dated 8 Pehr uanr) , I
suc,ested that "ic initial INF deployments proceed desnite Soviet blackmail,"
the Soviets, inter alia, might "reopen unfinished business in Berlin by reviving
their demands in 1976 and 1977 for termination of Allied military natrols in
Fast Berlin and perhaps of Allied Military Liaison Mission tours in Fast rermany."
I would add to this a unilateral move to alter, if not abrogate, the 1971
Quadripartite 4greement, perhaps by removing Soviet military personnel and
substituting East rerman soldiers at the checknoints on road and. rail. access
points between East and West rermamy and around West Berlin.
6. Finally, T would suggest that we not under-estimate Moscow's determination
first to block INF deployment or, if blackmail and inducements nro-e unsuccessful,
to irmose significant costs on West rermany and its allies trrouRb both political
and military retaliatory measures. The Soviets are already irreversibly committed
to adopt stern countermeasures, ann their incentives to act forcefully have been
reinforced her an assessment that NATO has maneuvered itself into a. highly
vulnerable posture on the whole INF issue. Events next winter may nrove that
the Soviets have been deluding themselves about the extent of this vulnerability
and, in particular, about Political trends in West Cermary which hard' +nade the
Kohl government a ripe target for coercive dinlomacv. Perhaps. T't my basic
point is that Soviet perceptions will he decisive, not the US intelligence
community's estimate that Bonn and the other NATO basing countries will go ahead
with deployment regardless of Soviet threats and counter-measures.
7. T would contend that Andropov and company are as deeply committed to
act in response to INP deployment as Khrushchev was in 1958-1962 to force the
West to accent his terms for a West Berlin settlement and a Berman peace treaty.
The West's stubborn resistance to Yhrushchev's hold theists, of course, ultimately
drove him to install missiles in Cuba in a desperate hi.d to break the Western
Position. Historical analogies are always hazardous, but it seems to me that the
record obliges "warners" to be Particularly alert and sensitive when they see a
Proud and determined Soviet leadership digging itself into a Potentially dangerous25X1
commitment. Andmr y and Neues Deutschland have sounded a loud and clear early
warning: any attempt to "blackmail" Fast .ermany will "damage" both West Germany
and West Berlin.
SECPTT
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