TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN WARSAW PACT THEAHTER FORCES AND DOCTRINE THROUGH THE 1990S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00766R000100070003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2014
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 1, 1989
• Content Type: NIE

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Trends and Developments
in Warsaw Pact Theater
Forces and Doctrine
Through the 1990s
1 National Intelligence Estimate
Key Judgments
These Key Judgments represent the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
50-52 EXTRAS/CB
"Seeret-
NIE 17-14-89W
February 1989
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The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of these Key Judgments:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurs,
except as noted in the text.
The full text of this National Intelligence Estimate is being published
separately with regular distribution.
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
NOFORN (N F) Not releasable to foreign nationals
NOCONTRACT (NC) Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
PROPIN (PR) Caution?proprietary information involved
ORCON (0C) Dissemination and extraction of information
controlled by originator
REL... This information has been authorized for release to...
WN WN INTEL?Intelligence sources or methods involved
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Key Judgments
We judge that the Soviet leadership's security policies will produce, during
the period of this Estimate, the most significant changes in Soviet general
purpose forces since Khrushchev's drastic force reductions. We further
assess these policies are designed primarily to help the Soviet leadership
revitalize the Soviet economy by shifting resources from defense to civilian
sectors. We also believe decisions already undertaken signal a sharp
divergence from existing force development trends, and they have necessi-
tated a dramatic alteration in our forecast of future Soviet general purpose
forces.'
When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he inherited a technologically
backward economy that had experienced a decade of slowing growth
characterized by industrial bottlenecks, labor and energy shortages, low
and declining labor productivity, and decreasing efficiency of capital
investment. Almost immediately after becoming General Secretary, he
began to establish the political and ideological foundation for imposing his
own priorities for resource allocations, clearly signaling a more intense
competition between civilian and military needs. In doing so, he:
? Reaffirmed the traditional party authority for formulating military
doctrine, which the Brezhnev regime had allowed to become dominated
by the professional military hierarchy.
? Promoted a debate carried out in doctrinal terms over "reasonable
sufficiency" and "defensive sufficiency," but which reflects a more
fundamental examination of "How much is enough?" for defense.
? Attempted to dampen demand for defense spending by using arms
control forums and foreign policy initiatives to reduce external threats.
? Broadened the Soviet concept of national security as part of the "new
thinking" policy to give greater weight to its economic and political
components.
? Embraced vigorously the position adopted by previous Soviet leaders that
the impossibility of victory in nuclear war is basic to the political
dimension of Soviet military doctrine, and that the pursuit of capabilities
associated with achieving victory is too elusive and costly.
Gorbachev's initial "ground-laying" objectives were largely achieved dur-
ing his first few years in office. The regime did not order cutbacks in
military programs immediately, however, preferring instead to reduce the
'See Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, alternative key judgment on page 7
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burden by attempting to increase the efficiency of the defense sector.
Despite these efforts to alleviate what Soviet officials describe as a "crisis"
in the economy, after four years Gorbachev has failed to bring about a re-
bound in economic growth. Determined to succeed in his revitalization
campaign and recognizing that the defense industrial sector offers an
important source of additional help for his modernization program,
Gorbachev, in 1988, decided to take stronger action to invest more in
consumer-oriented projects. He evidently decided to act at that point
because, in addition to the obvious lack of progress on economic programs
and the rise in consumer dissatisfaction, the regime was faced with some
key deadlines in the preparation of the 1991-95 Five-Year Plan. The
results have become most vividly evident with announced policy initiatives
designed primarily to help the Soviet leadership reinvigorate the economy
by shifting resources from defense to the civil sector:
? Unilateral reductions and restructuring of Soviet general purpose forces
that will cut 500,000 personnel from peacetime forces by January 1991,
including 240,000 personnel from Soviet forces west of the Urals and
50,000 personnel from those in Central Europe. Forces remaining
opposite NATO will be converted into a "clearly defensive" structure.
? Cuts in overall defense spending of 14.2 percent and defense production
levels of 19.5 percent over the next two years that clearly reflect plans for
a reduced force structure and reductions in rates of equipment
modernization.
? Increases in the defense industry's direct contribution to production of
consumer and civilian investment goods that will cut significantly into
defense output.
Despite these dramatic actions and their apparent far-reaching implica-
tions, there remains considerable uncertainty about the durability and
consequences of Gorbachev's initiatives on military matters. The amount of
progress that is achieved on economic revival will largely determine
Gorbachev's ability to sustain his reforms, his willingness to undertake
additional initiatives, his standing with the party leadership, the support he
receives in pursuing related programs, and his ability to control the impact
of external factors that could impinge on his objectives.
Nevertheless, we believe it is highly likely that further decisions to reduce
planned defense spending and to shift investment from defense to the civil
sector will become apparent during the coming 13th Five-Year Plan (1991-
95). We reaffirm the recent assessment in NIE 11-23-88
December 1988, Gorbachev's Economic Programs: The Challenges Ahead
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that Gorbachev will divert additional resources from the defense sector to
the civil sector. Over the longer term, Gorbachev probably will continue to
impose constraints on the defense budget, and we judge that Soviet defense
spending will continue to decline as a portion of GNP through the turn of
the century.
We believe that the doctrinal concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and
"defensive sufficiency" have been articulated primarily to strengthen
Gorbachev's control over defense resource decisions to support economic
revival. We also believe that, by the turn of the century, these concepts
probably will have become lasting features of Soviet national security
policy, helping ensure continued party control over defense policy and
defense spending
Decisions by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies to reduce their general
purpose forces and cut defense spending over the next two years would
reverse the long-term trend of continuing growth in size and offensive
capabilities of these forces. As a consequence of the planned cuts, the
offensive capabilities of Warsaw Pact theater forces will decline through
the first half of the 1990s
We judge that the USSR will maintain large general purpose forces in the
Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone to reinforce its status as a superpower, to deter
aggression, to carry out wartime missions, and to underwrite its political
objectives in the region. Within emerging economic constraints, we also
believe the Soviets will modernize their still formidable general purpose
forces. Furthermore, the Soviets will want to minimize the erosion of their
relative military position due to both Warsaw Pact force reductions and
continuing improvements in NATO military capabilities. Absent a far-
reaching conventional arms control agreement, the Soviets will maintain
the capability to conduct large-scale offensive operations deep into NATO
territory but only after general mobilization. For the period of this
Estimate, Warsaw Pact forces, led by the USSR, will remain the largest
aggregation of military power in the world, and the Soviets will remain
committed to the offensive as the preferred form of operations in wartime.
Even with reductions in defense spending and procurement, the Soviets will
continue to maintain the world's highest level of weapons production
through the turn of the century. Although Soviet weapons projected
through the 1990s will involve mostly evolutionary improvements over
present types, a steady stream of better military technology will be
available to Soviet force developers throughout this period. Indeed, the
military expects perestroyka to yield significantly improved military
technologies.
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In addition to reductions in procurement funds, the significantly increased
unit costs of high-technology weapon systems will further reduce tradition-
ally high Soviet procurement rates. The increased effectiveness of these
weapons, however, will reduce the number of such systems required to
maintain the combat capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces. These
factors will almost certainly lead to a less than 1-for-1 replacement rate for
more advanced Soviet weapon systems over the course of this Estimate. As
a consequence, we expect to see a continuation in the recent trends of
declining production rates and deployment patterns for high-technology
equipment.
Since the late 1970s, the Soviets have improved their capabilities to
conduct longer and more intensive conventional operations against NATO,
including increased training for defensive operations against attacking
NATO forces. The Soviets assess NATO to be a tougher military opponent
on the conventional battlefield today than in past decades. Furthermore,
they believe improvements in NATO doctrine and projected force modern-
ization will make NATO an even more formidable conventional opponent
over the course of this Estimate 25X1
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Soviet pessimism regarding the utility of nuclear war and NATO's
increased conventional capabilities have caused the Soviets to prepare for
the possibility that a NATO-Pact war might remain conventional.' But
they believe they must also prepare for nuclear war both to deter it and to
wage it if it happens. Indeed, we judge that the Soviets still believe a
NATO-Pact war is likely to escalate to the nuclear level due to NATO's
doctrine of flexible response. Therefore, we expect the Soviets to maintain
sizable nuclear forces subject to limitations imposed by current and future
arms control agreements. Furthermore, we believe that, should an agree-
ment with NATO governing quantities and modernization of short-range
nuclear forces not materialize, the Soviets will continue to expand and
modernize their tactical nuclear missile force by the mid-1990s.
Following a trend we identified in NIE 11-14-85, we believe the overall
peacetime readiness posture of Warsaw Pact general purpose forces
opposite NATO during the period of this Estimate will be designed to
accommodate the following:
? Primary emphasis will be placed on the ability to mobilize and deploy
large reinforcements before hostilities, not on the ability of forward
forces to initiate a quick, unreinforced attack.
'Soviet chemical and biological warfare capabilities are fully considered in NIE 11-17-86
August 1986, Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare
Program. This Estimate concurs with the judgments held in that document.
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? In line with the Warsaw Pact's recent decisions to reduce and restructure
its theater forces, these forces will be maintained at sufficient readiness
to defend against a sudden attack and act as a defensive shield to allow
for the full mobilization and deployment of Pact forces.
We consider Pact initiation of hostilities without mobilization to be
extremely unlikely. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the
Pact might initiate hostilities from a condition of partial mobilization if it
perceives an opportunity to achieve decisive results against NATO, or a
need to forestall NATO from achieving decisive results against the Pact.
Our judgments regarding Warsaw Pact sustainability in a future war with
NATO differ substantially from those made several years ago. In 1985 we
stated unconditionally that the Warsaw Pact logistic structure in Central
Europe could support 60 to 90 days of theater offensive operations against
NATO. We now judge that overall Pact sustainability is a function of the
resilience of NATO's forward defenses. If NATO's forward defenses were
to collapse within three days of intensive operations, ammunition stocks in
the Western Theater of Military Operations (TMO) would be sufficient to
support the Pact's Theater Strategic Operation for up to 90 days. If, on the
other hand, Pact forces were to require at least two weeks of high-intensity
operations to achieve a decisive breakthrough, the Pact would not have
enough ammunition in the Western TMO to sustain a theater strategic
operation beyond a total of about 30 to 45 days. If confronted with the
prospect of some shortfall in ammunition supply, the Pact would move
additional ammunition stocks from elsewhere to the Western TMO, or
adjust war plans to avoid or at least minimize any adverse impact on
combat operations.
Soviet general purpose forces are fielding new weapons of virtually every
type, and we believe this trend will continue through the end of the
century. Motivated by the need to counter NATO's deep-attack, high-
technology conventional weapons and extended-battlefield concepts, for
example, the Soviets have been able to match or exceed NATO's capabili-
ties in nearly every major ground forces' weapons category. Rates of
equipment modernization probably will decrease through the end of the
century as the Soviets reduce defense production to free resources for the
civil sector. However, we expect that the Soviets will resist cutting
substantially research, development, testing, and evaluation in an effort to
close the military technology gap with the West. As in the past, Soviet
forces in the Western TMO will likely be the first to receive new
equipment.
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The Ground Forces are the largest element of the Soviet armed forces, and
their development determines the overall direction of Soviet theater forces
development. We see no evidence that this will change. We now judge,
based on the plans for reductions in force levels, defense spending and
military procurement, that a 25-year period of Soviet Ground Forces
growth has ended, and the decline in their overall size could go beyond that
already announced. We further judge that a resumption of growth in the
Ground Forces is highly unlikely before the turn of the century.
In order to meet the targets for reductions set by Gorbachev for January
1991, Soviet Ground Forces will be considerably restructured over the next
two years, but we cannot confidently predict their final form. Before
Gorbachev's cuts, the Soviets had begun to move toward combined-arms
formations. Although the final balance of tanks and mechanized infantry is
still in flux, we believe that combined-arms doctrine will guide Soviet force
restructuring through the 1990s.
Despite cuts in defense spending and procurement, we judge the Soviets
will continue to modernize their Air Forces, albeit more slowly than in the
past. Beginning in the mid-1990s and continuing through the turn of the
century, the Soviets are expected to introduce light, medium, and Stealth
bombers, Stealth and non-Stealth fighter-bombers, and at least one new
fighter. The announced reduction of 800 combat aircraft from the Air
Forces, however, signals a significant change in the pattern of force
expansion of the past two decades. We now judge that the Soviet Air
Forces will remain at their post-reduction levels until after the end of the
century.
Soviet naval general purpose forces continue to have the major missions of
protecting the Soviet missile-launching submarine force and defending the
USSR against NATO strategic and theater forces. Although the Navy can
be expected to bear a share of spending reductions, major emphasis will be
placed on improving antisubmarine and antisurface combatant operations,
gradually modernizing Soviet naval aviation, and increasing the availabil-
ity of sea-based airpower as larger aircraft carriers enter service during the
1990s. Support for land TMOs remains a primary wartime task of naval
theater forces, and we project a slow continuation of several organizational
and weapon trends that should provide land theater commanders with more
capable naval forces for combined-arms operations.
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact defense industries have been expanding and
producing a larger share of the NSWP military inventory. But announced
defense spending cuts and the weakened state of NSWP economies will
cause military production in the NSWP countries to decline during the
period of this Estimate. We also judge that NSWP forces will fall further
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JICLA C I.
behind Soviet forces in technology and organization during this same
period. The relative contribution of the NSWP armies to overall Warsaw
Pact military capability is also likely to decline somewhat over the next few
years.
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A major objective of the Soviet leadership's current foreign policy is to
reduce political support in the NATO countries for increased defense
spending to support NATO's force modernization program. Gorbachev will
continue to negotiate for conventional arms control agreements to slow
Western military modernization and facilitate his own defense program. In
addition, Warsaw Pact foreign policy over the period of this Estimate will
seek to weaken the position of the United States and Canada within the
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Alternative Key Judgment. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,
while recognizing the significance of the ongoing changes in the Soviet
Union, believes the likelihood of large unilateral reductions in military
expenditures beyond those already proclaimed by Soviet leaders is not as
high as implied by the majority view in the Estimate, particularly for the
longer term. Notwithstanding the potential importance of new develop-
ments in Soviet military policies discussed in this Estimate, the Director,
DIA, believes present evidence and future uncertainties make the elements
of continuity in Soviet military policy as important as the changes for US
national security and defense planning
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