BOLIVIA: POTENTIAL FOR TERRORIST AND INSURGENT VIOLENCE

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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of -Seefet-_
Central 25X1
Intelligence
Bolivia:
Potential for Terrorist
and Insurgent Violence
Special Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
This Memorandum represents the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
ect e
NI SIIM 89-10001
April 1989
Copy 524
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or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
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Director of Secret
Central 25X1
Intelligence
NI SIIM 89-10001
Bolivia:
Potential for Terrorist
and Insurgent Violence
Information available as of 24 March 1989 was used
in the preparation of this Memorandum.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Memorandum:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
also participating.
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
This Memorandum was approved for publication by the
Chairman, National Intelligence Council.
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April 1989
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Key Judgments
For the first time in 20 years Bolivia faces a potential insurgent challenge
from about five guerrilla/terrorist groups that have recently become
operational. Currently, these groups do not have the capability of fostering
regime-threatening instability and are unlikely over the next two years to
develop sufficiently to do so. They do offer a nucleus for a more
threatening movement over the longer term, especially if US-supported
coca eradication efforts result in peasant dislocation and unrest. Most of
the groups have some connection with narcotics trafficking, and they will
seek to exploit these links for financial gain and poli as US
involvement in interdiction and eradication deepens.
Socioeconomic problems, harsh austerity, the decline of the legal left, and
rising anti-Americanism due to US counternarcotics efforts help account
for the appearance of these new groups. The guerrilla groups are small?
the largest has only about 50 trained militants. For the most part, they are
loosely grouped around the urban-based Marxist-Leninist National Libera-
tion Army (a resurrection of the group that fought with Che Guevara in
1967), and nonlethal bombings have been the groups' operational staple.
One Indian-based group is attempting to establish a rural insurgency, but,
despite ambitious and professional planning, a chance encounter allowed
security forces to disrupt the effort.
Bolivian security forces are corruption ridden, equipment poor, possess only
rudimentary intelligence capabilities, and are primarily trained for a
conventional rather than counterinsurgency role. Nonetheless, Bolivia's
counterinsurgency capability, in terms of personnel and suitable equip-
ment, is still relatively better than was Ecuador's before the rise of its
urban guerrillas in 1984?which Quito ultimately dismantled.
Any growth Bolivia's guerrillas achieve probably will have to be without
significant outside aid. The Soviets, Cubans, Nicaraguans, Libyans, and
others maintain contacts and/or training relationships, but none of these
potential benefactors seems likely to go much beyond maintenance support
levels unless radicals first demonstrate considerable progress and potential.
In the event of a military coup in Bolivia, however, we would expect an in-
crease in foreign assistance and a boost for radical fortunes.
In sum, we expect guerrilla activity to grow but only unevenly and
modestly. A rural-based insurgent effort would offer long-term potential,
but geography and traditional mistrust of outsiders will make recruitment
ill
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an uphill battle. The urban-based effort preferred by the majority of the
fledgling organizations could prove more threatening in the short term, but
urban-based radicals tend to be more vulnerable to even crude government
countermeasures?as the examples of Ecuador and, earlier, Uruguay
suggest
A wildcard accelerator in the equation remains the US counternarcotics
role. If it deepens and becomes more publicized, traffickers would increase
funding to insurgents who oppose eradication, and they in turn would seek
gain by tying themselves to nationalistic backlash over US "intervention"
and by working harder to target Americans. Should insurgency become a
serious threat, the Bolivian security forces would require substantial
external assistance?looking principally to the United States
iv
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
Discussion
1
The Insurgent Groups: Nature and Composition
1
Tupac Katari
1
National Liberation Army
2
Alejo Calatayud Command
5
Simon Bolivar Command
5
Foreign Support
6
Links to Narcotics Traffickers
9
The Government's Counterinsurgency Capabilities
9
Responding to Insurgent Potential
10
Foreign Military Cooperation
10
Prospects for an Insurgency
12
Implications for US Interests
15
Annex: Bolivian Order of Battle
17
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Discussion'
Since late last summer there have been growing
indications that for the first time in more than 20
years Bolivian radical leftist and insurgent groups
were forming and becoming operational; several have
now carried out violent but nonlethal actions. Report-
ing has
identified at least five insurgent/terrorist groups,
including one rural-based movement and four urban-
based organizations. All of these groups are hostile to
US interests and one of them?the Simon Bolivar
Command?apparently was responsible for a bomb-
ing attack last Augtstaainsuh?Secretary of State
Shultz's motorcade.
Despite indications that these subversive groups are
organizing and in some cases are engaged in paramili-
tary training efforts, they do not appear to be plan-
ning nor are they capable of causing serious unrest in
the remaining months of the tenure of President Paz
Estenssoro, who leaves office in August. They could
serve as the nucleus for a more threatening movement
in the years ahead, however, especially if Bolivia
reverts to the chaotic economic conditions and near
anarchic litics that prevailed under Paz's predeces-
sor
The Insurgent Groups: Nature and Composition
Tupac Katari
The small Tupac Katari (TK) insurgent movement
emerged last year and is the only Bolivian group that
has sought to build a mass-based rural insurgency. Its
' This Memorandum, examining the prospects for insurgency and
terrorism in Bolivia, was requested as a fast-track assessment by
the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research. It examines the current capabilities and projected impact
of the country's emerging radical groups, looking out over a two-
year time frame. It follows the work done in Interagency Intelli-
gence Memorandum NI LIM 86-10010, July 1986, Prospects for
Leftist Revolutionary Groups in South America, and Interagency
Intelligence Memorandum NI JIM 87-10005, May 1987, Insurgen-
cy and Counterinsurgency in Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. Al-
though Bolivia was not a primary focus of either publication, both
offer regional tive and parallel in examining the situation in
Bolivia today.
1
leaders apparently broke away from a tiny, nativist
political party called the Tupac Katari Revolutionary
Movement?Liberation (MRTK-L) because of its ad-
vocacy of armed struggle. In early 1988 they estab-
lished a base in a remote village in the Aymara-
speaking region of the altiplano north of Lake
Titicaca. The group's support of national liberation
and native Indian dominance and its location in an
area that Peru's Sendero Luminoso guerrillas report-
edly use for a safehaven have raised questions about
possible links between Tupac Katari and Sendero, but
we have no compelling evidence that the two move-
ments cooperate with each other. A chance encounter 25X1
between a group of foreign mountain climbers and a
Tupac Katari patrol last August was a major windfall
for the Bolivian security forces and allowed them to
disrupt the movement before it could become well
entrenched. Despite their success, Bolivian security
officials were taken aback by the well-organized
am of the Tupac Katari movement.
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Bolivian police and military efforts followed last
summer's confrontation between French and Canadi-
an alpinists and a group of 15 or 16 armed individ- 25X1
uals, most of whom were Aymara-speaking peasants.
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"Tupac Katari School for Combatants." Many 25X1
'We more frequently refer in this Memorandum to Bolivia's
subversive groups as insurgent rather than terrorist, but we recog-
nize that, given their rudimentary level of organization, it is
difficult to definitively categorize them as either. Of the two
organizations with the most potential, Tupac Katari is attempting
to form an insurgency and the National Liberation Army, by name
at least, comes from an insurgent tradition. We judge that, as all
the groups are at an early stage of development, however, they will
rely heavily on terrorist tactics.
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and stressed that the Tupac Kataristas represented
the "voice of the oppressed Aymara people." The
material included guidance in preparing the peasants
for a long and bloody struggle and techniques for
targeting rural military and police detachments. Sev-
eral pamphlets dating to early last year referred to
1988 as the first year of the Tupac Kataristas'
struggle
suggest that the Tupac Katari move-
ment, though still at an incipient stage, was preparing
its trainees in all facets of rural insurgency. Although
the group apparently had not yet carried out an armed
operation, the school was designed to accommodate
some 20 trainees, and their instruction included weap-
ons and explosives handling, homemade bomb con-
struction, communications, and night patrolling. An
inventory of weapons listed five Swiss-manufactured
rifles, M-1 and M-2 rifles, and an M-3A1 subma-
chinegun that was probably stolen from the Bolivian
Air Force.
in the village has fleshed out the picture of the group's
composition. Bolivian security officials have conclud-
ed that Apolinar Condori was the leader of the Tupac
Kataristas, and several members of his family also
were members. Condori was arrested by the police
and subsequently turned over to the Army in La Paz
for further questioning. Although a congressman
elected on the MRTK-L ticket has spoken out in
Condori's defense and tried to rally public support for
his release, the arrest of Condori, the identification of
his lieutenants, and the closing of the Tupac Katari
school doubtless are major setbacks for the move-
ment.
In sum, because of fortuitous circumstances, the
Bolivian security forces were able to seriously disrupt,
if not dismantle, the Tupac Katari guerrilla structure
at a fairly early stage
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regarding the size of the movement once it was
discovered by the Bolivian authorities, but it probably
had fewer than 30 members
Although the marginalized Indian population offers a
potentially rich recruiting source, the Tupac Kataris-
tas were bucking a long tradition of hostility to
outsiders in selecting a remote Indian village as the
place to launch an insurgency. Indeed, the willingness
ug---gests that receptivity to the movement may
- .
have been only lukewarm.
National Liberation Army
The National Liberation Army (ELN) is the most
significant of the urban-based groups. It was created
in late 1987 or early 1988 by militant cells of two pro-
Cuban radical leftist organizations, the Coordinated
4th of March Movement (C4M) and the Patriotic
Popular Bloc (BPP), which apparently resurrected the
name to try to capitalize on the revolutionary tradi-
tion of the original group that fought alongside Che
Guevara. The National Liberation Army leader-
ship?which appears to overlap with that of the
Coordinated 4th of March Movement and the Patriot-
ic Popular Bloc?also reportedly reasoned that main-
taining a legal political group would enable them to
strengthen their ability to recruit members who could
then be vetted for possible clandestine operations. The
National Liberation Army initiated paramilitary
training for its members in early 1988, and by last fall
Bolivian security forces had uncovered six safehouses
belonging to the group in the La Paz area. Although
the group has not claimed responsibility for any
terrorist action, we suspect that it may 17ye carried
out several bombings
Most information regarding the group's origins and
early activities
by January 1988 the
National Liberation Army was recruiting among stu-
dents in Cochabamba and other urban areas and had
established a nationwide organization. By March,
guerrilla training for members reportedly had begun
in three-month cycles at a site in the Yungas with
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Table 1
A Look at Bolivian Insurgent Groups
Group
Date Ideology Foreign Links
Organized
Tupac Katari 1988
(TK)
Overlapping member-
ship and leaders
National Patriotic Con-
vergency Axis (EJE-P), a
legal radical coalition, is
tied to the CAC, ELN/
FAL-ZW, and perhaps
the CSB
Nativist
National 1987
Liberation Army
(ELN)
Marxist-
Leninist
Alejo Calatayud 1987
Command
(CAC)
Marxist-
Leninist
Zarate Willca 1988
Armed Forces
of Liberation
(FAL-ZW)
Marxist-
Leninist
Simon Bolivar 1986
Command
(CSB)
Renegade
cell of pro-
Soviet Com-
munist Party
Violent
Activities
Size
None
Unknown?per-
haps a few dozen;
activities disrupt-
ed by recent
arrests
None claimed 100 total, proba-
bly no more than
50 militants
Bombings
(1987)
May have
merged with
ELN
Power outage Believed to be
in capital (Oct. part of ELN
1988); bombings
near Congress
(Dec. 1988)
Bombings Probably a dozen
(1986, 1987); or so
Shultz motor-
cade (Aug. 1988)
instruction focused on small arms and demolitions
training. The doctrine of the group called for an
armed vanguard to create the conditions for an
eventual general revolt. Piecing together several re-
ports suggests that total membership in the organiza-
tion is less than 100, and many of the individuals do
not have paramilitary responsibilities.
yielded additional information about
tile group's ideology, leaders, foreign links, and weap-
onry. Documents cited "Marxism-Leninism-Guevar-
ism" as the group's ideological inspiration and empha-
sized its desire to coordinate all insurgent activities in
Bolivia?including those carried out by the Tupac
Kataristas?and its willingness to cooperate with
3
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other Latin American insurgent groups such as Peru's
Revolutionary Movement?Tupac Amaru (MRTA).
Among the individuals that the police identified as
linked to the National Liberation Army were 40-year-
old Gregorio Lanza, a longtime revolutionary who
reportedly has had contacts with Cuban, Libyan, and
PLO officials. At one of the safehouses, Bolivian 25X1
police found a high-explosive rifle grenade that proba-
bly had been stolen from the Bolivian Army, and a 25X11
Because the National Liberation Army has not
claimed responsibility for any terrorist actions?de-
spite fairly extensive preparations?we suspect that
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Table 2
Bolivia: Indicators of Incipient Insurgency
ELN TK CAC CSB AVC
(1984)
Organization/recruitment
Radicalization of leftist parties/factions
?
Increased proselytizing in rural areas
Increase in travelers from proinsurgency countries
Reports of urban cells
?
? ? ?
Press statements by insurgents; press reports on insurgent plans
?
Training
Reports of military training sites
? ? ?
Reports of training outside the country
? ? ?
Acquiring resources
Discovery of caches (arms, uniforms, and so forth)
Thefts of weapons
Evidence of special equipment (radio, printing press, and so forth)
?
Income from robberies, kidnapings, or narcotics
Outside support
Evidence of foreign money or arms
?
Evidence of assistance from foreign insurgents
Actions/violence
Violence against government, utilities, symbolic targets
? ? ?
Reports of infiltration of labor or political organizations
Sightings of armed people in rural areas
?
Reports of planning for violence
Discovery of a forging/counterfeiting ability
Assassinations
Production/circulation of radical propaganda
? ? ?
Establishment of front organizations
Popular support
Connections with legitimate groups
? ? ? ?
Growing media coverage
?
Evidence of a growing number of sympathizers
Indications of insurgent attempts to exploit public issues
?
? ?
a Our indicators show that the insurgency in Bolivia has not
progressed to a level comparable to that in Ecuador at the end of
1984. Compared to the AVC?which at that time numbered about
300?Bolivian groups are smaller and less active. Further absent in
Bolivia are significant insurgent recruitment efforts or attempts to
raise funds through bank robberies, kidnapings, and so forth.
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? No information
? Indicated in reporting
ELN?National Liberation Army
TK?Tupac Katari
CAC?Alejo Calatayud Command
CSB?Simon Bolivar Command
AVC?Alfaro Vive Carajo (Reporting on this Ecuadorian group is
provided for purposes of comparison. Information is as of
December 1984, approximately one year after the AVC
began operations.)
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the gronn may he onerating
The latter
group apparently was the perpetrator of an unprece-
dented citywide power outage in La Paz last October.
It also claimed responsibility for the bombing in
December outside the Chamber of Deputies.
Bolivian authorities also
believe the Zarate Willca group may be an element of
or perha s a s linter from the National Liberation
Army.
Alejo Calatayud Command
The Alejo Calatayud Command (CAC) is an urban-
based group that was founded in Cochabamba in
1987 and takes its name from a local revolutionary
figure. The Calatayud Command is closely linked to
the National Liberation Army and its overt affiliates
in that many of its leaders, such as former Jesuit
priest Rafael Puente Cuevas and Sonia Brito, appear
to belong simultaneously to these affiliates as well.
Calatayud is the organization with the clearest link to
narcotics traffickers and has made opposition to US
antinarcotics efforts a key ingredient in its attempt to
appeal to peasants.
Created in the aftermath of Operation BLAST
FURNACE, Calatayud has focused on trying to raise
concern among campesinos in Cochabamba regarding
US antinarcotics activities and to carry out anti-US
terrorist acts. Its members, who reportedly have re-
ceived funding from local narcotics traffickers, have
pushed the line that US-sponsored coca eradication
efforts are a "crime" against peasants and some
Calatayud-linked peasant leaders claim US military
personnel in country have committed atrocities. In
May 1987 a Calatayud bombing near a house leased
by a USAID contractor, together with growing peas-
ant unrest, was sufficiently worrisome to cause the
temporary withdrawal of US personnel from the
Cochabamba area. In June 1987 Calatayud activists
clashed with local police during anti-US protests, and
the group has not claimed responsibility for any action
since then.
regarding Calatayud activi-
ties over the last year and a half suggests that the
group has either disbanded or more likely has merged
with National Liberation Army cells. The group?
either acting as the Calatayud or under another
5
name?may continue to proselytize among peasants 25X1
in Cochabamba or elsewhere and to foment anti-US 25X1
sentiment among coca-growing campesinos. DEA per-
sonnel in Cochabamba have received numerous
threatening telephone calls in recent months, but we
have no evidence linking the Calatayud to those calls. ?-)av
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Simon Bolivar Command
The Simon Bolivar Command (CSB) is an urban- 25X1
based cell?numbering only a handful of individ-
uals?that draws its members from the pro-Soviet
Bolivian Communist Party but operates without the
support or approval of party leaders. US installations
and officials have been the principal targets for its
terrorist actions, which have been either clumsily
carried out or designed largely for their propaganda
value.
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Bolivar Command, rather than the Zarate Willca
group, which also claimed credit, planted the bomb on
8 August 1988 that exploded near the motorcade
carrying then Secretary of State Shultz. The Simon
Bolivar Command was the only group that expressed
knowledge about a second bombing that day, this one
at the US Embassy's commissary. Moreover
indicates that
Communist Party officials suspected Simon Bolivar
Command leader Jose Espinosa?a Cuban-trained
explosives expert?of having been the culprit,
Espinosa and his group have a history of involvement
in anti-US bombings. In March 1986 he was appre-
hended near the US Embassy soon after dynamite
had exploded on the Embassy roof. A subsequent
investigation by US security officials revealed that the
briefcase Espinosa had been carrying contained dyna-
mite. In May 1987 the Simon Bolivar Command
claimed responsibility for a dynamite attack at the
Citibank branch in La Paz. There were no fatalities in
any of these incidents, and the circumstances suggest
that the main intent was to make a political state-
ment
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Figure 1. Police scramble to
.find those responsible for the
bomb attempt against then
Secretary of State Shultz.
Foreign Support
7,4%,,W74:4
.hat the
Cubans are not advocating armed insurrection in
Bolivia at this point, although Cuba reportedly contin-
ues to provide on-island paramilitary and other train-
ing, especially to members of the National Patriotic
Convergency Axis?a radical leftist umbrella organi-
zation linked to insurgent groups. Under President
Paz, relations between Bolivia and Cuba have been
cordial and former Foreign Minister Bedregal, who
only recently resigned, was an outspoken Castro
sycophant. Social Democrat Jaime Paz Zamora, who
has longstanding ties to Cuba, almost certainly is
Havana's preferred candidate?among those with a
realistic possibility of winning?in the presidential
election on 7 May, but Cuba's presence in Bolivia is
not likely to be threatened regardless of who wins.
Under these circumstances, there probably will be
little change in Cuba's policy of pursuing state-to-
state relations while ? uietly working to strengthen the
radical left.
Cuban officials continue to push for unity among the
various Bolivian groups. The Cubans use the National
Patriotic Convergency Axis as their main vehicle.
Santiago Rafael Salas Ochoa, the political counselor
Secret
of the Cuban Embassy, meets regularly with a wide
spectrum of Bolivian radical leftists, including Na-
tional Liberation Army leaders and the Simon Bolivar
Command's Espinosa, and the fact that many of these
individuals are also members of the Convergency
Axis, a legal political entity, gives him p er
for doing so In November, for example,
Salas was present for the
creation of a new radical leftist umbrella group called
the Peoples Movement for National Liberation, whose
constituent members include the Coordinated 4th of
March Movement and elements of the National Lib-
eration Army.
Information regarding support to Bolivian radical
leftists by other foreign governments and groups is
much sketchier.
in Pebruary 1988 Soviet Embassy
officials funnelled $30,000 to a National Liberation
Army representative, and the Soviets generally have
been far less active than the Cubans in maintaining
contacts with Bolivian r dical leftists,
members of the Calatayud
have received training in Libya,
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Significant Incidents
1989
Seventeen dynamite attacks in one day against
various political party offices. Responsibility
unknown.
1988
Peruvian naval attache assassinated. Peruvian
insurgent group Sendero Luminoso believed to
be responsible.
Explosion damages a statue in central La Paz.
A previously unknown group claims responsibil-
ity as retribution for US failure to grant a visa
to Yasir Arafat.
US Embassy commissary suffers minor damage
from explosive device. Claimed by the Simon
Bolivar Command.
Bomb explodes near then Secretary of State
Shultz 's vehicle in La Paz. Simon Bolivar
Command and Zarate Wil/ca group claim
responsibility.
1987
A large bomb seriously damages a newspaper
office in La Paz. Responsibility unknown.
Explosion next to USAID contractor's home in
Cochabamba. Possibly drug related, but Alejo
Calatayud Command claims responsibility.
Bomb thrown at US Embassy during labor
protest in March. Fourteen bystanders injured.
1986
Explosive device thrown into the yard of the
defense attache operations coordinator. First
incident against the US military since 1980.
Explosion in Cochabamba at the headquarters
of a USAID-funded organization associated
with coca eradication. Responsibility unknown.
An explosive device thrown onto the roof of the
US Embassy causing minor damage. Simon
Bolivar Command believed responsible.
Secret
Figure 2
Bolivia: Bombing Incidents, 1986-89
Unknown Responsibility
Domestic targets
Foreign targets
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
2
0 1986 87 88 89a (Jan-Mar)
Insurgents Claimed Responsibility
6
a Includes 17 dynamite attacks in La Paz
that occurred in a single day.
321311 4-89
several Convergency Axis leaders
have visited Libya over the last several years. In our
judgment, the Libyan connection with Bolivian radi-
cal leftists is a small part of Tripoli's overall program
of subversion and anti-US activity in Latin America.
The PLO has an office in La Paz and has contacts
with a variety of radical leftists, including members of
the Convergency Axis and the Calatayud, but we
have no evidence that the PLO is providing material
support to an of these rou s or is advocating armed
insurrection.
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Links to Narcotics Traffickers
three of the five
insurgent/terrorist groups have some involvement in
narcotics trafficking. Calatayud has the strongest
links to Bolivian narcotics traffickers, having report-
edly accepted their financial support and having
actively sought to undermine US-supported antinar-
cotics efforts. that one
of the Tupac Katari leaders was observed marketing
coca leaves, presumably in an effort to provide fund-
ing for his organization. Similarly,
at a National Liberation Army safehouse indicated
that an individual associated with that group was
known by the security services to have ties to traffick-
ers.
In sum, available evidence suggests that several of the
organizations may obtain revenue from narcotics cul-
tivation and trafficking, although we do not know the
extent of the involvement. Moreover, at least one
group has been able to develop links to peasant
organizations by claiming that the US-supported
antinarcotics program threatens their livelihood. We
look for other radical leftist groups to pursue similar
tactics?especially if US involvement in interdiction
and eradication deepens. In our view, a deepening
involvement in the narcotics trade would enable the
groups to expand their capabilities.
The Government's Counterinsurgency Capabilities
Notwithstanding some initial success against the new-
ly formed radical groups, the Bolivian security forces
have extremely limited capabilities. The military ser-
vices can maintain internal order against a low-level
guerrilla threat, but the development of an organized,
widespread insur enc would severely tax their skills
and resources.
The Bolivian military is among the weakest and most
poorly equipped in the hemisphere, and its problems
have been aggravated by drastic defense budget cuts.
As a result, the capabilities of the armed forces are
constrained by a lack of equipment, inadequate train-
ing, marginal leadership, and poor communications
and logistic support. Moreover, many military officers
9
Bolivia and Ecuador: A Comparison
Even Bolivia's rudimentary counterinsurgency
capability is relatively better than was Ecua-
dor's before the rise of the Alfaro Vive Carajo
(AVC) in 1984. Ecuador did not possess mili-
tary counterinsurgent forces at that time, al-
though it did have police counterinsurgent units
that were to be used if regular law enforcement
units failed. Bolivia, on the other hand, has
dedicated counterinsurgency units in both the
military and the police. Like Ecuador, Bolivia
expects its civilian law enforcement units to
play a major role against insurgents.
In 1985, Ecuadorian President Febres-Cordero
recognized the need for a better organized coun-
terterrorist apparatus and sought and received
training assistance from the United States,
Spain, and Venezuela. US military aid re-
mained stable throughout this period at about
$3 million per year, but President Febres-
Cordero reoriented Ecuador's military budget
from a conventional warfare focus toward coun-
terinsurgency concerns. With an improved intel-
ligence system, a strengthened police counter-
terrorist capability, and new military coun-
terinsurgency units, the government was able to
contain and then roll back the AVC.
The level of the insurgent threat in Bolivia now
is probably somewhat lower than in Ecuador in
1984, in part because the Bolivian insurgent
effort is dispersed among a number of relatively
small groups. In addition, the AVC was more
active than any of the Bolivian groups. How-
ever, we judge that social conditions in Bolivia
are more propitious for the expansion of insur-
gent groups than they were in Ecuador.
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have been corrupted by the narcotics trade, with
individual officers and Army, Navy, and Air Force
units continuing to provide protection for shipments of
both drugs and chemical precursors.
One key deficiency of the military?which signifi-
cantly limits its counterinsurgency potential?is its
rudimentary intelligence capabilities. The Armed
Forces Intelligence Directorate appears to be well
organized, but is hampered by a lack of funds,
manpower, and well-trained personnel. Collection re-
sources are primarily limited to open-source materials
and information obtained from subordinate military
organizations, low-level agent networks, and trusted
ex-military personnel
Similarly, even though the Bolivian armed forces as a
whole have considered internal security to be their
major mission in recent years, they are largely trained
and equipped for conventional warfare. Of the Army's
50 battalion-size infantry/armor units, only six as-
sault battalions and one jungle battalion have any
special forces orientation. Two of these assault battal-
ions, both airborne qualified and designated "rang-
ers," constitute the Army's principal counterinsur-
gency units. Since the defeat of the Che Guevera?led
insurgency of the 1960s in the jungles of Santa Cruz,
most of the combat experience for the armed forces
has come from its limited participation in counternar-
cotics operations
The Army is generally meagerly equipped with con-
ventional weaponry but does have about 175 armored
cars and armored personnel carriers that could be
used in urban operations. The Air Force also suffers
from a decided shortage of cargo aircraft (mainly four
C-1 30s and four Fokker F-27s) to provide long-range
patrol, paratroop operations, or general transport sup-
port, and it has only a dozen helicopters. No more
than half of Bolivia's aircraft are flyable at any time,
and the Army's armored vehicle readiness is about the
same
Responding to Insurgent Potential
The military has taken some steps to meet internal
security needs and to respond to reports of insurgent
activity. For example, the Army has increased patrols
and roadblocks in the area northeast of Lake Titicaca
Secret
due to reported Tupac Katari activities. The Air
Force has been upgrading its conventional fighter
capability and expects to add another 22 Pilatus PC-7
attack trainers to the 14 it presently has on hand. It
also is adding six more T-33 trainers to the dozen
France has delivered since 1986 and all of these
presumably could be armed. All of these aircraft?
slow flying, relatively easily maintained, and lightly
armed?could be adapted for a limited counterinsur-
gency role in Bolivia. Intelligence activities also have
been increased with President Paz recently ordering
all military intelligence agencies to operate under
single direction; primary emphasis, however, remains
on counternarcotics rather than counterinsurgency. In
addition, in 1985 a Special Rural Police Unit
(UMOPAR) was created under the Ministry of Interi-
or to combat insurgency and narcotics trafficking in
rural areas of Bolivia and it now numbers about 640
personnel. Here too, however, the emphasis has been
on narcotics
Foreign Military Cooperation
Bolivia has sought security assistance from the United
States but the bulk of this has been for combating
narcotics as well. US military assistance apart from
antinarcotics aid has been limited, amounting to
$400,000 of IMET (International Military Education
and Training) support in FY 1989 and no MAP
(Military Assistance Program) funding. For FY 1990,
an additional $5 million in MAP funding is tentative-
ly scheduled but is subject to review. US Military
Training Teams (MTTs) have been conducting train-
ing sessions with the Bolivian antinarcotics police in
the areas of Chapare and El Beni as requested by the
government. The Bolivian militar, however, has not
been involved with these MTTs
Over the past year Bolivia has approached Peru and
Brazil regarding the problems of narcotics trafficking
and terrorism, but regional assistance and exchange
generally remain quite limited. During 1988 Bolivia
had bilateral cooperation discussions with Peru and
exchanged intelligence. Antinarcotics accords also
were signed in September 1988 between Bolivia and
Peru to establish joint border control programs be-
cause the Peruvians are interested in gathering infor-
mation on the Sendero Luminoso, which may be using
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Figure 3
Major Military Units
de 01
NPO'
Guayarameri
Peru +f
South
Pacific
Ocean
Lago
Titicaca
Guerrilla amp
Cydiscovered
Ts ina
*NI +
? *LA
ttcha PAZ
Patacamayegid.
C i I
Lago
Poopo
Trinidad
Bol i
+1..Cochabamba
ta Cruz
*Sucre
Army unit
?Infantry
494IP ? Motorized Infantry
Naval unit
4. Air unit
O 200 Kilometers
.1
O 200 Miles
azil,
Rebore.),
iPuerto Suarez.
Tupiza. prija Mantes
Paraguay
14,
Argentina
11
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Bolivia as a safehaven. A small number of Bolivian
military personnel?less than 10 per year?also have
received technical training in Brazil and Argentina
since the mid-1970s. A few others have occasionally
trained in Peru, Venezuela, and Spain. In the event of
a serious insurgency, Brazil, Argentina, and perhaps
Peru would probably be inclined to provide expanded
counterinsurgency training and?in the ca
Brazil?perhaps some military equipment.
Prospects for an Insurgency
Over the past eight months, political violence?in-
cluding campaign-related terrorism that exceeds that
of previous years?has been on the rise. We expect
insurgent activity to grow, but probably unevenly and
modestly, over the next two years. The reasons for the
growth are several:
that the radical left will
get a small percentage of the vote in the May
presidential and congressional elections, and this
poor showing may strengthen the clout of those
revolutionary activists who advocate armed strug-
gle. Indeed, the decline in the political strength of
legal leftist parties since the mid-1980s is probably
one of the reasons for the emergence of insurgent
groups.
? Government antinarcotics programs are clearly un-
popular in the Chapare and other coca cultivating
and trafficking regions, thereby providing radical
groups with a rallying cry, a base of potential
recruits, and a friendly environment in which to
operate. In our view, the radical left's prospects for
exploiting this issue will grow if Bolivia?with US
support?follows through on plans to increase eradi-
cation and interdiction.
? Bolivia's economy is likely to experience only mod-
est?about 3 percent?real growth over the next
year and little headway will be made in reducing
unemployment, currently estimated at about 20
percent. The urban unemployed, as well as the
underemployed, represent a potential pool of re-
cruits for any insurgency movement.
Secret
? Despite tough austerity measures, President Paz's
prestige as the father of Bolivia's revolution in 1952
and his leadership skills have helped keep the lid on
social unrest. Bolivia's next president, however, al-
most certainly will not command Paz's broad re-
spect. The leader in the polls, ex-General Hugo
Banzer, has long been anathema to the radical left,
and his election might cause students and others to
be increasingly attracted to revolutionary violence.
That said, Bolivia's insurgency is still nascent and is
likely to remain a minor to moderate problem over the
next 24 months. Existing guerrilla groups appear to be
small and inclined to maintain a low operational and
recruitment profile. There is little evidence that indi-
vidual radical groups are now seeking to change this
posture. Moreover, at this stage they may be vulnera-
overnment countermeasures, however clumsy.
Bolivia's geography also works against the growth of a
large-scale insurgency over the short term. It is
literally hard to get around, as much for the guerrillas
as the Army. Geographic isolation also leads to a
focus on local, nonideological concerns. Che Guevara
learned this in 1967 and Tupac Katari may have
absorbed a similar lesson last year.
While Bolivia's economic and social problems are
crushing, they have been for 50 years. The politically
conscious fraction of the campesinos will shift its
allegiance from the current political system only
slowly, if at all, believing its lot was improved by the
1952 revolution.
In the near term, Bolivia's guerrilla groups seem
unlikely to receive any substantial boost from outside
assistance, although present levels of training and
support could easily be maintained. There are several
reasons for this: (1) current Soviet policy does not
favor new insurgent adventures in South America; (2)
Cuba and Nicaragua have other priorities and, be-
yond perhaps maintenance training, funding, and
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Social Consequences of Economic Restructuring
President Paz's administration has implemented
draconian measures over the last three years that
have led to an economic recovery_but have also
had negative social consequences that may be
fostering an environment conducive to the growth
of insurgency and terrorism. By freeing prices,
liberalizing the exchange and trade system, reor-
ganizing state enterprises, reforming the tax sys-
tem, and strengthening the financial sector, the
government cut inflation from an annual rate of
23,500 percent in late 1985 to 20 percent in 1988
and reversed a six-year trend of negative growth
rates. As a result of Paz's reforms, however, real
wages declined over 65 percent by 1987. Unem-
ployment has also increased, especially in the
mining sector where the work force at the state
mining corporation, COMIBOL, was slashed from
27,000 to 7,000, and four of the country's 14
ere closed down.
nemployed miners have flooded
into the cities where they have been unable to find
jobs; meanwhile in some rural areas an increase in
economic-related violence and crime is breaking
down the traditional community structure.
Bolivians have traditionally depended on the pub-
lic sector for economic support, but the Paz gov-
ernment's tight fiscal policies have limited public-
sector spending. The government's insistence on
capping public-sector wage increases and its re-
moval of numerous subsidies also have contribut-
ed to the decline in living standards.
Government antinarcotics efforts are another
source of popular discontent because of the impor-
tance of narcotics to the Bolivian economy. We
estimate that Bolivians earn about $600 million
per year from coca production, equal to all of
Bolivia's legitimate exports, and amounting to 15
percent of GDP. Moveover some studies indicate
that as much as 60 to 75 percent of the Bolivian
population receives a direct or indirect benefit
from the narcotics industry. Revenue from coca
cultivation has helped many campesinos particu-
larly in the Santa Cruz and Chapare regions
improve their living standards. As long as the price
for coca remains relatively high and the govern-
ment's ability to implement a comprehensive crop
substitution program is limited, there probably
will continue to be substantial resistance by peas-
ant groups and other organizations to US-support-
ed antinarcotics programs.
Despite the short-term social costs of the Paz
government's economic reforms, Bolivia's econom-
ic prospects are favorable, assuming continued
sound financial management. Real GDP per capita
is expected to increase in 1989 for the first time
this decade, and a recent announcement that
public-sector wages would be raised 15 percent
should also contribute to a general improvement in
real wages this year. Inflation is likely to decline
to less than 10 percent this year. There has been a
surge in metals output, particularly in gold, and
the mining reorganization is expected to pay off
this year by increasing export revenues. The lead-
ing presidential candidates for the election on 7
May have promised not to alter the basic thrust of
Paz's economic approach, but all of them will face
growing pressure to implement new social mea-
sures.
counseling, are not likely to heavily commit them-
selves to Bolivia unless radicals on their own demon-
strate considerable progress and potential; (3) Libya
will probably continue to offer travel and occasional
training/funding but nowhere in Latin America has
this been on a significant level; (4) the PLO will not
13
want to jeopardize their current diplomatic position in
Bolivia; and (5) some groups like Tupac Katari may be
committed to ideological and material self-sufficien-
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Figure 4
Bolivian Economic Performance, 1984-89
Real GDP Growth
2.8
2.4
I I I
_0.3 -0.2
-2.9
84 85 86 87 88
Percent
Real GDP Per Capita Growth
3.5
0.5
1
-0.4 -0.3
-3.0 -3.0
-2.9
-5.5
89 84 85 86 87 88 89a
Urban Unemployment Consumer Price Growth
18.2
15.5
20.0
21.5
20.0
19.0
11,750
1,281
66
11
22
10
84 85 86 87 88 89a 84 85 86 87 88
a Projected.
89 8
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Further, we doubt that developments in neighboring
countries will have much impact on the Bolivian
insurgency. In particular, there is not likely to be
much spillover in Bolivia from insurgency nearby.
This is due in large part to Bolivia's geographic
isolation, but we also note that in other cases (for
example, contacts between the Colombian M-19 and
the Alfaro Vive Carajo group in Ecuador or the
Salvadoran guerrillas and Honduran leftists) insur-
gents in one country have had only a marginal
capability to support revolution elsewhere. The Peru-
vian Sendero Luminoso insurgent group
has a limited operational ca-
pciumLy III Ill111VICL. CI'tier? was reportedly responsible
for the December 1988 assassination of the Peruvian
naval attache in downtown La Paz. It is not likely,
however, to provide support for existing Bolivian
groups, in part because of its philosophy of self-
sufficiency. Sendero?itself drawn from Peru's Indian
population?could conceivably attempt to establish a
like-minded group among Bolivian Indians, but this
would be a costly diversion of resources and, given the
insular, apolitical ethos of Bolivia's rural dwellers,
would have limited potential for success. It is possible
that the Sendero Luminoso could enter Bolivia to
conduct sporadic terrorist attacks, probably against
Peruvian targets. In the near future, however, it is
likely to concentrate on building its strength in Peru
rather than seeking to establish a power base in
Bolivia.
The level of confidence in our judgments regarding
prospects for insurgency in Bolivia is only moderate.
We have greater confidence in
our assessment that insurgent groups do face an uphill
battle in recruiting widely for their forces
Any insurgent growth would be destabilizing but less
so if it were primarily rural based. Rural Indian
recruitment would be a longer term process for the
guerrillas. Moreover, politicians, less immediately
threatened by rural rather than urban unrest, would
be more inclined to rally round the flag and give the
military a free hand. If ex-General Banzer?who still
commands widespread support throughout the mili-
tary?emerges from the May election as the next
president, his leadership also would be less susceptible
to a challenge in facing a guerrilla threat. Should a
coup occur in Bolivia, however, whether directly
15
connected to an insurgent threat or not, guerrilla
fortunes would probably be boosted and an at least
modest increase in foreign assistance for the radical
left would be likely.
Implications for US Interests
If either rural or urban violence does increase, US
personnel will be at increased risk, both from collater-
al injuries from attacks not directed at them and from
direct attacks. The US Embassy, located in a building
housing a bank and subject to at least one dynamite 25X1
attack, could become a target. Narcotics traffickers
might also take advantage of an increased atmosphere
of violence to "settle scores" for extensive US support
to Bolivian counternarcotics programs. To the extent
that the United States is associated with anti-insur-
rg.encv_al
the threat to personnel would also increase.
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The degree of threat to the United States is also
directly proportional to the degree of US involvement
in coca eradication. Reportedly, Cochabamba traf-
fickers are already financing the Alejo Calatayud
Command. If the traffickers' supply of coca were to
become scarcer because of US-funded eradication or
if they felt threatened by other antinarcotics actions
such as arrest or extradition to the United States,
traffickers would probably increase funding to anti-
eradication insurgents. Furthermore, Bolivia's well-
organized, leftist peasant federations are outraged by
the July 1988 legislation outlawing most coca cultiva-
tion. While their demonstrations have been generally
nonviolent, coca growers (who number over 37,000)
could provide a pool of potential recruits for rural
groups. Indication of a more substantial terrorist-
narco connection would necessitate an upgrading of
the poten livia and US interests and
personnel
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The Bolivian security forces are so limited in capabili-
ties that substantial external assistance would be
necessary should insurgency become a serious threat.
The Bolivians would look to the United States as their
principal source of such aid. The government is likely
to exaggerate the insurgent threat?even if it private-
ly judges it to be low?in order to attract increased
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