THE SOVIET THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP95M00249R000801120013-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/11/16: CIA-RDP95M00249R000801120013-6
PHALANX
June 1983
The Soviet Threat
Robert M. Gates
Seth MORS Symposium
9 March 1983
Standing before this group to talk about the
Soviet strategic threat is a little like being in-
vited to a convention of Evangelicals to talk
about why they should believe in Jesus. It is a
subject on which all of you have heard count-
less briefings and are as a group well informed
in terms of Soviet weapon systems. their capa-
bilities and effectiveness. There is a danger.
however. especially among the well informed,
of becoming lost in the trees. of losing perspec-
tive on the nature of the strategic competition.
Discussion in the United States of the Soviet
threat for too many years has focused on a very
narrow aspect of the competition. That discus-
sion has tended to revolve around the presenta-
tion of the defense budget and often has con-
centrated on what they spend and what they get
for their money and what we should spend and
hope to get for our money. But I would submit
that this limits our national attention too much
to a debate about numbers and too little to why
we are engaged in this competition in the first
place. the nature of that competition, and its
historical context. We have trivialized the most
profound contest in history into metaphysical
debates about kill probabilities. throwweight,
fractionation. fratricide and survivable C'.
Now. I know, that the numbers are important -
especialh at budget time and especially for
those who must propose and those who must
vote on real programs. Indeed. I will talk to you
today about numbers. But the numbers have
crowded out history and meaning. and our
citizens have little basis to judge whether the
cost and nsk of the competition are justified
because they too often do not understand the
nature of the contest itself. So. today. I turn to
the past as a guide to the future. I want to place
the Soviet threat in an historical context and to
discuss the nature of our adversary, his resolve
and commitment to the competition, his
weapons. and the long-range prospects.
First, to the nature of the conflict. Some
would have you believe that this competition is
yet another episode of great power rivalry
growing out of nationalisms rooted in the last
century: that it derives from a serch for security
or to overcome a national sense of inferiority;
or a quest for markets or spheres of influence.
or a host of other traditional modem European
State objectives. More recently, you will have
heard that it is based in misunderstandings or
failure at Yalta or the hobgoblin fantasies of
military industrial complexes on both sides;
that the rivalry is based on old fashioned
thinking, an out-dated cold war mentality, or an
exaggerated suspicion of the other side's in-
tentions.
My personal view is that these explanations
do not go to the hran of the conflict: that it is, in
fact, a conflict deeply rooted in ideas and that
the ideas and the conflict are as old as recorded
history. The threat posed by the Soviet Union
- by Russia - is the lineal descendant of the
same threat Western civilizations have faced
for three and a half thousand years: it is the
threat posed by despotisms against the more or
less steadily developing concept that the
highest goal of the State is to protect and foster
the creative capabilities and the liberties of the
individual. The contest between the United
States and the Soviet Union is. in my view, the
latest chapter in the conflict that pitted the
Athenians against Xerxes and the Persians: the
Romans against Attila and the Huns: Medieval
Europe against Genghis Khan and the Mongol
horde; and the Holy Roman Empire against
Suleiman and the Ottomans. It is the contest
between two elemental and historically op-
posed ideas of the relationship between the
individual and the State. The ideas are
irreconcilable.
Our Alien Adversary
The first point 1 want to make today is that
the threat from Russia is grounded in ideas
older than Marx and Lenin and Bolshevism,
and derives from a culture and civilization fun-
damentally different from our own - despite
the best efforts of some observers to persuade
us that the Russian leaders must think as we do
and inwardly share the same spiritual values
because they wear Saville Row suits, like jazz,
American cigarettes and fast cars, and are per-
sonable and intelligent. Abraham Lincoln is
said to have asked his Cabinet how many'legs a
dog would have if you called the tail a leg. They
all answered five. Lincoln replied, "No, four.
Calling a tail a leg don't make it so." Calling
Russia Westernized or European don't make it
so. It is vital to understand just how different
Russia - the Soviet Union - is from us. to
understand how different is their history. cul-
ture, and outlook. This is an approach un-
welcome to some who see it in American
ethnocentrism or narrow-minded prejudice of
some sort. But listen to the observations of
several noted Russian-born historians, es-
pecially Tibor Szamuely.?
For centuries, "Most incomprehensible and
alien of all. pervading and coloring every West-
ern description of Russia. was the awesome
sway of an omnipotent State exercising unlim-
ited control over the persons. the property. and
the very thoughts of its subjects" - and the
faithful servants of the monarchs of absolutist
Europe were among those who felt this to be a
phenomenon beyond the compass of their expe-
rience. There is a basic fact that today has been
largely forgotten or passed in silence: "Every
country of modem Europe either was at one
time a province of the Roman Empire or re-
ceived its religion from Rome. Russia is the
sole exception. It is the only country of geo-
graphical Europe that owed virtually nothing to
the common cultural and spiritual heritage of
the West."
The absence of natural frontiers for Russia
led to a history of armed struggle against in-
vaders that for length, intensity, and ferocity
has no parallel in the annals of any other nation.
For centuries Russia was the frontier. "the great
open defenseless dividing-line between the set?
tied civilized communities of Europe and the
nomadic barbarian invaders of the Asian step-
pes."This was Russia for a thousand years. The
cruel-relentless struggle never abated. It was a
permanent part of her life for most of her his-
tory. The death of the great Khan Batu saved
Europe from the Mongols: Russia lived under
Mongol rule for 250 years.
This was a national experience and a nation-
al existence radically different from that of the
West. It created a social and political system, a
national character, a mentality, a way of life
utterly dissimilar to the patterns evolved in
Western and Central Europe. The Mongols
gave to Russia a political and administrative
system, a concept of society quite-snlikeLany-
thing learned in the West. The Mongol Empire
was in fact "a State grounded on an ideology."
not just a State among other States but a "World
Empire in the Making." the object of which was
the establishment, by means of war, of a system
of universal peace and of a worldwide social
order.
The three centuries that followed Russia's
proclamation of full sovereignty after expelling
the Mongols were for her people a period of
unremitting and relentless armed struggle such
as no other still existing nation has endured. It
was "the fierce struggle of a nation placed on
the frontier between Europe and Asia, on the
great dividing line between settled and nomadic
society, between Christian, Moslem, and
Pagan. of a poor but hardy resourceful nation
pushed out of its homeland into the inhospitable
environment of northern forests and Arctic
waste." ... , "the struggle of a nation that felt it
had been assigned by Providence and by nature
to the stupendous task of colonizing and set-
tling a wilderness far greater in size than the
whole continent of North America . . . " This
combination of national purpose. moral fervor,
self-defense, and everyday struggle for a bare
existence was the driving force behind the Rus-
sian people's travail. The state of never ending
war gave their society its distinctive form.
In Russia, military service was obligatory
and permanent. In wartime, each and all were
compelled to go to battle. "And wartime was all
the time." To gain an idea of the colossal effort.
compare it with medieval military practice in
Europe. From the 1300s, Russia'raised and
maintained a permanent armed force of 65.000
men. At the battle of Crecy in 1346. the King of
France commanded the largest army yet seen in
feudal Europe - 12,000, and the force of the
First and greatest Crusade numbered 25 -
30,000. And these campaigns were "short-
lived spurts of energy that left their begetters
utterly exha,;cted." Yet Russia, with a much
smaller pr.pu:ation than France. maintained its
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huge arrr. not lust for an isolated campaign but
for 300 unb-nken years. while at the same time
conducting an endless series of wars against
more highly developed Western neighbors and.
also colonizing a continent. The result was the
rise of a political system "based on the un-
questionrne obedience and unlimited submis-
sion of the subjects; on the principle of the
obligatiens owed by each and every subject to
the State, on the impressment into the State's
service of all the creative forces of the nation.
and on the sacrifice of private interest to the
State's demands." The Tsar combined symbols
of terrifying power with very real and ex-
tremely effective authority over the lives and
welfare of every one of his subjects. regardless
of degree or rank. The position of the Tsar (of
the State) was one of unique strength. He was
the sole and exclusive wielder and the source of
power. All authority in the country emanated
from him. He shared power with no one.
The Russians' attitude toward their state was
determined by their acute consciousness of the
fact that only a powerful and rigidly centralized
State in full control of the nation's every re-
source could ensure national survival. Another
determinant was the centuries-old isolation
from Europe and the resulting ignorance and
fear of the outside world. But even these cannot
account for the ecstatic rapture, the exultation
bordering on idolatry with which Russians
learned to regard their country and their State.
"Russia was a state of mind. a secular ideal, a
sacred idea and object of almost religious belief
- unfathomable by the mind, unmeasurable by
the yardstick of rationality."
Messianic Communism in Russia grows out
of a centuries-old identification of Russia with
Orthodox Christianity. its cause with the cause
of God. its State power with the power of God.
The State and the faith became one. In 1510,
this found expression in a monk's address to the
Tsar -Al' Christian Empires have converged
into thy single one: two Romes have fallen. but
the'third sands and no fourth can ever be. Thy
Empire shall fall to no one." This became the
"Russian idea" - dismissed over succeeding
:entunes by Western Statesmen and journalise
as hypocritical mumbo jumbo. Yet. the convic-
tion that Russia occupied a special place in the
-world permeated every segment of the Russian
xople - the ultimate vindication of an other-
.vise unbearable social and political system.
The idea lives on today.
Over the centuries, the Russian idea de-
veloped into an exotic amalgam of emotions
that struck vibrantly upon the high-strung
chords of the Russian soul: "deep national feel-
ing, a sense of belonging to a nation set apart
from others by its own history; . . . the convic-
tion that the individuals' duty toward the State.
.. transcended all other obligations...; the idea
that collectivism . . . was nobler titan in-
dividualism: the assumption that idealism and
other worldliness were inherent in the Russian
national tspintl in contrast to the gross maten-
alism of the Western scheme of values:.. .
consciousness. to the point of exaggeration. of
the profound difference between Russia and the
West: the Messianic fervor that imbued the
'Russian idea', the conviction that the Russian
nation' was a 'God-fearing people' entrusted
with the mission of sharing with others the
revelation of unity and of true freedom which
had been vouchsafed to them alone, and of
redeeming the world from the bonds of in-
dividualism and materialism."
Russia, as it emerged onto the European
stage. had three main peculiarities: I) the mili-
tary structure of the State - "great Russia-in-
arms" fighting West and East for her very ex-
istence; (2) the compulsory. extra-legal nature
of the internal administration and social struc-
twe; (3) and a supreme authority with unlimited
sphere of action. It does sound familiar.
Even at the end of the I8th Century. "West-
cm governments and public opinion began to
assume that Russia was a State much the same
as any other absolute monarchy, only consider-
ably larger, rather more backward, and con-
sequentiy mysterious. To a certain extent, this
was due to ignorance of Russian conditions and
to the remarkably thorough-going way in which
Russian educated society had adapted itself to
the forms of European life. Much more telling.
however, was the unremitting conscious effort
of the government itself to implant. both abroad
and at home, the image of a well-ordered soci-
ety that had chosen its political system partly
out of necessity and partly for its manifested
advantages." .
A final note on the nature of our adversary.
Much has been made in recent months about
technology transfer to the USSR. I would point
out to you that industry and technology were
transplanted from the West to Russia. begin-
ning with Italian architecture in the 14th Cen-
tury and carried forward by Peter the Great.
imagine. if you will, the sight of the great
seven-foot tall Tsar touring and working as a
laborer in Western Europe in the late 17th cen-
tury to learn the ways of the West. to him
Western technicians and craftsmen and to ac-
quire whole industries and technologies and
factories - which he would bring back to Rus-
sia to begin to modernize that backward State.
And, as Szamuely observes, this artificial crea-
tion was forced upon an unwilling nation by
Peter to overcome its military weakness. The
very act of modernizing Russia -of establish-
ing and exploiting contacts with the West -
from the beginning was to make Russia a great
military power. Did Peter intend that
Westernization accompany modernization? He
once told a companion, "We shall need Europe
for a few decades, and then we can turn our
backside to her." Can the Soviets' still aggres-
sive quest for Western technology surprise us,
realizing that the development of industry in
that land originated with a transplant. a foreign
graft, artificially protected and fostered by the
State from then until now?
It is this unique State which is now confront
a State and a culture shaped by a thousand
years of constant war, sacrifice. and the convic-
tion that Russia's destiny is to establisn a new
world order. And still we ask if they can sustain
their defense effort.
The Threat
With this historical insight into the nature of
our rival, let me turn to its military machine -
the threat itself. The Soviet Union embarked on
a long-term buildup of strategic forces which
will continue throughout the decade: a com-
prehensive program intended to achieve mili-
tary objectives against the United States and
Eurasia and involving improvements to offen-
sive and defensive forces and the means to
control them. The estimated dollar costs, ex-
cluding RDT&E of Soviet strategic forces
during the Iasi decade were more than three
times US outlays. In 1981 alone, estimated
dollar costs of Soviet intercontinental attack
forces exceeded US outlays by about 50 percent
-even at a time when the US was investing in
Trident. air launched cruise missiles, and B-52
enhancement programs.
ICBMs
The Soviet ICBM force currently consists of
;nearly r 41,1Q launchers. More than half are SS-
17. SS - Ifs. and SS-19 missiles. most of which
are equipped with multiple. independently tar-
getable reentry vehicles (MIR Vs). The Soviets
have nearly completed a modernization pro-
gram to deploy large numbers of the most accu-
rate versions of these ICBM systems. As a
result, the Soviets now possess the necessary
combination of ICBM numbers, reliability,
accuracy, and warhead -yield to put most of the
US Minuteman and Titan silos at risk from an
attack with a relatively small proportion of their
ICBM force. Each warhead on the MIRVed
SS-18. for example. has a better than 50 per-
cent chance of destroying a Minuteman silo.
The single R V versions of the SS-18. with their
large destructive power and accuracy. are cap-
able of destroying, with high probabilirv, cur-
rent fixed targets. ICBMs not suitable for hard-
ened installations can be targeted against
strategic bomber airfields. conventional mili-
tary bases, including ports for repair and basing
of US SSBNs, and administrative and eco-
nomic centers. In 1981, estimated Soviet dollar
costs for ICBMs were 10 times as large as US
outlays.
Soviet ICBM modernization will continue
over the next 10 years. We already have identi-
fied four new ICBM programs. These pro-
grams feature further improvements in accura-
cy and increased survivability. One is a solid-
fueled missile, believed to be medium-sized,
which carries a MIRV payload and is probably
intended as a replacement for the SS-I I and
perhaps the SS-17. Another may serve as a
mobile ICBM. While retaining existing types
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of iiq,ic missiles, such as the SS-18, future
solid-propellant ICBM development and de-
ployment v. ill give the Soviets additional
flexibility in handling and in basing their mis-
sile forces.
The Soviets currently have deployed over
5,000 warheads on their ICBMs. They are in a
position to add several thousand warheads to
their ICBM force by the end of the decade.
SLBMS
The Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile
submarine force currently consists of 62 mod-
em SSBNs. These SSBNs - YANKEE, DE-
LTA. and TYPHOON-class units - are armed
with 950 missiles (SLBMS) with a total of
almost 2.000 nuclear warheads. The estimated
cumulative dollar costs between 1972-81 of
Soviet SLBM programs was about 65 percent
greater than corresponding outlays by the US.
The range capabilities of the Soviet SLBMs
capable of strikes against the US vary from
3.000 kilometers for the SS-N-6. carried by
YANKEE-class submarines. to 9,100 kilo-
meters for the SS-N-8, carried by DELTA I and
11-class units. The accuracies and yields of
these missiles also vary, but none currently
have the combination of accuracy and yield
necessary to threaten hard targets such as US
ICBM silos. Soviet SLBMS would, however,
be effective against a range of targets, in-
cluding US SSBNs in port and bomber bases.
The portion of the bomber force held on alert
for rapid take-off would escape the strike.
assuming DOD planning factors are correct.
Over the next 10 years. the Soviets will de-
ploy more SSBNs armed with long-range,
more accurate missiles. Their force of sub-
marines with long-range missiles is capabl. of
striking targets in the United States while
remaining in waters close to the Soviet Union
where they can be protected by other naval and
air forces.
The overall size of the force is likely to
remain unchanged. But. as newer MIRV-
capable SLBMs are deployed in greater num-
bers, the Soviet SSBN force will be able to
cover additional targets. If the SS-NX-20 car-
ried by the TYPHOON-class submarines were
fined with seven warheads - the number car-
tied by the SS-N-18 - six TYPHOONs could
cover more targets than all of the current op-
erational YANKEES together. The accuracy of
Soviet SLBMs will improve over the next 10
years and the), might achieve a limited hard
target capability by the early 1990s.
IRBMs
The Soviets currently have some 580 in-
termediate and medium range ballistic missiles
carrying about 1,250 warheads deployed in
bases throughout the USSR. They still have
about 240 older SS-4 MRBMs and SSS
IRBMs. They also have deployed about 340
highly accurate SS-20 mobile IRBMs, each
with three independently targetable warheads.
All but about 100 of these are opposite NATO.
The Soviets have instituted a moratorium
against additional SS-20 deployments in the
western USSR, but we expect the force to ex-
pand in the east.
Bombers
Even in this area the US has considered its
preserve for many years, the Soviets are
showing new interest. The Soviets are de-
veloping a new intercontinental bomber that is
similar in appearance to, but larger than, the US
B-l. The new bomber will probably begin to
enter service with the Soviet Air Forces during
the mid-to-late 1980s. It is expected to have a
supersonic capability and the ability to pene-
trate Western air defenses at low altitudes. The
Soviets probably will configure the new bom-
ber to carry- free-fall bombs and long-range
cruise missiles. This weapon flexibility would
allow them to use some of the new bombers to
penetrate air defenses and deliver bombs, while
using others as standoff platforms for launching
cruise missiles.
The Soviets currently have some 150 heavy
bombers assigned to their strategic aviation
forces. Almost half of these aircraft - some 70
TU-95 Bear- are equipped with air-to-surface
missiles that can be used to attack both land and
naval targets. These aircraft could be reequip-
ped within the next several years to carry long-
range cruise missiles. The additional cruise
missile carriers could be used to complement
the new bombers.
The Soviets continue to produce about 30
Backfire bombers per year and about half are
assigned to the Soviet Air Force. The Backfire
probably is intended for strikes against land and
naval targets on the periphery of the Soviet
Union and Warsaw Pact countries, but has the
capability to perform missions against the US
under certain circumstances. Moreover, the
Soviets also may choose to equip it with long-
range cruise missiles, which would increase
significantly the area threatened by the Back-
fire.
Ballistic Missile Defense
The USSR is currently upgrading and ex-
panding ballistic missile defenses at Moscow
within the limits of the ABM Treaty. The
Soviets will increase the number of ABM laun-
chers at Moscow to the Treaty limit of 100 by
the mid-1980s. Such a force could be easily
overcome by a large US missile attack, but it
would provide some protection against small
attacks. Research, development, and test pro-
grams are improving their ability to expand
ABM defenses, although there is no evidence at
this time that they are planning to do so.
In the strategic defense area generally -
ABM, SAMS. interceptors. and control and
warning systems - the estimated cumulative
dollar costs of Soviet spending were more than
ten times as great as US outlays between 1972
and 1981 and for 1981 alone more than 20 times
as great, reflecting differences in the two coun-
tries' strategic doctrine and differences in the
bomber threat.
The great disparity between Soviet and US
outlays year after year for a decade - and
before that, Soviet expenditures in strategic
weaponry in the late 1960s and early 1970s
when US defense resources were focused on
'Vietnam - has led-to substantial cumulative
advantages for the USSR.
And do we see a slowing? In the first three
years of this deade, we have already identified
as many systems under development as in each
of the previous two decades. Among these are
fighter and airborne warning and control air-
craft, ballistic and cruise missiles, space sys-
tems and submarines. We project that more
systems will reach initial operational capability
in the 1980s than in either the 1960s or 1970s.
The new systems cover the full range of tech-
nologically advanced weaponry the Soviets
will need to modernize all major elements of
their forces.
Steady expansion of production floorspace
- averaging 2-3 percent a year - has also
occurred since the mid-seventies. This has pro-
vided the Soviets with the potential to translate
the new systems into deployments in the field.
The Challenge in the Third World
In many respects. a description of Soviet
intercontinental attack forces, and even the
forces opposite NATO and China, tends to
;obscure what I regard as the more immediate
threat posed by the Soviet Union now and for
years to come: the challenge in the Third
World. Even here the Soviets bring important
advantages.
? The first is the ability to provide substantial
quantities of weapons of varying degrees of
sophistication with great speed and often
attractive terms to countries in need of arms,
either for internal control. national defense.
or aggression. The steady flow of arms from
the great depot at Nikolayev to Syria. Cuba,
Iraq. and a host of other nations is testimony
to attractiveness of Soviet weapons. What is
so dismaying is the ready availability of huge
stocks of weapons, which permit the Soviets
to answer calls for military equipment almost
immediately. And with the weapons come
Soviet advisors, maintenance, and resupply.
? A second advantage is the Soviet program of
active measures or coven action. All that
need be said and can be said is that the pro-
gram is vast, sophisticated, well-funded, and
highly professional. It incorporates the full
range of such activities, including agents of
influence, political manipulation, pro-
paganda. forgeries, and disinformation, ex-
ploitation of instability, and support of in-
surgencies.
? A third advantage is an aggressive program of
training for both military and security forces
in host countries and in the Soviet Union
itself. ,
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A to:rth advantage is the soviets opporru?
run to make use of surrogate or proxy goy
ernrnents which provide military forces. In
Ethiopia and Angola. the Cubans help main-
tair? the current governments in power and at
the same time are able to ensure that forces
hostile to the Soviet Union and Cuba do not
threaten sympathetic governments. In Cen-
tral Amenca. Cuba has armed Nicaragua
with older Soviet weapons and Nicaragua in
turn has become an exporter of revolution and
insurgency. Surrogates minimize the cost and
risks for the Soviet Union of involvement in
the Third World and at the same time lessen
the chances of the kind of dramatic expulsion
that the Soviets endured in 1972 in Egypt or
the loss of a sympathetic figure as in Chile in
the early 1970s.
In sum. I believe the most likely immediate
threat from the Soviet Union during the next
decade will be the Soviets ' exploitation of eco-
nomic. social, and political problems in the
Third World to foster instability, and that the
arsenal of tools they have at their disposal
makes them a formidable adversary in this are-
na as well as in the strategic military competi-
tion. It is not accidental that their new more
active role in the Third World began in the
mid-1970s and coincided with our expulsion
from-Vietnam. That and subsequent events led
the Soviets to conclude that the United States
would not compete militarily in the Third
World. As long as they perceive the risks of
confrontation with this country to be small,
they will not hesitate to exploit any opportuni-
ties that present themselves.
The Soviets also see an opportunity to ex-
ploit differences between this country and our
allies and will use every means at their disposal
to magnify those differences and to use them to
divide the West. In the forefront of this has
.been their broad effort to derail the deployment
of INF. While it is hard to quantify the magni-
tude of that effort. I can tell you that there: have
b rt some estimates that their campaign to
prevent deployment of the enhanced radiation
weapon (neutron bomb) in the late 1970s in-
volved a coven program costing perhaps as
much as S 100 million.
A final word about the threat. I believe we
will not see open Soviet aggression against an
ally or China or Iran. for these art dramatic
actions the Russians know would galvanize the
West. and give new life to NATO and pmt-
pa.redness even in the most cost-conscious
countries. No. the Soviet way has been far
more clever than Hitler's open aggression.
They strive to avoid armed conflict with impor-
tant and militarily strong adversaries, as in
1939 and in 1962. They use military power
cautiously and most often when they have over-
whelming force. But they advance where there
is a vacuum, where hostile forces are weak, or
they insinuate themselves through clandestine
means. They believe time is on their side; there
is no need to hurry. The fruit will drop when it
is ripe. And the circumstances will usually be
sufficiently ambiguous that their role cannot be
proven to a skeptical, disbelieving West.
Vulnenbllitieea
I have sketched out a mindset and an arsenal
of weapons and other instruments of foreign
policy that suggest that we face a formidable
adversary indeed. But it is an adversary with
weaknesses and vulnerabilities:
? The United States does not stand alone. The
Soviet Union faces also a powerful NATO
Alliance in the West, and China in the East.
The military might of the United States and
its allies is prat and growing stronger. The
economic might and technological prowess
of the United States and its allies is over-
whelming.
? The Soviet economy is in trouble. There art
sips that the factories may have trouble pro-
ducing all of the weapons and equipment that
the Soviet military would like to obtain.
? The Soviet Union depends impbrsantiy on
imports of pain, technology, and production
techniques from the West.
? The Soviet Union cannot rely upon its allies:
indeed, revolts over a generation in Hungary,
Poland. and Czechoslovakia raise questions
of the reliability of their forces for the War-
saw Pact. The inability of the Soviet Union to
absorb these states is. in itself, evidence of
the fundamental cultural and historical con-
trast between Europe. of which they are a
part, and Russia.
? The Soviet Union has little to offer de-
veloping nations either in terms of economic
assistance or as a model of an effective eco-
nomy.
? Russian advisors, military and civilian, tend
to be detested in virtually every country in
which they an hosted.
In sum, the Soviets are not ten feet tall and
they do not march in seven league boots. They
have problems and they have vulnerabilities.
both of which can be exploited. But they art
also flexible, patient and determined. Lenin
once said "Two steps forward, one step back."
Despite its great vulnerabilities. Russia grew
over the centuries in just this way - probing
outward, exploiting opportunities and the vul-
nerabilities of its enemies, enduring setbacks
(some of them dramatic), but always
reasserting the relentless pressure. This was the
pattern of Russian expansionism for centuries,
and so it still remains.
Conclusions
Will Durant once calculated that in the last
3,400 years of recorded history, only 268 have
seen no war. The monumental conflicts in my
story, as described at the beginning, were those
between the emerging civilizations of the West
with one concept of the relationship between an
individual and the State, and the despotisms
and barbarisms of the East with a fundamental-
ly different view of that relationship. And when
"those Western civilizations grew tired or lost
their will, or for whatever reason let down their
guard. destruction followed. Edward Gibbon's
words in The Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire still seem relevant today: "The Ro-
man's were ignorant of the extent of their danger
and the number of their enemies. Beyond the
Rhine and the Danube, the Northern countries
of Europe and Asia were filled with innumer-
able tribes of hunters and shepherds, poor,
voracious and turbulent; bold in arms and im-
patient to ravage the fruits of industry ... The
endless column of barbarians pressed on the
Roman Empire with accumulated weight." A
thousand years of Russian history - and
.Marxism-Leninism as well - whisper to the
'Soviet leadership that conflict is inevitable, that
the contest for supremacy is unending. that one
side will win and the other will lose. and that
destiny or God or the forces of history will
ensure Russia's victory.
President Kennedy some 20 years ago
observed that we were involved in a long Twi-
light struggle. We have now been in that strug-
gle for just 35 years. Compare that. if you will,
with the centuries of struggle between Rome
and the barbarians, the two and a half century
struggle between Europe and the Mongol
horde, and the 200 year struggle against the
Tunes. It is a long struggle that stretches before
.us and the Russians are banking on the fact that
we lack the will to sustain the competition.
As a final thought, therefore. I would
suggest to you that the chief threat posed by the
Soviet Union is not necessarily in the vastness
of its military forces - though vast they are,
but, like the barbarians facing Rome, in the
relentlessness of their assault. The "endless
column of barbarians" is pressing on. The ques-
tion of inestimable historical importance as we
strive both to counter the Soviet threat and to
diminish the dangers of nuclear conflict, is
whether we will remember the origin and na-
ture of the context, and the lessons of history:
that the whole historical experience of our
adversary teaches him that conflict is constant
and inevitable; and that eventual victory in the
competition is Russia's destiny and the jus-
tification for its centuries of hardship and sacri-
fice. And so. despite our fondest hopes to fulfill
isaiah's prophesy, all of human history - and
especially all of Russian history - points to our
need and the need of our children and their
children for swords as well as plowshares. It is
not a forecast of an altogether felicitous future
-Newly all of the following points an quosed or pVtphmm d
from Tibor Sranwelv's The Arsdao Treditioo (McGrI*-
Hill book Company, Se- Vat. 19141. u4w in min Biro
cow biuorwrs such as Paul Miiiuko. and V Kliuchev$ky.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/11/16: CIA-RDP95M00249R000801120013-6