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November 4, 2016
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January 24, 2005
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April 13, 1979
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PDF icon CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5.pdf593.02 KB
MM IL % 07, (N1) Approved F ~Mea~RYR8R001200210002-5 I UJ DAMI-ISH 13 Apr 79 SUBJECT: GRILL FLAME (U) 1. (U) Summary: a. (S/ORCON) Under the coordination of an OSD oversight committee established by Dr. Ruth Davis, the DIA, Army, and Air Force are initiating low level efforts to better understand whether there exists militarily usable psychokinetic (psychoenergetic?) effects. This effort responds to written interest by Congressman Rose, Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and Service interest in whether there is potential adverse consequence to known extensive efforts in the Soviet Union in this area. b. (S/ORCON) Prior work by the CIA"& recent low level support of experiments at SRI by DIA and Army has been contracted through the Air Force Foreign Technology Labs at Dayton. These effort's and others supported at SRI have led to both most unusual apparent capability for remote viewing and great controversy among the scientific community as to the clinical suitability of the experiments. c. (S/ORCON) As a consequence the OSD and the Army believe it is crucial to conduct controlled in-house experiments under competent technical staffs who are with high assurance not emotionally involved with the existance or non-existance of the phenomenon. nn0Ld 7L n r1fi 7 M 61 R 61 n,71,j V, 6 TO I CLASSIFIED BY: ACSI DA REVIEW ON: 13 Apr 99 REASON: PARA 2-3Olc ~ DOD 5200.141(3) S~fsif RDI~1T Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 Approve 0788R001200210002-5 d. (S/ORCON) Prior to any work starting, the standard procedures for protocol verification in cases where human subjects will be accomplished. To overview the Army efforts, an informal oversight committee has been established under Dr. Yore of the Staff of the Assistant Secretary of Army for R&D. 2. (U) Chronology: a. (S/ORCON) Stanford Research Institute: In 1971, two laser physicists, Dr. Hal Puthof and Mr. Russel Targ, became involved in a research program to scientifically investigate PSI. In 1972, they had the good fortune to acquire the talents of a psychic of some renown, Ingo Swann. Swann demonstrated the ability not only to remotely view targets at great distance from him, but, also was able to somehow affect physical objects mentally. In a now famous experiment conducted in 1972, Swann was able to significantly disturb, on command, a superconducting magnetometer, which was as shielded as technology could'make it. In 1973 a second formidable psychic came on board. He was.Pat Price, a retired police inspector. Price had no trouble becoming extremely adept at RV. More recently, Hella Hammond has joined the SRI effort as a psychic and although was first picked as a control case, thought to have no ability whatsoever, she has performed some rather amazing feats. b. (U) CIA: (1) (S/ORCON) In April 1972, the CIA became interested in potential intelligence applications of PSI. After discussions with Puthof and Targ, a modest effort began. 2 UOG~~LL FL U7 (J) kd?9(? a?LD/MI 12D C~awMD V Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 MOLL [I ~ LTV#or Release 2005/03/09: CIA-R 96-00788R001200210002-5 (2) (S/ORCON) By October 1972, the investigation had expanded to allow a more complete research plan. The results were surprising, encouraging, and disputed within the CIA by skeptics from ORD* and budding advocates within OSI* (3) (S/ORCON) In Summer 1973, Price, working only from a set of geographic coordinates read to him, provided striking descriptions of a "military-like" facility. As it turned out, the place was a sensitive NSA installation in West Virginia. Price was able to penetrate into the building and among other accurate descriptions, was able to correctly name people working there--but, most important, spoke out classified codewords he "read" from file folders. (4) (S/ORCON) Next, CIA decided to give Price the coordinates of a Soviet facility whose exact R&D mission was unknown. An extremely elaborate protocol was developed to guard against fraud or other criticism. Price again provided a great deal of information, but typically there was a mix of signal to noise; good data comingled with spurious. Of particular note, however, is a drawing and oral description of a large "crane" at the target site. Later, CIA analysts concluded that either Remote Viewing had taken place, or Price had intimate knowledge of theURDF-3 (an over- head platform). (5) (S/ORCON) It was decided to see if Price could operationally assist in technical collection efforts. In two tests checked against the interior plans of foreign embassies known to CIA audio specialists, Price correctly located the coderooms, leading the operations officer to agree *ORD: Office of Research and D I: Office of Scientific Intelligence Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 ~COREY LLJ (6) (S/ORCON) In Fall 1974, an experiment was conducted in-house by CIA engineers familiar with the SRI-Price coordinates protocol. The result was a description of what could only be a SA-5 missile training site at the coordinates. The Libyan desk officer was impressed, and indi- cated that a HUMINT agent had previously reported the same information. (7) (S/ORCON) In July 1975, Libyan coordinates were provided to Price, who came back with a description of a guerrilla training site-- again, confirmed by CIA analysts from clandestine agent reporting. The same month Price tragically died of a heart attack. (8) (S/ORCON) Since July 1975, CIA interest hats remained minimal and unofficial. The Agency claims to have stopped all work, but there may be a small, "clandestine" project-still going among a few advocates. The primary reason for abandoning the effort was fear of winning a "Golden Fleece Award." c. (U) Army: (1) (S/ORCON) Army's interest in Psychoenergetics (PSI) goes back to 1972 and 1975 when the Surgeon General (MIIA), with DIA, published studies of Soviet/Bloc work. (2) (S/ORCON) In 1976, USAMICOM informally expressed interest in US replication of claimed Soviet experiments. SRI worked up a small program, and in August 1977 a one-year, $80K contract was let by MICOM. Work was to be accomplished under the innocuous title, "Investigation of Unconventional Discrimination Techniques." Of particular interest was Soviet efforts along the line of man-machine interface;e.g., radar operators continuing to guide AA missiles to the target despite the CRT images being obscured by chaff. MOURA (9) ~S_E,CREY CUM w WNRIKI UMM Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 ,d Release 2005/03 ELC~% "' 1,oJLT/0 9. r, tt ? 00788R001200210002-5 V (3) (S/ORCON) By Spring 1978, enough "demonstrations" of the phenomenon existed to warrant serious consideration for a comprehensive program to explore military application of PSI. Most promising were three subareas: Remote Viewing (RV), Psychokinesis (PK), and Telepathy. The Army ACSI was designated focal point to develop a DA program along the following criteria: (a) moderate intensity, low profile, (b) balanced distribution of work--avoid overlap and husband scarce resources, (c) balanced in-out house effort, (d) in-house effort first center on replicating SRI-type organizations' experiments, (e) consider both basic and applied research, and (f) fit within any future DOD program. A complete security envelope was placed over Army's interest in PSI, and the effort was given the unclassified nickname, GRILL FLAME. (4) (S/ORCON) In March 1978, Targ and Puthof presented a talk on RV to a select AMSAA"DARCOM audience. This led to increased effort by AMSAA to explore RV in harmony with DA guidance, as it might apply to target acquisition and target description: (a) ascertain location and activity status of enemy units, (b) detect changes in status of places like enemy assembly areas, (c) detect, identify, and report activity of enemy equipment, and (d) provide real time battle damage assessment. Also of prime interest was accessing enemy communications, and command and control s stems. N~xr PAGE? O (S/ORCON) In August 1978, Dr. Vorona, DIA', chaired a meeting to develop a coordinated DOD program. A permanent Working Group, comprised of representatives from all interested agencies/services, was 75 lf'~l":1~1h1 (U) W~La~ dG~ Eaodola seam tea Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 Approved For 'Mc insert this paragraph: 2c(5) renumber subsequent paragraphs please: 78R001200210002-5 (.5 (S,ORCON) In Juty 1978, DIA sponsored a series of four unique experiments, in which intelligence analysts intimately familiar with target sites interfaced directiy with the Remote Viewer. The DIA Project Officer had prepared three sets of Soviet/Bloc target coordinates, and one US control set. Even he did not know the coordinates, until the moment they were read aloud to the Viewer, Ingo Swann. Immediateiy upon hearing the coordinates, Swann verbalized about and drew sketches of the target. Only tow correlation of target description to actual site was achieved in the first three trials. However, Swann provided a -moderate to high", Lengthy description of ttie ~~st target, a Soviet strategic missije field east of Moscow; a significant achievement. Most SG1A SG1A amazing perhaps, Swann passed through a si,.o cover, "?traaveiiing" down until reaching a connecting tunnel. Going through this passageway he entered a command and control room. One comment, among many, stands out: The floors are paved in "white tiles... u tdutf ~R ~t(t0)t~tt~ n ~-1 ED L5 .)[E t 1n W rt ED W ?n i t1 Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 MCA, 1~9i , (9) 7 T established and has met a number of times to: (a) ensure scientifically acceptable experiments and evaluation methodologies, (b) ensure valid investigation of military applications of PSI and, (c) investigate significance of foreign technical and military PSI efforts. The Working Group also acts as a clearing house for information on the subject within the DOD framework, and monitors protocols for compliance with legal and medical. guidelines. 7 (.$) (S ORCON) In Sep-Oct 1978, Arn ACSI/and INSCOM designed a small program to narrowly examine purely intelligence application of RV. The concept was to familiarize (train) a cadre of personnel who had been subjectively culled from the whole INSCOM organization. Selection criteria included: above average intelligence, outgoing personality, adventuresome, open-minded, mature, artistic nature, and successful life,'career. It was preferred that the individual not have in-depth PSI knowledge or background. The following intelligence PSI applications were identified: locating and effecting undetected entry into denied enemy units/facilities; SALT verification; advance warning of hostilities; "reading" enemy battle plans and intentions; tracking and locating key enemy commanders,,others; and, surveillance of known or suspected enemy clandestine HUMINT opera- tions and activities. Implicit was the development of appropriate counter- measures to known or suspected enemy PSI capabilities. () (S/ORCON) AMSAA concluded a contract in September 1978 to have SRI conduct a number of experiments in support of the areas of .interest outlined in paragraph 2c(4) above;These would be carried out CG30~:(~ FLM127 M CL 1,P, U U'"I' A EDO NEW Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 Approved For Release 2005/03( [ F-l m-~D, nu (0) (S'ORCON) In Oct 78, Congressman Rose (NC), expressed in writing to Dr. Davis, DDR&E, his strong desire for DOD'to undertake PSI investigation. He promised full support for the program. On 13 Feb 79, Congressman Rose and others from the House Intelligence Committee were briefed by SRI, Dr. Vorona, and John Kramar, AMSAA Project Officer. Again, full support and commitment to the program was tendered by Rose-- the others seemed impressed by what they had heard. O (S/ORCON) Also on 13 Feb the GRILL FLAME DOD Steering Committee first met to hear and offer comments on the program's develop- mental status. Committee members: All Service ACSIs, Dr. Ruth Davis, Dr. LaBerge, and Dr. Vorona. The tone of the meeting was a positive one. O (S'ORCON) Ms Volner, AGC, provided legal guidance on SG1I SG1I 15 Feb 79, to the effect that any GRILL FLAME protocol should be reviewed by the Surgeon General's Human Use Testing Committee. If found to involve humans as subjects of research, or "risk" was entailed, appropriate HEW guidelines and AR 70-25 would apply. /vt (40) (S/ORCON) On 6 Mar SRI briefed, at his request, 00788R001200210002-5 Also on request, subsequent briefings were provided to him by DIA, CIA, and Army. (Note: Impression by Army briefers is that are positive on the subject, and most likely will soon give Dr. Brzenzski and the President a full scale pitch on the program. have also talked with Dr. Davis.) , SG1I SG1I SG1I Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 DP96-00788R001200210002-5 1 /3 (44) (S/ORCON) On 26 Mar SRI and AMSAA presented their RV- related protocols to the Surgeon General's ad hoc Human Use Subcommittee for GRILL FLAME. That panel judged the proposed RV work to be technology transfer and application oriented, rather than research or testing; ]therefore, HEW and AR 70-25 did not apply. It was recommended, however, that: (a) adequate scientific review of research protocols should be provided, (b) a behavioral scientist should participate in protocol execution, and (c) separate organizations like AMSAA and MICOM should develop Human Use Review Committees and processes. There recommendations will be incorporated whenever appropriate. i4~ O (S.'ORCON) This week, MG Thompson requested,the Surgeon General designate, by name, a fully qualified behavioral scientist to act as consultant during protocol development. In addition, the Chief of the Army Science Board, Dr. Yore, was directed by the Under Secretary of the Army to put together a small team of four-five highly regarded individuals of diverse backgrounds, to assist in protocol development, and to later monitor the work for its technical and scientific credibility. 3. (U) Other US Government "players": a,. (S/ORCON) USAF: Has maintained a small program over the past few years mainly to replicate known or claimed Soviet PSI experiments. Since March 1979, AF ACSI has displayed a positive attitude toward the subject and it is possible that within a year the AF program will escalate significantly. 'ELL iFd\L0 (U) SEE C RE OUD"d?S~B N umulOdDo /~1~2, D C~17, 1 M V Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 772-C Approved Fo Release n, ~i, MIN b. (S/ORCON) Navy: In the early 70s, conducted some PSI experiments, but claims to have dropped out (perhaps because of criticism by press/ Congress of "weird" projects). Suspicion lingers among Army project personnel that Navy may have nevertheless kept a tightly compartmented effort going. Navy reps attend all DOD meetings, but remain uncommitted and literally silent. 4. (U) CURRENT/FUTURE STATUS: a. (S/OR(JN) Army Science Board: Dr. Yore is now lining up team members and within two weeks will meet with them to schedule field trips to SRI, AMSAA, INSCOM and MIA. Dr. Yore will advise and report directly to the Undersecretary. b. (S/ORCON) MICOM. Concentrating on development of a program to exploit potential offered by PK. First, "Phase Zero" calls for replication and evaluation of certain experiments already designed and performed by out-house organizations like SRI. Funds are available for a complete program, but intention is to commit only some contractor support monies for Phase Zero; the remainder held in abeyance until that phase is completed. The following near term actions expected within two weeks: (1) a committee of three senior scientists and engineers has been appointed to review the entire PK program, (2) the committee will select a qualified scientist as program director and, (3) the program director will be assured of a quality staff by the committee. Upon completion of Phase Zero the following objectives, to which fixed milestones have not been 9 UL MOLLS U'I~t~till 1U) L&ANINE aodo/J ZED Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 ~Ou~ fl T~A oQFor Relea CGL~G~ 6 05/0 : IA -- RDP96-00788 RR001200210002-5 EI decided by MICOM, will be achieved: (1) Develop a PK-activated switch and (2) conduct an intensive analytical effort. The PK-switch phase will involve development of specialized software, hardware and algorithyms. The analytical effort will include research of modern physics and formu- lation of a protocol to look for the PK "mechanism." c. (S/ORCON) INSCOM - currently in the initial phase of familiarizing and introducing six RV specialists to the subject matter. Over the next six months they will discreetly filter out to SRI for `"training" in RV techniques. The INSCOM contract is $95K. Long term objectives include (1) refine specific abilities identified in each of the RV specialists, (2) establish intelligence collection procedures using RV and, (3) establish an institutional system for responding to validated tactical and strategic intelligence collection requirements (ICRs). Milestones: Feb 79 - Jul 79 Initial orientation May 79 - Aug 79 Individual training at SRI Aug 79 - Dec 80 Refine specific individual abilities Oct 79 - Mar 80 Establish response mechanixm to ICRs May 80 - Dec 80 Initial introduction of RV data to intelligence cycle. Although only a very few INSCOM experiments have been conducted, all in the past two weeks, first cut analysis is encouraging with a moderate- to-high degree of target correlation. However, it is still too early to make any accurate assessments or predictions. e. (S/ORCON) AMSAA - On-going effort is divided between contractor (SRI) development of RV techniques; and AMSAA independent challenge/veri- fication of those methods and outputs. Through March 1979, SRI accomplished the following of significance: (1) Remote Viewer(s) accurately located person(s) unknown to him, with four out of five first place blind SE OUdd RUV s (O) QKOOls MOO O/M 200 tea ~ Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 SERF car add do ; JJ c~) Approved For Release 2005/03/09: CIA-RDP9**(Ni__IA judge matches and, (2) three experienced RV specialists scored well beyond chance in determining access codes to computers. Current contract with SRI is about $190K. Between April 79 and March 80, SRI will perform as follows: TASK ONE: (1) Conduct RV.sensing tests on Units/'equipment at Fort Ord. (2) Provide to AMSAA relevant RV data, protocols and procedures. (3) Provide guidance necessary to establish in-house RV program. (4) Conduct training of AMSAA personnel on a ten-choice numerical device. TASK TWO: Apply and evaluate RV techniques relative to: (1) Tracking and locating key enemy personnel. (2) Detect change in status of military unit. (3) Rapidly determine damage resulting' from non-nuclear attack. (4) Determine access code to computers; and other electronic hardware, (5) Determine countermeasures to enemy RV. (6) Determine general context of enemy, documents and other information items. Recently, a number of in-house RV trials were conducted', in accordance with established SRI protocols, with encouraging results. The first were of the "inbound and outbound" experimenter variety (beacon individual goes .to target). The next phase (near term) will use the geographic coordinate SEC RELL MUTT T (9) L~L1~Ci_[_; M, li" aD C I M M V Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5 G TL~1, C ~'IIIP96-00788RO01 d; ai~r L200210002-5 protocol. Targets will be selected that are both distinctive in nature, and which can be coorelated to tactical maps. Multiple viewers will be used in an attempt to better "fix" precise target locations. A major goal is to.develop better procedures for technically demonstrating the existence or non-existence of RV (NOTE: AMSAA and INSCOM work very closely on the PSI effort. Within the spirit of a true team effort, MICOM will probably fold in well with these organizations, resulting in the most efficient approach to the problem.) MM511 id/,i ' (C~) LET G 0 12 GdG~S~ aUdC/~_~a~ ~a~a~7 Approved For Release 2005/03/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5