RECOMMENDED AGENDA ITEMS

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250018-5
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RIFPUB
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U
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
November 4, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 12, 2000
Sequence Number: 
18
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NOTES
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PDF icon CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250018-5.pdf136.05 KB
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Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250018-5 RECOMMENDED AGENGA ITEMS 1. Committee Composition: By~osition, rather than by name. b. Include observers outside.DoJ. (By name in this case; e.g., DDavis. Note: Several months ago she suggested the possibility of including individuals from the c and perhaps Congress.) 2. Meeting Frequency: Essentially a clerical problem, but needs to be resolved. Possibility of semiannual or quarterly. Should be fixed; e.g., second Thursday of each quarter. 3. Should Committee receive detailed updates from the DoD players? Be briefed only by the Chairman of the Working Group? (Note: Recommend our position be selggl eg4_l?rj of rxgs by players. on rotational basis. Chairman has shown little inclination to stay an top of developments, or to get out and give briefings.) 4. Deg grate the ,, g rsng.,C nittee,,,leader once and fc?r _.: (most important issue). Two basic factors at play: a. What is nature of evolving program -- looking out next few years? If essentially logic calls for that line of leadership, starting with Dr LaBerged Tf it is in fact a proven case of utility, intPJ jcipe should lead. If it is policy, it is up for grabs. (Note: Strongly reccxromend that f ,qrjap,~,,t ...feL^I.. Years. we._ bov~ to R&D le to pursue this issue in a more scientific, less cumbersome, vigorous way. We should content ourselves to adding "soft" issues as needed; e.g., potential security problems, bad publicity, etc. Intelligence involvement should be constrained to compact, discreet pursuit of utility value.) b. At present who has shown significant co nittment? Again, in terms of the major factor, scarce resources, it has been the R&D community. Their levels, rightly so, are many times greater than anyone else. IntellU.gerice has been self--conbrainea. (rightly so) and policy organizations (if any exist) zero. Basic fact is that R&D seems to have charter -- plus extraordinary amount of raw power in terms of money, times to spend it, personnel, etc. 5. Individual members of steering Committee should take special, specific responsibilites regarding the program. One person, probably the chosen leader, should keep SECDEF up to date. Another principal should do same for Congress. Other suitable responsibilites should be identified. 6. In the near future, depending upon how the Steering Committee feels about the total analysis, including the scientific, some thought might be given to developing a national, coordinated project. Application research could remain discreet, under control of individual agencies; Utility could remain discreet, under control of intelligence organizations; Basic research -- looking for the "mechanism" -- might be' openly conducted A p p ' F O ' d I P b r ~ ~ ' a ` O f / I W-6 O'8 2M035 -5 Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250018-5 Foundation. The latter would lend credibility to the project because it would allow for levels of peer review, criticism, etc, not presently possible. 7. As now consitituted, do. we really have a coordinated venture, whereby equal resolve, if not connittment of resources, is evident? At what point will the Steering Committee decide whether or not the project should be pursued with true vigor, or be dropped. Another basic fact is that the current approach is of the "nickel and dime" variety. Army, almost alone, has carried the ball and Army staff has been the essential,drivingforce. Wn i ed to seriously consider handling the affair as a bona fide R&D program -- appoint a manager, etc, etc -- at the OSD level It should not be balooned out of proportion insofar as managarnent goegoes. Fact is, we are taking two steps back for each one forward by having DIA as focus for leadership. They have no resources -- like us on the Staff to drive the project. They are policy makers. . When would g hear from Gale? The plan now is to have him and ea lrepresentative Committee i k group brief an discuss science findings. (Note: I think Dr Davis and Dr LaBerge informally discussed last saner, the question of when to give the findings to DCI, NSC and Congress. We cannot avoid doing so, as each is knowledgeable that the evaluation is taking place.) Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250018-5